Alexander Hegius (ca. 1433-98) : His life, Philosophy, and Pedagogy

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Alexander Hegius (ca. 1433–98): His life, philosophy, and pedagogy. (Volumes I and II)

Matthews, John V. G., Ph.D.
Andrews University, 1988

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ALEXANDER HEGIUS (ca. 1433-98)
HIS LIFE, PHILOSOPHY,
AND PEDAGOGY

A Dissertation
Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
John V. G. Matthews
June 1988
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HIS LIFE, PHILOSOPHY,
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ABSTRACT

ALEXANDER HEGIUS (ca. 1433-98)
HIS LIFE, PHILOSOPHY,
AND PEDAGOGY

by

John V. G. Matthews

Chairman: George R. Knight
Title: ALEXANDER HEGIUS (ca. 1433-98): HIS LIFE, PHILOSOPHY, AND PEDAGOGY

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Problem

There are scholars who have suggested that Alexander Hegius was among the three most important educators of the fifteenth century. Whether or not this can be substantiated is open to question. The fact remains that he was a pivotal figure in the development of education in the Northern Renaissance. Scholars have argued at length about his life, the obscure details of which are significant for understanding the youth of Desiderius Erasmus. There are also a few outdated studies that deal in a cursory manner with his pedagogy. Although some of this material is based on genuine primary research, only a small proportion of it is of any great consequence. Little of significance has been published in English. When it comes
to an analysis of his writings, there has been no definitive study made in any language. In view of the paucity of scholarly material available, it is the purpose of this study, after giving a brief biography of Hegius' life, to examine his prose writings and to make an analysis of his philosophy and the consequent educational corollaries. The investigation was undertaken in order to evaluate Hegius' contribution to the emerging Northern Renaissance.

Method

An historical-documentary method of research was used in approaching this topic. The major primary source for the study is the Dialogs of Alexander Hegius published in 1503. Other sources include letters and treatises of Hegius' contemporaries.

Conclusions

Hegius was principal of the school at St. Lebuins in Deventer for sixteen years prior to his death in 1498. During that time the school grew and prospered. What had been a fairly typical school of the late medieval period in that area soon became one of the main centers for the study of the "humanities." It must consequently be acknowledged that Hegius' efforts had a considerable influence on the emergence of the Renaissance in the Netherlands. An analysis of Hegius' writings reveals a subtle shift in attitude in the direction of a nominalist philosophy and away from the Thomism prevalent in the schools of the Low Countries. The complex interplay of this nominalism with his emerging humanism had far-reaching effects on the curriculum and methods in Deventer and made St. Lebuins an outstanding center of the new learning.
DEDICATION

To my wife, Marla, whose openness and delight in helping others are something that every educator wishes to inspire in his students.

To my parents, Edith and Ginger, whose unsophisticated ways could teach learned educators much about the raising of children.

To my children, Angela and Sharon, the miracle of whom inspires me to the best of which I am capable as a Christian minister and educator.
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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Throughout the period that I have been working on this dissertation I have been the Dean of Men at Newbold College in England. Being involved in a research project of this nature and at the same time serving as the chaplain for well over one hundred young men has inevitably meant that some duties and responsibilities have been neglected. I would therefore like to acknowledge my indebtedness to "my boys," who have patiently accepted the limitations that this project has placed upon the energy I have had available to spend on caring for them. To those young men who perchance forgot to consult my schedule and, as a result were sent scurrying from my office for coming to see me during periods reserved for my studies, I offer a humble apology. I also apologize to those students in my classes for the occasions when their lecturer has not been able to offer of his best simply because he has been too busy with other interests. My biggest apology perhaps must be to my wife Marla and my two girls, Angela and Sharon. They are my greatest earthly joy, but they can well be excused for sometimes finding this a little difficult to believe. I have often spent considerably less time with them than they could justly have expected from me.

There are a great many people who have helped me with this project, and to all of them I express my gratitude. Most cannot be mentioned here, but there are some whose assistance I have particularly appreciated. The library staff at the British Library, x

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Reading University, and Newbold College in England; Andrews University and the University of Michigan in the USA; and the Athenaeum-bibliotheek in the Dutch city of Deventer have all gone beyond the call of duty in helping me to find obscure titles and locate rare books. The archivists in Deventer and in the German cities of Wesel and Emmerich have also been gracious in their assistance. I am indebted to a number of my colleagues, past and present, on the faculty of Newbold College. In particular I wish to mention Kenneth Newport and John Dunnett for their assistance when I have not been able to come to terms with the niceties of the Greek and Latin languages. Special mention must also be made of Daniel Augsburger, Arthur Coetzee, George Knight, and Kenneth Strand, the members of my doctoral committee. I have appreciated their concern and the faith that they have always expressed in me, even when the going has been slow and tough. There have been a number of students who have served as assistant deans in the residence halls at Newbold College while I have been working on this project. These young men have often borne the burden of daily routine, and sometimes of overall responsibility, in order to allow me to continue with my task. I am extremely grateful to them for their willing assistance. Those I wish to mention in particular are Reidar Johansen, Edwin Boksberger, Michael Baker, Raafat Kamal, and David Savalani. Last but not least, I must thank those who have made some of the secretarial work a little easier for me. In this group are included my wife, Sandra Nab, and a number of student secretaries who have worked for me over the years, especially Dee-dee Mansell, Trish Blue, and Lee-Ann Swanson.
PREFACE

The city of Deventer has grown up around the site upon which Lebuinus, an Anglo-Saxon monk from Britain, first constructed a small wooden church in the year 768. The Church of St. Lebuins is today one of the most impressive buildings in the old part of the city. The present Gothic structure dates back to the latter part of the fifteenth century. As one stands in the shadow of the old building and looks across at the houses on the opposite side of the square, there is little of particular interest that seems to attract one's attention. On closer inspection, however, a small plaque can be seen set in the wall next to one of the doorways. It reads:

From before the fourteenth century until 1839 this was the site of the widely renowned Latin school where, among others, Alexander Hegius (d. 1498) lectured and Erasmus studied.1

Five hundred years ago when the present church was being erected the churchyard must often have been filled with curious onlookers from the school across the square. At that time, between 1482 and 1498, Alexander Hegius was the principal. No doubt he often stood on the steps of the old schoolhouse keeping a watchful eye on his more than two thousand charges as they made their way to and from their lectures. It is difficult to imagine that, at the

1The original reads: "Van voor de 14e eeuw was dit gebouw de wijd vermaarde Latijnse school gevestigd, waar o.a. Alexander Hegius (± 1498) doceerde en Erasmus studeerde." In this dissertation quotations have generally been translated into English except for those used in footnotes. These have been left in their original language. Unless otherwise stated the translations are mine.
close of the fifteenth century, the humble buildings near the church were the center of a great revival of learning in Northern Europe.¹ This educational revival was to make a decided impact on the course of the Renaissance north of the Alps. It is worthy of note that the only two names mentioned on the small plaque commemorating the long history of the Latin school in Deventer are from this significant period in its existence. Desiderius Erasmus (ca. 1467-1537) and Hegius were at the school attached to the Church of St. Lebuins during the last quarter of the fifteenth century in what was to become, perhaps, its finest hour.

There are scholars who have suggested that Hegius, along with Vittorino da Feltre (1378-1446) and Guarino da Verona (1374-1460) in Italy, was one of the three most important educators of the fifteenth century.² If this evaluation is accepted, it makes Hegius the greatest of the teachers north of the Alps in that century. Not all scholars have been ready to acclaim Hegius so highly,³ but there can be little doubt that the work he did in the Deventer school was of considerable significance. He was in fact a pivotal figure in the development of education in the Northern Renaissance. In spite of this, there are few who have studied the history of education who are even vaguely aware of the fact that Hegius ever existed. Those

¹The present houses still have a number of walls dating back to the fifteenth-century schoolhouse, though a lot of rebuilding has taken place. The facades have all been altered.

²Heinz Otto Burger, Renaissance--Humanismus--Reformation: Deutsche Literatur im Europäischen Kontext (Bad Homburg, W. Germany: Verlag Gehlen, 1969), p. 120.

scholars who do know anything about him are more likely to have come across his name as a result of a study of the life of Erasmus than because of any particular interest in Hegius himself. Even in books dealing specifically with the Renaissance, if Hegius is mentioned it is generally only in passing. When reference is made to him, the information given is almost always based upon earlier secondary sources. All but a few of the secondary accounts to which scholars refer in making their observations about his life and work are themselves rather suspect, being based on an extremely limited analysis of Hegius' own writings.

The problem has arisen largely because Hegius' works have never been published in a critical Latin edition or in any modern language. To the present they have remained hidden in the obscure fifteenth-century Latin in which they were written, with all its confusing abbreviations. The task of deciphering the small printing and numerous errors of the 1503 edition of Hegius' Dialogi has been an additional burden that has deterred research.

Another major problem in assessing the contribution made by Hegius to the Northern Renaissance is the limited availability of detailed documentation relating to his early life. Most of what is known about his birthplace, youth, and education has been deduced from comments written in passing by his colleagues and students.

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Until the late nineteenth century there was still a fair amount of controversy regarding the date of his birth and the periods during which he taught at the various schools with which he was associated. To this day there is not complete unanimity, though twentieth-century researchers have generally agreed upon the dates of the more significant events of his life.

It is, in fact, in attempting to establish when Hegius moved to Deventer that most research has been done relative to his life history. Interestingly, scholars who have involved themselves in this debate have not generally been concerned with Hegius himself, but rather with the dating of Erasmus' birth. Erasmus speaks of Hegius as having been his teacher in Deventer and gives certain clues about his own date of birth when he writes of his sojourn in that city. From the available evidence, however, it appears that Erasmus left Deventer about the time that Hegius arrived. In order for Erasmus' statements to have any significant bearing on our evaluation of Hegius' contribution to the Northern Renaissance, it would need to be established that there was at least a brief period of meaningful interaction between these two individuals.

Vague as their chronology might be, the sources to which one is obliged to turn in an attempt to piece together a biographical outline of Hegius' life must therefore include the writings of Erasmus. In addition, there are the letters and works of other close associates of Hegius such as Wessel Gansfort (1419-89) and Rudolf Agricola (1444-85). A number of biographical documents written about these men by their contemporaries also contain short anecdotes involving Hegius. Goswinus van Halen (1469-1530) and
Gerardus Geldenhauer (1482-1542) are among these authors. Another valuable work is the fairly detailed autobiography of Johannes Butzbach (1478-1516).\(^1\) Butzbach reflects upon the important role played by Hegius in the activities that made the Deventer school so famous. A number of Hegius' former students and associates looked back upon the period of his rectorship as a high point in the development of the city school. Some of these men, Butzbach among them, composed panegyric verses to commemorate the work of their revered schoolmaster. Though these verses cannot be taken too seriously, they do provide one or two interesting insights into Hegius' life.

One other source worthy of mention is to be found in the Deventer archives. Here many of the city records from the fifteenth century have been preserved. Though there is disappointingly little to be found regarding the school during the time that Hegius was principal, there is some information that has proven to be very helpful.

The scholars of the next generation were the first to write in any detail about the life and work of Hegius. Foremost among these was Hermann Hamelmann (1526-95).\(^2\) His work, based as it was on second- and third-hand accounts, is not always historically accurate. In the absence of more reliable documents, however, it remains an important source at the disposal of the researcher.

During the nineteenth century there were a small number of historians who showed considerable interest in an investigation of

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the life of Hegius. These included Guillaume H. M. Delprat, Wilhelm Dillenburger, Carl Krafft, and Dietrich Reichling. The conclusions drawn by these researchers are in many instances quite inaccurate, though their work was of sterling quality. It was only when Percy Stafford Allen began to publish the Opus epistolarum of Erasmus in 1906 that he and Reichling realized that most previous historians had dated the arrival of Hegius in Deventer too early. Throughout this century the debates have continued, involving such men as Regnerus Richardus Post, the noted expert on the devotio moderna; Anton Carl Frederik Koch, the Deventer archivist and member of the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences; and Ernst-Wilhelm Kohls, whose interest has been in the dating of Erasmus' birth. The contributions made by these historians seem finally to have settled the major arguments, and a tolerably accurate sketch of Hegius' life can now be drawn.

When it comes to an evaluation of the contribution that Hegius has made to the development of the Renaissance in Northern Europe, there has been a limited amount of research done by such

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men as Paul Mestwerdt and Johannes Lindeboom.¹ Most other scholars who discuss the matter of Hegius' humanism rely to a large extent upon the work of these two historians.

The matter of Hegius' pedagogy has also been broached by Mestwerdt and Lindeboom, though not in any great detail. Josef Wiese has made more of an attempt to deal with this area of concern, but his approach is mainly to evaluate Hegius through the achievements of his pupils.² The most valuable analysis of Hegius' contribution in the field of education is possibly the work of P. N. M. Bot, though his Humanisme en Onderwijs in Nederland is by no means a specialized study on the work of the Deventer schoolmaster.³

If many of the studies done up to the present time have been somewhat sketchy and limited, and if even those that have been based on solid research have become somewhat dated, there is one area where there has been hardly any work done at all. A few historians have written in vague terms about Hegius' educational philosophy, and some rudimentary efforts have been made to analyze his writings. In reality, however, it is clear that this is a field of research where only the surface has been scratched. Wiese has made a brief summary of the Dialogi, but he has not attempted to evaluate the significance of Hegius' writings. In terms of seeking to understand

¹Lindeboom, Humanisme; and Paul Mestwerdt, Die Anfänge des Erasmus Humanismus und "Devotio Moderna" (Leipzig: Rudolf Haupt, 1917).

²Josef Wiese, Der Pädagoge Alexander Hegius und seine Schüler (Berlin: Actien-Gesellschaft für Verlag und Druckerei, 1892).

³P. N. M. Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs in Nederland (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1955).
Hegius' philosophy and the educational corollaries arising from it, no definitive study has been made. It is the purpose of this dissertation to make such a study.

The dissertation is somewhat out of the ordinary in at least two respects. First, Hegius' Dialogi, which is the major primary source, is presented in translation as an extended appendix. As far as can be ascertained, this is the only translation of the Dialogi into any modern language. The second unusual feature is that much of the project does not rely upon primary historical sources, even though an historical-documentary method of research has been used in making the analysis whenever appropriate. The reason for this is that a good deal of the first half of the dissertation merely serves the function of establishing the criteria by which Hegius' life and work is evaluated.

The first chapter of this project is a brief biography on the life of Hegius. As it is not the purpose of the dissertation to provide a detailed biography, time has not been spent in extensive primary research in this area. The discussion is to a large extent a summary of the work done by previous scholars regarding the major events in Hegius' life. The conclusions drawn are essentially a consensus of twentieth-century scholarly opinion. If undue emphasis seems to have been placed upon an attempt to date the arrival of Hegius in Deventer, it is because of the importance of establishing that Erasmus and Hegius had sufficient time together in Deventer for some sort of meaningful interaction. Unless this can be shown, the validity of Erasmus' comments regarding the time he spent as a pupil under Hegius at St. Lebuins must be called into question.
The second chapter considers the nature of the Renaissance of the Low Countries in the late fifteenth century. In doing this it establishes the criteria for judging the contribution made by Hegius to the rise of biblical humanism and the arrival of the new learning. The third chapter does much the same thing, except that it focuses on pedagogy in the Netherlands just prior to the revival of learning.

At this juncture in the dissertation attention is turned to the writings of Hegius. The fourth chapter gives a brief outline of the Dialogs followed by a synthesis of Hegius' philosophy. Chapter 5 is the evaluation of Hegius in terms of the criteria set up in chapter 2. Chapter 6 considers what is known of Hegius' pedagogy in the light of the pre-Renaissance education described in chapter 3. The final chapter is a concluding summary and analysis.

One point that needs to be clarified at the outset is the understanding of the word "humanist." In modern Christian circles, at least, this word can have somewhat negative connotations. The modern humanist is considered to have accepted a purely secular outlook on life, with his philosophy, understanding of the universe, and moral value-system built upon common human experience rather than divine revelation. The biblical humanism of the Renaissance in Northern Europe was nothing of the sort. It was not skeptical of faith, nor did it question the validity of an absolute, supernatural revelation. On the contrary, one of its major features was a desire to return to the early documents of the Christian faith, namely, the Word of God in its original tongue, the works of the Church Fathers, and the formulations of the ancient Ecumenical Councils. Northern
humanists imitated the classical style of the Italian Renaissance and ancient Greek and Roman learning, but the content of their literary work was religious, and the aim of their pursuit included moral reformation along with educational excellence. The humanists of the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries were not secularists. In the North, at least, their purpose was a predominantly religious one.

In the present age of crisis and change, it is difficult to cast one's mind back to a time when it took two weeks rather than two hours to cross Europe. Once that mind-set has been altered, it is tempting to think that life at the more leisurely pace of the past must have been easier. No doubt in some ways it was. Change and crisis, however, were no less real to our forefathers. The fifteenth century was an era that brought significant changes in man's intellectual perspectives and his outlook on the physical world. As Alexander Hegius presided over his school in the city of Deventer, he must have been aware that he was a participant in something of an intellectual revolution. Students were learning things that he had not studied in school and using printed books the likes of which he had never seen in his youth. He could have had very little idea of the consequences of this intellectual revolution, but it is clear from his correspondence with Agricola that he took to his task as schoolmaster with a sense of urgency. The changes must at times have been bewildering to him, but Hegius was not one who blindly sought the security of all the old methods. As a mature man he had undertaken the study of Greek and classical Latin, and he must well have understood the bitter-sweet nature of change, achievement, and
intellectual growth. As a wise pedagog Hegius undoubtedly wished to encourage this kind of experience in his pupils. From the rapid growth of the school while it was under his rectorship, it is obvious that he was successful in fulfilling this desire. It is to a study of the life and writings of this exceptional man that attention is now turned.
"What use to a man is knowledge of the movement of the stars if he is not sensible of what is proper for him and what is not."

"All learning is pernicious that is attended with loss of honesty."

Alexander Hegius
CHAPTER I

A BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH OF ALEXANDER HEGIUS

Birthdate and Year of Death

The birth and early years of Alexander Hegius are shrouded in mystery. There is little concrete evidence in his own writings or those of his contemporaries that allows one to settle anything with complete certainty. The evidence would, however, suggest that he was born in the town of Heek in Westphalia around 1433.\(^1\)

It is to the works of Hermann Hamelmann that one must turn for much of the information that is available regarding Hegius' early years. Hamelmann states that Rudolf von Langen (1438-1519)\(^2\)

\(^1\)See figure 1, p. 2. Heek is situated in the district of Ahaus on the banks of the River Dinkel, approximately ten kilometers from the present Dutch-German border and thirty-five kilometers northwest of the city of Münster in Westphalia.

\(^2\)Hermann Hamelmann, Hermann Hamelmanns geschichtliche Werke, 2 vols., ed. Heinrich Detmer and Klemens Löffler (Münster, Westf.: Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1902-13), vol. 1, pt. 2:10. Only born in 1526, Hamelmann was not able to give an eyewitness account of Hegius' life. As a result of his reliance upon sources that were sometimes rather suspect, there are a number of factual errors in the history that he has written. Regarding Hegius' birthplace, see also Julius Heidemann, "Vorarbeiten zu einer Geschichte des höheren Schulwesens in Wesel," 2 pts., in Jahresberichte des Gymnasiums zu Wesel für 1852-53, and 1858-59 (Wesel, Germany: August Bagel, 1853-59), 2:11; and Wilhelm Dillenburger, "Zur Geschichte des Deutschen Humanismus: Alexander Hegius und Rudolf von Langen," Zeit­schrift für das Gymnasialwesen 24 (1870):483-84. On the strength of the evidence given by Hamelmann, it is certain that Hegius' name was Alexander von Heck (Heek). It was a fairly common practice in the late medieval period to use the name of one's birthplace as one's surname. Likewise, it was a practice of the humanists to latinize their names. Thus, from Heek comes the name Hegius.
Fig. 1. Map of the Low Countries and neighboring areas, featuring centers of importance to the *devotio moderna* and early humanism.
was a schoolmate of Hegius. Though this point has been disputed, Dillenburger and Josef Wiese argue quite convincingly that Hamelmann is correct. Being fellow students, it seems likely that the two men would have been born at approximately the same time. Von Langen's birthdate of 1438 is one that is well established. It may therefore be concluded that Hegius was born at a time not too distant from this date.

Wiese argues that, although the date for Hegius' birth is uncertain because scholars are dependent upon conjecture in arriving at any conclusion, the year 1433 is the most probable. The "conjecture" about which Wiese writes has to do with a comment made by Johannes Butzbach in connection with Hegius' death. "Finally the beloved man of God died, full of days..." The last phrase translated from the Latin plenus dierum is an idiom used only of those who have attained old age. It would not have been appropriate

1Hamelmann, Geschichtliche Werke, vol. 1, pt. 2:10.

2Nineteenth-century scholars such as Guillaume Delprat have suggested a date of around 1420 for Hegius' birth, making him eighteen years older than von Langen. See Guillaume Henri Marie Delprat, Verhandeling over de Broederschap van G. Groote en over den Invloed der Fraterhuizen... na de Veertiende Eeuw (Utrecht: Johan Altheer, 1830), p. 296.


4Ibid., p. 33. See also Adalbert Parmet, Rudolf von Langen (Münster, Westf.: Friedrich Regensberg, 1869), p. 16; and Dillenburger, "Deutschen Humanismus," p. 484.

to use this expression if Hegius had not attained the age of sixty-
five at the time of his death.¹

The date of Hegius' death is explicitly given by Butzbach as
December 1498.

On the day of Saint John the Evangelist [27 December] in the
year of our Lord fourteen hundred and ninety-eight at the vesper
hour he was buried to the left of the choir close to the left of
the entrance to the crypt in Saint Lebuins.²

Surmising that Hegius was of a similar age to von Langen, but not
forgetting that he was at least sixty-five when he died, it may be
estimated that he was born about 1433.

One piece of additional evidence that this is the correct
date is found in a comment recorded by Gerardus Geldenhauer (1482-
1542) and purported to have been made by Hegius. This was included
by Johannes Fichardus (1512-81) in a collection of works published
in 1536, sixty years after the event to which Geldenhauer referred.

¹Dillenburger, "Deutschen Humanismus," p. 484, states: "Wenn
Hegius 1433 geboren war, so war er 5 Jahre älter als Langen und
zählte, als er 1498 starb, 65 Jahre, so das er mit Recht plenus
dierum genannt werden." (Emphasis added.)

²Butzbach, Auctarium, in Krafft and Crecelius, Beiträge,
1:32, reads: "Sepultus in templo divi Lebuini in sinistra chori
abside secus introitum cripte ad sinistram manum Anno dni Millesimo
Quadragesimo Nonagesimo Octavo in die Sancti Johannis evange-
liste hora vesperarum occasum iam sole petente." There are actually
two churches in Deventer named after St. Lebuin. The smaller one is
on the Broederenstraat and is a Roman Catholic Church. The larger
one is situated close to the River Ijssel between the Hofstraat and
the church square or Grote Kerkhof. It is now a Protestant church,
and is generally called the "Grote Kerk" to distinguish it from the
Catholic St. Lebuins. Hegius was buried in the Grote Kerk. Both
churches were already standing in the fifteenth century. (See the
map of Deventer, p. 5.) With reference to Hegius' death, there is
also an entry in the Deventer Town Archives, Medieval Archive no.
150: Treasury accounts (Cameraarsrekeningen), 1460-1527. These
accounts remain unedited. In 1498 an entry was made about a message
to a Master van Breda requesting his help at the school in the place
of "Seligen meister Sanders" or "Alexander of blessed memory."
MAP OF DEVENTER

1. St. Lebuins Charter Church
2. Our Lady Parish Church
3. Brethren Church
4. St. Nikolaus (Berg) Church
5. City Hall
6. City School in various buildings around 5 & 6

Fig. 2. Map of fifteenth-century Deventer, featuring major landmarks in the old part of the city.

ILLUSTRATION OF THE TOWN OF DEVENTER

Fig. 3. Illustration of the town of Deventer taken from an anonymous woodcut dated about 1550. Foreground: Ijssel River; "I" (below "H"): House of the Brethren of the Common Life; "L": St. Lebuins Church (school on right of square in front of church).

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It is reported that Hegius claimed to be a forty-year-old man and already a master of the liberal arts, but, nevertheless, a barbarian in letters until he met the youthful Rudolf Agricola, who taught him all that he knew of Latin and Greek literature.\(^1\) This meeting took place while Hegius was teaching in the town of Emmerich sometime in the mid-1470s.\(^2\) Once again this information cannot be considered completely reliable. It is a clear statement, however, and does lend support to the other arguments already presented. This accumulated evidence makes it fairly safe to assume that Hegius was born about 1433. In the absence of any further information, this conclusion has generally been accepted by twentieth-century scholars.\(^3\)

At just the time of Hegius' birth, the Brethren of the Common Life were increasing their influence and establishing their houses in Westphalia, and the devotio moderna was beginning to make a strong impact.\(^4\) In Italy the Renaissance was well established, and the first stirrings of this movement would soon begin to be felt.

\(^{1}\)Gerardus Geldenhauer, cited by Johannes Fichardus, ed., *Virorum qui superiori nostri et secundo saeculo eruditione et doctrina illustris atque memorabiles fuerant. Vitae* (Frankfurt: Christianus Egenolphus, 1536), fo. 85 verso.

\(^{2}\)There is a question as to the exact date of the meeting. The matter is discussed below, p. 22, n. 3.


north of the Alps. It was in this religious and intellectual milieu that Hegius grew up, and as his education progressed, he was soon caught up in the changing currents of these new ideas.

**Early Years and Education**

If solving Hegius' date of birth is a problem, the nature, location, and extent of his education remain an almost complete mystery. To the present it does not appear that his name has been found in any of the school or university lists. Between the time of his birth and 1469, there is no certainty as to his whereabouts, but it must be assumed that during this period of about thirty-six years he was receiving a fairly extensive and thorough education. His accomplishments after 1469 would certainly point to this.

Hamelmann gives the only hint as to where Hegius went to school, and it turns out to be a rather confusing observation. He suggests that von Langen and Hegius were schoolmates in the city of Deventer, where they came under the influence of the renowned Thomas à Kempis (1380-1471). À Kempis was a member of the Augustinian canons regular at St. Agnietenberg.¹ This monastery, situated near the city of Zwolle and about thirty kilometers from Deventer, would have been associated with the school in Zwolle rather than Deventer, if it was associated with any school at all. Hamelmann must almost

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¹Hamelmann, *Geschichtliche Werke*, vol. 1, pt. 4:10-11. The monastery at St. Agnietenberg adopted the Windesheim rule, but did not actually belong to the Windesheim congregation. The Windesheimers were those Brethren of the Common Life who had opted to become regular monks and established a regular monastery at Windesheim a few kilometers from Zwolle. See Regnerus Richardus Post, *The Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation and Humanism*, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, no. 3 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 22.
certainly have been aware of this, and it would appear that his
reference to the two boys coming under the influence of a Kempis in
Deventer is an unintentional error. The connection that he makes
between the famous monk and the two youthful Westphalians is there­
fore a strong indication that the boys studied at the city school in
Zwolle.

The history of the city of Deventer between 1420 and 1460
also makes it unlikely that Hegius and von Langen would have been
students there. Dillenburger has noted that

... from 1422-50 Deventer suffered under the plague; and again
in 1454 when the city was deserted, even by the magistrate. In
1458 the scourge repeated itself with renewed strength. Both
the city and the school suffered. ... ¹

It is thought that von Langen was in school and under the influence
of the Brethren of the Common Life between 1450 and 1456.² Considering
his noble birth, the influence of his uncle who was the dean
of the cathedral in Münster,³ the fame of the school in Zwolle

²Parmet, Von Langen, pp. 23-24. See also Dillenburger,
"Deutschen Humanismus," p. 486. It should be remembered that the
school in Zwolle was a city school and not an institution under the
direct control of the Brethren of the Common Life. However, Hyma
gives evidence that shows the strong influence the Brethren had on
the Zwolle school. See Albert Hyma, The Christian Renaissance: A
History of the "Devotio Moderna", 2nd ed. (Hamden, CT.: Archon
Books, 1965), p. 125, especially n. 183, where he refers to Gerard
Zerbolt's (1367-98) Super modo vivendi, fo. 27.a. The evidence for
this close cooperation is corroborated by Post who is generally at
pains to dissociate the Brethren of the Common Life from any parti­
cipation in teaching activities at the schools in the towns where
they had established their houses. While maintaining that none of
the Brethren taught in the city school, Post is obliged to admit
their great interest in the educational program and their tutelage
of the schoolboys in Zwolle. Post, Modern Devotion, pp. 236-37,
361, 367-69.

³Wiese, Hegius, p. 9; and Klemens Löffler, "Rudolf von
Langen," in Westfälische Lebensbilder, ed. Aloys Bömer and Otto
during this period, and the calamitous conditions in Deventer at the time, it would only be natural for von Langen to have attended the school in Zwolle rather than the one in Deventer. Hamelmann's hint at a connection with à Kempis heightens the probability that this was indeed the case. It appears then that Hegius, who was a fellow student of von Langen, may have attended the school in Zwolle sometime during the years 1450-56.

Before leaving the matter of Hegius' school days, it is of interest to consider the likelihood of his having been influenced by Thomas à Kempis. This is of some importance in attempting to gauge the influence of the *devotio moderna* on Hegius. As mentioned previously, à Kempis was a monk in an Augustinian monastery. It seems

Leunenschloss (Münster, Westf.: Aschendorff'schen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1930), p. 344.


highly improbable, however, that he taught at the school in Zwolle. Post observes correctly that even if the Brethren of the Common Life were closely associated with the Zwolle school, the monks in the monastery at St. Agnietenberg were not.¹ He argues further that, as a member of a monastic order, a Kempis would have devoted himself to a contemplative life of study and writing. If he taught anybody at all it would have been novices in the monastery, not boys in the city school.² From this it appears that he would not have had much contact with anybody except his fellow monks.

Dillenburger and Wiese argue differently. While they do not propose that a Kempis taught in the city school or worked alongside the Brethren of the Common Life in the dormitories where many of the students lived, they do suggest that it is quite possible that he sought out the students in Zwolle and spoke to them. To their way of thinking, taking his own experience as a schoolboy into consideration, it would be unlike a man of such deep spirituality and such high calling to fail in seeking to meet the needs of the Zwolle schoolboys in some way.³ This is substantiated by Goswinus van

¹Post points out that a Kempis was never actually a member of the Brethren of the Common Life. Post, Modern Devotion, p. 21. There can be no doubt, however, that a Kempis was an heir to the ideas of the Brethren, and a participant in the movement known as the devotio moderna. Not only had he spent some time between 1392 and 1398 in the domo antiqua, a dormitory operated by the Brethren in Deventer, but he would also have absorbed many of the ideas of the Windesheimers whose practices were quite closely observed in the monastery at St. Agnietenberg where he was a monk.

²According to Post, a Kempis' desire to be left alone in the confinement of his cell was respected by his superiors, and he seldom left the precincts of the monastery. Post, Modern Devotion, pp. 521-22.

Halen in his *Vita* on the life of Gansfort. He quotes Gansfort as having said of his student days in Zwolle: "I often heard Thomas à Kempis, and first learned truly to cherish him while I attended the school there."

Considering these different views it does not seem wholly unlikely that à Kempis would have had some influence on the lives of von Langen and Hegius in their student years in Zwolle. Post mentions that à Kempis preached frequently for the novices at St. Agnietenberg, and this would lend support to the theory that he might show an interest in the students at the school just a few kilometers away. The saintly Thomas would no doubt have remembered his years as a student in the Deventer school under the care of the Brethren of the Common Life, and he would easily have related to the young schoolboys in Zwolle. It is entirely possible that the


2Hyman, though not dealing specifically with the question of the possible influence of à Kempis on the schoolboys in Zwolle, does emphasize the close links that existed between à Kempis and the Brethren of the Common Life. Gerard Groote (1340-84) and Florentius Radewijns (1350-1400) may be considered the founders of both the Windesheim movement and the Brethren of the Common Life. Collaboration between the two groups was particularly strong in the early years, and Windesheim was to a large extent financed and built by the Brethren of the Common Life in Deventer. Founded in 1387, the Windesheim monastery continued to grow through the 1390s, and letters between Radewijns and the prior at Windesheim reveal that many of the schoolboys as well as the Brethren in Deventer were inclined to enter the newly established monastery south of Zwolle. A Kempis was at Deventer during this time. When he himself entered a monastery he did not choose Windesheim, but he went to St. Agnietenberg.
pupils would occasionally have enjoyed a visit with him in the monastery at St. Agnietenberg.¹

Whatever else may be questioned concerning these issues, there is one thing that has become quite clear. The influence of the devotio moderna on any student at the school in Zwolle would undoubtedly have been considerable. Whether that influence came from the Brethren of the Common Life, the Windesheimers, or à Kempis and the monks at St. Agnietenberg, the fact remains that the students were exposed to these pietistic ideas. If Hegius was a student in Zwolle, he would have become well acquainted with the concerns of the devotio moderna.²

where the Windesheim Canons were practiced. Hyma indicates that close cooperation between the Brethren, the Windesheimers, and the monks of St. Agnietenberg continued until at least 1424. À Kempis would, therefore, almost certainly have shared the considerable educational interest exhibited by the Zwolle Brethren. See Hyma, Christian Renaissance, pp. 136-38.

¹Van Overzee, Humanisme, p. 29. This author writes that Thomas became a fountain of information and ideas, and that from far and near people came to St. Agnietenberg to ask his counsel in their problems.

²The uncertainty with regard to Hegius' attendance at the school in Zwolle is obvious. Klemens Löffler proposes a plausible alternative that has not been fully explored. He suggests that von Langen was placed under the guardianship of his uncle at the cathedral school in Münster, and that he attended school in Münster rather than in Zwolle or Deventer as has been assumed on the basis of Hamelmann's statements. Löffler, "Von Langen," pp. 344-45. The conclusion that he draws in the case of Hegius is that he, too, was a pupil in Münster. He observes:

"Wo der etwa gleichalterige Alexander Hegius und Anton Liber aus Soest ihre erste Bildung erhalten haben, muss dahingestellt bleiben. Doch möchte ich es wenigstens von Hegius wegen seiner Heimat (Heek bei Horstmar) fur das wahrscheinlichste halten, dass er in der Tat Langens Mitschuler, aber nicht in Deventer, sondern in Münster gewesen ist." Löffler, "Von Langen," p. 345. While Löffler's remarks cannot be discounted, the proximity of Heek to Münster is not a forceful argument. Zwolle is not much farther distant from Heek than is Münster, and in view of the fame of the Zwolle school, the attraction of the school in Münster would have
Further observations with respect to Hegius' education take one further into the realm of speculation, but one or two possibilities do present themselves and appear worthy of comment.

The assertion has been made that Hegius was one of the students in Zwolle who rejoiced at the visit of Cardinal Nicolas been limited at the time Hegius was a pupil. It was only in later years that the cathedral school in Münster achieved fame. Von Langen himself, Hermanus Buschius (1468-1536), Timannus Kemenerus (fl. 1490-1510), and Johannes Murmellius (1480-1517) were renowned educators who taught in Münster, but only in the latter part of the fifteenth and in the early sixteenth centuries. These were the men who made the school famous. When Hegius was a student, Münster did not offer any special attractions. See Dietrich Reichling, Johannes Murmellius: Sein Leben und seine Werke (Freiburg-im-Breisgau: n.p., 1880; facsimile reprint ed., Nieuwkoop, Netherlands: B. de Graaf, 1963), pp. 26-40; Henkel, "Educational Contributions," p. 196; and Post, Modern Devotion, pp. 625-26. In presenting his argument about where von Langen and Hegius attended school, Löfler gives no indication that he is basing his conclusions on anything but conjecture. I have not been able to find references in any other sources that would support or confirm his observations. Several of the authors who uphold the idea that Hegius studied in Zwolle have done their research since Löfler published his article in 1930. Their conclusions have not been affected by his remarks. If it could be shown that von Langen was indeed a student at the cathedral school in Münster, the reliability of Hamelmann's remarks would be even more seriously questioned. In addition, if we were to agree that Hegius was a schoolboy in Münster then the important question with regard to the influence of the Brethren of the Common Life on Hegius would need to be reconsidered. Post, Modern Devotion, pp. 424 and 625, indicates that the influence of the Brethren on the school in Münster was limited. This might be debatable in later years. However, it was more than likely true of the 1440s and 1450s. There was a hostel or domus pauperum established for the pupils at the school, but this project was not an early undertaking of the Brethren in Münster. Henkel's "Educational Contributions," p. 196, is rather superficial in intimating that the early work of the Münster Brethren in the field of education was of great consequence. The earliest date that could be given for any contribution worthy of note would be the 1460s. It must, nevertheless, be acknowledged that the devotion moderna had been well established in the bishopric of Münster. See Landeen, "Beginnings of Devotio Moderna," pt. 1: 188-96; pt. 2:221-53. If Hegius had been a student in Münster he would certainly have been aware of this movement. Considering his close association with the Brethren of the Common Life in later years, it seems most probable that he had fairly strong contacts with them when he was at school, wherever it might have been.
Cusanus (1401-64) to Zwolle in 1456. This is a matter of pure conjecture. While it is certainly possible that Hegius was there, the only evidence for this has already been presented in support of the argument that he was a student in Zwolle.

Another suggestion has been put forward in an attempt to establish the link between Hegius and the Brethren of the Common Life during his early educational experience. There is a possibility that a certain Dietrich von Heek (d. 1478) was the brother of Hegius. Dietrich is listed in the necrology of the Augustinian monastery of the Windesheim congregation at Frenswegen, where he was a lay brother. It is quite likely that he was recruited from among the schoolboys who lived in the dormitories run by the Brethren, as


3Frenswegen was situated just to the northeast of Albergen, about forty kilometers from Heek. It was a prominent center of the devotio moderna, and being of the Windesheim Congregation it would have been in close contact with the Brethren of the Common Life. For example, the chronicle from Frenswegen gives considerable detail concerning the work of one of the leading Brethren, Henry von Ahaus (ca. 1369-1439). The chronicler presents a knowledgeable account of Henry's work as founder of the early Brethren houses in Germany. See Ernst Barnikol, Studien zur Geschichte der Brüder vom gemein­samen Leben. Die erste Periode der Deutschen Bruderbewegung: Die Zeit Heinrichs von Ahaus (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr [Paul Siebeck], 1917), pp. 184-92; and Landeen, "Beginnings of Devotio Moderna," pt. 1:183, n. 99.
this was a common source of novices. If Dietrich and Alexander were from the same family, there would be an added suggestion that Hegius was closely connected with the Brethren in his youth. There would have been a strong probability that the two boys attended school in the same place.

In the final analysis it must be admitted that there can be little certainty concerning Hegius' early education. One can only rely upon personal judgment of what is likely to have happened considering the interests manifested and the accomplishments realized by Hegius in his later life. The birthplace of Hegius has already been noted. There is a suggestion that he was born "in the courtyard of the school in the village of Heek," and that his father was "a wealthy mayor of rural stock." When Hegius was a child the work of Henry von Ahaus was just coming to fruition. Von Ahaus had successfully initiated the work of the Brethren of the Common Life in Germany and introduced the devotio moderna to that country.


2It should be noted that Wilhelm Kohl indicates that there is no basis for suggesting that Dietrich and Alexander were brothers because Dietrich was of peasant stock. Wilhelm Kohl, Das Bistum Münster, 3 vols., Germania Sacra, new series, nos. 3, 5, and 10; vol. 2: Die Klöster der Augustiner-chorherren (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter & Co., 1971), p. 165. Dillenburger, however, describes Alexander as being bauerlich ("of peasant or rural stock") as well. Dillenburger, "Deutschen Humanismus," p. 483. The possibility of any connection between Dietrich and Alexander remains, of course, a matter of speculation.


4Ibid., p. 485.

Brethren houses had been established in many of the towns in the territories surrounding the village of Heek.¹ It seems natural that Hegius' father, who was possibly the mayor of Heek, would have been aware of the developments taking place in the eastern Netherlands and Westphalia. The rise and spread of the devotio moderna, of which the Brethren of the Common Life constituted a significant part, could scarcely have failed to come to his attention. When it was time for young Alexander to be sent to school, his father would no doubt have heard of the dormitories established by the Brethren of the Common Life, and particularly of their influential work in the education of students in the city of Zwolle. This city is about ninety kilometers from Heek, and Hegius would not have had to travel what would be considered a great distance in order to attend the famous school. Zwolle attracted students from many places more distant than the bishopric of Münster.² Considering Hegius' subsequent close relationship with the Brethren of the Common Life in Wesel, Emmerich, and Deventer, it seems quite probable that at least some of his schooling was under the guardianship if not the tutelage of these Brethren.

¹In the Netherlands, in addition to the houses in Deventer and Zwolle established before the end of the fourteenth century, there were houses in Albergen (1406), Hulsbergen near Hattem (1407), and Doesburg (1425). In Westphalia and neighboring areas of northwest Germany, Brethren houses were established at Münster (1401), Osterberg near Osnabrück (1410), Osnabrück (1415), and Wesel (1436). There were also a number of houses of the Sisters of the Common Life, for example, at Lochem, Doetinchem, Schüttorf, Coesfeld, and Borken. All of these houses were in fairly close proximity to the district of Ahaus.

²Albert Hyma, The Brethren of the Common Life (Grand Rapids, MI.: William B. Eerdmans, 1950), p. 116. Mention is made of students coming from Poland, all of Germany, and Flanders, as well as many other places.
Assuming that Hegius was a student in Zwolle, he would have encountered an educational program that was fairly typical in the Netherlands.¹ This is true, even if the excellence of the Zwolle school vis-a-vis the other schools of the time is admitted. Eight classes were offered at Zwolle, of which the primarius factus or first class was the highest. In general a student graduating from the first class would have been at least seventeen years of age.²

It would seem likely that Hegius completed his schooling in Zwolle at least as early as his schoolmate, von Langen. This was in 1456, which would have made Hegius about twenty-three, somewhat older than most pupils.³ If one then considers that Hegius' appointment to the rectorship of the city school in Wesel in 1469 is the first date in his life that can be established with any accuracy, this leaves a period of a minimum of twelve years unaccounted for.

It is unlikely that Hegius would have been appointed rector of an old and well-established school if he had no experience as a teacher.⁴ It must be assumed, therefore, that by 1469 he had already proven himself to be competent and successful in his chosen

¹The curriculum in Zwolle is examined in chapter 3 along with a survey of fifteenth-century education in the Netherlands. This gives a general idea of the subjects that Hegius would have studied and the methods he would have encountered.

²Post, Modern Devotion, p. 365.

³This date is arbitrary and is only suggested because of the connection made between Hegius and von Langen by Hamelmann. Hegius may well have been in a different class from von Langen and could have completed his studies some time before 1456. In fact, this is more probable.

⁴The Stadtschule or city school at Wesel was founded in 1342. Friedrich Nettesheim, Geschichte der Schulen im alten Herzogthum Geldern und in den benachbarten Landesteilen (Düsseldorf: August Bagel, 1881), p. 80.
career. \(^1\) Where and for how long he taught is not known. Such possibilities as terms in Wesel, Emmerich, Deventer, and Groningen prior to 1469 have been suggested. \(^2\)

Besides teaching, Hegius also spent some time in obtaining higher qualifications between the time he completed his secondary education and 1469. On the title page of his Dialogi he is given the appellation artium magister, or Master of Arts. \(^3\) None of the available sources give any indication as to where this degree was obtained. It is almost certain that Hegius did not travel to Italy in pursuit of learning, \(^4\) but there are no clues about which of the

\(^1\) It should not be considered a hard-and-fast rule that an inexperienced teacher would never have been appointed to a position of authority in an established school. For example, in 1500, when he was about twenty years of age and had just recently graduated from the university in Köln, Johannes Murmellius was given the post of vice-principal or Konrektor at the school in Münster. See Reichling, Murmellius, pp. 25-26, 33.

\(^2\) Guillaume Henri Mari Delprat, Verhandeling over de Broederschap van G. Groote en over den invloed der Fraterhuizen ... na de Veertiende Eeuw, 2nd ed. (Arnhem, Netherlands: Nijhoff & Zoon, 1856), p. 98; and Heidemann, "Schulwesens in Wesel," 2:11, n. 44.

\(^3\) Alexander Hegius, Alexandri Hegii artium magistri Gymnasiarche quondam Daventriensis philosophi presbyteri utriusque lingue docti Dialogi, ed. Jacobus Faber (Deventer: Richard Paffraet, 1503), fo. A.r recto. Hegius is also referred to here as a doctor of languages, but this should only be interpreted as being a laudatory remark. The structure of the Latin sentence indicates that artium magister is his earned title.

\(^4\) A number of Hegius' friends made trips to Italy. In each of these cases, even if the exact dates of the journeys cannot be pinpointed, there is clear evidence that such trips were made. See, for example, Löffler, "Von Langen," pp. 346-48. With Hegius there are no such hints. In fact, the evidence weighs against any journey across the Alps. The previously cited remark made by Hegius about his studies with Agricola makes it seem highly improbable that Hegius travelled south. See above, p. 6, especially n. 1. Had he made such a trip, Agricola would not have been his only mentor in the classics. See Kan, Programma, p. 6; and Erasmus, Opus epistolarum 1 (1906):105.23.56-106.23.63. Both these sources indicate that Hegius acquired his learning in the classics from Agricola.
northern universities he might have attended. With the qualifications afforded him if he had graduated from the first class at the school in Zwolle, his studies for a master's degree would have been comparatively short. This might account in part for the lack of any evidence concerning his higher education.

Whatever his education might have been, Hegius was without doubt a talented and able man. He knew how to apply the knowledge he had gained from his own education to the task of guiding his pupils through their schooling. In the eyes of his students he was a learned scholar and a wise teacher. Butzbach observes:

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1By 1470 there were sixty-eight universities in Europe, thirty-three of which were in France and the Germanic or central European lands. See Hastings Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, 3 vols., 2nd ed., ed. Frederick Maurice Powicke and Alfred Brotherston Emden (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 1:xiv. Lists of students and graduates from these institutions are usually incomplete, if indeed they still exist. There is therefore no way of determining which university Hegius attended. It is conceivable that a short-list of possible universities could be drawn up. Several factors would need to be considered. Universities with complete or near complete student lists between 1450 and 1469 would be unlikely because Hegius' name has not been found in these. Proximity to Westphalia would be a consideration, Hegius apparently having attended a northern university. The philosophic approaches of the various institutions might also be compared with that of Hegius to determine any possible connections. Such a study would undoubtedly prove interesting, but it is beyond the scope of this dissertation and would in any case probably be inconclusive.

2See Regnerus Richardus Post, Scholen en Onderwijs in Nederland gedurende de Middeleeuwen (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1954), pp. 103-6; and Frederiks, Zwoise Schoolwezen, pp. 80-81. A bright student who had completed the first class would need only a short time at a university to complete the requirements for an M.A. In the case of Hegius, this would mean that incomplete university lists would be even less likely to include his name. It would also make it less surprising that nowhere in the writings of his students and his colleagues, or in his own works, is one able to find any hint about his university studies. The period may have appeared to him so insignificant that he seldom mentioned it. His relationship with Agricola, whom he valued highly as a tutor, is mentioned by most of his biographers. These same biographers were not equally impressed that he placed a particularly high value upon his university education.
Deventer ... has ... still another advantage for which it rightly has a reputation far and wide above all other towns in that region. That is the ancient and highly celebrated gymnasium which, under the excellent guidance of the most learned men, enjoyed an enviable reputation because of the attention it paid to the humanities. ... Alexander Hegius [was] an extraordinarily learned man, a master of three languages, and in addition a philosopher and a poet. ... Truly, there was a man worthy of all praise, which he deservedly received from scholarly men during his life and after his death. Like a bright star he shone among the people for his uprightness, and among the scholars for his comprehensive knowledge and great attainments.!

Teaching in Wesel and Emmerich

In 1469 Hegius accepted an appointment as headmaster of the city school in Wesel, southwest of Münster. The treasury records verify that early in that year he took up residence in the employ of the town council. He remained at the school for five years until early in 1474.3

There is not much that can be said about the period he spent in Wesel. The information that is available throws very little light on his activities as rector of the famous school in that town.


2The records in Wesel indicate that Hegius' predecessor received his last payment as headmaster in 1469. Heidemann, "Schulwesens in Wesel," 2:11.

3Unfortunately, the reports from the treasury for 1474 have been lost, and a precise date for his departure cannot be fixed. An entry in the public records on 25 October 1473 names Hegius' successor, but apparently Hegius did not leave Wesel immediately. By the time the summer semester began in 1474, however, he had moved on to his next appointment. See Wiese, Hegius, p. 10; and van der Velden, Agricola, p. 80.
As Heidemann points out, it is in fact remarkable how little is said about Hegius in the official documents. For example, the treasury records do not mention a single payment being made to Hegius by the town council. The most plausible explanation for this is that Hegius attracted a great number of students and this brought in sufficient funds to the school so that no additional money was needed.  

This explanation is indirectly supported by the fact that new regulations had to be established in the early 1470s to stop the many students from loitering around the taverns. According to these statutes the students were required to be in their dormitories by nine o'clock. This would seem to indicate that there had been a fairly large influx of new students, which is probably attributable to the work of Hegius. At this stage of his career, Hegius had not yet begun the study of Greek and the classics, but he must already have proved himself to be an outstanding teacher.

From Wesel, Hegius moved to the town of Emmerich, some thirty kilometers to the northwest. There he became rector of the school attached to the church of St. Maartens. He held this position for approximately eight years until he accepted the invitation

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1 For the way in which school expenses were met and teachers salaries paid, see below, pp. 131-32. Under the system that was most commonly used, if the income from the scholars was sufficient, the rector would not need to approach the city treasury for additional funds. Those who came from beyond the city limits were usually required to pay higher fees, and it appears that there were quite a number of this class of student while Hegius was the rector.


3 Hyma, Brethren of Common Life, p. 119.

to become rector of the city school in Deventer.¹

According to the account given by Goswinus van Halen, the years in Emmerich were of vital importance for the intellectual development of the newly appointed rector. It was while he was in Emmerich that Hegius first became acquainted with the learning of the classical authors. During these years he spent some time studying under the guidance of his youthful tutor, Rudolf Agricola. From Agricola, Hegius was able to glean some of the Renaissance ideas with which the younger man had become acquainted in his travels south of the Alps. Van Halen describes the circumstances under which Hegius pursued his studies:

Before Hegius was headmaster at the school in Deventer, while he was in charge of the school in Emmerich, he began to learn pure Latin and Greek from Rudolf Agricola. Agricola was staying in the home of Count Spiegelberg in a small town not at all far from Emmerich. When Rudolf was able to take leave of the Count the two men stayed together in the house of the Brethren at Emmerich, in a cell that was as unpretentious as the dwelling place of Philemon and Baucis according to the description given by Ovid.²

At the time of this meeting, about 1475,³ Hegius' appetite for the

¹The length of time that Hegius remained in Emmerich has been disputed. Nineteenth-century scholars argued that he was only there for a short time, and that he had already taken up his position in Deventer sometime between 1474 and 1476. See Heidemann, "Schulwesens in Wesel," 2:12; Wilhelm Dillenburger, "Geschichte des Gymnasium zu Emmerich: I Periode," in Jahresbericht über den Schulcurusus 1845-46 an dem Königlichen Gymnasium zu Emmerich (Emmerich, Germany: n.p., 1846), pp. 14-15; and his "Deutschen Humanismus," p. 489; Kaemmel, Deutschen Schulewesens, p. 220, and Wiese, Hegius, p. 11. This is discussed below, pp. 25-26.

²Van Halen, in Kan, Programma, p. 6. Like the Gansfort Vita in the Programma, the Vita on Agricola from which this quotation is taken has been attributed to Goswinus van Halen. See above, p. 11, n. 1; and van der Velden, Agricola, pp. 10-16. The allusion to Philemon and Baucis may be found in Ovid Metamorphoses 8.631 ff.

³Marcel Augustijn Nauwelaerts, Rodolphus Agricola (The Hague: Kruseman, 1963), pp. 29-31, poses some questions about the
classical authors and a return to a purer form of Latin was first awakened. Already a competent teacher, new ideas were being implanted in his mind that would make him a famous pedagog.

The school in Emmerich was flourishing even before Hegius took up the rectorship. As the new headmaster he was able to build upon the foundation already established and to encourage further

accuracy of van Halen's account and the dating of the meeting. He points out that Agricola learned Greek in Ferrara, and that he only began his studies there in the latter half of 1475. If his second visit to the North took place before the end of 1475, Agricola would not have been able to introduce Hegius to the Greek language as van Halen suggests, unless he had already learned it from someone like Gansfort prior to this date. It may be because of this that Nauwelaerts places Agricola's second trip north from Italy in 1477 rather than in 1474, as do van der Velden and Allen. See van der Velden, Agricola, p. 80; and Allen, in Erasmus, Opus epistolarum 1:106, n. 56. If the meeting took place in 1477 this would allow for Agricola to have attained a fair proficiency in the Greek language. See Nauwelaerts, Agricola, p. 31. This does not, however, seem the most plausible explanation. It seems probable that Allen is closer to the truth. Agricola completed his studies at Pavia in the academic year 1474-75. Percy Stafford Allen, "The Letters of Rudolph Agricola," The English Historical Review 21 (April 1906):302-17, lists the letters of Agricola in chronological order. A number of the letters cannot be accurately dated, and the places from where they were written are not always clear. From a perusal of these letters, the summers of 1474, 1475, and 1477 would all be times when a trip to the North could have been made. In the absence of further evidence, the most logical time for the journey would be after Agricola completed his studies at Pavia and before he went to Ferrara. It is therefore my opinion that Agricola and Hegius met in Emmerich in the summer of 1475. The question relating to the study of Greek at this time is not difficult to answer. It is either true that Agricola had already learned some Greek, or else the exact details of the incident had faded in van Halen's memory. The latter and most probable explanation does not give any serious cause for concern regarding the validity of the account. It remains true that Hegius learned Greek from Agricola, and it does not in any way deny that they met at Emmerich about the mid-1470s. At this time, the account makes it clear, Hegius "began" his study of pure Latin and Greek. In fact, right up to the time of his death, Agricola continued to instruct Hegius in the classics. It should be noted that the date of 1475 suggested above for this meeting is not based on primary research but on the evidence as presented by van der Velden, Allen, and Nauwelaerts. The alternative dates of 1474 and 1477 would not pose any insurmountable problems, and they could just as readily be accepted.
growth. The success of the school when Hegius was rector is to some extent illustrated by the history of the Brethren of the Common Life in Emmerich. A brotherhouse was established in this town in 1468 and, as was the custom of the Brethren, they developed a strong interest in the spiritual oversight and housing of the schoolboys. In order to facilitate better spiritual care of the many students, plans were laid for the establishment of a dormitory. This expansion took place during the early 1480s, by which time Hegius would have been able to develop a strong educational program in the town. The first building was opened early in 1482, but proved to be too small. A neighboring building was renovated to provide additional dormitory space, and plans were drawn up for an even larger building than had already been erected. The fact that the Brethren were interested in expanding their facilities is indicative of the progress that was being made in the school. The Brethren would not have wished to put up new buildings if there was not a growing demand for accommodation. At about this time Hegius moved away from Emmerich, and it is interesting to note that the plans for the third dormitory had to be shelved by the Brethren.

A significant point arising out of this is the evidence of a

1Dillenburger, "Gymnasiums zu Emmerich," pp. 3-14; and Post, Modern Devotion, p. 419.

continuing friendship between Hegius and the Brethren of the Common Life. From what van Halen writes about Agricola and Hegius having shared a room in the "house of the Brethren at Emmerich," and from the close cooperation there appears to have been between the Brethren and the school regarding the housing of students, it becomes quite obvious that Hegius was favorably disposed toward these men of the devotio moderna.

The information available about the period that Hegius spent in Emmerich is limited and sketchy, but the impression gained is that this was a successful and productive time in his life. The influence of his innovative style of teaching and administration seems to have left its mark on the school. It was at about this time that the spirit of the Northern Renaissance began to manifest itself at the school in Emmerich under the leadership of a number of humanistically inclined scholars. In addition, Hegius himself was gaining in experience and knowledge during these years, and the success he achieved was a foretaste of the fame that would come to him as headmaster of the school in Deventer.

Rector at Deventer

The year 1483 has been generally accepted by twentieth-century scholars as the time when Hegius transferred to the school in Deventer. Recently, however, the validity of this date has been

1Dillenburger, "Gymnasiums zu Emmerich," pp. 3-14.

2See, for example, Allen, in Erasmus, Opus epistolarum, 1: 106, n. 56; Hyma, Youth of Erasmus, p. 105; van Overzee, Humanisme, p. 37; and Post, Modern Devotion, p. 561. Prior to the turn of the century, 1474 or 1475 were the dates usually suggested for the move. See above, p. 22, n. 1.
questioned by Ernst-Wilhelm Kohls and Anton C. F. Koch. These scholars have proposed an earlier arrival. There is good reason to believe that their questions are justified, even though they do not agree as to the exact year in which Hegius took up his new post.

Much of the scholarly research into the date when Hegius became rector in Deventer has been an outgrowth of attempts to establish Erasmus' date of birth. Erasmus was a student in the school at St. Lebuins during the time that Hegius was rector, and he refers to the latter as "Alexander Hegius, the schoolmaster, my former teacher." To nineteenth-century scholars this presented no problem, because they presumed that Hegius remained in Emmerich for only a short time, dating his move to Deventer as early as 1474 and not later than 1476. This was approximately the time when Erasmus enrolled as a student in Deventer.

The Vita on Agricola written by van Halen states plainly that Hegius arrived in Deventer in 1483. While the Vita has been found to be somewhat inaccurate in its chronology, it is basically a


3Desiderius Erasmus, Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 1: The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 1 to 141--1484 to 1500, ed. R. J. Schoek, trans. R. A. B. Mynors and D. F. S. Thomson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 52.28.19-20. The particular letter cited here was from Erasmus to Cornelius Gerard (ca. 1460-post 1523), and it is thought to have been written from Steyn in 1489.

4Van Halen, in Kan, Programma, p. 6, observes: "Anno salutis 1483 factus est Alexander Hegius Daventriensis gymnasiarcha."
sound document presenting a fairly comprehensive knowledge and understanding of events.\(^1\) It is quite conceivable that van Halen may have been wrong by one or even two years in this report, but most unlikely that he would so grossly misrepresent the facts as to be wrong by eight years. When it is remembered that he was personally well acquainted with Hegius, first as a result of being a servant of Wessel Gansfort\(^2\) and later as a pupil in the Deventer school at the time of Agricola's death in 1485,\(^3\) it may be assumed that van Halen was fundamentally correct in his narrative. This being the case, the arrival of Hegius in Deventer and the departure of Erasmus present somewhat of a problem if the comments that the latter makes about Hegius being his teacher are to be taken seriously.

Erasmus claims to have left Deventer when he was fourteen.\(^4\) Until recently there have been a number of scholars who have proposed 28 October 1469 as his date of birth. If this date were to be accepted, it would place his departure from Deventer sometime between October 1483 and October 1484. This would not pose any

\(^1\)Van der Velden, \textit{Agricola}, p. 14.


\(^3\)Van Halen, in Kan, \textit{Programma}, p. 6, says:
"Memini cum Alexandrum Hegium Daventriae audirem anno salutis 86 [sic, should read 85] venire ad hunc litteras de morte Rodol. Agricolae Daventriam, quas non sine lachrymis auditoribus in ludo legit, nec mirandum sane si ei Agricola charus fuit."

\(^4\)In a letter from Leuven dated 17 April 1519, Erasmus writes to a certain Jacobus Theodoricus of Hoorn (d. ca. 1534): "Daventriam reliqui quatuodecem natus annos..." Erasmus, \textit{Opus epistolarum}, 3 (1913):532-33.940.8-9. This statement has generally been regarded by scholars as an authentic reference to his age at the time he left Deventer, but this may need to be reconsidered.
problem with regard to a 1483 dating for the arrival of Hegius. Acceptance of the 1469 date, however, ignores or rationalizes the statement made in the same letter from Erasmus where he says that he was in his fifty-third year at the time of writing. More significantly, it does not take into account the information now available concerning the bridge about which Erasmus speaks. He says: "When I departed from Deventer the river flowing past the city was not yet crossed by a bridge." The Deventer Archives supply evidence that the river was spanned by March 1483.

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1Ibid., p. 533.940.9-10. The statement reads: "nunc ago annum quinquagesimumtertium." This would mean Erasmus was born in October 1466, and argues for his departure from Deventer by October 1481, almost certainly before the arrival of Hegius. Koch, Erasmus' Birth, pp. 39-44, explains how Erasmus added a year to his age at the major "climacteric" years in his life, specifically at the ages of forty-nine and sixty-three. In 1519 when the letter was written to Theodoricus, he had already passed his forty-ninth birthday, and one may assume with some justification that he was actually only in his fifty-second year. This would be consistent with the other comments he made about his age during this period of his life. In any case, taken along with an analysis of other information that is available, it rules out 1469 as the year of Erasmus' birth.

2Erasmus, Opus epistolarum, 3:532.940.5-7. Erasmus writes: "... quod cum ego Daventria discederem, nondum fluvis qui urbem praeterfluit, ponte iunctus erat."

3Deventer Town Archives, Medieval Archive no. 251: Bridge Accounts and Expenses, 1482-87. Koch, Erasmus' Birth, pp. 34-36, has made an analysis of this material and gives a summary of the salient points. Construction of the bridge commenced in August 1482. Though work continued until 1487, by March 1483 the river was spanned. This is evident from the above-mentioned archive and from Medieval Archive no. 150: Treasury Accounts (Cameraarsrekeningen), 1460-1527, where the city accounts after 22 February 1483 record a change from "ferry toll" to "bridge toll." Neither of these sources has as yet been edited, and they are in a medieval script that is legible only to the expert. In an interview in the Deventer Town Archives, 20 March 1984, Dr. Koch gave assurance that there was no further information of any significance in either of these collections regarding Hegius or his relationship with Erasmus. As a consequence of what is now known about the bridge, and if it is accepted that Erasmus was fourteen on leaving Deventer, it must be acknowledged that his date of birth could not have been 1469.
In order for Hegius to have had the influence on the young Erasmus which the statements made by the latter strongly suggest, it seems that the new rector must have arrived in Deventer sometime before the beginning of 1483. While it is acknowledged that the relationship between Hegius and Erasmus was of limited duration and significance, nevertheless, it is quite apparent that it continued over a period of at least some months. In an autobiographical statement Erasmus observes:

In his [Erasmus'] ninth year he [Erasmus' father] sent him to Deventer; his mother went with him as guardian and guide of his tender years. The school there was at the time in a state of barbarism (a standard text was Pater meus; they were forced to learn the paradigms, the textbooks being Eberhard and John of Garland), except that Alexander Hegius and Synthen had begun to introduce something of a higher standard as literature. At length his playmates, of whom the older ones were in Synthen's class, gave him his first taste of better teaching, and later he sometimes heard Hegius, but only on high days when he lectured to the whole school. Here he reached the third form.\(^1\)

Armed with this information, Koch argues in support of Kohls and against Allen and Post that Erasmus left Deventer before the end of

\(^1\)Erasmus, *Collected Works*, vol. 4: The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 446 to 593—1516 to 1517, ed. James K. McConica, trans. R. A. B. Mynors and D. F. S. Thomson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 404-5.38-47. The quotation is taken from the Compendium Vitae of Erasmus. The authenticity of the document is supported by the editor of this volume of the Collected Works, along with his associates. See pp. 400-403. The fact that Erasmus only reached the third class in Deventer meant that he would have had neither Hegius nor Johan Sinthius (d. ante 1493) as his classroom teacher. These men taught only in the two highest classes, but it was common for the rector to speak to all the students on feast days. If we remember that about a third of the year consisted of feast days, it is clear that Erasmus would have been able to hear Hegius on a number of occasions in a fairly short space of time. Soon after Hegius arrived, he began to get rid of the "barbarous" textbooks of which Erasmus complains. Along with the way in which the Compendium Vitae states that Erasmus "later" sometimes heard Hegius, this lends support to the idea that it was at the very end of his stay in Deventer that Erasmus first became acquainted with the famous Deventer pedagog.
1482 rather than late in 1483 or the summer of 1484.1

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1Koch, Erasmus' Birth, pp. 24-38, particularly from p. 33. Allen's position is outlined in Erasmus, Opus epistolarum 1:578-84, where he suggests a 1466 birth for Erasmus and a 1484 departure from Deventer. Post, on the other hand, argues for a 1469 birth, and a departure "far into 1483." Post, Modern Devotion, p. 658. See also Regnerus Richardus Post, "Nochmals Erasmus' Geburtsjahr," Theologische Zeitschrift 22 (1966):319-33, especially pp. 325-30. Kohls proposes a 1466 birthdate and a departure before 1483, suggesting that Hegius could already have been in Deventer as early as 1479. See Ernst-Wilhelm Kohls, "Noch einmal das Geburtsjahr des Erasmus," Theologische Zeitschrift 22 (1966):359; and his "Rektoratsbeginn des Alexander Hegius," pp. 33-43. Koch builds an extremely convincing case for a birthdate of 28 October 1467. His evidence and reasoning more than adequately answer the questions raised and problems posed by Allen, Post, and Kohls. Since Koch published his argument in favor of a 1467 birthdate, further evidence has come to light which seems to support 1466. See John B. Gleason, "The Birth Dates of John Colet and Erasmus of Rotterdam: Fresh Documentary Evidence," Renaissance Quarterly 32 (Spring 1979):73-76. Gleason has presented conclusive evidence that Colet was born in the latter half of January 1467. There is no doubt that, if one accepts as true the remark made by Erasmus about Colet being a few months younger than he, then one must also accept that Erasmus was born in 1466. See Erasmus, Opus epistolarum, 4:515.1211.284-85. The question remains, however, as to whether or not Erasmus can be trusted. This problem is recognized by Gleason when he writes: "Now that Colet's birthdate can be fixed with certainty it is clear that, to the extent Erasmus' birthdate is inferrable from his, the Dutch humanist must have been born on October 28, 1466. . . ." Gleason, "Colet and Erasmus," p. 76. The confusing element is the fact that the comment about the age difference between the two men was made by Erasmus in a letter dated 1521. This was at the time when he had already added one year to his age in order to avoid the "climacteric" forty-ninth year. It might seem that Erasmus would not go so far in his self-deception as to mislead his readers about the age difference between himself and Colet, but it is not possible to be certain of this. In fact, once he had made the change in his age, he was equally concerned about the next major climacteric. When he reached the age of sixty-three, according to his revised birthdate, and, in 1528, added another year to his age, he was actually fleeing from an imaginary climacteric. See Koch, Erasmus' Birth, p. 43. If he considered these matters so seriously, it cannot be certain that he was not applying an imaginary birthdate of 1466 when he compared his age with that of Colet. It may be that 1466 is the year of Erasmus' birth, but in that case the comment that he makes about being fourteen on leaving Deventer must be rejected. He could not have left at that age and also have been in the school when Hegius was rector. If, on the other hand, a birthdate of 1467 is accepted, the information available with reference to Erasmus' early years and education and Hegius' rectorship in Deventer can readily be harmonized. No major rationalization of the historical data and extant sources is necessary.
Koch has made what appears to be a significant breakthrough regarding the beginning of Hegius' labors in Deventer. No details were known about the rector who served in the school at St. Lebuins prior to Hegius until Koch found mention in the city archives of a heretofore unknown Master Peter van Sparwoude. It seems that van Sparwoude was the head of the school\(^1\) until about the end of 1481. On 4 September of that year he registered a new will.\(^2\) By 5 February 1482 his two daughters, the sole beneficiaries named in the will, were in possession of his house, and we can assume that van Sparwoude was dead.\(^3\)

From what Erasmus says, it is certain that Hegius arrived in Deventer before the bridge across the river was opened in March 1483. Erasmus probably left Deventer before his birthday on 27 October 1482,\(^4\) and he had definitely gone by March 1483. Hegius' immediate predecessor died sometime between 4 September 1481 and early February 1482. We might hazard a guess, therefore, that Hegius arrived to take up his new post early in 1482. This is based

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\(^1\)The term *schoelmeijster*, later used of all schoolteachers, was, according to Koch, used only of the rector at this time in the history of the Deventer school. See Koch, *Erasmus' Birth*, pp. 36-37, especially n. 116. The term is used to refer to van Sparwoude in an entry in the Deventer Town Archives, Juridical Archive no. 55: Renunciation Books, 1479-86: fo. 51.2, dated 7 September 1479.

\(^2\)Deventer Town Archives, Juridical Archive no. 55: Renunciation Books, 1479-86: fo. 128.7, dated 4 September 1481.

\(^3\)Ibid., fo. 146.5, dated 5 February 1482.

\(^4\)If he were born in 1467, this would have been his fifteenth birthday, and he says he departed from the city when he was fourteen. This has been discussed above. See p. 27, n. 4; and p. 30, n. 1. Erasmus may conceivably have given an incorrect age, but scholars have been inclined to consider that this was an accurate report. If he was born in 1466, then the statement must be regarded as inaccurate.
on the assumption that van Sparwoude died shortly before the entry was made in the Renunciation Book on 5 February 1482 where his heirs are recorded as being in receipt of their legacy. It also allows for a short but significant period of time during which Erasmus would have had an opportunity to hear Hegius lecture at special services and meetings of the entire school body.\(^1\) In addition, this dating would not do any great violence to van Halen’s statement that Hegius began his work in the city in 1483, especially considering that some of the other dates in the \textit{Vita} are a little inaccurate.\(^2\)

There is some correspondence from Agricola that might at first seem to support the 1483 dating. In a letter written to Hegius, he congratulates him on the opening of the school. While the letter is not dated it can with certainty be shown that it was written from Groningen in the fall of 1483.\(^3\) Agricola says:

\begin{quote}
\textit{...}
\end{quote}

\(^1\)For a diagrammatic representation of the data, see figure 4, p. 34, where the relevant information has been set out in the form of a time-chart.

\(^2\)It is interesting that Arnold Moonen dates Hegius arrival in Deventer as 1482. His chronicle of the city cannot be considered very accurate, but Moonen may have had some sources that have since been lost. See Arnold Moonen, \textit{Korte Chronyke der Stadt Deventer, van de Oudste Geheugnisse af tot het Vredejaer 1648}, 2nd ed. (Deventer: Jan van Wyk, 1714), p. 60. See also the title page, where he mentions that he has used printed as well as manuscript sources.

\(^3\)In a letter written from Groningen on 6 February 1483, Agricola mentions to Dietrich von Plenningen (ca. 1420-1520) that his library was in Groningen and that it would prove to be a problem transporting it to Heidelberg. See Rudolf Agricola, \textit{Unedierte Briefe von Rudolf Agricola}, ed. Karl Hartfelder (Karlsruhe, Germany: G. Braunschen Hofbuchdruckerei, 1886), p. 29; and van der Velden, \textit{Agricola}, pp. 159-60. By 2 May 1484, Agricola was in Heidelberg, having passed through Deventer en route. See Nauwelaerts, \textit{Agricola}, p. 76. He soon set to work in Heidelberg, and in view of the fact that he makes no mention of there being any problem, it must be assumed that his library was already there. A remark in the congratulatory letter to Hegius makes it clear that Agricola had sent the library at the time of writing. The letter must therefore have
Now that you have made a good start in opening the grammar school in Deventer I wish you happiness and success. I know that at first the work will not be too flattering to you. The city itself has been wasted by the plague and must be to you a cause of terror and loathing. As a consequence it is inevitable that the assembly hall will not be crowded . . . and in a state worthy of your expectations. But I hope that your loss will be easily born . . . , and that a happier, more fruitful time will come, and heaven's blessings be restored.¹

It is true that the general impression gained on reading this letter is that Hegius was presiding over the beginning of a new school year for the first time. However, the text by no means demands this as the only interpretation. Agricola could have written these words to encourage Hegius in what he knew had been a difficult situation for the new rector. The school was undoubtedly closed during the time of the plague if even the magistrates had been forced to flee. Now that the school was open once more, Agricola, probably in reply to a letter from Hegius announcing the reopening, was wishing Hegius well for the future. Without the previous letter sent by Hegius to Agricola, the interpretation of this letter cannot be definitely settled. But if Hegius had, for example, written that his first year as rector in Deventer had been a difficult one, that the plague had caused a fall in the enrollment, and that he hoped when the school reopened the situation would take a turn for the better, been written after February 1483, but before Agricola passed through Deventer on his way to Heidelberg, at which destination he arrived in May 1484. Mention is also made in the letter of a very serious outbreak of the plague, and this is known to have occurred between August and mid-October 1483. See Jacobus Revius, J. Revii Daven-

³Rudolf Agricola to Alexander Hegius, [Fall 1483], from Groningen. See appendix B, Letter no. 2, p. 650.
TIME-CHART RELEVANT TO HEGIUS' ARRIVAL IN DEVENTER

Erasmus (E.) born
8th class
(Came to Deventer (D.) 1478--Jubilee yr. E. met Agricola in D.
1476--Jan
1477--Jan
1478--Jan
1479--Jan
1480--Jan
1481--Jan

28 Oct 1467
E. 9 yrs. 1476--Jan
E. 10 yrs. 1477--Jan
E. 11 yrs. 1478--Jan
E. 12 yrs. 1479--Jan
E. 13 yrs. 1480--Jan
E. 13 yrs.

(E.) born 8th class 7th class 6th class 5th class 4th class

Sparwoude (S.) d.
S. revises will 4 Sep
S. heirs have house 5 Feb
Bridge under construction
Bridge started
Bridge spans river 16 Mar

E. 14 yrs. (E. left D. when 14)
3rd class

E. 15 yrs.

E. mother d.

Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar Apr May
1481 28 1482 1483 1481

Hegius (H.) arrival: anytime after death of S.
H. & E. together in D.
H. arrival: probably early 1482
E. had probably left D. if precise about departure age
E. had definitely left D.

Fig. 4. Time-chart of events relevant to the education of Erasmus at St. Lebuins and the arrival of Hegius to take up the rectorship of the Deventer school. (Assumes 1467 birthdate for Erasmus. If Erasmus was born in 1466, data must be rationalized.)
Agricola's reply would have been a very natural one.¹

In a similar vein, a letter written to Anthony Liber (fl. 1470-ca. 1507) from Deventer in April 1484 could be taken as an announcement that Hegius had just become the new school rector. Agricola writes: "Master Alexander Hegius, who leads the school here, sends you greetings."² Agricola was at the time passing through Deventer on his way to Heidelberg. Liber was teaching at the school in Kampen, to the north of Zwolle.³ It is inconceivable that Liber, who was well acquainted with Hegius through the meetings at Aduard,⁴ would not already have known about Hegius' position in Deventer, even if it were true that Hegius had only been at the school since the end of 1483. Kampen is situated forty kilometers down the River Ijssel, a well-traveled waterway that connected it

1In a letter to Agricola one year later, dated in Deventer on 17 December [1484], Hegius writes: "You asked about my school affairs, [and] how they were progressing. . . . Now I have the school full, but in the summer it was a little less crowded, for the plague, which at that time killed over twenty of my students, took many away from here. . . ." See appendix B, Letter no. 3, p. 652. It can readily be seen that there was an ongoing correspondence between the two men concerning the state of the school.

2Rudolf Agricola to Anthony Liber, 7 April 1484, written from Deventer. The greeting reads: "Magister Alexander Hegius qui hic ludo literario praest, saluere te iubet." See Rudolf Agricola, Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii Lucubrationes, ed. Alardus of Amsterdam (Köln: Johannes Gymnicus, 1539), p. 177. Anthony Liber also goes by the name of Anthony Vrije van Soest. Allen, in Erasmus, Opus epistolarum, 1:580, n. 23, uses this letter as evidence that Hegius had recently arrived in Deventer.

3Lindeboom, Humanisme, p. 69, especially n. 3.

4Hegius' participation in the meetings at Aduard constitutes a very significant facet of his life during the years he was at Emmerich and the early years of his residence in Deventer. This is more fully considered in chapter 3. Liber also attended these meetings. He and Hegius may even have been colleagues in Emmerich, as they both taught there in the 1470s. See Lindeboom, Humanisme, pp. 68-69.
with Deventer. By April 1484 Agricola would not have been breaking any news to their mutual friend. This statement can have been no more than a greeting.

Alexander Hegius lived for about sixteen years in Deventer, probably in the home of the printer, Richard Paffraet (ca. 1455-ca. 1512). While many of his learned contemporaries traveled through Europe in pursuit of knowledge, the humble schoolmaster concentrated his efforts on improving the school that he came to regard affectionately as his own. The years between 1482 and 1498 were the most noteworthy in his life. As rector of St. Lebuins he was able to institute some remarkable changes that were of great significance to education in Northern Europe at the end of the fifteenth century. Deventer was among the first of the schools north of the Alps to institute the new approach to learning that became so much the hallmark of the Northern Renaissance. From a relatively small student body in a town troubled by the plague, Hegius built up a school that was second to none in the Netherlands. At its height, the students numbered about twenty-two hundred. The reasons for the astonishing growth and educational excellence of this school under his leadership becomes apparent as his philosophy and pedagogy are evaluated in the subsequent pages of this dissertation.

Hegius was personally acquainted with many of the leading

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1 See the letter from Rudolf Agricola to Alexander Hegius [ca. January 1485], written from Worms. In this letter Agricola sends greetings to a Master Richard and his wife, who are Hegius' hosts. Appendix B, Letter no. 4, p. 655.

