

eds. G. F. Hawthorne, R. P. Martin, and D. G. Reid (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993), and some other recommended readings. The second edition (I did not have the first edition to compare) shows some addition of bibliography. For example, in the second chapter, one new reference is printed after 2007 (year of the Capes's first edition); two new references appear in chapters 1, 4, and 9; three new works in the chapter 11; four in chapters 3, 5, and 10; five in chapter 7; eight in chapter 6; and thirteen new books in chapter 8. This clearly shows the desire of the authors to update their study based on recent works and discoveries, a necessity for a new edition.

The authors have definitely accomplished their initial goal: a good one-volume book on more-or-less "everything" about Paul, both simple to read and full of insight. To pack that much information into less than five hundred pages is definitely risky, since there is so much that could be left out. Yet here is where the authors show that they have mastered the complexity of Paul's world, letters, and theology. One does not have to agree with everything the three authors proposed. However, their ability to summarize the different arguments, allowing the reader a certain exposure to deep critical thinking, is commendable. They have definitely created an interesting initiative that should be commended for its originality, creativity, and innovation. In many ways, they have succeeded in their enterprise.

I highly recommended their book to any theology student starting to read and understand Paul. This book can definitely be used as a textbook introducing students to Paul epistles, as well as used by anyone who wishes to study the letters of Paul on his/her own. Lastly, what I believe is most helpful about this book—as much as its helpfulness for studying biblical theology in general—is that the authors wrote the book not only to discover Paul from an intellectual point-of-view but also "to rediscover Paul so that we can imitate him as he imitates Christ" (10).

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Harwood, Adam, and Kevin E. Lawson, eds. *Infants and Children in the Church: Five Views on Theology and Ministry*. Nashville: B&H Academic, 2017. xiv + 218 pp. Softcover. USD 24.99.

This book deals with important issues of soteriology, anthropology, ecclesiology, and church praxis regarding infants and young children. The format of this book allows for five clear, distinct presentations from various denominational perspectives, providing summaries of a controversial topic, complete with responses and interactions. The five authors adequately represent the views of their respective denominations and have important insights to share, however they are not without inconsistencies or problematic arguments or conclusions.

Those from non-liturgical churches will benefit from reading Jason Foster's description of the Orthodox view. The theological richness of the prayers and liturgical word-pictures found in that tradition serve as reminders of how much has been lost over the years in regard to liturgical Christian practice. Nevertheless, Foster's presentation involves some inconsistencies.

If infants have "inherited sin" (16), how is it that they do not have guilt? What is guiltless sin? As Greg Strawbridge points out in his critique (41), the Nicene Creed (affirmed by Orthodoxy—27) mentions "one baptism for the remission of sins." Consistency would seem to require that the Orthodox, who baptize infants, should recognize that children are being forgiven at their baptisms—which would seem to presuppose their guilt. In addition, the liturgy of baptism itself involves exorcism, renunciation of the devil (22n19), "the death of the old man" (22), a person who is "corrupt through the lust of the flesh" (25), and a priestly invocation that "you are justified" (27). Justified from what? What is corruption, what is renunciation of the devil, if not a state of sin that involves guilt of some kind? Moreover, does not this kind of language imply the experience of adults?

David Liberto's Catholic view—that infants are guilty of original sin and thus need immediate baptism—is more consistent (48–49). But as Foster's critique notes, the tradition-based Catholic view involves "development of doctrine," (71). This precipitates the question, "Which tradition?" "Which magisterium?" There is disagreement on the details of the fate of infants who die unbaptized, for example, especially in more recent Catholic documents. In addition, inherent to this view is Augustine's conception that the sinful nature which remains after baptism is not actual sin. This differs from the historically Protestant view that the sinful nature is sin, and taints all human thought and action, such that the imputed, alien righteousness of Christ is always needed.

