Date of Award
School of Business
William Black’s (2005) control fraud theory suggests accounting fraud initiated by CEOs is more damaging than accounting fraud that is not. However, this theory has only been applied anecdotally to financial institutions. I test Black’s theory using a sample of manufacturing, merchandising, and service firms that engaged in accounting fraud from 2007-2014. I hypothesize that firms which commit CEO-led fraud will exhibit greater growth, leverage, and have higher CEO compensation. My findings do not show that there is any evidence that control frauds are more damaging than other accounting frauds that do not involve the CEO.
Takahashi, Kaylie, "An Examination of Control Fraud in Non-Banking Industries" (2016). Honors Theses. 143.
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