2 Gerhard Dumbar, Gehardi Dumbar, Reipublicae Davenportensi [sic] ab actis, analecta, seu vetera aliquot scripta inedita, ab ipso publici juris facta, 3 vols. (Deventer: Johannes van Wijk, 1719-22), 1:413.
thinkers of Northern Europe in his day. He numbered among his closest companions Rudolf Agricola and Wessel Gansfort. Besides these, there were many others with whom he met at the monastery of Aduard during his years at Emmerich and Deventer. These men formed a sort of "Northern Academy" which provided quite an impetus to the rise of humanism in the Netherlands. Eager for knowledge, Hegius was not ashamed to learn from others, even if they were younger than he, and he deemed it a privilege to call Agricola his tutor. However, Hegius' genius lay not so much in his capacity to acquire knowledge. It was rather because of his ability to transmit this knowledge to his pupils that he achieved fame. His students found it possible to develop their abilities and talents under his tutelage, and a significant number of them are still remembered by scholars in the late twentieth century. These men bear grateful testimony to the skill of this almost-forgotten master teacher who is one of the great pedagogues in the history of Western education.

Erasmus writes of him in his Ciceronianus:

I am of the opinion that we cannot pass over Westphalia, which has given us Alexander Hegius. He is an erudite, holy, and eloquent man, but one who holds fame in contempt and has thus accomplished nothing great.\footnote{Desiderius Erasmus, Opera Omnia, 10 vols. (Hildesheim, W. Germany: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1961-62), vol. 1: col. 1014.b. The passage reads: "Haud transeundem conseo Westphalia quae nobis dedit Alexandrum Hegium. Virum eruditem, sanctum ac facundam nominas, sed qui gloriae contempest nihil magni molitus sit."}

Johannes Butzbach remembered well the day that his beloved teacher was buried. He depicts the scene in these moving words: "This man, greatly loved of God, died amidst the lamentations of the poor, for he had spent all his substance on alms, so that at his death he left..."
nothing except his books and his clothes." The words of these two men who had both been pupils in the Deventer school portray something of the kind of individual that Hegius was—a learned Christian scholar and teacher, and a man with a great compassion for others.

In a literal sense it is true that Hegius left very little behind when he died. To the casual glance it may even appear that he accomplished "nothing great," but in truth his legacy was a group of intelligent and well-educated young men. These men had sat at his feet and imbibed the elements of the new learning of the Northern Renaissance as well as the spirit of the devotio moderna. The impact of some of these scholars on the development of ideas in the sixteenth century, a period of the greatest importance in the history of civilization, can never be measured.

In order to evaluate Hegius' contribution to the genesis and progress of humanism in the Low Countries, one must first understand what were the distinctive features of the Northern Renaissance. It is this topic that is now addressed.

1 Hyma, Youth of Erasmus, p. 106, where he cites Butzbach's Auctarium. See Krafft and Crecelius, Beiträge, 1:32.

2 Any negative overtones in this statement need not be taken too seriously. Erasmus is passing judgment in the form of a dialogue on various authors. In response to each name brought forward, he evaluates the person's ability as a "Ciceronian." The reply given when the name of Erasmus is raised is much more damning. Erasmus, he says, is not even a writer, let alone a Ciceronian. All that he is able to do is smudge ink on paper. See Erasmus, Opera Omnia, 1: col. 1013.d-f.
CHAPTER II

THE SCOPE OF THE NORTHERN RENAISSANCE IN

THE LOW COUNTRIES

It must generally be admitted that a man is a reflector of his times and circumstances. It would not be a fair judgment to claim any more than this for Alexander Hegius. And yet, Hegius was not a person who capitulated to the force of circumstance. Rather, as one who mirrored his age, he sought out that which was, in his estimation, of value. Building upon such a foundation, he looked toward a brighter future. Hegius lived in a century of transition—an era when medieval and modern were intermingled. He was a man in whom traces of both ages could be found. While he was fundamentally medieval in outlook, his ideas and practices exhibited a freshness that heralded the dawn of a new era. The intellectual changes of the Renaissance introduced mankind to the modern age, and Hegius was an active participant in an aspect of this metamorphosis that is known as the Northern Renaissance. As rector of the city school in Deventer, Hegius became a prominent figure in the Low Countries. Under his leadership the school became one of the most successful of the institutions of Northern Europe in heralding the new learning.

Hegius' philosophy and educational concerns can only be understood in the context of a number of intellectual and religious currents that were flowing in the Netherlands in the fifteenth
century. After a brief introduction to some of the relevant issues of the Renaissance, this chapter explores in more detail four main currents of thought of importance to the this movement in the North. This is in order to establish the criteria upon which Hegius can be judged in chapters 5 and 6 of this dissertation. The present chapter concludes with a discussion of the Aduard Academy of which Hegius was a member. It was among this group of scholars that he had some of his closest and most influential colleagues.

The Beginnings of the Renaissance in the Low Countries and Westphalia

The fourteenth and fifteenth centuries were characterized by the Renaissance. It first manifested itself in Italy, but soon spread to the rest of Europe. Changes were taking place in the way men viewed the universe, the world in which they lived, and their own existence in that world. This intellectual rebirth continues

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1See, for example, Lewis William Spitz, The Renaissance and Reformation Movements (Chicago: Rand McNally & Co., 1971); and Hermann Arend Enno van Gelder, The Two Reformations in the Sixteenth Century: A Study of the Religious Aspects and Consequences of Humanism (The Hague: Martinus Niijhoff, 1961). These two scholars both refer to Jacob Burckhardt's pioneer work, The Civilization of the Renaissance in Italy, 2 vols., trans. Samuel George Chetwynd Middlemore (New York: Harper & Row, 1958). This work was first published in German in 1860. In highlighting the very significant intellectual changes that were taking place, all these authors point out that Renaissance men tended to look back in time. The focus of their attention was on what they considered to be a more glorious era in antiquity, and thus, on the achievements and abilities of their classical forefathers. It would be untrue to suggest that men generally became pagan or irreligious. There was, nevertheless, an undoubted shift in man's mental attitude toward God, the universe, and himself as an inhabitant of that universe. "The greater appreciation of earthly life," observes Van Gelder, "put a philosophical in place of a religious salvation, since man, conscious of his own worth, considered himself capable of self-deliverance through knowledge and effort." Van Gelder, Two Reformations, p. 9. Spitz makes a similar point:

"There was . . . a subtle shift toward interest in and anxiety
to be the subject of much scholarly debate, and defies definitive
description. The problem of its continuity or discontinuity with
the Middle Ages is one of the major points of contention, making it
difficult to establish the limits and achievements of the movement.
And yet, such a distinctive era begs definition in which its essence
can be encapsulated. One historian writing about the intellectual
developments of the period has attempted to capture their essence in
a very broad definition upon which he later elaborates:

Renaissance designates the period of transition from the culture
of the Middle Ages to that of the modern world. . . .

We may use "Renaissance" . . . to designate in its widest
reaches and deepest implications the animating spirit of that
period, which brought about the changes in intellectual and
moral attitudes by which this transition was affected, or . . .

about man in the here and now, as well as in the hereafter. The
contemplative ideal gave ground to the active and studious life.
One can with justice speak of greater intellectual freedom,
fewer inhibitions, and more pronounced individualism during the
Renaissance than during the centuries preceding it. . . . The
change in Weltanschauung during this period may be described as
a move from official other-worldliness to an interest in man in
this world. . . ." Spitz, Renaissance and Reformation, p. 6.

Unlike van Gelder, Spitz sees the Renaissance, even in Italy, as
being largely within the confines of fifteenth-century Catholic
orthodoxy. He speaks of Italy as being "anything but secular." The
view that the Renaissance in Italy was a pagan movement has been
sharply contested. See, for example, Charles Trinkhaus, "The Reli-
gious Thought of the Italian Humanists and Reformers: Anticipa-
or Autonomy?" and Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Role of Religion in
Renaissance Humanism and Platonism," both in The Pursuit of Holiness
in Late Medieval and Renaissance Religion, ed. Charles Trinkhaus
and Heiko Augustinus Oberman, Studies in Medieval and Reformation

Van Gelder is not, in fact, suggesting that the Renaissance Italians
were irreligious. He points out that they generally remained loyal
to Catholicism, but proposes that their loyalty was based on an
alternative and man-centered interpretation of salvation and the

The purpose of making reference to van Gelder and Spitz in this instance
is to show that, while interpretations may differ, there is a basic
acceptance of the idea of a changed intellectual outlook in which
man features in a much more central position.
to designate the expressive works in which that spirit found embodiment in every field of human concern.¹

The "animating spirit" to which Aloysius Caponigri refers in this definition is to be found in various movements that acted with and upon one another in a fermentation that produced the new age. He enumerates these as (1) mysticism, (2) the beginnings of the reform spirit in Christianity, (3) scholasticism, and (4) humanism manifesting the early spirit of Renaissance.² These are the currents of intellectual and religious concern that are explored here in preparing to evaluate the life and work of Hegius.

The Renaissance north of the Alps developed with certain contrasts to its Italian antecedent. Scholars have long recognized that the new learning in France, Germany, and the Netherlands manifested features that set it apart from the Italian pattern. There were, for that matter, even large divergencies between the various regions of the North.³ The area where Hegius lived and worked included the Low Countries and Westphalia, and it is on this region


²Ibid., p. 10. Scholars interpret the significance of these elements of Renaissance differently, but there seems to be a general consensus regarding the major influences involved. For example, see Spitz, Renaissance and Reformation, chaps. 1-2, 4-5; van Gelder, Two Reformations, pp. 3-14, 119-26; and Heiko Augustinus Oberman, "The Shape of Late Medieval Thought: The Birthpangs of the Modern Era," in Trinkhaus and Oberman, Pursuit of Holiness, pp. 3-25.

³A recent publication with contributions from a number of prominent scholars deals with the different emphases in the various regions. See Heiko Augustinus Oberman and Thomas A. Brady, eds., Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Italian Renaissance in the Mirrors of Its European Transformations, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, no. 14 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1975). See also Spitz, Renaissance and Reformation, pp. 274-99.
that this study now focuses. It was undoubtedly the advent of humanism to the Netherlands that allows the rebirth in that region to be considered a part of the "Northern Renaissance." It must, however, be acknowledged that the distinguishing features of this renaissance in the Low Countries arose out of the forms of mysticism, the reform ideals, and scholasticism that prevailed there.

**Mysticism and the Devotio Moderna**

Bearing in mind the obvious differences between the history and culture of the Netherlands and Italy, it is not surprising that, in terms of renaissance, there would be much that was unique to each place. For the people of the Low Countries, a nostalgia for the classical past of the Roman Empire in the manner of the Italians was inconceivable. The most eminent thinkers of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries in the North were not literary Latinists in the Italian mold. They were, rather, mystics, pious writers, scholastics, and theologians. "This fact," comments Jozef Ijsewijn, "was to have lasting consequences for the period during which humanism penetrated the Low Countries and even for the character of humanism itself in the northern context."  

Foremost among the scholars of the North in the century

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1Spitz, Renaissance and Reformation, p. 274, prefers to use the term "Northern Humanism" rather than "Northern Renaissance." It would seem, if strictly adhered to, that this draws unacceptably stringent limits in interpreting the intellectual developments in fifteenth-century Northern Europe. Spitz admits as much when he states on the following page that "there might very well have been an efflorescence of culture in Northern Europe in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries even without Italian influences."

2Jozef Ijsewijn, "The Coming of Humanism to the Low Countries," in Oberman and Brady, Itinerarium Italicum, p. 196.
prior to the emergence of humanism and the Northern Renaissance were Jan van Ruysbroeck (1293-1381), Gerard Groote, and Thomas à Kempis.¹ Van Ruysbroeck was a Flemish mystic much influenced by the ideas of Meister Eckhart (1260-1327), the great German Dominican. Ruysbroeck was in turn visited by Groote, who inspired his disciple, Florentius Radewijns, in the founding of the Brethren of the Common Life.² The Brethren lived pious but practical lives as members of a lay order in which they were not required to take permanent vows or withdraw from society in the manner of most regular monks. The Windesheimers who took monastic vows and followed the Augustinian rule also lived, to a large extent, in accordance with the ideals of Radewijns and Groote. These followers of Groote and the ideas that they espoused were the genesis of a movement in the Low Countries that is known as the devotio moderna or "modern devotion."

Hegius, while never actually a member of the Brethren of the Common Life, either lay or regular, was nonetheless closely associated with the modern devotionalists throughout his life. He was in all likelihood schooled by them at the city school in Zwolle, where they were quite influential.³ It appears that he worked in close cooperation with them in his early teaching career⁴ and, when he was rector of the school in Deventer, he employed at least one of the Brethren as a teacher. Along with this man, Johan Sinthius, he

¹With regard to Thomas à Kempis, see above, pp. 7, 9-12.
³See above, pp. 7-9, 12.
⁴See above, pp. 24-25.
pioneered the way for the new learning in the northern schools.¹ The close relationship that Hegius maintained with this movement throughout his life undoubtedly constituted a contributing factor in the development of his pedagogical ideas.²

The relationship of the devotio moderna to the Northern Renaissance and humanism in the Low Countries has in recent years come under close scrutiny. It has long been taken for granted that the devotio moderna was strongly influential in the course of northern humanism. Albert Hyma takes this view. He proposes a revisionist thesis which suggests that the Northern Renaissance was principally a northern movement having little in common with its more secular southern counterpart. The extended title of his major publication on the topic is The Christian Renaissance: A History of the "Devotio Moderna." The impression given is that devotio moderna is almost synonymous with "Northern Renaissance" and "Christian humanism." Hyma clarifies his position, proposing a less extreme view than would at first seem to be the case. Nevertheless, his understanding attaches a somewhat exaggerated importance to the significance of the devotio moderna in relation to the Northern Renaissance as a whole.³

¹See below, pp. 335-37.
²See below, pp. 75-84, 91-93, 222-31, and 317-21.
³The influence of Groote and the movement he founded has been the subject of many books and articles, and a fair amount of scholarly debate. Albert Hyma has been one of the most prominent of twentieth-century authors dealing with the devotio moderna. For a listing of his major published works, see the bibliography below, p. 705. His scholarship has in more recent years come under strong criticism from such men as R. R. Post. While it remains true that much of the criticism against Hyma is valid, it seems that he is too much berated and too little read. Notwithstanding the major
R. R. Post challenges Hyma's views, and in the process he takes up an even more untenable position at the opposite extreme. The extended title of his book, *The Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation and Humanism*, is as misleading in the one direction as Hyma's was in the other.¹

problems in his publications brought to light by more recent scholarship, his works still contain a great deal of valuable information and many valid insights stemming from a lifetime of study. It seems a pity to discard his work as some appear to have done when he still has much to offer. His revisionist thesis has been rejected, and rightly so. It has already been mentioned that the Italian Renaissance was not as pagan as has sometimes been suggested, and Italian influences in the North cannot be denied. Hyma, however, keeps reminding his readers of the distinctiveness of the Northern Renaissance, with its own particular brand of Christian humanism. It would clearly be unwise to allow this distinctiveness to escape the attention.

¹Regnerus Richardus Post, *The Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation and Humanism*, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, no. 3 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968). While Hyma may well take too broad a sweep, Post is at pains almost completely to dissociate men such as Wessel Gansfort and Hegius from the Brethren of the Common Life, and thus from the devotio moderna and its influence. See pp. 480, 577. He goes so far as to suggest that the Northern Renaissance and the devotio moderna were diametrically opposed (pp. 630-31). Post has done invaluable research and made a major contribution to modern understanding of the devotio moderna and Northern Renaissance. Nothing can detract from this. It does appear, however, that in his zeal to correct the deficiencies in the views proposed by such men as Hyma, he has almost removed the devotio moderna from its historical context. He has compartmentalized it and the lives of men connected with it so that, for example, what happened to Gansfort in his youth and formative years is of little significance in his adult life and the formation of his theology (p. 480). It would seem that Ijsewijn, Caponigri, and Spitz have been more objective in their appraisal and are closer to the truth. See above, pp. 40-42. They suggest that the devotio moderna and mysticism, while subordinate components, nonetheless constitute integral parts of the Renaissance movement. Certain elements of the two movements may well be mutually exclusive, but this cannot be a denial of interaction and synthesis. The suggestion has already been made that some of Post's conclusions need to be re-evaluated. See Heiko Augustinus Oberman, "Quoscunque Tulit Foecunda Vetustas," in Oberman and Brady, *Itinerarium Italicum*, p. xxiv; and Oberman, *Masters of the Reformation: The Emergence of a New Intellectual Climate in Europe*, trans. Dennis Martin (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 46-50.
There is good evidence to show that the Northern Renaissance was in some respects a native movement that soon grafted itself onto the Italian Renaissance. There is equally good evidence that the Northern Renaissance was stimulated by and indebted to its Italian antecedent. The truth of the matter seems to lie in an acceptance of both ideas. The new learning could not have sprung up in the North if there was no fertile ground in which it could germinate. At the same time, at least some of the seed that was planted was of Italian origin. The result was a flowering of ideas that had a definite classical Renaissance quality. The final product, however, was northern in essence.¹ A significant part of this distinctiveness was a result of the contribution made to the northern movement by the devotio moderna.

With its mystical tendencies and simple piety closely linked to practical social duty and Christian service, the devotio moderna cannot be ignored in seeking an understanding of the revival of learning in the Netherlands. Men like Rudolph Agricola, Gansfort, and Erasmus brought to their literary and intellectual pursuits much of the religious fervor imbibed in their earlier lives. In their school days they had associated with the Brethren of the Common Life as boarders or pupils in the brotherhouses. Gansfort and Erasmus were also at least indirectly influenced by the Windesheimers. Some of what they had imbibed of the spirit of the devotio moderna in their most impressionable years they took with them into the humanistic revival. It is at least partly the result of this that the

¹For a further discussion of the nature of the Northern Renaissance, see below, pp. 60-74.
Northern Renaissance is characterized by a stronger religious emphasis than was true of the revival of learning south of the Alps.¹

The Reform Spirit in Christianity

Wessel Gansfort and Erasmus are among those who have often been classified as forerunners of the Reformation.² These men

¹Besides the major contribution by Post, there are a number of other studies relating to the devotio moderna and its influence that have appeared since about 1950. For example, Paul van Overzee, Het Humanisme als Levensbeschouwing in de Nederlanden (Amsterdam: C. Hafkamp, 1948). Notwithstanding Post's early publications, van Overzee proposes a close link between the new learning in the North and the devotio moderna. He suggests that Dutch humanism can well be divided into an early, more medieval period—the devotio moderna, and a later period of biblical humanism (p. 14). This view is just one step removed from that of Hyma. Wybe Jappe Alberts,Moderne Devotie, Fibulareeks, no. 48 (Bussum, Netherlands: van Dishoeck, 1969), is a concise and factual work revealing the author's thorough knowledge of the primary sources. Its objectivity is a prominent and commendable feature. W. Lordeaux, Moderne Devotie en Christelijke Humanisme (Leuven: Universitaire Uitgaven, 1967), is a history of the devotio moderna in Leuven. This is an in-depth study considering the tensions and affinities between the devotionalists and the humanists in a unique situation. It is nevertheless valuable over the broader spectrum, for example, when studying the situation in Tubingen or Deventer where the Brethren of the Common Life also worked closely with the early humanists. An important article published by Lordeaux is "Het Boekenbezit en het Boekengebruik bij de Moderne Devotie," in Studies over het Boekenbezit en Boekengebruik in de Nederlanden voor 1600, Archief en Bibliotheekwezen in België, no. 11 (Brussels: Instituut voor Middeleeuwse Studies van de Katholieke Universiteit te Leuven, 1974), pp. 247-325. This study deals with library collections, and the ownership and use of books, including the classics, among the devotionalists.


"On the grounds of our three findings, namely that (1) the concept of Forerunner proves to be anything but alien to the period concerned, (2) the Forerunner is not a product of Protestant apologetics, (3) the rejection of the Forerunner is the outcome of an ahistorical disjunction of medieval and Reformation thought, we are prepared to defend the concept of the Forerunner of the Reformation as a valid and indispensable tool for
featured prominently in the coming of humanism to the Netherlands.\(^1\)

It is accepted that they were intimately connected with the development and blossoming of the new learning in the North. It must consequently be acknowledged that there were certain affinities between the reform spirit and Christian humanism that left a distinctive stamp on the Northern Renaissance. It is important that an attempt be made to discover what this reform-mindedness entailed. With this information it is possible to judge more effectively the nature of Hegius' involvement in the rebirth of learning in the Low Countries.

To the humanists of the North there was seldom any question of rejecting Catholic orthodoxy. The writings of Gansfort do at times exhibit a critical evaluation of the Catholic Church and some aspects of medieval theology,\(^2\) and it is true to say that Gansfort

\[\text{historical interpretation.}^\text{\textcopyright Forerunners of Reformation, p. 38. Oberman makes it clear that the classification of forerunner does not denote causation, but rather antecedence. From this perspective it is the nature of change rather than its cause that becomes critical. The forerunner is in this respect a precursor not only of the Protestant but also the Catholic Reformation. Thus, in speaking of a "reform spirit" in the Netherlands in the fifteenth century, it should be remembered that no direct connection with the Protestant Reformation is of necessity being postulated.}\]

\(^1\)These men featured, respectively, in the second and third stages of the rise of humanism in the Netherlands. See p. 74 below.

\(^2\)For a concise evaluation of Gansfort's ideas, see Post, Modern Devotion, pp. 476-86, 536-42, where his reform-mindedness is alluded to. Gansfort's appraisal of indulgences provides an interesting example of his attitude. He argues that plenary remission is not granted to anybody in this life. The pope, unaware of who will be received into heaven, has no authority to demand that anybody be so received by the granting of plenary indulgence. He observes further:

"How can one grant by Christ's authority, unless he grants in accord with the will of Christ? If then one grants indulgences by the authority of Christ and in accordance with his will and his evaluation of them, how, I ask, will you establish the claim that the will of Christ has determined that one and the same work of indulgence is worth--now six years, now seven, now seven..."
was at one time in danger of investigation on the grounds of suspected unorthodoxy.\(^1\) He was, however, in no way advocating schism.\(^2\) Rather, his reform-mindedness revealed a wish to purify the Church of false conceptions that he felt were damaging to it. For example, there was a cautious rejection of superstitious fables and a call to return to the truth of the gospel. Speaking of the much-discussed appearance of a supposed apparition from the dead, Gansfort writes:

As a rule I regard such revelations and visions as dangerous and illusory... The fact is that the Gospel has grown so old

\(^\text{1}\)Gansfort to Master Ludolph van Veen, from Zwolle, dated 6 April [1479]. Here Gansfort speaks about the fate of John of Wesel who had been condemned for heresy. "I learn that as soon as the inquisitor has disposed of him, he will descend with an investigation upon me." Gansfort's problems at this time stemmed partly from his espousal and propagation of the nominalist via moderna at the University of Heidelberg, where there was a strong faction in support of the realist via antiqua. Miller, Gansfort, 1:93-94, 237.

\(^\text{2}\)Gansfort was undoubtedly treading on dangerous ground, for example, in his attitude to papal authority. He recommends respect and obedience toward the pope, but nevertheless suggests that this obedience must not be irrational. Men should believe with the pope, and not in him. See Oberman, Forerunners of Reformation, p. 105. In his Farrago, Gansfort asserts:

"When he [the pope] believes what he should, the faithful are bound to assent to it, not simply because he believes it, but because it is what he should believe...."

"Hence we reach the conclusion: That although it may be assumed that the pope and prelates, in view of the high station of dignity to which they have been raised, walk in the truth of the gospel more nearly than all others, and that therefore... they should be believed rather than any of those subject to them, nevertheless their subjects are not bound to believe them without reserve." Quoted in Miller, Gansfort, 2:151.

At this point we can only speculate as to the consequences of a confrontation between Gansfort and the Church.
to us that we believe some one who returns and brings us tidings of the dead rather than the prophets and Moses, rather even than the apostles and evangelists. . . .

And yet I do not on this account reject revelations and visions that harmonize with the truth and induce piety. . . . In most such visions however we must not ignore the astuteness of the angel Satan, who transforms himself into an angel of light.1

An inducement to piety and an emphasis on the individual in relationship to God became the major concerns for Gansfort. His stress was on a love relationship in which God works the work required of man:

Everyone knows and loves this treasure [Christ] just as much as he values it. And to the degree that he knows, values, and loves this treasure he is reshaped in the image of God. . . . Only through these three things, that is, knowing, valuing, and loving God and Jesus Christ Whom He sent, and the Holy Spirit, only thus are we made participants of this treasure.2

From the life and writings of Gansfort one is able to ascertain a number of points that typify the spirit of reform as it was manifested in the Netherlands. First, there was no rejection of the authority of the Church, but there were questions raised about the manner in which the Church exercised its authority. Second, there was to be no mindless acceptance of beliefs and traditions, a point to be remembered in particular by those highest in rank. Third, those traditions that were based on superstition more than on biblical authority were to be questioned. And fourth, there was to be a simple and practical piety exercised in the context of a vital relationship with God. On this point, Gansfort was leaving behind some of the complexities of scholastic theology. It cannot be said

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1Gansfort to Gertrude Reyniers, in Miller, Gansfort, 1: 240-41.

2Gansfort to Jacob Hoeck, from Groningen, dated 19 September [ante 1489], in Oberman, Forerunners of Reformation p. 117.
that this was Luther's theology of righteousness. Gansfort still worked within the confines of a nominalist interpretation of salvation, but his emphasis was a new departure, and a token of the spirit of reform which is addressed here.

The points made regarding Gansfort's reform-mindedness do not all apply to the devotio moderna, though certainly this movement encouraged an intelligent if somewhat mystical faith, along with a practical piety. An additional aspect of the reform spirit in the Netherlands was, however, strongly in evidence among the devotionals. This was with regard to their understanding of ethics. The Brethren of the Common Life practiced a Stoicism\(^1\) that emphasized moral education. Knowledge was not an end to be desired in itself. Rather, the end to be achieved was a virtuous life, built upon a proper knowledge and understanding of God. The virtuous life was not one in which happiness was sought so much as one in which right was done. This would bring ultimate blessedness, though the present pathway might at times be difficult. The devotio moderna was, therefore, a reforming influence in the area of moral rectitude.\(^2\)

\(^1\)With regard to Stoicism, see below, pp. 66-70, 200-204.

\(^2\)Spitz, Renaissance and Reformation, p. 42, makes the following concise summary of the conservative moral attitudes and practical piety of the Brethren of the Common Life:

"The brothers worked as artisans in shops, instructed the poor, taught in their own schools, supported homes for poor students near cathedral schools and in university towns, copied classical and Christian manuscripts, and operated printing presses for devotional and even some scholarly material. In their schools they used the texts of the 'safe classics'--that is, the moral philosophy of Seneca and Cicero, the clean poets, and pedagogically sound rhetoricians. They have in fact been described with some truth as one of the sources of the northern Renaissance. Their spiritualist emphasis and Stoic ethic inadvertently tended to minimize the importance of the sacerdotal apparatus for the salvation of the individual".
The emphasis of the devotionalists and Gansfort on the need for a personal relationship with God is an evidence of one final point to be made regarding the nature of the spirit of reform. Unintentional as it might have been, the stress on an individual and mystical union with God lessened the need for reliance upon the Church. The structures established by medieval Catholicism as a means to achieve salvation were now dispensable, though it would not be true to say that they were discarded. Neither Gansfort nor the devotionalists sought to undermine the position of the Church. Their wish was to renew it from within so that it could better fulfill its function.

In Erasmus the pre-reform spirit reached its zenith in Northern Europe. He was an arch-critic of the Catholic Church and, at the same time, one of its most loyal sons. It is no wonder Luther observed that he had merely hatched the egg laid by Erasmus. Nor is it surprising that the Catholic and Counter-reformation movements could use some of Erasmus' ideas, even though his books were eventually included in the Index librorum prohibitorum after it was established in 1557. It is worth remembering that Erasmus declared that he first became aware of the new learning while he was enrolled at St. Lebuins. Without prejudging the issue of Hegius' reform-mindedness, perhaps it was also while he was a student in Deventer that Erasmus first came into contact with the spirit of reform.

Regardless of the impending Protestant revolt, the Roman Church faced a crisis at the end of the fifteenth century. There was an air of uncertainty following the Babylonian captivity, the schism of the Western Church, and the fall of the Eastern Empire.
The Hussite revolt, the conciliar movement, and moral decay in high places bespoke the end of the ecclesiastical monolith in its medi­eval form. In the context of this scenario, a spirit of reform manifested itself in Europe during the latter half of the fourteen hundreds. In Northern Europe this pre-Reformation movement had a number of distinctive features that have been outlined. In chapter 5 the reform-mindedness of Alexander Hegius is assessed in the light of these features.

Scholasticism

Another current of late medieval thought that should be considered in evaluating the contribution made by Hegius to the Northern Renaissance is scholasticism. The observation that scholasticism was a major element influencing the course of the Northern Renaissance might at first appear to be unfounded. It seems absurd that the northern humanists, who wrote so vehemently against the scholastics, would themselves be caught up in the scholastic web. Close examination, however, substantiates this link between humanism and scholasticism and reveals that there was at least some common ground.¹

  "Humanism and scholasticism not only defy simple, solitary definitions, but also resist a prevalent scholarly tendency to depict them as mortal enemies. . . . It has been suggested that in terms of their intellectual origins and approach to university studies many fifteenth century thinkers were actually
By the fifteenth century, scholasticism had developed, broadly speaking, into two opposing camps—the via antiqua and the via moderna. Traditionally, the Thomists and Scotists have been considered followers of the "ancient way" of realism. Those who espoused Occamism, on the other hand, were the "moderns," also known as terminists or nominalists. It must be acknowledged, however, that scholasticism cannot be defined in any simple manner, and that it is not easy to draw sharp distinctions between nominalists and realists as some have wanted to do. There is undoubtedly some validity in recognizing two major schools of thought in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. The problem is that, having once defined the schools, it is impossible to classify any one of the many individuals who contributed to the wegestreit as falling strictly within the limits of these definitions.

Recent scholarship has made it clear that those who were earlier classified as nominalists or Occamists can no longer be hybrids of scholasticism and humanism.

"Not only were humanist attacks on subtlety, ineloquence, and impracticality not without precedent among scholastic theologians . . . , but humanists also seldom let their criticism of scholasticism lead them to question the basic Christian content of scholastic learning. Critical of scholastic form and method, they became quite docile before the capital points of scholastic doctrine . . . . Those who chose to abolish scholastic doctrine as well as to criticize scholastic method became Protestants." Ozment, "Humanism," pp. 137-38.


2 Ibid., p. 499. The validity of this traditional appraisal of scholasticism, with certain qualifications and reassessments, has received some support in recent years by no less distinguished a scholar than Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The Validity of the Term: 'Nominalism'," in Trinkhaus and Oberman, Pursuit of Holiness, pp. 65-66.
considered to have belonged to one homogeneous school of thought. While there may have been certain similarities in some of their views, their ideological positions often had little in common.\(^1\)

The complexities of late scholasticism have become increasingly obvious. With deeper understanding, the earlier negative assessments made regarding nominalism have given way to a more positive appreciation of its role in the development of intellectual history. It is no longer necessary to view nominalism, particularly in its moderate "logico-critical" form, as a destructive force.\(^2\)

Rather, it may be seen as one of the crucibles in which language and ideas were tested as the late medieval era evolved into the early modern age. With this understanding, it may even be considered to have been creative.\(^3\) It is upon this creativity that attention is focussed in order to gain some understanding of the contribution

\(^1\)William J. Courtenay, "Nominalism and Late Medieval Religion," in Trinkhaus and Oberman, Pursuit of Holiness, pp. 26-59. Courtenay has summarized the major twentieth-century developments in the study of medieval scholasticism. After presenting the traditional theories, he has outlined a revision of these ideas and proposed some new perspectives and possible developments. The revised theory of late scholasticism divides the via moderna into three distinct groupings: (1) an Augustinian "right wing" branch, also known as the "historico-critical" group; (2) a central Occamist branch designated as moderate members of the "logico-critical" group; and finally (3) the radicals of the "logico-critical" group, most closely according with the traditional definition of nominalism. In this branch was the "left wing" of the via moderna, which was overly skeptical, stressed an extreme form of atomism or individualism, and emphasized the potentia absoluta of God to the limit of its consequences. (See pp. 27, 34-35.) In the new perspectives that Courtenay has proposed, he questions the use of the terms "Occamism" and "nominalism," and draws the conclusion that "'nominalism' should perhaps be left to the realm of logic, where it was subscribed to by many moderni who otherwise have little in common." Courtenay, "Nominalism," p. 53. Cf. Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 499-520.

\(^2\)Courtenay, "Nominalism," p. 49.

\(^3\)Oberman, "Late Medieval Thought," p. 11.
made by scholasticism to the Northern Renaissance.

Ernest A. Moody gives a brief evaluation of the writings of William of Occam (ca. 1285-1347) in the following terms:

The primary significance of what is called the "nominalism" of William of Ockham is its rejection of the confusion of logic with metaphysics, and its vigorous defense of the older conception of logic as a *scientia sermocinalis* whose function is to analyze the formal structure of language rather than hypostatize this structure into a science of Reality or of Mind.\(^1\)

Two major areas of concern in scholasticism as it related to the emergence of the new learning are highlighted in this statement. First, metaphysics was no longer to be established upon logic, and was completely separated from it. In the High Middle Ages metaphysics might better have been called metalogics, for it was studied within the framework of a formalized logic of language.\(^2\) Second, and a corollary of the first, logic was to be studied as a science in its own right.\(^3\) It was to be applied in the analysis and use of


\(^3\)Note Moody's comments:
"The logic presented by Ockham is a well organized and clearly articulated exposition of the common body of logical teaching... Precisely because this logic was a formal logic, it could be accepted and utilized by the scholastics of all parties regardless of the metaphysical or epistemological oppositions dividing... realists from nominalists." Moody, *Medieval Logic*, p. 6.

This logical methodology was a tool rather than a philosophical or theological ideology. Trinkhaus, "Religious Thought," p. 347, points out that the humanists avoided systematic analysis of epistemological issues, but used the logical tools in an analysis of the "structure of speech and language."
language, as it had been prior to the era of high scholasticism. It is worthy of note that it was mainly through the Occamist or moderate logico-critical category of nominalists that these contributions to the Renaissance were made.

A further influence arose out of the confrontation between the nominalists and realists. Throughout the fifteenth century the rivalries between the two opposing viae were expressed in attempts by their respective champions to elevate the one above the other in the universities. At Paris, Köln, Heidelberg, Tübingen, and elsewhere vigorous debate took place regarding the merits of the various propositions of the wegestreit. Occasionally feelings ran so high that physical violence and student riots were the outcome. Oberman points out that many who followed the via moderna, along with the modern devotionalists, "sought to transcend the scholastic... controversies, in pursuit of a synthesis of scientia and sapientia that would further the renewal of... Christian charity."¹ Among the more moderate moderni there was a desire to escape the scholastic web with its endless disputations and tiresome intellectualism. Influenced by the piety that was so much a part of life in the North, they sought a more practical and vital faith. Their aim was to simplify the complex whenever this was possible.² This attitude was carried with them into the Renaissance.

The term scientia as used above may be taken as knowledge that is rationally and philosophically probable. Sapientia, on the

¹Oberman, Masters of Reformation, p. 46.
²See below, p. 63, where "Occam's Razor" is discussed; and Oberman, "Late Medieval Thought," p. 13.
other hand, is devout wisdom based on revelation and belief. In the opinion of the moderni, knowledge might be used to support belief, but, in the final analysis, belief was to hold precedence over knowledge. Many things theological, they argued, are not subject to proof. The search for sapientia was thus not only a simplification of scholastic ideas, but it brought about a division between philosophy and theology. This was also a distinguishing feature that late scholasticism bequeathed to many of the northern humanists.\(^1\) The moderni along with the humanists showed a marked tendency toward epistemological probabilism, rejecting, for example, the alleged proofs of God.\(^2\)

One final area of concern for the moderni that should be considered is the subject of universals.\(^3\) In contrast to the views

\(^1\)One of the major distinguishing characteristics between the two viae concerned the relationship of philosophy to theology. The men of the via antiqua sought to encompass all knowledge in one non-contradictory system of philosophy and theology, albeit with philosophy subordinate to theology. The moderni separated philosophy from theology, so that, for them, what was philosophically or intellectually probable (scientia) might not actually be theologically sound. The consequence was a reintroduction of the division between faith and reason that the realism of the via antiqua did not acknowledge. The use of terminology was of great importance to this debate, and the nominalistic logic of the study of language played a central role. See Armand A. Maurer, Medieval Philosophy (New York: Random House, 1962), p. 266; and Trinkhaus, "Religious Thought," p. 345.


\(^3\)Courtenay, "Nominalism," pp. 37-43; and Oberman, "Late Medieval Thought", pp. 12-15, also mention questions regarding the contingency of creation, and the ordained and absolute will of God. These were pivotal issues within nominalism that are touched on in the evaluation of Hegius. They were, however, complex theological and philosophical issues in which the humanists of the Renaissance were not too inclined to get involved. See below, pp. 62, 64.
held by the men of the via antiqua, universals were considered by the nominalists to be names rather than actual entities. This is mentioned because it is one of the features that most easily distinguishes nominalists from realists. The importance of this matter is seen when Hegius' relationship to scholasticism and his involvement in humanism are evaluated.

One of the distinct impressions gained in exploring the relationship between scholasticism and the Northern Renaissance is that it was the ideas of the via moderna that were most influential in the emergence of the new learning. Inasmuch as scholasticism was a part of the Renaissance movement, it was moderate logico-critical nominalism that made the greatest impact on humanism. Hegius has been classified more as a realist than a nominalist by previous scholars. This is, therefore, a significant point that needs to be considered.

From this discussion of scholasticism the fact has emerged that there was more in common between the philosophers and the humanists than might at first have been expected. Scholasticism is, therefore, an important intellectual current that needs to be understood in order to gain a better grasp of the development of the Northern Renaissance.

**Humanism**

Humanism was at the heart of the Renaissance movement. The devotio moderna, the spirit of reform, and scholasticism were important elements in the rebirth of learning, but important only because

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of their effect on humanism. What remains now is that attention be given to the humanism of the North and the particular manner in which it manifested itself in the Low Countries. Hegius has been classified a Renaissance humanist by some and a medieval scholastic by others. Johannes Lindeboom observes that "we sometimes see him [Hegius], as it were, on a small humanistic mound, certainly superior to others, but quite unable to see over the scholastic wall." If a shadow of doubt is cast upon the humanism of Hegius, the question must be answered by establishing what was the essence of humanism in the revival of learning that took place north of the Alps, particularly in the Netherlands. The life and work of Hegius can then be measured and interpreted in the light of what could legitimately be expected of one who participated in the new learning in Northern Europe at the end of the fifteenth century.

At this point, therefore, a synopsis of scholarly opinion regarding the basic elements of northern humanism is presented. Humanism is a word so often used, with such widely differing connotations, both negative and positive, that such a definition seems appropriate. Six major areas of concern are discussed.

The first of these is the relationship of humanism to philosophy and scholasticism. In order to understand humanism as it developed at the end of the fifteenth century in Northern Europe, it is necessary to correct a misconception that it was an intellectual

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2It is recognized that such a task is not really possible in a limited number of pages. The result will undoubtedly fail to satisfy any one particular scholar, but it is hoped that a tolerable, albeit general, understanding will result from the effort.
awakening concerned with metaphysical or theological problems. Because the humanists polemicized against the scholastics, it is often assumed that the fundamental concerns related to the age-old controversy between Aristotle and Plato. This was not the case. The attacks of the humanists were a rejection of the complex and obscurant scholastic dialectic. The battle should not be seen as one in which some kind of "Platonistic humanism" was pitted against the realism of Aristotle, interpreted by the via antiqua of Thomas Aquinas (ca. 1225-74) or Duns Scotus (ca. 1265-1308). Humanism is perhaps better understood as a literary method than an ideology, and, in any case, the northern humanists generally remained more indebted to Aristotle than they did to Plato.

The humanists, while often appearing to be scholastic themselves, were prone to attack the "dialecticians" because of their "barbaric" views and methods. This apparent contradiction can be

1See, for example, Kristeller, "Humanism and Platonism," pp. 368-69; Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought," in Oberman and Brady, Itinerarium Italicum, pp. 4-5; Spitz, Religious Renaissance, pp. 7-8; and W. Keith Percival, "Changes in the Approach to Language," in Cambridge Later Medieval Philosophy, p. 808.

2See above, p. 54.

3Bartholomew van Keulen (1460-1514), a teacher in the Deventer school under Hegius, is quoted by Ijsewijn to illustrate the attitude of the emerging humanists toward those they considered scholastic "barbarians:"

"Babbling barbarism, you will sooner dethrone Boötes, Bear-keeper
From the pole of the northern world,
Before you cast down from their twin-peaked mount
The learned, laurel-crowned chorus of Muses.
If you do not cease molesting them with words, Apollo
Will crown you with a little donkey's ears."

Bartholomei Coloniusiensis Silva Carminum, cited by Ijsewijn, "Low Countries," p. 271. The Carmina was first published in 1491.
explained in two ways. First, quite simply, their emergence from scholasticism was not complete and, particularly prior to 1500, the early humanists retained much that is scholastic. This cannot, however, be considered a denial of their humanism. Second, while they rejected scholastic dialectic, they espoused many of the principles of the moderate logico-critical nominalists. These moderate followers of the via moderna used "Occam's Razor" against the specious arguments of their fellow scholastics. As a tool of literary philology, this logical method became a distinctive feature of humanism as well. The formal dialectic of syllogistic logic gave way under the influence of the writings of men like Lorenzo Valla (1407-57) and Rudolf Agricola. The new approach allowed for probability and persuasion, where the central issue was not only whether the conclusion of the argument had been validly inferred from the premises. It should not be assumed, however, that this was a rapid and all-embracing change. Even after 1500, and at the largest Italian universities, scholastic logic was still taught with traditional vigor.

The close relationship between certain aspects of scholasticism and humanism has been established, and it is clear that the humanists of the North were indebted to their scholastic fellows and

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2"A plurality is not to be posited without necessity." See Maurer, Medieval Philosophy, pp. 284-85. See also pp. 57-58 above.


predecessors. It is also necessary to understand what the basic discrepancies were between the two groups.

The humanists, absorbed as they were with literary pursuits, were inclined to keep away from any of the complex epistemological and metaphysical questions that absorbed even the moderate moderni. For example, the potentia absoluta and potentia ordinata of God and the contingency of creation were central issues for the Occamists. The humanists, however, did not usually involve themselves in these debates. It is not so much that they disagreed with the conclusions of the scholastics in any of these questions (though they may have done so). It is just that they were not concerned. Their attacks on the scholastics were not because of differences in philosophy or theology. Rather, they were opposed to the barbarism of medieval language, the metalogical methodologies, for example, of the modus significandi, and the formal, syllogistic approach to dialectic.

Another difference is that the literary bent of the humanists led them to an interest in original documents and classical and patristic authors. Unlike the scholastics, they were not concerned with established traditions and schools of interpretation.

Finally, humanists, following the advice of the classical rhetoricians, stressed right living and practical moralism over the

1See also pp. 54-60 above.
4See below, pp. 125, 160-61, 292-94, and 317-21, where the modes of signification are discussed.
need for absolute theological orthodoxy or an unerring rationalism. The scholastics, on the other hand, felt obligated to preserve true doctrine. This gave "right thinking and correct confession" priority over "right living and good deeds."  

A second major interest identifying the humanism of the Northern Renaissance was the concern for a learned literary philosophy. Fundamentally, humanism must be seen as a method of scholarly discipline and a manner of approaching intellectual concerns, particularly with regard to the *humanae litterae* or classical literature. Kristeller has said that the humanists were "grammarians and rhetoricians, poets and writers, translators and copyists, historians and classical scholars, and many of them, perhaps the majority, were nothing but grammarians and rhetoricians." Their study of the antique sources was characterized by an intense interest in the classical languages, the purity of which they felt had been lost in the Middle Ages.  

The humanism of the North has been described as a *transitus humanismi ad christianismum*, where the emphasis is more on the *sacrae litterae* than the *humanae litterae*. Excepting that the northerners were somewhat more oriented toward the Bible and the Church Fathers, their methods and classical style remained the same.  

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Theirs was a scholarly and critical philological treatment of religious texts, resulting in the publication of devotional literature in the classical style, as well as the printing of religious literature from the period of the Early Church.¹

The third identifying feature of humanism is the manner in which the art of rhetoric was elevated. Of the three arts taught in the classical curriculum, the one most emphasized by the scholastics was dialectic. The humanists, on the other hand, although they by no means rejected dialectic, discarded what they considered to be the intricate sophistries of scholastic debate. They acknowledged further that grammar was basic to the other two arts, and therefore of vital importance. But the art par excellence was rhetoric. The acceptance of man as an emotional as well as an intellectual being made the art of persuasion rather than the art of proof the focal point. Grammar and logic were instruments of great value and importance, but they were ultimately the servants of rhetoric.² In the North it was Agricola who, building on the ideas of Lorenzo Valla, introduced these new approaches into the circles of learning. The changes were not immediate, but through the sixteenth century his humanistic De inventione dialectica became the standard work on logic and rhetoric in many of the universities.³

²Bouwsma, "Two Faces of Humanism," pp. 3-6, 35-37, 43; and Kristeller, "Humanism and Platonism," p. 369;
distinguishing features of humanism in the Northern Renaissance is the area of intellectual concerns. In humanism there were at work two often contradictory forces—Stoicism and Augustinianism. There was a consequent conflict of interest that surfaced particularly in their intellectual and religious pursuits. This conflict was not necessarily one school of thought rivaling another. There were no large groups of humanists who claimed adherence to either a Stoical or an Augustinian orientation. Rather, it was an intra-personal struggle arising from the strength of both these elements in medieval thought and society. While some humanists tended to be more Stoical and others more Augustinian, in all of them there appear to have been traces of both ideologies. Many of the inconsistencies of humanistic intellectual endeavor may hereby be explained.

An example of this conflict was the elevation of intellectual activity in accordance with the ancient philosophers, while at the same time making reason subordinate to revelation in agreement with Augustine. In the North, where the other fine arts did not flourish until well into the sixteenth century, the intellectual life of letters became an all-consuming passion.

The Platonic division of man into mortal body and eternal soul had the consequence of attributing man's highest happiness to intellectual activity, to the complete exclusion of sensual gratification. It was by means of mental exertion that one could most closely approach immortality. Living in accordance with the eternal principles of reason emanating from the universal soul, one in a

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1Bouwsma, "Two Faces of Humanism," pp. 3-60. Bouwsma has presented some interesting and penetrating insights on this subject.

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sense transcended time and overcame death.¹

The humanism of the Low Countries in the late fifteenth century was not much affected by the universal theism of the Florentine Platonists.² Nevertheless, there was a keen appreciation of the enduring values that it was felt could be obtained from the collected wisdom of the past. In an age of crisis, there was a search for inner peace and security.³ The humanists believed that this could be achieved through sustained intellectual activity focused on an earlier era less tainted by the follies of men. They were confident that the previous "golden age" could be resurrected, and that a return to its pristine purity through the avenues of reason and the mind would bring stability to society.⁴ Hence the revival of the wish to educate rulers in the ancient classics, for thereby would be realized the ideal of government by wise "philosopher-kings."⁵

The Stoic belief that knowledge is virtue is not hidden far beneath the surface of these ideas. The powers of the mind are seen as the link between God and man. This concept is illustrated by the thoughts of Nicolaus Cusanus, who said that the intellect of man is the most valuable thing that exists next to God Himself.⁶

The Augustinian element in the thoughts of the humanists

²Spitz, Religious Renaissance, pp. 15, 39.
³Oberman, "Late Medieval Thought," p. 11; and Bouwsma, "Two Faces of Humanism," pp. 24-29.
⁶Spitz, Religious Renaissance, p. 11.
provided a counter to this elevation of the intellectual powers. This Augustinianism did not deny that happiness was to be found through activity of the mind, but it directed the thinking, particularly of the northern humanists, in the direction of a devout philosophical wisdom. The search for sapientia was an avowedly intellectual one, but it acknowledged that reason was subordinate to faith. In the final analysis, revelation was supreme. There was no avenue through which the mind could travel in a Platonic sense from the shadow of this world to the reality of God. Nor could this be achieved by specious scholastic "proofs." The distinction between creator and creature was complete. What was Platonic for the humanists of the Low Countries before 1500 was only so in the Neoplatonic Augustinian tradition of the Middle Ages. There was no revival of Plato as had occurred in Florence.¹

Augustinian theology was less inclined to divide soul and body and recognized a unity and wholeness in the nature of man. Sin could not merely be considered a function of a degenerate body. It was the result of the corruption of heart and mind. This devaluation in the humanist understanding of the powers of the mind allowed for a correspondingly greater emphasis to be placed upon the affective aspects of man's nature. The place of the will and the power of choice were acknowledged, and the Stoic concept of knowledge automatically producing virtue was recognized to be false. Other factors besides the intellect had to be considered in the search for philosophia Christi.² If there was to be a choice between knowledge

¹See below, p. 87, n. 1.
and virtue, then virtue must be chosen. Reason was a tool available to the humanist, but *virtus* and *humanitas* were the aims, for knowledge without conscience was considered to be the ruin of the soul.¹

The fifth area in this search for the distinguishing features that were manifested in the humanism of the North is that of religious concerns. The consequence of the particular emphasis of the northern scholars in their intellectual pursuits was that a much more specifically religious tendency was engendered in their humanism. Oberman asserts that the interest of the scholars of the Netherlands in humanism "is due to the recognition of the service it provides for the study of Holy Scripture."² In an area so strongly influenced by the *devotio moderna*, this is hardly surprising.³

The Italians were seeking to reestablish classical Italian culture. The northerners were much more specifically interested in early Christian antiquity. Likewise, where the Italians studied grammar, rhetoric, and poetry largely for their own sakes, the northern humanists applied these arts in the service of *sacrae litterae*. There was a much greater willingness in the North to recognize that intellectual pursuits must be the handmaid of religion, to acknowledge that reason is subject to faith, and to exalt the "folly of the cross."⁴ The enduring values of the classics

¹Silver, "Humanism," p. 120.
²Oberman, "Quoscunque," p. xxiv.
⁴Ibid., pp. 195-96, 277, and especially p. 282, where it is suggested that the northerners might well be called "humanist Christians" rather than Christian humanists. See also Bouwsma, "Two Faces of Humanism," pp. 41-45.
were held in high honor, but with reservation, for there were other values more perfect and enduring, of which the classics could only be a reflection. Rudolf Agricola writes:

We must have regard for this (moral philosophy) first and foremost . . . By means of these (moral examples from the classical philosophers and poets) we make a step toward sacred literature, and we must direct our way of life to their teaching. . . . The rest of the things that have been handed down have something more or less of error mixed into them. . . . But sacred writings are very far removed from all error, and they alone lead us by a sure, solid path.1

Both the Augustinian tradition and the Stoicism of the 

devotio moderna encouraged an emphasis in moral education. The moral humanitas of the South became in the North much more of a Christian pietas.2 The happy life was not the intellectual life, but the intellectual life that resulted in virtue--a virtue that could no longer be expected as the natural consequence of knowledge.3 Each individual must make an inner commitment, arising out of a personal exercise of the will, and directed by an informed conscience.4 The consequence of these views was a critical attitude to the formalism of church life5 and a desire to return to the golden age of Christianity revealed in the Scriptures and the writings of the Early Fathers.

Education is the sixth and final area examined here in

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order to discover the special characteristics that distinguish the humanism of the Northern Renaissance. The acceptance by many of the northerners of a practical \textit{vita activa} rather than the passive \textit{vita contemplativa} was a major feature of their outlook and practice. This was especially evident in their educational endeavors. "To them," writes Ozment, "man was a complete unity, driven mainly by passion and will, who found self-fulfillment not in withdrawn contemplation of eternal verities, but in active engagement in society."\textsuperscript{1} It was not sufficient merely to discuss and write in a classical style about Christian morality. The virtuous life was to be lived, and it was necessary that knowledge of it be passed on to the boys and young men who would be the leaders and scholars of future generations. Teaching was considered to be the most praiseworthy and useful of occupations, even if it was not always the easiest or most lucrative.\textsuperscript{2}

An important aspect of the educational endeavor was the attempt that was made to improve upon the Latin grammars of the Middle Ages. The desire of the humanists was to teach the classical languages according to ancient rather than medieval usage. By early in the sixteenth century, humanism was the predominant intellectual force in the Latin grammar schools of the Low Countries, and many of the textbooks were written and published locally.\textsuperscript{3} Reliance on

\textsuperscript{1}Ozment, "Humanism," p. 140. See also Bouwsma, "Two Faces of Humanism," pp. 140-41. The Augustinian acceptance of the wholeness of man legitimized physical and practical activity that had hitherto been considered inferior to intellectual pursuits.


\textsuperscript{3}Ijsewijn, "Low Countries," pp. 217-19, 241, 277.
Italian publications had been considerably diminished.

The mature conceptions proposed by the northern humanists regarding the work of the teacher may be found in the writings of Erasmus. A perusal of *De ratione studii* is sufficient to convince the reader of the high importance attached to the study of the *humanae litterae.* The task of the teacher was to instill in his students a knowledge of and love for the classics. At the same time, the students were to be drawn to Christ. The tensions resulting from these two major aims may be seen, for example, when Erasmus considers the place of the works of Plautus in the curriculum. He remarks almost apologetically: "Should someone think that a few, selected comedies of Plautus, free from impropriety, should be added . . . , I would personally not demur."\(^1\)

The pedagogical program of the humanists in the Low Countries may be seen as the practical outworking of their intellectual ideals. As such, it reflected the methods and concerns outlined in this section as distinguishing characteristics of humanism in the North. It would not be correct to think that in the latter part of the fifteenth century humanistic education suddenly replaced the medieval system. The change was a progressive one, and the ideals of the humanists were not fully realized even at the height of the


humanistic era in the sixteenth century. In fact, the progress of humanism in the Low Countries may be divided into three main stages. First, there was a period of interest and brief contacts with Italian humanism, ending in the early 1460s. Between this time and about 1485, the second stage of development occurred. This was the era of "epoch-making pioneers" who laid the foundation upon which the more mature humanists of the third period could build, around the end of the fifteenth century. In making a judgment on Hegius' humanism these various stages should be borne in mind.

Consideration has now been given to the main currents of thought and movements that flowed together to constitute the Renaissance in the Low Countries. Northern humanism, which was its main feature, was influenced by three other major elements, namely, the devotio moderna, a spirit of reform, and scholasticism. Looking at how these elements affected humanism has facilitated the establishment of criteria by which Hegius must be measured as his contribution to the revival of learning in the Low Countries is considered.

At this juncture, the focus of this study turns to the circle of scholars who met at the monastery at Aduard and Hegius' relationship to this group. The impetus given to the new learning by this intellectual fraternity was largely responsible for the emergence of humanism in the Netherlands toward the end of the fifteenth century.

The revival of learning in Italy centered round the cities, courts, and universities. In the North, humanism developed in the much humbler environment of some of the monastic houses, from whence it spread to the grammar schools and universities. The monastery at Aduard was one of these centers of renewed learning, and it was here that Hegius met with and learned from the other leading humanists as they searched for the bonae litterae and devout wisdom.

Aduard is situated about eight kilometers northwest of Groningen in the far north of the Netherlands. Under Abbot Henry of Rees (d. 1485), the Cistercian Abbey in this small community became renowned as a cynosure of scholarship in the Low Countries. Henry, who was abbot from 1449 until his death, seemed happy to offer a haven of rest and refreshing to any learned priest, physician, philosopher, scholar, or teacher. The leading intellects of the time would gather here during their vacations, or whenever opportunity allowed, and share with each other their thoughts and aspirations.

Though Aduard has been described by eye-witnesses and many scholars even up to the present as a "northern academy," its influence should not be compared with that of the Florentine Academy. There was no revival of Plato at Aduard, but, in harmony with the early beginnings of the revival of learning in the Low Countries, there was a considerable revival of devout scholarship. Aduard became a catalyst for the mysticism of the devotio moderna, scholasticism, and the reform spirit of the late fifteenth century as they came into contact with the newly developing humanistic ideals.
producing an amalgamation that was a token of the Northern Renaissance. Hegius was one of those who frequented this abbey, and he counted among his closest friends the two leading figures of the academy, Wessel Gansfort and Rudolf Agricola.

Two major sources of information regarding the events at Aduard exist. One of these is a collection of letters made by Antony Liber, who had studied in Italy during the 1460s, and who became a well-respected teacher in the Low Countries. The writings of Goswinus van Halen provide the other source.

Van Halen lists a number of the men with whom he became acquainted while studying in Groningen, where he worked as a famulus or servant of Gansfort. In a letter to Albert Hardenberg (1510-74) he writes:

I have known Adwerd for forty years and more. In the early days you could not find a learned man in all Friesland except by going to Adwerd, which at that time was not so much a monastery as an Academy. Of these facts the following would testify if they were alive:—Rudolf Agricola, Wessel of Groningen [Gansfort], Willem Fredriks, Pastor; Johannes Oestendorp, who is still living, Canon at Deventer, and my teacher; Rudolf von


Langen of Münster; Paulus Pelantinus; Alexander Hegius, also my teacher; Johannes Canter of Groningen, father of Jacobus Canter, Poet Laureate; Lambert Fryling of Groningen; and (I had almost passed him by) "eques auratus," Onno van Eusum; also Arnold of Hildesheim; and others who were accustomed to spend whole weeks, not to say months, in Adwerd, in order to hear or learn that which would make them daily wiser and better. And then there was that man . . . Father Hendrick van Rees, whose breast was nothing less than the hiding place of the Holy Spirit and the repository of Sacred Writ. I have repeatedly heard my predecessor, John of Oudkerk, say that all his discourse breathed forth learning and the sweetness of the Holy Spirit. . . .

And oh, how great a friend was Arnold Gryp to me. . . .
Yes, and Bernhard van Doesborch, later Abbot; and Henry van Edam . . . ; and Rudolph Hilderbrand. . . . When Rudolph died, I thought I never again should obtain such a friend in Adwerd.1

Liber is not named in this list of scholars and students, but he is mentioned later in the letter. He had been a student in Pavia in 1468, and was a colleague of Hegius at the school in Emmerich. Upon leaving Emmerich he taught in turn at schools in Köln, Kampen, . . .

1Goswinus van Halen to Albert Hardenberg, dated 23 November 1528, published in Hardenberg, "Vita Wesseli." This translation is taken from Miller, Gansfort, 2:327-28. From about 1510-30 van Halen himself was rector of the house of the Brethren of the Common Life in Groningen; Willem Frederiks (ca. 1450-1527) spent some years in Italy and was pastor of the St. Maartens Church in Groningen from about 1480; Johannes Oostendorp (fl. 1480-1520) was a successor to Hegius as headmaster of the school in Deventer; Paulus Pelantinus (fl. 1480) was a physician and an early poet of the Adward circle; Johannes Canter (ca. 1425-ca. 1500) is considered second only to Rudolf Agricola amongst the early humanists of the Low Countries; Lambertus Frjling (fl. 1480) had studied at Ferrara in Italy; Onno van Eusum (fl. 1445-80) had made a pilgrimage to the Holy Lands in 1445; Arnold of Hildesheim (fl. 1480) was rector of the school in Emmerich soon after Hegius left there; Johan van der Oldekerken (fl. 1480-ca. 1507) was head of the brotherhouse in Groningen. Arnold Gryp (fl. 1480) and Rudolf Hilderbrand (fl. 1480) both studied at Köln; Bernhard van Doesburg (fl. 1480-1507) was later abbot of the brotherhouse of Doesburg; and Henry of Edam (d. 1518) was procurator of the House of Florentius, the Deventer brotherhouse, at the time that Hegius was schoolmaster. See van Rhijn, "Goswinus," pp. 5-6; and his Studiën over Wessel Gansfort en Zijn Tijd (Utrecht: Kemmink & Zoon, 1933), pp. 160-62. With regard to Rudolf von Langen, see above, pp. 3, 7-9; Klemens Löffler, "Rudolf von Langen," in Westfälische Lebensbilder, vol. 1, ed. Aloys Bömer and Otto Leunenshöch (Münster, Westf.: Aschendorffschen Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1930), pp. 344-57; and Ijsewijn, "Low Countries," pp. 227-28.
Amsterdam, and Alkmaar. Liber wrote to a number of the members of the Aduard Academy, and quite a collection of letters has been preserved.

From these letters and from further comments made by van Halen, the concerns and aspirations of those belonging to the Aduard circle may be gauged. When one considers the diverse backgrounds of the men who met at Aduard, and the broad spectrum of interests involved, it is quite astonishing how these men interacted and shared with each other. At least in the history of this particular fellowship of scholars, the supposed exclusiveness of those eager for the new learning is found to be fallacious. Wessel Gansfort—philosopher, mystic, pre-reformer, and pre-humanist—appears to have been admired by all. He was happy to answer the questions of the scholastics, advise the aspiring humanists, and, in the tradition of the devotio moderna, to serve as a spiritual father to all.

Hardenberg reports of an incident that occurred when a certain Doctor Martin visited Aduard from Paris:

At the table of the Abbot, Henry Rees, while all were eating, 

1Regnerus Praedinus (1510-59) was a prominent teacher who, though he was extremely critical of the Roman Church, remained a faithful Catholic. He and Hardenberg report a number of further incidents from the history of Aduard. Some of these are second-hand accounts purported to have come from van Halen, but they were written many years after the events in question were supposed to have taken place. Hardenberg, in particular, along with other Protestant reformers, tends to portray Gansfort as a Protestant, which he was not. It is necessary, therefore, to weigh some of these reports with care. See de Vocht, Collegium Trilingue, 1:142-48; and van Rhijn, Studien over Wessel Gansfort, pp. 183-84.

2There was a decree published on 1 March 1474 condemning the teaching of nominalism in Paris, and throughout this period Paris was in an uproar as a result of the wegestreit.
this doctor began forthwith to ask Wessel many questions. . . . After luncheon . . . Wessel said, "Now present whatever you please." The doctor presented many points. But such were the replies he received from Wessel that he jumped up from the table, threw off his bonnet and kneeling upon it said in the deepest admiration: "Either you are a second Alanus [Alan of Lille (1128-1202), an apologetic and polemical philosopher], or an angel from heaven, or another Being, whom I will not name. Blessed be God! I am not disappointed in my desire. It is not in vain that I have sought you, nor in vain that the 'Master of Contradiction' was admired and hated by the Doctors of the Sorbonne."

Wessel had not lost the powers of debate, and even in his old age he could apparently hold his own with the "schoolmen."

It is said that Agricola, who has been called the father of humanism in Germany and the Low Countries, sought if possible "not to depart a finger's breadth in the least" from Gansfort's side. While Gansfort's style of writing does not give much evidence of the humanistic ideal of classical purity, his thinking certainly had much in common with the rising tide of humanism.

In his last years, Gansfort was appointed pastor over the nuns of St. Clara in Groningen. In a letter to one of his charges he advises her in his capacity as a spiritual counselor:

Be regular in the observance of your duties in your cloister home, and that will suffice your body for discipline. In the matter of sleep and food and drink and clothing, follow the


\[3\] One scholar has made an interesting comparison, suggesting that Agricola's humanism was "vorm-rijk maar ideeën-arm," while Gansfort's form or style was unskilled, but in the world of ideas, infinitely more fruitful. Lindeboom, *Humanisme*, p. 62. See also de Vocht, *Collegium Trilingue*, 1:148; and van Rhijn, *Studien over Wessel Gansfort*, p. 92.
common usage and be content. But in your reflection and medita-
tion on the Lord Jesus never be content. By so doing you will
often have him as the sweet guest of your heart, and by his
counsel he will faithfully control all your thoughts.¹

The simple piety and practical mysticism of the devotio moderna are
quite apparent in Gansfort's advice. The same may be said of his
advice to the monks at Aduard, who were in the habit of reading at
mealtimes a worldly-wise book called The Dialogs of Caesarius. "It
would be better," he exhorted, "to have theology and the devotions
of Bernard [of Clairvaux (1090-1153)] presented before the Brethren;
for this [Caesarius] contains not only absurdity, but much that is
dangerous."² The monks took heed of his admonition and soon dis-
carded the offensive work along with others that Wessel despised.

In a letter written by Hegius it is clear that he is respon-
ding to a concern that Gansfort has expressed regarding the aims of
teaching and the subject matter in the curriculum of the Deventer
school. "You ask to be informed of my tutoring. I have followed
your counsel. For all learning is pernicious that is attended with
loss of honesty."³ Gansfort was aware of the dangers inherent in
the new learning and the revival of the classical writings. His
letter must have been a reminder to Hegius of the importance to be
attached to piety and godliness. The renaissance in learning should
not be allowed to overwhelm the sound moral principles of the devot-
tio moderna that both men had espoused from their youth.

¹Gansfort to an unnamed nun, n.d., in Miller, Gansfort, 1:245.
²Hardenberg, "Vita Wesseli," in Miller, Gansfort, 2:342-43.
³Hegius to Wessel Gansfort, from Deventer between 1482 and
1489, in appendix B, p. 656.
As a child, Gansfort had attended the city schools in Groningen and Zwolle. In both places he had come under the influence of the Brethren of the Common Life. In Zwolle he became acquainted with and was influenced by Thomas à Kempis. He was educated in the via antiqua at Köln, but eventually adopted a nominalist outlook after failing to convince some friends in Paris of the validity of Thomistic realism. Although he turned to the via moderna, it would be false to suggest that he rejected all his former beliefs and ideas. Evidence remains of both ideological schools in the wege-streit, even in his later writings. Between his enrollments at Köln and Paris, he attended the university in Leuven for a short

1Van Rhijn, Wessel Gansfort, pp. 23-38. In Zwolle Gansfort certainly resided in the dormitory or klerckenhuis of the Brethren of the Common Life. R. R. Post acknowledges Gansfort's close ties to the devotio moderna but asserts that only his pious writings reflect that link. Post considers "quite simply omitting" the theological writings from any discussion of the influence of the devotio moderna upon him. To separate the piety of a man like Gansfort from his theology is tantamount to suggesting that a body without breath is a living creature. In his later years Gansfort was intimately connected with the devotio moderna. This is clear from his residence at St. Agnietenberg. He may not be typical of everything that the devotionals represented, yet it is inconceivable that he should not be considered to reflect their tradition. See Post, Modern Devotion, pp. 476-86. De Vocht's evaluation, erring as it does to the opposite extreme, is almost certainly closer to the truth. "Most of the peculiar views of Wessel about religion and religious practices, as well as about studies and methods, can be traced to those of his first masters." De Vocht, Collegium Trilingue, 1:139, n. 4.

2"There I frequently heard and first cherished Thomas à Kempis, when I visited the school in that place." Kan, Programma, p. 5. This statement in the fragment on the life of Gansfort published by Kan should not be doubted. The author, van Halen, is quoting Gansfort. The earliest manuscripts of Gansfort's writings make mention of à Kempis on a number of occasions. The Protestant reformers were inclined to remove references to à Kempis in their editions, so mention of the mystical sage from St. Agnietenberg actually argues in favor of the authenticity of the fragment.

3Van Rhijn, Studiën over Wessel Gansfort, pp. 99-100.
time. There he studied Greek and a little Hebrew, and acquired a
taste for the new learning. The circle of friends with whom he
joined were interested in the intellectual developments of the
Italian Renaissance, and his curiosity was soon aroused.\(^1\) Gansfort
visited Rome, and quite possibly Greece and Egypt as well.\(^2\) His
last years were spent traveling between St. Agnietenberg in Zwolle,
St. Clara's in Groningen, and Aduard. Gansfort was in many ways a
prototype of the "Renaissance man."\(^3\)

Hegius shared Gansfort's interests and appears to have been
a close friend of this pious and learned man. Besides the concern
expressed by Gansfort for the work of Hegius at the Deventer school,

\(\)\(^1\)De Vocht, *Collegium Trilingue*, 1:140.

\(\)\(^2\)Van Rhijn, *Wessel Gansfort*, pp. 87-93. See also Harden­
berg, "Vita Wesseli," in Miller, *Gansfort*, pp. 321-22, 341; and the
extract by Gerardus Geldenhauer dealing with the life of Wessel, in
Johannes Fichardus, ed., *Vororum qui superiori nostroque eruditione
et doctrina illustres atque memorabiles fuerunt, Vitae* (Frankfurt:
Christianus Egenolphus, 1531), fo. 87 verso. An English translation
is given in Miller, *Gansfort*, 2:345-47.

\(\)\(^3\)For the writings of Wessel Gansfort, see M. *Wesseli Gans­
fortii . . . opera*. Other works with valuable contributions for an
understanding of the life and thought of Gansfort besides those by
van Rhijn and Miller include old studies by Carl Ullmann, *Reformers
Before the Reformation*, 2 vols., trans. Robert Menzies (Edinburgh:
T. & T. Clark, 1855); and Barend ter Haar, *Willem Mol, and Edel­
hardus Bernardus Swaelue*, eds., *Geschiedenis der Christelijke Kerk
in Nederland in Tafereelen*, 2 vols. (Amsterdam: G. Portielje & Zoon,
1864-69). The books and articles by van Rhijn appear to be the most
scholarly. Ullmann and ter Haar have tended to accept uncritically
the statements of Hardenberg and Geldenhauer and have therefore
interpreted Gansfort as a Protestant pre-reformer. Miller has some
of the same failings, but the translation of the works from the
Gansfort Opera by Jared Waterbury Scudder are well executed. Post,
in *Modern Devotion*, pp. 476-86 inter alia, has some interesting
comments; and William Spoelhof, "Concepts of Religious Nonconformity
and Religious Toleration as Developed by the Brethren of the Common
Life in the Netherlands, 1374-1489" (Ph.D. dissertation, University
of Michigan, 1946), is a masterful study with some thoughtful obser­
vations about Gansfort.
the single extant piece of correspondence between these two men reveals much about their relationship. The letter begins: "I am sending you, most excellent sir, the Homiles of John Chrysostom. I hope the reading of them will afford you delight. For golden words always pleased you more than golden coin."¹ At the time of writing Hegius had just returned from a trip on which he had obtained certain literary works from among the books left by Cardinal Nicolas Cusanus. The reference to this in the letter suggests an ongoing correspondence between the two men. "I have been, as you know, in the Cusan Library."² It is also obvious that the Homiles of Chrysostom were not the only books that passed between these two scholars. Regarding the works from the library of Nicolaus Cusanus, Hegius says: "If you want any of these, let me know; they shall go to you. For it is not right that I should have anything that I would not share with you." Hegius goes on to ask, "If it will not inconvenience you to be without the Greek gospels,³ I beg you to lend them to me." Finally, Hegius salutes Gansfort: "Farewell, and if you want me to do anything, signify it to me and it will be done."

Hegius' admiration and respect for Gansfort is obvious, and

¹Hegius to Wessel Gansfort, from Deventer between 1482 and 1489, in appendix B, p. 656.

²Emphasis added. The library was established by Nicolas Cusanus in the basement of the hospital he had founded in his home town of Cues.

³Perhaps these were the gospels purported to have been given to Gansfort by Pope Sixtus IV from the Vatican Library. See Hardenberg, "Vita Wesseli," in Miller, Gansfort, 2:325. Gansfort, offered a bishopric, is reported to have turned it down and asked instead for a Greek and Hebrew Bible.
his apparent willingness to solicit and follow the advice of the older man suggests that Hegius would have been fairly strongly influenced by him. Hegius almost certainly wrote his Dialogs sometime following 1479, after which he would have been in close contact with Gansfort. The assumption can probably be made that Hegius at least partly accepted the philosophic outlook of Gansfort.¹

Hegius' relationship with the other prominent figure of the Aduard Academy is equally enlightening in providing a better understanding of the Deventer schoolmaster. Rudolf Agricola was undoubtedly the leading humanist in the Low Countries prior to 1485. Born about 1444 at Baflo, north of Groningen, Agricola was a precocious child. From an early age he exhibited a keen interest in music and study. He attended school in Groningen, probably at St. Maartens, the more prestigious of the two schools in the city. It is quite likely that he had fairly close ties with the Brethren of the Common Life, and he may have lived in the klerckenhuis where he would have been cared for by the brothers.² Agricola studied further in Erfurt, Köln, Leuven, and, possibly, in Paris. During these years he became proficient in philosophy, tending toward

¹A clear exposition of Gansfort's intellectual and philosophical position is given by van Rhijn, Stüdi en over Wessel Gansfort, pp. 91-102. The parallels and discrepancies between the ideas of the two men are interesting to note. See below, pp. 256-57, where these questions are explored further.

²Marcel Augustinus Nauwelaerts, Rodolphus Agricola (The Hague: Kruseman, 1963), pp. 11-12. Agricola's father, the abbot of the monastery at Selwert, maintained close links with the Brethren of the Common Life in Groningen. Post, Modern Devotion, p. 10, disputes the idea of any connection between Agricola and these Brethren. He argues that even if there was a connection with the devotio moderna, this was of no consequence in terms of Agricola's intellectual development. His observations in this instance are more plausible than was the case in his evaluation of Gansfort.
Thomism; he learned to speak French eloquently; and, particularly while at Leuven, he began to admire the style and thoughts of Cicero and Quintilian, and to develop a yearning for humanistic studies. He received his M.A. from Leuven in 1465. If he spent any time in Paris, then it is possible that he began his study of Greek there, perhaps under Wessel Gansfort. In 1468 Agricola traveled to Italy, where, except for a couple of trips of short duration to the North, he remained for ten years. He studied at Pavia from 1469-74, devoting his attentions to Cicero and Quintilian, though he was supposed to be studying law. In 1475 he enrolled at Ferrara, where he concentrated on a study of poetics and Greek, apparently attaining the distinguished title of Doctor of Arts. One of his lecturers in Greek was the famous

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1Agricola has been adjudged a moderate realist who accepted the views of the Thomists and, thus, the traditions of the via antiqua. Spitz, Religious Renaissance, p. 26; and Paul Mestwerdt, Die Anfänge des Erasmus Humanismus und "Devotio Moderna" (Leipzig, Rudolf Haupt, 1917), p. 105. John of Wesel, who held nominalist views, was teaching at Erfurt from about 1450, but Agricola was only there for a short time, matriculating at the age of twelve in 1456. It is not likely that there would have been much contact between these two individuals. Köln, Leuven, and Paris remained by and large in the tradition of the realists, although there was a lot of disputation regarding the wegestreit in the intellectual circles of Paris. Hyma makes the following observations concerning Agricola: "In common with Hegius, he [Agricola] displayed a wholesome respect for the works of Aristotle. . . . He was neither a realist nor a nominalist, but favored the Thomistic philosophy above Scotism. He was less interested in theology and philosophy than in rhetoric." Albert Hyma, The Youth of Erasmus, 2nd ed. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), p. 117.

2De Vocht, Collegium Trilingue, 1:149-50.