Thus, David P. Scaer's Lutheran view of original sin is, I would argue, more scripturally supportable (e.g., Gen 8:21; Jer 17:9; Matt 7:11; Rom 1–3; 5:12–21; Eph 2:3). However, his realist, Augustinian conception is less so. The "in Christ" motif in Paul is metaphorical. We were not literally buried with Christ, nor literally seated now with him in the heavenly places (Rom 6; Eph 2:6), any more than we were literally present in Adam when he sinned, as Augustine averred. Also problematic is the idea that baptism is more important than faith for certainty of salvation (82). As Scaer, himself, states in a footnote (82n3), many have noticed the internal contradiction between claiming that justification is by faith, when in the end it is really by baptism.

While Strawbridge's Reformed views of the continuity of the covenants, Adam's representative headship, original sin, and original guilt are convincing (118, 138), internal tensions arise in regard to "covenant," "children of believers," and "infant faith" as meaningful categories in all cases. On the Reformed view, in what sense would a non-elect person be a "believer," or

a recipient of the covenant promises? Only *elect* children are really receiving something in baptism. In a view that appears to be unique (or at least poorly stated), Strawbridge affirms that “God has determined salvation for every single person in his church” (127). In the traditional Reformed view, however, the church is (correctly) viewed as a mixed body. If it is a mixed body, there are elect and non-elect present in the church. Therefore, in the end, infant baptism is merely a *potential* sign for the parents and children who *might* be recipients of the covenant promises.

As a credobaptist, I concur with Baptist Adam Harwood’s assertion that baptism in the New Testament invariably involves conversion, repentance, and faith. The claims of paedobaptists (here presented by Scaer and Strawbridge) that infants can have faith are difficult to accept barring some kind of Scriptural warrant that they could actually trust Christ and receive him for salvation. The claims that the pericopes of Jesus’s blessing of infants and children are grounds for infant baptism seem insufficiently supported. Since Jesus (through his disciples at least) did baptize (John 3:22; 4:1–2), what would prevent him from baptizing the children if this was appropriate? What is clear instead from these passages is that a humble attitude of receptivity is an essential element of the kingdom, and that there is a propriety and effectiveness of Jesus’s blessing for the children.

As Harwood’s chapter also shows, the doctrine of original sin is neither exclusively Calvinist nor paedobaptist. Arminians and Baptists have also accepted it, including Thomas Helwys—whom Harwood does not mention—the cofounder of the English Baptists. (See also Matthew Pinson, *Arminian and Baptist: Exploration in a Theological Tradition* [Nashville: Randall House, 2015]). Harwood’s claim that inherited guilt is inconsistent with the Baptist faith and message should be qualified, in that this is only the case in the two latest versions (1963 and 2000). Previous versions contained language affirming original guilt.

Harwood himself denies original guilt and claims (as does Foster) that sin is reducible to volition, and that children are innocent until an ostensible *age of accountability*. There are at least two problems with this view: First, sin is a broader category than volitional thoughts, words, and deeds. It also includes our sinful state in Adam (Gen 5:1–3; Rom 5:12–21); the resultant sinful nature and corruption of the heart (Gen 8:21; Ps 51:5; Jer 17:9; Matt 15:19; Rom 8:6–8; Eph 2:3), as well as unintentional sin (Lev 4–6; Ps 19:12–13; Acts 3:17–19; Rom 7:14–25; 1 Tim 1:13–15; etc.). Second, even when we are following God’s will, our very “best” is tainted by sin (Exod 28:38–40; Lev 6:13; Isa 64:6; Luke 17:10; Heb 7:25; 1 John 1:8–2:2). All (except Jesus) are sinners (1 Kgs 8:46; Eccl 7:20). The Pelagian conception of Foster and Harwood leads to the conclusion (contra the texts above) that sinlessness is attainable. If sin is only a choice, then becoming sinless simply means making

the right choices. While Harwood and Foster might deny this conclusion, it is a logically-derived consequence of their view.

