individuals in different social locations experience texts in different ways (385); hence his positive and negative history and the concept of historical imagination, via Brueggemann, may remain less persuasive for those who hold a more conservative view of history and Scripture.

Though multiauthored, The Future of Biblical Archaeology shows consistency in theme in that most of the authors present their views of what biblical archaeology means as well as where they believe the discipline is heading. However, not all of the authors are so like-minded. Scolnic’s essay on the identification of Migdol, for instance, though interesting and covering some of the same ground as Hoffmeier, follows a more traditional, text-based approach in its methodology and hence does not advance the discipline in any significant way. Ortiz also uses a traditional ceramic typological approach to take on the deconstructionist views of Israel Finkelstein, who, taking his cue from recent trends in biblical studies, uses archaeology by aggressively pushing a low Iron Age chronology to replace the united monarchy of the Bible with a small tribal chiefdom. By dealing with the ceramics from the relevant Iron Age sites, and consequently picking apart the basic tenets of this position, Ortiz demonstrates the viability of both the high chronology, as well as a tenth-century-B.C. united monarchy. Not to detract from the importance of the article, which forms a necessary reply to an attack upon one of the major beliefs of both the Bible and the discipline of biblical archaeology, it nevertheless seems to be somewhat out of place in a volume that focuses on new directions. In some ways Hoffner’s essay is a bit of an enigma. Like others, in the section on using texts in biblical archaeology, it focuses on the literature of one culture (in this case Hittite) in comparison with that of the Bible. However, in contrast to the others it seems to take a more negative stance toward archaeology, as opposed to texts. It also seems to perpetuate to some degree the fallacy of negative proof, i.e., the attempt to sustain a factual proposition on the basis of nonevidence; in this case, since no Hittite texts have been found in Israel, Hittite influence on the Bible must have been mediated through Syria (192).

The book is well edited, with only a few mechanical errors. Since it is a collection of essays, graphics do not figure prominently. Nevertheless, there are four maps, five tables, four pottery plates with descriptions, and two figures distributed within three of its essays. An index would have made the volume more user friendly. This book is a must-read for those seeking to understand from where biblical archaeology has come, as well as where the discipline may be heading.

Andrews University

Paul J. Ray, Jr.


Michael S. Horton writes from a staunchly traditional Reformed theological position, drawing heavily on Calvin and to a lesser extent Luther. In this second of four volumes on covenant theology, Horton (Lord and Servant: A Covenant Christology, and Covenant and Eschatology: The Divine Drama) interacts with Catholic, Jewish, and other Reformed scholars intending to show systematically that his covenant motif establishes forensic justification alone as a means to salvation, and provides an ontology in which union with Christ is devoid of merit-based human participation in salvation. His covenantal theology forms a matrix from which forensic justification emerges and, consequently, makes union possible and inevitable. Forensic justification then is the only source of man’s righteousness in an ordo salutis—order of salvation—based on Rom 8:30.

Horton’s entire soteriology begins by distinguishing between two covenants in which God has related to mankind. The first is a “covenant of promise,” known as a
"royal grant" in ancient Near Eastern terms. What was determined from eternity, God unilaterally confirmed with Abraham and is the promise later fulfilled in Christ. Its unilaterality means it is unconditional because God not only promised Abraham, but swore by himself—by two immutable oaths (Heb 6) in which it is impossible for God to lie. This covenant is the only basis of man's attainment to righteousness. In contrast, the "covenant of law," known as a "suzerain-vassal" treaty, is conditional in nature, and structured so that the fulfillment of the suzerain's promises are contingent on the vassal's adherence to an oath. In this covenantal structure, according to Horton, righteousness is attained through obedience to the law. This applies to the Sinai covenant and the prelapsarian Adamic covenant.

Horton's exegesis is limited to Paul's portions of the NT. He omits any explanation of Rom 2:13-16 or Jas 3-4. Humanity is saved once for all by Christ (although it is not clear whether it happened actually in eternity or in history at the cross). Christ's active obedience (life) and passive obedience (willingness to die) were imputed to humanity as righteousness. Works of the law have no power for righteousness because the law is incapable of saving under the "covenant of promise." Only Christ's righteousness imputed at justification can merit salvation.