4Nauwelaerts, Agricola, p. 33.
Battista Guarino (1434-1513).\footnote{Ibid., p. 35; and John Edwin Sandys, A History of Classical Scholarship, vol. 2: From the Revival of Learning to the End of the Eighteenth Century (New York: Hafner Publishing Co., 1958), p. 51.} In 1479 Agricola returned to the Netherlands, where he lived in Groningen, working for the city government. In 1484, at the request of his friend of former years, John of Dalberg, now Bishop of Worms, he proceeded to Heidelberg where he taught and pursued his scholarly interests. In 1485, after a trip to Rome, he died at Heidelberg in the arms of his friend, the bishop.\footnote{There is a discussion of the primary sources relating to the life of Agricola in van der Velden, Agricola, pp. 1-18. Of the five major sources, excluding Agricola's letters and works, the two most relevant to this present study are the vita by Goswinus van Halen, "De Rod. Agricolae," in Kan, Programma, pp. 5-13; and Gerardus Geldenhauer, "Vita Rodolphi Agricolae Frisii," in Fichardus, Virorum qui superiori, fo. 83 verso-84 recto. Agricola's works are published in his Lucubrationes; and Rodolphi Agricolae Frisii de inventione dialectica, ed. Alardus of Amsterdam (Köl: Johannes Gymnicus, 1539). For his letters, the best information is found in Percy Stafford Allen, "The Letters of Rudolph Agricola," The English Historical Review 21 (April 1906):302-17. Allen gives pertinent information regarding each of the letters, including where they may be found. The main secondary sources, already mentioned in the footnotes of this chapter, are van der Velden, Agricola; Nauwelaerts, Agricola; and a chapter entitled "Agricola: Father of Humanism," in Spitz, Religious Renaissance, pp. 20-40.} An important question appertaining to the course of the Northern Renaissance is whether or not Agricola, the "Father of German humanism," was influenced by the Platonic revival in Italy. The unanimous verdict given by scholars of the life of Agricola is that he was not significantly touched by any of these ideas so prominent south of the Alps.\footnote{See, for example, Spitz, Religious Renaissance, p. 16.} Like his northern colleagues, Gansfort and Erasmus, he never came under the spell of the Florentine Academy.
Though all these men spent time in Italy, none of them returned to the North with any thoughts of introducing the concept of universal theism so much a part of the renewed Platonism. What was Platonic in their thought was probably more the result of medieval Augustinianism than anything else. As a consequence, the Renaissance of the Low Countries never fell under the shadow of a revived Plato in the Florentine tradition.¹

Of much more significance to the North was Agricola's interest in the writings of Lorenzo Valla. The similarities between the thoughts of Agricola in his De inventione dialectica and the ideas

¹Ibid., p. 15. For a survey of Florentine Platonism beyond the borders of Italy, see Paul Oskar Kristeller, "The European Significance of Florentine Platonism," in Medieval and Renaissance Studies: Proceedings of the Southeastern Institute of Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 1967, ed. John M. Headley, Medieval and Renaissance Series, no. 3 (Chapel Hill, NC.: University of North Carolina Press, 1968), pp. 206-29. This article does not relate specifically to the Low Countries. It does state, however, that the influence of Platonism in the teaching tradition was very slight, even though the writings of the Florentine Platonists were widely dispersed and made an impact on scholarly thought in the sixteenth century. During the period under discussion, this was not the case in the Netherlands. Agricola and Hegius were knowledgeable in terms of the philosophy of Plato, but preferred the ideas of Aristotle—a fact that has been used to illustrate their realism and adherence to the via antiqua. With major advances in the understanding of the nature of the Northern Renaissance, it is perhaps time for a reappraisal of the impact of Platonism in the Low Countries. It may be that no significant revisions of current understanding are necessary, as would appear to be the case. But such an exercise would be valuable. The establishment of the Cusan Library in the North in about 1470 may well be a point of departure in such an undertaking. If Hegius visited this library, no doubt many other early humanists would have done the same. The collection showed a preference for Platonic thought, in accord with the philosophic viewpoint of Cusanus himself. See Pauline Moffitt Watts, Nicolaus Cusanus: A Fifteenth-Century Vision of Man, Studies in the History of Christian Thought, no. 30 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1982), particularly pp. 21-22. It remains true, however, that the early humanists in the Low Countries, even those who had visited Italy, appear to have been singularly unimpressed by the renewal of Plato or the ideas of such men as Marsilio Ficino (1433-99) of the Academy in Florence. Thus, Platonism cannot be considered a mark of northern humanism.
of Valla are quite evident. Concerns that are expressed by Agricola are problems to which Valla has previously addressed himself. In his *De elegantia Latine linguae*, Valla exhibits a strong dislike for the medieval Latin grammars. He stresses the need for a return to the purity of classical Latin, emphasizing the works of Cicero and more particularly Quintilian. Elsewhere Valla indicates a marked preference for Epicurean ethics.

These are the very issues that were discussed by the humanists of the Aduard Academy in their correspondence with one another. Rudolf von Langen writes:

> With my own hands I have transcribed the little book of *Elegantiae*. . . . The little book will be my constant companion: I know nothing that has such value in so narrow a span. How brilliant Valla is! he has raised up Latin to glory from the bondage of the barbarians. May the earth lie lightly on him and the spring shine ever around his ear!.

Hegius expresses a similar high regard for Valla in a letter that he writes to Agricola: "I have been reading Valla's book *On the True Good*, according to which Vegius defends the side of pleasure, Cato that of honor. Vegius has made me an Epicurean." Valla, in an

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2Lorenzo Valla, *De elegantia Latine linguae* (Rome: J. P. de Lignamine, 1471).


4Hegius to Rudolf Agricola, from Deventer, dated 17 December [1484], in appendix 8, p. 652.
appendix to his *De elegantiae*, deals with the problem of the barbaric use of the Latin word *suus*. Hegius discusses the matter in much the same vein in his "Invective against the Modes of Signification."\(^1\) It is apparent that Valla had made quite an impression on the scholars of the Aduard circle. In later years Erasmus continued this northern tradition, holding the works of Valla in high esteem.\(^2\) It must be acknowledged that it was Agricola who introduced this very positive appraisal of Valla's ideas in the North, especially among the scholars who frequented the monastery at Aduard.

It appears that Hegius kept in as close a contact with Agricola as he did with Gansfort. The letters that passed between himself and Agricola bespeak a deep friendship and a kindred spirit.

In response to the letter of 17 December quoted above, Agricola writes:

> I cannot easily tell you how much pleasure your letter has brought me, not only because it came from you, the dearest of men to me, but also because I perceive that you are daily becoming more ... refined, and I am led into the highest hope that through your guidance, admonition, and educating--otherwise by the ability of none--more civilized literature will reach Germany and eventually occupy this stronghold.

> I showed your letter to the bishop of Worms [John of Dalberg], who expressed his joy ... in the hope of our Germany.\(^3\)

Agricola's return to the North from Italy had been traumatic. The classical culture of the South had been traded for the boorish barbarities of the Low Countries and Germany, where medieval thought patterns, language, and life-style still prevailed. One of the few

\(^1\)Hegius, appendix A, pp. 634-35.

\(^2\)For further discussion of the influence of Valla's ideas in the North, particularly on Hegius, see pp. 291-92, 296-97, 341.

\(^3\)Rudolf Agricola to Hegius, from Worms, dated Tuesday [January 1485], in appendix B, p. 654.
things that gave Agricola any cause for hope in the midst of his pessimism was the work of Hegius in the Deventer school.1

Goswinus van Halen recalls the sad day when Hegius learned of the premature death of his friend and mentor:

I well remember that when I was a pupil in Deventer under Alexander Hegius in 1486 [sic, 1485], a letter came to Deventer about the death of Rudolph Agricola, which he read to all the students with tears in his eyes. This is not surprising, for Agricola was very dear to him. It was from him that he learned all the pure Latin and Greek that he knew.2

Agricola had died without seeing his fondest hopes for a revival of learning in the North fulfilled, and Hegius was left without his most able instructor in the classical languages. It must have been a bitter disappointment for Hegius. Just as Agricola had put his hope in the work of Hegius, so Hegius relied upon the learning of Agricola. Even after Agricola's death, however, Hegius continued faithful to the hopes of his old friend. By the time of his own death about fourteen years later, the Northern Renaissance was well under way.

The letters of the Aduard scholars are filled with the excitement they felt for the new learning, the mention of books old and new, and the names of the classical authors and the Church Fathers.3 Travel in pursuit of learning became even more common than it had been. Antony Liber, for example, writes of his journeys to the various educational centers:

1Van der Velden, Agricola, pp. 127-31.
3See, for example, appendix B, pp. 642-56. These letters are considered more carefully when an evaluation is made of Hegius' humanism in chapter five.
I have still a great many things to do, but I shall not begin upon them till the printed books from Cologne arrive at Deventer. My plan was to go to Heidelberg, Freiburg, Basle and some of the universities in the East and then return to Deventer through Saxony and Westphalia. ... [I have disposed] of the 1500 copies of The Revival of Latin [Particularibus studiis] amongst the schools. After visiting Deventer and Zwolle I shall go to Louvain, and then ... to Paris. ... 1

Not all the letters express such new horizons. Those of men like Henry van Edam 2 exemplify the very conservative spiritual elements within the Northern Renaissance. Corresponding with a novice, van Edam writes of different matters, and in a very different tone:

Apply your whole heart to the things that are to be done in your house, and you ought to learn carefully the daily exercises to be performed, for in that way you will always delight in your work and be most contented. For he who does his work carelessly and imperfectly will find no pleasure in his labors. ... Nor can such a man make any progress in virtue.

... Beware of haste in your work, namely, in your writing and reading ..., and pray often between tasks .... You ought often to come and bewail your passions and defects and take counsel in regard to them. You should gladly hear your defects so that you may make progress. You ought always to read books which teach man to know his vices and contain remedies against the latter, books which can arouse your mind to love God .... Do not read books which whet the intellect on strange themes not pertaining to salvation.3

Van Edam's letter almost seems out of place in this discussion of

1Antony Liber to Arnold of Hildesheim, [from Köln?, ca. 1477], in Allen, Age of Erasmus, pp. 24-25. It is possible that Liber, Arnold of Hildesheim, and Hegius were all teachers in the town of Emmerich at this time.

2See above, p. 77. Henry van Edam was procurator of the House of Florentius in Deventer in 1479 and for some years after, and would have been well acquainted with Hegius. See Gerhard Dumbar, Het Kerkelyk en Wereltlyk Deventer, 2 vols. (Deventer: Henrik Willem van Welbergen, 1732; Lucas Leemhorst, 1788), 1:236.

3Henry van Edam to a novice in the brotherhouse at Emmerich, [from Deventer], n.d. The letter is found in a manuscript collection, no. Mr. 128 G 16, at the Royal Library in The Hague. Quoted by Hyma, Youth of Erasmus, p. 97. See also van Rhijn, Studiën over Wessel Gansfort, pp. 160-62.
the renaissance of learning in the North, but it cannot be ignored. It is reminiscent of Gansfort's letter to an unnamed nun,¹ and is a reminder of the piety of the group in which humanism first emerged in the Low Countries. Van Edam was probably much less the exception than the rule. In any case, he appears to have been accepted as one of the circle of friends, and his ideas certainly illustrate the broad range of interests among the scholars. In the tradition of this northern conservatism, even Erasmus, the most renowned northern humanist, soon returned to the sacrae litterae after a brief period of interest in the more classical literature so popular in Italy.

Aduard--Renaissance in Microcosm

The Aduard Academy provides a pattern and a preview of the Northern Renaissance. It was from this circle that humanism grew and took root in the Low Countries. Sacred and classical literature, purer Latin and Greek, printing, publishing, and libraries, Stoic and Epicurean ethic, and mystical piety—all were subjects of conversation and correspondence among the northern scholars who met together at Abbot Henry's monastery. Somehow the pace of life toward the end of the fifteenth century seemed to hasten for these men. The thirst for learning encouraged them to travel more widely, seeking old manuscripts and new books. Old languages were studied in order to discover new intellectual treasures and challenges. For the participants in this movement in the Low Countries, however, the search was always tempered by the piety of a community steeped in the traditions of the devotio moderna.

¹See above, pp. 79-80.
The concerns and ideologies of the Aduard scholars reveal that they had not completely disentangled themselves from the scholasticism that had become so much a part of intellectual life in the Middle Ages. There was a spirit of reform within the group, evident in the writings of Wessel Gansfort, one of their most prominent leaders. Gansfort was the religious philosopher, the pious sage, with new ideas about many things, but having the same mystical reverence for the Lord Jesus that characterized the Brethren of the Common Life and the Windesheimers. The element of humanism was epitomized by Rudolf Agricola, the classical artist in the academy. It was from Agricola that the others could learn the basic skills and techniques of the humanistic revival, and the finer niceties of classical thought. Combining as it did all these elements of the revival of learning in the North, the Aduard Academy in a sense provides a microcosm of the Northern Renaissance.

As a member of the Aduard circle, Hegius absorbed a desire for the new learning. Like any wise pedagog, he was as much a student as a teacher. It is in terms of how Hegius related to the elements of renaissance distinguishing the northern renewal that he must be evaluated. The manner in which his ideas compared with the other scholars in the circle, and his association with these men, are therefore very important issues in determining his contribution to the rise of humanism in the Netherlands.

Another important issue is Hegius' contribution in the realm of practical pedagogy. In order to understand more fully what it was that made the school in Deventer different under his leadership, it is necessary to consider the type of education that prevailed in
the Low Countries prior to 1482. This is the topic of chapter 3, following which attention is given to a consideration of Hegius' own philosophy and pedagogy.
CHAPTER III

EDUCATION IN THE LOW COUNTRIES BEFORE THE NORTHERN RENAISSANCE

During the Middle Ages education was an ecclesiastical function controlled by Church-dominated institutions. The primary goal was to provide the Church with clerics and scholars. Latin, the key to all the intellectual treasures of the Western Church, was the overriding emphasis in the extremely narrow curriculum. As the medium of scholarship, Latin remained a living language for over a thousand years after the fall of the Roman Empire. In order to accommodate new concepts resulting from the gradual evolution of medieval civilization and the progress of theological and philosophical thought, the vocabulary was continually being enlarged. As a living language, and without the restraints that curb changes of grammar and syntax in modern times, Latin drifted slowly from its classical origins. Classical norms appeared unimportant and were often ignored by medieval scholars as they grappled with new ideas. By 1450 Latin as taught in the schools was far removed from the literary art of the classical era that it had once been.

The humanism of the Renaissance, looking as it did to the golden ages of antiquity, was repulsed by the "barbarism" of the Latin used by the intellectuals and divines of the Church. This raises a number of questions. What aroused in the humanists such a
great aversion for medieval learning? Why did they try to replace a
living ecclesiastical language with an essentially dead classical
one? Why attempt to restructure the system of education that had
survived so many centuries? What was, after all, so barbaric that
it could no longer be tolerated? In order to answer these ques-
tions, one must attempt to see the fifteenth century as the human-
ists saw it. Particularly is this true of education, for it was the
schools of Northern Europe much more than the Church or the matter
of theological orthodoxy that proved to be the battle ground. Only
from this perspective can one begin to understand why a man like
Alexander Hegius would be willing to devote his energies to a cause
that must at first have seemed impossible to accomplish.

The Development of Latin through the
Middle Ages

At the beginning of the Middle Ages, learning was divided
into the seven liberal arts, made up of the trivium and quadrivium.
The trivium included grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, all of which
were devoted to some aspect of language study. The quadrivium was
the study of arithmetic, geometry, astronomy, and music. This
followed Plato's (ca. 429-347 B.C.) conception of the division of
knowledge as outlined in The Republic. The purpose and methods of
teaching language were, however, very different in the Middle Ages
from what they had been in antiquity. Latin had been used through-
out the Roman Empire as the official language. There had always
been a core of Roman civil servants to whom it was a natural lan-
guage, even if this was not true for all the people living in the
Empire. After the fall of the Roman Empire, Latin entered a period
of considerable change, remaining the *lingua franca* only in ecclesiastical usage. The Roman conception of *grammatica* as the art form of letters and literature in the context of the culture of the Empire was largely abandoned. Latin remained a living language, but it was learned largely by non-Latins. Even in Italy the vernacular soon became distinctly different from the language of the Romans. The study of Latin grammar served now to facilitate understanding and communication. It was no longer regarded as an art form. *Grammatica* became a means to an end within the ecclesiastical structure rather than a conception of literature.

In the teaching of grammar the traditions and niceties of the classical language were forgotten. *Grammatica* was no longer the honing of an already well-learned language. It was exposure to a new and almost incomprehensible barrage of quotations and vocabulary at a time when the child had barely mastered the art of reading and writing in his own language (at about the age of eight or nine). Biblical passages and creeds, commandments, prayers and liturgies, psalms, songs, and excerpts from classical and medieval authors were all learned in Latin from memory without much concern for understanding. Pupils were not allowed to speak in the vernacular and were often severely punished for doing so. With scant regard for the finer nuances and structures, the students were exposed to Latin in such a way as it was hoped they would most quickly become proficient in its use as a means of communication. The main texts used in this process were the *Ars minor* of Donatus (fl. 350) and excerpts from the *Institutiones grammatica* of Priscian (fl. 525).¹

¹For discussion of these authors, see below, pp. 119-20.
During the twelfth century further changes began to take place in the intellectual world that had a direct bearing on the Latin Language and how grammatica was conceived and taught. While Donatus remained in use, the syntax of Priscian was found to be a hindrance. In order for Latin to remain a viable medium of communication, it had to adapt itself to the newly developing concepts in the fields of logic and metaphysics. Henry Osborn Taylor observes that Latin grammar represented the first stage of knowledge for all medieval men, in that all learning was contained in this language.¹ Including rhetoric as a subdivision of grammar, he continues:

The next course of the Trivium was logic; and likewise its study will represent truly the second stage in the mediaeval realization of the human impulse to know, to wit, the second stage in the appropriation and expression of the knowledge transmitted from the past. . . . The close connection between grammar and logic is evident. Logic treats of language used in rational expression, as well as of the reasoning process carried on in language. Its elementary chapters teach a rational use of language, whereby men may reach a more deeply consistent expression of their thoughts than is gained from grammar. Yet grammar is also logic, and based on logical principles. . . . Thus in mediaeval education and in the successive order of appropriating the patristic and the antique, logic stood on grammar's shoulders. It was grammar's rationalized stage, and treated language as the means of expressing thought consistently and validly; that is, so as not to contravene the necessities of that whereof it was the vehicle. And since language thus treated was in accord with rational thought, it would accord with the realities to which thought corresponds, and might be taken as expressing them. This last reflection introduces metaphysics.²

In the same way in which grammar was followed by logic and then by the more advanced study of metaphysics in the medieval curriculum, according to Osborn, so these subjects represented


²Ibid., 2:362-64.
stages of intellectual achievement through the Middle Ages. Grammar corresponded to the learning of the early Middle Ages, logic to the appropriation of knowledge in the twelfth century, and metaphysics to the re-expression of ideas in the high Middle Ages. He explains:

The grammatical represented an elementary learning of what the past had transmitted; the logical a further retrying of the matter, an attempt to... formulate parts of it anew with deeper consistency of expression. Then follows the attempt for final and universal consistency: final, inasmuch as thought penetrates to the nature of things and expresses realities and the relationships of realities; and universal, in that it seeks to order and systematize all its concepts, and brings them to unity in a *Summa*....

Metaphysics was not ineptly called so, since it had in time come after the cruder physical hypotheses [in antiquity]. But such was not the order of mediaeval intellectual progress.... Not physics, but logic (introduced by grammar) led up to the final construction... of ultimate hypothesis as to God and man, led up to the all-ordering and all-encompassing *Theologia*. *Metalogics*, rather than *Metaphysics*, would be the proper name for these final expressions... of the mediaeval impulse to know.1

By the fifteenth century, modified by the intellectual processes described by Taylor, Latin had to a large degree broken away from its classical roots. It was, in fact, the vehicle of scholasticism. As ill-conceived an idea as it might have been, the humanists saw the corruption of Latin as partly responsible for the corruption of the Church. Some humanists believed that a return to classical grammar and classical and patristic literature would enable the complex sophistries of scholasticism to be replaced by the wisdom of the Bible, the Fathers, and the ancient philosophers and scholars.2 However, more was involved in these changes than a

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1Ibid., 2:365-67.

2See, for example, William J. Bouwsma, "The Two Faces of Humanism: Stoicism and Augustinianism in Renaissance Thought," in *Itinerarium Italicum: The Profile of the Renaissance in the Mirror of Its European Transformations*, ed. Heiko Augustinus Oberman and...
rejection of medieval logic. The simple desire for a purer Latin also played a central role. The humanists, following the pattern established by Lorenzo Valla, maintained that the best way to study Latin was to learn from the classical authors and to copy their style.

This new approach to learning instituted by the humanists was in many ways successful. It established a platform for a more critical and scientific study of history, and therefore a more objective appraisal of the past and understanding of the present; it prepared the ground for both the Catholic and Protestant Reformations by its criticism of the fabric of medieval thought and the society that had emerged under the patronage of the Church; and, while itself looking backward, it opened the way for a more rational approach to life and intellectual pursuits, thereby anticipating the modern era.

At the same time this approach carried with it the seeds of the demise of pre-Reformation humanism. In rejecting medieval Latin, the humanists rejected a living language and opted for a dead one. The issues of the sixteenth century and the Reformation overwhelmed biblical humanism and were in effect its death knell. Its


hour of glory was but a short one, and its abhorence of "medievalism" was all but forgotten with the passing of the Middle Ages. Yet, while it lasted, it revealed a tremendous energy and resourcefulness in pursuing its self-appointed mission.

From this it is clear that in the space of less than a hundred years, education in Northern Europe went through some dramatic changes. The medieval system of schooling gave way to the educational strategies of the biblical humanists, whose ideas were soon forced into retreat by the new approaches to education arising out of the turmoil of the Reformation era. The question that arises from this with regard to the present study is as follows. What were the significant changes introduced into the educational system in the short period of time during which biblical humanism reigned supreme in the Germanic lands? In order to answer this question, one needs first to consider what the northern schools were like at the beginning of this period of change. Only when this has been done is it possible to understand and appreciate the work of Hegius in the schools of the Low Countries at the end of the fifteenth century. It is upon this matter that attention is now focused.

Types of Schools

In the Burgundian Netherlands of the fifteenth century, most

1Much of the information in the rest of this chapter is based on two secondary sources. The chapter provides background information necessary for an evaluation of the aims and achievements of Hegius. It does not constitute an area of primary research in terms of the objectives of the dissertation. I have therefore felt at liberty to rely on these excellent studies. The authors have taken into account the earlier scholarly works on education in the Low Countries as well as new documents and materials that have more recently come to light. Regnerus Richardus Post, Scholen en Onderwijs in Nederland Gedurende de Middeleeuwen (Utrecht: Spectrum,
schools were in some way attached to the local parish or chapter church. There were some schools attached to monasteries, but they generally offered advanced philosophy and theology, and these only to novitiates. Philosophy and theology followed a study of the arts, so the novitiates would already have completed at least the study of the trivium before they entered the monastic schools.

The Brethren of the Common Life did initiate a small number of private schools, one of which was in the town of Deventer, but these were alternative institutions that did not replace the parish schools. In fact, the city governments often enforced strict regulations that discouraged such establishments from competing with the parish schools.¹

Most of the larger towns and cities controlled the education in the area of their jurisdiction. The usual arrangement, true also of Deventer and Zwolle, was that the school was associated with the parish or chapter church but controlled by the local authorities. In the case of Deventer, although the school was attached to the chapter of St. Lebuins, this was so only in that both the parish church of Onze Lieve Vrouw and the school were under the authority of the chapter. In other words, the school remained in essence a

¹Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, pp. 155-56.

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1954), relates generally to education in the Netherlands prior to the humanistic revival. Post's conclusions are based on extremely detailed research into the history of the many different schools. Jan Frederiks, Ontstaan en Ontwikkeling van het Zwolsche Schoolwezen tot Omstreeks 1700 (Zwolle, Netherlands: J. J. Tijl, 1960), is a study specifically concerned with the school at Zwolle, which, in the fifteenth century, also had periods of outstanding success. There are many parallels between this institution and the school at St. Lebuins in Deventer. The information in this particular section of the dissertation, on the various types of schools, is taken mainly from Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, chaps. 2-3.
parish school in spite of its connection with the chapter, which also reflected the usual pattern in the Low Countries. The distinction is important, however, because institutions strictly classified as chapter schools, like monastic schools, were usually only for novitiates obligated as clerics to the particular chapter.

It appears that as early as 1378 the municipal government in Deventer had gained control of the school from the ecclesiastical powers.\(^1\) As the controlling body, the authorities in Deventer held themselves responsible for maintenance of the buildings, protected the school from alternative institutions such as that of the Brethren of the Common Life, and appointed the headmaster.\(^2\) In essence, though connected to the chapter, St. Lebuins was a city school.

Besides the main city schools there were often preparatory schools teaching a preliminary curriculum. These were sometimes a

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\(^1\)Gerhard Dumbar, Het Kerkelyk en Wereltlyk Deventer, 2 vols. (Deventer: Henrik Willem van Welbergen, 1732; Lucas Leemhorst, 1788), 1:306. Referring to "de oude Kameners Rekening van het gemelde jaer [1378]" (a document relating to decisions made by the town chamber), Dumbar makes the point that Wilhelm Vreden was chosen as rector by this ruling body. In discussing the school in Deventer, Julia Henkel claims that Post is incorrect in saying that it was not under the control of the Brethren of the Common Life in the fifteenth century. She also states that the school at St. Lebuins was not a Stadt schule (city school) but a Stiftschule (ecclesiastical school). See Julia S. Henkel, "An Historical Study of the Educational Contributions of the Brethren of the Common Life" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1962), p. 118, n. 1; and pp. 162-64. Henkel does not distinguish sufficiently between the school at St. Lebuins and the alternative school run by the Brethren of the Common Life. At first she seems to be speaking of one institution, but later it becomes clear that she is aware of the second school. In any case, Hyma, whom she claims as her authority, admits that the Deventer school never came under the control of the Brethren. See Albert Hyma, The Youth of Erasmus, 2nd ed. (New York: Russell & Russell), pp. 29-30. She makes no reference to any authority with regard to her claim that the school was not controlled by the city government. Cf. Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, pp. 73-74.

\(^2\)Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 50.
part of the main school, but they were also run by other groups or individuals if the authorities allowed this. Their main function was to teach reading and writing in the vernacular. Subjects of a practical nature were usually taught in a handelsschool or commercial school, which prepared students for work in civil government or in the trading interests of the Low Countries and the Hanseatic League. These commercial schools were found in some of the larger towns and were not usually connected with the local parish or city schools. However, they were often required to make payments in support of the city schools because of their status as alternative institutions of education. The main subjects in the curriculum included arithmetic, accounting and commerce, and German and French, all of which were important in European trade.

For the purposes of this discussion, it is mainly the city schools that are of interest. Prior to the humanistic renewal of learning in the late fifteenth century, the school at Zwolle was probably the most renowned of the city schools in the Low Countries. Fortunately, the historical sources have been fairly well preserved and a tolerably good understanding can be gained of the educational program of this institution. The Deventer school was run along very similar lines. From what is known of these two schools, it is

1Ibid., p. 78. They were also called French or German schools.

2Ibid., p. 94; and Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, p. 86. Zwolle probably had a slightly wider and more advanced curriculum, but Deventer followed a similar pattern. Though more progressive than most schools in the Netherlands, Zwolle was not atypical except in the upper two classes. Deventer, even before the time of Hegius, also offered the upper classes. Both schools followed the general practice in the Low Countries of teaching the trivium in the lower or elementary classes.
possible to obtain a fairly clear picture of the best that was being offered in the city schools of the Netherlands just prior to the work of Hegius at St. Lebuins.

**Class Divisions and the Curriculum**

At the preparatory schools, which were often attended by children of both sexes, pupils learned to read and write in the vernacular. The boys continued their education in the city schools, where the trivium or elementary section of the seven liberal arts was offered. They would begin their studies in class eight, which was the lowest class in most institutions.

**The Trivium**

The major emphasis in the curriculum was, of course, the teaching of Latin grammar. This almost entirely occupied the first three years, through the sixth class. In the fifth class logic was added and taught along with grammar, leading to completion of the

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1Most of the information relating to the curriculum in the Low Countries, and particularly in Zwolle and Deventer, is taken from Post, *Scholen en Onderwijs*, chap. 4; and Frederiks, *Zwolse Schoolwezen*, chap. 2.

2In some instances, girls were allowed to attend the city schools along with the boys, but this was not the usual practice and did not occur in Deventer or Zwolle. See Post, *Scholen en Onderwijs*, pp. 78-79.

3Johan Cæle (ca. 1340-1417), who had worked closely with Gerard Groote in reforming the school in Zwolle, had introduced the division of the students into eight classes. Prior to this there had usually been four or five classes. By the latter half of the fifteenth century, the eight-class division had generally been accepted, though only the most progressive and flourishing schools taught the top two classes. Some schools had a preliminary ninth year that was parallel in function to the preparatory schools. See Frederiks, *Zwolse Schoolwezen*, p. 67; and Henkel, "Educational Contributions," p. 27.
trivium by the end of the third class after about six years of study.

Throughout this period students also studied music, which should actually have formed part of the quadrivium, but served the practical purpose of providing music in the local parish or chapter churches. The study of music at this level was fundamentally concerned with voice production and should perhaps not be too closely identified with music as it was defined by the ancient and classical authors.\(^1\) In antiquity, music included harmony, rhythm, meter, versification, poetry, and drama, most of which was neglected in medieval education.

Drama and gesture brought music close to the realm of rhetoric, where the emphasis was on the use of language to arouse the passions and the will. Rhetoric, which should have formed part of the trivium, was also almost completely omitted from the educational program. In an age when correct methods of logic and reason were the means of persuasion, the appeal was not to passion and the will. During the Middle Ages, rhetoric had, in fact, come to be associated with correct procedures of drawing up contracts and charters, and writing letters and official documents.\(^2\) It is not known whether

\(^1\) Hastings Rashdall, *The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages*, 3 vols., 2nd ed., ed. Frederick Maurice Powicke and Alfred Brotherston Emden (London: Oxford University Press, 1936), 1:35. "In the Dark Ages," says Rashdall, "music included but a half-mystical doctrine of numbers and the rules of plain-song." His use of the term "Dark Ages" suggests that he might well be painting a gloomier picture than is necessary. The musical curriculum in the Low Countries, for example, seems to have included more than what would be expected from Rashdall's remarks. His evaluation is, however, not far from wrong.

this was taught in any detail at Zwolle or Deventer, except perhaps as part of the study of grammar. Rhetoric certainly did not constitute a major ingredient in the curriculum.

An action taken by the chapter of St. Goedele in Brussels in 1457 is indicative of the attitude of most institutions in the Low Countries in their approach to the curriculum, and specifically the trivium. While not from the precise area in which Deventer is located, the regulations adopted by St. Goedele give a good idea of what constituted the typical program. Scraps of information incomplete in themselves, obtained from many other schools in the Low Countries, generally seem to fit the pattern outlined for the school in Brussels. Post summarizes:

It was stipulated that in the future the rector and his associates were required to teach the boys the principles of grammar and logic as had already been done up to that time, viz. Donatus, cases, tenses, rules, harmony (congruitatibus), how to write prose and verse, and all that is found in the Summulae of Petrus Hispanus.1

When a student had mastered this program of studies, he was ready to embark upon his investigation of the more advanced subjects that made up the curriculum of the quadrivium.

The Quadrivium

Completion of the fourth class was often considered sufficient for entry into the monastic orders, and completion of the third class fulfilled the requirements for entry into university. In his Compendium vitae, Erasmus remarks:

Here [at Deventer], he reached the third form. . . . And so the boy was removed to 'sHertogenbosch, being now old enough for the university. But they were afraid of a university for

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1Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 96.

Elsewhere, writing under the assumed name of Florentius about his earlier experiences, Erasmus states: "The boys were already ripe for the institutions they call universities—for they were adequate grammarians, and had got by heart a great part of the Dialectic of Petrus Hispanus..."\footnote{Ibid., pp. 10-11.103-5. Letter no. 447 to Lambertus Grunnius, from London, dated 1516. Just before this statement, on line 94, Erasmus gives his age as being fourteen at the time. It will be remembered that Erasmus states in another letter that he left Deventer when he was in his fourteenth year. See above, p. 27. In the Compendium vitae, in Erasmus, Collected Works, 4:47, he says that he left Deventer after he had completed the third class. A comparison of these remarks confirms the idea that the third class was the university entrance requirement, and this is substantiated by some comments made by Johannes Buschius. See Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, pp. 99-100; and Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, p. 68.}

It becomes obvious why the secunda and prima were such unusual classes in the schools of the Low Countries. The curriculum, consisting as it did of the advanced arts or quadrivium, was parallel to that of the universities. Having finished the first class, a student was able to complete the requirements for a Master of Arts degree at a university more quickly than if he had entered after the third class.\footnote{Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, pp. 103-6; and Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, pp. 80-81. Also, see above, p. 19.}

The subject matter of the quadrivium has been described in various ways, but without too much certainty. Rashdall observes that, "historically speaking, the Quadrivium is chiefly important as
supplying the skeleton outline of a wider course of study that was afterwards filled up by the discoveries of the twelfth-century Renaissance."\(^1\) Post, referring to the curriculum of the secunda and prima in the Low Countries, says that ethics and philosophy were taught, meaning by philosophy "the other subjects of the quadrivium."\(^2\) Music, as has already been explained, was being taught on the level of the trivium. Post makes it clear that the subjects of the quadrivium were not taught according to the outline given by Martianus Capella (fl. ante 439). Rather, as Rashdall proposes, there was a "wider course of study" built on the skeleton of the medieval curriculum. Post maintains that the subjects of the quadrivium at Zwolle and Deventer were the same as those that "had been developed in the arts faculties of the medieval universities."\(^3\) An important aspect of these studies was an emphasis on the works of Aristotle, both in their original and through the commentaries of their medieval interpreters.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)Rashdall, *Universities*, 1:36. Before the particular quotation cited, Rashdall gives a very negative assessment that is nevertheless indicative of the medieval quadrivium at its worst: "In the Dark Ages arithmetic and astronomy found their way into the educational curriculum chiefly because they taught the means of finding Easter. Music included but a half-mystical doctrine of numbers and the rules of plain-song: under geometry Boethius [ca. 480-ca. 525] gives little but a selection of propositions from Euclid without the demonstrations." Ibid., pp. 35-36.

\(^2\)Post, *Scholen en Onderwijs*, p. 100.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 106.

\(^4\)A short history of the development of the arts curriculum at Paris is given in Rashdall, *Universities*, 1:439-50. Statutes published in 1366 established a curriculum that was essentially unchanged by further statutes given in 1452. Rashdall lists three stages of instruction. "For B.A.--Grammar, Logic, and Psychology. For the Licence in Arts--Natural Philosophy and Metaphysics." For
Zwolle and Deventer seem to have been the only two schools in the Low Countries that offered the second and first classes. This was true at least until very late in the fifteenth century, and probably into the sixteenth century. Johan Cele introduced the secunda and prima in Zwolle, and Thomas à Kempis speaks about the first class in Deventer as early as 1400.\(^1\) The sources yield very little information about the curriculum at Deventer, but it is possible to gain some idea of what was taught in Zwolle. The two schools held much in common. In their historical connections with the devotio moderna, in the curriculum they taught on the elementary levels, as well as in their methods, Zwolle and Deventer were very similar. It is fairly safe to assume that the parallels would have extended to the teaching of the quadrivium in the top two classes.

In order to gain some idea of what would have constituted the curriculum of the quadrivium in Deventer, one must examine how the various subjects were taught in Zwolle. The first of these is music.

The theoretical study of the art of music in the Middle Ages followed the pattern established by Martianus Capella and Boethius. Frederiks explains:

\(^{\text{1}}\)Thomas à Kempis, Opera omnia voluminibus septem edidit additoque volumine de vita et scriptis eius disputavit, 7 vols., ed. Michael Josef Pohl (Freiburg-im-Breisgau: Herder, 1904-22) 7:282.
As a science it was distinctly philosophical, having little or nothing to do with practical musicianship. It delved deep into antiquarian systems and the harmonic relationships of pitch. A singer or instrumentalist was not considered to be a musician in the strict sense of the word.\(^1\)

Under Cele, however, practical musicianship was stressed. As school rector, he was responsible for music at St. Michaels Church in Zwolle. Cele himself was an accomplished organist, and there was quite a revival of good church music under his direction and leadership. The schoolboys in both the lower and the upper classes would undoubtedly have benefited from his expertise, for the church choir was made up from their ranks.\(^2\)

A less enthusiastic rector than Cele, from the time just prior to the Reformation, is quoted by Georg Schunemann:

Singing in the morning, singing in the evening, singing Latin verses that neither the singers nor the listeners understand, singing before this altar and then before that one, singing in memory of this late-departed saint and then of another—that is the work, that is the prescribed duty of the scholars in the schools.\(^3\)

While Cele would not have considered this segment of his responsibility such a burden, the statement does give some idea of the prominent role music played in the lives of the pupils and teachers. The time spent in practice was mostly outside of class hours, which were long enough as it was. Perhaps the disgruntled headmaster can be forgiven. While there is no information concerning Deventer, one may assume that the headmaster of St. Lebuins also carried this heavy responsibility. It is known that the choir was made up of

\(^1\)Frederiks, *Zwolse Schoolwezen*, p. 77.
\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 77-79.
students, and that the normal pattern in the Low Countries was for the rector to be the director of music in the local church.

Another of the arts of the quadrivium is arithmetic. Frederiks has given an account of what this might have been expected to cover. He includes examples of the complexity of calculations using Roman numerals and gives reasons why he thinks Cele would have included arithmetic in the curriculum. The suggestion is made that this subject would not have been neglected because it was necessary for accounting, music, and reckoning the ecclesiastical calendar. Frederiks proposes that, like music, it would have formed part of the more elementary curriculum as well as being studied in the top two classes which were the real domain of the quadrivium.¹

Notwithstanding the fact that the German institutions of higher learning required a stronger emphasis in arithmetic,² Frederiks may well have been a little over enthusiastic in his assessment. His assumptions are mostly based on conjecture. Without denying that any arithmetic was taught, it seems that in both Zwolle and Deventer this would have been fairly elementary. It is more likely that any advanced arithmetic and accountancy would have been taught in alternative commercial institutions.

Geometry and astronomy were likewise very little emphasized. In the case of the latter, the material studied hardly warrants the name of astronomy. It was associated with elementary arithmetic in the making of calculations relating to the ecclesiastical calendar. Ptolemy and Euclid were taught in the German universities, but there

¹Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, pp. 79-81.
²Rashdall, Universities, 1:449
is little evidence for this at Zwolle or Deventer.

Post and Rashdall are probably closest to the truth in their assessments of what was taught in the quadrivium.¹ When those who were students in Zwolle and Deventer wrote of their studies in philosophy and ethics, they were almost certainly referring to a study of the writings of Aristotle.² It seems inadvisable to read as much into the sources as Frederiks has done in positing direct parallels between classical or even medieval conceptions of the quadrivium and the curriculum of the secunda and prima. Natural philosophy, metaphysics, and ethics are more likely to have occupied the senior students than the subjects of the quadrivium strictly defined.

A better picture of the nature of the curriculum in the pre-humanist schools is obtained from an examination of the textbooks used at the different levels. This is the next focus of attention in developing an understanding of late medieval Dutch education.

Textbooks³

Preparatory Education

The textbooks that were used in teaching the children to read and write were known as abecedariën. These cleyne boecxkens ("small books") contained such things as the Lord's Prayer, the creeds, the Ave Maria, and other material of a similar religious

¹See above, pp. 108-10.

²Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, pp. 100, 154.

³Information for this section is taken mainly from Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, chap. 5; and Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, chap. 2.
nature. The language taught, although referred to as Duytsch ("German"), was actually the language commonly used at that time in the northern areas of the Low Countries and sections of Westphalia. It was, in fact, the forerunner of modern Dutch and closely resembles this language.

More advanced reading was from Dutch translations of Aesop's Fables, Die Dietsche Catoen, and some of the writings of Jacob van Maerlant (ca. 1235-1300), a literary pioneer in the Dutch language. There was also a host of other locally written works that were used in different places at various times. In some instances, these preparatory schools began the teaching of elementary Latin, using selections made from the textbooks of the trivium.

1Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, pp. 83-85; and Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, p. 71. It should not be thought that each child would have had a personal copy of the textbooks, particularly before the age of printing.

2See Ben Edwin Perry, Babrius and Phaedrus, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1965). In his introduction, Perry gives a summary of the origin and history of Aesop's Fables. In the Middle Ages selections from these fables were made, and extended morals attached. This was done in Latin and the vernacular.

3The Disticha Catonis, attributed to Dionysius Cato, otherwise known as Cato the Elder (ca. 234-ca. 149 B.C.), is a collection of moral maxims of unknown pagan origin, written A.D. 100-300. See Gary Cowan Boyce, ed., Literature of Medieval History: 1930-1975, 5 vols. (Millwood, NY: Kraus International Publications, 1981), 3:1498. Medieval educators admired the Disticha not only for its Latin but also for its moral teachings. It was, consequently, sometimes translated into the vernacular. The moral theme was built around the adage, "work diligently and do not arouse contention."

4See Wilhelm Moll, Kerkgeschiedenis van Nederland voor de Hervorming, 2 vols. (Arnhem, Netherlands: Nijhoff & Zoon, 1864-67), vol. 2, pt. 2:262. (Vol. 2, pts. 3-4, and the Index were published in Utrecht by Kemink & Zoon, 1869-71.) Moll, writing with reference to the end of the fifteenth century, says that there were at least one hundred primer type textbooks in use at that time.
Textbooks of the Trivium

In bemoaning his unfortunate plight as a student in the Deventer school about the time of the arrival of Hegius, Erasmus confirms what one would have expected to find in the nature of textbooks. He writes:

The school there [Deventer] was at that time in a state of barbarism (a standard text was the Pater meus; they were forced to learn the paradigms, the textbooks being Eberhard and John of Garland), except that Alexander Hegius and Synthen had begun to introduce something of a higher standard of literature.¹

According to a plausible explanation given by F. M. Nichols, the Pater meus of which Erasmus complains was "an exercise in concords to be repeated by the boys after the master, Pater meus, patris mei, etc. It may be assumed that the younger boys had no books. Hence the prelection."² Erasmus' observation about the paradigms would have been a reference to the rote learning of tenses or conjugations of the verbs.³

¹Erasmus, Compendium vitae, in Collected Works, 4:404-5.40-44. As positive as Erasmus was in his appraisal of Hegius, he remained extremely critical of his studies in Deventer and 'sHertogenbosch, and of his association with the Brethren of the Common Life in these centers. Admittedly, his disgust was aimed at the system of education prior to the innovations introduced by Hegius. One is, nevertheless, left to wonder if Erasmus did not owe more to the teaching he received in these early years than he was willing to admit. His literary career began immediately upon the completion of his schooling, and his ability in the Latin language, even at this early age, was well advanced. See William Harrison Woodward, Desiderius Erasmus Concerning the Aim and Method of Education, Classics in Education series, no. 19 (Cambridge, England: The University Press, 1904; reprint ed., New York: Teachers College, Columbia University, 1964), p. 4.


³The word translated "paradigm" is tempora in the original and is usually rendered "tense" in a grammatical context. It seems surprising that Erasmus complained at having to learn the conjugations of the verbs. It can only be assumed that the method was the
The textbooks to which Erasmus refers as "Eberhard and John of Garland" were fairly standard. Eberhard de Bethune, of whom little is known, wrote a grammar based to a large degree on excerpts from the Doctrinale of Alexander de Villa Dei (ca. 1170-ca. 1260). It is commonly entitled the Graecismus¹ from the title of the eighth chapter, which is an introduction to the Greek language. The standard of Greek is very poor. In fact, it is more misleading than helpful. Roman rather than Greek characters are used, and the aberrations that result sometimes bear almost no resemblance whatsoever to the Greek. The Latin, too, would be less confusing if it were studied direct from de Villa Dei. Eberhard proposes such strange distinctions in meaning and usage that even some of the simplest words and constructions become complex and confusing.²

The other work mentioned by Erasmus is the Textus equivocorum cornutus of John of Garland (ca. 1195-ca. 1272). Like that of Eberhard, this text is a versified grammar. Garland was an Englishman who lectured in Paris and Toulouse. Percy Stafford Allen evaluates the worth of Garland's grammar at some length. One of the examples cited by Allen is the following excerpt concerning a dog.

After a line was read, the commentary was dictated:

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¹The full title is given by Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 148. It is Graecismus, de figuris et octo partibus orationis seu Grammaticae regulae, versibus latinis explicatae.

Latrat at amittit, humilis, vilis, negat, heret [from haereo]:
Est celeste Canis sidus, in amne natat.
["It barks, loses, is humble, is despised, denies, and clings:
It is a star in a constellation, and swims in the water."]

"Firstly it is a thing that barks": three verses of quotation follow.
"Secondly it loses; canis being the name for the worst throw
with the dice": one verse of quotation.
"Thirdly it is something humble: David to Saul, 'After whom
is the King of Israel come out? after a dead dog? after a flea?'
Fourthly it is something contemptible: Goliath to David, 'Am
I a dog that thou comest to me with staves?'
Fifthly it denies like an apostate: 'A dog returned to its
vomit.'
Sixthly it adheres." But here the interpreter goes astray
under the preoccupation of the times: "heret significat hereticum
et infidelem ['It adheres signifies the heretic and the
infidel']; hence 'It is not good to take the children's bread
and cast it unto dogs, that is to heretics and infidels.'
Seventhly it is a star; hence are named the dog days, in
which that star has dominion.
Eighthly it swims in the sea; the dog fish."¹

Learning this kind of material from memory must have been extremely
frustrating. Practically the only faculty challenged was the memory
itself. Like Eberhard, Garland was inclined to use some obscure
derivations of common words, and this must have added to the prob-
lems that the students faced.² The material seems to have little
sense or purpose. It is no wonder that the humanists rejected the
book, and Erasmus complained of having John of Garland forced upon
him.

Johannes Butzbach was another of the students in the Deven-
ter school at the end of the fifteenth century. He also mentions a
number of books that were used and makes the following observation:

I have often heard it said that apart from the Parables of
Alanus, the morals or ethics of Cato, the Fables of Aesop, and

¹John of Garland, Textus equivocorum cornutus, cited by
Allen, Age of Erasmus, pp. 36-37.

²Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 149.
a few other writers of this character, upon whom they now look with contempt, scarcely anything was read.\footnote{Johannes Butzbach, The Autobiography of Johannes Butzbach: A Wandering Scholar of the Fifteenth Century, trans. Robert Francis Seybolt and Paul Monroe (Ann Arbor, MI.: Edwards Brothers, 1933), p. 114. It is not quite clear whether Butzbach is relating his own experience, and therefore a statement of fact; or if he is merely reporting what he has heard from others concerning an era that had passed before he came to Deventer. Whatever the case may be, he certainly does not seem to reject the idea that what was said was true. This is a little difficult to understand, in that he was in Deventer at the end of Hegius' career. The textbooks he mentions were undoubtedly used before the arrival of Hegius, but it seems that by 1498 the scope of books used would have been wider. This is discussed below on pp. 323-26.}

Aesop and Cato have already been mentioned in connection with preparatory education.\footnote{See above, p. 114.} Butzbach's reference to them is not at all surprising. One of the couplets from Cato is sufficient to give an idea of the type of moral verse to be found in these distichs:

Secure thy chance when first it be at hand,  
Lest that once scorned thou dost in vain demand.\footnote{Cato [Pseudo-], The Distichs of Cato, trans. Wayland Johnson Chase, University of Wisconsin Studies in the Social Sciences and History, no. 7 (Madison, WI.: University of Wisconsin, 1922), p. 43. The Latin reads as follows:  
"Quam primum rapienda tibi est occasio prona,  
Ne rursus quaeras iam, quae neglecteris ante."  
Ibid., p. 42.}

On the level of the trivium, these writings would of course have been studied in Latin.\footnote{The Latin translation of Aesop's Fables published in Deventer at the end of the fifteenth century was the work of Lorenzo Valla. See appendix C, p. 662, where the first of a number of editions of Aesop is listed as follows: Aesopus Graecus, latinus per Laurentium Vallum factus (Deventer: Jacob van Breda, [ca. 1486]).}

The \textit{Parables of Alanus} were published in Deventer in 1492,\footnote{Alan of Lille, Doctrinale altum sive liber parabolarum Alani metrice descriptus cum sentenciis et metrorum expositionibus} which suggests that they continued in use while...
Hegius was rector. They had probably been used quite extensively prior to this date as well. The book by Alan of Lille also focuses on the question of moral values in the life of the student.

Two other books that were used on the level of the trivium must also be mentioned. These are the Ars minor of Aelius Donatus, who was the teacher of St. Jerome, and the Doctrinale of Alexander de Villa Dei. The Ars minor is a section from a more extensive grammar written by Donatus, the Ars grammatica. The grammar in its entirety was seldom used as a textbook in the trivium, but the Ars minor was almost standard. It deals mainly with the eight parts of speech and does so in a fairly competent manner except for two problems. First, it was written in the fourth century for children who knew and understood Latin well, having learned it naturally from birth. It therefore leaves out such things as gender, declension, and conjugation because the student would already have been expected to have a firm grasp of these things. The second problem arose from the attempts of the medieval teachers to rectify the first. With all sorts of ill-conceived commentaries and interpolations, the Ars minor became a text of poor quality.

utilis valde ad bonorum morum instructionem (Deventer: Jacob van Breda, 1492). See appendix C, s.v. "Alanus." There were several later incunabula editions printed in Deventer.

1À Kempis, Opera omnia, 7:293, speaks of a certain brother who was educated in Deventer and remained indebted to the models of Alexander and Donatus.


3The Ars minor was first printed in Deventer under the title, De octo partibus orationis. See appendix C, s.v. "Donatus."
Post, writing with reference to the *Ars minor* and other texts, makes the following comment: "The medieval schools used ... rhymed textbooks, usually in Latin hexameters, so complex that the verses are almost too difficult for us to understand." In the case of the *Ars minor*, which was actually written at the time of the Roman Empire, the problem may well have been the pedagogical methods employed rather than any major inadequacy in the material itself. A short excerpt from the *Ars minor*, admittedly purged of its medieval interpolations and glosses, illustrates that it was in fact a book of considerable value:

What is a participle? A part of speech partaking of the nature of the noun, and of the verb; of the noun, the genders and cases; of the verb, the tenses and meanings; of both, the number and form. How many attributes has the participle? Six. What? Gender, case, tense, meaning, number, form. How many genders of participles are there? Four. What? ... How many cases of participles are there? Six. What? Nominative, as hic legens; genitive, as huius legentis; dative, as huic legenti; accusative, as hunc legentem; vocative, as O legens; ablative, as ab hoc legente. How many tenses of participles are there? Three. What? ... [etc.]

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1. Post, *Scholen en Onderwijs*, p. 141. It should be noted here that the other grammar used in the early Middle Ages along with Donatus was probably not used a great deal in the schools of the Low Countries in the fifteenth century. The *Institutiones grammaticae* of Priscian is a lengthy and detailed book of eighteen chapters. The last two chapters, forming what is known as the *Priscianus minor*, deal with syntax. This was the most commonly used section of the *Institutiones*. The first sixteen chapters, or *Priscianus major*, deal mainly with word formation and pronunciation. By the thirteenth century, and particularly with the appearance of the *Doctrinale* of Alexander de Villa Dei, Priscian was being discarded. The *Institutiones* did not lend itself to the teaching of Latin in the form that the language was developing as the vehicle of scholastic logic. See Rashdall, *Universities*, 1:442.


After being introduced to Latin by Donatus, the students were faced with the formidable task of coming to terms with the Doctrinale of de Villa Dei. The work was commissioned by a certain Bishop of Dol whose family was being tutored by de Villa Dei. The text was completed in 1199 and enjoyed three centuries as the most popular grammar in the schools of Europe. An example taken from the critical edition of the Doctrinale edited by Dietrich Reichling gives some idea of the difficulties facing the student:

In the plural of the first and fifth [cases] it is proper to place "i." If by chance these [cases] are neuter, it is proper to place "a" with them, as well as in the fourth case: Exceptions are ambo and duo, these vary in declension. Unless there is a contraction, the genitive takes "orum." The third [case] is completed in "is" and makes the sixth like itself. The fourth [case] is formed from "os" except the neuter, and this takes "a."3


2Stellwag, Klassieke Vorming, p. 83.

3The excerpt reads as follows in Latin:
"Primo plurali decet i quintoque locari.
hos casus neutri quartumque decet per a poni;
excipis ambo, duo, tamen haec heteroclita pono.
dic nisi concisis orum fieri genetivis.
tertius est sex tumque sibi sociavit.
os faciet quartus, nisi neutris; a damus illis."
De Villa Dei, Doctrinale, p. 11.79-84.

Today a student learning the same material would see a table in the textbook something like the one given below:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Second Declension Plural:</th>
<th>Nom.</th>
<th>lup-i</th>
<th>bell-a</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>lupus, m.</em>--wolf</td>
<td>Voc.</td>
<td>-i</td>
<td>-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>bellum, n.</em>--war</td>
<td>Acc.</td>
<td>-os</td>
<td>-a</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Gen.</td>
<td>-orum</td>
<td>-orum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Dat.</td>
<td>-is</td>
<td>-is</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>AbL.</td>
<td>-is</td>
<td>-is</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The cases are given in the following order in the Doctrinale: nominative, genitive, dative, accusative, vocative, and ablative. This
Reichling's edition of the Doctrinale has 178 pages. Many of these have a number of editorial notes and commentaries, but their removal would hardly take away from the daunting task of learning the large volume of remaining versified material. The student would have to recall to mind the exact lines that applied in each different instance so that he would be sure to use the appropriate sentence construction and word endings. The Latin hexameters, intended to simplify the learning process, were in themselves a severe mental test. In fact, they made the achievement of proficiency a monumental task.

The Doctrinale may have been an improvement on some earlier medieval textbooks, but to the modern mind it is nonetheless "barbaric," and it appeared so to the humanists as well. It approaches the study of grammatica with a logical bias that was appropriate during the late Middle Ages, and it was therefore well accepted by the scholastics. While not exclusively in the tradition of the via antiqua, it tended toward a Thomistic interpretation of philosophy. The humanists rejected the Doctrinale in the end, though at first they were willing to use it after they had made certain revisions. Hegius, along with his teaching colleague, Johan Sinthius, was involved in one of these revisions. Erasmus condemned the Doctrinale only after he had been exposed to the writings of the Italian humanists and had matured a little in his thinking. The controversy continued well into the first half of the sixteenth century.1

accounts for the difference in the order of the endings given here and in the quotation taken from the Doctrinale. The modern student would learn the exceptions as a list of words or in a simple rhyme.

1Hegius' attitude is examined below on pp. 294, 335-37.
Some of the other books that may have been used in Deventer and the rest of the schools in the Low Countries are also of interest, particularly because of what Hegius wrote about them. In the fifteenth century two Dutch-Latin Dictionaries appeared in the Low Countries. The smaller of these was the Gemmula vocabulorum. The Gemmula vocabulorum was a more extensive work. These books were printed by a number of publishers throughout the Netherlands after about 1480. The Gemmula was first printed by Richard Paffraet in Deventer in 1489, and the Gemma in 1495. These dictionaries borrowed a great deal from the Latin-German Vocabularius ex quo, which

At this point it is well to note a number of earlier medieval dictionaries. It is possible that some of these were available for use by the teachers, but it is unlikely that students would generally have had access to them. The first of these is by Papias (fl. 1051). This follows the alphabetical principal, which was an improvement on earlier attempts at similar works. Previously the derivations had been given under the root. Papias returned to this method of presentation from time to time, to the detriment of his labors. The major problem, however, is inconsistency in medieval spelling. The dictionary is a crude literary tool, but better than nothing. The second dictionary is the Liber derivationum by Huguccio of Pisa (fl. 1190-1214). In this work the words are given according to their etymological derivation, which is sometimes rather questionable. In fact, the work is extremely cumbersome and difficult to use. The best of the dictionaries is the Summa qui vocatur catholicon of John Balbi (ante 1298). This once again follows the alphabetical principle. The derivation of the words, however, remains rather unscientific, and spelling continues to be a problem. This makes the work far from satisfactory, and, in the eyes of the men of the Renaissance, barbaric. Another dictionary is that of William of Brito (fl. 1225-50). It bears the title Exposizioni difficiliorum verborum. While these works would not often have been seen in the classroom, they are mentioned here because of comments that Hegius made about them. See Hegius, appendix A, pp. 640-41; Allen, Age of Erasmus, pp. 43-52; and Jozef Ijsewijn, ed., "Alexander Hegius (fl.1498): 'Invectiva in Modos Significandii',' Forum for Modern Languages 7 (4 October 1971):314.

1See appendix C, s.v. "Gemmula" and "Gemmula."
was published extensively toward the end of the fifteenth century.\(^1\)

Another textbook with a considerable circulation was *De scholarium disciplina* of Pseudo-Boethius. This was written sometime in the thirteenth century and gained for itself quite a positive reputation over the next two hundred years, until the time of the humanists. The author of this work is not known, but it was quite certainly not Boethius. The *Scholarium disciplina* has, in the words of Jozef Ijsewijn, some very "queer Latin."\(^2\) In spite of this it was used regularly in the schools prior to 1500. Jacob van Breda first printed the work in Deventer in 1490, and there were several later editions.\(^3\)

A work mentioned by Post and discussed at length by Allen is the *Mammaetractus* of Johannes Marchesinus (fl. 1450).\(^4\) It is not at all certain that this was used as a text in Deventer, but Allen has observed that it is a good example of the standard of some of the literary aids being used in the fifteenth century. Allen has summarized the contents and value of the *Mammaetractus* in these words:

> The book consists of a commentary on the whole Bible, chapter by chapter; . . . upon various sermons . . . and hymns, with notes on the Hebrew months, ecclesiastical vestments, and other subjects. . . . From its scope the book might be expected to be . . . large . . ., but in fact it can be printed in a quarto volume. . . . The surprising part of the book is its triviality.\(^5\)

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\(^2\)Ijsewijn, "Hegius Invectiva," p. 303.

\(^3\)See appendix C, s.v. "Boethius [Pseudo-]."


\(^5\)Allen, *Age of Erasmus*, pp. 53-54.
This latter point is clearly illustrated in the examples given by Allen.

The works of the modistae such as Michael de Morbosio (fl. 1280) may also have been used as textbooks in the schools. The Modi significandi which these modistae wrote are speculative grammars influenced by scholastic logic. The humanists rejected these works in no uncertain terms.

Whether or not Pseudo-Boethius, the works of the modistae, or the Gemmae and the earlier dictionaries were textbooks in Deventer remains an open question. It is probably true that they had been used before the arrival of Hegius. It is also likely that some continued to be used during the period of his rectorship at St. Lebuins. Whatever the case may have been, Hegius wrote some strong criticisms of these books. In this he echoes the sentiments of Lorenzo Valla.

When a student had gained a fair knowledge of Latin and reached the fifth class, he began the study of logic. The textbook he would then have begun to use is the Summulae logicales of Petrus Hispanus (ca. 1210-77). The Summulae was written around the time when the works of Aristotle had been rediscovered and were being

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4Petrus Hispanus was enthroned as Pope John XXI in 1276.
studied. Though complex in format and content, it is a naive interpretation of Aristotle. It was used later by both realists and nominalists with the addition of their own glosses and commentaries.

In 1491 the Summulae was published in Deventer by Richard Paffraet. Post has outlined the twelve chapters of this book so as to give some idea of what was meant by the study of logic:

The first chapter gives definitions and interpretations of dialectic, nouns [nomen], verbs [verbum], sentence structure [pratio], proposition [propositio]. The different kinds of proposition are also given. The second chapter deals with predicables [predicabilia] such as genus, species, accident, and property [commune]. The third chapter is concerned with the categories [Aristotle's predicamenta], and, therewith, an understanding of quantity and quality. The definition is always given first and then explained. The fourth chapter considers syllogisms and gives the various kinds as well as their rules. The material covered in the fifth chapter would perhaps not normally be considered a part of logic; it belongs more in the realm of dialectic [strictly defined as one of the classical arts rather than in the sense of medieval logic], or possibly even rhetoric. It is called "ratio" [reason]. The chapter deals with the question of where evidence may be found; in other words it gives the locus in the technical sense, the source of evidence [sedes argumenti], the foundation of demonstration. It is also called "De locis" [Concerning Topics]; this is the subject to which Rudolph Agricola directed his attention in his major work. One may distinguish between the intrinsic topic and the extrinsic topic. Under the intrinsic are definition, periphrasis, interpretation, cause, and origins [generatio]. Under extrinsic are relation, opposition, contrariety, contradiction, and assumption [of one thing for another--transsumptio]. The next chapter (VI--Concerning Fallacy [De fallacius]) deals with faulty syllogism: begging the question [petitio principii], proving a different proposition to the one intended [ignorantia elenchii], ambiguity of words, and deficiencies in the consequent. Further chapters deal with supposition [suppositiones] (VII), relatives [relativa] (VIII), personal supposition [personales suppositiones] (IX), appellations [appellatio] (X), restricted terms [restrictio] (XI), and distributed terms [distributio] (XII).

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1 See appendix C, s.v. "Petrus Alfonsus Hispanus."

2 Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 152. Information regarding the definitions of these words as they relate to philosophy and logic may be obtained from the following sources: J. H. Baxter and
The complexity of the Summulae makes it difficult for many present-day adult scholars to comprehend. The average student in the medieval schoolroom was about twelve to fifteen years of age when exposed to this material for the first time. Even a cursory glance at the way in which the argument is presented is sufficient to convince the reader that the book must have presented a daunting challenge to any prospective scholar in his young manhood. The quotation cited here is taken from the treatise on suppositions:

But I believe that it is impossible for a general term, functioning as predicate, to have simple suppositional value and to be movably or immovably indeterminate when there is a universal sign in the subject of an affirmative proposition, as in the statement: "Every man is an animal", and in similar propositions. The reason for this is, . . . that everything which is predicated of something is either greater than or equal to that of which it is [essentially] predicated. . . . But in this proposition: "Every man is an animal", the predication is essential and the predicate is not of equal extension with the subject; therefore, it is greater. It is not accidental; therefore, it is substantial or essential. Consequently it is a genus or differentia. It is not a differentia; therefore it is a genus. But the nature of a genus, when it is distributed either movably or immovably, is not a genus. . . .


1The Latin reads:
"Sed ego credo impossibile esse terminum communem, in praedicato positum, habere simplicem suppositionem et confundir moviliter vel immoviliter, signo universali existente in subjecto affirmativae, ut 'Omnis homo est animal', et sic de aliiis..."
Without personal copies of the *Summulae*, which they were unlikely to have had, the average student could only with great difficulty and untiring perseverance have gained even an elementary understanding of logic from Petrus Hispanus.¹

Other books that may well have been used in the study of logic were anthologies of the classical authors,² the writings of

consimilibus; quia ... omne quod praedicatur de aliquo aut est maius eo aut est aequale ei de quo praedicatur [per se]. ... Sed in hac propositione: 'Omnis homo est animal', est praedicatio per se et non praedicatur aequale; ergo maius. Non accidentale; ergo substantialia vel essentiale. Ergo genus vel differentia. Non differentia; ergo genus. Sed natura generis, multiplicata mobiliter vel immobile, non est genus. ..."


²A number of these anthologies or *Florilegia* were compiled during the Carolingian period and remained in use until the time of the humanists. The following authors were included: Apuleius (ca. A.D. 123-post 161), Avianus (fl. ca. 400), Boethius, Julius Caesar (100-44 B.C.), Calpurnius Siculus (fl. A.D. 50-60), Cassiodorus (ca. 490-ca. 583), Cato, Cicero (106-43 B.C.), Claudian (fl. 395-404), Donatus, Gellius (ca. A.D. 130-ca. 180), Horace (65-8 B.C.), Juvencus (ca. A.D. 60-post 127), Lucan (A.D. 39-65), Macrobius (fl. 399-422), Martianus Capella, Nemesianus (fl. ante 300), Ovid (43 B.C.-A.D. 17), Persius (A.D. 34-62), Petronius (fl. 1st century A.D.), Pliny the Elder (ca. A.D. 23-79), Priscian, Querolus (ca. 400), Quintilian (ca. A.D. 30-ante 100), Sallust (ca. 86-35 B.C.), Seneca the Elder (ca. 55 B.C.-ante A.D. 1), Seneca the Younger (ca. 4 B.C.-65 A.D.), Statius (ca. A.D. 45-96), Suetonius (fl. A.D. 117-38), Terence (ca. 190-159 B.C.), Tibullus (ca. 55-19 B.C.), Valerius Flaccus (fl. A.D. 80-92), and Virgil (70-19 B.C.). The Latin poems entitled *Aetna, Ciris, and Culex*; Latin translations of Greek excerpts from Aesop, Aristotle (primarily from Boethius), the *Iliad* by Homer (9th century B.C.), and Plato; and the religious works of Apollinaris (first bishop of Ravenna), Augustine (354-430), Ennodius (ca. 473-521), Jerome (ca. 342-420), Prudentius (348-ca. 410), and Tertullian (ca. 160-ca. 225 A.D.) were also commonly cited in the anthologies. This may appear to be a representative selection of classical and ecclesiastical authors, but it must be remembered that the selections were often short and the text corrupt. Medieval education was certainly not classical, though a glance at the long list of authors might give that impression. It is likely, however, that the humanist tendency to exaggerate in order to prove a point made them paint a blacker picture of medieval education than was necessary. See Post, *Scholen en Onderwijs*, pp. 150-51.
Aristotle that were available, and the *Consolatione philosophiae* by Boethius.¹ The latter was one of the most influential books of the Middle Ages. Boethius also translated Aristotle's *De interpretatione* and the *Categoriae* into Latin, and wrote commentaries on some of his other works. Were it not for these translations, scholars of the medieval period would have been almost totally ignorant of Aristotle until the twelfth century. Boethius' writings remained in vogue until the time of the Renaissance, and the *Consolatione* was even translated into Dutch in the 1460s.² Boethius must have been well known in the Low Countries at that time, and his works were no doubt used in the teaching of logic and philosophy.

**Textbooks of the Quadrivium**

Little is known concerning the textbooks that were used in the quadrivium in the Dutch schools prior to 1480. All that may be ventured is that the writings of Aristotle that were available would have been studied. This was generally the case in the northern universities during the fifteenth century, and there is no reason to doubt that the same held true in the *secunda* and *prima*. These two classes were considered equivalent to the first years of university education.³ The complete absence of anything but some minor speculations by Post and Frederiks in their definitive studies makes it


³Rashdall, *Universities*, 1.4-47.
clear that these scholars found little or nothing in the sources.¹
When it comes to evaluating this aspect of the curriculum in the
Deventer school, it is not possible to make many comparisons between
the textbooks in use prior to 1480 and those used in later years
after the school had come under the direction of Hegius.

Educational Practices and Methodologies²

In order to gain a better understanding of daily life in
fifteenth-century Dutch schools, the conditions under which the
students and masters pursued learning must now be considered. In
this brief overview of the educational program, some observations
are made about the work of the teacher, attitudes toward students,
methods, and discipline.

The role played by the rector in medieval times was even
more critical than the role of the principal today. Schools waxed
and waned according to the abilities of their appointed leader.³
The program of the school, though often controlled to some extent by
city and ecclesiastical regulations, was essentially in the hands of

¹Neither Post nor Frederiks are able to make any definite
observations about textbooks used by the advanced students in the
secunda and prima. It is only from the limited information avail­
able regarding the subject matter of the curriculum that any sugges­
tions can be made. Frederiks bases his assumptions on the under­
standing that the upper classes in Zwolle were taught according to
the earlier medieval conceptions of the quadrivium. It has already
been argued that this was not completely true. See above, pp. 107-
13; and Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, pp. 77-82. Post has merely
given some information from the school at Utrecht in the year 1565
and from Deventer after the arrival of Hegius. He makes no comment
about the books used on the level of the quadrivium in Deventer or
Zwolle prior to 1480. Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 154.

²This section is based almost exclusively on Post, Scholen
en Onderwijs, chap. 5; and Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, chap. 2.

³Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 119.
the rector. It was he who appointed and supervised the teachers, accepted and disciplined the students, established the principles on which the school was run, and ensured that the school was functioning effectively in achieving its goals. The success of the school depended to a large extent on the abilities and initiative of the rector and on his capacity to motivate the teachers. Flourishing schools were the work of outstanding headmasters.

The rector did not generally appoint a teacher who did not hold a Master's degree. This may be deduced from, among other evidence, the attitude taken toward Bartholomew van Keulen (1460-1514). Van Keulen taught in Deventer during the time of Hegius and was the teacher of Johannes Butzbach in 1500. Butzbach writes:

I reached the third class. At that time, the class was under Master [sic] Bartholomew of Cologne, an unusually earnest and learned man. . . . Although he was in every way worthy, still no university had honored him with the degree of Master. For this reason, he is, to this very day, a thorn in the flesh for many blockheads, who are proud of their empty titles; and his works are criticized by them as schoolboys' exercises and despised by them.1

The fact that a teacher who did not have the Magister artium was considered a mere schoolboy is indicative of what was normally required.

Post raises the question of teachers' pay. He feels unable to give any definite answers but adds that, even with the several benefits received, their lives could not have been filled with much luxury. In return for the effort required, the remuneration was small, and the situation was "zeker niet rooskleurig."2 The rectors


2"Certainly not rose tinted." Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 131.

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of the city schools were paid from the fees of the pupils by the city authorities. It was then the rector's responsibility to pay the teachers. Because of the numbers of students, the teacher at a flourishing school was obviously better paid. But certain limits were established beyond which the percentage of a student's fees normally paid to the masters was retained by the city treasury. More than a certain number of pupils brought no increase in salary.

Post has summarized his evaluation of the situation:

The lot, or should I say the privilege of the rector of a medieval school, and probably even more of his subordinate teachers, was a sober one, requiring a great deal of effort. The masters were usually appointed and paid by the rector. A poor paymaster would certainly not have been a royal employer.\(^1\)

While the teaching vocation was highly honored, the physical and financial benefits were minimal.

School fees varied a little from school to school but were usually more expensive for outsiders than for citizens of the host town. Poor students were also catered for and were allowed to beg. They were often given board and lodging by benevolent householders. Most towns also had dormitories, many of them run by the Brethren of the Common Life. The Brethren, however, were usually unwilling to admit students who had not yet attained the fifth class and were not intending to enter one of the religious orders.\(^2\) Many of the citizens of the towns offered lodging to students at a reasonable price.

Teachers and students alike endured a long daily schedule.

\(^{1}\)Ibid., p. 132.

\(^{2}\)Butzbach, Autobiography, p. 106; and Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, pp. 63-64.
Frederiks has outlined the timetable in Zwolle, which is representative of that of most schools. The day began at 6:00 A.M., or 7:00 A.M. in the winter, with early mass in the church. This was followed by a free period for breakfast, and then practice for participation in high mass, which began at 9:00 A.M. At 10:00 A.M. the first actual lessons were given, followed at 11:00 A.M. by the midday break. At 1:00 P.M. lessons resumed, and continued until 5:00 P.M. with a one hour break.¹

The "free periods" between classes were often filled with some other required activity like choir practice. Even when the students were free, the masters still had to supervise their games, as they were responsible for the activities of the students until they returned to their lodgings in the evening.

It was not common to have regularly scheduled vacations, though some schools did have these. Vacations were considered unnecessary on account of the feast days, which made up about one-third of the year. Feast days and Sundays were, however, hardly holidays in the modern sense of the word. Classes still met, except that the content was changed and the rector often lectured to the entire student body.²

In the classroom situation, the role of the teacher was considered very differently from what it is today. The teacher was essentially viewed as the fountain of all knowledge. The textbook


was of vital importance as well, but the teacher was often the one who dictated it to the students, and he was certainly the one who interpreted it.

The student was in turn seen as the recipient of knowledge. To a large degree, knowledge was believed to bring virtue. Once the teacher was able to instill knowledge into the student, then ignorance could be dispelled and sin conquered. If theory did not always quite accept this stoicism, practice did. Reason and the mind were seen to be the avenue to an understanding of God in the Thomistic view of the via antiqua which was influential in the schools. The mind should, therefore, be filled with the appropriate knowledge that would enable the learner to formulate the correct perceptions of divinity. This essential body of knowledge was the accumulated learning of the ages, interpreted by the logic of the schoolmen.¹ The methods used for making this transfer of learning from teacher to student were the results of efforts to come to terms with the extremely difficult problems facing the medieval educator.

Classes often had over one hundred students under a single teacher. The sheer impossibility of accomplishing anything on an individual basis demanded that the teacher be a lecturer. The class was subdivided in such a way that those who needed assistance could receive it in small groups from their more capable fellow-students. In many classes the teacher was, in fact, a student from one of the higher grades rather than a magister.²


²Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, pp. 133-36.
If there were not sufficient texts among the students, the textbook would be dictated (pronuntiare). The lecture (lectio) would follow, at which time the content and form of the text would be explained. Occasion was also given for disputatio, particularly in the higher classes, with all the students often being present. The disputationes were debates on specified topics conducted in accord with the principles of scholastic logic. Of these Paulsen writes:

The object . . . was to give practice in the application of the subject matter of learning . . . . They [disputations] formed unquestionably an excellent means of making the acquisition of knowledge a sure and certain thing. They were calculated to increase the ready command of knowledge, and a quickness to perceive the trend of others' thought and its relation to one's own conceptions. We may very well assume that in both depart­ments the medieval man of learning possessed a skill hard to discover in modern times.2

In this approach to learning, because of the lack of written works and because of the desire to expand the rational and logical abilities of the mind, stress was placed on exercise of the memory.3

1Paulsen, German Universities, p. 35, states that the process of lectio was:
"Praemitto, scindo, summo, casumque figuro,
Perlego, do causas, connoto, obicio [sic]."
Praemitto was an introduction to the text with definitions of its limitations (termini--points of origin and destination). Scindo was an analysis into parts, after which a summary statement or summo of the content was made. The casumque figuro set up the sophistical arguments against the factual. This included establishing the correct principles of exposition by which the points of the arguments were to be explained. The perlego was the actual interpretation of the text. Under causas, the rational basis for judgment was given in harmony with Aristotelian and medieval logic. The connoto included further explanations regarding related points raised by the argument. Finally, objicio considered any remaining points of controversy. See also Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, pp. 83-84.

2Paulsen, German Universities, pp. 36-37.

3Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 141.
Students could write down on their slates much of what was said in the lecture. Some of this could be condensed and written in their rapiarium, a book of important notes and quotations. The bulk of the material, however, had to be committed to memory. To make matters even more difficult, the thought world of the books being studied was very different from the ideas and experiences of the boys of the Low Countries. All these things seemed to work together in adding to the enormity of the task that faced the student in memorizing the work that was set before him. It is no wonder that strict discipline played a central role in the motivation of students. In this area the rector had supreme authority, and it was, in fact, illegal for anybody to attempt to obstruct him in the performance of his duty. The method of discipline was generally corporal punishment, which could be quite brutal. Beatings were often administered in public and on the bare buttocks. The symbol of the teacher was a paddle, with which he was often depicted in the early woodcuts.

Misdemeanors ranged from not knowing the lesson, truancy, and speaking Dutch, to visiting pubs and frequenting brothels. The rector had to ensure that the students were always under supervision.

1Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, p. 40.
2Ibid., pp. 55-56. See also the introductory comments made by Wayland Chase to his translation of the Ars minor. He gives a concise and interesting description of the difficulties facing a medieval student. Donatus, Ars minor, pp. 12-14.
3Jan Isaak van Doorninck, "Bouwstoffen voor eene Geschiedenis van het Onderwijs in Overijssel: 3--De School Afgebeeld," Bijdragen tot de Geschiedenis van Overijssel 4 (1878): 82-83. A good example of this type of woodcut is given. Also, see below, p. 370.
4Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, pp. 125, 128.
during the school day, and he was required to make regular visits to the hostels and residences where the boys lived. Besides his own observations and those of the teachers, he relied on tattling, which was encouraged.

Discipline was severe and intended to punish moral indiscretions as well as to encourage the acquisition of knowledge. It was thought that what could not be drilled in by the lecture might be beaten in with the rod or the paddle. Whichever method was successful was of little significance. Appeal was made to both honor and fear. The main thing was that the student be motivated in some way to imbibe the requisite knowledge and thus expand his mind and expel ignorance.

To the modern mind the methods and practices of the medieval schools appear rather crude. Their effectiveness, at least for many of the students, must be open to question. Yet it appears that the educational goals were often achieved, and many adept and nimble-minded scholars were produced. (Not so much is known about the many failures that there must have been.) The school drilled into the medieval student that knowledge which was considered essential, and in this task it was relentless and single-minded. Only one approach to reasoning was acknowledged. All learning needed to fit into the framework of the medieval logical system. In the area of the Low Countries the interpretation of this system that was favored was the via antiqua.

Philosophic Approach

In his study of the school in Zwolle, Frederiks concludes that Johan Cele definitely favored the Thomistic via antiqua. He
adds: "We do not, therefore, need to doubt that Cele would have
instructed his students in the spirit of scholastic philosophy."¹

Without detailed research in the primary sources, it is not
wise to make specific statements about schools in any of the other
towns. It is also unwise to make broad generalizations that cannot
be substantiated with detailed documentary evidence or the authority
of some scholar in the field. Nevertheless, the undoubted impres­
sion gained from a study of education in the Low Countries is that
what was true for Zwolle about 1400 was also true elsewhere through­
out most of the fifteenth century. Although the scholars have not
generalized, their evaluations have tended almost without exception
to point toward a Thomistic frame of reference. This is true of
both nineteenth- and twentieth-century researchers.² There has been
much that has changed in the interpretation of the educational his­
tory of the Low Countries in the fifteenth century over the last
hundred years. A Thomistic conception of reality, however, appears
to have been a constant. If this has not been plainly stated, it
has nevertheless been commonly assumed.

A survey of the development of Dutch scholasticism reveals
that some prominent scholars like Marsilius van Inghen (d. 1396)³

¹Frederiks, Zwolse Schoolwezen, p. 55.

²See, for example, Heinrich Julius Kaemmel, Geschichte des
Deutschen Schulwesens im Uebergange vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit
(Leipzig: Dunker & Humblot, 1882), pp. 164, 180-81; Paul Mestwerdt,
Die Anfänge des Erasmus Humanismus und "Devotio Moderna" (Leipzig:
Rudolf Haupt, 1917), pp. 101-12, 149-68; Johannes Lindeboom, Het
65, 77-78; and Hyma, Youth of Erasmus, p. 117.

³Marsilius van Inghen had been rector of the University of
Paris, and he was the first rector at Heidelberg. See Rashdall,
Universities, 2:251; and Heiko Augustinus Oberman, Masters of the
were nominalistic in their orientation. Generally, however, the Netherlands tended to remain fairly conservative and traditional philosophically throughout most of the fifteenth century. There was a distinct preference for the "ancient" over the "modern" way. Those who followed the via moderna had often been associated with Paris, where there was much argumentation over the two viae. The university in the city of Köln was strongly Thomistic, and many Dutch students attended there. Leuven tended toward Thomism, and Heidelberg attempted to allow the co-existence of both viae.¹ Most students from the Low Countries, and therefore most teachers, would have been educated with a preference for the via antiqua.

The nature of the textbooks used in the schools was also a reflection of the Thomistic bias. It could not be said that they were strictly Thomistic, for nominalists used them as well. But a number of them grew out of the early scholastic tradition and were well-suited to Thomistic logic.

