#### Presentation Title

P-34 The Existence and Uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium in Mean Field Game Theory

#### Presenter Status

Undergraduate, Andrews University Department of Mathematics

#### Second Presenter Status

Undergraduate, Duke University Department of Mathematics

#### Third Presenter Status

Professor, University of California, Los Angeles Department of Mathematics

#### Preferred Session

Poster Session

#### Location

Buller Hall Hallways

#### Start Date

21-10-2022 2:00 PM

#### End Date

21-10-2022 3:00 PM

#### Presentation Abstract

In recent and past works, convexity is usually assumed on each individual part of the action functional in order to demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium on some interval [0,T] (this meant that each hessian was assumed to be nonnegative). Particularly, a certain assumption was imposed in order to quantify the smallness of T. The contribution of this project is to expand on this with the key insight being that one does not need the convexity of each part of the action, but rather just an appropriate combination of them, which will essentially ``compensate'' for the other two terms to yield convexity in the action.

This is meaningful in both the pure and applied settings as it generalizes the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium slightly more, but maybe more importantly matches real-world application slightly closer, as in reality there are many settings in which not each part of the action have convexity. Thus, it is more accurate for modern application of Mean Field Game Theory.

P-34 The Existence and Uniqueness of a Nash Equilibrium in Mean Field Game Theory

Buller Hall Hallways

In recent and past works, convexity is usually assumed on each individual part of the action functional in order to demonstrate the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium on some interval [0,T] (this meant that each hessian was assumed to be nonnegative). Particularly, a certain assumption was imposed in order to quantify the smallness of T. The contribution of this project is to expand on this with the key insight being that one does not need the convexity of each part of the action, but rather just an appropriate combination of them, which will essentially ``compensate'' for the other two terms to yield convexity in the action.

This is meaningful in both the pure and applied settings as it generalizes the existence and uniqueness of a Nash equilibrium slightly more, but maybe more importantly matches real-world application slightly closer, as in reality there are many settings in which not each part of the action have convexity. Thus, it is more accurate for modern application of Mean Field Game Theory.

## Acknowledgments

University of California, Los Angeles (UCLA), David Harold Blackwell Summer Research Institute 2022 (DHBSRI)