From the "covenant of promise" to justification by faith alone already accomplished in Christ comes Horton's notion of union. Justification is a necessary precursor to union, yet they are distinguished. Union takes place through the elocutionary or "speech-act," the Word—preaching and the sacraments—and the perlocutionary act of the Spirit in us. One is not sure how these "speech-acts" interact with the human will, except that they inevitably lead to salvation. Within this union, the rest of the ordo salutis, calling, conversion, sanctification, and glorification take place. These follow in the train of justification, finding their possibility from the imputation of righteousness in justification and reality from the historical "speech-acts" of God. In this way, salvation is complete as an event (justification), and the resulting blessings (e.g., sanctification, repentance, adoption) are responses of gratitude by the believer. Any synergism—cooperation of the human will with the Spirit—is righteousness by works. It is "schizophrenic" in its method of attaining righteousness and incompatible with the "covenant of promise," the gospel (300).

Horton's insistence on righteousness by faith in Christ apart from works of the law and his acknowledgment of the binding claims of the moral law are to be commended. It is his understanding of righteousness by faith that needs close scrutiny.

First, a foundational error is Horton's conclusion that there are two different types of covenants. Skip MacCarty (In Granite or Ingrained: What the Old and New Covenants Reveal about the Gospel, the Law, and the Sabbath [Andrews University Press, 2007]) shows that both covenants contain the same gospel "DNA." Each covenant was an expression of the Trinity's eternally existing covenant of peace, and fashioned by God to meet the needs of the people in their particular context in history.

Whereas Horton contends the Sinai covenant is one of works-based righteousness, MacCarty sees the historical-redemptive purpose and content in the Sinai covenant as consistent with the Abrahamic covenant. Horton agrees that there is historical-redemptive continuity between the covenants, but believes that their essential content—the means of righteousness—is entirely different. Horton strays when he says that the Sinai covenant was a works-based covenant. MacCarty shows that it was indeed a faith-based covenant, but Israel, by their lack of faith, experienced it as a works-based covenant. Thus Paul writes to Christian Jews about the character of the Sinai covenant as Israel experienced it as being works-based, but not as God's intended theological message (Rom 10:3).
It is not disputed that the Sinai covenant was incapable of providing righteousness for man. This is how Paul distinguishes between the covenants when he says that the Sinai covenant cannot disannul the covenant of promise. But distinguishing between the covenants in terms of their purpose and theological content is a mistake. Horton makes this mistake when he divorces the historical-redemptive continuity of the covenants from any continuity in theological content. The logical result of Horton’s distinction is that OT Israel must be saved by works, while the rest of humanity is saved by faith-based righteousness.

MacCarty affirms the continuity of the content by noting Paul’s use of Deut 30:11–14 in Rom 10:5–16. Horton not only misses the consistent gospel message in each covenant, but in distinguishing the content of the two, he has created a false antithesis: the Sinai covenant is considered conditional and the promise covenants unconditional.

A second foundational problem is in Horton’s assumed ontological background. With an unconditional, unilateral covenant as its basis, salvation is contained entirely within justification and is entirely forensic. The unconditionality eliminates any necessity for repentance, and the unilaterality any possibility of human cooperation in history; it also removes justification and salvation from the temporal-historical sphere, where history and its participants are contingent. Horton is careful to distance himself from a platonic or neoplatonic ontological framework when it comes to his notion of “union,” but his event of justification itself must be created and enacted outside of temporal-history in eternity—despite his claim that “the cross is the reality itself” (173). Horton also says that occurring after justification, “union with Christ brings together the temporal tenses of our salvation—past, present, and future (131).”

These two quotes represent a contradiction underlying the whole work. For Horton’s justification to be entirely forensic and sufficient for salvation, it must be completed in the Trinity’s eternal covenant apart from any human participation in temporal history. However, for the cross to be a reality in history, justification cannot be limited only to an eternal declaration without any temporal-historical qualities. The experience of justification requires a response. Until then, it is a provision. Clearly, Horton is still using a platonic theory of reality that he chides Milbank for (131). He doesn’t depart from Calvin’s understanding of God and eternity, which is Augustinian, as Canale maintains (Handbook of Seventh-day Adventist Theology [Hagerstown, MD: Review and Herald, 2000], 145).

These two errors in the book give rise to a host of soteriological and eschatological difficulties. Personal sanctification and judgment, each requiring a process, are also seen as events. Horton’s interpretation of Rom 8:30 as an “order of salvation” fails to account for Scripture’s past, present, and future applications of justification and sanctification. Thus these are not viewed as occurring in a parallel and simultaneous way in the life of the believer, but in a definite order.

This book is a great resource for those scholars interested in traditional Reformation soteriology. Its broad systematic approach encompasses all aspects of the topic. It does leave out a necessary assessment of “justification by works” in James and Rom 2:13. Horton spends much effort defending Calvin and Luther against philosophical paradigms and Roman Catholic tradition, which is interesting in its own right but might make it seem to the reader that Reformed covenantal theology itself is living in the past.

Berrien Springs, Michigan

DEREK NUTT