Thomism posited an all-encompassing conception of reality, with metaphysics, or perhaps better, metalogics, supreme. Theology was not a discipline distinct from philosophy, but an integral part of that study. Philosophy substantiated theology and was, in fact, the means by which man could comprehend God. Knowledge was seen as ultimately non-contradictory. It should therefore be embraced in a grand summa that was to be achieved through medieval logical


¹See Maarten van Rhijn, "Wessel Gansfort te Heidelberg en de Strijd Tusschen de 'Via Antiqua' en de 'Via Moderna'," Nederlandsch Archief voor Kerkgeschiedenis 18 (1925):259-64.
reasoning built upon the principles of Aristotelian dialectic.¹

The close ties between the Church and the school ensured that teaching practices as well as the material taught were in close accord with these overriding philosophical conceptions. However crudely it was done, schooling aimed at the "stretching" of the mind in a specific and narrowly defined manner. The avenue to knowledge was through logic. Thus, a formal approach to logic, based upon Aristotle but peculiar to scholasticism, was learned; language was taught within the parameters of this system; reason and intuition were developed so as not to contravene its established logical methodologies; and the mind of the student was challenged in a strictly formal way, according to the traditional scholastic pattern. Creativity in the modern sense was not a goal. It was "allowed" only within the limits of scholastic logic—if it is possible to understand creativity in this sense. This is not to suggest that the medieval mind was not capable of astonishing achievements. Scholastic thought was complex and often extremely profound. It was, however, undoubtedly only the most brilliant of the students who were able to achieve proficiency, and then just those who contained their ideas within the strictures of the scholastic system. Many a medieval student must have given up as a result of the poor methods and facilities, the lack of adequate teaching materials, and above all, the complexity of ideas almost beyond imagination. It is no wonder that the monasteries were often filled with half-educated monks and ignorant lay brothers.

¹See above, p. 99.
At the beginning of this chapter the question was raised as to why the humanists reacted so strongly against late medieval education. Even a cursory comparison of the features of biblical humanism in the North with the program of education in fifteenth-century Dutch schools immediately reveals some of the major issues that resulted in this negative assessment.

The study of metaphysics was the supreme goal of scholastic education. Grammar was subordinate to metaphysics, and only a means to an end. The humanist was unable to countenance this attitude, for to him grammar was an art based upon classical norms, not the vehicle of scholastic logic.

In addition, the humanists were not generally interested in the metaphysical formulations of scholasticism. Metaphysics could not, in the mind of the humanist, be the pinnacle of learning to which all other knowledge was aimed. More important to the humanist than philosophical argumentation about the views of the ancient sages and the Scriptures was the study of these sources themselves. From these, and not from the specious wranglings of the scholastics, could pietas and sapientia be obtained. Education should be concerned with a renewal of classical learning and language.

From this standpoint, as the humanist looked at the subject matter and approach to learning of the schools in the Low Countries, he could only feel that they were failing in their task. Contemporary education was, in his opinion, barbaric.¹

¹See above, pp. 60-74, where the concerns of the humanists are outlined. See also Jardine, "Humanism and Logic," pp. 797-807; and Percival "Approach to Language," pp. 808-17.
It now remains to consider the philosophy and practices of Alexander Hegius, the Deventer pedagog of the late fifteenth century. His ideas are compared with those of the other northern humanists; and the school at St. Lebuins is examined in the light of any changes brought about by Hegius that distinguish it from the earlier medieval schools discussed in this chapter. In this manner the contribution made by Hegius to northern humanism is evaluated. To begin this process, Hegius' philosophy as presented in his Dialogs is outlined in the next chapter.
CHAPTER IV

THE PHILOSOPHY OF ALEXANDER HEGIUS
AS OUTLINED IN HIS DIALOGS

Philosophy at the end of the Middle Ages has been portrayed as an accumulation of ideas distorted by endless controversies. The consequence of these debates was the creation of what can only be described as an extreme doctrinal confusion. As the writings of Alexander Hegius are examined, there are times when this evaluation seems most appropriate. Yet, in order to understand the man and to appraise his contribution to pre-Reformation humanism in Northern Europe, it is essential that an attempt be made to find some kind of order in the apparent confusion.

The major problem with which one is faced is that of understanding the medieval mind. Medieval patterns of thought are so foreign to modern man that they seem at times to be quite illogical. One tends to weigh them in the balance of modern ideas and find them wanting. Understood from a medieval point of view, however, they are quite reasonable. In fact, it is partly because of their strict, logical formulation, established upon principles very different from those of present-day common sense, that they sometimes appear so unfathomable. To make Hegius' writings more intelligible

to the modern reader, his philosophy is outlined in terms of a sequence that follows a fairly rudimentary division of medieval philosophy. The emphasis in this investigation is not to scrutinize all the niceties of his philosophy under the spotlight of the various medieval philosophical traditions. It is rather to achieve an understanding of his ideas that permits an adequate evaluation of the impact of his philosophy upon his educational endeavors. Before this investigation is undertaken, however, consideration is given to the major concerns of each of the fourteen dialogs, as well as the "Miscellany" and "Invective Against the Modes of Signification."  

A Synopsis of the Dialogs

The first dialog is an epistemological treatise entitled "Concerning Knowledge and That Which Is Known." It begins with a rejection of skepticism, postulating that "something can be known." Knowledge, and the avenues to knowledge, are narrowly defined in Aristotelian terms, with a clear distinction being made between

1In publishing the Dialogi, Jacobus Faber and Richard Paffraet did not group the individual dialogs under main headings. For example, the four dialogs on the soul are presented as separate and distinct works rather than as subdivisions of a main section. In editing the Dialogs I have elected to retain the divisions as they are in the original 1503 publication, though for the sake of clarity it would have been preferable to introduce main headings and subdivisions. The "Farrago" and "Contra modos significandi" are not dialogs in the strict sense of the word, though they were published under the title of Dialogi. For additional information about the Dialogs, see the introduction to appendix A, pp. 381-83.

2A summary of the Dialogi, in some respects more detailed than this overview, is also given by Josef Wiese in Der Pädagoge Alexander Hegius und seine Schüler (Berlin: Actien-Gesellschaft für Verlag und Druckerei, 1892), pp. 19-37.

3Alexander Hegius, The Dialogs of Alexander Hegius, appendix A, p. 386. In this synopsis references are made to appendix A only when direct quotations are being used.
knowledge and belief. Observation, logical reasoning, and certain universally accepted conceptions are the only avenues through which knowledge may be generated. Dependence upon any other authorities or methods is considered to result only in speculation or belief. This is not to imply that belief and faith are necessarily inferior to knowledge. To the contrary, certain beliefs are seen to be of much greater value than some knowledge.

Knowledge is considered to be a good thing in and of itself because "the more truths a man knows the more like he is to God."¹ Learning is, therefore, the perfection of the mind, because it is the means by which the mind moves toward knowledge. The dialog continues with an evaluation of the liberal arts and a reference to the "sciences." Hegius concludes that grammar, rhetoric, and metaphysics are worthy to be learned and known.

The next four dialogs all deal with the subject of the soul. The title of the first of these is a good description of the contents: "Concerning the Soul: and Firstly, Concerning the Soul in Kind, and Its Definitions, and Many Other Things." The "Many Other Things" could well be included in the titles of quite a number of the dialogs, for it is at times somewhat difficult to follow the logical progression of Hegius' thought. The numerous digressions often seem meaningless to the modern mind, but careful consideration usually reveals that there is method and reason in the development of the argument and the manner of presentation.² As with the first

¹Ibid., p. 395.

²Wiese makes a similar observation. He notes that what seem like meaningless amplifications are always, in the end, seen to be of value. He writes:
dialog, this one is firmly established upon Aristotelian concepts. After introducing the topic, Hegius gives an etymology of the Greek and Latin words for soul. This, he emphasizes, is the only contribution a grammarian can make to the understanding of the soul, for grammar deals with the names of things and not their substance. He then explains that, because the soul is "mobile and transmutable," natural philosophy and metaphysics provide a more suitable arena for a study of its nature.

The contributions of the metaphysician and the dialectician to the understanding of the soul are then considered, and the distinctions between substance, accident, and kind are clarified. An explanation is given of the three kinds of souls—vegetable, sensible, and rational—and how they are to be distinguished. This is followed by a universal definition of the soul, which states: "The soul is the prime impulse of a physical, organic body, having life in potentiality." A lengthy consideration of the ramifications of this definition, as well as those of a complementary definition, constitute the remainder of the dialog. The complementary definition distinguishes four orders of living things, namely, those that live or feel or move or understand. These distinctions arise from the transmutation of matter to form different bodies as well as the

"In all these writings great skill is evident in the framing of questions, and the expression is adroit. The red thread often seems to go missing, but this is only to outward appearances. Despite the many digressions which form the platform for a repetition of what has been previously stated, the author is nevertheless well able to return to his topic at the necessary time." Wiese, Hegius, p. 34.

1Hegius, appendix A, p. 404.
2Ibid., p. 410.
animation of each body by an individual soul. Hegius emphasizes that each of these animated bodies is "one of itself."\(^1\) He thereby rejects the Pythagorean hypothesis of a transmigration of souls and establishes the basis for a later rejection of the Platonic concept of a world soul.\(^2\) The dialog concludes with an investigation of the powers and operations of the soul.

The next dialog, "Concerning the Vegetable Soul," is a more specific enquiry into the first of the three kinds of souls. The major focus of attention is on the operations of the vegetable soul. These are to nourish and augment the body in order to make possible its most important operation, which is generation. In a discussion of digestion and assimilation, the transmutability of matter is once again stressed, and the opportunity taken to remind the reader of the transient nature of this present life. "Man is commanded to remember that he is ash and will return to ash."\(^3\) While the vegetable soul can only attain eternity for the body which it animates by the operation of generating another body like the first, the rational soul is different. The human race will continue to live forever, "part . . . in heaven, part in hell."\(^4\) It is not possible

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 418.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 468-69. See also Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 220, 339. Gilson points out how certain Platonic concepts were introduced into the writings of the medieval commentator, Averroes (1126-98), through the ideas of Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. A.D. 198-211). It was against the ideas of these men that Hegius was reacting. His argument brings to mind the heated discussion of this topic that took place in Paris in 1277. See Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, vol. 2: Mediaeval Philosophy (Garden City, NY.: Image Books, 1962), pt. 2:152-53.

\(^3\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 433. \(^4\)Ibid.
for this to be demonstrated or known, but it can be most assuredly
and emphatically believed.

Next, the relationships between body and soul, and form and
matter are explored briefly, but not thoroughly discussed. On one
or two occasions the medieval bent of Hegius' thought is plainly
evident. There is, for example, a reminder of the tendency of the
ancient and medieval scholars to split hairs over trivia. A case in
point is where Hegius resurrects the argument as to which is the
bottom and which is the top of a tree. In spite of this, as a short
treatise on nutrition, the dialog is quite informative. It could
almost be called a lesson in high-school biology.

The third of the dialogs on the soul is "Concerning the
Sensual or Sensible Soul." It begins by affirming the method of
Aristotle, which Hegius recognizes as the only correct way for an
instructor to teach. Learning is best facilitated by presenting the
general and then proceeding to the particular, or moving from what
is known to what is less familiar.¹

From a discussion of natural and acquired virtues, and
active and passive virtues, the dialog leads into an investiga­
tion of the sensile soul. The senses are considered to be passive

¹It is often thought that Aristotle espoused the scientific
or inductive method (from specific to general) and rejected the
deductive method (from general to specific). This is not true. If
by the deductive method one means the syllogism, which is usually
based on a general major premise and a particular conclusion, then
Aristotle used this repeatedly. He proposes that advance is made
from generals to particulars, but there is a subtlety of meaning in
this that subsumes induction under the deductive method. "Now what
is [seems] to us plain and obvious at first is [actually] rather
confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known
to us later by analysis." Proceeding from generalities, the gener­
alities are actually clarified by understanding the particulars.
virtues that take up within themselves the form and likeness of the object sensed. This having been done, the object can be judged and recognized through the powers of the active virtue of the sensile soul. In describing the difference between the sense and intellect, Hegius states: "Sense recognizes individually, intellect universally. . . . Also, intellect passes judgment when it wishes, but a sense cannot sense unless a sensible thing is present." With this, the stage is set to turn to the last of the dialogs on the soul.

"Concerning the Intellectual Soul" is the longest of all the treatises published in the Dialogs. In modern terminology, much of it could be classified as psychology of learning. The medieval interest in syllogisms and logical proofs is retained, and many sophistical syllogisms are presented and corrected. However, this interest in medieval logic presents a lower profile than had been the case with the earlier scholastic treatises. While some of the ideas of the Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain remain to ensure clarity of expression, there is not undue emphasis placed upon them.

After reiterating some points made in the earlier dialogs on the soul, Hegius declares that the intellectual soul is the mover of man. An investigation of this soul leads to the conclusion that, unlike the vegetable soul of plants or the sensible soul of animals, the intellectual or rational soul of man is indivisible. It has powers and potentialities, but no parts. Each human body is animated by an individual soul. This soul, though it was created at a particular point in time to animate a particular body, is immortal. Intellect, which is a virtue or power of the soul, is, as a result,

1Hegius, appendix A, p. 448.
eternal in itself. "Intellec is everlasting, for it cannot be destroyed."¹

Building on an examination of matter, form, substance, and accident, the relationship between soul and body is considered at length. The intellectual soul is seen as the eternal, indivisible, substantial form of a man, which perfects or completes the transmutable, material body. Belief in the resurrection is affirmed, after which event the soul will perpetually animate its body.

An aspect of the dialog that is of considerable interest is then taken up. What has in modern times been called the "banking system of education" is a prominent feature of the understanding of learning as set forth by Hegius in this treatise. "To teach means to act, to be taught, to be acted upon."² While the intellect may be considered an active virtue because of its power to reason, in taking up knowledge or error, it is passive and acted upon. Knowledge is of itself static and, in a sense, merely deposited in the mind. Things are observed to be true—discovered rather than created by any form of human mental activity.

The question of universals is also raised in this dialog. Hegius argues that "to understand universally is to have in the mind a universal concept."³ There is no allusion to a Platonic universal reality. Rather, there is an acceptance of the idea that the whole multitude of individual things raises in a person's mind the concept of universality. In dealing with the problem of universals, the work of the physicist and the dialectician is considered. The thoughts of the physicist are seen to be about things, while the

¹Ibid., p. 461. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 464.
thoughts of the dialectician are about thoughts. Dialectic, therefore, is intimately connected with the intellect and an understanding of the reasoning powers of man.

On more than one occasion, Hegius explores the differences between the senses and the intellect, and toward the end of the dialog he presents a list of twelve comparisons made by Aristotle. Along with a consideration of these differences, Hegius discusses the intellect in potentiality and actuality. The intellect in potentiality awaits knowledge, and also has within itself the ability to investigate that which has been taken up by the active intellect. The motive powers of the intellect are also considered, and these relate to volition or will. The dialog is concluded with a discussion of the nature of truth. This investigation focuses on truth as it is found in the intellect and the will, and truth as an independent concept relating to entities and things.

The next of the treatises is "A Dialog on Physics." A description is given of the various schools of philosophy, following which Hegius proposes that metaphysics is the most important study of the speculative philosopher. The divisions of philosophy are set out, and the different areas of concern in each of these divisions are discussed briefly. The subdivisions of physics are given as metaphysics, which deals with universal mobile entities; mathematics, which deals with magnitudes, numbers, and figures; and physics taken specifically, which deals with mobile things.

According to Hegius, the mobile entity is the subject of natural philosophy or physics. The reason is given as follows:

Because it is the most universal name among all the nouns signifying things considered in physics, not transcending the
bounds of physics. Whatever is considered in physics is either a mobile entity or pertains to a mobile entity.\footnote{Ibid., p. 503.}

In terms of this definition a wide spectrum of subjects is justifiably included in the study of natural philosophy. Hegius adheres closely to Aristotle's understanding in enumerating these topics, basing his conclusions firmly on the authority of the Aristotelian corpus. As defined by Hegius, all incorporeal substances and all physical bodies are classified as mobile entities. These are things "made by God or by nature, not by a rational soul."\footnote{Ibid., p. 505.}

This means that, in addition to physical bodies and their properties, the dialog categorizes a number of other topics as pertaining to the field of physics. A few examples suffice to illustrate that these would be classified very differently by the modern scientist. Philosophical and theological issues such as the nature of the soul and an understanding of life and death; biological matters relating to plants and animals; and psychological concerns about memory, sleep, sensing, and learning are all considered to be legitimately within the domain of physics. Even God, who is not a mobile entity, is the subject of natural philosophy because, as the "unmoved mover," He pertains to mobile entities. On the other hand, things that are the product of the rational soul are not rightfully considered to be in the realm of physics. Argumentation arises out of the mind. Because it is not created by God or nature it is studied under the title of dialectic as part of the subject matter of rational philosophy.

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with inevitabilities and universalities, Hegius states that physics
does not deal with particular things, for these are subject to death
and transmutation. What was true about them before their death or
transmutation no longer remains so after they cease to be. What is
true of things considered as universal concepts, however, always
remains true. He illustrates his argument in the following manner:

This universal axiom, "every animal has the sense of touch," is
an inevitibility, for it will be true for as long as the universality of animals remains. But this specific pronouncement,
"John has a sense of touch," is not an inevitability, for as
John dies it loses its truth.1

The remainder of the dialog is primarily concerned with an
investigation of the principles of things and the principles of
sciences. The former relate to the concepts of form and matter,
which are explained in quite detail; the latter are "statements
known of themselves and indemonstrable." 2 This discussion of the
principles of the sciences gives an interesting account of various
aspects of scientific methodology as seen from a medieval viewpoint.

The seventh dialog, "Concerning the Whole and the Part," is
among the easiest of the dialogs to comprehend. It takes as its
starting-point one of the principles of the sciences mentioned in
the previous dialog. According to this principle, the fact that the
whole is not equal to its part is something that is known and needs
no demonstration. As Hegius explains:

If a foot is half a foot, a foot is equal to half a foot. But
for the total to be equal to its part is repugnant to the com-
mon conception of the mind; therefore the whole is not its own
part.3

The dialog retains much that distinguishes it as being medieval, but

1Ibid., p. 504.  2Ibid., p. 508.  3Ibid., pp. 520-21.
at the same time the approach is largely within the realm of what the modern reader would call "common sense."

Hegius uses the truism about the whole and its part in a creative manner to broach a number of topics important to his students. The resulting illustrations are interesting and informative. Aspects of measurement, relative size, arithmetic, and geometry are explored, and there is a re-emphasis of some of the concepts concerning the soul. The powers of God and His ability to create from nothing are contrasted with the need of the creature to have created matter with which to perform his crafts. There is a consideration of creation, generation, and transmutation, and a further investigation of the principles of natural things as they relate to form, matter, substance, and accident.

In addition, there are two other items worthy of mention. First, Hegius deals with the authority upon which something may be known or believed and clearly indicates that faith is of paramount importance in this matter. Second, he illustrates what is meant by the principles of natural science, using geometry as an example. As applied in the case of geometry, there are three principles, namely, "postulations, definitions, and general conceptions of the mind." These are further explained and enumerated, giving a clear picture of those things that are known by the geometrician, from which he may proceed to prove the unknown. The presentation of the dialog is generally lucid, and it is informative of Hegius' approach to education and learning.

The following dialog is short and uncomplicated. Entitled

\[\text{Ibid., p. 534.}\]
"Questions Concerning the Sensible and the Sense," it deals simply with the conditions under which sensation occurs. Emphasis is placed on sight and touch, though the other senses are also mentioned. The two major issues discussed are the contrast between those things sensed of themselves and those things sensed accidentally, and the question of what impedes or enhances sensation.

Some of the examples used in the dialog are helpful in clarifying the difference between substance and accident. In answer to a question concerning hearing, Hegius writes:

All sounds are audible of themselves. All sounded things are heard accidentally, because [they are heard] through their sounds. From which it follows that all voices of animals are heard of themselves, but the animals [are heard] accidentally. The voice of the nightingale is heard of itself, the nightingale [is heard] accidentally.¹

The ninth dialog takes the reader from the area of physics and natural philosophy to the area of ethics. The heading of the treatise is "Here Begin τα Ἡθικα Ἐρωτήματα: That Is, Questions about the Moral Arts." The importance of ethics in relationship to the other areas of philosophy is stressed at the beginning of the dialog. It is through an understanding of ethics that an individual comes to know "what things should be done by him, [and] what avoided."² Only with this knowledge is it possible to make correct choices and thereby achieve the ultimate goal of human existence, which is happiness. A distinction is made between revealed ethics and ethics discovered by human intelligence, the former being considered absolute but not the latter.

The reader's attention is then turned to a discussion of

¹Ibid., p. 545. ²Ibid., p. 551.

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speculation and operation, in which the importance of putting knowledge into practice is considered in the following manner:

To know is the same thing as knowledge, just as to love is the same thing as love. No thing is its own goal. For this reason to know is not the goal of speculative science, but to observe.

To know is to have knowledge, to observe is to use knowledge.\(^1\)

From these thoughts the dialog proceeds to an investigation of motivation and choice, and the practical purpose of choice, which is to seek out the good.

An enquiry is then made into the area of aesthetics in terms of art for its own sake or art with a purpose. Following this, politics and economics, which are also classified as ethical issues, are discussed. Consideration is given to the relative importance of these areas of concern. Politics, the science of administering the state and maintaining high standards of morality, occupies the primary position. Economics, which deals with home and business, and ethics, as applied to the individual, are subject to politics.

The following dialogs appear at first to have rather misleading titles. The first is "Concerning the Sacred Mystery of the Holy Incarnation, with Adjoined the Method of Finding Easter: Two Dialogs." The next is "Concerning the Most Christian Birth of the Savior: Second Dialog." If the reader expects a theological investigation of these topics, or even a devotional review, he will be disappointed. However, these treatises do provide some valuable insights into the nature and concerns of medieval religion. Any informed student would need to have studied this information because

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 552.
of the importance of the ecclesiastical calendar in daily life. Hegius' position is seen to be conservative and traditional, almost to the extreme, as might well be expected of one who was charged with the education of youth in the Middle Ages.

The first of these dialogs begins with an examination of Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity. This turns out to be a brief and simple explanation of the credal statements formulated by the early Ecumenical Councils of the Church. Following a question as to what time of the year Christ was born, the focus of attention is turned to an explanation of the cosmos and the movement of the sun and the stars. The signs of the zodiac are mentioned in connection with the changes of the seasons and an understanding of the yearly and monthly cycles. Along with this information, a subsection of the dialog is devoted to the complexities of establishing the correct day for the celebration of Easter. A consideration of the omnipotence and eternity of God concludes the discussion.

The second of the dialogs on the incarnation begins with an investigation of the conception and birth of Christ. Except for some brief theological pronouncements, the main concern of the first part of this treatise is also the calendar. In addition to the value of this information as general knowledge required of an educated man, the intent is to establish the year of Christ's birth. In establishing this date, Hegius is more medieval than scientific.

In the latter half of the dialog, Hegius discusses some of the prophecies concerning the birth of Christ. The messianic prophecies of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Jacob, and Daniel are briefly examined. Following this, reference is made to the Hebrew names of God, a
short comment is made regarding the nature of inspiration, and the seventy-week prophecy of Daniel 9 is interpreted according to the principle of one day being equivalent to one year. The commentaries of Augustine with reference to the prophecies of the Sybils and some observations regarding the Magi conclude the dialog.

There is a serious editorial problem in this dialog similar to that found in the "Contra modos significandi." An edition of the works of Eusebius Pamphilus (ca. 260-ca. 340) dating from 1501 is cited. Clearly, this has been inserted by an editor--probably Jacobus Faber--1501 being three years after Hegius' death. A question is thus raised about the possibility of further interpolations, but there is no way of checking this. The section that has been added makes little sense in the Latin and seems to be a hasty insertion. There are few instances in the Dialogs that leave the reader with any similar impression. This, at least, is encouraging.

The twelfth dialog is nothing more than an introduction to the last two dialogs. The title is as follows: "The Dialog of Alexander Hegius, Formerly Schoolmaster at Deventer, περὶ τεχνῆς καὶ 'ΑΤΕΧΝΑΣ, on Art and Inertia; and Concerning the Uses of the Arts of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric..." The purpose of this introduction is to define what is meant by art, to explain how ethics relates to art, and to distinguish between active and effective arts. As Hegius explains, active arts leave "no work behind after the act," while effective arts "bring something into being."
The second to the last dialog is "Questions concerning Art." In this treatise, the arts are divided into mechanical and liberal. Manual workers are said to perform mechanical arts. Hegius vehemently defends the mechanical arts against any charges of inferiority. He then proceeds to define and examine certain branches of the liberal arts.

The first of these is grammar. Hegius considers this to be the most excellent of the liberal arts in that it is the vehicle of all the other arts. Only through grammar is one able to make known one's thoughts or to comprehend anything. It is, therefore, an indication of man's superiority over "dumb beasts." ¹

Poetry and music are also defined as liberal arts, and these are discussed together. Hegius manifests a high regard for music and stresses the importance of a knowledge of meter and "the quantities of syllables." ² These terms are not explained in detail, but just mentioned in passing.

The final section of this dialog is an investigation of dialectics. After defining the word and discussing its etymology, attention is turned to the question of how the truthfulness of conclusions may be established. Correct and faulty procedures of logic are examined, and there is a simple explanation of the syllogism. The danger of being mislead by sophistical argumentation if one is ignorant of the rules of dialectic is also pointed out.

The fourteenth and final treatise of the actual dialogs is "A Dialog about Rhetoric." This completes the discussion introduced in the twelfth dialog on the arts of the trivium, namely, grammar,

¹Ibid., p. 599. ²Ibid., p. 601.
logic, and rhetoric. Hegius argues strongly against the opponents of rhetoric who suggest that, because its powers are sometimes abused, it is of no value. The various types of audiences who will be addressed by the orator are considered, and the task of the orator in each case is explained. The important skills that must be developed by the prospective rhetorician are outlined, and the different parts of a speech are given with a short explanation of each. The dialog ends with this final statement: "Orator, whoever you are, if you want to be thought eloquent, read our rules and use your talent."¹

Two additional treatises are included in this volume of the works of Hegius. The first of these is entitled "A Miscellany by Alexander Hegius, Master of Arts." As the heading suggests, it covers a wide variety of topics, but the overall purpose is to improve the Latin grammar of the reader. Classical constructions are presented as being correct and to be used in preference to the barbarisms of medieval Latin. Examples are proliferated and explained in Latin and Dutch, with occasional references to Greek. From time to time appeal is made directly to the classical authors. The detail of the "Miscellany" defies summarization beyond these broad generalizations.²

The final treatise, adjudged by previous scholars to be the most important of Hegius' works,³ is "An Invective Against the Modes

¹Ibid., p. 613.

²Ibid., pp. 614-32. A brief perusal of the "Miscellany" is sufficient to give a fair idea of the nature of the treatise.

³Ijssewijn, "Hegius Invectiva," is a critical edition of this treatise. See Ijssewijn's introductory comments, p. 301.
of Signification." The modes of signification are philosophical grammars that were written toward the end of the thirteenth century and in the early fourteenth century.¹ Hegius makes a strong attack on these medieval schoolbooks and their writers, the modistae. In their attempt to classify language according to set, logical formulations, they distorted Latin grammar in a manner quite contrary to that of accepted classical usage. Hegius observes:

21. Those who are called grammatici are not called grammatici because they know the modes of signification, but because they know how to speak Latin! Those who are said not to be grammatici are said not to be grammatici for this reason, that they cannot speak Latin, not because they do not know the modes of signification.

22. Knowledge of the modes of signification does not make a grammaticus, because those who wrote about the modes of signification were not, even they, grammatici; for all their conversation was full of faults.²

From inveighing against the modistae, Hegius proceeds to condemn a number of the medieval schoolbooks that were commonly being used. He mentions specifically the Scholarium disciplina of Pseudo-Boethius, the vocabularies or Gemmae, and some of the medieval dictionaries.³ The ancient authors are proclaimed to be the only safe standard to follow. Except for a few letters written by Hegius and Agricola, the volume of the Dialogs ends with a warning to seek for classical fruits and to flee from the acorns of the barbarous medieval texts.

¹Jan Pinborg, "Speculative Grammar," in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982), p. 255, says of the modistic grammarians: "In their words we find a coherent linguistic theory in which every grammatical feature treated is fitted into a single descriptional framework, based on expressly formulated premisses."

²Hegius, appendix A, p. 638. ³See above, p. 123.
The essential structure of humanist philosophy did not diverge greatly from that of the medieval philosophers. The philosophy of the Middle Ages was largely built upon an interpretation of the classical philosophers. The humanists and the medieval philosophers, therefore, looked to a common source. Classification of the various areas and concerns was much the same. What differed was the emphasis placed upon these areas and the interpretation of the concerns. Because philosophy at the end of the Middle Ages was understood so differently from the way philosophy is studied in the twentieth century, it is important that the reader have some idea of its structure. While focusing attention on the writings of Hegius, one should remain aware that the overall arrangement of his philosophy is fairly typical of other medieval scholars and philosophers.

In the sixth dialog, Hegius discusses the classification of philosophical concerns. He points out that "philosophy is divided into physics, ethics, and logic; that is, into natural, moral, and rational."\(^1\) Each of these areas with its subdivisions is now considered separately. (See figure 5.)

**Natural Philosophy**

In the sixth dialog, Hegius proposes that the mobile entity is the subject of natural philosophy.\(^2\) The subdivisions of natural


\(^2\)The greatest proportion of the dialogs relate most specifically to natural philosophy. By number these are 1-7 and 10-11.
Fig. 5. Hegius' three areas of philosophy and their subdivisions.
philosophy are given as "metaphysics, mathematics, and physics." Each is examined in turn.

The dialogs do not allow for a simple classification of philosophy, generally, or of metaphysics, in particular. The definitions given and the manner in which issues are approached make clear-cut distinctions difficult to find. Although Hegius does not use the specific terms, it seems clear that he considers ontology, theology, and epistemology to lie within the domain of metaphysics.

In response to the question of whether metaphysicians should be called philosophers, Hegius replies:

Most of all, for of all the sciences metaphysics claims for itself the name of wisdom, and stands in relation to the other speculative sciences as the knowledge of an architect to the knowledge of his assistants. Therefore the metaphysicians especially are to be called philosophers.

From this statement it appears that Hegius, in accord with medieval philosophers, places metaphysics at the pinnacle of learning. However, this is not true. Hegius is speaking here of the "speculative sciences," and these by no means encompass all knowledge. This is seen more clearly when rational and moral philosophy are discussed.

The goal of metaphysics is formulated in these words: "To speculate what each thing is, that is, whether it is substance or

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1Hegius, appendix A, p. 493.

2The treatises cannot be classified exclusively. Subject matter in any one dialog may relate to several areas of philosophy.

3Hegius, appendix A, p. 493.

4"Speculative" distinguishes a science or art from the "operative" and "effective" arts. Cf. Hegius, appendix A, pp. 412, 552, and 597. This matter is discussed in more detail when an evaluation is made of Hegius' scholasticism. See below, pp. 194-96, 213, and 251-55.
accident, and from what each is different."\(^1\) This goal is applied specifically to mobile entities excluding those that may be classified as mobile bodies. Mobile bodies are placed in the category of physics taken specifically.\(^2\)

In discussing the concerns of metaphysics, Hegius writes:

Metaphysics deals with entity inasmuch as [it is] entity. . . . Metaphysics teaches that man is a substance, and different from his knowledge; [and] that knowledge is an accident, different from man, since every accident is different from the substance to which it is accidental. Again, it teaches that humanity is not different from man, but in essence the same thing that man is. No complete substance is different from that of which it is the substance. Since humanity is the complete substance of man, it cannot be different from man.\(^3\)

From this it is clear that, in the mind of Hegius, metaphysics dealt with both ontological and epistemological issues. The ontological questions, or questions of reality and being, center mainly on an understanding of the soul. From an investigation of the properties of the soul, the other ontological issues are raised. Because the soul is a mobile entity, moving, for example, from the terminus a quo of ignorance to the terminus ad quem of knowledge, it is suitable to be studied in the area of natural philosophy.\(^4\) Equally, as an entity created by God, the soul is the subject of natural philosophy.\(^5\)

The investigation of the nature of the soul in the second to fifth dialogs introduces a number of ontological issues of concern to the medieval metaphysician. Most of these are alluded to in a brief summary Hegius gives of the operations and nature of the various types of souls:

\(^1\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 558. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 494.
\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 493-94. \(^4\)Ibid., p. 404. \(^5\)Ibid., p. 505.
A. What does the vegetable soul effect?

B. The vegetable soul effects nutrition, growth, and generation—the nutrition and growth of its own body, but generation not of its own body, but a body like its own body.

A. What does the sensual soul effect?

B. Vision, and hearing, and the other operations of the senses. It also affects troubled feelings and affections, for [those things] that have a sensual soul can be troubled by happiness and sorrow, anger and desire.

A. What does the intellectual soul effect?

B. Its own thoughts, affirmations, denials, reasonings to support and to oppose, knowledges and errors, right and wrong choices, right and wrong precepts of reason, and, universally, all virtues and vices. It is therefore clear that the soul is the effector of all the vital operations of the living body.

A. Is the soul the matter of the living body?

B. It is not; for matter is liable to transformation of substance. Matter which now has the form of earth will in the summer have the form of grass. The soul, on the other hand, is liable to transformation of accident; for it can move from virtues to vices, and vice versa, [and] from knowledge to error, and vice versa. Therefore the soul is not matter.

A. Can form and matter coincide, that is, can one and the same substance be the matter of that of which it is the form?

B. They cannot, for the same thing cannot grant existence and receive existence. Since it is [the property] of form to grant existence and of matter to receive existence, for that reason matter and form cannot coincide.¹

In accordance with the Aristotelian foundation undergirding most of his philosophy, Hegius' perception of existence is largely to be understood in terms of the form-matter hypotheses. All bodies are made up of prime matter, which is transmutable according to the substantial form it receives.² Bodies which have been prepared to receive souls are generated by nature from prime matter. Vegetable and animal souls are also generated by nature, but rational souls

¹Ibid., p. 435. ²Ibid., pp. 407-8, 410-11.
are created by God. The rational soul animates and perfects the
human body, and in union they constitute the living human being.

As may be seen from the quotation cited above, questions regarding
substance and accident are also of paramount importance in an inves­
tigation of the union of body and soul.

Though he acknowledges that it cannot be proved, Hegius
maintains that the soul is immortal:

According to faith and truth, one must say that the human
soul will exist for ever, and will never perish or come to an
end. But it did not always exist, but began to exist, not by
generation, but by creation. And because the human soul was
created by God out of nothing it can be reduced by the same into
nothing, although it is never to be reduced into nothing because
God wills that the rational soul be preserved for ever, so that
after this life it may either pay the penalty for its sins or
receive the rewards of its right actions, so that no evil should
remain unpunished nor good unrewarded.

After the body has been corrupted by death, the soul remains active
even though it is, for a time, no longer animating any body. As
Hegius explains, the soul "understands without consideration of
appearances." "After the resurrection," however, "the human soul
will perpetually animate its body and never be separated from it."

Hegius observes further that the metaphysician also studies
the operations and powers of the soul, so nutrition, digestion, and

1Ibid., p. 475. 2Ibid., p. 410.
3Ibid., pp. 411, 467-68, 545. These are examples of the
several instances where substance and accident are discussed in the
dialogs. See also Dagobert D. Runes, Dictionary of Philosophy
(New York: Philosophical Library, 1942), s.v. "Accident" and "Sub­
stance," where a definition is given of these terms. Accident has
no independent or self-sufficient existence, but exists in another
being, substance, or accident. Substance, on the other hand, is an
ultimate, distinct subject of being, though it is not necessarily
independent of cause.

4Hegius, appendix A, p. 477. 5Ibid., p. 479. 6Ibid., p. 478.
generation or reproduction constitute a part of his investigation.¹

These functions relate to the vegetative soul. The powers of the sensible and appetitive soul are summarized by Hegius as follows:

Sense is the perceptive and cognitive power, for by sense the animal perceives and recognizes what is either pleasant or troublesome. Appetite, however, is a pursuing or fugitive force. An animal pursues or flees by means of appetite those things that have been perceived by means of sense.²

There are a number of statements distinguishing the virtues and operations of the sensible and intellectual soul.³ One important difference is that sensitive virtues are natural and innate, while the moral and intellectual virtues are acquired.⁴ Acquisition of knowledge and moral virtue are, respectively, epistemological and ethical questions that were of vital importance in late medieval education. These issues are examined in the appropriate place.

Before leaving the ontological questions, however, consideration should be given to some further points in Hegius' philosophy. These relate particularly to the broader issues posed in the investigation of the nature of the soul. The soul cannot be understood without an understanding of the creator of the soul. An enquiry into whether the human intellect is immortal is followed by a series of detailed affirmative responses hypothesized upon the basis of belief in a benevolent creator and sustainer. The essence of these arguments is found in the realm of faith rather than reason. This, however, by no means diminishes the authority for acceptance of an

¹Ibid., pp. 430-32, 436-37, 472, 479.
²Ibid., p. 425. The powers of the soul are also listed here as "vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, motive, and intellectual."
³Ibid., pp. 483-84, 470-71. ⁴Ibid., p. 443.
immortal intellect. Rather, it seems in Hegius' estimation to make the expected outcome even more certain.

The significance of an immortal intellect is crucial to an understanding of Hegius' philosophy and pedagogical concerns. He observes that the rational powers of humans distinguish them from the rest of the animals. While the vegetative and sensible powers are shared by the rational soul, the vegetable and sensitive souls of plants and animals have no share in the rational powers of mankind. This line of reasoning is developed in an interesting manner that is deserving of further attention when the matter of Hegius' humanistic bent is evaluated.

Theological and ontological issues are closely related in Hegius' philosophy. This is a result of the late medieval attempts to bring together all knowledge in one great summa. The writings of Aristotle had been assimilated into the Augustinian and Platonic traditions of earlier times by the schoolmen of the High Middle Ages. God, according to Hegius, "terminates the series of efficient causes." In other words, on the basis of created entities, God may be postulated. As an heir of the via antiqua, Hegius discusses creator and creation in terms of univocity. In answer to the question, "Can God and matter be conceived in one concept, that is, can the mind by one thought think of God and matter?" Hegius responds:

\[\text{\footnotesize\cite{Ibid., pp. 476-78. Ibid., p. 423.}}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize\cite{See below, pp. 299-302.}}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize\cite{Hegius, appendix A, p. 561. See also p. 518, where God is spoken of in Aristotelian terms as "pure actuality."}}\]
\[\text{\footnotesize\cite{Hegius is careful to add that matters of faith cannot be proved. Ibid., p. 529.}}\]

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It can, for [the man] who understands that every entity exists in nature has a concept common to God and matter. [He] who understands that every substance subsists of itself has a concept common to God and matter. And concepts of this sort are absolute and substantial. [He] who understands that every cause is prior to that of which it is the cause has a concept common to God and matter, respective and comparative, from which it is clear that, though God and matter are very different substances, since God is a most perfect substance, matter most imperfect, yet they can be conceived in one concept. And for that reason they can be signified by one univocal name. . . . From which it is clear that entity and substance, [and] cause and principle, signify univocally God and prime matter. Nor does this diminish the majesty of God, that He Himself and the matter that is His handiwork may be . . . signified by one name; just as it does not diminish the majesty of the king because he and his servant are signified by one name. 1

The sentiments expressed by Hegius leave the reader in no doubt of the fact that he rejects any form of pantheism or idea of a world soul. "God", he says, "is called pure actuality, while prime matter is pure potentiality." 2 While God and matter may be "conceived in one concept" and "signified by one univocal name," the distinction between creator and creation is strongly maintained. 3

As pure actuality, God is seen as a non-contingent being, with no beginning or end. "God has no quality inherent in Himself, but is . . . in His own substance such as we proclaim Him to be." 4 Replying to an enquiry as to why God says of Himself that He is the way, the truth, and the life, Hegius writes:

God is of necessity what He is, nor did He ever begin to be what He is, nor will He cease to be. . . . A created being, though it is . . . [created truth], is yet not of necessity that which it is since it can cease to be. For this reason God . . . is to be called the truth, for God is uncreated truth. . . .5

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1Ibid., p. 517. 2Ibid., p. 518.

3The matter of univocity is also important in an evaluation of Hegius' position in the wegestreit. See below, pp. 274-75.

4Hegius, appendix A, p. 497. 5Ibid., p. 488.
As a non-contingent being, God acts but cannot be acted upon, for his substance cannot be corrupted or transmuted.

He can neither begin nor cease to be, since of necessity He always has been and always will be; nor can He change His place, since He is contained by no place; nor His quantity, since He has none. For He is a spirit that is extended by no magnitude, nor by any quality, since no accident befalls God. . . .

In the terminology of the dialogs, God is, simply stated, a non-mobile entity. This poses somewhat of a problem, for it is only the mobile entity that is the subject of natural philosophy. Yet ontological questions relating to divinity are considered a part of metaphysics along with questions of being relating to the creation. These and other theological questions are therefore classified as subsections of natural philosophy. In fact, the reason why Hegius considers metaphysics to be the most excellent of the speculative sciences is that it "treats of the most excellent subject, the glorious God." The problem is solved quite simply by extending the definition of those things that ought to be studied by the natural philosopher. Not only mobile entities, but things pertaining to mobile entities may legitimately be investigated. "For this reason," says Hegius, "the 'prime mover' is a fit matter for the consideration of physics." As the craftsman of prime matter and the creator of the rational soul, God is the mover of mobile entities.

God's power to act as the unmoved mover is examined further by Hegius in terms of any limitation placed upon God's ability to act. Quite simply, he says, God "can act since He does act." In

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1Ibid., p. 497. 2Ibid., p. 400. 3Ibid., p. 504.


5Hegius, appendix A, p. 518.
accord with the later scholastic theologians such as Scotus and Occam, Hegius proposes that God has limitless power. He limits Himself, however, according to the laws of noncontradiction and to the commands He has given. These commands are in harmony with His disposition to choose the good. Commenting with regard to the idea of the immortal soul, Hegius argues that it "is not immortal of its own nature, but by the will and kindness of God."  

Further questions relating to the substance and being of God are investigated in the two dialogs concerning the incarnation. The nature of the Trinity is explained with simplicity and clarity. Without any complex explanations regarding the details of the Christological controversies, Hegius presents a concise, nonscholastic summary:

He who denies that the Son is of one substance with the Father either holds the opinion that the Son of God is not true God, as Arius . . . thought, . . . or he holds the opinion that the Son and the Father are two gods, differing in substance, which is also a sinful thing, because the worship of many gods is manifest sin. To avoid this twofold sin the Christian must believe the Son of God to be true God, and of one substance with the Father. Therefore they are bound to believe the Son of God to be God, not a created being, begotten, not made. Because of this it is inevitable that the Son is of one substance with His Father.

After an explanation of the term "consubstantial," the discussion on this point is concluded with a defense against Arianism:

The Father . . . is the same substance as the Son, [but] not the

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2For example, Hegius argues that it cannot happen that one who has lived shall not have lived. Hegius, appendix A, p. 575.

3Ibid., p. 478. 4Ibid., p. 565.
same person. For the Son of God said, "I and the Father are one" [John 10:30]. By saying "I and the Father," He indicated that He is not the one who is the Father. By saying "one," He indicated that He is the same thing as the Father is. 1

A variety of questions relating to being and purpose are discussed in the context of an investigation of divinity and the exercise of divine power. For example, the philosophical problems of transubstantiation are mentioned, 2 the virgin birth is affirmed, 3 the complete divinity and the complete humanity of God in Christ are declared, 4 teleological issues are touched upon, 5 and the ultimate purpose of God is clearly stated. Without fanfare or complex explanation, the simple biblical reason for the incarnation is given:

That He might redeem the human race. Because God loved man He became their redeemer; for the one who created heaven and earth for man deigned to become man to redeem man from devilish slavery. 6

In this unsophisticated pronouncement is an example of much of what Hegius attempted in his approach to ontological and theological questions. Ontology and theology have always been complex subjects, but perhaps never as complex as during the High Middle Ages. Trying to find his way through the maze of scholasticism, Hegius presented his ideas in a less complicated and involved manner. His purpose was to make the material more intelligible to his students. He did not always succeed, but certainly his approach has the appearance of being a little more down to earth. Ontology and theology were not considered a platform for dialectical argumentation. Hegius' concern was to explain creator and creature as he understood them.

As referred to earlier, metaphysics was seen by Hegius to be

1Ibid., p. 566. 2Ibid., p. 536. 3Ibid., pp. 580-81. 4Ibid., p. 588. 5Ibid., pp. 478-79. 6Ibid., p. 564.
the queen of the speculative sciences because it was in this discipline that God was studied. While metaphysics may also have been the queen of the sciences to the scholastics before him, Hegius' concern was not scholastic. His aim was a simplification that would facilitate learning, for he felt a knowledge of God to be of vital importance to his students. This point is illustrated in his answer to the question, "Is any faith better and more excellent than knowledge?" He replies:

The belief without which holiness cannot be had . . . is more excellent than the knowledge without which holiness can be had . . . .

. . . [A person] who does not believe that God was made man and suffered for the salvation of men will not be able to worship God in holiness. Yet [he] who does not know that a triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles is not without a share of holiness on account of ignorance of this sort. Therefore it is more excellent to believe the former than to know the latter.¹

For Hegius, intellectual and spiritual concerns were not separate.² In terms of modern understanding, however, it might be said that he placed a higher value on spiritual truths than on intellectual knowledge. The theological and ontological simplification that resulted was his attempt to reach the minds of his students without the barriers imposed by the web of scholastic thought. Questions of faith and knowledge bring this investigation to the threshold of an examination of what Hegius regarded to be truth. The avenues through which truth was acquired and the means by which knowledge might be learned would, of course, have been of major importance to a pedagog of Hegius' stature. At this point, therefore, attention is given to his epistemology.

¹Ibid., p. 391. ²See above, pp. 168-69, and below, p. 304.
The manner in which a person comes to a knowledge of truth is explained by Hegius in the following way. "Every demonstrative proof is brought about by means of things more known."¹ He adds: "In every science there must be a progression from indemonstrable statements to demonstrable statements."² The proposal is then made that "it is the function of the metaphysician to establish the principles of the sciences."³ This idea is developed as follows:

It is necessary that the physicist knows the causes, principles, and elements of natural things. For we cannot know for what reason those things are true that we propose concerning natural things unless we know the principles, causes, and elements of natural things.⁴ Asked to explain what the principles are of which he is speaking, Hegius proposes that they are of two kinds. First, there are the principles of things, which are "the causes of things. Of this sort are matter and form."⁵ The second are the principles of sciences, and these are "statements known of themselves and indemonstrable."⁶

It is on the basis of these indemonstrables that Hegius argues knowledge may be acquired. He says that the physicist or natural philosopher is able to come to an understanding of universal propositions "because they are known either of themselves, or by

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 534.
²Ibid., p. 508. Examples of things not requiring demonstration are given in various places throughout the dialogs. One of the most general of these statements that at the same time gives a good idea of the kind of principles involved in this kind of thinking is the following:

"The physicist knows that everything which moves, moves from... the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem, because every motion has two termini... The physicist knows that every thing that is moving was moving and will move, because that which is moving is neither beginning nor ceasing to move...."
Ibid., p. 392.
³Ibid., p. 536. ⁴Ibid., p. 507. ⁵Ibid., p. 508. ⁶Ibid.
experiment, or by proof."¹ This last statement illustrates the progression from indemonstrables to demonstrables. It also gives the source of authority that Hegius recognizes as legitimate in the acquisition of knowledge. Building upon things known of themselves, the natural philosopher may experiment in order to provide evidence upon which he is able to construct rational proofs.

The definitions of knowledge and truth provided by Hegius limit the understanding of these terms greatly. Things not known of themselves, sensed, or proved cannot be known, but only believed. Even these narrow limits are further restricted in the reply given to a question concerning how many kinds of truth there are. Hegius proposes that there are things true of necessity and things true conditionally. Knowledge of both these kinds of truths is possible if the term "knowledge" is understood generally. With this interpretation, he can argue, "I know that I am alive, which is a conditional truth, no less than that a triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles, which is a thing true of necessity." On the other hand, if "knowledge" is understood in a specific sense, "as the knowledge by which we assent to propositions necessarily true because of proof, then it must be said that there is no knowledge of conditional truths."²

¹Ibid., p. 392. A more detailed presentation of the three sorts of knowledge postulated by Hegius is given elsewhere: "Some are facts known of themselves . . . , which are called universal conceptions. . . . Of this sort are these statements: every whole is greater than its part. . . . Others are facts that are judged to be true by some sense [by experiment], as: . . . vision cannot occur along a curved line. . . . Facts that are urged by proof are these: every triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles . . . , etc." Ibid., p. 389.

²Ibid., p. 500.
While knowledge may be narrowly defined, Hegius' conception of truth is not limited as a result. Truth may be established on the basis of knowledge, but this does not exclude the possibility of additional avenues through which it may be known. Belief, in contrast to knowledge, is not established upon anything affirmed by the senses or proved by the intellect. Rather, it is based on some authority outside of the individual.

The first of these authorities is that of other trustworthy men or their writings. Hegius uses as an example the physicist who might have proved many things but who can only hold beliefs about the crocodile if he has never seen one. These beliefs must rest upon the testimony of others who have observed the crocodile.¹ Likewise, the fact that Rome is a city in Italy "is known by the Romans, [and] believed by the Germans who have never seen Rome."²

Some additional remarks regarding knowledge and belief make the point that it is possible to begin with a belief and turn it into knowledge. Hegius reminds the student that the desire for knowledge is, in fact, a strong force motivating many men to set out in quest of learning. Certainly during the scholastic era, theologians and philosophers had attempted to establish rational proofs for those things that had formerly been believed. Hegius, however, makes it clear that not all belief can become knowledge:

Those things which once took place and were narrated by trustworthy historians are believed by us, and they cannot ever be known, because those things which took place cannot occur a second time.³

According to Hegius, the second authority that may be

¹Ibid., pp. 392-93. ²Ibid., p. 390. ³Ibid.
believed in the establishment of truth is the Word of God. Any belief established upon this authority is of the order of faith and cannot become knowledge. Hegius says that "no article of faith can be proved. It would take away the merit of faith if articles of faith could be proved."\(^1\)

There is no reticence on the part of Hegius to use the Word of God alongside other authorities to establish intellectual truths. Commenting in passing about one of the principles of science, he makes an interesting comment. He argues that the whole may not be admitted to be different from all its parts for these reasons:

Because neither experiment, nor reasoning, nor the authority of Holy Scripture compels us to admit this thing; therefore it ought not to be admitted. The conclusion is proved since man is compelled to admit nothing but what experiment, or reasoning, or authority compel him to admit, and especially the authority of Holy Scripture.\(^2\)

There is no hint of any reason to doubt that the authority of Scripture is at least equal to that of proof or experiment, even though the former only affords belief, while the latter bring knowledge.\(^3\)

The manner in which Hegius believed the Scriptures to have been given to men is clearly described by him:

The prophets were the instruments of the Holy Spirit because they were His pens; [and] the Holy Spirit was the scribe who spoke through the apostles. In that [same] way the Holy Spirit spoke through the prophets. And just as our Savior said, "It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father speaks in you" [Matthew 10:20], so too the Holy Spirit spoke through the prophets. And for this reason the Holy Spirit is the scribe of both Testaments, New and Old. His pens with which He wrote the

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 529.  \(^2\)Ibid., pp. 523-24.

\(^3\)As this matter is of considerable significance in judging the nature of Hegius scholasticism, it is discussed further below, pp. 265-68.
Old Testament were the prophets; the pens with which He wrote the New Testament were the apostles and evangelists.\footnote{Hegius, appendix A, p. 590.}

Hegius appears to have accepted an inerrant verbal inspiration of the Scriptures. In this he is conservative and traditional.

There is much more that could be considered in examining Hegius' ontological and epistemological outlook, but sufficient has been said to give a broad understanding of his metaphysical views. Certain aspects of his metaphysics are re-examined at a later stage in order to determine his position in the wegestreit.

A second subdivision of the area classified by Hegius as natural philosophy is that of physics. While Hegius separates metaphysics from physics in his definition of the two subjects, many of the issues in these areas relate closely to one another. For example, while ontological and theological questions are examined as aspects of the domain of metaphysics, cosmological questions are discussed as part of physics and astronomy. Cosmology, however, is as much a metaphysical issue as are ontology and theology.

In order to understand the manner in which Hegius distinguishes between natural philosophy (physics taken generally), metaphysics, and physics taken specifically, it is perhaps best to allow him to speak for himself. After explaining that general physics proclaims truths about all mobile things, and specific physics deals only with mobile bodies, he gives the following examples:

Cognizance of these truths is general physics: everything that moves is moved by a mover; everything that moves moves from some place and moves to some place . . . ; everything that moves with an acquisitive motion moves towards that thing which it lacks; everything that moves with dismissive motion moves away from that which it has. But specific physics is cognizance of
these truths: the heavens move in a circular motion, that is, around the center of the world; earth and water move downward, that is, toward the center; fire and air move upward, that is, away from the center.¹

While natural philosophy relates to universal conceptions and definitions, specific physics relates to the subsection of natural philosophy that deals with "sensible" things or concrete things that can be sensed.

Metaphysics, the first subdivision of natural philosophy examined, was not concerned with the concrete, mobile body, but with the mobile entity, which is "more universal."² The definition of metaphysics, however, is extended by the idea that things pertaining to the mobile entity may also legitimately be studied in the area of metaphysics. Because of this, the distinction between metaphysics and physics is of necessity blurred. The soul, which is a mobile entity, is the perfection of the human body, which is defined as a mobile body. The body of man pertains, however, to the intellective soul and is therefore suitable for study in the area of metaphysics.

The the goal of physics, it is argued, is "to speculate on the natures of mobile things."³ Those whose studies involve them in the area of specific physics "write what has been discovered by them or by others concerning natural things."⁴ Hegius enumerates some of the topics that the physicist might study by referring to Aristotle. The books he cites, along with the associated commentary, give some idea of the subject matter involved in physics taken specifically:

The books On the Heaven and the World, the title of which indicates what is dealt with in them; the books On Generation

¹Ibid., p. 497. ²Ibid., p. 504. ³Ibid., p. 558.
⁴Ibid., p. 495.
and Corruption, which deal with generation and corruption and the other movements of the four elements; the books Of Meteors which deal with those things that have their origin in the heights, of which sort are clouds, hail, snow, thunder and lightning, comets, and rainbows, and the rest—for these bodies are called meteors, that is, lofty and raised up, since meteoros is translated as lofty and raised up; the books of minerals which deal with metals and the other subterranean bodies, such as sulphur, natron, etc.; the books On the Soul deal with the parts of the soul and its powers; the books On Vegetables and Plants deal with the natures of plants, that is, of trees and grasses; [and] the books about animals deal with the natures of animals. The books On Sense and the Sensed, On Sleep and Waking, On Memory and Recollection, On Length and Shortness of Life, On Life and Death, On Movement of Animals, the movement of the heart, On Breathing Out and Breathing In, On Youth and Old Age, [and] food and the nutritive, . . . deal with what has been overlooked in the book On the Soul.¹

Before the reader exclaims with satisfaction that Hegius has finally hit upon an area in which at least some of the subject matter is classified as physics in the modern world, time should be taken to examine Hegius' approach to these studies. He is not concerned, as it might seem, with the individual or particular, except inasmuch as these contribute to universal understanding. He says:

Science is not lasting unless it is about inevitabilities. [Things] that are pronounced about universals are inevitable, [but] not [things] that [are pronounced] about particulars. For [things] that are pronounced about particular animals cease to be true when the particular animals die. But [things] that are pronounced about universals always remain true. . . .²

¹Ibid., pp. 498-99. (Note that the references and footnotes have not been included with this quotation.) Hegius distinguishes between the various subjects studied in general and special physics. General physics, he says, is to be found in Aristotle's eight books on Physics. Cited here is a long list of the titles relating to specific physics. One of the titles given is On the Soul. While some issues in this treatise deal with specific physics, the questions raised are generally metaphysical. See Aristotle, On the Soul, trans. W. S. Hett, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1957), p. 2. On p. ix, Hett points out that all the works mentioned in the last sentence of the citation taken from Hegius "belong to subjects on the borderline between bodily and mental."

²Hegius, appendix A, p. 504.
Even the study of specific physics, because it is a science, is more concerned, therefore, with all-embracing definitions than with a study of particular concrete objects.

Indebted as he was to Aristotle, Hegius inherited much of the philosophical outlook of the classical Greeks. Aristotle was strongly influenced by Plato's separation of reality from the world of sense. Even though he rejected Plato's world scheme, there was a tendency in his thinking to elevate logical mental activity above what would today be called the modern scientific method. The scientific method espoused by Aristotle was not always a critical evaluation of sense and experiment, but often the pursual of a course of rational reasoning to its logical conclusions. This was done in spite of the apparent absurdities that sometimes resulted. As a classicist, Hegius became heir to similar methods of reasoning. For Hegius, physics was limited by classical and medieval mental concepts, and it was therefore much more theoretical than would be the case in modern times.¹

With regard to what is meant by the specific, concrete

¹The following observations made by Hett help to explain the problems faced by the modern scholar in understanding Aristotle, and therefore, Hegius:

"The modern reader studying Greek philosophy is confronted at the outset by a difficulty which must be boldly faced. Aristotle received his training in the school of Plato, and from him inherited many of his fundamental beliefs. Plato had come to regard the world of sense as unreal, and only the world as apprehended by the mind, detached as far as possible from sense impressions, as real. Aristotle repeatedly shows this Platonic influence in his handling of philosophical questions. . . .

. . . Aristotle was the son of a doctor, and himself a biologist, who believed in experiment and dissection as a means of collecting evidence. Thus his views on the soul are influenced by his physiology. Yet he never falls into the meshes of materialism." Hett, in Aristotle, On the Soul, Loeb, pp. viii-ix.
object, and the universal abstraction, Hegius writes:

By universals is meant the whole multitude or universality of any things. By universal men we mean the whole multitude of men, that is, the whole human race. By individual things, however, is meant any one part of universality, as, by individual men we mean either Peter or Paul.¹

The manner in which individual things establish universal concepts and definitions is illustrated in the following examples:

A. To what does this statement, [that] nothing is nothing, owe [the fact] that it is true?

B. To every thing, for it means that every thing is something. It owes to me [the fact] that it is true, because it means that I am something. It owes to my book [the fact] that it is true, because it means that my book is something.

A. To what does this statement, [that] there is no vacuum, owe [the fact] that it is true?

B. To every place, for it means that every place is filled.

A. To what does this statement, [that] no body is infinite, owe [the fact] that it is true?

B. To every body, for it means that every body is finite.²

The particular ideas examined by Hegius in what he classifies as specific physics relate mainly to an understanding of prime matter. In the Aristotelian tradition, ὄλν, or prime matter, is considered by Hegius to be pure potentiality.³ It was created by God ex nihilo and could be reduced to nothing by God if He so desired.⁴ In nature, however, there is no annihilation of matter. It is the basic ingredient from which all bodies are made. In the words of Hegius, "matter is the wood from which nature fashions all

¹Hegius, appendix A, pp. 463-64.
²Ibid., p. 482. The understanding that Hegius had of universals is important in evaluating his philosophic position, and the matter is taken up again on pp. 276-77.
its works. . . . From what does nature make grasses [and] plants, from what animals, if not from matter?"¹

What distinguishes different bodies from each other is the form that they take, not the primary ingredients from which they are made. Hegius explains:

Matter is the subject of transmutation. But the subject of transmutation is what remains the same in the transmutation as it was before the transmutation and will be after the transmutation; as, when a man is changed into earth, that same thing that before the transmutation had the form of a man, after the transformation has the form of earth.²

The difference in value between a donkey and a man is, therefore, in no way dependent upon the matter from which each is made. In fact, from this point of view, neither the man nor the donkey is of any more value than a stone.³ Loss of form would not mean the destruction of matter, but rather its reduction to an ingredient of one kind.

In order to conceive of prime matter, Hegius observes, accident and substance would need to be taken away. To strip a composite substance like man of his accidents would be to take away from a man those things that make him different from other men. These would include his intellectual and moral virtues. To strip a man of his substantial form would be to take away that which makes him different from a donkey. This would mean the removal of his rational soul. Having thus separated form and matter, "we shall retain nothing but the prime matter." ⁴

It appears at first from this argument that it would be

¹Ibid., p. 512. ²Ibid., p. 516. ³Ibid., p. 408. ⁴Ibid., p. 511.
possible to find prime matter in nature. However, this is not the case. Hegius writes:

While the law stands that God gave to created things, matter cannot be formless, just as a place cannot be empty. For God decreed [that] just as body [succeeds] body in place, so let form succeed form in matter. For this reason . . . engendered form always takes the place of destroyed form continuously.\footnote{1}{Ibid., p. 512.}

With this understanding the transformation or transmutation of matter is postulated.

By transmutation is meant either the acquisition or loss of a particular form. The principles of substantial transmutation are matter, privation, and form. "Matter is subjected to transmutation, privation is the \textit{terminus a quo}, [and] form the \textit{terminus ad quern.}\footnote{2}{Ibid., p. 530.}

For example, in the acquisitive transmutation from earth to grass, earth is the \textit{terminus a quo} and grass the \textit{terminus ad quern}. The subject of transmutation, which is the prime matter, remains essentially the same. It merely undergoes changes of form.\footnote{3}{Ibid., p. 433.}

In these transmutations the rational soul, created by God, is the form of man. Man is, therefore, the subject of metaphysics, because his substantial form is spiritual, not natural.\footnote{4}{Ibid., pp. 411, 420-21.} The forms of all other living and inanimate things on earth are engendered from nature. They are, therefore, the subject of physics taken specifically. While the natural order remains as it is, there is no

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\textit{\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. 512.} \hspace{1em} \textit{\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 530.} \hspace{1em} \textit{\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 433.} \hspace{1em} \textit{\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., pp. 411, 420-21. Responding to a question about the generation of men and animals, Hegius writes:

"It is partly similar, partly different; for just as nature prepares the body of a dumb animal . . . , so also it prepares the human body. [It is] dissimilar, however, because nature engenders the soul of the dumb animal in the prepared body, but does not engender the human soul. . . ." \textit{Ibid.}, p. 479.}
\end{flushright}

What is true of the sensitive souls of animals would also be true of the vegetable soul.
limit to the number of transmutations that matter may undergo.

Building upon this understanding of matter, a number of other questions are examined within the area of specific physics. The natures of organic and inorganic substances are explained, and concepts relating to the part and the whole are explored. There is discussion of the concepts of dimension, longitude, and latitude; and further investigation of the composition of matter. Hegius rejects the theory of atoms, proposing that matter can be infinitely divided without ever arriving at a smallest part. Other topics closely linked with transmutation and form are discussed in the third dialog. These relate to the generation (reproduction), nutrition, and corruption (death) of animate things. Because the vegetative and sensual souls are engendered by nature, plants and animals are also discussed. Particular attention is given to the senses and things sensed.

Two other important issues mentioned are cosmology and medicine. Medicine is alluded to rather than investigated, but it falls within the domain of specific physics in Hegius' scheme and should be touched upon here. Hegius writes about medicine in the context of a discussion of digestion. Elsewhere he gives a long list of the healing properties of plants. He proposes that the goal of medicine is health.

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\begin{align*}
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ pp. 413-14.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ pp. 520-43.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ p. 515.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ pp. 512-15.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ p. 537.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ p. 471.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ pp. 430-41.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ pp. 415-16, 444-45.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ pp. 393-94.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ pp. 544-48.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ p. 437.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ pp. 444-45.} \\
Ib_{ib.}, & \text{ p. 558.}
\end{align*}
\]
The references to cosmology are generally so intermingled with matters relating to astronomy that cosmological questions are discussed in the third subdivision of natural philosophy, which is mathematics. Astronomy constitutes one of the four subsections of mathematics. Even though Hegius mentions cosmology as being applicable to the area of physics, he fails to make an adequate distinction between these concerns and those of astronomy. At this point, it is, therefore, sufficient to note that cosmological questions also fall within the domain of physics taken specifically.¹

As has just been noted, the third and last subdivision of natural philosophy is mathematics. Hegius proposes that the goal of mathematics is "to speculate on quantities and their relationships, that is, equalities and inequalities."² Mathematics he considers to be the most exact of all the sciences.

Whatever mathematicians know, they know most certainly, and on this account there are no differences between them. The professors of the other arts often disagree among themselves. . . . Mathematician does not differ from mathematician, but what any one of them thinks, they all think jointly.³

The mathematician is seen as one who "puts forward proof so that he may convince . . . by means of unavoidable arguments."⁴ While it would be wrong to suggest that modern scientists always agree with one another, the way in which Hegius speaks of mathematics does give the impression of something approaching the modern conception of the scientific method.

In elaborating upon the quantities with which mathematics deals, Hegius enumerates the subsections of this area of natural

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philosophy. Mathematics, he says, is concerned with "continuous quantity and separate quantity. Geometry and astronomy deal with magnitudes, arithmetic and music with numbers and relationships of numbers."\(^1\)

It is immediately obvious that the subsections of mathematics constitute the subjects of the quadrivium. Thus, they may be classified as sciences as opposed to the arts of trivium.

Geometry is the science of the quadrivium most extensively examined in the dialogs. It would not be correct, however, to say that Hegius gives a well-organized or comprehensive introduction to the study of geometry. The most that can be suggested is that he often refers to the principles and proofs of geometry. This is done, it seems, more for the purpose of illustrating his other arguments than for teaching geometry itself.\(^2\) Although he states that there are countless different definitions applicable to geometry,\(^3\) Hegius is inclined to repeat the same ones each time he refers to the subject. This hardly supports the idea of a concerted attempt to teach geometry to his students.

The subject matter considered by the science of geometry is "universal figured magnitudes, or the universal figures of magnitudes."\(^4\) The scope of geometry is best described by a quotation from the dialogs. Replying to an enquiry as to the magnitudes with which geometry deals, Hegius writes:

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 494.

\(^2\)It should be noted, however, that Hegius often inserts apparently irrelevant material into the dialogs with the purpose of familiarizing his students with its content or for re-emphasis.

\(^3\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 535.  \(^4\)Ibid., p. 503.
Line, surface, and body; for geometry teaches that every figure is enclosed by a boundary or boundaries. . . . It teaches likewise that a plane figure is enclosed by lines, a solid [figure] by a surface or surfaces. It teaches that the first of the plane figures is the circle, because it is enclosed by a single line; the first of the solids, the sphere, because it is enclosed by a single surface. It teaches likewise that the first rectilinear figure is . . . the triangle, because fewer straight lines than three are not able to enclose an area, just as fewer plane surfaces than four cannot enclose a body.  

This gives a fairly good idea of the kind of material with which Hegius deals whenever he turns his attention to geometry.

What Hegius calls the postulations and conceptions of geometry are very much the same as the principles and definitions given for mathematics that he uses in describing it as the most exact of the sciences. In fact, it is under the description of general conceptions of the mind in relation to geometry that the most universal statements about mathematics are made. The postulations he proposes for geometry are taken from Euclid. These universal

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1Ibid., p. 494. Elsewhere in the dialogues, it is observed that geometry speculates on the following: "Magnitudes and their relationships, that is, what line is equal or unequal to what line, what area to what area, what body to what body." Ibid., p. 558.

2Cf. p. 187 above, and Hegius, appendix A, pp. 508-10, 534-35, 562-63. It seems that Hegius has used mainly the principles of geometry rather than those of music, arithmetic, or astronomy in delimiting the study of mathematics. The principles of mathematics might be somewhat more universally stated than those of geometry, and some of them would be applicable to the other three sciences, but it is clear that the statements in the dialogues are closely linked together and that they are not very broad in scope. Some of the items proposed as mathematical principles would certainly more correctly be called principles of geometry. They have little or nothing to do with music or even arithmetic, though they might be useful in astronomy. Hegius' students were probably more familiar with principles of geometry than with those of the other three sciences. Also, the principles of geometry are perhaps more easily and effectively used as illustrations. This may help to explain the slight confusion between mathematics as a subdivision of natural philosophy, and geometry as a subsection of mathematics.

3Hegius, appendix A, p. 535. 4Ibid., p. 534.
conceptions and postulations provide a solid basis for the proofs of geometry presented elsewhere in the dialogs. A modern beginner in geometry would need to become familiar with the selfsame principles.

The proofs and practical applications of geometry are woven into the dialogs at various points, sometimes in a rather strange manner. For example, the triangle and the quadrilateral are first likened to the vegetable and sensitive souls, respectively, following which plane figures are defined.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 421-22.} Lines, angles, and plane figures are further defined when the principles of mathematics are considered.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 508-10.} Except when the scope of geometry is given, there is little information about solid figures. Dimension, discussed previously in the domain of specific physics, is applicable to the plane and solid figures of geometry as well.\footnote{Ibid., p. 515.} In connection with dimension, longitude, and latitude, there are also some brief allusions to geography, which was frequently studied along with geometry.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 516. See also pp. 551, 586-87.}

Explanations are given of a few fallacious geometrical proofs and syllogisms upon which Hegius elaborates after correcting them.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 522-23.} Some methods of drawing plane figures are discussed,\footnote{Ibid., p. 527.} and the manner in which the areas of figures may be calculated is examined.\footnote{Ibid., pp. 540-41.}

Astronomy is the second of the subsections of mathematics that deals with continuous quantity or magnitude.\footnote{Ibid., p. 494.} Hegius gives no clear definition of the scope and limitations of astronomy. As mentioned earlier, cosmology and astronomy can hardly be differentiated

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., pp. 421-22. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., pp. 508-10. \textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 515. 
\textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 516. See also pp. 551, 586-87. 
\textsuperscript{5}Ibid., pp. 522-23. \textsuperscript{6}Ibid., p. 527. \textsuperscript{7}Ibid., pp. 540-41. 
\textsuperscript{8}Ibid., p. 494.
in the dialogs. Furthermore, in dealing with the concepts and calculations of astronomy, it is quite apparent that Hegius' major concern centers upon computations relevant to the ecclesiastical calendar. This involves an examination of space-time relationships and the regular and ordered movements of the earth. As such, the way in which Hegius approaches astronomy is actually from a cosmological viewpoint, with what seems a rather unusual end in view. In terms of medieval astronomy, however, he was not very different from his predecessors or many of his contemporaries.2

1See above, p. 198. Bernard Wueilner, A Dictionary of Scholastic Philosophy, 2nd ed. (Milwaukee, WI.: Bruce Publishing Co., 1966), s.v. "Cosmology," defines the study as follows: "The philosophical study of the ultimate principles and universal characteristics of the merely material universe." Webster's Seventh New Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. "Cosmology," says that it is a "branch of metaphysics that deals with the universe as an orderly system," or a "branch of astronomy that deals with the origin, structure, and space-time relationships of the universe." Webster's, s.v. "Astronomy," states that this is "the science of celestial bodies and their magnitudes, motions, and constitution." Cosmology is discussed today as a metaphysical question. Hegius, on the other hand, seems to have considered that specific physics was the most appropriate classification of cosmological issues. The distinction made by Hegius between physics and metaphysics, as has already been seen, was rather vague. In terms of the definitions given above and the manner in which Hegius deals with cosmological questions, it seems that cosmology and astronomy were closely linked in his thinking. Hegius' classification of cosmology is not overt. In fact, he does not mention the word cosmology as such. Clearly, he does not consider it a strictly metaphysical issue. Yet it is not strictly confined to specific physics as he defines it. For example, he writes: "Philosophers dispute whether the matter of the sky and the stars is transformable in its own nature or intransformable, and the case is still sub judice." Hegius, appendix A, p. 433. I have therefore elected to distinguish cosmology from specific physics, because I think that, in practice, he has done the same. The obvious place to deal with it is under astronomy, particularly because Hegius hardly differentiates between the two. In spite of objections that might be raised in the modern mind, the medieval classification of mathematics in the domain of natural philosophy makes this appropriate.

Hegius is able to discuss astronomy in the domain of natural philosophy in spite of the fact that he is not sure whether the sky is transmutable.\(^1\) He is still able to consider it a mobile entity because "although the whole sky does not change its position, yet its parts change their positions."\(^2\)

The majority of references to cosmology and astronomy occur in the dialogs on the incarnation. Hegius postulates an earth-centered universe. The heavens are divided into an upper and lower hemisphere, and the rising and setting of the sun are its passing into one or the other of these spheres.\(^3\) The notions of Pliny regarding the world and the sun are also outlined. Asked to evaluate these, Hegius observes simply: "those that are true are to be believed. But those that are false and savor of impiety are to be refuted."\(^4\) Hegius does not distinguish between what he believes to be true and false, but it is clear that he would reject all the assertions of Pliny that attribute any form of divinity to the sun.

Elsewhere Hegius rejects the views of Plato and Aristotle, who suggest that matter is co-eternal with God.\(^5\) Hegius argues that "the uncreated craftsman can fashion something out of nothing,"\(^6\) and says that the world and all matter were made in this way. There is,

\(^1\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 433. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 499.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 567. Hegius mentions the fact that people in different places see different hemispheres, and that the sun sets earlier in the east than in the west. He draws no conclusions from this, however, except that Indians are allowed to eat meat when it is forbidden to the Spanish. There is an inconsistency in his argument in that he says there are only two hemispheres just before he says that different hemispheres are seen by different peoples. He gives no explanation of this, and seems to accept without question the idea of a Ptolemaic universe.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 576. \(^5\)Ibid., pp. 527-28. \(^6\)Ibid., p. 526.
therefore, an essential difference between Hegius and the classical philosophers on this point. Hegius retains the medieval Christian tradition of a divine creation *ex nihilo*, in agreement with Roman Catholic orthodoxy.

Other matters that are investigated include a discussion on the movement of the moon, with a brief explanation of the way in which an eclipse takes place. The reasons for the yearly seasonal changes are explained. An interesting point is that the signs of the zodiac are enumerated, along with some brief explanations. It is worthy of note that these comments are relevant only to astronomy, and that no astrological significance is even alluded to. Problems relating to the yearly cycle and the length of the year are also considered. In this context Hegius explains the differences between the true astronomical year, the Roman year, and the Jewish year.

Using the information given, Hegius shows how to calculate the day upon which Easter will fall in any given year. He also refers to some medieval astrological tables that give zodiacal configurations relating to the time when Christ was born. On the basis of this information, he proposes that Christ was born at about mid-winter.

The next two subsections of mathematics are arithmetic and music. These deal with separate quantities or numbers. References to arithmetic are minimal. Besides the brief definitions

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1Ibid., p. 500.  2Ibid., p. 568.  3Ibid., pp. 581-82.  
4Ibid., p. 571.  5Ibid., pp. 573-74.  6Ibid., p. 569.  
7Ibid., p. 494.
given, there are only a couple of times when anything that might remotely be called arithmetic is mentioned. The divisions of a unit of measure are explained$^1$ and, in addition, proportional numbers$^2$ as well as fractions and ratios are discussed.$^3$ While it is true that these references do not by any means constitute an attempt to teach arithmetic, it could not be suggested that this subject was not taught. The manner in which the dialogs deal with concepts related to numbers seems to presuppose a basic knowledge of arithmetic.

Music, though defined by Hegius as one of the sciences of the quadrivium, is dealt with in the context of the arts. It is considered more from the point of view of poetry, in the midst of an evaluation of grammar and dialectic. For this reason, it is discussed below in the area of rational philosophy.$^4$ Music as it is understood today is hardly mentioned in the dialogs.

Moral Philosophy

The second major division in Hegius' philosophical scheme is that of general ethics or moral philosophy. In comparing moral philosophy with natural and rational philosophy, Hegius observes:

Knowing how to live rightly is better than knowing the natures of things, or how to dispute or say or speak rightly. Because of this ethics is preferred to the other parts of philosophy. And thus Socrates [469-399 B.C.] was judged the wisest of men, . . . for when the other philosophers were wasting their efforts in examining the natures of things he [was] the first of all [men who] devoted himself to the study της ἁγθείας.$^5$

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$^1$Ibid., p. 520.  $^2$Ibid., p. 525.  $^3$Ibid., pp. 578-79.

$^4$See below, pp. 214-15.

$^5$Hegius, appendix A, p. 550. In the context of this statement Hegius declares that moral philosophy is to be preferred to the liberal arts, astronomy, astrology, and geography.
Errors of the will are considered more harmful than errors of the intellect, for they cause a man to turn from that which is right to wickedness.  

In discussing metaphysics, it was pointed out that Hegius regarded metaphysicians to be the chief of the speculative philosophers. Now it has been seen that ethics is to be preferred above natural and rational philosophy. This use of superlatives is a little confusing. In addition to the technical differences that need to be clarified, the reasons Hegius gives for making these statements need to be taken into account. The speculations of the metaphysician are important because his thoughts are about God. But it is more important for a man to have an understanding of ethics than of any other branch of philosophy, because without correct choices and values he will be cut off from God. The two ideas, in reality, are not mutually exclusive. Without a knowledge of God and revelation from God, men are unable to do what pleases God. But knowing about God is not sufficient, and, therefore, practice of the truth must follow on from speculation about God. Hegius explains this as follows:

To know is to have knowledge, to observe is to use knowledge. Because of this, to know is the prime perfection of the mind, and is called by philosophers the prime actuality. . . . To observe, however, [is] the secondary perfection, and is called the secondary actuality, for no one without knowledge is able to observe.

