Date of Award
3-28-2016
Document Type
Honors Thesis
Department
School of Business
First Advisor
Carmelita Troy
Abstract
William Black’s (2005) control fraud theory suggests accounting fraud initiated by CEOs is more damaging than accounting fraud that is not. However, this theory has only been applied anecdotally to financial institutions. I test Black’s theory using a sample of manufacturing, merchandising, and service firms that engaged in accounting fraud from 2007-2014. I hypothesize that firms which commit CEO-led fraud will exhibit greater growth, leverage, and have higher CEO compensation. My findings do not show that there is any evidence that control frauds are more damaging than other accounting frauds that do not involve the CEO.
Recommended Citation
Takahashi, Kaylie, "An Examination of Control Fraud in Non-Banking Industries" (2016). Honors Theses. 143.
https://dx.doi.org/10.32597/honors/143/
https://digitalcommons.andrews.edu/honors/143
Presentation Record URL
Creative Commons License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-No Derivative Works 4.0 International License.
DOI
https://dx.doi.org/10.32597/honors/143/