truncated work which contains a mass of stimulating thoughts and observations.

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SIEGFRIED H. HORN


The author, Professor of NT at Perkins School of Theology, in justifying the publication of this book points to the fact that it is more limited and specialized than James Moffatt’s *Love in the New Testament* (London, 1929), Viktor Warnach’s *Agape: Die Liebe als Grundmotiv der neutestamentlichen Theologie* (Düsseldorf, 1951), and Ceslaus Spicq’s *Agape dans le Nouveau Testament* (Paris, 1958-59). It concentrates on the love ethic, the love command rather than on all aspects of love. Another reason given for its justification is that these either need to be updated or “are not sufficiently critical in method to avoid what many Protestant and Roman Catholic interpreters would now regard to be an unjustified homogenization of differing perspectives and emphases within the New Testament itself” (p. 19).

Furnish works from the assumption gained through the results of form and redaction criticism that the different NT writers have their own contexts and therefore their own differing emphases and interpretations of the love command. By considering the full context, Furnish seeks to understand precisely the meaning of the love command for each writer.

He discusses separately each section of the NT beginning with Jesus’ commandments to love, followed by the settings in the Synoptic Gospels, Paul, the Johannine literature, and the remaining books of the NT. While different contexts have led to different emphases and interpretations, the significant thing is how central the love command is in the NT. However, this is not so clear in the Pastoral Epistles and 2 Peter, where love is seen as one among other Christian virtues, and James, where it does not play its distinctive role. One cannot always be too dogmatic, however, about the presence or absence of the centrality of the love command or other major theological doctrines in a particular writing. The particular purpose of the writing will determine what will be presented and what will be emphasized.

After his conclusion, the author presents four considerations from his study which touch upon contemporary discussions of Christian ethics. The most important of these is the first: NT commendation of love is formulated in a command to love. Thus love is not spontaneous but must be constantly called forth since it is man’s will and not his emotions. Love is fulfilled in deeds of mercy and kindness. “Practical love” is the only love that can be commanded. Love is not the “compendium” (Murray) of all the law or its “distillation” (Fletcher) but “the criterion and measure by which the law itself . . . is to be judged” (p. 200). On this point, he opposes Fletcher and the “new morality” proponents because they assimilate the “love principle” “so far into the decision-making process itself that it loses its force as the single command under which that whole process is to be constantly judged and redeemed” (p. 204).
Furnish has added an appendix treating the various words for love in the NT. Besides the expected thing, he points out that \textit{agapan} is not always used in the distinctively NT way and, on the other hand, \textit{philein} is used more often with the meaning associated with \textit{agapan}. Indices of passages and authors are included. It would have been very helpful if the author had included a bibliography.

This is a careful and skillfully written work. The author is very judicious with the evidence and fair to opposing views, but nevertheless forthright in presenting his own positions. It will remain the standard work on this topic for a long time to come.

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Sakae Kubo


The purpose of the book, which represents a series of lectures given at various places, is to seek for a whiff of the transcendent from within the \textit{activity} of the scientist. With the dominating influence of science in Western culture there has come a progressive retreat from reference to the transcendent in our thinking. The advance of science has involved the debunking of the myths about the gods, and the development of historical science has resulted in the dehistoricization of what in the myths, couched as they often are in the language of history, time and space, appeared to former ages as historical.

Does this mean that the symbolic language of religion, which forms the basis of the theologian's discourse, represents something that has now faded from the cultural grasp of modern man? Does man's "coming of age" mean not only that he no longer creates myths and symbols but that he cannot understand the process at all, since there is no common ground in his experience with the myth-maker of the past? Are there no longer any spots in his total experience where the talk of ultimate reality or values is relevant?

Gilkey's point is that such language is indispensable if we are to do proper justice to the concerns of the scientist. Such theological elements are to be looked for, not in the conclusions of science (where the liberals found them) but in the \textit{activity} of scientific inquiry. Specifically the scientist is concerned for truth, objectivity and rationality. Such concern is of the nature of a commitment, an "unconditioned affirmation" that truth is to be found and that truth is of essential importance. Science is not the impersonal activity of an uncommitted intellect. The scientist has a passion to know, and the obligation to make judgments according to adequate criteria.

Once the scientist is distinguished as inquirer after truth, and as engaged in the process of considering the application of the knowledge he has, we are in two quite different spheres. To raise the question of the use of the knowledge at the scientist's command is to enter the realm of moral discussion. Here traditional discussions become relevant, for example the discussion concerning man's freedom. So the way is open for theological discourse. As man involved in the application of knowledge to human problems, the scientist can become the subject of a discussion about man.

What about the future? The irony of the situation of modern man is that