It [moral science] is operative, because it is not speculation . . . , nor learned for the sake of speculation, but moves on from speculation to operation. For no one who is of a sound mind learns moral science so that he may speculate on right and

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1Ibid., p. 390.  
2See above, p. 164.  
3See below, pp. 251-55.  
4Hegius, appendix A, pp. 552-53.
While in some senses metaphysics is supreme, the practical ethical consequences of knowing about God are no less significant.

According to Hegius, ethical values have been arrived at by human speculation as well as by divine revelation. Ethical values that are established upon revelation are seen by him to be "more true" than those discovered by men, "for the discovered is true to the extent that it corresponds and accords with the revealed, but the revealed is true in every way." As in other areas, Hegius acknowledges the supremacy of matters of faith and revelation over matters of reason.

The subdivisions into which general ethics is divided are politics, economics, and "ethics taken specifically, which is called monastic." In evaluating these subdivisions, Hegius proposes a hierarchical order based upon what he feels to be the most important areas of concern. The most excellent of the moral sciences, he says, is that "which causes good morals in the city." He continues:

For the morals of a city cannot be good unless the morals of the home and of men are good. And, for this reason, the science that causes good morals in the home and the science that causes good morals in men are subject to that science which causes good morals in the city. For the more universal a good is, the more divine; so the most excellent of the parts of moral science is the science of administering the state. . . . From which it

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1Ibid., p. 552. Emphasis added. 2Ibid.

3Ibid., p. 493. In order to maintain clarity, ethics taken generally is referred to as moral philosophy. Ethics taken specifically, which Hegius sometimes calls monastic, is simply called ethics. In modern terminology, moral philosophy might be called axiology. Hegius, however, does not investigate a broad spectrum of axiological issues, and it is perhaps best to retain his own terminology.
follows that the most worthy of the sciences is [that] which brings good morals to the City of God.¹

In theory, Hegius places politics at the pinnacle of the moral arts. In practice, however, his concern is mostly with the ethics of the individual. Although no specific mention is made of aesthetics, this axiological question is alluded to in a general way, and is discussed here as a fourth subdivision of moral philosophy along with politics, economics, and ethics.

According to Hegius, politics, the first subdivision of moral philosophy, is a civil science dealing with the government of city or state. In summary, he outlines the scope of this science:

[Politics teaches] in what way . . . a state should be administered, for it teaches about the different sorts of states. Every . . . state is either under an aristocracy, that is, the administration of the nobility; or under a democracy, that is, the control of the people; or under an oligarchy, that is, under the control of a few; or under a monarchy, that is, under the command and dominion of a single prince.²

Along with this description, some observations are made regarding further subdivisions of the four types of rulership described, and a basic etymology is given for some of the words connected with politics.

Politics, being architectonic, is a more excellent art than the arts subject to it. For example, the military art, which is part of the art of political administration, is more excellent than the art of making reins or spurs. The reason for this is that the architectonic arts have superior goals:

¹Ibid., p. 562. Hegius describes the hierarchy as being architectonic, the meaning of which is clearly explained. Architectonic arts "excel the arts subject to them." Ibid., p. 559.

²Ibid., p. 495.
The goal of the military art is victory and peace, for wars are fought so that, once victory is won, the victors may live in peace. But the goal of the art of making reins is the rein and its price.\(^1\)

There is the slightest hint of an awareness of the civic consciousness proposed by the classical authors and reiterated by the men of the Italian Renaissance. This point, however, is not elaborated upon or stressed in any way. Hegius merely asserts, on one occasion, that "dangers should be endured and misfortunes bravely borne for the well-being of the state."\(^2\)

The area of politics, in fact, is surprisingly de-emphasized in the dialogs. In spite of the claim that politics holds the first place among the moral arts, Hegius says little of major consequence relating to this field. The claim is more a reflection of his considerable indebtedness to the classical authors than a genuine concern to discover the principles of political science. Hegius is much more interested in individual piety and only pays lip-service to the supremacy of politics.

The second subdivision of moral philosophy is economics. This art teaches how to manage family and domestic matters.\(^3\) While lower in the hierarchy than politics, it is nevertheless considered architectonic "because the economist controls the cultivators of fields, vineyards, [and] gardens, [and] the herders of sheep, goats, [and] pigs."\(^4\) Other than these comments, Hegius has little to say about the art of economics. His much more lengthy remarks on the subject of ethics, taken specifically, often have some relevance to

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 559.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 552.  \(^3\)Ibid., p. 495.  
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 559.
economics and politics. Generally speaking, however, these remarks are much more apropos to the area of "monastic."

Monastic, otherwise known as ethics taken specifically, is the third of the subdivisions of moral philosophy. Ethics deals with the "behavior of individual men, such as fortitude, justice, generosity, [and] temperance."\(^1\) "It teaches us what is honorable, what 'base, what decent, what indecent, what right, [and] what sinful."\(^2\) According to Hegius, decisions regarding these issues should be made upon the basis of what God reveals and "whatever right reason dictates."\(^3\) Thus, the criterion of value is external to man, but it needs to be internalized and subjected to the scrutiny of reason in order to establish the standards by which the individual will conduct himself. Man must become aware of true values, which have their ultimate source in the mind of God, who is the eternal good.

In order to establish a system of values, man needs to gain a knowledge of what is right and wrong, and upon this knowledge to build an understanding of the goals of human behavior. Hegius explains this process in response to the question, "Is knowledge of the virtues necessary for man?" He says:

It is, because the recognition of happiness, since it is the goal of the human race, is necessary for man. For just as it is necessary for an archer to see the target at which the arrow is to be fired, so it is necessary for a man to know his goal, that is, happiness. All human actions are to be aimed at acquiring that. And, since happiness cannot be recognized without cognizance of virtue, for virtue comes under the definition of happiness, because happiness is operation according to virtue, it is therefore clear that knowledge of the virtues is necessary for man. Again, unless a man has knowledge of the virtues and

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 495. \(^2\)Ibid., p. 550. \(^3\)Ibid.
liches, he is not to be set above dumb animals, nor does he differ from them except only in the shape of his body.\footnote{Hegius' conception of the process of establishing values is seen to be essentially Aristotelian in this statement.} There is at the same time a hint of Epicureanism in his ideas, as well as an unmistakable element of Stoicism.\footnote{Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.4.1-2, 1.7.15-16.} Consideration of of the nature of the valuing experience as understood by Hegius reveals the presence of all of these elements.

All acts are subsumed in the progression toward the ultimate goal of happiness. Hegius gives the following example:

\begin{itemize}
\item \footnote{Ibid., p. 551.}
\item \footnote{An analysis of the constituent elements of Hegius' moral views is made below. See pp. 238-41. Just prior to 300 B.C. the Stoics and Epicureans began an investigation of the sumnum bonum. The Epicurean view was fairly closely modeled upon Aristotle, and happiness was considered to be the supreme good. This happiness was a result of pleasure achieved by participation not in things of a material or sensual nature, but in the refined activities of the mind. Intellectual pleasure was achieved by the contemplation of noble themes, the friendship of wise and gifted men, and the peace achieved through living a morally upright life which sought fairness and happiness for all. The ultimate aim of the Epicurean was pleasure, and the ultimate pleasure was found in a pure and good mind. The conclusions drawn by the Stoics were somewhat different. They said that virtue was the ultimate goal and the only true good. Individual pleasure was not a consideration, though the virtuous man would undoubtedly find happiness as a by-product of his virtue. Passions and pleasures were to be made subject to reason, informed by a knowledge of what was right and good. Man must be his own master and seek virtue, not pleasure, whatever the circumstances. The life of the Epicurean, therefore, could be a placid one in the presence of good company and comfortable surroundings, with the mind occupied by pleasant thoughts. The Stoic, on the other hand, was to seek virtue independent of and to the exclusion of pleasure. The Stoic could not rely on his external circumstances in any way. He was to find the sumnum bonum without recourse to anything but the practice of an austere virtue, based upon a knowledge of what was right. The vicissitudes of life were to be accepted without question. What fate befell a person was of no consequence, for the only matter of importance was to practice virtue.} All acts are subsumed in the progression toward the ultimate goal of happiness. Hegius gives the following example:
\end{itemize}
The farmer makes a plow so that he may have [something] with which he can cultivate the earth; he cultivates the earth so that he can sow it; he sows it so that he can harvest crops; he reaps so that he can thresh; he threshes so that he can grind; he grinds so that from the flour he can make bread; [and] he makes bread so that he can satisfy himself and live happily.¹

Connected with this thought is the idea that God terminates the progression of all causes. Man was created in order to obtain a knowledge and love of God in this life, and to enjoy the happiness of dwelling in His presence in the future.

Hegius proposes that knowledge of the ultimate goal pertains to the area of politics,² but he speaks of this goal in terms of ethics. Explaining why men seek blessedness, he writes:

No one can say for the sake of what he wishes to be blessed, that is, for the sake of what he wishes it to be well for himself. . . . [When] asked why he wishes to eat, he can say in answer that he wants to eat because he is hungry; [asked] why he wants to drink, [it is] so that he may not be thirsty. . . . But [when] questioned why he wants it to be well for himself he has nothing that he can answer, because for it to be well with a man is the ultimate goal of human acts. There is nothing beyond the ultimate.³

This blessedness is spoken of in terms quite similar to those used relative to the modern concept of self-actualization. The ultimate goal is an intrinsic value, prized for its own sake. Intermediate goals are really only instrumental in achieving the final goal, "because the mind of man is content only with the ultimate goal and cannot rest unless it has achieved it."⁴

Man always acts with the purpose of finding happiness. Whether it be a difficult task that needs to be accomplished, or whether an evil deed is committed, these are done by a man "because

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 561. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 560. ⁴Ibid.
he considers them good for him and desires to obtain some advantage from them." Performance of a skill, speculation regarding truth, the labor of the sailor, the desires of an idiot or a murderer—all are aimed at achieving that which the individual feels is good for him and will bring happiness to him. The study of ethics is, therefore, of vital importance, for "no one can become blessed who does not know what things should be done by him, [and] what avoided." Hegius observes further that "every individual must take pains to learn the ultimate goal of his actions," for true blessedness can only result from a knowledge and practice of the right, irrespective of the consequences. It is in this area that the Stoic element of Hegius' ethics may best be seen. To the Stoic, knowledge is virtue, and ignorance results in vice. Acquisition of knowledge, therefore, is of paramount importance if the right is to be practiced.

Hegius never makes the extreme assertion that knowledge is virtue, but his understanding of the nature of the valuing experience does at times approach this position. He makes it clear, however, that one who knows the right may conceivably choose the wrong.

Virtue as understood in the dialogs needs to be explored a little to uncover the significance of these ideas. Hegius proposes that the vegetative, sensitive, and rational souls each have virtues that pertain to them. These virtues are either innate or acquired. Those acquired by the rational soul are divided into intellectual and moral, the former learned by study, the latter achieved through

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1Ibid., p. 554. 2Ibid., p. 551. 3Ibid., p. 561.
4Ibid., pp. 443-44. Hegius names wisdom, intellect, knowledge, prudence, and art as intellectual virtues or habits; and fortitude, generosity, temperance, and justice as moral virtues.

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practice. On the authority of the Nicomachean Ethics, Hegius explains the importance of these propositions:

Every habit by which the intellect proclaims the truth is its virtue, just as every habit by which the will chooses the right is its virtue. And on account of this Aristotle, in the second [book] of Ethics, divides virtues into intellectual virtues, by which the intellect affirms the truth, and moral, by which the will chooses the right.  

In this statement a close interrelationship between an intellectual assent to knowledge and correct moral choices is plainly evident.

A similar point is made when Hegius writes:

All doctrine [defined as speculative science] does seek out the good, because the goal of speculative science is speculation about truth. To speculate about truth is a good thing, since it is a perfection of the human mind, therefore every speculative science seeks out the good. For just as the skill of a good craftsman makes him fit and disposed to the making of good works and not bad, so a doctrine makes the man who has it disposed to speculating on the true and not the false.

While Hegius does not go so far as to say that knowledge is virtue, he is in effect saying that virtue is impossible without knowledge.

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1Ibid., p. 443, and p. 461, where acquired virtues are defined as habits "generated in the soul by frequent actions."

2Ibid., p. 596.

3Ibid., p. 553. The close connection between moral and intellectual virtues is further illustrated when Hegius writes about the potentialities of the rational soul:

"The potentialities of the rational soul . . . are generally two, namely, cognizant and motive, which we call intellect and volition. For inasmuch as the potentiality is cognizant, it is called intellect, but inasmuch as the potentiality is motive, it is called volition or will. Hence, although different names are used in respect of the soul—as, we call what is the intellect itself reason, mind, memory, will, [and] free choice—nevertheless these names do not speak a difference in the essence of the soul, but differ in classification. Thus, it is called intellect inasmuch as it apprehends, reason inasmuch as it discerns, mind inasmuch as it investigates, memory inasmuch as it preserves, will inasmuch as it has appetite, [and] free choice inasmuch as it makes decisions." Ibid., p. 484.

Also, see below, pp. 300-305, where the moral and intellectual virtues are spoken of with respect to the immortality of man.
Knowledge, he argues, generates a predisposition to choose that which is right. This predisposition would not be possible if knowledge was absent. From this perspective the influence of Stoicism may be seen to be a major factor in Hegius' moral philosophy.

Hegius goes on to point out that knowledge is never a guarantee of right choice. Right choice, he says, depends upon control of the sensual and intellectual appetites. The sensual appetite is described by Hegius as follows:

"[It is] that which a sense judges pleasant; as, the appetite to eat what tastes good, or to smell what smells good, or to hear what is pleasing to listen to, or to see what delights the sight, or to touch what is pleasant to feel. This appetite is to be restrained by reason; for [he] who gives it reins looser than [is] just departs from moderation, in which virtue is established, and slips into vice."

The second of the animal appetites, the intellectual, is understood in these terms:

"[It is] when we seek out that thing which our mind knows, that is, which reason judges should be sought out, as when we seek either happiness or those things by which we shall be able to achieve happiness. This appetite is called will, for will is nothing but the power of the human mind desirous of those things that right reason dictates should be sought out."

The power of choice is in the domain of the will, for by the power of the will "we choose or shun those things that the intellect has judged either good or evil."

Hegius supports a belief in the freedom of the will. He proposes that man is able to choose between those things he wishes to do, and those things that should be avoided. If the honorable

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1There are two appetites, natural and animal. The animal is subdivided into sensual and intellectual. Ibid., pp. 555-56.
2Ibid., p. 556.
3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 429.
5Ibid., p. 555.
thing is done, according to what right reason dictates, the will is considered to be honorable. A depraved will, on the other hand, desires and chooses base things.\(^1\) In the matter of choice, Hegius in not so much a Stoic as he is an heir to the ideas of Augustine\(^2\) and a disciple of Occam.\(^3\)

Hegius observes that the man who chooses vice does so for the sake of pleasure, and because he thinks that his choice will bring him happiness. He is, however, deceived, because he has not learned the ultimate consequence of his choice or studied the goal of his actions. Such a man, in fact, is acting upon the impulses of the sensitive nature rather than upon the dictates of reason.

In comparing the senses and the intellect, Hegius lists a number of points established by Aristotle that throw light upon the manner in which freedom of choice is exercised:

The fifth [point] is that in each [sense and intellect] there is an appetite with judgment, mediating, namely, in respect of good and evil, though in different ways, since sense looks only at the present but intellect to the future. Thus it sometimes dismisses what is presently pleasing out of consideration of future sorrow. . . . Ninth [is] that in the sense, if there is a judgment that this thing is either good or bad, the appetite moves either to pursuance or avoidance. So through reasoning about likeness, if the intellect judges a thing either good or bad, the intellectual appetite moves either to pursuance or avoidance. But there is this difference in that the sensitive

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 426. It is interesting to note that, while freedom of choice is granted to man, animals and inanimate things are determined by God, who created them to bring advantage to humanity. Ibid., p. 555. See also Korolec, "Will and Choice," p. 631.


\(^3\)Korolec, "Will and Choice," p. 638.
appetite moves of its nature, but the appetite of the intellect [moves] freely [i.e., with freedom of choice]. Tenth [is] that in each it happens that both truth and falsehood are composed or split up with regard to either good or evil. But there is a difference between the simply good and the apparent good, as a result of which what is presently pleasing, though great evil follow it, appears to the sense to be good; and that [which] is simply good is apparent to the intellect, looking not only to present pleasure but to the future.¹

From what has been considered, it becomes clear that Hegius' appraisal of ethics, though strongly Aristotelian, is somewhat eclectic. The major emphasis is that knowledge of the right is a prerequisite to doing what is right, for in his view right action springs from right reason. Virtuous action is sometimes seen as being pleasurable in the manner in which Aristotle declares it to be so. Hegius' description of this pleasure may even intimate a degree of Epicureanism. At other times virtuous action is encouraged merely because it is right, not because it is pleasurable, and from this point of view, Hegius may be considered stoical. Whether acts are performed from pleasure or duty--and this is not clear--Hegius insists that the will is free to choose for good or ill. In all these points, Hegius had much in common with many of his contemporaries in the late medieval period.²

The fourth and final subdivision of moral philosophy is aesthetics. The question of aesthetics is not directly examined by Hegius, but arises out of his discussion of the intellectual appetite. This appetite is divided into speculative and operational appetite. Different appetites are stronger in different men, and so some become speculative thinkers, while others desire to perform

¹Ibid., p. 483.

²See below, pp. 302-4, where this is discussed further.
certain tasks. In the latter group the appetite for operation is stronger than the appetite to speculate, and such persons might, for example, become craftsmen.¹

There is no detailed discussion of aesthetics, and what is noted is mentioned only in passing. Different arts have different goals, and these are not all "equally worthy and excellent... All arts are awarded their dignity from their goals."² The value of the goals is based upon their universality, and so the architectonic arts are more highly considered than the subsidiary arts. Thus, administration of a state is of higher value than the military, economic, or rhetorical arts, for these are all subject to it. They enhance the superior art. Another example is the making of spurs. It is an art subject to the military art, and therefore of less value than the military, and so on.³

Some arts are operations only, while others have works or products resulting from their operations. This depends upon the particular art and its goal. Examples used by Hegius include, in the first group, the art of flute-playing, the goal of which is merely playing a flute. This is an operation without any resulting work. The same cannot be said of the art of weaving, for the goal of this art is the woven fabric.⁴

There is no indication of any preference for arts that are merely operations over arts that produce some work. Hegius at no time demeans the practical arts and occupations. This might, however, be thought to be implicit in his acceptance of the hierarchy

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 556. ²Ibid., p. 559. ³Ibid. ⁴Ibid., p. 557.
of arts based upon the architectonic principle as he explains it. On the other hand, he defends manual workers from the accusation of being adulterers on account of their occupations.\footnote{Ibid., p. 598.} The only preference shown is with respect to those arts whose operations result in works. In their case, "works are better than operations,"\footnote{Ibid., p. 558.} but this in no way suggests that these arts are either inferior or superior to arts whose goals are merely operations. In other words, art for art's sake is neither condemned nor elevated. It is apparently accepted by Hegius as being of equal value to art that has as its objective some kind of tangible, useful product.

Moral philosophy is of major interest in an examination of Hegius' philosophy. As a schoolteacher at the close of the Middle Ages, Hegius was greatly concerned with the moral development of his students. Education and religion were not considered separate spheres of influence in the fifteenth century. Education was religious education, and there was an intense interest in the moral aspects of this education. The most striking aspect of moral philosophy as presented by Hegius is the close relationship that emerges between intellectual and moral virtues. Knowledge, however, is not considered to be virtue even if knowledge is a good thing in itself. The freedom of will to follow or deny the dictates of reason based on the knowledge acquired is never denied to man. Different goals and arts are available for man from which he may choose those he desires. Thus, he is able to participate in the valuing experience and strive for the "summum bonum".

\[\text{Ibid., p. 598.} \quad \text{Ibid., p. 558.}\]
Rational Philosophy

In the scheme developed by Hegius, the third and final division of philosophy is rational philosophy, sometimes referred to as logic taken generally. Hegius defines it as follows:

Logos is translated as reasoning or speech, and for this reason the Son of God is, in Greek, called Logos, because He is the speech and word of the Father. Hence logicus [means] pertaining to reason or speech, and logica the science dealing with speech. In speech there ought to be three things: for it ought to be complete and unspoiled, true and not false, [and] polished and decorative. For this reason there are three parts of logic: grammar, which makes speech complete and free from barbarity and solecism; dialectic, which makes it true, since it differentiates truth from falsehood; [and] rhetoric, which makes it polished and decorative.¹

It is immediately recognized that the three parts of rational philosophy described are the arts of the classical and medieval trivium. The subject matter of rational philosophy is, therefore, the liberal arts, "worthy to be learned and known by free men."²

Art is defined as a creative habit performed according to the dictates of true reason.³ It must be remembered that a habit is an acquired virtue generated in the soul by frequent actions.⁴ The virtue applicable to art is not moral but intellectual.⁵ By moral virtue, the will chooses that which is right. The intellectual virtues pertaining to the arts, however, are dictates of reason by

¹Ibid., p. 495-96. Dialogs 12, 13, and 14 deal most specifically with rational philosophy. The dialogs are fairly clear in their exposition of grammar, rhetoric, and logic. For this reason a discussion of the detailed composition and structure of these arts is not undertaken at this point. Neither is the practice of these arts explained. Rather, the general content and purpose of each art is outlined, and the way these arts relate to each other as subdivisions of rational philosophy is explored.

²Ibid., p. 399. ³Ibid., p. 595. ⁴Ibid., p. 461.

⁵Ibid., p. 596.
which truth is affirmed. Arts are thus operations, either active or effective, that result from knowledge and abilities learned by the intellectual soul. They are, as such, classified in the area of rational philosophy. They do not pertain to moral virtues and, therefore, cannot be discussed as moral philosophy. Neither do they pertain to natural philosophy, since they are not created or generated by God or nature but by the intellect of man. Moreover, grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic are not entities but concepts. As such they cannot constitute elements of natural philosophy, for in this area only the mobile entity is legitimately investigated.

In comparing physics and logic, Hegius clarifies what he means when he says that rational philosophy deals with names or concepts rather than things:

The physicist thinks about things and pronounces something about them, and on this account the thoughts of the physicist are thoughts of things. The dialectician, however, thinks about thoughts and pronounces about them, . . . and on this account the thoughts of the dialectician are thoughts of thoughts. Thoughts about things are . . . primary concepts of our mind; thoughts about thoughts, however, are . . . secondary concepts of our mind. Thoughts of things are called primary intentions.

1Ibid., p. 597. Active arts perform an operation, leaving no work behind after the act, for example, dancing. Effective arts leave some work behind after the act or operation is completed, for example, poetry or sewing.

2Hegius' use of the terms dialectic and logic is not always clear in this discussion. Technically, dialectic refers to a specific art rather than to the broad field of rational philosophy. The manner in which Hegius refers to dialectic in this context, the development of the argument, and the fact that he uses the word logic towards the end of the discussion, all suggest that "dialectic" could be replaced by "logic." The points being made seem to refer generally to rational philosophy rather than specifically to dialectic. It is, therefore, appropriate, in my opinion, to use the term "logic" to mean one of the three divisions of philosophy, namely, rational philosophy or logic taken generally. "Dialectic," on the other hand, should be taken to mean specific logic, i.e., logic as a subdivision of rational philosophy.
while thoughts of thoughts [are] secondary intentions. For this reason dialectic is said to be concerned with secondary intentions, the primary being adjoined, for the dialectician thinks about thoughts and concepts of things by means of thoughts of thoughts.¹

In terms more easily understood, he says:

Logic is either concerned with thoughts . . . ; or concerned with statements . . . ; or concerned with reasoning. . . . But because thought, statement, [and] reasoning are operations of our intellect, so logic is said to be concerned with the operations of our mind.²

As noted before when natural and moral philosophy were under discussion, the role played by the intellect is a major emphasis in Hegius' presentation of his ideas.

As opposed to art, the concept of inertia is presented. Inertia, like art, is defined as a creative habit. In contrast to art, however, it is a habit with false rather than true reason. Such a habit is a vice rather than a virtue and is described by Hegius as "lack of art" or "idleness."³ Instead of operating according to right reason, the intellect fails to affirm the truth. "The habit according to which the intellect errs and thinks wrongly is bad, and not worthy of the name of virtue."⁴

A study of grammar, rhetoric, and dialectic are intended to equip the student with the means of obtaining knowledge. This knowledge, in turn, enables the intellect to affirm truth according to the dictates of right reason. In this way virtue rather than vice is acquired, and art rather than inertia flourishes.

It is upon the specific arts that attention now focuses. Along with grammar, dialectic, and rhetoric, poetics is also

¹Hegius, appendix A, pp. 464-65. ²Ibid., p. 466. ³Ibid., p. 596. ⁴Ibid.
considered among the arts. Poetics deals with poetry and music. Although music is actually a science of the quadrivium, the manner in which it was taught in the fifteenth-century schools and the way in which Hegius writes about it make it necessary to examine it as one of the liberal arts.

The first subdivision of rational philosophy examined here is grammar. The goal of the art of grammar, according to Hegius, is communication through correct speech. "It is good for a man to know how to explain the sensations of his mind to other men. Speech . . . has been granted to man for this purpose." As one of the early humanist teachers, it became Hegius' aim to cultivate in his students a precise knowledge of Latin grammar according to classical rather than medieval usage.

The purpose of the study of the art of grammar is further clarified by the way in which Hegius contrasts it with rhetoric. He writes:

[The difference is] the same as between saying things properly and speaking well. Many men say things properly who do not speak well, for to say things properly is to speak according to the precepts of the grammarians; to speak well is to speak according to the precepts of rhetoric.2

Hegius wrote the last two treatises published in the Dialogs with the aim in mind of assisting his students to "say things properly" and to "speak well." In the "Invectiva," he says, "A man speaks well who mars his speech neither with grammatical fault, nor with solecism, nor with any corrupt misuse of words."4

Elsewhere in this same treatise, Hegius makes the following

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1Ibid., p. 399.  2Ibid., p. 496.  3Ibid., pp. 614, 633.  
4Ibid., p. 637.
observation in roundly condemning contemporary grammatical usage:

If grammar, which is the art of speaking, could speak for herself, [there is] no doubt but that she would be extremely angry with those who so tear her into pieces, so disfigure her that she does not deserve even to be called grammar. . . . Grammar . . . is the art of speaking . . . correctly. That which is now learned by children . . . is hardly to be called a liberal art, for it is the art of speaking not correctly but barbarously.\(^1\)

The "Miscellany" is an attempt to improve the situation described by Hegius. It is full of examples of correct grammar and syntax, with classical usage being held up as the ideal. The observation is made that every art is a method, "because every art is a certain going through. Grammar is going through those things to which the science of grammar pertains."\(^2\) As he expressed it, Hegius was striving to teach his pupils the correct methods of "going through" grammar.

According to Hegius, grammar is "the most excellent of the liberal arts."\(^3\) This is perhaps best understood in terms of the primary position held by grammar rather than in thinking that grammar was more polished than dialectic or rhetoric. Grammar was not better, but it was the art through which the others were learned.

We ought to give grammar the credit for anything we ever learn from instructors or from books, for we owe to grammar what we learn of dialectic, physics, mathematics, ethics, and the other liberal disciplines. For no one is able to learn anything from any instructor whose conversation he does not understand, nor can anyone learn anything from a book written in Latin if he has no knowledge of the Latin language.\(^4\)

As the primary art, it was essential that grammar be learned correctly and well. This would enable the scholar to study and to impart knowledge most effectively.

\(^1\) Ibid., p. 636. \(^2\) Ibid., p. 632. \(^3\) Ibid., p. 598. \(^4\) Ibid., p. 599.
Poetics is another aspect of rational philosophy that should briefly be investigated. Hegius devotes a little space in the dialog entitled "Questions Concerning Art" to the subject of poetics. Poetry as defined by Hegius is primarily a subsection of grammar. There is, however, a close interrelationship posited between poetry and music. Because music was at least theoretically considered to be one of the subjects of the quadrivium, it seems appropriate to make some distinction between poetics and grammar.

The close ties between music and poetry are in evidence in all that Hegius writes regarding the latter. Commenting on whether or not poetry may be called a liberal art, he observes:

Just as it is a liberal thing to speak correctly, so it is to compose words correctly and music rhythmically. Poetry, because it is an art of composing rhythmically, is therefore allotted the name of music, [and] rightly numbered among the liberal arts.¹

He continues with regard to the affinity between the two arts:

The lines of which the poet is the creator are called songs. To make verses is said [to be] to sing, or to compose. Since music is the art of singing and of composing, poetry is rightly called music.²

In defining music in these terms, Hegius has in mind that it consists of three parts, namely, composition, playing an instrument, and singing. In his description of poetics, he deals only with composition. The specific point that he makes is the importance of a knowledge of meter and syllables in composing poetry or music:

[A man] who knows the quantities of syllables can write good verses. . . . He can avoid barbarisms, because he can shorten the syllables that need to be short and lengthen those that need lengthening. . . . He . . . can know what ambiguous words mean. . . . He can distinguish good syllogisms from the sophistical and barbarous. He can understand and translate many songs.³

¹Ibid. ²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 601.
Clearly, what is spoken of here is of a much broader scope than would be understood by musical composition in the present age. Along with ideas dealing specifically with poetry and music, questions are raised relating to grammar and even to dialectic.

It is to dialectic that, at this point, the focus of discussion is turned. Dialectic is the second major subdivision of rational philosophy. This art, Hegius says, "is the art of debate" or disputation. In outlining the goals of dialectic, he states:

It is a liberal thing to look to the truth and to refute falsehood. These are the offices of dialectic, for from dialectical points are brought forward the arguments with which truth is defended and falsehood defeated. Likewise, it is a holy and a liberal thing to turn one who is erring from his error, so that he may abandon it, which is done by the resources and the service of dialectic. [The man] who concedes any false thing is forced to concede everything which is of necessity bound up with that false thing.

On the authority of Augustine, Hegius affirms the usefulness of dialectic in investigating and interpreting biblical problems. He concludes his introductory remarks on this subject with an appropriate admonition: "You must only beware of any delight in quarreling and childish showing-off in catching out your opponent."

While dialectic is concerned with the operations of the human mind, the laws of logic are not considered by Hegius to have been established by men. In much the same way as he speaks of mathematical truths being self-evident and based upon "unnecessary arguments," he suggests that dialectical conclusions are inevitably based upon given propositions. He argues:

The sequence that exists in good reasoning is not true because there is agreement among men that it should be true, nor is a false sequence false because there is agreement among men that

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1Ibid., p. 496. 2Ibid., p. 601. 3Ibid. 4Ibid., p. 563.
it should be false, but a true sequence is true by its own nature, just as a false one is false by its own nature.¹

Men take note of a logical sequence and acknowledge it to be true. For this reason, it is essential that truthful propositions be posited. Otherwise, by the inevitability of the logical sequence, a conclusion may be drawn that is logically correct, but, because of false propositions, the conclusion may be untrue.²

Much of the rest of the examination of dialectic is concerned with true and false syllogisms and logical proofs. This relates more to methodology and is not discussed at this point. There are, however, some interesting observations arising out of a comparison of dialectic and rhetoric. The work of the dialectician is more precisely delimited by these remarks, and they are, therefore, worthy of note.

Hegius observes that dialectic and rhetoric create credibility, but in different ways:

Dialectic creates credibility by debate, and by questions and answers, which are broken speeches. Rhetoric, however, uses an unbroken speech and creates credibility. Again, dialectic rejoices in perfect syllogisms, rhetoric in enthymemes. Moreover, dialectic deals in thesis, rhetoric in hypothesis.³

In connection with the terms thesis and hypothesis, the

¹Ibid., p. 603.

²An example given by Hegius of a correct logical sequence based on false propositions is as follows: "If a circle is a triangle [then] a circle is enclosed by three lines: a circle is a triangle, therefore a circle is enclosed by three lines." The conclusion is logically correct, but not true. Ibid., p. 602.

³Ibid., p. 608. The enthymemes spoken of are explained as being "imperfect methods of reasoning," lacking a "proposition or a minor premise." Ibid., p. 604. Thesis is described as being unrestricted and general, whereas hypothesis is limited and specific. An example of the former is the question of whether one should marry; of the latter, whether Plato should marry. Ibid., p. 608.
question of universality is raised. In describing dialectic earlier in the dialogs, Hegius states that it deals with "universal argumen-
tations." He observes that a knowledge of universal and specific terms is important in the liberal arts:

It is a liberal science [to know] when a noun [that is] the subject in any proposition is taken for the things on which it has been imposed, when [it is taken] for itself, when for the thoughts and the conception of the mind. [The man] who is ignorant of it cannot discern good arguments from sophistries. It is a liberal thing to know what nouns are . . . meant universally, which particularly. For [he] who does not know that cannot argue rightly. When any noun is meant universally, things lower than itself can be subsumed into it, which cannot occur if it is meant particularly. If every animal [taken universally] has the sense of touch, it is inevitable that man has the sense of touch; but because every animal [taken particularly] is a quadruped it is not inevitable that man is a quadruped.

From this argumentation, it is obvious that dialectic involves an investigation and understanding of the exact meanings of terms as a basis for making true propositions. In this sense, it may be con-sidered to have some parallels with modern analytic philosophy.

Hegius describes grammar as the art of speaking properly and rhetoric as the art of speaking well. Though he does not use the exact words, he could, similarly, have suggested that dialectic is the art of speaking truthfully, or with precision of meaning.

Consideration must now be given to an examination of rheto-
ric, the final area of rational philosophy in the scheme presented by Hegius. In seeking to understand grammar and dialectic, some of the basic elements of rhetoric have already been introduced.

\[1\] Ibid., p. 502.  \[2\] Ibid., p. 605.

\[3\] Cf. Copleston, History of Philosophy, vol. 3: Late Medi-

\[4\] See above, pp. 212, 216.
grammar was seen as the art of speaking properly, rhetoric was defined as the art of speaking well. In comparing dialectic and rhetoric, rhetoric was said to use unbroken speech, enthymeme, and hypothesis. In these ways it was noted to be different from dialectic, which uses broken speech, syllogism, and thesis. Also, whereas dialectic is universal argumentation, rhetoric is more inclined to be concerned with particular cases.

Hegius considers rhetoric to be a worthy art, and among the most honorable of skills. He gives the following reasons:

Orators, by the art of speaking well, which is called rhetoric, accuse the guilty and force them to pay the penalty for their crimes. They defend the innocent, so that punishment is not exacted from them for crimes they have never committed. The makers of laws, by the power of oratory, compel the people to bind themselves to the service of the law. The precepts of living, even if they are honorable by nature, flow more easily into the hearts of men if they are illuminated by the splendor of oratory.

Elsewhere Hegius writes: "[A person] speaks well who speaks according to the precepts of rhetoric, that is, who advises and dissuades well, praises and blames well, [and] accuses and defends well." While the goals of oratory are seen to be positive and praiseworthy, Hegius recognizes that the art may be perverted and misused by wicked men. He nevertheless defends rhetoric vehemently against its opponents, arguing with Augustine that "it is not the faculty itself [that is] blameworthy, but the perversity of those who misuse it."

The good rhetorician, therefore, is not merely a person who speaks well but also one who lives a blameless life. The man who

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1 Hegius, appendix A, pp. 496, 563, 605, 607-8.
2 Ibid., p. 562. 3 Ibid. p. 399. 4 Ibid. p. 606.
5 Ibid. See also pp. 399-400, 607-8. 6 Ibid., p. 607.
has achieved advanced skill in rhetoric is considered by Hegius to be an eloquent man, and eloquent men of classical times are held up as ideals after whom aspiring students should pattern themselves.¹

From the descriptions given of the three major arts comprising rational philosophy, one recognizes that Hegius sees grammar as the foundation upon which the other arts should be established. In fact, without grammar, acquisition of knowledge would not be possible. Dialectic is concerned with the meaning of terms, and with detailed argumentation and logical proofs. As such it builds upon grammar and calls for a refinement of the intellectual skills made possible through a knowledge of grammar. Rhetoric is in some senses the same. It, too, builds upon the foundation established by grammar. It seeks to create credibility, which is also a goal of dialectic. Rhetoric, however, goes beyond the intellectual realm to the realm of the will, for it seeks to persuade and praise and blame. The man of eloquence, the rhetorician, seeks to touch the emotions of his listeners. Not content with merely establishing intellectual truths, he seeks to influence the actions of men by touching heart as well as mind. In this sense the rhetorician, using different methods, goes beyond the dialectician in his purposes. The last of the arts to be studied in the area of rational philosophy may thus also be seen to impinge upon the area of moral philosophy. This is because of its relevance to politics as a tool of persuasion and its interest in influencing decisions of the will.

The investigation of rational philosophy concludes the study

¹Ibid., pp. 606-7.
of Hegius' philosophic scheme. The basic elements of his ideas relating to natural, moral, and rational philosophy have been examined and, at this juncture, attention must turn to an assessment of Hegius philosophy in the context of his times.
CHAPTER V

AN EVALUATION OF HEGIUS' PHILOSOPHY IN
TERMS OF PRE-REFORMATION HUMANISM

Attention has already been focused on the desirability for a reassessment of the philosophy of Alexander Hegius. Present advances in understanding of the intellectual forces at work in the latter part of the fifteenth century have made clear the need for such an undertaking. In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to present a systematic synthesis of Hegius' philosophy. It now remains to analyze this philosophy in terms of the criteria formulated in chapter 2. These criteria establish what may be considered the major distinctive features of the Northern Renaissance in the Low Countries. Comparison of Hegius' philosophy with the ideas of the northern humanists will facilitate an evaluation of his contribution to biblical humanism in the pre-Reformation period.

This evaluation is be approached in terms of the four distinguishing features of the Renaissance posited in chapter 2, namely, mysticism, a reform spirit in Christianity, scholasticism, and humanism. The latter two concerns constitute the main areas of emphasis in the discussion. It is in these areas that issue is taken with some of the positions adopted by previous scholars regarding Hegius' philosophic viewpoint.

1See above, p. 61. 2See above, p. 42.

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Hegius' relationship to the movement known as the devotio moderna has been touched upon on several previous occasions. It has already been noted that, in all likelihood, Hegius received his early education in Zwolle. In this town there was a close relationship between the Brethren of the Common Life and the school. Prior to Hegius' arrival in Deventer, during his earlier teaching career, there is evidence of other links with the devotio moderna. Particularly at Emmerich there is a strong indication that he worked in collaboration with these Brethren.

The piety and mystical concerns of many of the members of the Aduard Academy have also been mentioned. With regard to these men, it was pointed out that lay and regular Brethren who followed the devotio moderna were at times guests of Abbot Henry of Rees. Wessel Gansfort in particular was portrayed as one in whom the practical mysticism of the devotio moderna was evident. It has also been made clear that Hegius held Gansfort in high esteem, not only as one of the leading figures in the Aduard Academy, but as a trusted friend. The single extant piece of correspondence between the two men leaves little doubt that Hegius was a most willing recipient of Gansfort's advice and ideas. The Deventer schoolmaster could hardly have failed to be influenced by the pious old sage whom he so admired. Consequently, it must be acknowledged that Hegius' association with the scholars who met at Aduard is as much an indication of his acceptance of the attitudes of the devotio

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1See above, pp. 7-16, 24-25.

2See above, pp. 76-77, 91-92.
When consideration is given to the teaching practices followed in the Deventer school under Hegius, it is also noted that as the schoolmaster in that town he was by no means averse to the ideas of the devotio moderna. His close association with Johan Sinthius is an illustration of this. Sinthius was a member of the Brethren of the Common Life who served under Hegius as one of the most renowned teachers at St. Lebuins.

In spite of objections raised by some modern scholars, there can be little doubt that Hegius was influenced by the spirit of the devotio moderna throughout his life. Numbering among his closest friends some of the Brethren, and others who admired and imitated the Brethren, it must be acknowledged that he showed a strong partiality to their way of life.

Some of the students who attended his school lodged with the Brethren and later joined the ranks of the Brethren and the orders of other reformed monasteries. Johannes Butzbach, who was the prior of the Benedictine monastery at Laach from 1507-26, was one such student. He has left an interesting record of his experiences at

1 See above, pp. 78-84. 2 See below, pp. 335-37, 346-47.

3 See, for example, Regnerus Richardus Post, The Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation and Humanism, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, no. 3 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 577. Post argues that "a devout way of life is not sufficient to make a Brother of the school rector." He is clearly missing the point. No modern scholar is claiming that Hegius was a member of the Brethren of the Common Life. The claim is that Hegius' association with the men of the devotio moderna awakened in him the desire for a similar kind of piety. Notwithstanding the fact that he never joined the Brethren, there is no doubt that his philosophy and pedagogy were informed by the spirit of these men with whom he worked in close association.
the Deventer school. In describing the school he attributes much of its success to the work of Hegius, suggesting that when Hegius died the school began to deteriorate. The decline of which he speaks should be understood from the point of view of a pious Catholic monk rather than a Renaissance humanist. He writes regarding the St. Lebuins at the height of its fame:

The school at Deventer, at that time, was of great assistance to the reformed orders, in providing them with many well-trained men. As long as it maintained its well-merited reputation through skillful instruction and thorough scholarship, everybody strove to secure suitable people from that source. In those days, one saw students better fitted and more deeply versed in the arts pouring into the orders at Deventer and Zwolle, and these were superior to those whom I find now in the first and second classes, although at present they read more advanced authors in the schools.

Butzbach's concern was not classical education, but rather the preparation of dedicated youth who would enter the monasteries. He felt that the Deventer school fulfilled this function up until the time that Hegius died. Following Hegius' death, however, the number of novitiates entering holy orders began to wane.

Whatever may have been the reasons for this decline, Butzbach's observations make one thing clear: under the rectorship of Hegius, the Deventer school encouraged among its students a piety that resulted in many of them becoming monks. Whether or not the classics were studied, a point that remains to be examined, Hegius seems to have had the ability to inspire in his pupils an attitude of reverence and piety. Under his rectorship, the spirit of the

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2Ibid., p. 112. 3Ibid., p. 114. 4See below, pp. 323-26.
devotio moderna was never forgotten. Whatever else he may have become, Hegius remained very much a teacher steeped in the traditions of the movement that had so strongly influenced religious life in the Netherlands throughout the fifteenth century.

Along with a number of prominent men around the turn of the sixteenth century, Butzbach notes the personal attributes and characteristics of Hegius. As well as being an "extraordinarily learned man," he says, Hegius shone "like a bright star . . . among the people for his uprightness."\(^1\) Hegius was not only revered for his learning but also for his practical Christian piety. It is to be remembered that it was also Butzbach who wrote of Hegius that he "died amidst the lamentations of the poor, for he had spent all his substance on alms, so that . . . he left nothing except his books and his clothes."\(^2\)

The editor of Hegius' Carmina and Dialogi, Jacobus Faber, paints an even more vivid picture of his former rector's good qualities:

Though he surpassed others in rank and authority, he showed exceptional affability in condescending to men of low estate. He was extremely energetic, and always preferred a busy life to a quiet and restful one; he was extraordinarily anxious to find the best way of serving studious youth. . . . He took infinite pains to achieve what would be most permanent without calculating what struggles it would cost him . . . , and when he sought

\(^1\)Butzbach, Autobiography, p. 112.

hard work, he did so not under the spell of foolish Midas' hidden gold, but out of a longing to do good. In fairness he would not allow those who were obviously poor to be disappointed by others who claimed the same benefits in return for fees, and was very ready to admit them, regarding heaven as his recompense. . . . Thus while he was alive he did all that one could to live a virtuous and unselfish life; he relied on God, and did not hope in vain. . . . He was most assiduous in encouraging the pursuit of virtue, to the exercise of which he earnestly called his pupils . . . , exhorting them to abandon vice, which he hated.1

Faber's remarks are a typical example of the eulogies written by humanists, in which there is a marked tendency to exaggerate. It cannot be doubted, however, that Hegius was an industrious and devoted teacher, deeply concerned with the physical well-being as well as the spiritual and intellectual development of his students. Faber and Butzbach concur in their assessment, affirming that their former rector did not seek to accumulate wealth but spent his earnings on assisting the poor. The practical piety and spirit of the devotio moderna could hardly be better illustrated in the life of any man, be he a regular monk of the Windesheimers, one of the Brethren of the Common Life, or merely one who patterned his life after the principles established by these Brethren.

Hegius' most famous student, Erasmus, in writing about his schoolmaster, makes a similar evaluation. Hegius, he says in his Ciceronianus, "is an erudite, holy, and eloquent man, but one who

holds fame in contempt."¹ Elsewhere he writes that Hegius was "as upright in his life as he was serious in his teaching."² He adds that he had only one fault, in that "he cared less for fame than he need have done, and took no heed of posterity."³ Once again the reader is impressed with the idea that, for all his learning, Hegius remained a humble and dedicated Christian scholar in the tradition of the devotio moderna.

As significant as these evaluations made by his contemporaries is the impression gained from a perusal of Hegius' writings. Even when his attention is taken up with scholastic or humanistic issues, there is a pervading sense of practical piety lurking just beneath the surface. This is not as easy to document as to perceive in reading the dialogs themselves. A few examples, however, may be helpful in illustrating this point.

Among the speculative sciences Hegius considers metaphysics to be the study of primary importance. The reason for this is that it is in the area of metaphysics that the student deals with man's understanding of the divine.⁴ Hegius' exhibits a firm belief in God as the creator and sustainer of a totally dependent universe. God brought man into existence ex nihilo by His omnipotent and absolute


³Ibid. This trait in Hegius' character distinguished him from many of the later humanists, notably Erasmus.


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power. Man could be reduced to nothing again if God so desired, for "He does not preserve any creature from necessity, but of His free will."¹ This idea of man's complete and utter reliance upon the ordained and beneficent will of the Almighty One is brought to the attention of the student a number of times. In addition, while the dialogs are concerned with imparting philosophic and scientific knowledge, from time to time there is a reminder that belief is in some instances better than knowledge. For example, Hegius observes: "To believe that God is the true creator of all things, the savior of mankind, is more excellent than to know that a triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles."² The acquisition of intellectual and even moral virtues is not seen as an end in itself but as a means to an end. Knowledge about God enables man to experience belief in Him.

Hegius devoted his life to the practical purpose of putting his students in touch with their creator. He did this by introducing them to the information that, in his estimation, was essential to the achievement of this end.³ "Man," he points out, "has been made to discover God and to love Him in this life, and to thank Him and enjoy Him in the future."⁴

Another indication of the spirit of the devotio moderna in the writings of Hegius is his emphasis on the practical above the

¹Ibid., p. 478. See also p. 561. ²Ibid., p. 391.
³Even when the subject matter may appear to the modern reader to have little relevance to the goal of salvation, it was of paramount importance to the late medieval scholar's understanding of divinity, and man in relationship to God. See below, pp. 249-50, where this is discussed in more detail.
⁴Hegius, appendix A, p. 561.
speculative. He notes: "If that man seeks out a good thing who takes pains to learn an art, so much the more does he seek out the good who employs that art than [he who] pursues it by learning."¹

In his own life he sought to live up to this ideal. He felt it was not sufficient to simply acquire the new learning for himself from such men as Agricola. Rather, he followed the teaching vocation and attempted to impart this knowledge to his students.²

Some unconnected points of relatively minor significance in themselves help to illustrate the way that Hegius subtly attempts to remind his reader of the importance of religious concerns and virtuous living. In speaking of the cosmos, Hegius illustrates the difference in the time of the rising of the sun by reference to religious practice. He points out that the Spaniards may eat meat when the Indians may not.³ By so doing he reinforces the authority of the Catholic Church, whose commands are to be believed.⁴ In defining logic, Hegius informs the reader of the etymological connection between the words logic and logos ("word"). In the midst of a thought that is at first glance unconnected with theology, the reader is thus reminded of Christ, the Word of God.⁵ Thoughts of this kind are interspersed throughout the dialogs, often making an

¹Ibid., p. 553.
²Hegius' practical life was in contrast to some of the other famous humanists, notably Erasmus. Erasmus was much happier in the privacy of his study than he was teaching, and even Agricola devoted very little of his admittedly short life to the classroom.
³Hegius, appendix A, p. 568.
⁴Ibid., p. 391. The commands of which he speaks are to be based on the Bible and the creeds.
⁵Ibid., p. 495.
appearance when they are least expected.

The poems written by Hegius and published in 1503 also provide a good illustration of his religious concern. His poetry at times approaches an almost mystical devotion. This spirit of adoration is seen, for example, in the "Panegyric to the Divine Mary, Ever Virgin"; a "Hymn to the Birth of the Most Christian Savior"; and other poems such as those entitled "The Passion of Our Savior" and "The Most Glorious Resurrection of Jesus." Some of the other poetic compositions are lamentations over the temptations and evils of the world, and exhortations to righteous living.

The evidence for Hegius' conservative religious outlook is incontrovertible. The source of his piety cannot be ascribed to any direct links with the Brethren of the Common Life, for he was never a member of this lay order. It is, nevertheless, almost beyond any question that his views would have been affected by his association with these Brethren and the regular monks of the reformed monasteries in the area. He lived in a land renowned for the rise of the devotio moderna and in the midst of a people renowned for their piety. His life and writings reflected this same spirit. Inasmuch

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1Hegius, Carmina, fo. A.vii verso.  
2Ibid., fo. C.v verso.  
3Ibid., fo. E.ii recto.  
4Ibid., fo. E.iv recto.  
as the devotio moderna characterized the revival of learning in the Low Countries, and his life mirrored this piety, Hegius participated in this aspect of the Northern Renaissance.

Hegius was a man of his times, and the peculiar emphasis of fifteenth-century Netherlandish religion left its mark upon him. Along with this traditionalism, however, there was in Hegius the spirit of something new. He was by no means radical, or even mildly critical, in his attitude toward the Church. His writings, nevertheless, contain more than a hint of the reform-mindedness typical of northern humanism. It is Hegius' reform-mindedness that this study now addresses.

The Reform Spirit in Christianity

It should be remembered that the reform spirit did not only prefigure the Protestant Reformation, but that it was part of a developing reform-mindedness within Catholicism itself. Two of the most eminent of the northern scholars of the time, Gansfort and Erasmus, have been considered outstanding examples of men in whom a spirit of reform can be found. Both men remained loyal sons of the Catholic Church. Their wish was to purify Catholicism of the medieval superstitions and practices that detracted from what they believed was the established mission of the Church. In this they did not question the orthodoxy of Catholic theology so much as advocate a return to the biblical sources that had provided the foundation from which Christianity had grown. These sentiments, in part, provided the stimulus that resulted in Catholic renewal. In

1See above, pp. 45-48, especially pp. 47-48.
certain respects they also became the battle cry of Protestantism, with its emphasis on *sola scriptura*. The genesis of these ideas, however, was a reform-mindedness among scholars like Gansfort who were unaware of the impending schism that was about to befall Christendom.\(^1\) Hegius was one of the heirs of Gansfort's ideas.\(^2\)

With respect to the authority of the Church, it would have to be said that Hegius was more conservative and orthodox than was Gansfort. As one would expect in a treatise written for the benefit of students in a religious institution of the late Middle Ages, there is no overt criticism of the Church or its administration anywhere in his *Dialogs*. Even reading between the lines it is well-nigh impossible to find any spirit of dissatisfaction. The distinct impression gained is that Hegius fully endorses the "catholic and orthodox faith,"\(^3\) though he never actually broaches the topic of Church authority. It has been suggested, however, that his silence on this matter may be as significant as his lack of criticism.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) See above, pp. 48-54, where the characteristics of the spirit of reform have been outlined. These may be summarized as: (1) an acceptance of the authority of the Church, though the way in which the authority was exercised might be questioned, (2) an acceptance of Church orthodoxy, but not a mindless endorsement of beliefs and traditions that were not scripturally based, (3) a rejection of medieval superstition, (4) a simple and practical piety exercised in a vital relationship with God, (5) a Stoic moralism, and (6) an unwitting lessening of sacerdotalism. Hegius' reform-mindedness is judged on the basis of these criteria.


\(^3\) Hegius, appendix A, p. 397.

\(^4\) Interview with Daniel Augsburger, Professor of Historical Theology, Andrews University, Berrien Springs, MI., 16 August 1984. Augsburger proposed that Hegius' silence on the subject of Church
When Hegius might have appealed to the authority of the Church, it is noteworthy that he stresses the supremacy of the Scriptures. "Man," he writes, "is compelled to admit nothing but what experiment, or reasoning, or authority compel him to admit, and especially the authority of Holy Scripture." Elsewhere he argues that truths commanded by the Church must be believed, but adds: "Of this sort are those things that are contained in both Testaments, the Old and the New, and in the creeds." In these pronouncements he seems to place the authority of Scripture and the early Ecumenical Councils above that of the Church.

One would not be justified in arguing from this evidence that Hegius was critical of the Roman Catholic hierarchy and what it represented. There is, nonetheless, a hint of the spirit of reform that was so obvious in Gansfort. Hegius is plainly concerned that what is done must be done according to the dictates of Holy Writ.

The second point regarding Hegius' reform-mindedness is closely connected with the first. When he writes about the virgin birth, mortal sin, transubstantiation, or any of a number of doctrinal issues, Hegius displays an orthodoxy that is scrupulously Catholic. There can be no doubt about his acceptance of the fundamental theological positions of the late medieval Church. He even goes so far as to equate doctrinal perfection with holiness, a

authority might be quite meaningful and that it was a point which needed to be considered in evaluating his reform-mindedness.

1 Hegius, appendix A, pp. 523-24. 2 Ibid., p. 391.
3 Ibid., pp. 580-81. 4 Ibid., p. 578. 5 Ibid., p. 536.
6 Ibid., p. 565.
view that, to the modern mind, would seem more appropriate in an
inquisitor than an educator. It is surprising, then, that he never
once, not even in passing, so much as mentions the question of
indulgences. Throughout the dialogs Hegius is dealing with moral
issues such as the nature of virtue and vice, the exercise of the
will in choosing between right and wrong, man in relationship to
God, man's ultimate destiny, and matters of this sort. One of the
things that is characteristic of his style is the way in which he
inserts information that is seemingly unconnected with his argument.
He does this in order to illustrate a point in the argument but also
to remind his reader of some other important matter, usually of
spiritual significance. The Dialogs are admittedly not a treatise
on sin and salvation, but, considering the particular issues about
which he is writing, the total absence of any reference to penance
or indulgences must be significant. Hegius would certainly have
been aware of Gansfort's views on the matter. If he was of the same
opinion as Gansfort, he would have been careful not to encourage
among his students belief in a system that he considered to be
fallacious. It is also unlikely that he would want to raise an
issue as controversial as this in the classroom. His complete
silence on these matters in the dialogs could thus be explained.

Once again, an argument from silence cannot be considered
conclusive. Hegius' position, however, is quite clear. Man is
compelled to accept nothing that cannot be proved by experiment or
reason, or that is not required by authority of Scripture. There
should be no mindless acceptance of untried propositions or ideas
not urged by the Word of God. Carelessness in these respects would,
as Hegius understood things, result in error rather than knowledge or belief.¹

Another aspect of Hegius' reform-mindedness is illustrated by his rejection of certain aspects of medieval superstition. An illustration of this is his attitude toward astrology. In an evaluation of various kinds of philosophy, Hegius writes:

Whether divinatory mathematicians ... and casters of horoscopes (since they are often mistaken and more often predict falsehoods than truths) should be called philosophers, I leave to the judgment of others.²

If there is any doubt about the answer, Hegius clarifies the point in another place when he states bluntly that divinatory mathematicians make men impious.³ In discussing the signs of the zodiac, his observations relate entirely to the calendar and astronomical concerns. There is not the slightest hint of interest in astrology revealed in these remarks.⁴ This is a point of some significance when it has been shown that such men as Erasmus and Melanchthon were not averse to dabbling a little in the astrological arts.⁵ While Hegius retains many medieval conceptions and patterns of thought, there is little evidence in his writings of any superstition. In this it may even be that he outshone some of the later humanists.

The next area to be addressed in establishing Hegius’ reform-mindedness is that of practical piety. This involves more than a reflection of the ideals of the devotio moderna, although

⁴Ibid., pp. 570-71, 581-82; and above, p. 193.
⁵See, for example, Anton Carl Frederik Koch, The Year of Erasmus’ Birth and Other Contributions to the Chronology of His Life, trans. E. Franco (Utrecht: Haentjens Dekker & Gumbert, 1969), pp. 40-41.
these ideals were certainly contributing factors. As has been stated previously, the northern humanists were in many respects the heirs of Wessel Gansfort's ideas. They developed Gansfort's emphasis on the mystical piety of the devotio moderna into a search for Christian wisdom. The spirit of reform was not, to men like Hegius, a question of theological debate. Rather, they sought to simplify theology by applying humanistic rhetoric and logic, thus escaping many of the snares of scholasticism. This clarification of religious thought was for the practical purpose of seeking devout wisdom, or philosophia, and its consequent moral reform. All this was done completely within the confines of Catholic orthodoxy.

Hegius' approach to the incarnation is a good illustration of this point. His observations are simple but profound. After the

\[\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\text{See above, pp. 222-31.}\]


\[\text{"A piety amongst laymen manifests itself, not satisfied with meditating on Christ's suffering and taking part in processions. There is a desire to take a more direct part in religious matters and a craving for sermons, which strengthen man morally; many seek for support in spiritual songs, in the vernacular, to be understood by all, and a clear need is evident for people to read the Bible themselves. This revival did not emanate from the theologians, but from educated laymen, including the humanistic scholars, that is, those who knew the classical languages. Thus Hegius, the rector of the Latin school at Deventer, who learnt from Laurentius Valla to interpret the Gospel as philosophia Christi and in this sense he speaks of an Epicurus christianus [sic]. Valla too had not based the justification of the Christian creed on authority, but on "immanent standards of reason and history" (i.e. the original Christianity and the Fathers). Asceticism must, Hegius says, be the duty not only of the monks." Van Gelder, Two Reformations, pp. 122-23.}\

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question, "Is the name Emmanuel appropriate to Christ, that is, to God incarnate?" the dialog continues:

B. It is appropriate, because although God has always been with man, yet when He was made man He was with man in a special way, through His assumption of human nature.

A. Why is Emmanuel called the great name of the Lord?

B. Because it symbolizes the Word made flesh, which dwelt among us, that is, God made man. Such a name is to be valued greatly by us; for what greater thing could happen to us than that God, having taken flesh, should have dwelt among us.¹

Hegius' treatises on the incarnation leave much to be desired and contain a great deal that is irrelevant to the modern reader. But when he does make statements such as the one cited above about the incarnation, the reader is left with the distinct desire to hear more. There is a simplicity of expression about what Christ has done that stimulates in man the urge to bow down and worship.²

Similarly, in dealing with the difficult question of the person and nature of Christ, Hegius presents a concise, intelligible explanation without seeking to explore or explain all the technicalities and pitfalls. His argument is scholarly and precise, but not

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 588

²Comparison between the works of Thomas Aquinas and Hegius is not strictly speaking fair, for the purposes they had in mind were quite different. Hegius was not attempting to write a summa of theology. Nevertheless, a look at how Aquinas deals with the matter of the incarnation is quite revealing. In answer to some of the same questions, where Hegius makes a brief, devotional statement, Aquinas enters the long round of scholastic proposals, objections and answers to objections. The difference, however, is not so much in the length as in the response one has to what has been said. In reading Aquinas, the mind is stretched and one is challenged by the most profound thoughts; but the challenge is almost entirely intellectual. There are, to be sure, treasures of wisdom much greater in Aquinas, and thoughts that lead one to the praise and worship of God, but they are hidden so deep beneath the intricate scholastic arguments that it is a daunting task to seek them out. For example, see Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, 3.1-26.
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burdensome. The distinct impression gained in comparing both his religious and scientific dialogs with earlier theological and philosophical documents is that Hegius was making things simpler for the sake of his students.

Hegius may, therefore, be seen as one of those who sought after devout wisdom or philosophia (sometimes called sapientia). Scholarship was in no way to be neglected, but it should be made as uncomplicated as possible. It is in this light that the full intent of these words from the dialogs may be understood: "What use to a man is knowledge of the movement of the stars if he is not sensible of what is proper for him and what is not?"

The idea of a philosophia Christi is also connected with the next concern in the evaluation of Hegius' reform-mindedness. This is the area of ethics and morality. In discussing the role of ethics in philosophy, Hegius observes:

Not only is πράσινον a part of philosophy, but the most powerful part of it. For philosophy has three parts: ethics, physics, and logic; that is, moral, natural, and rational. πράσινον is the science of right living; physics is the science of speculating on the natures of things; [and] logic is the science

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1Cf. Hegius, appendix A, pp. 564-66, and Aquinas Summa 3.2. 1-8. Hegius deals with this difficult subject in a less eloquent and scholarly manner, but one feels less confused after two pages of the Dialogs than after eight articles of the Summa. Hegius' "devout wisdom" would have been intelligible to his pupils. Aquinas is only for the scholar well initiated in the intricacies of theology and scholasticism.

2The manner in which Hegius attempted this simplification of the complex has already been commented upon in chapter 4 where a synthesis of his philosophy was presented. See above, pp. 172-74. The ideal toward which the men of the Northern Renaissance strove was also outlined above in dealing with developments in scholasticism. Hegius' position is clarified further when his scholasticism and humanism are evaluated below on pp. 266-71, 285-86.

3Hegius, appendix A, p. 456.
of right disputation, right saying, or right speaking. But knowing how to live rightly is better than knowing the natures of things, or how to dispute or say or speak rightly. Because of this ethics is preferred to the other parts of philosophy.¹

Hegius emphasizes the importance of knowing what is right, after which he goes on to argue the necessity of doing it. He stresses the idea that true happiness can only be achieved by "operation according to virtue,"² after which he says:

No one who is of a sound mind learns moral science so that he may speculate on right and wrong things, which [rather] are to be learned by us so that we may perform the right and avoid the wrong.³

As would be expected from someone influenced by the devotionemodernae, Hegius exhibits a strong Stoic moralism in his writings.⁴ He acknowledges that what is right may not bring present pleasure, but he points out that the rational man will put off present pleasure in favor of future blessedness.⁵ Right living is an exercise of the will in choosing and practicing that which informed reason dictates as honorable, no matter what the consequences. The rules for right living "are the precepts of the Decalogue and the canons of the Holy Fathers."⁶ The long-established standards of moral practice within Christendom are absolute and may not be tampered with. Hegius is seen here to be a champion of piety and moral reform.

The Stoic element revealed in the Dialogs is surprisingly

³Ibid., p. 552. ⁴See above, pp. 199-204.
⁵Hegius, appendix A, p. 483.
⁶Ibid., p. 623. Incidentally, this is a reference to the early Church Fathers and not the papacy. The word used is patrum, not paparum.
juxtaposed with an interest in Christian Epicureanism. Hegius admits his attraction to Epicurean ideas in a letter to Agricola. "I have," he says, "been reading Valta's book On the True Good, according to which Vegius defends the side of pleasure, Cato that of honor. Vegius has made me an Epicurean." It must be acknowledged that the major source of the ethical system proposed by Hegius is Aristotle, interpreted with a bias toward Stoic moralism. In the dialog on the "Moral Arts," there are, however, some hints of an Epicurean perspective. These intimations should perhaps not be interpreted as a genuine acceptance of Epicureanism. They might better be seen as an indication of the high esteem in which Hegius held his humanist colleagues and predecessors who had expressed a preference for Epicurean ideals. Inasmuch as Hegius was an Epicurean, he was a disciple of Valla and Agricola, and prefigured Erasmus. This aspect of Hegius' ethical scheme is important because it identifies him with humanists whose reform-mindedness in

1Hegius to Rudolf Agricola, from Deventer, dated 17 December [1484], in appendix B, p. 652.


"Pleasure is to be sought deliberately. But not all pleasures are equally desirable. The most desirable are intellectual, not sensual. . . . 'There are no people more Epicurean than godly Christians.' . . . This seemingly audacious paradox proves to be defensible if, but only if, we know what 'true' pleasure is. It is virtue, righteousness. . . . Since the true Christian is the man who lives most righteously, therefore he is the one who lives most pleasurably. And since the Epicurean standard of goodness is pleasure, therefore the Christian is the 'true' Epicurean." Erasmus, Colloquies, p. 535.
the area of practical moralism included a definite Epicurean element. The lines of distinction between the two ethical systems are difficult to draw, but the two emphases are to be found in the arguments Hegius presents.\footnote{For further discussion, see above, pp. 200, 206. Note also the evaluation made by other scholars, for example, Paul Mestwerdt, Die Anfänge des Erasmus Humanismus und "Devotio Moderna" (Leipzig: Rudolf Haupt, 1917), p. 157. He writes concerning Hegius: "Immerhin ist es wichtig festzustellen, dass sich der Gedanke des christlichen Epikuräismus schon bei diesem Humanisten, der theologisch ein Scholastiker, seiner persönlichen Frömmigkeit nach ein christlicher Stoiker war, findet."} His Aristotelianism may be interpreted as having an Epicurean bias when he maintains that happiness is operation according to virtue. On the other hand, he is Stoical when he argues that following the dictates of right reason irrespective of the consequences may not bring pleasure. In both instances, however, he remains, with the other humanists, a staunch moralist.

This facet of Hegius' thought once again cannot be considered an evidence of reform in any radical sense. His emphasis was upon practical morality as opposed to what he saw as meaningless debate on ethical issues. As subtle as their impact might have been, his perspectives nevertheless reflected the reform-mindedness of the Renaissance in the Low Countries.\footnote{Further ramifications of Hegius' ethical position are discussed below when the intellectual aspects of his humanism are evaluated. See below, pp. 298-304.}

The sixth and final area of concern with regard to the
spirit of reform is the lessening of dependence upon the sacerdotal structures of the Church. This was an unintentional consequence of the reform-mindedness of the precursors of the Reformation. Similarly it can be said that Hegius' influence lessened dependence upon the priestly system of salvation within Catholicism inasmuch as he participated in the spirit of reform that has been investigated.

In summary, it must be acknowledged that Hegius was less critical of the Church than, for example, Gansfort. Any criticisms that Hegius might have had are not expressed in his extant writings. One can only make some tenuous assumptions about questions such as the authority of the Church and indulgences. These assumptions are made on the basis of certain significant silences in his writings. Although there is an absence of overt criticism, there do appear to be one or two hints that there were issues in which Hegius was not in complete agreement with medieval Church practice and saw a need for change.

Hegius can only described as a precursor of the Reformation in the sense that he stressed a less complex theology, simple, practical piety, and a strict moralism. In addition, he emphasized the biblically established authority of the Church and rejected certain medieval superstitions. In an age of crisis for Catholicism, it is perhaps his very orthodoxy that makes Hegius one in whom a spirit of reform is detected. It is, however, beyond question that in certain significant respects Hegius was a participant in the reforming ideal that made the Renaissance of the Low Countries a distinctive movement. Like Gansfort and Erasmus he helped to prepare the foundation upon which both Catholic and Protestant reform were established.
Scholasticism

In this investigation of Hegius' scholasticism, the question is not so much whether he was, in fact, a scholastic. Scholarly opinion has been quite unanimous in declaring that Hegius' undoubted humanism was still very much influenced by his medievalism. No one would take issue with this. Rather, it is the nature of his scholasticism that is open to question. To the present, historians have been just as single-minded in their evaluation of this issue. Without exception, they have proclaimed him to be a staunch realist of the Thomistic school, and thus a follower of the via antiqua. In this section, the views of a small number of scholars who have commented on Hegius' writings are briefly considered and then attention is turned to an analysis of his scholasticism.

Lewis Spitz has made the following evaluation of Hegius and his contribution to education as headmaster in Deventer:

Under Hegius, Deventer was dedicated to Thomistic realism, and Hegius, who learned Greek and made partial concessions to humanist learning, was himself concerned with problems of post and ante rem. Metaphysics was still the "praestantissima omnium scientiarum," high above grammar and rhetoric, alone deserving the name of wisdom. In his work directed against skepticism, the De scientia et de eo quod scitur, he argued that Aristotle was basic to a knowledge of the res naturales and to metaphysics as well and expressly polemicized against Plato and the Platonists.

Spitz categorizes Hegius as a realist because he is concerned with the problem of universals, because he is strongly Aristotelian, and

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1 Some scholars have suggested that Hegius can hardly be called a humanist because his scholasticism so outweighed all other considerations. This issue is discussed when an evaluation is made of his humanism. See below, pp. 279-89, 311-14.

because he purportedly considers metaphysics to be the first of the sciences.

Johannes Lindeboom also focuses attention on Hegius' Aristotelianism as a measure of his indebtedness to the via antiqua. He argues that the Dialogs are hardly more than a collection of scholastic treatises based on a dry realism. It is he who writes that Hegius is sometimes seen "on a small humanistic mound, certainly superior to others, but quite unable to see over the scholastic wall."¹

Paul Mestwerdt, like Spitz and Lindeboom, maintains that Hegius' religious thought patterns are close to those of the devotio moderna, and that his philosophy is more in agreement with the "ancient" than the "modern way." However, he does give a much more positive evaluation of Hegius than does Lindeboom. He also asserts that in the controversy over faith and reason which occupied the attention of the schoolmen, Hegius

was inclined, in the manner of late scholasticism, approaching the tendency of the devotio moderna, to set narrow limits on the rational abilities of the mind. At time he has strong reservations regarding all-inclusive logical proofs.²

The inference is that this tendency, because it was established on the thought patterns of the devotio moderna with its inclination toward realism,³ can hardly be considered humanistic. Even more

¹Johannes Lindeboom, Humanisme, pp. 77-78. Except for the fact that Lindeboom refers to Hegius as a dry realist, his comments relate more to Hegius' humanism than to his scholasticism. For this reason these comments are considered in more detail in the next section. See below, pp. 286-87, 290-91.

²Mestwerdt, Anfänge des Humanismus, pp. 150-51.

³Maarten van Rhijn, Studien over Wessel Gansfort en Zijn Tijd (Utrecht: Kemink & Zoon, 1933), p. 98.
certain, it cannot be an indication that Hegius was in any way under the influence of nominalism.¹

Without implying that Hegius was a nominalist, P. N. M. Bot is the only author who appears to have seen in Hegius anything of the via moderna. He comments in a footnote: "Vives, in contrast to Hegius, opposed nominalistic terminism..."² This is slender support from which to gain comfort if one wishes to challenge the evaluations made by previous scholars.³ It does seem, however, that certain questions must be raised, for there appears to have been a tendency to judge the issue of Hegius' scholasticism on the basis of

¹Mestwerdt comments further that there can be no doubt of where Hegius stood in the weqestreit. He argues that the schoolmaster assumed a real knowledge of the supernatural and thereby placed himself squarely in the camp of the realists. Mestwerdt, Anfänge des Humanismus, p. 104. Van Rhijn, Studiën over Wessel Gansfort, p. 98, concurs fully.


³See, for example, Albert Hyma, The Youth of Erasmus, 2nd ed. (New York: Russell & Russell, 1968), pp. 110-11. Hyma, who seems to have studied the life of Hegius more carefully than many others, quotes almost verbatim from Lindeboom in making his evaluation of the Deventer schoolmaster. Cf. Lindeboom, Humanisme pp. 77-78. Reference could be made to a great many other scholars, but this would merely be a reduplication. Most have relied on the work of those who have gone before them. From scholars who have looked more carefully at Hegius' writings, there is very little comment on the issues involved in the weqestreit. Josef Wiese, Der Pädagoge Alexander Hegius und seine Schüler (Berlin: Actien-Gesellschaft für Verlag und Druckerei, 1892), gives no analysis of Hegius philosophical point of view with regard to the struggle between the realists and the nominalists. Jozef Ijsewijn, in his editorial introduction to "Alexander Hegius (†1498): 'Invectiva in Modos Significandi',' Forum for Modern Language Studies 7 (4 October 1971):299-306, is also silent on the issue. The same author, in "The Coming of Humanism to the Low Countries." in Oberman and Brady, Itinerarium Italicum, p. 276, goes no further than to say that one should not be surprised to find the coexistence of scholasticism with humanism in the Renaissance men north of the Alps. This comment is not even made with specific reference to Hegius.
comments made by others rather than an in-depth study of his works. Particularly in the light of revisions in the understanding of nominalism outlined by William Courtenay, and the new perspectives he proposes, it seems that the time has come for the question of Hegius' position in the wegestreit to be considered afresh.

For a number of reasons it would be wrong to suggest that Hegius was an uncompromising and full-blown nominalist. First, there is evidence from those who sat at his feet that this was not the case. Johannes Caesarius (ca. 1468-ca. 1550) proposes that Hegius "should be reckoned among the philosophers." He adds to this comment that his interest in philosophy led Hegius to apply himself studiously to the "writings of the Paris philosophers." The Parisians were renowned for their dedication to the via antiqua.

Secondly, if the proposal is made that Hegius held certain nominalist views, this does not mean that it is necessary to deny his indebtedness to realism. As unlikely as it may at first seem, this strange blend of the viae was not unknown. While it might be surprising to find in one person generous proportions of both the


2Johannes Caesarius Dialectica Johan Caesarii in X tractatus digesta (Köln: Godelfrido Hittorpio, 1529), tract IX.

3It should be remembered, however, that at this time there was a considerable amount of controversy over the wegestreit in Paris. Nominalism was prohibited there between 1473 and 1481. So, while it would appear that Caesarius is suggesting that Hegius was a follower of the via antiqua, this is not the only way in which his statement can be interpreted. He may merely be noting that Hegius exhibited a keen interest in the writings of those involved in the controversy that was causing such an upheaval in Paris.
via antiqua and via moderna, such an occurrence would certainly not be unique. In fact, Gansfort, one of those whom Hegius most admired and imitated, held opinions drawn from both schools of thought. It would be natural for Hegius to share some of the same ideas. To be sure, Hegius reveals more than a passing interest in scholastic questions relating to the res naturalis and ens mobile.

This leads on to a third point. If Hegius was in some senses a nominalist, then it must be established to which branch of nominalism he belonged. Bearing in mind Courtenay's re-evaluation of nominalism, it is no longer necessary to see all nominalists as belonging to one homogeneous school of thought. Those whose beliefs accord most closely with the traditional definition of nominalism have been described by Courtenay as belonging to the extreme logico-critical group. A person holding moderate nominalist views would not be classified as a member of this radical group. Because of these changed perceptions of the via moderna, nominalism must now be understood in terms quite different from what would have been the case in the first half of this century. It is a fact, however, that the most recent scholarly evaluations that have taken serious account of Hegius' writings all date from the early part of the twentieth century. The perceptions current at the time would not have allowed for an interpretation in which it was posited that Hegius was a "moderate" nominalist in what was a creative movement.

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1See above, pp. 54-55, 81; and Maarten van Rhijn, Wessel Gansfort (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1917), pp. 236-37.

2See Hegius, appendix A, pp. 450, 502-4; and above, p. 165.

Up to this point it has been established that Hegius has consistently been classified by scholars as a realist. Attention is now given to the manner in which Lindeboom and Mestwerdt conducted their research and, in particular, to the thoroughness with which they set about their task. As one reads these two authors after having become familiar with Hegius' Dialogs, one is left with the uncomfortable impression that even they have not made a complete study of his writings. By his own admission, Lindeboom found them

1The most detailed evaluation of Hegius scholasticism made to date is without a doubt the work of Mestwerdt. It is to be lamented that his promising young life ended tragically when he fell victim to the carnage of the First World War. He did not even see his masterful work in print. It is indeed unfortunate that it will never be possible to read the mature thoughts of this historian. Lindeboom has also done some valuable in-depth primary research. Others like Hyma, Spitz, Bot, and van Rhijn have made worthy contributions, but their work is not of sufficient depth to be considered authoritative in its own right. Their reliance on earlier historians is too great.

2For example, Lindeboom, Humanisme, p. 78, accuses Hegius of teaching spontaneous generation. He refers to Hegius' remark in the dialogs, appendix A, pp. 431-32. A closer study of the context in which these remarks are made and a comparison with Hegius' comments on p. 413, and pp. 419-20, make it clear that spontaneous generation as it is normally understood is not the issue. Hegius is merely saying that if a plant does not develop from a seed, it is said to have spontaneous generation, or, in modern terminology, to be propagated asexually. Lindeboom, Humanisme, p. 80, says that "nowhere do we find a single reference to any Scripture." Lindeboom's point is that Hegius relies more heavily on Aristotle than on the Bible, and this is quite true. My point is that he has not read Hegius very thoroughly. Within a few lines of the reference that he makes to Hegius' understanding of the etymology of the word "soul," there is a reference to Ezek 18:4. See Hegius, appendix A, pp. 403-4. This is by no means the only reference to Scripture. Lindeboom's footnote references to Hegius' writings also give the impression that he has been selective in his reading of the Dialogi. The same kind of criticism must be leveled against Mestwerdt. For example, Mestwerdt states that Hegius rejects Occam. He uses as the basis for his argument the idea that Hegius believes in a real knowledge of the supernatural, and that an understanding of God can be achieved through reason and not only by belief. Mestwerdt, Anfänge des Humanismus, p. 104. In support of this argument he cites Hegius, appendix A, p. 400, where it is argued that "metaphysics is the most
dry and uninteresting, and it has to be admitted that it is by no means an easy task to pore over the small and sometimes unclear print of the 1503 edition. Moreover, neither of these scholars was writing a specialized work on Hegius. In this light their diligent labor must be considered most laudable. Hegius was one among many who fell within the scope of their research. It must consequently be acknowledged that there has not up to this time been a thorough analysis of Hegius' scholasticism. This is true even if no account is taken of the changing views of modern scholarship regarding the wegestreit in the late Middle Ages.