Harwood (quoting Millard Erickson) attempts to ground the idea of the “age of accountability” in Deut 1:39, Isa 7:15–16, and Jonah 4:11 (169). Regarding Deut 1:39, he argues that those who “had no knowledge of good and evil” were innocent and therefore spared. But all those under twenty were spared—is no human being sinful, guilty, or accountable until the age of twenty? God mentioned “the little ones” because the people had said they would die in the wilderness. Jonah 4:11 refers to *all* the people of Nineveh, whom God was about to destroy for their sin if they did not repent. Isaiah 7:15–16 simply refers to a point when the child would refuse evil and choose the good, but there is no data in the text which addresses the issue of guilt. Ignorance is not bliss, nor is it innocence. Harwood suggests that non-guilty infants need “the atoning work of Christ to purify them from the stain of an inherited sinful nature” (170). But is not Christ’s atonement for *sin*? Strawbridge, quoting Harwood, writes: “People who die as infants or young children are free from God’s judgement.’ But is not death itself a judgment? Is God rendering a judgment of death without any judicial basis in the guilt of sin?” (192). Strawbridge’s questions are apt.

How does the case of a guilty, sinful young person who has not yet been baptized differ from that of a guilty, sinful infant (who is both guilty in Adam [Rom 5:21–21] and because of his/her resultant sinful nature [Gen 8:21; Ps 51:5; Eph 2:3]) who has not yet been baptized? Why object to the latter and not the former? Is not Christ’s atonement needed in both cases? Cannot both be saved only through His merits if they die before baptism?

Objections to original guilt (such as Erickson’s—quoted by Harwood [169–170]) on the basis of individual responsibility run up against much scriptural data. If it is always unfair to have corporate identity in punishment or intercession, then God is unfair throughout Scripture (see e.g., Gen 9; Exod 20:5; 32:9–14; 12; Lev 4:3; 26:39–40; Deut 28:18; Josh 7; 1 Sam 3:11–14; 4:10–22; 2 Sam 12; 21; 1 Kgs 14:10; 2 Kgs 5:20–27; 22:19–20; Mal 1:2–3; Matt 23:34–39; Acts 2:23, 3:13–15; etc.).

Charges of unfairness should also logically apply to any view which includes death and sinful natures from Adam. How are these punishments any more fair than imputed guilt? No one chose to be born sinful, separated from God, and subject to death. The ostensible problem of injustice is illusory: Just as individuals suffering under generational or national curses could have them mitigated and be saved by trusting God (Gen 49:5–7; Exod 32:29; Num 3:6–9; Josh 6:17–26; Ruth), so also can we who are born and die “in Adam” (1 Cor 15:21–22) accept Christ’s provision of salvation by faith (John 1:12–14; 3:16; Rom 3–4; 5:17) and be reborn and resurrected in Christ (John 1:12–13; 3:3–8; Gal 3:27–29; 1 Cor 15; Eph 4:24; 2 Cor 5:17).

Passages such as Ezekiel 18, which emphasize individual responsibility, are dealing with a *distortion* of the ideas of corporate punishment and solidarity (which are assumed elsewhere in the book, e.g., 21:4; 23:46–49; 24:21) into a complacent fatalism. However, Deut 24:16 prohibits unguided humans from making the decision unilaterally in court to punish children for their parents' sins. Scripture maintains a balance between corporate and individual responsibility (see 2 Kgs 21:19–22:2 and 23:26–27 for examples).