When he makes the point that Hegius is more dependent upon Aristotle than upon the Scriptures, Lindeboom argues that, at least in this sense, Hegius belongs completely to the medieval period.\(^1\)

The ties between Greek philosophy and the Christian theology of the Middle Ages have often been explored. Etienne Gilson is one who has seen in this amalgamation of theology and philosophy the source of much that is positive in the intellectual development that took place during the Middle Ages.\(^2\) Hegius found himself living at the end of this important era in the history of western thought. The transition from the medieval intellectual approach to that of the early modern period was a gradual one. Even the Occamists who had discarded the Thomistic concept that argument built upon pure excellent of all the sciences." In fact, quite contrary to what Mestwerdt proposes, Hegius emphasizes the point that articles of faith cannot be proved. See appendix A, p. 529.

\(^{1}\)Lindeboom, Humanismus p. 80.

reason could be theologically acceptable still found themselves in a world steeped in the long-held traditions of high scholasticism.

It cannot be expected that Hegius would have escaped these influences. It would not have been a simple matter to turn away from the rich heritage of scholasticism, and, indeed, it was not a task that he accomplished. A negative judgment of Hegius on these grounds seems somewhat premature considering the time in which he lived. A rejection of scholasticism would have been tantamount to a rejection of theology. It was, after all, from a scholastic viewpoint that practically all theological investigation was conducted in the pre-Reformation period. The northern humanists, with the strong interest they had in things theological, were all to a greater or lesser degree influenced by scholasticism.\(^1\) It happens that Hegius, who must be considered among the earlier humanists, retained much in his intellectual approach that was scholastic.

A brief perusal of the Dialogs is sufficient to convince the reader that Hegius is medieval in his thinking. This comes as no surprise, but it raises a number of questions about the particular scholastic opinions that he espoused. These questions must be answered bearing in mind the criteria developed by which it was proposed that Hegius' contribution to the Northern Renaissance should be judged.\(^2\) If it can be shown that Hegius accepted some of the

\(^1\)See above, p. 54, n. 1.

\(^2\)See the analysis of late medieval scholasticism made above, pp. 54-60. The criteria that were established relate most specifically to the moderate logico-critical school of nominalism. They may be summarized as follows: (1) Metaphysics was no longer established upon logic and was completely separate from it, (2) logic was to be studied as a science in its own right and applied in the analysis and use of language, (3) there was a desire to transcend
presuppositions of the moderni, this will be of quite some significance. This is particularly true because of the impact that such a discovery makes on an understanding of what Hegius accomplished in the school at St. Lebuins. It was, after all, through the moderate logico-critical school of nominalism that scholasticism made its greatest impact on the Northern Renaissance. This is not to suggest that the via moderna and humanism were parallel movements, but inasmuch as the scholastics did influence the humanists, it was through the moderni.¹

The first question that must be addressed is to what extent Hegius distinguished metaphysics from logic. In other words, did Hegius study metaphysics within the framework of a formalized logic of language; or did he, along with Occam and the nominalists, reject the confusion of metaphysics with logic?² It has been argued that Hegius was a follower of the via antiqua because he looked upon metaphysics as "the most excellent of all the sciences."³ This argument is immediately seen to be on shaky ground when it is compared with similar statements in the superlative made with reference to the scholastic controversies in pursuit of a synthesis of scientia and sapientia, (4) it was accepted that there was a division between philosophy and theology, and (5) universals were considered to be names rather than actual entities.

¹Oberman, Masters of Reformation, pp. 36-40.


³See above, pp. 243-44, and p. 248, n. 2; Mestwerdt, Anfänge des Humanismus, pp. 103-4; and Hegius, appendix A, p. 400.
to moral and rational philosophy. "Ethics," writes Hegius, "is the most powerful part of it [philosophy]," and "is preferred to the other parts."¹ He says of grammar that it ought to be given "credit for anything we ever learn from instructors or from books."² It may initially appear that these are merely contradictory statements issuing from a confused and disordered mind. Further study of the dialogs, however, soon reveals that his comments are not merely ill-considered hyperbole. Of more importance, it can be established beyond any shadow of doubt that Hegius does not elevate metaphysics above the other areas of intellectual pursuit or refer to it in any way as the only science deserving of the name of wisdom.

The definitions of metaphysics, ethics, and grammar are in each case accompanied by a rationalization of the importance attributed to the respective aspect of philosophy under discussion. This is presented in such a way that there is no denigration of the other branches of philosophy. Metaphysics is not considered most important because it subsumes logic. If this were the case, then Hegius would indeed have to be classified along with the medieval metalogicians. Rather, the importance of metaphysics is that "it treats of the most excellent subject, the glorious God . . . , to whom be praise . . . for endless ages."³ If Hegius is proposing some sort of hierarchy, it must be admitted that the subject he considers most important is ethics. This is perhaps to be expected if it is remembered that he was one of the earliest of the northern humanists, most of whom retained a deep concern for personal piety. Hegius

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 550. ²Ibid., p. 599.
³Ibid., p. 400. Cf. Aristotle Metaphysics 1.2.983a.5-11.
makes it clear that in his opinion, "knowing how to live rightly is better than knowing the natures of things [natural philosophy], or how to dispute or ... speak rightly [rational philosophy]."  

A point particularly germane to this discussion is that, if metaphysics is being elevated, its elevation is only relative to the field of natural philosophy. No inference is made suggesting that logic is subsumed by metaphysics. Hegius does say that metaphysics "claims for itself the name of wisdom, and stands in relation to the other speculative sciences as the knowledge of an architect to the knowledge of his assistants."  

The limitations of this statement should be carefully examined, however. Those who claim that he was elevating metaphysics above all other avenues of intellectual endeavor have failed to note that Hegius does not consider moral and rational philosophy to be among the speculative sciences. Both of these he declares to be operative sciences, a distinction that

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1Ibid., p. 550. Metaphysics and rational philosophy remain indispensable. Without them men could not learn about God or use reason in attempting to understand Him. The propositions about the various branches of philosophy are thus seen to be complementary rather than contradictory, even allowing for any added importance attached to ethics. Ibid., pp. 598-99. Cf. above, pp. 164, 194-96.


3Speaking of moral philosophy and particularly of politics, Hegius observes that the goal of this science, since it is the summum bonum, "embraces the goals of all the other sciences" and "is rightly to be called architectonic, that is, chief and ruler of all sciences." Ibid., p. 562. This immediately raises a question about what is meant by the "speculative sciences," for they cannot be considered architectonic in relationship to moral science.

4He says that logic is "concerned with the operations of our mind." Ibid., p. 466. Moral science, he proposes "is operative, because it is not speculation." Ibid., p. 552. Furthermore, in writing about the speculative sciences he speaks only of mathematics, physics, and metaphysics. He never includes the areas of moral and rational philosophy. Ibid., pp. 553-54, 558.
completely alters the importance that can be attached to his statement about metaphysics. The theory that Hegius saw metaphysics as the science above all sciences can no longer be advanced as an argument to illustrate his supposed strict adherence to the via antiqua.

Further investigation of the relationship between the various branches of philosophy makes it even clearer that Hegius did not advance the idea that metaphysics was studied within the framework of a formalized logic of language. It is quite apparent that in discussing metaphysics his indebtedness to Aristotle is greater than his indebtedness to the men of the via antiqua. He writes:

Metaphysics deals with entity . . . , and teaches, concerning every entity, what it is, whether substance or accident, and from what each individual entity differs, and to what it is identical.¹

In much the same way, his discussion of rational philosophy sounds more classical than medieval and does not allow much ground for the theory that there is a scholastic confusion of metaphysics with logic. Hegius explains:

There are three parts of logic: grammar, which makes speech complete and free from barbarity and solecism; dialectic, which makes it true, since it differentiates truth from falsehood; [and] rhetoric, which makes it polished and decorative.²

If anything, it would have to be admitted that these definitions reflect neither the views of the via antiqua nor the via moderna, but that they are couched in the simpler language of the classics.


²Hegius, appendix A, p. 496. See also dialogs 13 and 14. Dialog 14 is almost wholly dependent on classical sources as may be seen from the footnote references.
The manner in which Hegius views the relationship between metaphysics and logic is clearly settled by a simple appeal to his writings. Logic is said to be concerned with thoughts rather than universal entities, and grammar "deals with the names of things [and] not the things themselves, except inasmuch as they are represented by names." In addition, it can no longer be argued that Hegius saw metaphysics as constituting the pinnacle of all philosophic knowledge. To the contrary, there is a decidedly nominalist bent to the views that he espoused. On the basis of the evidence in his dialogs, one must, therefore, conclude that Hegius was not inclined in the manner of the via antiqua to combine metaphysics with logic into a formal science of reality.

It is not surprising then to find Hegius attacking the works of the modistae so vehemently. From a philological viewpoint he found these medieval grammars barbaric and unacceptable in teaching classical Latin. He was not prepared to acknowledge that the modes of signification should in any way control the structure of Latin grammar. From a philosophic viewpoint he was equally adamant that rational philosophy and metaphysics should not be combined into a metalogical theory.

There appears to be little question that, at least in those

1Hegius, appendix A, pp. 464-66, especially p. 466. See also above, pp. 210-11.

2Hegius, appendix A, p. 403.

3Ibid., pp. 633-41. These pages constitute Hegius' "Invective Against the Modes of Signification."

4The attitude that Hegius held toward the modistae is more thoroughly examined below, pp. 292-94.
matters discussed up to this point, Hegius can no longer be classified as a strict adherent of the via antiqua. In accepting the nominalist interpretation in this instance, Hegius reveals a clear preference for the via moderna. More than this, he manifests an affinity with William of Occam, the primary significance of whose nominalism, according to Ernest A. Moody, "is its rejection of the confusion of logic with metaphysics."\(^1\)

This raises the second criterion by which the issue of Hegius' scholasticism must be judged. Adherents of the moderate logico-critical school of nominalism studied logic as a science in its own right and applied this science in the analysis and use of language. The resurgence of logic as a separate field of study was a predictable consequence of the differentiation that had once again developed between logic and metaphysics. The natural extension of much of the foregoing discussion is, therefore, that Hegius also began to use logic as a tool in the study of language. This should not be mistaken for a continued attempt to find within language a universal metaphysical structure. Rather, it was a search for clarity and precision in the use of language that would leave no question about which concept was represented by each expression.

It would be a distortion of the evidence to suggest that Hegius was unconcerned with scholastic issues or untouched by the influence of the via antiqua. Hegius certainly saw the usefulness of the new logic in establishing precision of meaning in language. At the same time, like Wessel Gansfort, he argued in favor of a thorough knowledge of dialectical debate. Gansfort had made the

\(^1\)Moody, Medieval Logic, p. 6.
observation that John of Wesel (ca. 1400-1481) would not so easily have fallen foul of the inquisitors had he been well versed in logic.¹ In a similar vein, Hegius maintains that dialectic is a liberal art and worthy of study because

... from dialectical points are brought forward the arguments with which truth is defended and falsehood defeated. Likewise, it is a holy and a liberal thing to turn one who is erring from his error ... which is done by the resources and the service of dialectic.²

He also makes this comment:

[He] who is in the possession of that knowledge [of making evil and captious arguments] cannot be deceived and seduced from truth into error, which easily happens to those who do not have that knowledge.³

Even in these statements, however, there is no question of an amalgamation of metaphysics and logic. Hegius is concerned with an accurate use of language. It is true that the arguments presented in a number of the dialogs are largely established upon syllogistic proofs⁴. Nevertheless, his use of syllogism hardly goes beyond what Aristotle has expounded in the Prior Analytics. He makes reference to medieval mnemonic devices such as barbara celarent⁵ and assumes that his readers have some knowledge of the structure of syllogisms.

¹Oberman makes the following observation: "What concerned Wessel here was . . . a precision of language that left no doubt as to which term stood for what concept. As a general principle Wessel called for an end to the propaganda campaign against logic." Oberman, Masters of Reformation, p. 39. See also Wessel Gansfort to Lodolph van Veen, from Zwolle, dated 6 April [1479], in Edward Waite Miller, Wessel Gansfort: Life and Writings, 2 vols., documents trans. Jared Waterbury Scudder (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1917), 1:236-38; and van Rhijn, Studiën over Wessel Gansfort, p. 97.

²Hegius, appendix A, p. 601. ³Ibid., p. 395.

⁴See, for example, Hegius, appendix A, pp. 452-80.

⁵Ibid., p. 603.
But when he actually broaches the topic of syllogisms with a view to making some sort of explanation, the discussion is based upon elementary Aristotelian principles, informed to a degree by the humanism of men like Lorenzo Valla and Rudolf Agricola.  

The understanding that Hegius had of the role of dialectic has already been outlined. One of the major concerns of the dialectician is to establish "truthfulness of propositions." In order to ensure that this is possible, it is also the work of the dialectician to clarify the meanings of particular terms that go to make up propositions. For example, "because the philosophers of this age call all nouns terms," Hegius is extremely careful to make sure that it is clear exactly what each noun is standing for. He argues:

A grammarian deals with the names of things [and] not the things themselves, except inasmuch as they are represented by names. Therefore a grammarian does not deal with the substance of the soul, nor its powers, nor its operations, nor its organs. But [he] makes propositions about the name of the soul, from where it may be derived, and what meaning it may have.

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1Hegius appears to be aware of the developments that made a study of the theory of topics (strategies and principles of argumentation) central to an understanding of late medieval dialectic. For example, there is some evidence in his writings that he espoused views that lead to a decline in the status of the syllogism. See Eleonore Stump, "Topics: Their Development and Absorption into Consequences," in Cambridge Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 287-90. Cf. above, pp. 175-76; and Hegius, appendix A, pp. 466, 602-5, 608-9, 621, 625. Generally speaking, however, his use of the demonstrative syllogism in preference to topical arguments or enthymemes is indicative of his adherence to the views of Petrus Hispanus in this matter. Stump, "Topics," p. 282. While giving lip-service to some of the arguments concerning topics put forward by Occam and later developed by Agricola and Valla, Hegius had not fully come to terms with the new dialectic in which the topics constitute the main area of concern. Stump, "Topics," pp. 294-97, 298-99; and Jardine, "Humanism and Logic," p. 798-801.

2See above, pp. 215-17. 3Hegius, appendix A, p. 602.

4Ibid., p. 605. 5Ibid., p. 503. 6Ibid., p. 403.
In this statement Hegius not only makes it clear how the grammarian may use the term "soul," but he also underlines the fact that he sees no connection between metaphysics and dialectic. When at a later stage he gives a definition of the soul, Hegius is careful to eradicate any vagueness that might be caused by the ambiguous use of words. He is even willing to rephrase Aristotle's definition in order to remove possible misunderstandings.¹

What is inferred about the nature of terms in the quotation given above is made abundantly clear elsewhere. Logic is concerned with operations of the mind, not with some kind of universal metaphysical reality. Hegius explains:

The physicist thinks about things and pronounces something about them, and on this account the thoughts of the physicist are thoughts of things. The dialectician, however, thinks about thoughts and pronounces about them, . . . and on this account the thoughts of the dialectician are thoughts of thoughts. Thoughts about things are primary thoughts, or primary concepts of our mind; thoughts about thoughts, however, are secondary thoughts, or secondary concepts of our mind. Thoughts of things are called primary intentions, while thoughts of thoughts [are] secondary intentions. For this reason dialectic is said to be concerned with secondary intentions, the primary being adjoined, for the dialectician thinks about thoughts and concepts of things by means of thoughts of thoughts.²

The ideas presented by Hegius in this statement are of the utmost significance in this evaluation of his scholasticism, for in them are found a clear exposition of the views of William of Occam.³

¹Ibid., p. 415. Cf. pp. 409, 441. Examples of this type could be multiplied. A few references are given so that some idea can be gained of the manner in which Hegius attempts to achieve semantic clarity. See pp. 402, 423, 480, 590.

²Ibid., pp. 464-65.

³William of Ockham, Ockham: Philosophical Writings, ed. and trans. Pilotheus Boehner (Edinburgh: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1957). A few quotations suffice to illustrate the point:

"Logic is distinguished from the real sciences in the following
Paul Mestwerdt, while he agrees that Hegius makes a distinction between grammar and metaphysics, goes on to argue that in the "Invective Against the Modes of Signification," Hegius opposes the Occamists.¹ He proposes further that before Hegius came to Deventer Occamist logic was being taught, but that after the arrival of the new headmaster the school retreated into the realist logic of the via antiqua.² This could hardly be further from the truth. From a comparison between the writings of Occam and Hegius, one can safely ascertain that Hegius was not only aware of the views held by Occam, but that he was also a disciple of Occamist logic. As such, he followed the via moderna. Contrary to what Mestwerdt has argued, it seems that his adherence to logico-critical nominalism is one of the striking features of Hegius' philosophy that helps to explain the success of the Deventer school under his rectorship. The old logic may have continued to influence the school, but the direction

manner. The real sciences are about mental contents, since they are about contents which stand for things; for even though they are mental contents, they still stand for things. Logic, on the other hand, is about mental contents that stand for mental contents... . . . We should realise, however, that the reason why we deny logic to be a real science is not that it is not a thing. . . . We deny it to be a real science because it is not about mental contents that stand for real things." Occam, Prologue to the Expositio super viii libros Physicorum, cited in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. 12-13.

"Names of second intention are those nouns which are used precisely to signify mental concepts, which are natural signs, and also other conventional signs, or what goes with such signs. All the following are of this kind: 'genus', 'species', 'universal', 'predicable' and the like. For such names signify only mental contents... . . ." Occam, Summa totius logicae, l.c.xi, cited in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. 57-58.

¹Mestwerdt, Anfänge des Humanismus, p. 106.

²Ibid., p. 107.
in which Hegius led his pupils was unquestionably away from realism.

The program of logico-critical nominalism has been succinctly outlined by Heiko Oberman:

The via moderna has claimed credit for the discovery of a method whereby the rampaging flood-waters of a capriciously speculative thirteenth-century river of learning with its confluence of physics, metaphysics and theology could be mastered and confined to useful channels. Particulars have been programmatically advanced as an indispensable point of departure and dependable foundation for all perception. The moderni have insisted on a disciplined and puritanical use of language in which only a clearly established meaning verified by the respective context may be ascribed to a term. . . . Much scholarly strife has thereby been exposed as mere semantic skirmishing that could be laid to rest in a spirit of unruffled objectivity.1

This description is, in fact, a fitting summary of what Hegius set out to achieve in the writing of his dialogs. Occam's Razor is clearly at work in Hegius' approach to philosophy, and the result is a much simplified pursuit of learning. As a result, little effort is made to investigate in any detail the complexities of such topics as medieval logical syntax or even the theories concerning the properties of terms. In the case of the latter, for example, only brief summaries are made of the relevant material.

This is illustrated when Hegius looks at the question of supposition, which is fundamental to an understanding of the properties of terms. Though it must be admitted that he is showing an interest in a subject central to the grammatical theory of late medieval scholasticism, the explanation that Hegius makes is simple and concise. The contrast with the extended treatise on supposition presented by the realist, Peter of Spain, could hardly be greater.2

1Oberman, Masters of Reformation, p. 37.
2Cf. Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales, pp. 2-19; and Hegius, appendix A, pp. 505-6, 605.
Even more significant than the style, however, is the fact that the explanation of supposition given by Hegius is more in accord with the definition of William of Occam than that of Peter of Spain. Peter of Spain attributes the property of supposition to any substitutive term, irrespective of whether or not it is a constituent part of a proposition. Occam would only allow supposition if the term functioned as part of a complete proposition. The view of Occam is the position that was eventually adopted by the nominalists in contrast to that of the realists. Hegius, in full agreement with the nominalist position, writes that the science of supposition allows an individual to know:

... when a noun [that is] the subject in any proposition is taken for the things on which it has been imposed, when [it is taken] for itself, when for the thoughts and the conception of the mind.\(^1\)

In addition to the fact that Occam only allowed supposition if a term functioned as part of a proposition, he stressed that terms are mental concepts. Terms are names that signify things, but are not the things themselves. In other words, these signs have no universal reality outside of the mind. There is no common nature inhering in things that can be expressed by a universal name with which they are associated that elevates language to a metaphysical reality. The emphasis of Occam's logic is therefore on singulars.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 605. Emphasis added. Cf. Occam, Summa totius logicae, l.c.lxii, cited in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. 64-65. See also Joseph Mullally, in the introduction to Peter of Spain, Summulae Logicales, p. xlvii; and Moody, Medieval Logic, pp. 21-25, who both outline the differences between the via antiqua and the via moderna regarding supposition.

\(^2\)See Occam, Summa totius logicae, l.c.xiv, lxxii-lxiii, in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. 32-40, 64-68; Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 491-94; Oberman, Masters of Reformation, pp. 36-37.
This same emphasis is found in the writings of Hegius:

Every substance is particular, because particular things have particular substances. Many things cannot have a single substance. Likewise every accident is particular, for one accident cannot exist in many things. Particular whitenesses are in particular white things, particular blacknesses in particular black things; and universal blackness and whiteness are not found, for all white things are not white with one whiteness, nor are black things black with one blackness. And so one must judge in the case of other accidents. Thus every thing is particular; and since science is about universals, it is necessary for it to be about universal names, not about universal things, since there are no such things.¹

There is an interesting point that arises from this emphasis on particulars in connection with Hegius' definition of personal, material, and simple supposition. Occam makes the following observation:

It is clear that personal supposition is not adequately described by those who say that personal supposition occurs when a term stands for a thing. But the definition is this: "Personal supposition obtains when a term stands for what it signifies and is used in its significative function."²

Hegius argues that personal supposition occurs when a subject is taken "for things significant in themselves."³ This sounds exactly like the kind of statement that Occam has considered to be inadequate. The question of whether Hegius espoused the ideas of Occam or followed the earlier logicians on this point must therefore be raised. It has to be acknowledged that the definition given by Hegius would not satisfy Occam. It has also to be acknowledged, however, that Hegius refuses to accept the theory of realism and stresses that while there are universal names there are no universal

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 505.
²Occam, Summa totius logicae, l.c.lxiii, cited in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, p. 66.
³Hegius, appendix A, p. 505.
things. Because of this it is impossible for Hegius to conceive of
total supposition in terms different from Occam in spite of the
inadequacy of his definition. In the example that Hegius gives of
total supposition, "Gold is in the miser's strong-box," the term
"gold" stands for "what it signifies and is used in its significative function." For Hegius there can be no thought that the term
acts in any other way than as a conventional sign for a particular
object. "Gold" is not that thing that is in the miser's strong-box,
but is merely a significative term that supposes for that which is
in the strong-box and is called "gold." In the mind of Hegius, a
realist interpretation of some sort of metaphysical connection
between the term and the object would be unthinkable.

There are two major conclusions that must be drawn after
considering this evidence. First, according to his own definition
and in the light of all the arguments presented in his writings,
Hegius must be classified a nominalist when it comes to his under­
standing of the nature of terms. Second, his rejection of realism
as well as the stance he took on the question of logic results in a
philosophical position according to which he must undoubtedly be

1Ibid., p. 506.

2Occam, Summa totius logicæ, l.c.lxiii, cited in Ockham,
Philosophical Writings, p. 66.

3See Boehner, in his introduction to Ockham, Philosophical
Writings, p. xxxiv; and Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 493.

4In response to the question, "Why are some . . . philosophers called realists and some nominalists?" Hegius makes the reply:
"Because some say that types and species are names . . . whereas
others say that types and species are things . . . . And therefore
these latter are called realists, the former nominalists." Hegius,
appendix A, p. 492. The argument proceeds immediately to connect
nominalism with the via moderna.
regarded as an avowed disciple of the *via moderna*. For Hegius
logic was a science in its own right, unconnected with metaphysics,
and applied in an analysis and use of language. It fulfilled a
largely classifying function and served to overcome contradictions
and to clarify the meanings of terms.\(^1\) Consequently, it should
be recognized that, because of these views, Hegius must be placed
alongside William of Occam as a member of the logico-critical school
of nominalism.

The significance of these conclusions is that the logico-
critical school was influential in opening the way for a much more
empirical approach to knowledge. Along with many other Renaissance
figures, Hegius may have looked back *ad fontes* to the knowledge of a
bygone era, but the ultimate result of his position was to make
*scientia* more scientific and to speed the development of a diversi-
fication of ideas.\(^2\)

The change of attitude regarding what could legitimately be
considered scientific knowledge has considerable implications as the
third area of this evaluation of Hegius' scholasticism is under-
taken. There was a strong desire among some of the men of the *via
moderna* to transcend the wrangling of the scholastics in pursuit of
a synthesis of *scientia* and *sapientia* that would lead to the estab-
lishment of a *philosophia Christi*.\(^3\) The question to be decided
is to what extent and in what manner Hegius participated in this
scholarly pursuit of Christian wisdom.

\(^{1}\)Oberman, *Masters of Reformation*, pp. 37, 41.


\(^{3}\)See above, pp. 58-59.
The effect of Occam's logico-critical emphasis was to bring about a considerable theological and philosophical simplification. This was the result of Occam's concept of knowledge or scientia. In the strictest sense he argued that there is scientia only when one knows a proposition that remains true notwithstanding changes that may take place in the existing world. There is evidence based upon singular contingent objects, but strictly speaking there is scientific knowledge only of necessary propositions that remain true universally.\(^1\) Up to this point in his argument, Hegius is in complete agreement with Occam.\(^2\)

Beyond the limits of this strict epistemological definition, Occam acknowledges that many things are known on the basis not of necessary truths but of contingent truths. This knowledge is, as Occam explains, an intuitive cognition of existent or non-existent

\(^1\)A section of the case that Occam presents concerning the different meanings that can be ascribed to the term "knowledge" is as follows:

"In a third sense 'knowledge' means an evident cognition of some necessary truth. In this sense, no contingent facts are known, but only first principles and the conclusions that follow from them.

In a fourth sense, 'knowledge' means an evident cognition of some necessary truth caused by the evident cognition of necessary premises and a process of syllogistic reasoning. In this sense, knowledge is distinguished from understanding, which is the possession of first principles, and also from wisdom.

\(^2\)Cf. Hegius, appendix A, pp. 500, 504-5, 508, where Hegius presents arguments that are very much the same as those of Occam. For a review of the general outline of Hegius' epistemology, see above, pp. 174-79.
singles, or an abstraction from such an intuitive cognition.¹

This aspect of Occam's argument is also accurately reflected by the manner in which Hegius presents his views. Note has already been taken of Hegius' emphasis on singles or particular things. Scientia, according to his understanding, is about universal names, not about universal things, for these do not exist.² Intuitive cognition must therefore be of contingent particulars, and abstractive cognition—which makes possible the conception of universal names—must be thoughts about contingent particulars. Bearing in mind that Hegius considers universals merely to be concepts of the mind, one is able to recognize the parallels between the thoughts of Occam and those of Hegius in the following quotation:

The judgment of a sense is in respect of individual things [intuitive cognition of an existent or non-existent singular], but the judgment of intellect in respect of universals [an abstractive cognition arising out of an intuitive cognition]. Sight is not able to judge that all swans are white, but judges only that the swan presented to it is white. Intellect pronounces all swans to be white. Hearing judges that the sound of a nightingale presented to it is pleasing; intellect judges that every sound of a nightingale is sweet. Also, intellect passes judgment when it wishes, but sense cannot sense unless a sensible thing is present to its sensory organ. The eye cannot see when a visible thing is removed, nor the ear hear when an audible thing is removed. We are not able to perceive by sense in absence [of a visible thing], though we are able to think about those things in the mind.³

Elsewhere Hegius reinforces the idea that even the intellect is dependent upon intuitive cognition because it needs images in itself in order for abstractive cognition to take place. Hence, a person

¹Occam, Prologue to the Ordinatio, Q.i.n; Quodlibeta, 6.q.6, 1.q.13; cited in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. 18-32.
²Hegius, appendix A, pp. 504-5.
³Ibid., p. 448. Emphasis added.
born blind has no cognition of color.¹

The net effect of this acceptance of intuitive cognition was once again to negate all ideas of a metaphysical connection between things and thoughts, to highlight the importance of particulars in epistemology, and thereby to drastically reduce the number of propositions that might scientifically be known to be true. Occam's logico-critical razor may therefore be seen as an active force with respect to epistemological considerations in the writings of Hegius. The consequences for scientia were as dramatic in his philosophy as they had been for the other moderni.

The reduction of scientia to only a small fraction of the whole body of human knowledge (taken generally) necessitated a completely different understanding of that which could not be proved by rational means. The complex "proofs" of the via antiqua became mere philosophical probabilities to the moderni. In the light of these new epistemological conceptions, many moderni attempted to bring together scientia and sapientia (devout wisdom) into the ideal of a philosophia Christi. The manner in which this was accomplished was through the theological and philosophical simplification that the new ideas demanded. The epistemology of the via moderna, therefore, may be seen to have paved the way for a less complex and more faith-oriented theology. The way in which this manifested itself in the writings of Hegius has already been alluded to.² There are, however, some additional evidences that are important to note.

¹Ibid., pp. 462-63, 485-86. See also Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 489-91, 494-95; and Boehner, in his introduction to Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. xxiii-xxix.

²See above, pp. 172-74, 228, 235-41.
In examining the distinctive epistemological features of the via moderna, the importance of the concept of contingency has become obvious. Contingency refers to the "non-necessary, covenantal character of our created world."\(^1\) It is brought into focus by an examination of the concepts relating to the absolute and ordained will of God vis-a-vis the created order. McGrath presents an inciteful analysis of the issues upon which attention was focused by the moderni in discussing the powers of God. He observes:

The essential distinction underlying the dialectic [between God's potentia absoluta and his potentia ordinata] concerns the hypothetical and the actual. In that God is omnipotent, he is able to do anything, provided that logical contradiction is not involved. . . . Out of an initial set of possibilities, God was at liberty to actualize any. . . . However, God did not actualize each and every possibility: only a subset of the initial set of possibilities was selected for actualization. . . . In other words, God must be thought of as possessing the ability to do many things which he does not will to do, in the past, present or future. God's freedom in relation to the initial set of actualizable possibilities is designated as the sphere of his "absolute power (potentia absoluta)", and in relation to the subset of actualized possibilities his "ordained power (potentia ordinata)\(^\text{sic}\)--and it is the dialectic between these two powers of God which permits both the divine reliability and freedom to be upheld.\(^2\)

Hegius is in agreement with all the essential elements of this nominalist position. His writings give a clear indication that he considers creation to be contingent\(^3\) upon a non-contingent and omnipotent God;\(^4\) he argues that God's omnipotence allows Him to do anything that does not involve a logical contradiction;\(^5\) and of the

\(^1\)Courtenay, "Nominalism," p. 39.
\(^3\)Hegius, appendix A, pp. 412, 518, 526.
\(^4\)Ibid., pp. 455, 488, 536-37, 577-78.  \(^5\)Ibid., p. 575.
original possibilities open to God, those that have been actualized
are presented as His ordained will. The ability of the Creator
to do that which He does not will is illustrated by the argument
that God could if He so desired make a place empty, though, in fact,
because of the ordained order, no such empty place exists. Another
example of the essential reliability of God's ordained will is
that the souls of men could be reduced to nothing if God so desired.
Such a contingency, however, is not to be. God, having ordained the
present order, is under a self-imposed obligation to maintain it.
Because this obligation is self-imposed, it in no way detracts from
His absolute freedom.

The primary effect of an acceptance of the views of the
moderni on the powers of God was to move theology in a more faith-
oriented direction and to bring about a division between philosophy
and theology. If the creation is a contingent order that is not
ontologically necessary, but was ordained by God as a subset of
an infinite number of initial possibilities, then there can be no

1Ibid., pp. 412, 575. Hegius does not present a systematic
evaluation of the powers of God, but a recognition of the concepts
of the potentia ordinata and potentia absoluta are implicit in the
manner in which he presents his argument. For example, the miracu-
lious is not considered to go contrary to the ordered order (this
would be a contradiction in the will of God, which is impossible)
but to be a part of it. Ibid., pp. 458, 536, 583. An interesting
aspect of his understanding of the ordered order is his proposal
that while man has freedom of choice, nature is determined and was
created in order to serve humanity. Ibid., pp. 431, 438, 518, 555.
In this aspect of his argument, and indeed in his general under-
standing of the powers of God, Hegius closely reflects the ideas of
Wessel Gansfort. See van Rhijn, Studiën over Wessel Gansfort, pp.
95, 102. Cf. J. B. Korolec, "Free Will and Free Choice," in Cam-
bridge Later Medieval Philosophy, pp. 630-31.

2Hegius, appendix A, pp. 482, 512.

3Ibid., pp. 412, 477-78.
necessary and logically provable hierarchy of being. The moderni had slashed away the scholastic proofs that bridged the chasm between theology and philosophy, and they found themselves once again in a world of faith where scientia was reduced to that which could be proved by reason or experiment within this present, contingent order. This led to a more empirical view of the realities of this world on the one hand, and to a stronger emphasis on trust and belief in the realm of the spiritual world on the other.

The new epistemological ideas and the theory of the dialectic of two powers proved to be additional weapons in the armory of the logico-critical nominalists in bringing about a considerable theological simplification and philosophical realignment. In this context the proofs of an ascending hierarchy of reality became at best mere logical probabilities. As Occam had understood it, these proofs could only be sapientia or devout wisdom. Scientia remained an important element in the considerations of the moderni, but scientia and sapientia could not come together to offer any certainty of knowledge about God. They could only offer a philosophia Christi, which demanded a response of faith. In this movement, too, it must be acknowledged that Hegius was an active participant.

As has been mentioned, the pursuit of sapientia, particularly as a result of the dialectic of two powers, brought about a division between theology and philosophy. Hegius draws a quite specific distinction. He observes: "This is the difference between philosophers and theologians, that philosophers believe things established to be true, theologians things revealed."¹ Elsewhere

¹Ibid., p. 526.
he suggests that "those things that Christians are commanded to believe cannot be proved by arguments,"¹ and he affirms that "it would take away the merit of faith if articles of faith could be proved."² In considering the fourth criteria by which Hegius’ scholasticism is to be judged, it must be acknowledged that he should once again be adjudged a disciple of the via moderna.³

The position adopted by many of the scholars of the via antiqua was that faith and reason could be encompassed in one non-contradictory system of philosophy and theology. The moderni on the other hand, along with Hegius, argued that scientia and sapientia could by definition never be a part of the same non-contradictory system that led to a scientific knowledge of God. In their minds, what was philosophically probable was not necessarily a proof of theological orthodoxy.

Historians and scholars have not been blind to the fact that Hegius proposes a clear distinction between faith and reason, but none have seen in this any indication of a nominalistic bent to his ideas.⁴ Instead they have attributed this aspect of his thought to his close association with the devotio moderna. It is undoubtedly true that Hegius was influenced by the ideas of the devotio moderna. However, his arguments show too much awareness of scholastic issues to be considered the response of one guided solely by the wisdom of the pious Brethren of the Common Life. Hegius had obtained a Master of Arts degree, and, while there is no indication of where it

¹Ibid., p. 433.
²Ibid., p. 529. See also p. 389, and above, pp. 176-78.
³See above, p. 59. ⁴See above, pp. 244-45.
was earned, it can safely be assumed that he was fully conversant with the issues involved in the wegestreit. Consequently, he must have been aware of the significance of the arguments he advanced concerning matters of faith and reason. If, in addition, it is acknowledged that there are other indications of his acceptance of certain views held by the moderni, it is difficult to see how this aspect of his thought can be seen as anything but nominalist.

The division that Hegius accepted between faith and reason did not raise a conflict in his own mind. He was comfortable and safe in what he believed, even if he did not know what he believed. After all:

[A person] who does not believe that God was made man and suffered for the salvation of men will not be able to worship God in holiness. Yet [he] who does not know that a triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles is not without a share of holiness on account of ignorance of this sort. Therefore it is more excellent to believe the former than to know the latter.1

One of the interesting issues that arises out of the schism that developed between theology and philosophy is the ontological question of being and cause. Hegius does not develop his ideas in this area as specifically as does Occam, but it seems that he is at least aware of Occam's arguments. When Hegius deals with the subject of being and cause, his emphasis is decidedly faith-oriented. It would, nevertheless, be misleading to suggest that he reflects the thoughts of Occam to any great extent. He does not manifest the overt skepticism of Occam regarding an intrinsically necessary progression from cause to effect. With Occam, however, he acknowledges that forms can exist without matter and effects without causes.2

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1 Hegius, appendix A, pp. 391. 2 Ibid., pp. 479, 536, 411.
This is an implicit acceptance of the fact that a necessary relationship between cause and effect cannot be proved. Hegius' observation that "God terminates the series of efficient causes" may or may not take into account Occam's point that an efficient cause can only be postulated on the basis of a conserving cause. If Hegius was aware of this argument, he does not mention it. Whatever the case may be, he is clear that, on the basis of rational proof, little can be known about God beyond that there appears to be a prime efficient cause. All other observations must be made from the standpoint of faith in God's revelation of Himself. Without the addition of propositions that originate in the realm of faith, no relationship can be postulated between created beings and God.

The uncertainty must remain as to whether Hegius is following Occam or merely reflecting the arguments regarding cause and effect that were bandied about by the men of the via antiqua. There is, nevertheless, no uncertainty as to the basic philosophical viewpoint that Hegius holds concerning a hierarchy of being. This is clarified by his concept of univocity, which is a lucid presentation of the ideas of the via moderna. Hegius rejects all thoughts of a metaphysical univocity founded upon the concept of a common nature.

1Ibid., p. 561. 2Gilson, Christian Philosophy, pp. 496-97. 3Ibid., p. 496; and Hegius, appendix A, pp. 529, 561. 4See above, pp. 262-63, 266-68, 270-71. The point to be made here is that no necessary hierarchy of being can be posited as a definite consequence of the empirical observation of singular contingent entities. Hegius is inconsistent in that he uses the Aristotelian form-matter hypothesis to suggest that matter is pure potentiality and God is pure actuality, which would imply an ascending hierarchy of being. It must be admitted, however, that this observation is made by Hegius in the context of a statement of faith and not as a part of any logical proof. Hegius, appendix A, p. 518.
between God and man. A clear distinction is made between creator and creature, and Hegius speaks only in terms of a nominal univocity. He writes:

It is clear that, though God and matter are very different substances, since God is a most perfect substance, matter most imperfect, yet they can be conceived in one concept. And for that reason they can be conceived by one univocal name, for whatever things can be conceived by one concept can be signified univocally.¹

Another significant aspect of the way in which Hegius limits the scope of philosophy with respect to its influence on things theological is found in the interesting manner in which he draws a connection between the theories of knowledge and of being. The observation is made that a person may be deceived into thinking that he knows something that is in actual fact only an opinion or a belief. Hegius accepts this possibility and presents the following response to the problem:

It cannot happen that anyone considering himself to exist is deceived, whether he knows it or thinks it, because [a man] who does not exist cannot be deceived. Nor can it happen that a man who considers himself alive is deceived. It is the living who are deceived, not the dead. And so, though many are deceived, thinking they know what they believe, yet a man who thinks he exists and lives can in no way be deceived.²

This argument is essentially the same as the one presented by René Descartes (1596-1650) over a century later.³ It constitutes the

¹Hegius, appendix A, pp. 516-17, especially p. 517. See also p. 488, where there is a clear statement distinguishing creator and creature; Gilson, Christian Philosophy, p. 496, especially n. 21; and Occam, Ordinatio, D.2.q.9.p sqq., cited in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. 105-6.

²Hegius, appendix A, p. 386.

central principle in Descarte's cogito, upon which is developed the system of Cartesian doubt. Hegius does not elaborate to any great extent on his thoughts, but the implications become quite apparent as he develops his theory of knowledge. The contingent individual is able to believe many things that he is not able to know. What is knowable is known only as a consequence of being, and the contingent being may only know those things that he has personally experienced. Because matters of faith can never be quantified and proved on the basis of empirical experience, they can never be known. Consequently, no proofs exist that can bridge the gap between philosophy and theology.

The final criterion by which the nature of Hegius' scholasticism must be assessed concerns the question of universals. It has already become obvious in this analysis of his philosophy that he conceives universals to be names rather than metaphysical entities. Much of what has been said about his scholasticism up to this point may be encapsulated in his theory of universals, for it is upon the foundation of this theory that the other aspects of his philosophy are developed. The separation of logic from metaphysics; the study of logic as a science in its own right; the new epistemology which elevates the realm of faith; and the consequent reestablishment of the distinction between philosophy and theology—all have their roots in a nominalist conception of universals.

On a number of occasions, Hegius raises the matter of individual things and their relationship to universals. It has already been established that he perceived all natural (created) things to

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1Hegius, appendix A, pp. 386-92.
be individual, "for," as he says, "the world is composed of individual things, not universals." He explains that to understand universally "is to have in mind a universal concept, that is, a cognition of some whole universality." Such a concept, however, should not be thought to possess any metaphysical character. As Hegius explains:

A universal, since it can be subjected or predicated in a pronouncement, and be part of a definition, is a name, not a thing. For a pronouncement and a definition do not consist of things, but of the names of things.3

Universals, therefore, are concepts of the mind, which Occam refers to as natural signs; or they are words, which are conventional signs that represent the natural signs.4

In spite of what other scholars have concluded, it appears that there can be little doubt that Hegius was fundamentally a nominalist and therefore an adherent of the via moderna. His philosophy is, generally speaking, informed by the ideas of William of Occam, and like Occam he must be considered a logico-critical nominalist.5 In the light of the contribution Hegius made to education, the conclusions to which this leads are of considerable

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1Ibid., p. 501; and above, pp. 262-63.
2Hegius, appendix A, p. 464.
3Ibid., p. 505; and Occam, Summa totius logicae l.c.14-16; and Expositio super librum Perihermenias, cited in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. 32-40, 43-45.
4Occam, Summa totius logicae l.c.1, cited in Ockham, Philosophical Writings, pp. 47-49; and Hegius, appendix A, p. 488.
5An acceptance of the idea that Hegius was a nominalist raises a number of interesting points, two of which need to be considered at this juncture. First, if Hegius was a nominalist, who were the Academicians against whom he inveighed? Hegius, appendix A, p. 386. Traditionally they have been classified as the followers
significance.\(^1\) It has been noted that education in the Low Coun-
tries was inclined to reflect the philosophical positions of the via
antiqua\(^2\) and that Hegius has, in the past, always been classified as
a realist;\(^3\) It has also been noted that, of all aspects of scholas-
ticism, logico-critical nominalism, was most influential in the rise
and development of humanism. If it is now accepted that Hegius was
fundamentally an adherent of the via moderna rather than the via
antiqua, it becomes much clearer why his ideas made such an impact
on education in the Netherlands at the end of the fifteenth century.

In this investigation of Hegius scholasticism, an attempt
has been made to establish that he was strongly influenced by the
views of the via moderna. At the same time it must be acknowledged

of Plato. Hegius himself accepts this classification. Ibid., p.
491. It cannot be that he is arguing against the Platonists, how-
ever, for they did not assert that nothing can be known. Ibid., pp.
386, 397. Those who have claimed that Hegius was a realist have
concluded that the Academicians were the nominalists, who, according
to earlier views, were considered extreme skeptics. See Mestwerdt,
Anfänge des Humanismus, p. 104. In the absence of any specific
explanation by Hegius, I would suggest that the Academicians were
the radical nominalists who, in fact, did adopt a more skeptical
approach to the theory of knowledge. The ideas espoused by this
group have been variously labeled as left-wing nominalism, extreme
logico-critical nominalism, and modernism. These ideas most closely
resemble the traditional view of nominalism. See Courtenay, "Nominal-
ism," p. 35. The second point to be considered arises from a
comment made by Hegius in a letter to Agricola. He says: "I also
want to find out . . . whether your Heidelberg people have now aban-
don their Marsilius . . . [regarding universals], or still take
his side." Hegius to Agricola, from Deventer, dated 17 December
[1484], appendix B, p. 653. Mestwerdt has suggested that the way in
which Hegius phrases his question indicates that he is opposed to
the nominalism of Marsilius of Inghen. Mestwerdt, Anfänge des
Humanismus, p. 105; and above, pp. 138-39. In the light of Hegius' view on universals outlined in this study, it must be concluded that
his question does not demand the interpretation that Mestwerdt has
placed upon it, and that Mestwerdt is incorrect in his assertion.

\(^1\)See above, p. 60. \(^2\)See above, pp. 137-40.
\(^3\)See above, pp. 243-45.
that, like Gansfort, Hegius retained many thought patterns of the via antiqua. In fact, Gansfort was probably the source of much of Hegius' thinking on scholasticism. By his own definition, Hegius must in some respects be considered a scholastic dialectician.¹ His indebtedness to the via antiqua has never been doubted, and for that reason no attempt has been made to examine this area of his thought.

Whatever may be said of Hegius' philosophical position, it is clear that, as one enters upon an investigation of his humanism, one must bear in mind that he brought with him in his excursions into the field of humanitas a definite scholastic bent. This comes as no surprise, considering that he was among the first of the humanists in the Low Countries. What is surprising, however, is the number of scholastic pitfalls that he managed to avoid. At least part of the reason for his success in escaping from these snares is the fact that he came to espouse logico-critical nominalism. If scholasticism and humanism can be linked in any way, then it is largely in the area of common interest that the moderni shared with the humanists.

**Humanism**

Hegius has been portrayed by some scholars as one who had barely begun the journey from scholasticism to humanism. P. N. M. Bot depicts Hegius' emergence from scholasticism in very tentative terms:

Hegius was certainly not a fully devoted suitor of the art of letters; he must rather be seen as a pre-humanist, taking up a middle position between the medieval and the modern age. Like Moses, he enabled many to enter the promised land, but in fact

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 496.
never reached it himself. Humanism was, for Hegius, his Sunday-best, worn with flourish, but not able to conceal his everyday clothes from view. It was not yet flesh and blood, but rather like a varnish through which shone the scholastic thought forms of one well-versed in the ideas of the modern devotion.

There are, however, clear indications in his Dialogs and in comments made about him by his contemporaries that he cannot be considered merely a scholastic. Hegius undoubtedly began the humanistic journey into the new age and inspired his pupils to do so as well.

Of all those who wrote about Hegius, the most renowned is Desiderius Erasmus, the greatest of the northern humanists. Erasmus did not actually have Hegius as his class teacher, but it has been established that he was a pupil in the school at St. Lebuins for a short but significant time while Hegius was rector. When Erasmus comments in the Compendium vitae about his experiences in Deventer, he says that it was there that he first felt the breath of something new. Hegius and Johan Sinthius, he observes, "had begun to introduce something of a higher standard as literature." Erasmus is not at all reticent to portray his former teacher as an accomplished humanist. Even allowing for the panegyrical style so typical of the humanists, the sincerity of Erasmus' words cannot be doubted:

Such full and ungrudging praise for this man [Agricola] has,
I confess, a singular charm for me, because I happened while yet a boy to have his disciple Alexander Hegius as my teacher. He was headmaster of the once famous school of the town of Deventer, where I learned the rudiments of both languages when I was almost a child. To put it in a few words, he [Hegius] was a man like his master: as upright in his life as he was serious in his teaching. Momus himself could have found no fault in him except one, that he cared less for fame than he need have done, and took no heed of posterity. If he wrote anything, he wrote as if he were playing a game rather than doing something serious. And yet these writings, so written, are of the sort which the learned world votes worthy of immortality.

So it is not without thought that I plunged into this digression; not to boast of the glory of Germany, but to perform the duty of a grateful pupil, and acquit myself of the debt I owe to the memory of both these men, because I owe to one the loving respect of a son, and to the other the affection of a grandson.1

On another occasion Erasmus writes concerning Hegius: "So elegantly did he reproduce the style of the ancients that one might easily mistake the authorship of a poem by him if the book's title page were missing."2 While this is an undoubted exaggeration, it does reflect the esteem in which Hegius was held among the humanists.3

Jacobus Faber, who edited the works of Hegius, was also

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1Erasmus, Collected Works, 31:350. The particular *adagium* cited here is numbered 1.4.39. The *Adagia* were published in 1500.

2Ibid., 1:38. The letter cited here was written in 1489.

3Hyma, Youth of Erasmus, p. 87, claims that "Erasmus subjected the Brethren of the Common Life and Alexander Hegius to a sweeping condemnation . . . between 1520 and 1530." I find no evidence to support this assertion vis-a-vis Hegius. The *Compendium vitae* in which Hegius is mentioned with great respect was not written until the latter part of Erasmus' life. The *adagium* and the letter written in 1489 are admittedly of early origin, and Erasmus' youthful idealism about his teacher may have been tempered with a little more realism as the years passed. There is, nevertheless, no record to my knowledge of Hegius being denigrated by Erasmus. It seems likely that Hyma is referring to a letter that Erasmus wrote to Lambertus Grunnius from England in 1516. Erasmus, Collected Works 4:6-32, especially lines 74-156. The Brethren of the Common Life are certainly condemned, but the condemnation cannot apply to Hegius because the letter speaks of events following the death of Erasmus' father. This event did not occur until after Erasmus had departed from Deventer.
liberal in the praise he gave of his former teacher. In a letter to Erasmus he says:

The writings of that excellent scholar, your teacher and mine, dearest Erasmus, are well worth my editing with your blessing. . . . I could justifiably be held guilty of disloyalty, indeed of malice, towards studious youth, if . . . I were to fail to rescue those products of his pen . . . from the devouring worm; for they are works that deserve to be preserved by the cedar oil of Pallas Athene, drawn by our Hercules from an inner shrine. I recognize how much I am indebted to the teacher under whom you and I served, though at different times. Who has ever responded worthily to all he did for us?

These sentiments are not only an evidence of gratitude to a well-loved teacher but also an expression of the esteem in which Hegius was held as a scholar, and they are presented in language that leaves no doubt as to what kind of scholar is being discussed.

Johannes Butzbach says that Hegius was an extraordinary man, worthy of great praise, "which he deservedly received from scholarly men. . . . Like a bright star he shone . . . among the scholars for his comprehensive knowledge and great attainments." Butzbach goes on to list a number of renowned humanists who had honored Hegius in their writings. He mentions Erasmus, Agricola, Johan von Dalberg, Jacobus Faber, Hermanus Buschius, and Michael Hobing (fl. 1470-1505). The latter two published poems in praise of Hegius. An excerpt from the poem by Hobing reads:

So then, my song, go through the untraveled fields
And distant pathways, go forward with haste on your journey
Until your way leads you hence to the western city
Where the waters of the Ijssel flow strongly and rapidly.
Here, close at hand, in its exalted position is Deventer with its stately walls,
Rich in the arts, with many citizens as well as visitors.

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1 Jacobus Faber to Erasmus, from Deventer, dated 1503. See appendix B, p. 657.

2 Butzbach, Autobiography, p. 112.
And here they have the illustrious teacher of the famous academy Whom Pallas has instructed in all the arts, Whose name this exalted one has jubilantly raised to the heavens Where well-deserved praise is heaped upon it in abundance.¹

Hermanus Buschius makes this poetic tribute to Hegius:

If anyone has found the entrance to the Aonian glades And has learned to distinguish between barbarity and the lyric arts; If anyone can discern either the words of the Greeks with fluency, Or spread the mighty Italian language as a worthy covering; If anyone understands the battles and wars of the Romans, Or manifests a knowledge of the Cumaens or Parthenius Then it is you--who bear with honor the title of king of Pella. May I perish, if you alone will not be this to me.²

It has already been noted that when Agricola appraised his colleague, he saw Hegius as the one hope in what appeared to be a fairly hopeless situation with regard to the teaching of humane letters in Northern Europe.³

¹The section of the poem that has been translated reads as follows in the original:

"Ite per insolitos tandem, mea carmina, campos
Et longum gressu carpite prorus iter,
Donec ad occiduam vos hinc via duxerit urbem,
Fortis ubi rapidas Issola voluit aquas.
Hunc iuxta excelsis posita est Daventria muris,
Dives opum multis ciubus atque frequens.
Sublimem tenet hec accadaemia clara magistrum,
Quem Pallas cunctis artibus erudit,
Cui fama egregia nomen super ethera notum
Efficit et iustus laudibus accumulat."

Michael Hobing, cited by Krafft and Crecelius, Beitrage, 1:25.

²The original reads as follows:

"Si quis in Aonio posuit vestigia luco
Scindit et intonsam si quis ab arte lyram
Si quis Graiorum didicit facunda virorum
Scripta: vel Ausonia fulmina digna toga
Si quis romanas acies et prelia novit
Vel que Cumeus: Partheniasque docet
Tu qui clara tenes Pellei nomina regis
Dispeream: si non hic mihi solus eris!"


³See above, p. 89; and appendix B, p. 654.
It is quite apparent that those who had studied under Hegius and those who knew him well considered him to be an accomplished scholar who was by no means deficient in a knowledge of the humanae litterae. Erasmus points out that in his eyes Hegius' excessive humility was an unnecessary trait, and it is true that if one were to judge Hegius as a humanist on this basis, he would fall far short of the likes of Erasmus. It is also true that if one compares Hegius' works with those of the accomplished humanists of the next generation, then he is found to be wanting. He was by no means the bright and shining star of humanist literature in the North. If, however, what his contemporaries have said is to be believed, it appears that he was a bright and shining star nonetheless.

Perhaps it is well to return to Bot's evaluation of Hegius with which this section began. Hegius was a humanist, but it must be admitted that he was struggling to set himself free from the clutches of the medieval learning that he had imbibed in his youth. As one evaluates Hegius in terms of his humanism, one may at times be a little disappointed. Generally speaking it appears that he has not quite reached the mark, but that he is grasping after the ideas of the new learning and that his mode of thinking has begun to move in the direction that later became the established pattern for the Northern Renaissance. His writings are not even as fluent as those of many of the young men who sat at his feet, and he seldom reaches great heights of artistry in his use of language. The aspect of his endeavors that is perhaps most impressive is not the quality of his humanism, but his earnest desire to inspire in his students the will to reach out for something better than he himself was able to
achieve. If he was not the ideal humanist scholar, at least he could point his students in the direction in which he thought the ideal might be found. In order to establish how closely Hegius mirrored this ideal, attention must now be turned to the criteria established in chapter 2 whereby his humanism is to be measured.1

The first aspect of this investigation of Hegius as a man of humane letters relates to the interrelationship between humanism and scholasticism.2 The humanists were not primarily concerned with metaphysical and scholastic issues. Their gaze may have been backward to a past era, but that era was the golden age of antiquity and not the age of high scholasticism. Although there would appear at first glance to be little common ground between the schoolmen and the men of the Renaissance, there are some interesting connections. This is particularly true of the later scholastics or moderni.

The moderni, it is recalled, had rejected the cumbersome philosophy of the via antiqua. This involved a rejection of realist metaphysics that was largely accomplished by the use of Occam's razor. The result was a considerable simplification in the areas of philosophy and theology. The humanists, though not quite so concerned with these areas of study, welcomed the simplification. More than this, however, they were quick to seize upon the method used to bring about the simplification.3 If the moderni opposed

1See the analysis of the outstanding features of northern humanism made above, pp. 61-74. The areas of concern are: (1) The relationship between humanism and scholasticism, (2) the interest of the humanists in establishing a learned literary philology, (3) the manner in which the humanists elevated the art of rhetoric, (4) the major facets of their intellectual endeavors, (5) their religious interests, and (6) the ideals they established for education.

2See above, pp. 61-65.

3See above, p. 63.
realism for philosophical reasons, the humanists cast it aside because it was as a consequence of this theory that Latin had become so entwined with and distorted by philosophy. It has already been established that Hegius was not averse to using logico-critical methods for philosophical reasons. Soon it will be seen that he was equally happy with the impact of these methods in the area of language study. He was not one who gladly tolerated the barbarities of medieval Latin. It may safely be said that the humanists, including Hegius, benefited greatly from the logico-critical emphasis of the via moderna.

It has been argued on occasion that one of the major issues in humanism was the age-old question of Plato versus Aristotle. The humanists have often been thought to reject a scholastic Aristotle in favor of a revitalized Plato. This is a misconception. Although the Florentine Academy was enamored of Plato, the northerners never did feel quite the same way. Indeed, there can be no question that in the North particularly, Aristotle remained important to the men of the via antiqua, to the moderni, and to the humanists. The fact that Hegius was greatly indebted to Aristotle cannot therefore be a basis for deciding that he was more a scholastic than a humanist.

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1See above, p. 255, 265.

2See above, pp. 64; and below, pp. 292-94, where the modistae are discussed.

3See Oberman, Masters of Reformation, p. 30, where he makes the comment that a love for eloquence does not replace a respect for dialectic amongst those who were inclined to humanism.

4Ibid., p. 37; and above, p. 62.

5See, for example, Lindeboom, Humanisme, pp. 77-78, who makes this accusation. Lindeboom also asserts that Hegius rejected
This aspect of the relationship between scholasticism and humanism cannot without further consideration be accepted as a distinguishing feature. It depends to a great extent on how the individual makes use of the writings of Aristotle. Hegius does not appeal to Aristotle in order to undergird any form of Thomistic realism. In fact, he cites Aristotle more in the sense of an author of antiquity than as a foundation upon which to build any scholastic theory, be it realist or nominalist. From this point of view he is a humanist.

Another feature that distinguishes the humanists from the schoolmen relates specifically to the manner in which they appealed to the classical authors. The humanists sought to understand the ancient texts without recourse to medieval glosses and commentaries. This is to a large degree the way in which Hegius used Aristotle and the other classical writers. However, one cannot escape the feeling that Hegius is still struggling to break away from the Middle Ages. With the exception of Aristotle, his appeal to the classical authors does not appear to be established upon a

the Platonic theory of a creation \textit{ex nihilo}. He refers to Hegius, \textit{Dialogi}, fo. I.ii recto. This is clearly a misreading of the text. See Hegius, appendix A, p. 527. In any case, rejection of Plato, as has been noted, does not imply adherence to the \textit{via antiqua}. Gansfort, for example, does not accept many Platonic ideas, but he is considered one of the moderni. Van Rhijn, \textit{Studien over Wessel Gansfort}, p. 95. It is interesting to note that even though Hegius is heavily indebted to Aristotle, he has no hesitation in rejecting him along with Plato when Aristotle's views go contrary to those of the faith. Hegius, appendix A, p. 528.

\begin{enumerate}
\item Oberman, \textit{Masters of Reformation}, p. 35.
\item The best examples of the manner in which Hegius refers to the classical authors are to be found in the dialogs on the soul, particularly dialog 5. See appendix A, pp. 450-89. Generally Hegius refers directly to the author in question, and he appears to be more interested in ancient than medieval writers. There are exceptions, however. See p. 468, n. 1.
\end{enumerate}

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thorough familiarity with these works. It is more as though he knows that the new learning requires a use of the ancient authors. From time to time, therefore, he finds an appropriate quotation that illustrates a point and inserts it in the text.\textsuperscript{1} As a good suitor of the \textit{humanae litterae}, Hegius refers to the classical writers and Church Fathers both for their ideas and beliefs and for the style of their Latin.\textsuperscript{2} The manner in which he does this is sometimes a little superficial, but it was quite obviously done well enough to inspire in his pupils the desire to immerse themselves more fully in the new learning. When one sees the interest expressed in classical studies mentioned in his correspondence, there can be no doubt of his efforts to improve his knowledge of the ancient authors.\textsuperscript{3}

One last point about the relationship between scholasticism and humanism concerns the emphasis placed by the scholastics on theological orthodoxy and by the humanists on right living. Petrarch (1304-74) had argued: "It is better to will the good than to know the truth."\textsuperscript{4} Hegius does not in any way play down the importance of right doctrine\textsuperscript{5} but, like Petrarch, he is more interested in right living. What he says in his letter to Gansfort springs immediately

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1}Ibid., pp. 431, 570, for example.
\item \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., pp. 427, 591-93, 606, 615-32, 639, 641.
\item \textsuperscript{3}See the letters to and from Agricola, and to Gansfort: appendix B, pp. 642-56. Mention is made of Lucian (fl. post A.D. 120), Sallust, Ovid, Pliny, Cicero, and others.
\item \textsuperscript{5}Hegius, appendix A, p. 565.
\end{itemize}
to mind: "All learning is pernicious that is attended with loss of honesty."¹ This is a constant theme in the thinking of the northern humanists, and one which is plainly evident in all the concerns to which Hegius turns his attention. The subject receives further consideration when this study focuses on the religious aspect of Hegius' pursuit of the humanae litterae.

At this point, however, the second major question regarding Hegius' humanism must be addressed. This is an evaluation of his commitment to an improved literary philology. It has been said that the most distinctive activity of the northern humanists was their pursuit of the study of grammar and rhetoric.² In this area Hegius excelled as a humanist. This is not to say that, from a classical perspective, his Latin was faultless. His excellence is not so much to be seen in his ability but in his dogged determination to improve his own grammar³ and to foster in his students a desire to do the same.⁴ It has already been concluded that Hegius saw grammar as the most important of the rational arts because it is the medium through which all other arts, sciences, and beliefs are transmitted.⁵ Of interest at this point is what his distaste for the barbarities of medieval grammar prompted him to do.

¹Hegius, appendix B, p. 656. ²See above, p. 65.
³Agricola to Hegius, from Groningen, dated 20 September 1480. See appendix B, pp. 642-49. Agricola responds to a number of grammatical and epistemological questions asked by Hegius.
⁴See above, pp. 212-13, where Hegius' appraisal of grammar is considered. His desire to elevate the art of grammar is apparent throughout the dialogs, particularly in the "Miscellany" and the "Invective Against the Modes of Signification." See Hegius, appendix A, pp. 614-41.
⁵See above, pp. 212-13.
In his writings Hegius manifests an ongoing concern for an accurate philology and etymology. For example, the question is posed: "Is this statement good Latin: De*us est infinitus a parte ante et a parte post ('God is infinite from the past and into the future')?" The response is given:

These statements are good Latin: De*us neque incepit esse neque d*efin et e*s; Deus neque ex nihilo factus est neque in nihilum rediget ('God neither began to exist, nor will he cease to exist; God has neither been made from nothing, nor will he be reduced to nothing').

The correct meaning is conveyed by the medieval expressions in the first example, but the sentence is not "good" (classical) Latin. In the last two sentences the "medieval barbarities" have been removed.

Hegius seems to enjoy investigating the root meanings of words and exercises his knowledge of both Greek and Latin in this pursuit. On one occasion he considers the etymology of "soul." He observes that the Latin anima is derived from the Greek ἀνευρός, "which means wind, for some of the ancients thought the soul to be nothing other than wind, that is, a habit refreshing the heart and blood." The Greek ψυχή, he says, "is translated as coolness or refreshment. . . . It is clear, therefore, that both among the Greeks and among the Latins the soul takes its name from refreshment." This example is chosen as an illustration because Lindeboom pokes fun at Hegius' description. However, modern Latin and

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1Hegius, appendix A, pp. 541-42, especially p. 542, n. 1.
2Ibid., p. 403. 3Ibid., p. 404.
4Lindeboom, Humanisme, pp. 77-78. There are better illustrations of his expertise in etymology, but this one has been chosen in order to respond to the comment made by Lindeboom. For further examples see, Hegius, appendix A, pp. 410, 494-95, 630, 632.
Greek lexicons offer the same definitions as did Hegius. Any number of examples of this type could be given, but sufficient has been said to show that one way in which Hegius responded to medieval Latin was to hold up before his students the ideal toward which they should strive. "Words," he says "are to be written and pronounced and construed as was the convention among the ancient grammarians."¹

Another noteworthy point to be made about Hegius' interest in philology is that his attention is not confined to Latin and Greek. As humble a beginning as it might have been, he makes one or two references to Hebrew,² and on a number of occasions he uses the Dutch vernacular.³ It was about 1485 that Reuchlin (1455-1522) took the first brave steps by a Christian toward a scientific study of the Hebrew language. The willingness of Hegius to do the same, as tentative and elementary as his approach may have been, is commendable, and an evidence of his biblical humanism. Likewise, his references to Dutch are an evidence of a new spirit that was beginning to be felt. At least it shows a more humane attitude toward the young men who sat at his feet.

At this point it may be of value to consider an appraisal made of the work of Lorenzo Valla in the area of philology. W. Keith Percival writes:

The work which most profoundly influenced all humanists in the area of Latin prose style was the voluminous Elegantiarum linguae Latinae libri sex by Lorenzo Valla (1407-57), which circulated beginning in the early 1440s. The revolutionary feature of Valla's manual was the extensive, though not exclusive, use of direct quotations from the authors of antiquity to back up the stylistic precepts. Valla was not concerned with syntax or

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 641. ²Ibid., pp. 588-89.
composition, however; the bulk of the *Elegantiae* is devoted to the proper meaning and choice of single words and the avoidance of barbarisms, i.e., non-classical words. What is truly novel in Valla's work is a pervasive critical attitude.

There could hardly be a more fitting description of the "Miscellany" which Hegius wrote. On the evidence of one of the letters that Hegius wrote to Agricola it is known that Hegius had read some of Valla's works. It seems most likely that he would also have read the *Elegantiae*. This almost becomes a certainty when the interest that Hegius has in the word *suus*, for example, is compared with what Valla had to say. If all that Hegius accomplished was confined to the contribution he made to philology, he would have to be declared a humanist on this basis alone. However, he did much more.

His distaste for the barbarities of medieval Latin led him to make a vigorous attack upon the *modus significandi*. The "Inventive Against the Modes of Signification" has been considered by scholars to be his most outstanding contribution to humanism.

Jan Pinborg observes that it was the aim of the *modistae* to raise the status of grammar from an art to a science within the overall medieval system of studies. He says:

> It was . . . determined to be a speculative [theoretical] . . .

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2Hegius to Agricola, dated 17 December [1484]. See appendix B, p. 652.


4Hegius, appendix A, pp. 633-41. Also, see above, pp. 125, 160-61, especially p. 161, n. 1.

5Lindeboom, *Humanisme*, pp. 74-75; and Ijsewijn, "Hegius Inventiva," pp. 300-301.
science . . . because its goal was not to teach language but to describe and explain the nature and organisation of language (in this case Latin) as the most important and convenient vehicle of communication.\(^1\)

It is exactly against this that Hegius reacts. For him, grammar is an art founded upon classical standards. It could never be a science built upon a medieval theory of universal language that had grown out of the realism of the High Middle Ages. He argues quite emphatically:

> Those who say that knowledge of the modes of signification makes a grammaticus ("grammarien") are mistaken. A man is not called a grammaticus for the reason that he knows that the material mode of signification of the noun is that which is common to the noun and the pronoun, and [that the] formal [mode] is that which is more proper to the noun. But a man who knows how to speak and to write in [correct] Latin is worthy of the name of grammaticus.\(^2\)

From a philosophical point of view, Hegius could not have accepted the modus significandi,\(^3\) but the thrust of his argument in the "Invective" is decidedly the perspective of a classicist. It is primarily as a humanist that Hegius opposes the modistae, of whom he singles out Michael de Morbosio for particular condemnation.\(^4\) In


\(^{2}\) Hegius, appendix A, p. 633.


\(^{4}\) Hegius, appendix A, p. 639. Michael de Morbosio, a son of the area now called Belgium, lived during the second half of the thirteenth century. He was a proponent of the active theory of signification according to which the properties and attributes of words are imposed upon them by the intellect. Pinborg summarizes the achievements of the early modists as follows:

> "Die erste Generation der Modisten hat eine bedeutende Arbeit geleistet, um die linguistische Theorie zu klären. Sie hat die Begriffe geklärt und auf einander abgestimmt, und der
his attacks on the medieval speculative grammars, Hegius follows the lead of Valla and inspires men like Erasmus to do the same.\textsuperscript{1}

In addition to his rejection of the modistae, Hegius was dissatisfied with the verse grammars such as the Doctrinale of Alexander de Villa Dei. He did not cast the Doctrinale aside completely, but together with his colleague Johan Sinthius, he edited it for use by the humanists. As this is an aspect of his activities that relates specifically to his pedagogy, the matter is discussed in the next chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that his aim in undertaking a revision of the Doctrinale was to improve and simplify the text so that students could more easily learn a better standard of Latin.\textsuperscript{2}

An aspect of the philology of the northern humanists that is quite distinctive is the emphasis they placed upon the sacred. Theirs was not merely an interest in the humanae litterae. The primary thrust of their endeavors was a concern for the sacrae litterae.\textsuperscript{3} Paul Mestwerdt says of Hegius in this regard:

In his attempt to demonstrate the significance of humanistic

\begin{quote}
Einfluss der einzelnen Stufen der semantischen Situation wurde genau untersucht. Es bildeten sich dabei im wesentlichen zwei Hauptanschauungen. Nach der einen, die besonders durch Martinus de Dacia und Johannes Dacus vertreten wurde, war die Sachbezogenheit der Grammatik und der modi significandi entscheidend; wie ihre Kritiker es später formulierten, haben sie nur die modi significandi passivi untersucht. Nach der anderen Anschauung, die besonders von Boethius de Dacia [of whom Michael de Morbosio was a disciple] herausgearbeitet wurde, war die Grammatik und die modi significandi ein selbständiger Bereich, der in sich untersucht werden musste; hier wurde der aktive Aspekt des Sinnes besonders unterstrichen." Pinborg, "Sprachtheorie," p. 94.
\end{quote}


\textsuperscript{2}See below, pp. 335-37. \textsuperscript{3}See above, pp. 65-66.
studies in the service of piety, along with an honest endeavor to strengthen religiosity and ethics there is a good portion of the apologetic that we found with the Italians, the purpose of which is to secure the formal and essential nature of the humanistic ideal against possible interference from the kind of piety and morality that is opposed to the development of culture.¹

In this instance Mestwerdt's appraisal of Hegius appears to be an accurate one. When Hegius discusses the various arts, he makes some noteworthy observations. He says:

> We owe to grammar also that we know of the mystery of our redemption—that we know that Christ, the Son of God, equal to the Father Almighty, came into the world for the salvation of mankind. . . . For we learn these things from the evangelists, whom no one [who is] illiterate can understand.²

Once again, even in the philological aspect of Hegius' humanism, one finds a concern for the moral and religious aspects of life creeping in. As is the case with the other humanists in the North, there is evidence in his writings of an interest in how the _humanae litterae_ can serve the _sacrae litterae_. The humanities are not an end in themselves. A learned philology must result in an improved standard of religious writings and ultimately be a means of achieving a deepened spirituality.³

Based on an examination of Hegius' writings, it may be concluded that, in the area of philology and grammar, he was not only a pioneer among the humanists, but that he manifests a standard of insight and scholarship that places him amongst the frontrunners of humanism in Northern Europe at the end of the fifteenth century.

The third main area of this investigation of Hegius as a

¹Mestwerdt, _Anfänge des Humanismus_, p. 154.

²Hegius, appendix A, p. 599.

³See below, p. 304-10, where the religious aspect of Hegius' humanism is investigated further.
humanist relates closely to that of philology and grammar. It concerns his attitude toward rhetoric, the second of the liberal arts. In outlining his philosophy, it has already been established that Hegius vehemently defended the art of rhetoric. This spirited defence inclines one to believe that he had come to the same conclusions as Valla and Agricola before him. Such an appraisal would in this instance be too positive. Valla and Agricola had elevated rhetoric to the position of the art par excellence. Valla's attitude toward Latin grammar was, as has been seen, much the same as that of Hegius. However, the emphasis that Valla placed upon classical literature as the only legitimate foundation for a study of Latin grammar led him to reappraise the status of dialectic in the curriculum. The consequence of the resultant revisions in the humanistic approach to the arts has been summarized by Lisa Jardine:

Their effect, in terms of traditional teaching, was to shift the focus of the curriculum away from syllogistic and its associated analysis of terms which facilitates the formal employment of terms in syllogisms. Instead, the theory of Topics became the centre of the course. As developed by the Roman orators and systematised in Boethius' De topicis differentis, the theory of the Topics provided a system of classification for oratorical material according to its appropriateness for a range of strategies used in debating, of which the syllogism was only one.

Rudolf Agricola formulated these ideas into the central theme of his De inventione dialectica, which eventually became the accepted text in the universities, but only in the sixteenth century. It is

1See above, p. 66. 2See above, pp. 217-19.
4Ibid., pp. 799-800.
inconceivable that Hegius would have failed to read De inventione dialectica by his friend Agricola. In the "Dialog about Rhetoric" there is evidence of an appreciation of the works of Cicero and Quintilian and an understanding of the new approach that had been pioneered by Valla and Agricola.\(^1\) Hegius had just begun to catch a glimpse of the ideal of rhetorical eloquence that later became the passion of the great humanists like Erasmus and Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540). To them eloquentia represented fluency of language in the widest sense. It should be a graceful and well-considered practice of grammar established upon classical norms.\(^2\) This was an ideal that not even the likes of Erasmus could achieve. For Hegius it appears to have been little more than an idea that he was able to present in theory. His writings show little evidence of the skill of the humanist rhetorician in pursuit of eloquentia.

Hegius must have considered himself more of a dialectician than a rhetorician according to his own definition.\(^3\) He uses broken speeches and syllogisms rather than continuous speech and enthymeme. In practice, his dialectic had not yet come to resemble that which was advocated by Agricola, in which Aristotle's theory of topics plays a central part. Having said this, it is important to remember that Agricola's De inventione only really came into its own as a

\(^1\)Hegius, appendix A, pp. 606-13. For example, Hegius says that rhetoric "gives us topics out of which arguments are brought forward, creating credibility." Emphasis added. He also observes that rhetoric uses "unbroken speech," and that while "dialectic rejoices in perfect syllogisms, rhetoric [rejoices] in enthymemes." Ibid., p. 608. Also, see above, p. 258; and appendix B, p. 652, where Hegius refers to Agricola's De inventione dialectica.

\(^2\)Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs, p. 77.

\(^3\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 496.
textbook around 1520 to 1530. It is clear that Hegius did not himself put into practice the the new ideals of rhetoric that were surfacing among the humanists or make them a centralizing theme in his curriculum. In the context of his times, however, he was by no means out of step with common practice even amongst those who were beginning to espouse the new learning. The fact that he was able to articulate the new ideas, if not to practice them, is an evidence that he was one who helped to foster the concept of eloquentia that became a feature of the humanism of the next generation.

An interesting consequence of the new approach to rhetoric that is also evident in the writings of Hegius is the increased willingness to look upon man as an emotional being. In agreement with Quintilian, Hegius is able to say that the true rhetorician must be "a good man skilled in speaking." Like Cicero, he can view him as someone who persuades.\(^2\) The manner in which the rhetorician establishes credibility is by appealing to the will. By contrast, the credibility achieved by the dialectician is based upon unavoidable logical proofs that appeal to the mind.\(^3\) This raises a fascinating aspect of humanism in which a conflict of interests between Stoicism and Augustinianism is evident. The next focus in this evaluation of Hegius centers upon this tension that surfaces as an intra-personal struggle in the writings of many of the humanists.

Intellectual concerns were obviously of paramount importance

\(^1\)See above, p. 296, n. 5; and Jardine, "Humanism and Logic," p. 805.

\(^2\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 607.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 608. Also, see above, p. 219.
to the humanists. After all, they considered that it was the rational ability of man that set him apart from the animals. The chief aim of humanism was to achieve the *summmum bonum*, which was understood to be happiness. This happiness, it was thought, could be attained through an exercise of the rational powers of man. If he were to apply himself diligently to the classics and the *sacrae litterae*, he would find there the wisdom of the past golden ages that would gain for him the blessedness he sought. In somewhat of a contrast to this emphasis on the cognitive aspect of man's nature, however, there was a corresponding emphasis on the affective element of his being. This was alluded to when the appeal of humanist rhetoric to the emotions was discussed. In the tension generated between these two facets of humanist thought lies buried the source of an interesting conflict between a Stoic intellectualism and an Augustinian appeal to man as a moral being with the power of choice.¹

When consideration was given to Hegius' epistemology² and ethics,³ it was established that there exists a similar tension in his thought. The conclusions drawn from an investigation of his writings suggest that for Hegius cognitive knowledge of what is right is a prerequisite to doing what is right. Knowledge of the truth is nevertheless not considered by Hegius to be a guarantee of right ethical choices.⁴ The intellect and the will, though both existing in a single indivisible soul, and both (according to one definition) being acquired virtuous habits of the mind, are not

¹See above, pp. 67-70. ²See above, pp. 174-79.
³See above, pp. 194-208. ⁴See above, pp. 204, 206.
subject to any absolute or predetermined interrelationship. Right reason may dictate a certain course of action, but the will, if it is depraved, may choose to act contrary to the dictates of reason.

Emphasis on the cognitive aspect of the intellectual powers grew out of the Stoic concept that knowledge is virtue. This was a theme that became thoroughly embedded in medieval thought through the influence of Thomas Aquinas, who taught that "the will acts according to the directives it receives from the reason." As heirs to the theology of medieval scholasticism, many of the humanists, Hegius among them, continued to stress the role of the rational intellect as pivotal to an understanding of the nature of choice. As Hegius says, "the intellective soul . . . is the mover of man." In order to gain a better grasp of what Hegius perceives is the role of man's intellect in the ordained order of creation, a brief examination of his ideas must be undertaken.

The divine intellect being the attribute of a non-contingent God is seen by Hegius to be quite distinct from created intellects. The intellect of man, nevertheless, is acknowledged to be the link that makes communication with God possible. As a result, development and exercise of the intellect attains a position of paramount importance in Hegius' thinking. He goes so far as to postulate a direct relationship between the divine and human intellects:

1See Hegius, appendix A, pp. 486, 461, 426.

2Korolec, "Will and Choice," p. 636. Aquinas does not say that knowledge is virtue, but rather that reason has power over the will. Reason and will, he argues, are one faculty in which the rational part is the governing power. Ibid., p. 635.

3Hegius, appendix A, p. 452. 4Ibid., p 455.
About this same active intellect there is a twofold opinion. For some men say that it is itself the divine intellect; others say that it is the same in respect of essence as the potential intellect, but it is called potential inasmuch as it is receptive, active inasmuch as it is active in its intellectual operation. And in the latter sense it is said [to be] nobler than the potential intellect. The second opinion is true, but the first is not denied, because we do not deny that the divine intellect acts on our understanding. Rather, it is necessary to concur principally with that very thing, since in every action it is necessary for there to be something active more noble than the thing acted upon.1

The belief that there is an interrelationship between the divine and human intellects allows Hegius to make a striking and presumptuous claim, but one that is consistent with the thinking of his times. He says that in exercising the intellectual virtues of the rational soul, men are able to approach divinity and participate in eternity. "The more truths a man knows the more like he is to God."2

The argument is developed even further. Hegius does not propose that there is any proof that the soul is immortal, but building on his understanding of the importance of the intellect he makes the following observation:

It is not necessary for the soul to be immortal because it knows immortality. But it is a likely and probable thing that it is immortal because it has knowledge of immortals, for it is not likely that that soul will perish to which has been given by God the potentiality of knowing those things that are immortal.3

The tenor of the argument is that by application of the intellect and living in accordance with eternal principles of reason, man may put himself in a position where he can no longer be mortal because he has established a link between the divine and the human minds. Man may not yet be immortal, but by a high level of rational activity he may come close to making himself "unmortal." Exercise and

1Ibid. p. 484. 2Ibid., 395. 3Ibid., p. 478.
development of the intellectual powers are the means by which the individual, in this life, can conquer death.

Hegius does not quite concur with the Stoics that knowledge is virtue.\textsuperscript{1} Nor does he even agree with Aquinas that the will acts according to the directives it receives from the intellect. What he does say is that "to speculate about truth is a good thing, since it is a perfection of the human mind. . . . A doctrine makes the man who has it disposed to speculating on the true and not the false."\textsuperscript{2}

In the scheme that Hegius proposes, the rational faculties of man play a central and indispensable role in the God-man relationship as well as in the discrimination process that occurs in the making of moral choices. The cognitive does not dominate the affective as is the case with Aquinas, but Hegius has stretched the potential of the rational powers as far as his theology and philosophy allows. It is quite natural that Hegius should see the intellect as being a vital component in matters of relationship and choice, for it is the rational powers that distinguish men from all other physical beings. The surprising thing is the extent to which he goes in his postulations without taking much cognizance of other aspects of the nature of man. And yet it would not be true to say that he dismisses the powers of volition as being unimportant. These, too, are emphasized. It is in the juxtaposition of the cognitive and affective facets of man's psyche that the Stoical and Augustinian aspects of his thinking are seen to be in tension.

The significance of living a morally upright life was crucially important with regard to salvation according to the theology

\textsuperscript{1}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 396. \textsuperscript{2}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 553.
of the time in which Hegius lived.\(^1\) It has already been established that the role of the rational intellect in volition is pivotal to Hegius' thinking. Ultimately, however, Hegius recognizes that the will is free, and that a man may choose to act against the dictates of right reason.\(^2\) In this he goes along with Occam\(^3\) and allies himself to the vast majority of the humanists who generally held that the will is not in bondage to reason or determined by God.\(^4\)

Although Hegius has elevated the rational powers to a status that is almost divine, he is forced by his understanding of ethics and his epistemology to acknowledge that final authority in moral decision making resides in the seat of the will. He is brought to this conclusion by the Occamist presuppositions that form the basis of his philosophy\(^5\) and by a more holistic view of the being of man that was becoming a part of humanist thinking.\(^6\) The appeal to the emotions that is encountered when examining Hegius' understanding of rhetoric is one evidence of this rediscovery of the importance of the physical and emotional aspects of man's nature.

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\(^2\)See above, pp. 204-6; and Hegius, appendix A, pp. 519, 555.


\(^5\)It is remembered that Hegius considers ethics to be the most important aspect of philosophy. His Occamism then ensures that revealed ethics (the ethics of faith that appeals to the heart) is considered to be "more true" than that which has been discovered by reason (the ethics of the mind). Hegius, appendix A, pp. 550, 552. Also, see above, pp. 270-76.

\(^6\)See above, pp. 68-70.
example of this tendency is seen in the fact that Hegius is not willing to denigrate the mechanical arts as being adulterous, in spite of the elevated perceptions that he has concerning the powers of the intellect.¹

The subordination of reason to revelation that was a consequence of both the Occamist and the Augustinian elements in his thinking had the effect, once again, of reducing that which was scientifically knowable. In the final analysis it was virtue, not knowledge, that was to be sought. The end in view for the humanists was not scientia but sapientia,² and it has already been shown that Hegius was a dedicated suitor of this devout wisdom.³ Both his reform-mindedness and his Occamist scholasticism inclined Hegius in the direction of a faith-oriented search for a philosophia Christ. The fact that a significant element in his thinking happened to be scholastic cannot allow one to question the validity of these ideas as a manifestation of his humanism.

It is evident that this enquiry has already strayed from intellectual to religious concerns. The two areas are closely interrelated, but there are some specifically religious criteria relating to humanism by which it was agreed that Hegius would be evaluated.⁴ The humanitas of the Italian Renaissance became much more of a Christian pietas in the North, and, consequently, the summum bonum was no longer merely the intellectual life, but rather the intellectual life that resulted in virtue. In addition, the attention that the northern scholars devoted to the classics was not

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 598. ²See above, pp. 69-70.
simply the result of a desire to understand and imitate the golden age of classical antiquity. Classical studies were pursued along with an investigation of the literature of the golden age of the Early Church. The purpose was primarily to discover what contribution these non-Christian sources could make to the development of the sacrae litterae and the pursuit of virtuous living. The question that must now be addressed is to what extent Hegius participated in this quest that was so much a part of northern humanism.

When noting the intellectual concerns of Hegius' humanism, this study considered the importance that he attaches to ethics and the freedom of the will in making moral choices. "Will," he says, "is nothing but the power of the human mind desirous of those things that right reason dictates."¹ That which right reason dictates is the life of virtue lived according to those precepts that have been revealed or discovered to be true.² Christian piety is an emphasis that has been seen to be an integral part of the whole of Hegius' philosophy, whether it be in relation to the various aspects of his scholasticism or the distinguishing features of his humanism. The influence of the devotion moderna in the Low Countries did not fail to touch the lives of the humanists there, and in this Hegius was no exception. He is able to agree fully with the greatest of the early Dutch humanists, Agricola, who observes that "first and foremost" one should have regard for moral philosophy.³ For Hegius, "the most worthy of sciences is [that] which brings good morals to the City of God."⁴

From someone so concerned about moral philosophy and right living, one would expect to find a considerable reliance on religious sources in his writings. Even taking into account the purpose for which he produced the dialogs, it is surprising how little appeal is made to the Scriptures and other religious authors. This is not to say that Hegius does not appeal to these sources. It is just that the reader does not feel that the dialogs are permeated by Christian religious thought to the same extent as, in particular, the thoughts of Aristotle. There is no question about the piety of the writings, but quite often it is apparent that Christian piety is being mediated through the mindset of Aristotle. It could be argued that this is the humanist ideal of classics in the service of the sacrae litterae, but a more honest appraisal is that Hegius still finds himself in the grip of medieval philosophy. To be sure, his point of reference is Aristotle himself rather than some medieval commentary on Aristotle. In this respect he manifests a strong humanist tendency. But it must be admitted that, in many of the dialogs, Hegius remains to a great extent under the spell of classical philosophy rather than the revealed Word. There is an appeal to the golden ages of antiquity, and this includes an appeal to Scripture and the Church Fathers, but the overwhelming emphasis remains with the writings of Aristotle.

It might be that a part of the problem lies in the expectations of the modern reader rather than in the writings of the early humanists. Although Occam had reintroduced a distinction between theology and philosophy, there is no question that these two areas of study remained inexorably intertwined at the end of the fifteenth
century. Rejection of a scholastic frame of reference was tantamount to a disavowal of Christian theology. Additionally, it must be accepted that the humanists as a whole remained deeply indebted to Aristotle. If one is willing to accept the definition proposed by Isidore Silver, that "human letters are the classical literatures considered as an instrument of moral education," then one may come to a better understanding of the issues at stake. It may be that the reader will not feel quite satisfied with this explanation, but from this standpoint it is possible to see the difficulties involved in disentangling religion and moral philosophy from the writings of the classical authors at the end of the Middle Ages. It can also be seen that, in spite of their distinctly classical frame of reference, it is not an anomaly to call Hegius or any of his northern colleagues biblical humanists. In order to make a fairer evaluation of the religiosity of Hegius' humanism, a fresh look must be taken at his writings from this slightly altered perspective.

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1Ozment, "Humanism," pp. 137-38; and above, p. 250.

2See above, pp. 286-87.


4The only fair judgment of the religiosity of Hegius' humanism is to compare it with the standards and practices of biblical humanism established by other northern scholars. A brief study of the writings of many of these men is sufficient to make the reader well aware that they often use the same approach as does Hegius. See, for example, De ratione studii, by Erasmus, the prince of the biblical humanists. This is translated in Erasmus, Collected Works, vol. 24: Literature and Educational Writings 2: De Ratione Studii, ed. Craig R. Thompson, trans. Brian McGregor (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1978), pp. 667-91.
In the more specifically religious dialogs, Hegius makes many references to Scripture\textsuperscript{1} and to the Church Fathers.\textsuperscript{2} Elsewhere scattered throughout the dialogs are occasional references to Christian sources. Some of these are fairly general, such as when Hegius proposes that those things that are to be believed by Christians "are contained in both Testaments, the Old and the New, and in the creeds."\textsuperscript{3} From time to time more specific references are cited, usually when a moral point is to be made. So, for example, Hegius quotes from Ezek 18:4, "The soul that sins, that same will die."\textsuperscript{4} He also makes use of Bible texts to illustrate grammatical usage.\textsuperscript{5} Interestingly, when Hegius discusses the arts of grammar, rhetoric, and logic, he cites Augustine on four occasions in the space of just a few pages.\textsuperscript{6} And in the final pages of the "Invective," a number of Early Church writers are held up as ideals that diligent students should follow in their pursuit of an improved style of Latin. From this brief survey it can be seen that in addition to the general moral piety found throughout his writings, Hegius makes considerable appeal to more exclusively Christian sources.

Insight into the interest Hegius manifested in the sacrae litterae is greatly enhanced by an examination of his correspondence. For example, in the letter to Wessel Gansfort, Hegius shares

\textsuperscript{1}See, for example, the second dialog on the incarnation, where Hegius cites a number of the Messianic prophecies. Hegius, appendix A, pp. 587-90.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., pp. 591-93. Here Hegius cites Augustine, Eusebius, and Basil of Cappadocia (ca. 330-79).

\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., p. 391. \textsuperscript{4}Ibid., p. 403. \textsuperscript{5}Ibid., p. 619.

\textsuperscript{6}Ibid., pp. 601-6.
the discoveries he had made in the Cusan library:

I found many Hebrew books, altogether unknown to me; but fewer of the Greek. The following, I recall, were there: Epiphanius Against Heresies, a very large work; Dionysius [the Pseudo-Areopagite] On the Hierarchy; Athanasius Against Arius; Climacus: These I left there. But I brought with me Basil On the Hexameron and his Homilies on the Psalms; the Epistles of Paul together with the Acts of the Apostles; the Lives of certain Romans and Greeks written by Plutarch, and also his Symposium; some grammars; some mathematical works; some songs of deepest feeling concerning the Christian religion, composed as I believe by Gregory Nazianzen; some prayers. . . .

. . . If it will not inconvenience you to be without the Greek gospels, I beg you to lend them to me.*

The words are like those of a young boy sharing a newly discovered mystery with a close friend. From this it is obvious that Hegius took great delight in the sacrae litterae.

Hegius did not, as far as is known, produce any critical texts of the Early Fathers or any scholarly works about them. This was a task that many of the other northern humanists undertook. He should not be judged too harshly because of this, however, for he chose the vita activa rather than the vita contemplativa and directed his efforts toward activities of a practical pedagogical nature. The only other extant works that are known are his poems, and in these there is no doubt of a decidedly Christian emphasis.2

Another aspect of Hegius' concern for the sacrae litterae is the manner in which he uses the classical humanities in the service of religion. For example, he quotes from Pliny in order to illustrate the theory of non-contradiction that forms a part of the argument on the dialectic of the two powers.3 In another place, when he

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1Hegius to Wessel Gansfort, from Deventer between 1482 and 1489. See appendix B, p. 656.
2See above, p. 230. 3Hegius, appendix A, p. 575.
is discussing grammar and poetics, he quotes from two hymns and then makes the following observations:

[A man] who knows the quantities of syllables can write good verses, which the man cannot do who does not know them. He can avoid barbarisms. . . . And for this reason those who do not know the quantities of syllables cannot correctly read in church the epistles and gospels, prophets and psalms, and the other things that are read.¹

A study of grammar—-and for Hegius this means classical grammar—is therefore seen as an essential part of preparation for participation in the religious services that constitute an integral part of living the virtuous Christian life.

It may then be said that Hegius, like the rest of his humanist colleagues in the North, pursued a study of the classics with a special focus on the benefits that this study might bring to an understanding of sacred literature. In addition, the study of humanitas was, in the minds of these scholars, only valid if it encouraged a virtuous way of life. As Hegius says: "What use to a man is knowledge of the movement of the stars if he is not sensible of what is proper for him and what is not."²

The sixth and final area of this investigation of the contribution that Hegius made to northern humanism deals with his educational endeavors. Because this is a very important aspect of his activities it is discussed in a separate chapter. Suffice it to say at this point that Hegius chose to live an active life of service rather than a contemplative life dedicated to private study. Even in this he reflected a tendency that was common among the northerners.³ The virtuous life was to be experienced and shared,

¹Ibid., pp. 601. ²Ibid., p. 456. ³See above, p. 72.
not merely written about in a fine classical style. Hegius did not fall short in this area. In fact, he even outshone the great names of the North. Agricola and Erasmus were much more inclined to the vita contemplativa than the active life. This is perhaps why their writings are of a higher standard than many of the other men of the Northern Renaissance. Most of the northerners, like Hegius, opted for the vita activa, and more often than not they chose to direct their energies into teaching. In this Hegius set for them a shining example worthy of emulation.\(^1\) In his dialog on ethics he writes: "If that man seeks out a good thing who takes pains to learn an art, so much the more does he seek out the good who employs that art than [he who] pursues it by learning."\(^2\) Hegius was not satisfied merely to hold up such ideals before his students. He lived them.

**Hegius—Pioneer of Renaissance**

The latter half of the fifteenth century was not a period that produced any great quantity or quality of humanist literature in the Low Countries. It was, nevertheless, a time when the epoch-making pioneers laid the foundation upon which the more mature humanists could build around the end of the fifteenth century.\(^3\) As Hegius' contribution to the study of the humanae litterae has been examined, it has become obvious that no more can be claimed for him than that he was one of the epoch-making pioneers. Ijsewijn observes that during this period Agricola seems to have been the only northerner "to engage himself wholly in humanistic studies."\(^4\)

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\(^1\)See above, pp. 228-29.  
\(^2\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 553.  
\(^3\)See above, p. 74.  
There is, however, no denying the fact that Hegius was taken up with the pursuit of humanistic ideals. In his correspondence, a sense of excitement is detected when he speaks of the new learning. There is also evidence of a genuine interest in self-improvement in Latin grammar and a knowledge of the classical authors as well as the sacrae litterae. It must be acknowledged that as a humanist Hegius had considerable deficiencies in certain areas, and by no stretch of the imagination can he be placed on a par with the likes of Erasmus. In each of the areas of his humanism that has been examined, however, there has been solid evidence of at least the genesis of a humanistic approach. As a grammarian, he excelled. As a rhetorician, he exhibited an elementary knowledge of humanistic theory but produced little that shows his practical ability. In his intellectual and religious approach, he manifested the same tendencies as did his northern colleagues. When his educational endeavors are evaluated in the next chapter, it is noted that it was chiefly through the efforts of Hegius that the humanist torch was passed on from Agricola to the future generation of students in the Low Countries. When all this is taken into consideration, it seems justifiable not only to conclude that was Hegius was a humanist, but that he was a good one. He became the leading light among the pioneers of humanism in the Netherlands and was a major contributor to the establishment of the foundation upon which the movement flourished in the early part of the sixteenth century.

The Renaissance in the Low Countries arose out of a number of movements and schools of thought that flowed together to constitute the new approach to learning. Chief among these was humanism,
which was in turn influenced by three other major elements. These were the devotio moderna, a spirit of reform, and scholasticism.¹ In the piety and spirit of reform that Hegius manifested one finds what one would expect in a northern scholar whose interests were inclining toward Renaissance ideals. Hegius was conservative in his intellectual approach, but it is possible to detect at least the beginnings of a more critical spirit that became the hallmark of later humanists. If he was critical, his major concern was for a more genuine religion stripped of medieval superstition and unnecessary scholastic haggling. His whole approach to life and learning was influenced by a deep concern for moral reform. Whatever did not, in his estimation, contribute to virtuous living received, at best, only secondary consideration. As a result, his humanism was strongly influenced by the spirit of devotion and piety that was typical of the North.

The understanding that Hegius had of scholastic issues is more surprising. Based on the evaluations made by other scholars, one would not have expected to find in his writings so much of an adherence to the ideas of the via moderna. Although it has not previously been recognized that Hegius espoused a nominalistic approach to philosophy, it has been acknowledged that if scholasticism made a contribution to Renaissance learning, then it was primarily through the medium of moderate logico-critical nominalism. It was to this branch of the via moderna that Hegius gave his allegiance, though he also remained indebted to the via antiqua.

¹See above, pp. 40-43, where the elements of the Northern Renaissance are discussed.
As attention is focused on the educational corollaries that resulted from the particular approach Hegius took to the new learning, his understanding of scholasticism takes on an added significance. The schools of the Low Countries generally offered an education that was steeped in the traditions of the via antiqua. If Hegius introduced more of the logico-critical methodology of the via moderna, it is not at all surprising that his school was also the first to take major strides forward in humanism.
CHAPTER VI

EDUCATIONAL COROLLARIES

Erasmus said of his former teacher in the Deventer school that if he had any fault it was his great humility.¹ A. F. C. Koch, who has done a great deal of research into life in Deventer in the fifteenth century, has concluded that Hegius must indeed have been an extremely humble man who lived a very simple life. For so famous and well-respected a teacher, it is quite amazing how little is mentioned about him in official city documents and records.² About the only thing recorded is his death.³ He bought no house, drew up no will, withdrew no money from the treasury for use in the school, and was even reticent to use his name in publications for which he was responsible or partly responsible. As a result, when it comes to developing a portrait of Hegius as a teacher or composing a picture of the Deventer school under his rectorship, there is very little direct information to which the researcher is able turn. Some ideas can be gleaned from comments made about him by his many grateful students. The rest must be inferred from such things as the kind of

¹See above, p. 281.

²Interview with Anton Carl Frederik Koch, Member of the Dutch Royal Academy of Sciences, Town Archives, Deventer, 20 March 1984. Koch's research has given him a deep insight into life in Deventer at the end of the Middle Ages. A number of the books that he has published are listed in the bibliography.

³See above, p. 5.
books being published in Deventer during the time that he was rector, the growth in the number of students, the attributes of the teachers that Hegius employed, what Hegius' philosophical writings reveal about his teaching methodologies, and so on.

Although the sources are not very clear as to what happened in Deventer at the end of the fifteenth century, this study attempts to discover if any significant educational changes were introduced. It can safely be assumed that Deventer was a fairly typical Dutch school in 1482 when Hegius arrived. It had seen some prosperous times in the previous century and could boast of being one of only two or three institutions that offered the first two classes. In the 1450s and early 1480s, however, Deventer had been ravaged by the plague and the school had suffered great setbacks. It is not likely then that there was anything particularly special about St. Lebuins at the beginning of Hegius' rectorship. Erasmus certainly found the school to be anything but advanced.\(^1\) It is, therefore, legitimate to compare developments in Deventer during the late 1400s with what was found in chapter 3 to be the norm for education in the Low Countries prior to the humanist revival. The investigation undertaken in the present chapter covers the following main areas: (1) educational philosophy and goals, (2) the curriculum, (3) books and printing, (4) Hegius as a teacher, (5) what was expected of the student, and (6) the methods that were employed in the school.

It is interesting that the three schools considered most

successful in the Low Countries and Westphalia in the last part of
the fifteenth century were at Wesel, Emmerich, and Deventer. These
were the three institutions at which Hegius was rector. The task
now is to discover what it was from a practical point of view that
made him such a successful pedagog.

**Educational Philosophy and Goals in Deventer**

Hegius defines learning as follows: "To learn is to admit
into the mind an assent to truth or falsehood, that is, to turn from
unknowing to knowing, from unbelieving to believing, or from not
deluded to deluded." Because knowledge "is good to have and to
possess," and learning is the process by which knowledge may be
attained, "it is inevitable that it is a good thing to learn." The
definition that Hegius gives, however, does sound a warning note.
He recognizes that "untruths are learned" as well, and that "heretics [learn] their heresies, the deluded their delusions."

Because of this it is imperative that the individual be
aware of the ultimate goal of his actions. Hegius explains: "Just
as an archer does not know where he will send his arrows if he does
not know his target, so neither can a man know how he ought to live
if he does not know for the sake of what thing he is living." According to Hegius the ultimate goal is blessedness. This is to be
found by discovering God and loving Him in this life, which in turn

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3Ibid., p. 396. 4Ibid, p. 397. 5Ibid., p. 561.

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prepares the individual to thank Him and enjoy Him in the future.\(^1\)

The basic presuppositions upon which Hegius established the goals of education must therefore be seen as religiously oriented. For the northern humanists in particular, the dissemination of a liberal education remained essentially a prerogative of the Church. There was little distinction between the aims of the Church and those of the school. The stock-in-trade of education was not knowledge, but knowledge that resulted in virtuous Christian living. It is in the light of these high ideals that Hegius' response to some advice given to him by Gansfort can best be understood. He says: "I have followed your counsel. For all learning is pernicious that is attended with loss of honesty."\(^2\) The influence of the devotio moderna with its strong emphasis on piety of life continued to be felt in the schools of the Low Countries, even when these institutions began to adopt a Renaissance approach to education.

The mystical yet conservative religious traditions of the devotionalists as well as the strong tendency of the via moderna toward a theological and philosophical simplification both prompted Hegius toward the humanist ideal of a philosophia Christi.\(^3\) In the final analysis, belief in God was better than any scientific knowledge. As a teacher, Hegius recognized that it is the purpose of education to turn "beliefs into knowledge,"\(^4\) but he did not feel that this was his primary task. He readily accepted that not all

\(^{1}\)Ibid.

\(^{2}\)Hegius to Wessel Gansfort, from Deventer between 1482 and 1489. See appendix B, p. 656.

\(^{3}\)See above, p. 141. \(^{4}\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 390.

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belief can be transformed into scientia, and with this he felt quite comfortable. The burden of his heart was to bring to his students that which he felt was necessary to prepare them for an inheritance in the eternal kingdom. The learning of sapientia or devout wisdom was the most essential aspect of education.

There was, therefore, a strong element of continuity with the past in the emphasis on moral education. On the other hand, Hegius' rejection of the scholastic "proofs" of the via antiqua introduced a new factor that was a consequence of the overall scheme of philosophy that he accepted. A clear distinction was now made between the areas of reason and faith. Though both remained essential aspects of the curriculum, the approach taken to these two areas of learning was very different. In the former the aim was to establish knowledge, while in the latter there could only be belief.

Another change in emphasis came as a result of Hegius' conception of what constituted knowledge worthy to be learned. If he rejected much of medieval learning as a result of his espousal of the via moderna, he was equally adamant that it should be rejected because of its "barbarity." The humanists could not countenance what they perceived to be an abuse of grammar, and in this Hegius was no exception. Grammar could not be formulated on the basis of a metaphysical connection with the entities and concepts that it was supposed to represent. It had to correspond with the usage of those who used it best, irrespective of any logical structures that some might wish to impose upon it. In the case of Latin, this meant that the standard for acceptable grammar had to be the language of

1Ibid., p. 390-91. 2See above, pp. 96, 141.
the classical authors. In this sense the humanists tried to revive a dead language.\footnote{See above, pp. 100-101.} It was on the basis of these considerations that Hegius made his attacks on the 
modistae.\footnote{See above, pp. 292-94.} One of his chief aims was to improve the standard of Latin taught in the schools.

The manner in which Hegius looked back to the classical age and the era of the Early Church as the source of the best knowledge is indicative of another of the humanist traits. Reliance upon the wisdom of antiquity was based upon the assumption that there is an unchanging body of knowledge that is reflected better in the wisdom of a past golden era than in the learning of the Middle Ages. The disintegration of late medieval society was thought by the humanists to be largely the result of negligence in pursuit of this wisdom.

A direct consequence of this acceptance of an absolute body of truth was the unimaginative way in which it was conceived that knowledge could best be communicated. P. N. M. Bot describes it as a method by means of which material was "pumped into the memory."\footnote{P. N. M. Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs in Nederland (Utrecht: Spectrum, 1955), p. 53.} Hegius, like the other humanists, did not question this method of instruction. Although the educational philosophy of the humanists did introduce some distinctive changes in methodology, they retained an almost slavish adherence to a system in which knowledge was "banked" into the mind like some sort of commodity.\footnote{See above, p. 150. Methodology is discussed below on pp. 358-68, but this aspect of the educational practices of the humanists is so all-embracing that it takes on the character of a fundamental principle. It was upon the basis of this principle that all their methodologies were developed.}
Hegius understood it, was an active operation, but to be taught was "to be acted upon."¹

From this brief overview of the educational philosophy and goals that Hegius established for his school, it is obvious that his general philosophy had important educational implications. There was a definite continuity with the past, but sometimes on the basis of quite different foundational principles. In some areas the modified philosophic perspectives resulted in fundamental changes of direction in educational practice. From this introduction, it is now time to look at specific areas in which these transformations took place. The first aspect of this examination is the curriculum.

Curricular Concerns

It would be false to suggest that the curriculum in Deventer underwent any revolutionary changes immediately upon the arrival of Hegius. The modifications that did take place were undoubtedly of an evolutionary nature, and there was much that remained the same.²

The division of the course of studies into eight classes appears to have been retained. Johannes Butzbach mentions an occasion "when all eight classes were together."³ This is admittedly a gathering that took place shortly after Hegius' death. The matter-of-fact reference to the event, however, seems to indicate that

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 461.
²For an outline of the major elements of the pre-humanist curriculum in the Low Countries, see above, pp. 105-13.
there was nothing unusual about such a gathering. If any questions have been raised, Butzbach's comment places the weight of evidence firmly on the side of the argument which suggests that Hegius did in fact offer the secunda and prima.

There is also no reason to believe that there were any major modifications in the manner in which the schedule of courses was divided between the trivium and the quadrivium. There may have been some change of emphasis in the content of the various subjects, but the overall structure would have remained the same. The requirements for acceptance into a program of study at any of the universities did not alter at the time Hegius was rector. This dictated to a considerable degree what subjects a school offered and how they would be taught. It may be assumed, therefore, that a study of grammar occupied the major portion of the first three years, followed by logic which was completed after six years. This means that by the end of the third class a student would have completed the courses prescribed by the medieval trivium.

The rector of a city school usually taught in the upper class. This means that Hegius would have lectured to students who had reached the second year in their study of the quadrivium. The suggestion has been made that the major emphasis in the secunda and prima was on an investigation of the philosophy of Aristotle. This

1See Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 101.


3See above, pp. 108-10, 113.
observation is well supported by the analysis that has been made of the dialogs that Hegius wrote. It has already been seen that some of them are heavily dependent upon Aristotle's writings. A number of them are undoubtedly lectures that Hegius gave to his students in the upper classes.¹

One of the first noticeable changes affecting the curriculum was almost certainly in the teaching of Latin grammar. Although this was of particular importance in the first three years of the trivium, it is obvious from what Hegius writes that the attempts being made to improve the standard of grammar were not confined to these early years. It is unnecessary at this stage to examine Hegius' approach to grammar, since it has already been discovered that he favored some basic changes that emphasized the importance of following the classical model.² The earliest publication of his "Miscellany" was about 1480.³ By 1488 the revision of the Doctrinale of Alexander de Villa Dei that he co-authored with Johan Sinthius was printed for the first time.⁴ These texts make manifest the deep concern that Hegius had for higher standards of grammar.

Some serious questions have been raised about the success and, indeed, the interest that Hegius had in introducing classical studies into the curriculum. These relate to certain observations that Butzbach makes concerning the time during which Hegius was rector of the Deventer school. But argues that these comments make

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¹Others would have been given on high days to the assembled school body.


⁴Ibid., p. 662, 681.
it difficult to accept the idea that there was any kind of revival of the classics in the curriculum in Deventer prior to 1498.\(^1\) The statement in question reads as follows: "I have often heard it said that apart from the Parables of Alanus, the morals or ethics of Cato, the Fables of Aesop, and a few other writers of this character . . . scarcely anything was read."\(^2\)

It must be admitted that Butzbach's remarks are somewhat confusing. On the pages prior to that from which the above quotation is taken, Butzbach lauds the work of Hegius. In doing this he gives the distinct impression that the school had made substantial curricular advances. He states that the gymnasium enjoyed an enviable reputation under Hegius' "because of the attention it paid to the humanities."\(^3\) These remarks come as no surprise considering the reputation Hegius had established as an early humanist. Some of Butzbach's other remarks are a little more puzzling. He observes:

But now, when all the schools . . . resound with the various admirable prose and poetic works of the ancient and modern writers, all zeal flags, and most of the students set about the matter like the ass with the lyre.\(^4\)

Bot's explanation of these remarks by Butzbach is to take them at face value, accepting that he was plainly unhappy with the new learning and the results it was having on students.\(^5\) Without

\(^1\)Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs, pp. 243-44; and above, p. 118, n. 1.

\(^2\)Butzbach, Autobiography, p. 114.  \(^3\)Ibid., p. 112.

\(^4\)Ibid., p. 114.

\(^5\)"Wij moeten dus wel combineren: onder Hegius grote bloei--veel roepingen--weinig klassieke schrijvers; na hem gehumaniseerd onderwijs--achteruitgang van de school--daling van het aantal roepingen." Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs, p. 244.

It does appear that the school went into decline after 1500, but not
denying that there is some truth to this view, it seems that there are other possible explanations for the apparent inconsistencies. In the first place, Butzbach may not have condemned humanistic studies at all, concerned as they were with "admirable prose and poetic works." Rather, he might have been pointing out the lack of motivation and flagging zeal of the students. From this viewpoint his observations may merely have been a nostalgia for the "good old days" when students had to work harder and were more inclined to enter holy orders. In this case, it is difficult to tell if the opinions that he expresses had some substance to them or not.

A second possible explanation of Butzbach's remarks is that he is not merely referring to the period when Hegius was rector. In the context of his observations, he speaks of the monastic reforms of the devotio moderna that had occurred during the previous century, during which time many learned men from the Deventer school became monks. These comments are made in the same context as the in the way that Butzbach seems to suggest. Erasmus also mentions the "once famous school of . . . Deventer." Erasmus, Collected Works, vol. 31: Adages Ili to Iv100, trans. Margaret Mann Phillips, annotated by R. A. B. Mynors (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), p. 350.56-57, adagium I. iv. 39. The decline of which Erasmus speaks is of a very different nature from that which concerned Butzbach. Butzbach notes that fewer young men were entering the orders. Erasmus, on the other hand, observes that what had once been a school well known for the study of the classics had now dwindled in fame. His concern was certainly not for the number of novitiates. The remarks made by Erasmus are in contrast to what Bot suggests Butzbach is saying, namely, that following Hegius' death, when the classics were introduced, there were fewer novices entering the monasteries. Erasmus makes it clear that under Hegius the classics were already studied. Consequently, Bot's interpretation of Butzbach cannot be accepted and one is forced to look elsewhere for a solution. Incidentally, the decline of which Erasmus writes could not have been too dramatic. Humanists like Johannes Oostendorp and Bartholomew van Keulen were among Hegius' successors in Deventer.

1Butzbach, Autobiography, p. 114. 2Ibid.
remarks previously cited and, in fact, in the same paragraph of Monroe and Seybolt’s translation. This interpretation becomes even more plausible when it is noted that Butzbach, in what at first seems to be a recollection of his Deventer days, writes: “I have often heard it said. . . .”¹ If Butzbach was a student in Deventer at the end of Hegius’ career, and if he had personal experience of the curriculum to which he appears to be referring, then this is an odd statement for him to make. If, however, it is understood that he is referring to a period of around one hundred years ending about 1500, the statement makes much more sense.

This explanation acknowledges that Alanus and Aesop were still studied under Hegius, which is not to be doubted. At the same time it does not demand an acceptance of the almost inconceivable suggestion that very few of the ancient authors were read prior to 1498. Without discounting the comments made by Butzbach, it can still be admitted that Hegius introduced a wider spectrum of texts that included the classics. This is affirmed elsewhere by Butzbach himself² and corroborated by the evidence of Erasmus.³

¹Ibid. Emphasis added.


³See Erasmus, Collected Works 31:348-51, adagium i.iv.39. I cannot agree with Bot when he argues that it was because of the more traditional textbooks and curriculum that greater numbers of novitiates entered the monasteries before Hegius’ death than after. It is my conjecture that the classics were studied under Hegius but that the piety of his life and teaching continued to encourage students to enter holy orders.
Hegius' interest in the classics is clear. He manifests a genuine concern for an improved standard of Latin, he defines grammar from a classical perspective, he regularly refers to classical and patristic authors, and he appears to encourage the printing of classical and humanistic works. On the basis of this evidence, it may confidently be argued that the curriculum in Deventer was given a more classical orientation under his direction.

The place of rhetoric in the curriculum is difficult to judge. As already noted, Hegius was aware of the new ideas that had been formulated by Valla and Agricola. Hegius hardly appears to incorporate these ideas into the bulk of his own writing, but he does present a revitalized humanist understanding of rhetoric in his dialog on that topic. Whether this was an isolated lecture, perhaps presented to all the students on a high day, or whether it reflected a basic change in the manner in which rhetoric was taught at St. Lebuins is open to question.

The next change that is considered is one about which there

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1See above, pp. 289, 295.
2See above, pp. 212-15; and Hegius, appendix A, pp. 595-641.
3See above, pp. 287-88, 308-9.
4See below, pp. 332-42; and appendix C, pp. 660-78.
5See above, pp. 296-98; and appendix B, p. 652. In a letter to Agricola in 1484, Hegius says: "I do not dare to request you to make an abridgement of your book On Dialectic.... I cannot fail to say that you will deserve the best from the students of rhetoric if you have shared it with them." The work to which Hegius refers is Agricola's De inventione dialectica. In the sixteenth century this book became the standard text for treatment of the humanistic approach to dialectic. It incorporates a well-considered exposition of the changed understanding of the role of rhetoric.
is much more certainty. The study of Greek was introduced into the curriculum at about the time Hegius became rector in Deventer. It appears that St. Lebuins was the first school north of the Alps to incorporate Greek as an integral part of the regular school program. It cannot be categorically stated that Hegius was responsible for this innovation, but the study of Greek was certainly encouraged when the new rector arrived in 1482.

The attitude that Hegius had toward the Greek language is vividly portrayed in one of his most celebrated poems, "On the Usefulness of the Greek Language:"

Whoever you are, if you wish to learn grammar, learn Greek;
In order to write correctly and without error, learn Greek.
If you do not know Greek you will corrupt the names of things;

1This proposal is made on the evidence of other scholars. See, for example, Regnerus Richardus Post, The Modern Devotion: Confrontation with Reformation and Humanism, Studies in Medieval and Reformation Thought, no. 3 (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1968), p. 562; and Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs, p. 182, especially n. 2. It is not possible to be definite about the exact date that Greek was first taught in Deventer. Erasmus, speaking of his acquaintance with Hegius, says: "He was headmaster of the once famous school of the town of Deventer, where I learned the rudiments of both languages when I was almost a child." Erasmus, Collected Works, 31:350, adagium 1.iv.39. One cannot be sure that it was only after Hegius arrived that Erasmus was exposed to Greek. Considering the proficiency Erasmus had reached just a few years later it seems likely that he would have studied it in Deventer for longer than just a few months. It is therefore conceivable that Greek was already taught in Deventer before Hegius arrived. If this is the case, no one has any idea of who the teacher might have been. The major problem is that Erasmus was never a pupil in Hegius' class. Hegius taught in the first class, but Erasmus only reached the third class at St. Lebuins. As a bright lad he may have learned Greek from his older friends who were in the upper class. See Erasmus, Compendium vitae, in Collected Works, vol. 4:405.44-45. It is, however, difficult to envisage how this could have taken place in the short time that Hegius and Erasmus were together in Deventer. If Erasmus did learn the rudiments of Greek at St. Lebuins then one feels instinctively that Hegius cannot be given all the credit for introducing the subject into the curriculum. On the other hand, there is no record of any other Greek teacher in Deventer at this early date.
If you do not know Greek you will write the names of things incorrectly;  
If you do not know Greek you will pronounce the names of things incorrectly.  
The language of Pelasgus will prevent you from writing poor verse.  
If you take delight in reading Pliny, learn Greek;  
And if you wish to study sacred books, learn Greek;  
If you wish to understand Hieronymus you must certainly learn Greek.  
If you do not wish to write poor verse, learn Greek;  
If you wish to dispute, whoever you are, learn Greek;  
Whoever you are, if you wish to learn rhetoric, learn Greek;  
If you wish to know mathematics, whoever you are, learn Greek.  
If you are enthralled by the art of medicine, learn Greek,  
For all illnesses are given Greek names.  
An Argolic name is ascribed to all figures of speech;  
The liberal arts speak the language of Greek,  
No other. To it the Latin language gives no words.  
In summary, everything is indebted to the learned Greeks.1  

Hegius may not have been extremely proficient in Greek, but he must have had a fairly good understanding of the language. Some years before he moved to Deventer, he had learned Greek from his friend Agricola. When the opportunity arose, Hegius introduced this:  

1Alexander Hegius, Alexandri Hegii Gymnasiarche iampridem Daventriensis diligentissimi artium professoris clarissimi philosophi presbyteri poete utriusque linque docti carmina et gravia et elegantia, ed. Jacobus Faber (Deventer: Richard Paffraet, 1503), fo. D.iii verso. The original reads as follows:  
"Quisquis grammaticam vis discere discito grece  
Ut recte scribas non prave discito grece  
Si grece nescis: corrumpis nomina rerum  
Si grece nescis male scribis nomina rerum  
Si grece nescis: male profers nomina rerum  
Lingua Pelasga vetat viciosos scribere versus  
Lectio quem Plinii delectat discito grece  
Si qvibus sacros libros vis discere discito grece  
Hieronymum teneas vigilans tu discito grece  
Ne versus scribas viciosos: discito grece  
Argumentari quisquis vis, discito grece  
Quisquis Rhetoricon vis discere discito grece  
Scire Mathematicam quisquis vis discito grece  
Artibus es medicus qui captus discito grece  
Morbis nam cunctis: sunt indita nomina greca  
Argolicum nomen: cunctis liquet esse figuris  
Artes ingenue graio sermone loquentur  
Non alio: quibus haud nomen dat lingua latina  
Ad summam: doctis sed debent singula grecis."
subject—or possibly merely nurtured its growth—as an integral part of the curriculum. For a man without the best of skills in Greek this was a brave new departure. Hegius had a vision of what might be, and, supported by Agricola, he was willing to take the risk of encouraging curricular innovations in order to achieve the fulfillment of his dream.¹

Soon after Hegius arrived in Deventer, the first Greek textbook was printed in the city. The title of the work is simply Coniugationes verborum graecae, and it was published no later than 1488.² There is no certainty that Hegius is the author of this work, but scholars have generally attributed it to him. Whatever the case may be, the fact that it was printed at all is a good indication that the study of Greek was progressing well in the Deventer school.

¹The question of Hegius' proficiency in Greek has been discussed by a number of scholars, and the conclusions have been summarized by Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs, pp. 182-84. Generally it is accepted that Hegius was no great master of the Greek language. While not disputing this, it is my opinion that one should take care not to underestimate his ability. Some of the arguments that Bot uses to suggest that Hegius only had an elementary knowledge of Greek seem rather weak. Hegius' appreciation for Agricola's translation of Lucian may not have been because he could not understand Greek but because of the potential the Latin text had for use in the classroom. See appendix B, p. 652. The fact that Hegius had no Greek Gospels of his own and had to borrow those of Gansfort is no argument at all. Erasmus' New Testament was only published in 1516. The Gospels were not freely available. This is born out by the fact that Gansfort himself had to ask for his copies as a gift from the pope in the 1470s. In the letter in which Hegius asks to borrow the Gospels he also says that he has acquired Paul's Epistles and the Acts of the Apostles. See appendix B, p. 656. One is led to wonder if owning Greek Gospels makes one a Greek linguist while having the Acts and Epistles leaves one ignorant of the language.

Beyond these major observations, it is not possible to add much information concerning differences that the humanist revival made to the Deventer curriculum. Hegius' Dialogs presuppose a fairly comprehensive knowledge in a number of areas, and it can be assumed that these subjects received attention at some point in the eight-year course of studies. For example, the logic that Hegius uses in all the dialogs takes for granted a basic understanding of parts of the Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain, at least in a simplified form.\textsuperscript{1} The calculation of the date of Easter, while quite elementary, demands a fair grasp of general arithmetic.\textsuperscript{2} The concepts of geometry are often used as illustrations, which presupposes a familiarity with this subject. Instructions are given as to how geometric figures are to be drawn or their areas found, and one can imagine that these activities were practiced in the classroom.\textsuperscript{3} These aspects of the curriculum seem, however, to manifest little in the way of change from the practices of the pre-humanist era.\textsuperscript{4}

The same can be said of music at St. Lebuins. There is no evidence to suggest any deviation from earlier practice that made this the rector's responsibility.\textsuperscript{5} Though there is no certainty, it may well be that it was Hegius' duty to serve as director of church music. He apparently had some skill in this area.\textsuperscript{6} Undoubtedly music remained a very important part of the daily program.

\textsuperscript{1}Hegius, appendix A, pp. 398, 533. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., pp. 573-79.
\textsuperscript{3}Ibid., pp. 527, 540-41. \textsuperscript{4}See above, pp. 112-13.
\textsuperscript{5}See above, pp. 110-12; and Gerhard Dumbar, Het Kerkelyk en Wereltlyk Deventer, 2 vols. (Deventeer: Henrik Willem van Welbergen, 1732; Lucas Leemhorst, 1788), 1:303.
\textsuperscript{6}Hegius, appendix A, pp. 600-601.
A better understanding of the Deventer curriculum is made possible if attention is focused on the kinds of books that were being printed in the city toward the end of the fifteenth century. Although even this does not answer all the questions, it highlights the trends that were being established with the arrival of the age of humanism in the Low Countries.

Books and Printing

At the end of the fifteenth century Deventer was a prosperous trading town, but it was not a large city. Though it had an accomplished school, it could boast no famous university. It is therefore quite amazing how many incunabula were printed there. In all of Europe there were few cities, large or small, that rivaled Deventer for its output of books.¹

Richard Paffraet printed his first dated book in 1477, and by 1485 Jacob van Breda (fl. 1470-1518) had also set up business, using equipment that he had obtained from Paffraet. The two men worked in friendly cooperation with one another in supplying the continuing needs of the student community and others in Deventer and as far afield as England.

The nature of the books that were published is of great interest in seeking to determine the impact of the humanist revival

¹Anton Carl Frederik Koch, Zwarte Kunst in de Bisschopstraat: Boek en Druk te Deventer in de 15de Eeuw (Deventer: Boekhandel Praamstra, 1977), p. 65. Koch estimates that from 1454-1501 approximately 1.8 percent of the titles published in Europe came from the two Deventer presses. These presses were only active in the last quarter of the century. See also Books Printed in XVth Century Now in British Museum, 9.1:xxxi, where it is noted that about a quarter of the books printed in the Netherlands prior to 1501 were printed in Deventer.
on the curriculum at St. Lebuins. The first impression gained from looking at the long list of books published is that the Deventer presses were busy, but not with the printing of works that would be indicative of a great classical revival. Only about 22 percent of the titles listed can be attributed to classical and semi-classical authors or to the Church Fathers. Moreover, these texts do not begin to rival the classical publications that were being produced in Italy. Most of the items printed in Deventer were short tracts and school textbooks. This is significant in itself, but it does not explain the apparent lack of substantial antique works. Comparison with the rest of Europe, particularly the area north of the Alps, does however shed some light on these questions.

It has been suggested that in Germany and the Netherlands the printers refrained from publishing classical works because the competition from Italian publishers was too great. The northern publishers could be certain of selling schoolbooks, whereas classical texts demanded a great deal of time, effort, and money to publish. Large works were a financial gamble in the face of the stiff Italian competition. The paucity of classical publications in the North does not necessarily indicate a lack of interest. There is evidence to suggest that Italian books were making an appearance in the Netherlands well before the end of the fifteenth century.

In addition, comparison with the rest of Europe places

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1See appendix C, pp. 660-78. Almost six hundred titles are listed. This figure is certainly too high and should probably be closer to five hundred. This discrepancy is explained in the introductory note to the appendix.

Deventer in a much more favorable light, despite the small number of classical titles. Whereas the estimated figure for classically oriented incunabula has been set at about 11 percent of total production for Europe as a whole, the figure for Deventer is closer to 13 percent. When Donatus, Aesop, Boethius, and the Church Fathers are included in these statistics, along with the grammars and other works edited or written by the humanists themselves, the percentage for Deventer rises to a figure approaching two-thirds of the total volume of publications in the city. The estimated figure for Europe as a whole is about one-third. On the basis of these statistics, it is quite clear that something of special interest was happening in Deventer at the end of the fifteenth century.

A closer examination of the titles reveals some interesting information. Eberhard's Graecismus was never printed in Deventer and Garland's Textus equivocorum cornutus was printed once. These texts had been used by Erasmus at St. Lebuins, but they were later condemned by him. It is unlikely that they continued in use for any length of time after he left the city. On the other hand, the books mentioned by Butzbach were printed regularly and presumably continued to be used fairly extensively to the end of the fifteenth century. These include the Disticha Catonis, of which there appear to be thirteen incunabula editions from Deventer; Aesop, which was

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1Ibid., p. x. Cf. appendix C. About 76 of the 588 titles are considered classical. In order to make a fair comparison with the rest of Europe, the Church Fathers, Aesop, Donatus, and Boethius have been excluded. Including these titles raises the figure to 132 (22 percent) of the total number, as noted above, p. 333.

2Ibid., p. xii, n. 4. 3See above, pp. 115-16.

4See above, pp. 117-19.
published eleven times; and five editions of the Parables of Alanus.

The Ars minor (De octo partibus orationis) of Aelius Donatus also seems to have continued in use during the time of Hegius. It was published seven times in Deventer and was also produced in large numbers by the Speculum printers of Utrecht.¹

The most popular grammar in Deventer was undoubtedly the Doctrinale of de Villa Dei. Between Paffraet and van Breda, about thirty-eight editions of various parts of this work were printed by 1500.² The most interesting aspect of these publications is not their great number but the manner in which they were edited. The humanists were not happy with the Doctrinale as it had come from the pen of its twelfth-century author. They felt that certain non-classical aspects needed to be altered, and they did this by means of fairly extensive editing and the addition of notes and glosses. In the forefront of these endeavors were Johan Sinthius and Hegius. Sinthius, a member of the Brethren of the Common Life, was employed by Hegius to teach in the advanced classes at St. Lebuins. The two men appear to have cooperated in their efforts to improve the Doctrinale. In fact, it has been suggested that they made a pact by which the one who died first would receive all the credit for the editorial work done on the Doctrinale.³ Sinthius died in 1493 and it is his name that generally appears on the title pages.

¹See appendix C, s.v. "Donatus;" Books Printed in the XVth Century Now in the British Museum, p. xi; and above, pp. 119-120.

²See above, pp. 121-22; and appendix C, s.v. "Alexander de Villa Dei."

³Johannes Butzbach, Auctarium, cited by Carl Krafft and Wilhelm Crecelius, Beiträge zur Geschichte des Humanismus am Nieder- rhein und in Westfalen: Mitteilungen über Alexander Hegius und
In 1893 Dietrich Reichling published a critical text of the Doctrinale along with a definitive study of the various editions through which it went until its demise in the sixteenth century. He writes concerning the edition published by Sinthius and Hegius:

Here the logical element is relegated to the background, while at the same time the rules of grammar are no longer founded upon philosophical principles but are exemplified by and established upon the grammatical usage of the classical authors.¹

Reichling contrasts the work of Sinthius and Hegius with all the editions that had been published up until 1484 when their text first appeared. Among the other editions of the Doctrinale that were also printed in Deventer toward the end of the fifteenth century were some with glosses by Gerhard von Zutphen (fl. 1480-1500). Reichling observes that this version of the Doctrinale is the one most firmly established upon scholastic logic.² It is worthy of note that this edition appeared at the same time as the one edited by Hegius and Sinthius. From the available evidence it appears that Hegius and Sinthius were the first to introduce classical elements into the Doctrinale at a time when the old logic still held firm sway in most of the schools in the Netherlands and neighboring areas of Germany.


²Ibid., pp. lxiv-lxv.

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The effort put forth by these two men to introduce a better quality of Latin in the textbooks must soon have made a substantial impact on the grammar taught in the classes at St. Lebuins.  

In contrast to this success, some of the dictionaries that Hegius so strongly opposed in the "Invective Against the Modes of Signification" were published at regular intervals throughout the period of his rectorship. There were, for example, four editions of the Gemmula and five of the Gemma prior to 1500. Though Hegius condemned the practice, it is likely that both staff and students continued to use these dictionaries along with the more substantial medieval works when they were available. It should be noted, however, that Huguccio, Briton, and the Catholicon were never published in Deventer in the fifteenth century. Until there were dictionaries of a better quality available, it was inevitable that the Gemma and Gemmula would continue to be used. The improved dictionaries only appeared on the scene early in the sixteenth century.

Two of the other grammar texts mentioned in chapter 3 are

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1The humanists did eventually turn completely against the Doctrinale. The attack started in Italy about 1490, but little was said in the North until the sixteenth century. See Reichling, in de Villa Dei, Doctrinale, pp. lxxxiii-cx, where he outlines the development of humanist thought concerning the Doctrinale. The particular contribution made by Hegius in this interesting saga is highlighted by Reichling on pp. xc-xci. It is noteworthy that the edition of the Doctrinale for which Sinthius is credited was published as late as 1508 without any additional commentary by the famous Parisian printer of the classics, Jodocus Badius Ascensius (1462-ca. 1535).


3Appendix C, s.v. "Gemma" and "Gemmula."

the Scholarium disciplina by pseudo-Boethius and the Modus signifi-
candi. The former was published in only four editions, while a work
by Albertus Eccardus, produced in 1489, is the only example of the
latter. ¹ It is difficult to say if the pseudo-Boethius continued to
be used in Deventer or whether it was printed for sale in other
centers. It certainly did not rival the ever-popular Doctrinale as
a grammar. The works of the modistae, singled out by Hegius for a
particularly venomous attack, could hardly have been used much in
the Deventer school, considering that only one edition was printed.

The Mammaetraunctus, referred to above² as a good example of
the kind of text often used in the medieval schools of the Low Coun-
tries, was never published in Deventer. If it had been used before
Hegius arrived, it seems fairly certain that the improved literature
that was introduced through the 1480s would soon have replaced it.

Of the other texts discussed in chapter 3, the only ones
of which there were more than one or two editions printed by van
Breda or Paffraet were those used in the teaching of philosophy and
logic. The Summulae logicales by Peter of Spain went through six
incunabula editions. From what Hegius expected of his students in
the most advanced classes in terms of an understanding of logic, it
is obvious that they had been introduced to the Summulae earlier
in their studies.³ The number of editions of the Consolatione
philosophiae, another of the philosophic texts, reached a total of

¹See above, pp. 124-25; and appendix C, s.v. "Boethius
[pseudo-]" and "Albertus Eccardus."

²See above, p. 124.

³See above, p. 331; and appendix C, s.v. "Petrus Alfonsus
Hispanus."
This strongly suggests that the book was used as a text in the school at St. Lebuins. A number of anthologies with excerpts from the writings of classical philosophers and other writers of antiquity were also published, probably for use in the advanced classes at the Deventer school.\(^2\)

Paul Mestwerdt suggests that Hegius influenced Paffraet to print books supporting the via antiqua.\(^3\) When an analysis is made of the texts published by Paffraet and van Breda, it is obvious that this is not true. Those publications in which there is no doubt Hegius was involved make clear that his major concern was for an improvement of the standard of classical literature as well as Latin and Greek grammar. In this sense they reflect his humanism. The Doctrinale edited by Sinthius and Hegius is therefore indicative of a turning away from the scholasticism of the via antiqua.

It remains true that, while there were editions of Albertus Magnus and Aquinas, nothing from the pen of Occam was printed in Deventer.\(^4\) There is no doubt that there was a great deal of continuity with the past. The evidence of certain new directions, is however, equally clear. Many of the books printed in Deventer represent the interests of a conservative and pious intellectual community. The overriding concern of this community was for a high level of religious commitment and morality. This is not surprising

\(^{1}\)See appendix C, s.v. "Boethius."

\(^{2}\)For example, appendix C, s.v. "Auctoritates Aristotelis."


\(^{4}\)See appendix C, s.v. "Albertus Magnus" and "Thomas de Aquino." There is only one edition from each of these authors.
when the influence of the devotio moderna is remembered. In addition to this religious conservatism, however, the interest in a revival of the classics is quite apparent from an examination of the kinds of texts printed on the presses of Paffraet and van Breda.¹

Before leaving the matter of publication, there are a small number of other books that were printed in Deventer that are of particular interest with regard to the kind of subject matter that may have been incorporated into the curriculum.² Besides a host of religious, pastoral, and ethical texts, there were one or two editions of the Psalms and Epistles of Paul, and liturgical versions of the Gospels, Acts, and Epistles.³ There were no complete Bibles, however, and one must assume that these were purchased from other printers. Whatever the case may be, the output of the presses in Deventer would have ensured an ongoing supply of religious tracts

¹For the sake of easier identification and location of the classical, semi-classical, and patristic authors or works listed in appendix C, their names are given here: Aesopus, Apuleius, Auctores Aristotelis (includes excerpts from Apuleius, Aristotles, Boethius, Plato, Porphyrius [ca. A.D. 232-ca. 305], and Seneca), Augustinus, Avianus, Boethius, Calphurnius, Cato, Chrysostomus (ca. 347-407), Cicero, Columella (fl. ante A.D. 50), Cyprianus (d. 258), Diogenes Cynicus (ca. 400-ca. 325 B.C.), Donatus, Eucherius (d. ca. 449), Hesiodus (fl. ca. 700 B.C.), Hieronymus (includes excerpts from Basil of Cappadocia, Cicero, Horace, Jerome, and Plato), Horace Flaccus, Isidore (ca. 560-636), Juvenecus (fl. post A.D. 300), Lucianus, Persius, Plato, Plautus (fl. 204-191 B.C.), Plutarchus (ante A.D. 50-post 120), Pompilius (fl. ca. 100 B.C.), Prosperus (ca. 390-ca. 463), Prudentius, Sallustius, Seneca, Terentius, and Virgilius.

²In appendix C an attempt has been made to classify the various publications according to the background and interests of their authors and the main concern of the texts themselves. Without access to all the publications this has not always been possible, but a study of the appendix generally gives a fair idea of the nature of each publication.

for use by the public and the students in the school.

The grammar texts that have already been discussed were supplemented by quite a few additional works printed in a limited number of editions. Along with some texts of lesser significance there were some important works by the Italian humanists. These included, for example, the grammatical writings of Sulpitius (fl. ca. 1490) and the *Elegantiae* of Lorenzo Valla.\(^1\) This latter work was greatly admired by Agricola, and, it may be assumed, by Hegius.\(^2\)

Another class of works that would most likely have been used in the classroom were the geographies. These works were written by Johannes de Hese, Johannes Presbyter, and Dionysius (Periegetes) Afer, and reached a combined total of five editions. Rudolf von Langen, the humanist with whom it is likely that Hegius spent some of his school days, wrote a history that was printed in Deventer on two occasions. Finally, a book on astronomy written by Peter of Cracow was published once prior to the turn of the century, but this occurred about 1500 which was after the death of Hegius.\(^3\)

It cannot be demonstrated with any certainty which of the books that were published by Paffract and van Breda were used in the school at St. Lebuins while Hegius was rector. This survey of the Deventer incunabula has served, however, to lend support to the view that something significant was happening in the city school at the end of the fifteenth century. Hegius was clearly in favor of a

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\(^1\)Appendix C, s.v. "Sulpitius," and "Valla."

\(^2\)See above, pp. 87-89, 291-92.

more wholehearted acceptance of the new learning, and a sizable proportion of the books that were printed on the presses in the city reflect this new approach. These publications undoubtedly played an important part in establishing a curriculum that reflected more fully the ideals of the biblical humanists.

Hegius—Pedagog and Rector

The next question that is addressed is the nature of the contribution that Hegius made as a teacher and headmaster at St. Lebuins. Once again the researcher is faced with the problem of how much can be inferred beyond the generalizations that have already been drawn regarding the work of a school rector in the Low Countries toward the end of the Middle Ages.\(^1\) It has been said that in medieval times schools waxed and waned according to the abilities of their appointed leaders.\(^2\) If this is true, then the success of the school in Deventer must largely be attributed to the energy and ability of Alexander Hegius. Soon after he arrived, the ranks of the students were greatly reduced by a severe onslaught of the plague, and the assembly hall seemed quite bare.\(^3\) This was not a very auspicious start for the new rector, but by the time of his death St. Lebuins was flourishing. The enrollment is reported to have been in excess of two thousand\(^4\) and it is unlikely that all the

\(^1\)See above, pp. 130-32.
\(^2\)Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 119.
\(^3\)See appendix B, p. 650.
\(^4\)See Josef Wiese, Der Pädagoge Alexander Hegius und seine Schüler (Berlin: Actien-Gesellschaft für Verlag und Druckerei, 1892), p. 7; and above, p. 36.
students could have fitted into the assembly hall. More than this, contrary to the fears expressed by Rudolf Agricola, the new learning had begun to take firm root in the Low Countries.\footnote{Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs, pp. 60-67, has made an analysis of the qualities that the humanists established for themselves as ideals for teachers. The two main features are a passionate desire for knowledge in all areas of intellectual endeavor and an attitude of paternal love for the student. Bot also gives a long list of other qualities counted as indispensable by the humanist writers. These include spiritual integrity, deep piety, uprightness of character, a well-rounded life experience, diligence, unselfishness, a flair for imparting knowledge, temperance, punctuality, patience, cheerfulness, impartiality, etc. As Bot observes, given the numbers of students and the regime of a late medieval school, to attain all these qualities would have been an impossibility. It is true, nevertheless, that these were the high ideals at which the humanist teacher aimed.} The one ray of hope for Agricola had been the work that Hegius was doing in Deventer. His hope was not in vain, for the rector of St. Lebuins did not fail him. Among staff and students, Hegius inspired a desire to expel medieval barbarism from the textbooks and the classroom.\footnote{See above, p. 62, n. 3.}

The success that Hegius encountered should not merely be attributed to his concerted attempts to introduce classical Latin into the curriculum, or his new approach to philosophy and the impact that this had on the classroom. Hegius implemented the aims and philosophy of the school in a program of biblical humanism that was reflected in all the various aspects of school life. As rector he sought to ensure that the teachers he employed were in sympathy with the new learning, and as a teacher he endeavored to be the model of what a humanist pedagog should be.\footnote{See above, pp. 89-90.} In this he was a pioneer who set the trends that the later humanist teachers would seek to follow.
Foremost among the qualities that the humanists looked for in a teacher was a love for his students. On the strength of the esteem in which Hegius was held by those who sat at his feet, it may be assumed that he was not lacking in this quality. In the midst of the extremely busy life that has been portrayed as the lot of the medieval teacher and headmaster, Hegius somehow seems to have found time to be a warm and approachable human being. The concept of the *vita activa* that he espoused did not merely include a high level of intellectual achievement and an unfeeling impartation of relevant information to the host of students who happened to be in his class. It was not sufficient to use any method that would work even if it happened to include harsh physical treatment, shame, or ridicule. For learning to take place there should be a relationship of love and respect. The teacher should be like a father to his students.

The attitude that Hegius had toward his students is brought into sharp focus by the letter that Jacobus Faber wrote to Erasmus as a preface to Hegius' *Carmina*. He says:

> He was extraordinarily anxious to find the best ways of serving

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1Ibid., p. 61. Bot suggests that if the humanists erred it was in their overemphasis on the knowledge that a teacher should acquire without an equal stress on practical pedagogical ability.

2Ibid., pp. 63-64. This is not to suggest that Hegius turned away from the use of physical punishment. However, the abuse of the rod that was a characteristic of medieval education was somewhat tempered by the humanists. Discipline was to be administered in an atmosphere of love and respect. The response of Hegius' students to their teacher seems to indicate that mutual respect was the essence of the relationship between them. See above, pp. 37, 224-27, 280-83.

3Bot, *Humanisme en Onderwijs*, p. 64. Bot quotes Johannes Murmellius, one of Hegius' most successful students, as saying: "The teacher must be loved rather than feared, and he must reveal to the boys the love and respect of a father's heart."
studious youth, and his life-story shows that he regarded it as his destined task to educate youth well. He took infinite pains to achieve what would be most permanent without calculating what struggles it would cost him; for in order to deserve well of youth and win its affection, he thought no kind of fatigue was of any consequence. . . . In fairness he would not allow those who were obviously poor to be disappointed by others who claimed the same benefits in return for fees, and he was very ready to admit them, regarding Heaven as his recompense; and he taught the liberal arts to them with the same careful attention as to the rich. . . . He was filled with goodness and made perfect in goodness.1

Even if allowance is made for the exaggeration to which humanists were inclined, it remains clear that Hegius was no ordinary teacher. He was prepared to make personal sacrifices in order to meet the needs of those for whom he labored. Whether it required time or money, he was willing to do what he could to be of service. In his attitude to the boys can be detected the spirit of one who acted as a loving father. If there were teachers who approached the humanist ideal, then Hegius was one of them. It could be said that he was one of the pioneers who set the standard for others to follow.

The same passage from Faber's letter indicates that Hegius was largely responsible for the school finances, for it was he who decided who should be admitted and with what financial arrangements. Normally the school would be financially supported by the city authorities. The rector would be given a budgeted amount to pay the teachers and provide for the needs of the institution.2 If this had


2 Post, Scholen en Onderwijs, p. 50.
been the case, one could expect to find some kind of entry in the treasury records. While Hegius was rector, however, there is no such entry, and it can only be assumed that the school had sufficient fee-paying students to meet all its expenses. In the absence of any entries in the city records, it can also be assumed with a fair degree of justification that it was Hegius who would have been entrusted with the responsibility of administering the income that was received from the students.

With this kind of authority, Hegius was certainly in a position to exercise the privilege usually afforded the medieval rector of employing the teachers of his choice. There is no list that reveals who all the teachers were, but those who are known were all accomplished men in their own right. Each one of those about whom some knowledge exists manifested a decided interest in the pursuit of the new learning. Hegius surrounded himself with the kind of teachers who would enhance the humanistic program he was trying to establish.

The contribution of Johan Sinthius to the school at St. Lebuins has already been discussed. The work he accomplished in

1See above, p. 131.

2Post, Modern Devotion, pp. 577-78, has raised some questions regarding Sinthius' employment as a teacher at St. Lebuins. This is an example of how Post is inclined to stretch a point in order to dissociate the Brethren of the Common Life from any activity or influence in the city schools. It is by no means unlikely that Sinthius would have helped the boys who lived in the domus clericorum with their homework, and perhaps he even gave lessons there. There is also no reason to doubt that he appointed his successors who were to carry on with this work in the boys' hostel after he died. None of this for a moment negates the fact that he also taught in the city school. Erasmus, for one, makes it clear that Sinthius was a teacher in the advanced classes. See above, p. 29, where Erasmus is quoted as saying that his older friends were in
editing the Doctrinale of de Villa Dei was recognized far beyond the limits of the city of Deventer as a worthy effort in helping to bring about a revival of classical grammar.

Johannes Butzbach mentions some others who were teaching in Deventer around the time Hegius died. About a Master Gottfried there is very little information beyond what Butzbach has to say. All that is known is that he was a bachelor of canon and civil law, and that he was a master of the liberal arts. He taught in the fifth class, where the main emphasis was on a study of grammar. In the fourth class Butzbach's teacher was Master Johan Venray. He had been a pupil under Hegius, and after the completion of his studies he was appointed to the staff at St. Lebuins. Butzbach says that he was industrious and well-informed. As a young man who had himself studied under Hegius, he no doubt espoused the new learning.

In the third class the teacher was Bartholomew van Keulen whose knowledge of Latin and the classics was of a considerably higher standard than that of Hegius himself. Even though he held no Master's degree, Butzbach considered him to be a well-loved "master and lecturer in the philosophical studies." As early as 1491 a book of van Keulen's poems, the Silva carminum, was printed. The humanist program at the Deventer school must have benefited a great

Sinthius' class. The reference is undoubtedly to a class taught in the city school and not to any separate lessons that may have been given by Sinthius or anybody else in the boy's hostel.

1Butzbach, Autobiography, pp. 116-17.
deal from van Keulen's presence on the teaching staff. The quality of his Latin scholarship was considered worthy of praise, even by the great Erasmus.\footnote{Erasmus, Collected Works, vol. 1: The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 1 to 141--1484 to 1500, ed. R. J. Schoeck, trans. R. A. B. Mynors and D. F. S. Thomson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1974), p. 52, letter no. 28, written in 1489.}

Concerned as he was to institute a better level of education in the northern schools, Hegius endeavored to find the best methods of pedagogy to achieve his purposes. The underlying assumption that the student was merely the recipient of knowledge put many pressures on the humanist teacher. If he was to be a fountain of all wisdom, he had to spend a great deal of time preparing himself for his task. The northern humanist teachers sought to instill in their pupils a deep spiritual piety along with a love for the classics. Hegius was one of the pioneers of this pedagogical ideal. The lifelong commitment that this venture demanded was for him the labor of love.

There is a story told about Hegius that gives an interesting illustration of his wholehearted dedication to the work that he took upon himself. It is said that he would stay up late at night studying and, in order to stop himself from dropping off to sleep, he would hold in his hand a short candle. As soon as he became drowsy, the candle would slip and burn him and he would awaken to continue with his reading.\footnote{The story is reported by Koch in Zwarte Kunst, p. 62. No reference is given as to its origin, and upon asking Mr. Koch if he could provide me with any further details, he said that he could not. He could only say that it was a story that he had come across at some time in his research, and admitted that it could well be apocryphal. Even if it is not quite accurate, it remains a fitting commentary on the life of this dedicated fifteenth-century scholar.} In his Dialogs, this love of reading is
well illustrated. Hegius either quotes from or makes reference to the works or deeds of some ninety other individuals. Most of these references are to classical and patristic sources. Hegius the scholar was, however, also Hegius the priest. Although little is known of the circumstances, it appears that he was ordained to the priesthood in his later years. Faber speaks of him as presbyteros on the title pages of the Carmina and the Dialogi. In the practice of his vocation, Hegius welded together these two aspects of his life, for he was to his students both scholar and pastor. It was this combination of personal resources that made him a great pedagogue, and one whom others sought to emulate.

Hegius ensured that he was a worthy model by applying himself diligently to improving his mastery of the new learning. He then used his administrative skills to introduce the new learning into the curriculum. Teachers were hired who were motivated toward achieving the humanistic educational goals that he had established. The school was developed on a sound financial basis, yet his main concern was always for the boys who sat at his feet and not for their fees. He would not turn away those who were genuinely poor. When he died he had little in the way of worldly possessions, for he had lived his life to serve others and not himself. The educational program that he established, the quality of the teachers that he hired, his commitment to the new learning, and the genuineness of his concern for the well-being of the pupils made St. Lebuins famous throughout the Germanic Lands. As a result, the school did not lack for students. It is to the daily activities of these boys and young men who came to Deventer that attention is now given.
The Student at St. Lebuins

The advent of the Renaissance in the North did not result in dramatic or immediate changes in the life-style of the medieval student. The gradual curricular modifications that occurred took place in an educational setting that remained essentially the same in terms of methodology and learning theory. Classes continued to be overcrowded, and the school day was long and filled with a number of activities that were not always directly connected with academic training. There were many holy days but few vacations, and the life of the student was a demanding one.¹

There were, however, some important changes in the basic fabric of student life. For example, the age of printing made it possible for many more students to have copies of the texts from which they were studying.² This change, although significant in the rise of Renaissance learning, did not particularly distinguish the Deventer school from any other. The presses in Deventer may have made printed texts more readily available, but students at other schools were as much at liberty to purchase such books as were students at St. Lebuins. The manner in which printed material was used in Deventer to help establish the new learning, however, was significant. As has already been noted, there was a definite emphasis placed upon a more classically oriented program of studies.

The innovations that were gradually being introduced did not substantially alter the role of the teacher in terms of his participation in the learning process. He remained the source of knowledge and the instrument by which that knowledge was to be channeled to

¹See above, pp. 133-34. ²Cf. above, pp. 135-36.

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the student. The intellect of the student was a passive recipient of the information that was presented to it. It has already been noted that the humanists continued to emphasize the role of the intellect to a degree that bordered on a belief that knowledge is virtue. The task of the teacher, therefore, was to ensure that the right kind of knowledge was presented to the student so that it could be absorbed into his mind. It is true that the elevation of the art of rhetoric and the Augustinian elements in the thinking of the humanists modified their understanding of the nature of man, and the emotional aspect of his being was more readily acknowledged. This was in turn reflected in the idealized relationship that the humanist teacher was supposed to establish with his students. In terms of the transfer of information, however, there were not many modifications in pedagogical practice.

In spite of Hegius' espousal of certain aspects of the Occamist concept of intuitive cognition, he did not altogether discard the thirteenth-century interpretation of Aristotle relative to learning theory. In this area of his thinking he remained to a large extent indebted to the via antiqua. He did not agree with the Thomists that the universal could of necessity be abstracted from the particular. He did observe, however, that "the intellect is called a passive virtue if it is compared with that which it

See above, pp. 67-70, 298-304.  
See above, pp. 343-44.  
See above, pp. 266-68.  
See above, pp. 150-51.  
understands, for it does not act on that which it understands, but is acted on by it."¹ Occam did not accept the theory of an active object informing a passive intellect. Interestingly, Hegius limits the passivity of the intellect to the way in which it takes up knowledge. In the manner that it seeks out knowledge or processes knowledge that has already been taken up, it is seen to be active rather than passive.

According to Hegius, the student is motivated by appetite, which Hegius divides into animal and natural. The natural appetite is that which seeks something "of which it has no cognizance." This is explained as follows:

Heavy things and light things have an appetite of this sort, for the former seek to be carried downwards, the latter upwards. By this appetite the human mind, when it is like a smoothed tablet and without all knowledge, seeks knowledge. Because of this Aristotle, in the first [book] of his works which is called *Metaphysics*, says [that] all men by nature seek to know.¹

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 1.1.908a.22.²

By nature, therefore, the student is considered to be an active seeker after knowledge. The teacher is responsible for making sure that in this quest for knowledge the student is exposed to truth and not error, for in its desire for information the mind will take up whatever is presented to it. Once an object or an idea has been written upon the blank slate of the mind, then the individual is said to have an image or phantasma of that object upon which the mind itself can work in an active way.³ It can, says Hegius, beget "in itself cognition of the thing about which it thinks."⁴

³Ibid., pp. 463, 485-86. ⁴Ibid., p. 462. See also p. 480.

¹Hegius, appendix A, p. 462. ²Ibid., pp. 555-56.
At this point the learner judges on the basis of reason what his response to an object or a situation will be. He is no longer dependent on any external object or idea, but makes his decision according to the dictates of reason. If his mind has absorbed the kind of information that will influence him in the direction of right reason, then the teacher has accomplished his task well.\(^1\) It is conceivable, however, that the mind can choose by false reasoning to do that which brings present pleasure without consideration of the future. It is therefore important that the student establish for himself the goal to which he aspires and that he be aware of the final consequences of all of his actions.\(^2\) Initially the student is dependent upon the teacher. The teacher's duty is to impart a body of knowledge that has been established as essential by the wisdom of experience and the humanist interpretation of the traditions of the past. In the end, however, the student must decide his own destiny in the light of all the information that his mind has absorbed.

It is evident from this study that no major changes occurred in the area of learning theory that would have distinguished the Deventer school from other schools in the Netherlands that had not yet come to accept the new learning. Traditional views still held sway, and it remained the task of the student to absorb a vast body of knowledge that was considered essential for educated persons. There was, consequently, an ongoing emphasis on memorization. The fact that logic was simplified and the verse grammars were made more intelligible was a considerable benefit, but the demands made on the

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 553.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 483, 551; and above, pp. 299-300, 302-3.
memory must still have been an awesome challenge to any student. Although no records exist, it may safely be assumed that, just as was the case in other late medieval schools, many students in Deventer were forced to give up their studies in despair.

In spite of the difficulties, however, a great number of students were very successful, not only in their studies but also in their later careers. The accomplishments of Hegius' students have been cataloged by several scholars. Therefore, it is not necessary to compile an exhaustive list or go into any great detail concerning the activities of all those who are known to have studied in Deventer between 1482 and 1498. Nevertheless, in this discussion of student life at St. Lebuins, it seems appropriate to mention some of Hegius' most distinguished pupils.

Erasmus is undoubtedly the best known of Hegius' students. He was never actually in Hegius' class, but he heard Hegius lecture on a number of occasions. Erasmus refers to Hegius as his teacher, and it is clear that he held the rector of the Deventer school in great esteem. He was particularly impressed with the fact that,

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about the time he left Deventer, Hegius was introducing a "breath of something new" into the curriculum at St. Lebuins. In spite of the praise that Erasmus had for Hegius, he had little positive to say about the school at St. Lebuins. A number of scholars have made the observation that Erasmus probably owed more to his schooling in Deventer than he was willing to admit, even if that schooling was mostly completed before the arrival of Hegius in 1482.¹

Among the rest of Hegius' students, some became prominent humanists, others remained conservative Catholic monks, and still others eventually joined the ranks of the Protestants. One of the most outstanding of the German humanists around 1600 was Hermanus Buschius. After his sojourn in Deventer he continued his studies under the famous Pomponio Leto (1428-98) in Rome.² Buschius was the author of the *Vallum humanitatus* which chronicles the history of many of his Renaissance contemporaries.³

Timannus Kemenerus, another of Hegius' students, also became a prominent humanist. Early in the sixteenth century the school in Münster enjoyed a period of considerable excellence under his leadership. For a time Johannes Murmellius was also on the staff of this school. He produced a number of humanist textbooks and led a distinguished career as a teacher until he met an untimely death in 1517. Josef Horlenius (1460-1521), who had been a student around


the time that Hegius first came to Deventer, was a master in the
school at Münster from about 1507. It is fairly certain that yet
another of the Münster pedagoges, Johannes Caesarius (1468-post
1512), was also a product of the Deventer school.¹

Münster was not alone in benefiting from the high quality of
students who had attended the school in Deventer and who later took
up a teaching career. For example, Johan Venray was first a pupil
under Hegius, then a teacher at St. Lebuins, and eventually the
rector of his alma mater. Petrus Homphaeus (ante 1480-1556) became
rector in Emmerich; Petrus Montanus (1468-1507) taught in a number
of Dutch schools; and Jakob Montanus (ca. 1460-ca. 1530), who later
attached himself to the Lutheran cause, was first rector of the
school at Herford. The list of those who followed the example of
Hegius, their erstwhile rector, could be considerably lengthened.

It was not only in the city schools of the Low Countries
and Germany that the former students of Hegius made an impact. A
number of them became prominent scholars and lecturers in the uni-
versities of Europe as well. For example, Otto Beckmann (1476-1546)
was appointed professor at the University of Wittenberg during
the time of Luther; Conrad Goclenius (fl. 1490-1520) and Hendrik
Cellarius (fl. 1490-1520) were lecturers at the Collegium Trilingue
in Leuven; and Gerardus Geldenhauer converted to the Lutheran cause
and was appointed a lecturer in theology at Marburg. A professor
who became famous in less fortunate circumstances was Ortuinus
Gratius (ca. 1480-1542). Gratius rather unjustly bore the brunt of

¹Wiese, Hegius, pp. 43-44. Information on the rest of the
individuals mentioned here as students of Hegius is gleaned from the
sources referred to above, p. 354, n. 1.
the stinging satires published anonymously under the title *Epistolae obscurorum virorum*. Gratius was a lecturer at Köln. Although he was in many ways a humanist, he defended some scholastic positions and was consequently ridiculed by the more extreme of his opponents.