All are sinners and condemned because of Adam's sin (Rom 5:12–21). How can there be condemnation without guilt? This case goes far beyond any of the corporate examples mentioned above, in that it involves all human beings. Also, as Strawbridge points out (191–192), denying Adam's representation in Romans 5 results logically in a dismissal of the doctrine of imputed righteousness (Rom 4; 5:18–19; 2 Cor 5:21; Phil 3:9)—a rejection which Harwood appears to admit and accept (164). Also significant is the elaborate tapestry of typological connections between Adam and Christ which are highlighted throughout Scripture that supports the “federal” view of original sin (See Sang-won Son, *Corporate Elements in Pauline Anthropology: A Study of Selected Terms, Idioms, and Concepts in the Light of Paul's Usage and Background* [Rome: Editrice Pontificio Istituto Biblico, 2001], 47, 58–59; Herman Ridderbos, *Paul: An Outline of his Theology*, trans. John Richard De Witt [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975], 63–64, 73, 81; G. K. Beale, *The Temple and the Church's Mission: A Biblical Theology of the Dwelling Place of God* [Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004], 67–80; G. K. Beale, *A New Testament Biblical Theology* [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011], 32–34, 192–193, 43–52, 401–403, 617–622; John H. Sailhamer, *The Pentateuch as Narrative* [Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1992], 110–111; 298–300; William J. Dumbrell, *The End of the Beginning* [Homebush, New South Wales: Lancer, 1985], 35–76; Richard M. Davidson, “Cosmic Narrative for the Coming Millennium” *JATS* 11 [2000]: 109–111; Joel R. Beeke and Paul M. Smalley, “Images of Union and Communion with Christ,” *PRJ* 8, 2 [2016]: 127; Brandon D. Crowe, *The Last Adam: A Theology of the Obedient Life of Jesus in the Gospels* [Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2017], 56–61, 151–152).

In regard to the question of what happens to infants who die, there is an option which is not mentioned by any of the authors (all of whom leave this to mystery or suggest that they are all saved): God can judge the case of the infant based upon either first the faith (or lack of it) of their parents or second his middle knowledge (Gen 11:6; Exod 3:19–22; 1 Sam 23:6–10; Ezek 3:6–7; Matt 11:21–23; Luke 22:67–68; 1 Cor 2:8)—He knows whether the child *would* have had faith in Christ or not had they lived longer.

All of the authors assume that a child is either a full member of the church (Foster, Liberto, Scaer, and Strawbridge) or is not a member at all (Harwood). This is a false dichotomy. Why cannot credobaptists hold that

children are part of the covenant in a provisional and hopeful sense, but that only baptism provides membership in the fullest sense (as the NT indicates)?

Infant baptism is not the correct solution for the correct doctrine (at least in its Federal form) of original sin. Though infants are born under God's wrath, condemnation, and are guilty, God's prevenient grace reaches out toward them (John 12:32; Titus 2:11). The most appropriate ceremony for infants in the Church is that which has explicit biblical precedent (Matt 19:13–15; Mark 10:13–16; Luke 18:15–17): a dedication ceremony in which hands are placed upon them in blessing, prayers are offered, and (as all the contributors agree) the Church pledges to help the parents train them up in "the discipline and instruction of the Lord" (Eph 6:4), by liturgy, education, and example.

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Levering, Matthew. *Engaging the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit: Love and Gift in the Trinity and the Church*. Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2016. v + 440 pp. Hardcover. USD 45.00.

Matthew Levering (PhD, Boston College) is the James N. and Mary D. Perry Jr. Chair of Theology at Mundelein Seminary at the Catholic University of Saint Mary of the Lake. He is the author or editor of over forty books on topics within dogmatic, sacramental, moral, historical, and biblical theology, and he is co-editor of two quarterly journals, *Nova et Vetera* and *International Journal of Systematic Theology*.

In this book, Levering argues that "the Holy Spirit should be praised and contemplated under the proper names 'Love' and 'Gift', with respect both to his intra-trinitarian identity and to his historical work in Jesus Christ and the church" (2). In Levering's view, these names ("Love" and "Gift") "instruct us about the distinct divine personality of the Spirit and shed light upon the biblical, liturgical and experiential testimonies to the Spirit's mission" (5). The main goal is, in the author's own words, "to show the value of the names 'Love' and 'Gift' for illuminating the Spirit in his eternal procession and temporal mission to Jesus Christ and the church" (15).

The book is composed of seven chapters, divided into two major sections. The first section (chs. 1–3) deals with the *person* of the Holy Spirit, focusing mainly on his eternal Trinitarian communion. In chapter 1, Levering presents Augustine's exegesis (1 John 4 and Rom 5:5 being the main texts), upon which the argument in favor of the names "Love" and "Gift" for the Holy Spirit is built.

Chapter 2 compares views that are somewhat different regarding the Spirit's procession and eternal generation: first, Greek patristics which show more "boldness" and, second, Orthodox theologians which show more