Other students worthy of mention are Jacobus Faber, who became a distinguished humanist and who edited the works of Hegius, his esteemed master; Rufus Mutianus (1471-1526), a scholar who led the students at Erfurt in a successful effort to hasten the establishment of humanist studies at that university; and, of course, Johannes Butzbach, the conservative prior of the monastery at Laach.

There are a host of other names that could be mentioned. Some were definitely pupils when Hegius was rector in Deventer, but concerning others there is, at present, less certainty. The men who have been mentioned above were undoubtedly among the best of the pupils who attended St. Lebuins. There were many others who made much less of an impact on their culture. The number of those who studied in Deventer at the time of Hegius and who later left their imprint on the pages of history, nevertheless, is quite extraordinary. It is hardly possible to read any scholarly account of life in Northern Europe in the first half of the sixteenth century without coming across the name of someone who was either educated in Deventer under Hegius or who was the student of someone so educated. Many of the biographers and historians of the sixteenth century, such as Hermanus Buschius, Geldenhauer, Hamelmann, Beatus Rhenanus (1485-1547), and Johannes Rivius (1500-1553), were directly or indirectly connected with someone who had been influenced in their school days by Hegius and his associates or by their students.
From this brief appraisal of his pupils' achievements, there is an abundance of evidence to support the idea that something of a very significant nature was taking place in Deventer when Hegius was rector. He cannot be given all the credit, but it is certain that the methods he encouraged and the curriculum he introduced made a lasting impact on the students. Even if some of the learning theory and methods might seem to the modern mind to be rather primitive, the students in Deventer were without question being motivated to pursue the new learning with diligent determination and unflagging zeal. The students were eager to absorb the material presented to them and, at the same time, they developed a deep admiration and respect for their teachers, particularly their beloved headmaster. In future years they were happy to acknowledge that they had been students at St. Lebuins and that Hegius had been their rector. It was with much affection that later they referred to him as "communis preceptoris," ("your teacher and mine") or "Alexandri mei praecip­toris" ("Alexander my teacher").

**Pedagogical Methodology**

The final topic on which attention is focused in this evaluation of the practical outcome of the educational program that Hegius established is in the area of teaching methods. Hegius did not write a systematic treatise on teaching, so one must turn to his Dialogs in order to gain some idea of how he was able to practice his art so successfully.

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There seems to be something of a paradox in the method that Hegius proposes. He remains firmly committed to deductive reasoning as the means by which knowledge is to be communicated; yet he argues that everything is particular, nothing universal. This same paradox is found in the writings of William of Occam.

The reason given by Hegius for using the deductive method is that "there cannot be a proceeding from ignorance to knowledge unless unknowns are proved by means of knowns." Genus, he argues, is more generally known than species. He could have made his point by saying that a child learns the concept of "animal" before he can distinguish a horse from a cow. Hegius seems to go further than this, however, when he says that "we know any particular thing when we have discovered its causes and its principles and its elements, for to know is to discover a thing through its cause." Throughout the dialogs Hegius stresses the importance of principles that are

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1Hegius insists that an instructor should follow the advice of Aristotle and "teach general propositions before specific ones." He goes on to illustrate his point with a number of examples, one of which is as follows:

"The geometrical teacher teaches that every figure is enclosed by a boundary or boundaries before he teaches that a plane figure is enclosed by a line or lines (and) a solid by a surface or surfaces, because the latter are specific propositions (while) the former [is] universal." Hegius, appendix A, p. 442.

2Ibid., p. 505.

3See Gordon Leff, William of Ockham: The Metamorphosis of Scholastic Discourse (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1975), pp. 566-67. Occam and Hegius refer to the same passage in Aristotle. Hegius does not seek to explain the paradox. Occam, however, makes a specific point of interpreting Aristotle in such a way as to reconcile the primacy of particular things with the deductive principle that gives the general precedence over the specific. Cf. above, p. 148, n. 1.

4Hegius, appendix A, p. 507. 5Ibid.
known of themselves and unprovable. These, he observes, are the **terminus a quo** for all other proofs. It is on the basis of these general principles that all other knowledge is deduced.\(^1\)

At first glance it seems that Hegius is firmly entrenched in his view that deduction is the only method by which to proceed from ignorance to knowledge. It is interesting to note, however, that his assertion regarding the particularity of all things is made in the very same context as his insistence upon the use of the deductive method. In fact, the argument in support of deduction leads into an acknowledgement of the primacy of particular things and then returns to a discussion of the importance of the first principles upon which deduction is based.\(^2\) Although Hegius is not as clear in explaining his position as Occam, the manner in which he presents his ideas does lead one to wonder if he holds some similar views on these issues. It would be wrong to suggest that Hegius was moving deliberately toward an acceptance of the inductive method. He remained a loyal disciple of Aristotle, whose logic proceeded from the general to the specific. At the same time, like Aristotle, Hegius recognized that it is often on the basis of particular things that one is able to clarify the meaning of the general.\(^3\)

\(^{1}\)Hence Hegius argues that there are certain pronouncements that it is not necessary to demonstrate. He illustrates his point by enumerating some of the principles of mathematics upon which all mathematical knowledge is established:

"Every whole is greater than its part; every part is less than the whole; every whole is equal to all its parts; whatever things occupy equal spaces are equal; whatever things occupy unequal spaces are unequal." Ibid., p. 508.

\(^{2}\)Ibid., pp. 504-7.

\(^{3}\)Aristotle *Physics* 1.1.184a.21-24.
The key to explaining Hegius' views is in recognizing that, for him, the general is a concept of the mind. Only the particular is an actual thing.\(^1\) Like Occam, he considers knowledge in the true sense (scientia) to be about universal principles that do not alter when particular things cease to be.\(^2\) Scientia, because it relates to universal concepts, must be the basis for any understanding of the particular because there is no way that an individual is able to experience and comprehend all particular things. Moreover, when a particular thing ceases to be, one may retain the general concept of such a thing in one's mind. From these concepts, which are general and "more known," the learner is able to move to an understanding of particulars. Particulars, being specific, may be less known because the individual may not have experienced them. It becomes clear that one of the main emphases of Hegius' method is that learning takes place when a person is able to discover the unknown on the basis of that which is already known.

According to Bot, the principle of using the known to teach the unknown was one of the central features of humanist teaching methodology.\(^3\) With a better understanding of the nature of the child and learning psychology, the humanists recognized that it was important to begin with the simple and move on to the complex. As a result, a number of humanists began to favor induction rather than deduction. Starting with tangible, empirical evidence, the learner was able to move by scientific induction to a grasp of the more complex and finally to an understanding of the abstract. It seems,

\(^1\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 505.  \(^2\)Ibid., p. 504.
therefore, that among the humanists those who used the deductive method and those who used induction did so for much the same reason. This leads one to suspect that the issue was not so much induction versus deduction, but the use of a method that would be most beneficial in helping the student to grasp the subject.

To some degree this can be substantiated in the case of Hegius by the importance that he attaches to particular things, in spite of his reliance upon deduction. Universal concepts might be the first principle of knowledge, but it is as individual things are experienced that these concepts are clarified and established in the mind. Once again reference can be made to the child who is unable to distinguish a horse from a cow because he has not yet learned the various species that constitute the genus of animal. Hegius is adamant that deduction is best because he considers the general to be "more known." It is interesting when it comes to grammar, however, that he is not concerned with universal logical principles but with the particular and "more known" usage of the classical authors. Although he may not have been aware of it, he was, in his attacks on the modistae, favoring an inductive method of language study.

The most that can be said for Hegius in this regard is that, on the basis of the similarity between his views and those of Occam, it may be suggested that he opened the way for a more empirical conception of knowledge. In the northern context, Hegius was an early Renaissance figure, and as such he was inclined to cast his mind backward to the classical and patristic periods of history. In the end, the Renaissance movement did introduce a more modern and scientific approach to learning, but a man like Hegius can hardly be
said to have participated in this new perspective on the world. He
must rather be seen as one of those who prepared the ground in which
the seeds of a more scientific approach might be planted. His
willingness to implement the most effective method of teaching of
which he was aware is a manifestation of an openness that was a
necessary prerequisite to the dawn of the modern era.

Any new approaches to education that Renaissance humanism
may have introduced did not alter the emphasis placed upon rote
learning and memorization that had been so much a feature of medi­
eval education.1 In spite of this the humanists became more and
more aware of the need to tailor learning activities according to
the propensities of individual pupils.2 The size of the classes
militated against the introduction of any significant improvements
in this area, but later humanists were at least aware of the needs
and established ideals toward which they could aim. From the infor­
mation known about Hegius, one is unable to say that he made any
distinctive contribution to the growth of this new awareness. On
the basis of the testimony of some of his students, however, it can
be said that Hegius attempted to simplify the learning process and
make it pleasant and enjoyable.3

1Ibid., pp. 53-56. Also, see above, pp. 135, 320-21.
2Bot, Humanisme en Onderwijs, pp. 51-53.
3Bot proposes that this is another distinguishing feature of
humanist teaching methodology. He says:
"Het streven naar 'Kindgemäschheit' deed de Humanisten ook zoeken
naar middelen om het onderwijs aangenaam en prettig te maken.
... Hun aversie van het verscholastiekte grammatica-onderwijs
berustte niet enkel op wetenschappelijke gronden, maar werd
zeker ook ten dele ingegeven door gevoel van deernis met de
jeugd, die met allerlei dialectische subtiliteiten werd lastig
gevallen." Ibid., p. 56.
In the letter that Jacobus Faber wrote to Erasmus in 1503 with reference to the personal attributes and pedagogical abilities of their former teacher, he says:

As treasures of the mind are finer than transitory and ephemeral possessions, so may his [Hegius'] glory ever grow greater from his enduring achievements; for by his teaching he deserved excellently well of his pupils, whom he never teased with circumlocutions, obscurities, or vain and petty cleverness of no relevance to the subject; who never learned the art of adding light to the sun; who did not wrap up in thick veils matters that were clearer than daylight, blunting the understanding with useless additions. On the contrary, he set whatever was obscure in the clearest possible light, in such a way that anyone save he whose "blood within his breast did coldly run" could understand it with the greatest of ease.1

Erasmus, in turn, has these comments to make about Hegius:

If he wrote anything, he wrote as if he were playing a game rather than doing something serious. And yet these writings, so written, are of the sort which the learned world votes worthy of immortality.2

Faber, who was in a better position than Erasmus to judge Hegius in terms of practical pedagogy, was clearly impressed by the way in which Hegius was able to communicate subject matter in a simple and interesting manner. Faber had had the opportunity to listen daily to the lectures of his beloved headmaster. Erasmus, on the other hand, had never actually been in Hegius' class, and his observations are made with specific reference to the writings of his former headmaster. Erasmus' attention is taken by what he considers the light-hearted simplicity of Hegius' presentation.

This evaluation may be surprising to the modern reader. Reading through the dialogs hardly seems like any sort of game. Comparison with the other schoolbooks of the time, however, is

1Erasmus, Collected Works 2:68; and appendix B, p. 659.
2Ibid., 31:350.61-64. The excerpt is from adagium l.iv.39.
sufficient to persuade one that Hegius' Dialogs are easier to understand than many of the other works. Much of the material in the dialogs is foreign to the modern mind and therefore difficult to comprehend. To Hegius' students, it would almost have been second nature. By the time they reached the prima in which Hegius was the lecturer they would already have studied logic. The manner in which faulty syllogisms are presented for correction all the way through the dialogs illustrates both the simplicity of the material that Hegius taught and the method that he used to exercise and sharpen the logical techniques of his students. By way of a game he would challenge students to pick out the errors of logic and correct the syllogisms. The logic involved a much less detailed analysis than that which was presented to students who had to learn all the complex technicalities of the scholastic dialectic of the Middle Ages. Hegius had indeed introduced practices that made life a lot more pleasant for the student than might otherwise have been the case.

Another of the interesting methods that Hegius uses to impart information is to introduce into a discussion material that at first seems quite irrelevant to the subject matter in question. He uses this material to illustrate a point that he is trying to make in the main discussion, but in so doing he is also exposing the students to information that is important in some other context. Often these interpolations take the form of some kind of admonition that encourages upright living. At other times they are used to

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1For example, see above, pp. 125-28, where the Summulae logicales by Peter of Spain is discussed.

2See, for example, Hegius, appendix A, pp. 452-58.
remind the student of some matter that has already been discussed. ¹ Although these digressions are a little disconcerting, if the reader is willing to take the time to follow carefully the train of Hegius thought, then the logic behind his method usually becomes fairly apparent. ²

In the dialog "Concerning the Whole and the Part," Hegius uses the truism that the whole is not its own part to teach a number of important points. This dialog is a good example of what Erasmus says about Hegius playing games with ideas. Hegius reviews arithmetical concepts of measurement, quantity, proportion, and infinity; geometry; and logic and the use of syllogisms. He also discusses the relationship between soul and body and the distinction between non-contingent and contingent beings. This leads into an investigation of the powers of God and a discussion on creation. The postulation that God is able to create ex nihilo provides an opportunity for Hegius to weave an explanation of the division between theology and philosophy into the dialog. Form and matter, accident and substance, physics and metaphysics, and even matters of grammar and classical literature are all skillfully presented with the concept of the whole and the part as the organizing theme. Sometimes the theme might almost seem to be lost, but Hegius manages to bring the

¹See, for example, appendix A, pp. 421-22, where Hegius discusses plane and solid figures in the midst of an exposition concerning the nature of the soul; pp. 567-68, where he upholds Church tradition when he is speaking of the rising and setting of the sun; p. 578, where he integrates learning and faith when he relates the eternal joys of heaven and pains of hell to the mathematical concept of infinity; and pp. 593-94, where geography is introduced into a discussion about the Magi.

²See above, pp. 145-46.
reader back on each occasion before the presentation loses its logical progression and becomes disconnected.\(^1\)

Faber remarks on the way in which Hegius was able to make the complex simple. The "Dialog about Rhetoric" is a good example of how Hegius synthesizes the ideas of others in order to present them to his students in a manner that allows them to assimilate the material with as little difficulty as possible.\(^2\) Although not quite so evident everywhere in the dialogs, the writings of Hegius do make manifest the efforts of the author to expedite the learning process for the benefit of his students. His style incorporates a generally clear logical progression, simplification of the complex, recapitulation and review, and a genuine attempt to make the subject matter interesting.

One of the devices commonly used in medieval schools as a method of sharpening the skills of the students was the art of disputation or debate.\(^3\) There is some evidence that Hegius continued this practice in Deventer. He makes reference to Augustine, who had pointed out the benefits and dangers of this art:

> The discipline of debate is of the greatest value for penetrating and solving all kinds of questions in Holy Writ. You must only beware of any delight in quarreling and childish showing-off in catching out your opponent.\(^4\)

From the manner in which Hegius expresses his views, it is likely that he considered the art of disputation to be a useful pedagogical method as well as a valuable skill in the hand of the scholar. The

\(^1\)Hegius, appendix A, pp. 520-43. \(^2\)Ibid., pp. 606-13.

\(^3\)See above, p. 135.

way he presents his argument is quite enlightening. It illustrates the concern that Hegius had not only to teach the theory of humanism but also to give it practical expression in the lives of his pupils. The humanists sought to avoid the pitfalls of scholastic wrangling, while at the same time they recognized the great benefit of a logical and scholarly approach to any issue. By the methods that he used, Hegius made manifest his wish to instill these high ideals in the minds of his students.

On the matter of discipline, Hegius has very little to say. The later humanists condemned the vicious discipline of the medieval schools and tried to establish a more humane attitude with regard to the punishment of students. However, there was no question of dispensing with corporal punishment. It was just that the humanists reconsidered the circumstances and manner of its use.\(^1\) Hegius' attitude in this debate is not documented. All that can be said is that it would have been most unlikely for him to think of doing away with the use of physical means as a method of motivation in certain instances. His use of the following examples as grammatical illustrations would tend to substantiate this idea:

("I hand you over to the rods because you deserve to be handed over to the rods"). . . . ("I hand you over to the rods to correct you, to improve you, to render you/make you/cause you to be well-behaved"). . . . ("I am handing you over to the rods not so much because you deserve to be handed over as to make you well-behaved").\(^2\)

There is no means of knowing to what degree, if any, these examples reflect Hegius' thinking on the matter of corporal punishment.


\(^2\)Hegius, appendix A, p. 626.
Though not a great deal can be learned from early woodcuts about pedagogical methodology, it seems appropriate at this juncture to include some examples of this art from schoolbooks printed in the Low Countries.\footnote{See fig. 6, p. 370.} Two of the woodcuts might be post fifteenth-century depictions of the Deventer school, but it is not possible to be sure of this. The "rod" is visible in two of the three examples.

It is undoubtedly true to say that Hegius taught more by what he did and the manner in which he applied himself to his task than by what he actually said. Like all good teachers, he recognized the value of a good example. In exhorting his students to take up the study of classical literature, he makes the following interesting comments:

30. Just as he paints best who paints just like the man who has painted best, and again, he carves best who carves just like the man who has carved best, so he speaks best who speaks just as the man has spoken who has spoken best. Thus he sings best who sings just as the man has sung who has sung best.

31. Let us, therefore, make every effort to speak as he spoke who spoke best--who is agreed among all to have been Cicero.\footnote{Hegius, appendix A, p. 639.}

His humility would have prevented Hegius from suggesting that his pupils follow the example he set as a pedagog and scholar. It is, nevertheless, true that many of them emulated his industry and devotion. Many of the characteristics that Hegius displayed in his humanism later became hallmarks of the humanist movement. This is particularly true of his practical pedagogy. Perhaps there were some who made every effort to teach as he taught who, in their experience, taught best--namely, their own beloved headmaster.

A significant element in Hegius' approach was that he did
Fig. 6. Early woodcuts depicting educational settings in the Low Countries.
not merely try to raise his students up to his own level, but
directed them toward wider horizons than he had been able to reach
and looked for them to gain higher attainments than he had been able
to achieve. The aims that he had, his attitude toward his students,
the subject matter that he taught, and the methods that he used were
all calculated to motivate his students to make the best use of the
opportunities that were given to them. This is not to suggest that
Hegius was the perfect humanist teacher. Those who came after him
improved upon his ideals and methods, but even then there remained
many aspects of humanist pedagogy that would be found suspect.¹
Even in those areas where Hegius had arrived at sound theoretical
principles, his practice did not always keep pace with theory.
However, the successes that were gained in Deventer far outweighed
any failures that there might have been.

No claim could be made to suggest that Hegius was a first
rank humanist of the order of Agricola and Erasmus, or a philosopher
approaching the level of Gansfort. Hegius was a dedicated scholar,
but by no means an intellectual or literary giant. His genius lay
rather in his ability to mediate between scholarship and practice,
and his claim to fame will always be primarily as a teacher.

¹See, for example, Hegius, appendix A, p. 557. Here Hegius
presents material concerning the aspirations one might have to the
consulship. The material is expressed in classical terms that
would be quite foreign to students in the Netherlands. This was a
common problem among the humanists. In their desire to elevate the
learning of a bygone era, they were inclined sometimes to forget
that classical ideas did not always fit into the medieval situation.
It would have been difficult for his students to relate meaningfully
to this kind of material. Similarly, it must have been difficult
to understand the extremely high priority placed upon the art of
rhetoric by most of the humanists. The value of classical rhetoric
in a medieval Dutch town could not have been readily apparent.
Hegius cannot be given all the credit for what was achieved at St. Lebuins at the end of the fifteenth century. He was ably supported by a group of dedicated teachers, he was blessed with a number of very capable students, he had the benefit of the friendship of the printer Richard Paffraet, and, above all, he took up his task at a time when the forces of history were preparing the way for the dawn of a new era. It has to be acknowledged, nevertheless, that it was Hegius whose pedagogical genius was the guiding spirit in what happened in the Deventer school. Without him there is no doubt that there would still have been a revival of classical learning in the Low Countries. As it happens, the revival that did occur bears the unmistakable imprint of his contribution.
CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

The last twenty years of the fifteenth century was a period of unprecedented educational excellence in the school linked to the church of St. Lebuin in the city of Deventer. The old city that had stood for centuries upon the banks of the river Ijssel was at the time enjoying a period of considerable prosperity. In consort with a number of other cities in Northern Germany and the Low Countries, Deventer formed a part of the Hanseatic League. In addition to its prominence as a trading center, it also began to develop a reputation for having the leading school in the Low Countries and one of the most advanced schools anywhere north of the Alps. Students joined the ranks of merchants who visited the town from many far-distant parts of Europe. There was a steady stream of young men, particularly from the Germanic lands, who boosted the enrollment at the school to somewhere in the region of two thousand by 1500.

The central figure and moving spirit in the educational endeavors that raised Deventer to a position of prominence in the world of learning at the close of the Middle Ages was Alexander Hegius. Hegius was a native of neighboring Westphalia. After serving successfully as rector of two flourishing schools in that region, he moved to Deventer. He settled in the city about 1482 and spent the last sixteen years of his life there as rector of the
school at St. Lebuins. These were Hegius' most productive years. Under his guidance the city school gradually adopted the principles of the new humanist learning that characterized the Northern Renaissance and heralded the dawn of the modern era.

Hegius, like any wise pedagog, was as much a student as he was a teacher. He applied himself diligently to the pursuit of excellence in his personal studies and motivated his students to attain scholarly achievements that were even greater than his own. In terms of literary skills, Hegius cannot be said to have achieved great heights. His Latin was good but by no means outstanding, and his *Carmina* and *Dialogi* are certainly not literary masterpieces. In the final analysis, it has to be acknowledged that Hegius was first and foremost a pedagog. The significance of his contribution to northern humanism must therefore be measured by his expertise in facilitating the learning process and his ability to inspire in his students the desire to know.

Undoubtedly, his ability to inspire his students carried over into the way in which he was able to lead his team of instructors. Hegius must have been a good administrator. The Deventer school grew to be a very large institution by medieval standards, and all the evidence that is available suggests that while Hegius was rector it ran very smoothly and successfully.

In addition to his expertise in the classroom and his skills as an administrator, Hegius was something of a philosopher. He could not be described as a great original thinker, but he seemed to have the knack of assimilating the ideas of others and presenting them in simplified form to his students. Not only did he accomplish
this task with a considerable measure of success, but he was also able to select from the various philosophies those ideas that he felt would advance the science of pedagogy. Woven into his thinking are a number of the principles that helped to bring about an educational renewal in Deventer and other schools throughout the Low Countries.

The second half of this dissertation has been an on-going examination and evaluation of the work and philosophy of Hegius, hence it is not necessary to make a lengthy summary or analysis of his ideas at this point. However, mention of some of the major conclusions that have already been drawn serves to highlight the nature of the contribution that he made to the development of the Northern Renaissance.

If it is accepted that the Renaissance of the Low Countries was a confluence of four major ideological trends, then the degree to which Hegius participated in the development of each of these areas of thought provides a good measure of his commitment to the new learning. The most conservative element in the forces that gave rise to the Northern Renaissance was the devotio moderna. Though Hegius never joined the Brethren of the Common Life or any group of monks--lay or regular--who conscientiously observed the rules of these Brethren, there is no question that he was influenced by the ideals of this movement. Life in Westphalia and the Netherlands during the fifteenth century was lived in an atmosphere of pious devotion that can to a considerable degree be attributed to the devotio moderna. Hegius could hardly have escaped its influence. The piety of his life, the conservative nature of his ideas, and his
long and fruitful cooperation with a number of men connected with the Brethren of the Common Life and the reformed orders would lead one to believe that he held this movement and its adherents in high esteem. His writings and what is known of his life confirm that he espoused many of the values by which the men of the devotio moderna ordered their affairs.

The second ideological current that contributed to the distinctiveness of the Renaissance in the Low Countries is that of reform-mindedness. In this area, the conclusions drawn about Hegius are more tentative. Unlike Gansfort and Erasmus, Hegius, as far as can be ascertained, did not make any overt criticisms of the Church. His reform-mindedness was manifested in an orthodoxy which rejected Church tradition and scholastic sophistry that could not be established upon biblical principle. Hegius' writings do not make him a strict biblicist by any means, but he was concerned that ideas be tested against the sources from which they had sprung rather than against what men said about those sources. Hegius aimed at bringing about a theological and philosophical simplification and encouraged a high standard of moral rectitude. Only in this conservative sense can he be said to have exhibited a spirit of reform. It is important to remember, however, that it was this kind of reform-mindedness that provided the foundation for both Protestant Reformation and Catholic renewal in the sixteenth century.

Scholasticism is the next area that was seen to be of major importance in the revival of learning in the North. The complex interplay of ideas in the field of scholastic thought has often been misunderstood, and not the least in the case of Hegius. The most
significant conclusion arising out of an examination of Hegius' philosophy is that he was not, as has been universally believed, a strict and single-minded adherent of the via antiqua. In fact, his allegiance is quite clearly more in line with the via moderna. If it is acceptable to assign labels, then Hegius must be considered a moderate logico-critical nominalist. The consequences of his transfer of allegiance to a philosophical scheme that was not generally accepted in the schools of the Low Countries may not have been fully understood by Hegius. Certainly the new philosophic approach, along with the strong emphasis that was placed on the classical humanities, resulted in a period of great prosperity for St. Lebuins. The empiricism to which the nominalist position ultimately led, however, was probably only faintly perceived by the Deventer schoolmaster.

The far-reaching effects of logico-critical nominalism on the dawn of the modern era have recently become an area of research into which a considerable amount of scholarly effort has been channeled.

Humanism must rightly be considered the essence of the Renaissance. It is the manner in which the devotio moderna, the spirit of reform, and scholasticism effected the humanism of the North that made the Renaissance of the Low Countries a distinctive movement. In some areas Hegius excelled as a humanist. In others it has to be acknowledged that he found it difficult to break away from the medieval roots in which he himself, most of his colleagues, and the entire educational system had been steeped. Whatever his failures as a humanist, it is an incontrovertible historical fact that, after the reforms introduced by Hegius at St. Lebuins, the standard of Latin scholarship improved dramatically. The principles
of biblical humanism soon became the standard by which good education was measured throughout all the Netherlands and Westphalia, and many of the schools began to model themselves upon the example set in Deventer.

Some of the most important contributions that arose from the humanistic endeavors of Hegius were his emphasis upon a more classical approach to grammar (including his attacks upon the barbarity of medieval learning, particularly in the form of the grammars of the modistae); the impetus that was given to the publication of classical texts in the North; and the introduction of Greek into the school curriculum. The accomplishments of the generation of pupils who sat at Hegius' feet attest to the success of his efforts. These young men became learned and able scholars all over Europe. Just one example is sufficient to illustrate the far-reaching effects of Hegius' work in Deventer. Erasmus, who says that he learned the rudiments of Greek at St. Lebuins, went on to publish in 1516 the first Greek New Testament of modern times.

In all these areas of concern, it was Hegius' expertise in applying the ideological trends of the Northern Renaissance to the educational setting that set him apart from many others. Agricola, a man of much greater ability in the field of the humanities, had to admit that the future of the new learning in the Netherlands was to a great degree dependent upon the pedagogical genius of Hegius. As has already been stated, Hegius must first and foremost be judged on the basis of his ability as a teacher, for it was in this art that he excelled. Sadly, little information about his teaching practices exists. In this important area, it is necessary largely to
rely upon the evaluations made by his contemporaries. They, unfortunately, did not report much of a specific nature concerning his methods, but those who knew him and studied under him were unanimous in their generous praise of his great ability as a humanist pedagog.

In spite of the fairly detailed analysis of Hegius' ideas and contribution to the humanist cause undertaken in this dissertation, some areas of research have as yet hardly been touched. Only a very cursory examination of his poetry has ever been undertaken, and not much information is given by any scholars about the changes that were made by Hegius and Sinthius in their edition of Alexander de Villa Dei's Doctrinale. Even when it comes to the Dialogs, there is still much scope for further analysis of Hegius' philosophy. One of the things that has only been done in a fairly superficial way in this presentation and in the editing of the Dialogs is the identification of the sources from which Hegius takes his ideas. This is a time-consuming task, and, as yet, it has hardly been begun. Only when Hegius actually names another author or work has any attempt been made to establish the exact source of the reference. There are many instances where it is obvious that Hegius is quoting, particularly from Aristotle, but to date no effort has been made to pinpoint these sources. This is a task that still remains to be undertaken.

When all is said and done, it has to be admitted that, in spite of the importance of his contribution to the Northern Renaissance, Hegius remains something of an enigma. Notwithstanding the fact that his writings are available for analysis, as a person he continues to be surrounded by an aura of mystery. That he was an an
extraordinary individual and a pedagogical genius is sure, but it is not easy to determine exactly why. He was not a man of outstanding literary ability and his works do not give much evidence of any great originality, yet his students held him in the highest esteem. Hegius was a pious medieval scholar who broke out of the traditional mold to become a greatly respected pioneer of biblical humanism. In spite of this, it appears that he was a man of the deepest humility, a true gentleman of letters, whose highest joy was not in self-glorification but in passing on his love of scholarship to the students for whom he labored. Modesty distinguished Hegius from many other humanists. This characteristic in his nature is probably one of the chief causes for the mystery that surrounds his life and the lack of documentary evidence concerning his achievements. It is also a characteristic that adds much to the respect one has for him as an individual.

Even if Hegius did not have all the skills of some of the other humanists, and even if certain of his personal attributes were in contrast to those of many of the humanists who came after him, his pioneering contribution to the development of the new learning in the Low Countries has to be recognized. As a scholar and a pedagog, Hegius earned himself a place as one of the many, but by no means the least, who played a part in heralding the Renaissance in the lands of Northern Europe.
Andrews University
School of Education

ALEXANDER HEGIUS (ca. 1433-98)
HIS LIFE, PHILOSOPHY,
AND PEDAGOGY
VOLUME II
SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY

A Dissertation
Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
John V. G. Matthews
June 1988
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APPENDIX A

THE DIALOGS OF ALEXANDER HEGIUS

Introduction

This appendix is, to the best of my knowledge, the first translation of the Dialogs of Alexander Hegius into any modern language. The translation was made by Rosemary James, who was at the time a graduate student at the University of Reading in Berkshire, England. I did much of the editorial work and made a small number of alterations where it was obvious to me that the translator had not fully understood the intent of the Latin.

The Dialogs were first published in Latin early in the sixteenth century under the title: Alexandri Hegii artium magistri gymnasiarche quondam Daventriensis philosophi presbyteri utriusque lingue docti Dialogi. The work was edited by Jacobus Faber, and the colophon indicates that Richard Paffraet printed the volume in the town of Deventer in 1503. The edition of 1503 was the only printing of the Dialogi, except for the "Farrago" or "Miscellany," which had been published earlier.¹ Sections of the "Contra modos significandi" were also published as an integral part of the "Farrago" in its earlier editions.

This translation was made from a copy of the Dialogs located in the British Library in London. The British Library shelf-mark is 11408.e.65 (2). There is no critical text of the Dialogi except for the last treatise in the work. This treatise, entitled "Contra modos significandi," was published in a critical edition by Jozef Ijsewijn.² Lawrence J. Johnson of the University of Texas in El Paso is apparently in the process of preparing a critical text at the present time. When he was contacted prior to beginning this translation of the Dialogs, he felt that he was not yet at a stage where he was able to share his work.

Because the translation has not been made from a critical text, it cannot be considered completely adequate. It has been included as part of this dissertation for convenience and reference. Nevertheless, it is an accurate reflection of the original, to which adheres fairly literally. It is hoped that it will serve its purpose well until such time as it can be checked against a critical

¹See appendix C, s.v. "Hegius."

Latin edition and upgraded to the status of a definitive translation. In terms of the objectives of this dissertation, the lack of any critically evaluated text was not felt to be a major obstacle.

As a literal rendering, the style of English in this translation may sometimes be a little awkward. I asked the translator to concern herself more with an accurate reflection of the Latin than with the niceties of idiomatic English. For the purposes of this dissertation, I felt that this was the correct emphasis. Perhaps at some later date, when a revision is undertaken, a more literary rendering will be considered.

In the original publication there are a few short sections that are clearly designated as the work of the editor rather than that of Hegius. These have not been included in the translation. Nor has a translation of the Carmina, published earlier in 1503 as a companion volume to the Dialogs, been attempted. Four letters that were published along with the Carmina and Dialogi have also been left out of this appendix. Instead, they have been included along with Hegius' other extant correspondence in appendix B.

The Dialogs suffer from the common problems associated with early printing. The text has some obvious errors and the meaning is not always entirely clear. Many words that had obviously been misspelled were silently emended. Except in quotations from other authors where comparisons were possible, these emendations were quite arbitrary. The underlying sense of the Dialogs, however, is generally clear, and the number of problems in translation were relatively few.

Changes in the meaning of words as well as ambiguities in the original or the target language sometimes made it difficult to express exactly what the author had in mind. For example, the Latin nomen can be translated as "name" or "noun" or, in some instances, even as "word." Similarly, scientia may be "science" or "knowledge." Teutonicus should be translated as "German," but Hegius uses it interchangeably to mean both German and Dutch. If the reader bears these possible variants in mind, it will allow for a broader understanding of what Hegius was trying to say.

Words or sentences in parentheses are translations from the foregoing statements in Latin, Greek, or Dutch. Except for Greek, the statements in their original language are either in quotation marks or underlined. Quotation marks are used rather than underlining when there is good evidence that the statement is a direct quote from some other source. If three languages are involved, the second language has not been underlined. Instead it has been placed in quotation marks, but without parentheses. This is to distinguish it as a translation quoted as it stands in the 1503 edition of the Dialogi. For example:

Petrus tamdiu habitavit in Gallia ut dedidicerit teutonice loqui: "Hy heest soe langhe in walsch lant ghowen dat hy dat duytsh vergreten heest" ("Peter has lived so long in France

1 For example, see below, pp. 387, 503, 614.
that he has forgotten how to speak Dutch\textsuperscript{1}.

Words in square brackets are additions to the text for the sake of clarity or better expression in English. They may also be editorial comments. Words preceded by a plus sign and enclosed in square brackets are additions to the text postulating an intentional or unintentional omission from the manuscript, the restoration of which is necessary for the sense of the translation. For example: "[+Define] the soul by one of its definitions."\textsuperscript{2} Words present in the text, but, in the opinion of the translator or editor, mistakenly included, are represented in brackets as follows:

A. Is everything infinite in magnitude immobile in the way that Melissius asserted? \textit{<because>}

B. It is not, because nothing is infinite in magnitude, since no. . . .\textsuperscript{3}

As it was not the purpose of this dissertation to produce a critical translation of the Dialogs, references by Hegius to classical and medieval authors have not always been fully investigated. Only in the most obvious and necessary cases have cross-references been made. Because of time constraints there are even a small number of important references that I have not yet been able to locate.

There are no footnotes or references to be found in the 1503 edition of the Dialogs except in the text itself, and these have been translated as such. All the footnotes are, therefore, mine.

\textsuperscript{1}See below, p. 615. \textsuperscript{2}See below, p. 410.

\textsuperscript{3}See below, p. 533.
Fig. 7. Reproduction of a page from the Dialogi by Alexander Hegius, edited by Jacobus Faber, and published by Richard Paffraet in 1503. See the 1503 edition of the Dialogi, fo. G.ii recto; and pp. 494-95 of this translation. Reproduced with the permission of the British Library.
Concerning Knowledge and What Is Known--Against the Academics.

Concerning the Three Types of Soul.

Two Dialogs Concerning the Mystery of the Incarnation: To Which Is Added [an Account] Concerning the Celebrating and Finding of Easter.

A Dialog on Physics.

Concerning Sense and the Sensible.

Concerning Art and Inertia.

Concerning Rhetoric.

Concerning Morals.

A Miscellany of the Same [Author]: To Which Is Added an Invective Against the Modes of Signification, Which He Refutes Most Skillfully.

A Letter, and a Second, of the Same [Author] to Others Lurking Among His Followers.¹

¹The full titles of the Dialogs are given in the table of contents in the front matter of books 1 and 2 of the dissertation. The partial listing of the contents given here is a direct translation of the title page of the 1503 edition of the Dialogs.
A Dialog of Alexander Hegius Concerning
Knowledge and That Which Is Known:

Interlocutors A and B

A. Tell me whether you are of the opinion that something can be
known, or nothing?

B. It is my opinion that something can be known.

A. Why do you differ from the Academicians, who assert that nothing
can be known?

B. Because they seem to me to be wrong.

A. You cannot agree with those who seem to you to be wrong?

B. I cannot.

A. Why?

B. No one is knowingly wrong; but [a man] who agrees with those
whom he judges to be wrong inevitably errs knowingly.

A. Why do the Academicians seem to you to be wrong?

B. Because it is my opinion that I know many things.

A. What?

B. I know that the whole is greater than its part. I know that any
given thing exists or does not exist. I know that I exist. I know
that I am alive.

A. Perhaps you know that you know something that is your opinion,
and thus by your opinion perhaps you are deceived.

B. It cannot happen that anyone considering himself to exist is
deceived, whether he knows it or thinks it, because [a man] who does
not exist cannot be deceived. Nor can it happen that a man who
considers himself alive is deceived. It is the living who are
deceived, not the dead. And so, though many are deceived, thinking
they know what they believe, yet a man who thinks he exists and
lives can in no way be deceived.

A. What is the difference between things that are known and those
things concerning which something is known?

B. Those things that are known are the senses of the human mind. Those things about which something is known are all the things about which the mind senses the truth, that is, the truth of which it pronounces by affirmation or denial. And things of this kind are partly in nature, partly not in nature.

A. Give an example.

B. In the case of a form that is in nature, it is known by what limit or limits it is defined. In the case of a vacuum, however, which is not in nature, it is known that it is in no place. That same thing is known in the case of an infinite body.

A. Why is there a knowledge of non-entities?

B. Because truth can be pronounced and proved concerning them.

A. What is the difference between knowledge of entities and of non-entities?

B. Knowledge of entities is affirmative and negative; knowledge of non-entities is negative.

A. Demonstrate this.

B. We know that a triangle is enclosed by three lines, and such knowledge is affirmative. We also know that a triangle cannot have two right angles, and this knowledge is negative. In the case of a quadrilateral triangle, which is not a thing, we know that it is not in nature.

A. If all those things that are known are senses of the mind, it appears that all known things are in the mind.

B. Your opinion is accurate in respect of scita propinqua ("near tenets"), for all facts that are called scita propinqua are in the mind.

A. What are scita propinqua?

B. They are senses of the mind, that is, those things that the mind pronounces, by affirming or denying, about those matters concerning which something is known.

A. What are scita remota ("tenets at a remove")?

B. [Those things] about which something is known.

A. Why are the senses of the mind called scita propinqua of knowledge?

B. Because they are in the mind, and for that reason are not far
removed from knowledge, which is itself in the mind. Therefore they are rightly called scita propinqua of knowledge.

A. Why are those things about which something is known called scita remota?

B. Because they can exist outside the mind. Sometimes some scita remota may be in the mind, because something is known about knowledge which is in the mind. Many things are known about the virtues and vices that are in the mind. It is not inevitable, however, that these things about which something is known should be in the mind, so they are rightly called scita remota.

A. If all the things that are known are in the mind, how could some sciences be called real?

B. They are called real sciences, and scitis remotis, and non propinquis.

A. What are the senses of our mind?

B. Things that our mind perceives concerning things that exist or do not exist, that is, that our mind affirms or denies about them.

A. Give an example.

B. If our mind perceives a right angle to be greater than an acute, then "a right angle is greater than an acute" is a sense of our mind. If our mind perceives the diameter of a square to be commensurate with the side, then "the diameter of a square is commensurate with the side" is a sense of our mind.

A. The senses of the mind seem to me to be true or false propositions.

B. You think rightly.

A. Are all the senses of our mind known?

B. Not all, but only the true [ones].

A. Why are the false not known?

B. Because to assent to the false is not to know, but to err.

A. Are all the true senses of our mind known to us?

B. No.

A. Demonstrate.

B. When we assent to any true thing for the reason that it has been told to us by some trustworthy man, we are said not to know it but to believe it.
A. What is the difference between knowing and believing?

B. This is the difference, that to know is to assent to something true for the reason that it is either known of itself or recognized by some sense or urged by some proof; to believe, on the other hand, is to assent to [something] true or false because of the statement of some man whom we think trustworthy.

A. How many sorts of knowledge are there?

B. Three.

A. Which?

B. Some are facts known of themselves and indemonstrable, which are called universal conceptions of the mind. Of this sort are these statements: every whole is greater than its part; every whole is equal to all its parts; things that are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other; if you subtract equal from equal, the remainders are equal. Others are facts that are judged to be true by some sense, as: vision cannot occur unless there is a transparent body between the sight and the object seen; vision cannot occur along a curved line; color cannot be seen unless it is subjected to light; every sound is in harmony with its octave and is dissonant to its seventh; hearing can occur along a curved line. Facts that are urged by proof are these: every triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles; every quadrilateral has four angles equivalent to four right angles; every pentagon has five angles equivalent to six right angles, etc.

A. What is the difference between knowledge and faith?

B. The same as between knowing and believing. For faith has its origin in statement; [but] knowledge [has its origin] in proof, or in the judgment of a sense, or in the manifest truth of a proposition known of itself.

A. You say that things known of themselves are known, and knowledge of them is called common knowledge, which Aristotle [384-22 B.C.] in the sixth [book] of Ethics calls intellect.¹

B. Knowledge of things known of themselves is rightly called intellect, because all men of healthy mind understand them to be true. It can even be called science, if this word science is extended, that is, taken generally. For there is no one who cannot truly say that he knows that every whole is greater than its part. If those things that are known of themselves and indemonstrable cause those things that are proved to be known, those things which are proved cannot be known except from the indemonstrable. It is

¹Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 6.3.1139b.14-17, and 6.5. 1140a.24-1140b.30.
inevitable that the indemonstrables themselves are known, for how could a thing that is not itself known cause other things to be known.

A. Can the same thing be both believed and known?

B. The same thing can be believed by one man, known by another.

A. Demonstrate.

B. That Rome is a city of Italy is known by the Romans, [and] believed by the Germans who have never seen Rome. The resurrection of the dead is firmly believed by Christians, [and] known by God who has foreknowledge of all things to come.

A. Can knowledge develop from belief?

B. It can, for many men set out abroad for the purpose of turning beliefs into knowledge.

A. Can every belief become knowledge?

B. No.

A. Demonstrate.

B. Those things which once took place and were narrated by trustworthy historians are believed by us, and they cannot ever be known, because those things which took place cannot occur a second time.

A. What is the difference between knowledge and opinion?

B. Knowledge is assent free from every fear, for he who has knowledge does not fear, nor is he deceived. Opinion, however, is assent allied with fear, for he who holds an opinion fears that he may be mistaken.

A. What is error?

B. A turning away of the intellect from truth, or of the will from right.

A. How many errors are there?

B. Two. Error of the intellect and [error] of the will.

A. Which of them is the more harmful?

B. Error of the will, because that always makes a man wicked, for he is wicked who deviates from the right.

A. Is not every error of the intellect harmful?

B. No.
A. Demonstrate.

B. When someone believes that his friend, who is out, is at home, he is in error, but it is not inevitable that an error of this sort is harmful.

A. What error of the intellect is harmful?

B. [That] which deprives a man of good, either of fortune, or of body, or of soul.

A. Demonstrate.

B. [A man] holds a harmful error who buys spoiled and faulty merchandise that he believes to be good, who believes a doctor to be skilled who is unskilled, who believes a thing to be honorable that is base, or a base [thing] to be honorable.

A. What error of the intellect is most harmful?

B. When a man deviates from that truth which he is bound to believe.

A. What are those truths that a man is bound to believe.

B. [Those] that the Church commands to be believed: of this sort are those things that are contained in both Testaments, the Old and the New, and in the creeds.

A. Is any faith better and more excellent than knowledge?

B. It is.

A. Demonstrate.

B. To believe that God is the true creator of all things, the savior of mankind, is more excellent than to know that a triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles.

A. Which belief is greater than which knowledge?

B. The belief without which holiness cannot be had, that is, the worship of God, and religion, is more excellent than the knowledge without which holiness can be had.

A. Demonstrate.

B. [A person] who does not believe that God was made man and suffered for the salvation of men will not be able to worship God in holiness. Yet [he] who does not know that a triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles is not without a share of holiness on account of ignorance of this sort. Therefore it is more excellent to believe the former than to know the latter.
A. Is every belief more excellent than knowledge?

B. No, for there are many things that it is better to know than to believe. For it is not to believe that a triangle has three, etc., that makes a man a mathematician, but to know. Nor is it to believe that a man is the same thing as his humanity and another than his warmness that makes a man a metaphysician, but to know. Nor is it to believe that man is a species while animal is a genus that makes a man a dialectician, but to know.

A. Does the physicist know all the things that he senses and proposes concerning physics, that is, concerning nature, or does he believe some of them?

B. A physicist knows some things, believes some.

A. Which propositions does the physicist know [and] which does he believe?

B. The physicist knows the universal propositions, that is, the things that he proposes concerning all mobile things, because they are known either of themselves, or by experiment, or by proof. He believes many of the specific propositions. Of such sort are those things that he proposes concerning certain kinds of animals, trees, and plants.

A. Demonstrate.

B. The physicist knows that everything which moves, moves from one place to another, that is, from the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem, because every motion has two termini, one from which it begins, another at which it ceases. The physicist knows that every thing that is moving was moving and will move, because that which is moving is neither beginning nor ceasing to move; and since it is not beginning to move it was already moving for some time past, [while] since it is not ceasing to move it will move for some time to come. The physicist knows that every natural transmutation is the passage of a transmutable thing from deprivation to possession or from possession to deprivation. And for this reason there are said to be three elements of change: matter, form, and deprivation—understanding by matter the transmutable thing, by form the possession, and by deprivation the lack and absence of form. For when the air changes from shadowy to bright it is transmuted from deprivation to possession. When, however, it changes from bright to shadowy it passes from possession to deprivation. When a man changes from ignorant to learned he passes from deprivation into possession. On the other hand, however, when he changes from learned to ignorant, that is, when he forgets those things he knew, he passes from possession to deprivation.

A. What are those things that the physicist believes?

B. Those that he confirms concerning the basilisk and the crocodile
and many other exotic animals. For which of the physicists has ever seen a crocodile or a basilisk?

A. Why is physics given a place among the sciences when it is partly a science, partly a belief?

B. Physics is called a science κατα συνεκδοχήν [sic, συνεκδοχήν] ("by synecdoche"), for we understand a part from the whole when we call it a science.


B. Because a large part of those [works] that are written about the characteristics of things is narration. For this reason things written about the characteristics of things are rightly assigned the name of history.

A. What do physicists relate about the crocodile and the basilisk?

B. Concerning the crocodile, these things are related by Pliny in the eighth [book]:

The crocodile is a four-footed animal equally dangerous to man on land and in the water. The Nile brings forth this evil. It lacks the use of its tongue. Alone among all living things it moves its upper jaw. In size it often exceeds twelve cubits. It is thought to continue growing for as long as it lives, [and] it lives for a long time. It lays as many eggs as geese, and by some prophetic power always incubates them beyond the area to which the Nile is going to rise at its highest flood. It is armed with claws and has skin on its back impervious to every blow, but on its belly, [skin] soft and tender, for which reason dolphins lurk to attempt its life in that area. This beast is fearsome against those who flee from it, [but] flees those who attack it. In the water it has dim sight; outside its vision is very sharp. At the sight of a man it sheds tears. If he approaches it soon devours him.1

These things are related by Pliny about the basilisk in the eighth [book] of his Natural History, in the twenty-first [chapter]:2

The province of Cyrenia produces the basilisk. It is not larger

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1Pliny *Natural History* 8.37.89 and 8.38.91-93.

2The reference to chapter 21 in the text is incorrect. It should read chapter 33.
than the size of twelve fingers. On its head is a gleaming white spot like some extraordinary diadem. By its hissing it puts all serpents to flight, and it does not, like the others, propel its body by multiple curves, but advances with its middle upright and erect. It kills shrubs not only with its touch but also by its breath; it burns up grass; it bursts rocks. It has been ascertained that when one was once killed from a horse by a spear, as the force of the poison passed along it [the spear], not only the rider but the horse too was destroyed by it. It is claimed that the venom of weasels is fatal to this creature; they cast them into their dens, which are easily recognized by the putrid smell.

Wise men speak with wonderful eulogies of the blood of the basilisk thickening like pitch; they attribute to it the obtaining of petitions from princes and powers, and of prayers from the gods. Some men call it the blood of Saturn. There are even those who record that the basilisk, simply by its appearance, kills a man—[a thing] that the ctablepas is also said to do:

[This creature] is not very fierce, and in all its members inactive, carrying its head, which is very heavy, only with difficulty. It is always hanging down to the ground. Everyone who sees its eyes dies immediately. It has its birth in western Ethiopia, near the spring that is called Nigris, the source, so many have thought, of the Nile.

"In Italy the gaze of wolves, too, is thought to be harmful to man," as we said above, "and to deprive temporarily of speech [any] man whom they see before he sees them."

Lucan [A.D. 39-65] writes thus about the basilisk: "Uttering hisses that terrify other deadly creatures, doing more harm than death-bringing potions, the basilisk repels all the common herd and reigns on the empty sand."

A. Is knowledge of itself, that is, of its intrinsic nature, a good thing; or is it [one] of these things that are neutral, that is, that are neither good in themselves nor bad in themselves, but are rendered good or bad by the nature of those who employ them?

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1Twelve inches.

2Pliny Natural History 8:33.78-79. The last sentence is an abbreviated version of what is given in modern critical texts.

3Ibid., 8.32.77.

4Ibid., 8.34.80.

5Lucan Pharsalia 9.726.
B. Knowledge is a good thing in itself.

A. Why?

B. Because knowledge is the perfection of the mind; for no one doubts that a thing is good for our mind which makes it perfect. Our mind lacks its completion when it is without knowledge, but once knowledge has been acquired it is complete and perfect.

A. How many things are good for our mind?

B. Two, to know the right and to will the right.

A. Why is it a good thing for our mind to know the right?

B. Because it renders a man like the supreme good. The more truths a man knows the more like he is to God, from whom nothing is hidden.

A. What is it that every man by nature desires?

B. To know.

A. Why?

B. Because every thing by nature desires its own perfection and its own good. Just as the prime matter of all corruptible things, which is called ὕλη ("wood/prime matter"), by its nature desires form, for it does not wish to be formless, and this form [that] is the perfection of matter is ἔμφύλιον ("perfection"), so our mind by its nature desires knowledge, because [that] is its perfection.

A. Is knowledge of evil a good thing?

B. Knowledge of evil is no less good than knowledge of good.

A. Why?

B. Because a man is no less obliged to avoid wickedness than to do right. But a man cannot avoid wickedness unless he knows it, for an evil is only avoided if recognized.

A. Is the knowledge of making evil and captious arguments, which is called σοφοτέχνη ("sophistry"), a good thing?

B. It is. [He] who is in possession of that knowledge cannot be deceived and seduced from truth into error, which easily happens to those who do not have that knowledge.

A. Is it useful for a businessman to know how merchandise is to be adulterated?

B. It is useful for him to know, not so that he can adulterate it, but so that he may not deal in adulterated wares.
A. Knowledge, as experience teaches, often makes men conceited and causes them to act arrogantly. Knowledge that provokes conceit is bad for the [one] that it makes conceited.

B. I admit that knowledge is bad for the man that it makes conceited, but this happens to knowledge because it is the mischance of knowledge to be in an evil mind. Knowledge that is in a right mind neither causes conceit nor makes anyone act arrogantly. Therefore it is evident that knowledge does not provoke conceit of itself, since knowledge does not make all men conceited; nor is it bad of itself, but by accident, because it is the fate of knowledge to be associated with an evil will.

A. For whom is knowledge of deception a good thing?
B. For the one who possesses it, for [he] who himself knows how to deceive can easily take care not to be deceived.

A. Is knowledge of deceit a bad thing for [one] who is deceived?
B. It is, but he is not in possession of it, for if he did have it he would not be deceived.

A. If knowledge is a bad thing by accident because it is sometimes associated with an evil will, it seems also to be good by accident because sometimes it is associated with a right will.

B. Although knowledge is bad by accident, it is nevertheless good of itself, because it is better to know than to be ignorant, that is, to possess knowledge than to lack it. [A thing] that is better to have than not to have is a thing good of itself, and [it] has an innate goodness. [A thing] that it is better not to have than to have is a bad thing.

A. Is it good to learn?
B. It is.

A. Why?
B. Because it is a good thing to acquire [that] which it is good to have and to possess. But since it is a good thing to possess knowledge, it is inevitable that it is a good thing to learn.

A. What is the difference between learning and knowing?
B. To learn is to be moved toward knowledge and to acquire it. To know is to possess it. To learn pertains to the κατηγορίαν ("category") of passion, to know to the κατηγορίαν of quality.¹

¹See Aristotle Categories 4.1b.25-2a.4. Aristotle postulates ten classes of predicates that may be attached to a subject. These are as follows: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place,
A. Does anyone who learns anything move from ignorance to knowledge?

B. Not every learner moves from ignorance to knowledge, for untruths are learned, and stories that are not known but believed are learned. [Those] who read histories learn many things from them. Christians have learned the catholic and orthodox faith, heretics their heresies, the deluded their delusions. To learn can be taken so strictly and particularly that only the man who moves toward knowledge may be said to learn.

A. Define to learn [as] generally accepted.

B. To learn is to admit into the mind an assent to truth or falsehood, that is, to turn from unknowing to knowing, from unbelieving to believing, or from not deluded to deluded.

A. How did Plato [ca. 429-347 B.C.] define learning?

B. Plato said that to learn was simply to recall forgotten things, that is, to move from forgetting to remembrance.1

A. Why was learning so defined?

B. Because he thought that the soul, when it was outside the body, had known those things that it learns when it dwells in the body and gives it life. He believed that the soul had existed in nature before it was infused into the body.2

A. Should one agree with Plato?

B. No. For if the soul, when it was outside the body, knew those things that it learns in the body, and if it learns nothing in the body except what has been known by it and forgotten, since the soul in the body can be changed from error [in respect] of some proposition to a knowledge of that same, it is inevitable that the soul outside the body had simultaneously both error and knowledge about the same proposition, which nature does not allow. One must therefore agree with Aristotle's opinion. He held learning to be a movement from ignorance to knowledge, and compared the mind with an unmarked tablet, so that he was of the opinion that it had known nothing outside the body.3

A. I admit that you have shown that our mind had no knowledge

1Plato Phaedo 75.e.
2Ibid., 75.c-77.a.
3Aristotle On the Soul 3.4.429b.29-430a.2.

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outside the body of all the things that it can learn in the body. For in the body it can learn falsehoods which it never knew, since the false can never by any means be known. But I am not yet convinced that our mind outside the body had no knowledge of those truths that it can learn in the body.

B. Be attentive: I shall convince [you].

A. I shall be most attentive.

B. Our mind in the body can learn infinite, that is, countless, truths; for our mind cannot learn so many truths that it overflows, as it is inevitable that a quarter-pint measure overflows if you try to pour out a third of a pint of wine. Our mind is like that matter which is called hyle ("ūλν/prime matter"), which is capable of infinite transmutations. For if the world is to last for infinite ages, matter must be subjected to infinite transmutations and must never refuse to undergo them. But its [the soul’s] mind did not have at one and the same time knowledges\(^1\) infinite in number, since no multitude is infinite in number except only the multitude of parts of the continuum. It will remain proved that our soul outside the body knew no truths at all, nor has it forgotten any of them.

A. You seem to me to be saying incompatible and contrary things; for you say that our mind can learn infinite truths, and you deny that it can know infinite things, which seems incompatible.

B. I seem to you to be saying incompatible things because you have no knowledge of dialectic, so that you cannot discern truth from falsehood. If you had some knowledge of it you would at least know that there is a good deal of difference between these two propositions: "infinite truths the human mind can learn and know," and "the human mind can learn and know infinite truths."

A. I admit that I do not know what difference there is between these statements. But I want to learn it from you.

B. Turn your attention to it: I shall teach [you]. When I say that the human mind can learn infinite truths I mean that it cannot learn so many truths that it can learn nothing in addition, that is, by learning add to the things that it has learned. But when I deny that our mind can learn infinite truths I mean that it cannot, at one and the same time, assent to infinite true statements, since no propositions, no matter how many, may be infinite in number. It is agreed among philosophers that only proportional parts of the continuum are infinite in number.

A. Are all the liberal arts good?

B. They are.

\(^{1}\)See below, p. 402.
A. Why?

B. Because they are called liberal for this reason, that they are worthy to be learned and known by free men. No one doubts that thing to be good which is worthy to be learned and known.

A. Why is grammar, that is, letters, good?

B. Because it is good for a man to know how to explain the sensations of his mind to other men. Speech, which is denied to dumb animals, has been granted to man for this purpose, that he may be able to share his thoughts and plans and wishes with other men, because man is by nature a political, that is, a social animal.

A. Why is rhetoric good?

B. Because orators, by the art of speaking well, which is called rhetoric, accuse the guilty and force them to pay the penalty for their crimes. They defend the innocent, so that punishment is not exacted from them for crimes they have never committed. The makers of laws, by the power of oratory, compel the people to bind themselves to the service of the law. The precepts of living, even if they are honorable by nature, flow more easily into the hearts of men if they are illuminated by the splendor of oratory.

A. Rhetoric seems bad and harmful, since it often rescues the wicked from punishment, [and] sometimes condemns the innocent and forces them to pay the penalty for crimes they have never committed.

B. Is fire bad because sometimes towns and villages are burned by fire, sometimes buildings and cities, sometimes even churches? Or are waters bad because sometimes they swamp and sink ships? Is a sword, therefore, bad, and not to be made for a soldier, because it is of use to a robber to murder travelers? Who considers knowledge of the laws bad and to be avoided because a lawyer, by a wrongful interpretation of the law, can turn supreme justice into supreme injustice?

A. Is rhetoric useful to the man for whom dishonorable things are advised by an orator, and good things spoken against?

B. It is not useful to him, but dangerous. In fact, that happens to him as a result of [his] ignorance of rhetoric. [A man] who is skilled in rhetoric, and knows from what grounds the arguments that the orator employs are brought forward, will not easily be able to be seduced from the honorable or urged to the dishonorable.

A. Is rhetoric considered to be useful or harmful?

B. Useful.

A. Why?

B. Because, if a judge has gained experience in rhetoric, the
expert orator will not easily be able to move him, that is, to confuse his mind with hatred or enthusiasm or mercy or indignation, so that he cannot discern the fair from the unfair. For it is the office of an orator to alienate the mind of a judge from his adversary and win its approval for himself, which can easily be achieved if the feelings of the judge can be moved.

A. Is not rhetoric harmful to the criminal when, being convicted by the lawyer, he is forced to pay the penalty for his crimes?

B. No.

A. Why?

B. Because it is better for the criminal to pay the penalty he owes than to be saved from it.

A. Since all sciences are good, are they all considered of one order, that is, of equal good?

B. No; but [those] that treat of more certain or more worthy things, and things more deserving of admiration, are more excellent than the others.

A. Which is the most excellent of all the sciences?

B. Metaphysics. Metaphysics is the most excellent of all the sciences discovered by the philosophers, for it treats of the most excellent subject, the glorious God by whose command all things are ordered, to whom be praise and honor for endless ages.

Τέλος ("The end")
A Dialog of Alexander Hegius τεδυ τυς [sic, τυς] τυχνς, That Is, Concerning the Soul: and Firstly, Concerning the Soul in Kind, and Its Definitions, and Many Other Things:
The First [Dialog]

A. Is there knowledge concerning the soul or not?
B. There is.
A. Is truth or falsehood known about the soul?
B. Your question is ridiculous.
A. Why?
B. Because no one ever knew a falsehood about anything. Whatever is known about what is or what is nothing, about the truth or about falsehood, is inevitably true. Although a vacuum exists nowhere, yet it is a truth that a vacuum exists nowhere, and this [fact] is known about it. Likewise, in the case of a false and faulty syllogism, it is known that it has not been formed according to the rules of dialectic, and this [fact] is true.
A. How many truths are known about the soul?
B. Three.
A. Which?
B. Truths known of themselves, truths learned, and truths proved.
A. What are the truths known of themselves?
B. [Those] that neither can be proved nor require proof.
A. Why can things known of themselves not be proved?
B. Because nothing is more known than things known of themselves. Every proof is achieved by proving from some thing better known, for belief in the conclusion is engendered from belief in the antecedent.
A. Tell me some things known of themselves concerning the soul.

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B. Every soul exists or does not exist. There is no soul in nature that may neither exist nor not exist. Two souls are fewer in number than four. Eight souls are greater in number than four. Eight souls are equal in number to eight.

A. Tell me some truths learned about the soul, that is, [things] that we discover to be truths.

B. Every soul exists in an organic body. All bodies of men, of dumb animals, of trees, and of plants are organic. No sense can be put into operation except in the presence of some object, for the sight cannot see unless light or color is present to it, etc.

A. State some truths proved about the soul.

B. Every soul is substance, every soul is form, etc.

A. Do you know one thing about the soul, or many things?

B. Both one thing and many.

A. How can this happen?

B. It is inevitable that [the man] who knows many things also knows one thing, since every multitude is composed of units.

A. Do you have one knowledge about the soul, or many?

B. I have as many knowledges about the soul as I know true things about it, for every single truth is known by its own knowledge of itself, nor can two truths be known by one knowledge, since while one is known the others can be unknown.

A. Since Aristotle in the books On the Soul taught many truths about it, why is he said to have handed down to us knowledge about the soul, and not many knowledges? For no one says that Aristotle handed us down knowledges about the soul.

B. Aristotle did hand us down knowledges, but custom calls all those knowledges one knowledge. For knowledge is sometimes a collective noun—when we call the knowing of many things knowledge; sometimes not collective—when we call the knowledge of a single truth knowledge.

A. Is the knowledge held about the soul affirmative or negative?

B. Both affirmative and negative, for it is known what the soul is, and what it is not.

A. Why did Aristotle refute the ideas of the ancients about the soul?1

B. So that he might hand down to us negative knowledge about it, that is, that he might teach us what the soul is not.

A. Why did he hand on his own opinion about the soul?

B. To teach what the soul is.

A. Can a belief be held about the soul, that is, can a truth be believed about it in the same way that a truth is known about it?

B. It can; for we believe that the soul will in time to come pay the penalty for the sins that have not in this life been blotted out by any repentance, just as we believe that it will in time to come receive the reward for [deeds] rightly done.

A. Why do we believe those things about the soul?

B. Because we believe that every sin makes the soul virtually a debtor, on the evidence of the prophet: "The soul that sins, that same will die" [Ezek 18:4]. And since man commits many sins in this life for which he pays no penalty, it will be necessary for him to pay the penalty for them in a future life. We believe, too, that a reward is due to [those] doing right, since an everlasting beatitude has been promised to [those] obeying the commandments of God, which we believe will be given to them after death.

A. How can a truth concerning the soul be at the same time known and believed, since knowledge entering the mind drives belief out of it?

B. Concerning the soul, as with other things, one thing can be known and at the same time another thing believed, but one and the same truth cannot be at the same time known and believed.

A. Is the soul suitable for the consideration of a grammarians?

B. No.

A. Why?

B. Because a grammarians deals with the names of things [and] not the things themselves, except inasmuch as they are represented by names. Therefore a grammarians does not deal with the substance of the soul, nor its powers, nor its operations, nor its organs. But [he] makes propositions about the name of the soul, from where it may be derived, and what meaning it may have.

A. From where is anima ("soul") derived?

B. From the Greek noun ἀνενήργος, which means wind, for some of the ancients thought the soul to be nothing other than wind, that is, a habit refreshing the heart and blood.

A. Is the soul a habit of the animal or not?
B. The soul is sometimes called a habit of the animal. Plautus [fl. 204-191 B.C.]: "anime leonis virus grave" ("The breath of a lion has an unpleasant odor"). But the soul that is the life of an animal is not a habit, for it is not a habit that enlivens and vitalizes the body of an animal, but a soul bringing breath with it.

A. Why is the soul called by the Greeks ὑ αμελής?

B. Because ὑ αμελής among the Greeks is translated as coolness or refreshment. Therefore the ancients, who thought the soul to be a refreshing habit, called it ὑ αμελής. It is clear, therefore, that both among the Greeks and among the Latins the soul takes its name from refreshment.

A. What meaning does anima have?

B. Animā sometimes means a wind. Horace [65-8 B.C.]: "Iam veris comites que mare temperant anima linea Thracem" ("Already the winds, the companions of spring, which calm the sea, drive the sails to Thrace"). Sometimes [it means] an animal habit, as has been said; [and] sometimes air. Virgil [70-19 B.C.]: "Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta semina terrarumque animeque marisque fuissent" ("He sang how through the great void were brought together the seeds of earth and air and sea"). Sometimes anima is the life of a living being, for this thing distinguishes living from non-living things—the fact that they have a soul, which non-living things lack.

A. Is the soul suitable for the consideration of the physicist, that is, for natural philosophy?

B. It is suitable.

A. Why?

B. Because the soul is mobile and transmutable. It can move from ignorance to knowledge, from delusion to knowledge, [and] conversely; from vice to virtue, and away; [and] from disquiet, that is, a state of change, to tranquility. All mobile things are suitable for the consideration of the physicist.

1 This remark does not appear to have been made by Plautus. See Gonzalez Lodge, Lexicon Plautinum, 2 vols. (Hildesheim, W. Germany: Georg Olms Verlagbuchhandlung, 1962), where no such statement is listed under any of the words used. The lexicon is comprehensive. Pliny Natural History 8.18.46 has "gravem odorem, nec minus halitum" ("Their odor is unpleasant, and not less their breath").


3 Virgil Eclogue 6.31-32.
A. You have shown that the rational soul is fit for the consideration of the physicist because it is mobile. Show also that the vegetable soul is suitable for his consideration.

B. The physicist does not consider only mobile and transmutable things but also the elements of transmutation, for it is [a function] of the same science to consider moving things and things moved. The vegetative soul enlarges the body, moving it from an imperfect quantity to a perfect, since it is the vegetative soul that digests and transmutes food, so that by it the body can be both fed and enlarged. For what is it that digests the moisture of the earth by which the trees and plants are nourished, and makes it suitable to be converted into the substance of the plant or into seed, that is, into fruit, if not the soul that animates the plant? As soon as the tree becomes lifeless, that is, completely dried up, all digestion ceases, and all nutrition. This same fact is to be appreciated about the soul of an animal.

A. Why is the sensual soul suitable for the consideration of the physicist?

B. Because it is the principle of transmutation, for it moves the animal and makes it advance, since it moves animals seeking food and causes them to change their positions. What causes cattle and sheep to seek pasture if not an appetite for food? Yet appetite is a force of the soul, therefore it is the soul that makes the animal go forward. It is itself the principle of progressive motion.

A. Does the metaphysician teach anything about the soul?

B. He does.

A. What?

B. That the soul is a substance, not an accident; that not every soul is of the same sort, but some are of one sort, some of different sorts.

A. Why does the metaphysician assert that every soul is a substance when no soul can subsist of itself, except only the human soul? For the soul of a tree or a dumb animal cannot be removed from its body and subsist of itself like the human soul, but as soon as it is separated from its body [it] inevitably dies and ceases to exist. It seems, therefore, that a soul of this sort ought rather to be called an accident than a substance, since it cannot exist in nature unless it be in some body. For [that] which needs something supporting and sustaining [it] deserves to be given the name of accident, not substance. Why is color said to be an accident if not because it is necessary for it always to be in some body?

B. The metaphysician calls substance not only those things subsisting of themselves, of which sort are substances made up of matter and form, but also the matter and form of which the made-up substances consist. For a substance is a thing subsisting of itself,
or a part of a thing subsisting of itself. Every living body consists of a soul and body. The metaphysician rightly calls every soul a substance.

A. Are all souls of one kind?

B. No, for not all living things are of one kind. There is as much difference between souls as between living things. Therefore, if living things are different in kind it is inevitable that their souls are different in kind.

A. Are all human souls of one kind?

B. They are.

A. Why?

B. Because all men are of one kind.

A. Are all sensual souls of one kind?

B. No, because not all dumb animals are of one kind.

A. Are all vegetable souls of one kind?

B. No, because not all plants are of one kind.

A. What things are of one kind?

B. [Those] that are very like each other, that is, so similar that none of them can be distinguished from another. For things of one kind have no distinction, nor is there any difference except this one—that one of them is not another. And for this reason [things] that are of one kind differ in number, because they differ only in this—that in number one of them is not another, but each is different from the other. For why do John and Peter differ in number if not because, in the double number that John and Peter make, John is not Peter, nor is Peter John?

A. Are two men of one kind?

B. They are.

A. How can this happen, since the one can be distinguished from the other?

B. They can be distinguished by their accidents, not by their substances, because the accidents, not the substances, make them unlike. The substance of a king is like the substance of a farmer as water is like water or milk [like] milk. For if anyone were able with his bodily eyes to see the substances of the two men like the colors of two pieces of paper, he would no more distinguish the substances of the former than the colors of the latter. The dialecticians realize this same [fact] who say that men differ among
themselves in accidental differences which they call common and personal, not in substantial [ones] which are in a higher degree personal.

A. Can any things two by number be of one kind and of different kinds?
B. They can.
A. How can this occur?
B. This can occur in several ways, for it is possible for two things to have parts of one kind and parts of different kinds. They may have substance of one kind and accidents of different kinds. They can, on the other hand, have substances of different kinds and accidents of one kind. Two things can have some accidents of one kind, some of different kinds.
A. Demonstrate that.
B. A man and a donkey have bodies of one kind, souls of different kinds. An Ethiopian and a German have substances of one kind, colors of different kinds. A white man and a swan have colors of one kind, substances of different kinds. Two men, one of whom is generous and the other miserly, are by color of the same kind and by character of different kinds.
A. If all men are by substance of one kind, why do masters set themselves up over slaves, so that they judge them to be more worthless than cattle? Why do noblemen put themselves above commoners, so that they hardly consider them fit to speak to?
B. The number of stupid people is infinite. Men do not judge themselves, nor do they remember the well-known oracle of Apollo, "γνῶθι σεαυτόν,"¹ by which each man is advised to know himself, since γνῶθι σεαυτόν is translated "know yourself." For γνῶθι is a verb in the imperative mood meaning the same as "know"; σε<σε> is a pronoun in the accusative case, meaning the same as [+"you"]; [and] σε<σε> is a pronoun in the accusative case meaning the same as "self." From which it follows that [anyone] who says that the oracle of Apollo is γνῶσελθάσος (literally, "know a stone") is making an error of grammar.²

¹"Know thyself" was one of the wise sayings inscribed on the walls of the temple at the Oracle of Delphi. Apollo was said to have presided over the oracle. See The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "Delphic Oracle," by William K. C. Guthrie.

²Hegius had probably seen this meaningless statement used, and he is here pointing out that such usage is incorrect. There was a growing interest in the study of Greek, as may be seen from the introduction of Greek into the curriculum at Deventer, but there was still a great deal of abuse and ignorance of the language.
A. Do living things owe to their bodies or to their souls the fact that they differ in kind?

B. To their souls, for a man and a donkey do not differ in kind for the reason that they have bodies differing in kind, but because they have souls differing in kind.

A. Why do the bodies of living beings not differ in kind?

B. Because the matter of all corruptible things, which is called hyle ("prime matter"), is one, not in number, but in kind. Since the body of a living thing is its matter, it must be that the bodies of all living things are of one kind.

A. Does a man surpass a donkey because the matter of a man is more worthy and more valuable than the matter of a donkey?

B. No.

A. Why?

B. Because all matter is equal to all matter in worth and value.

A. Is a man more valuable than a donkey?

B. He is.

A. In what things?

B. In his soul and in his accidents. A man has a rational soul, which a donkey has not; a man has knowledge and virtues, which a donkey lacks.

A. Is man more valuable than man in his substance or in accidents?

B. Man is more valuable than man and more worthy only in accidents, not in substance.

A. What does the dialectician teach about the soul?

B. In which κατηγορία ("category") the soul is, that is, in which class it is subsumed, and what subjective parts it has, and from what the definition of the soul is to be constructed. The dialectician teaches from what grounds proofs are brought forward by which those things are proved that are proposed in respect of the soul.

A. In what category is the soul?

B. In the category ad aliquid ("relative").

A. Why?

B. Because every soul is the soul of an animate being, just as every [animate] being is animated by a soul.
A. Why is the soul in the category of ad aliquid when it is agreed among all men that the soul is a substance?

B. Although the soul is a substance, yet the noun soul is not a substantial noun but a relative noun, or a noun used in relation to something. If soul were not a relative noun it would not be defined by that relative classification, which is actuality, which refers to potentiality. No one doubts that an angel is a substance, though the name of angel is the name of an office. Every father must of necessity be a substance since he is an animal, even though father is a relative noun, that is, something said.

A. Does the soul have one definition, or many?

B. One.

A. Why?

B. Because every noun of universality has one definition. Since soul is a noun of universality, it is inevitable that soul has one definition.

A. Why are souls in general called by the name anima?

B. Because they animate their own bodies. The soul of a plant animates its body, that is, gives it life, just as the soul of an animal animates the body of an animal.

A. Why does every noun of universality have one definition?

B. Because universality is a multitude of things called by one name and having one nature, on account of which they are called by one name, as a multitude of living men is called a universality because living men, with one nature, are called men. For they are called men because they are rational animals.

A. If you admit that every noun of universality has one nature it is necessary that you admit that entity has one nature, since entity especially is a noun of universality, for it signifies the universality of all the things that are in nature, whether they be substances or accidents.

B. I admit that the entity has one nature, for everything that is called entity is called entity for this reason, that it is in nature.

A. Why is the entity not a kind of substance and accident, since "with one nature" may be said of these things?

B. Because it is not said of these things in quid, for the entity cannot conveniently be related to a syllogism per quid.1

1The expressions in quid and per quid relate to the rules of
A. You say that the soul, which Aristotle defines by two definitions, has one definition.

B. I have said that the soul has one definition for this reason, because soul signifies all souls of one nature; for soul, signifying souls, is not a noun ἐνελεχεῖα, that is, ambiguous, which is called equivocal. Human souls are not called souls any differently from sensual or vegetable souls, but all are called souls because they are ἐνελεχεῖα ("the perfection") of living bodies.

A. Define the soul by one of its definitions.

B. The soul is the prime impulse of a physical, organic body, having life in potentiality.¹

A. Why is the soul called an impulse when it is not an action but the actor? For the soul operates, but is not an operation.

B. Actus is an ambiguous noun. Sometimes actus represents action or operation, hence those words are called active which signify action; sometimes the perfection of a man, which in Greek is called ἐνελεχεῖα, is called the actus of the one whose perfection it is. Therefore when we say that the soul is the actus of the body we signify that it is the perfection of the body.

A. Translate the noun ἐνελεχεῖα.

B. Entelechia is translated as perfection or completion or performance.

A. From where does it derive?

B. The end or completion of a thing in Greek is called τέλος, from which [derives] ἐνελεχεῖα, that is, perfect and complete; from which ἐνε[λε]χεια is translated as perfection or completion.

A. Why is the soul the perfection of the body?

B. Because the body, needing to be animated, is incomplete and imperfect, but the animated body [is] perfect. For as soon as the soul enters the body it makes perfect that which had been imperfect. Therefore the soul is perfection, since by its arrival the body is made perfect. By its departure, however, it is returned to imperfection. For it cannot happen that that thing which is not perfection should by its arrival make anything perfect, [or] by its departure make [it] imperfect.

A. Of what body is the soul the perfection? For there are three dialectic, the use of true and false syllogisms, and Aristotelian categories in terms of what may be predicated about the entity.

bodies: that to be animated, which will have a soul; the animated, which has one; [and] the inanimate, which has lost one.

B. The soul is the perfection only of the animate body. [That] which is to be animated will have perfection, [but] does not have it; [that] which is inanimate has lost the perfection that it had.

A. Is every form the ἐνεργεία, that is, the perfection of that of which it is the form?

B. It is.

A. Why?

B. Because every form causes the thing of which it is the form both to be and to be called perfect. For we do not call that thing perfect that lacks its own form, but [that] which has its own form. Therefore every form is perfection. Just as nothing can make a body white except whiteness, so nothing can make a thing perfect except perfection.

A. How many kinds of form are there?

B. Two.

A. Which?

B. The substantial form and the accidental form.

A. What is the difference between these forms?

B. Any substance consists of the substantial form and its matter, so that an animal or plant consists of soul and body, since the soul is the substantial form. Nothing consists of the accidental form and its subject.

A. Demonstrate this.

B. Paper and whiteness do not make up a substance, since whiteness cannot be part of a substance; nor an accident, since paper cannot be part of an accident. Since neither a substance nor an accident is made up from these things, it follows that nothing is made up from them.

A. Does a spiritual substance have a soul?

B. No.

A. Why?

B. Because it does not have a body, for every soul is the perfection of a body.

A. Since spiritual bodies do not have a soul, how can they live?
B. They live of themselves, not by a soul; for they are simple substances compounded of no parts. Therefore they have neither a soul nor a body.

A. If angels live of themselves in what do they differ from God, since He Himself also lives of Himself?

B. The life of God is eternal and uncreated, but the life of the angels has been created by God and is maintained so that it may not be reduced to nothing. For all things that have been created by God are maintained by God so that they may not slip back into nothing.

A. How many are the perfections of things?

B. Two.

A. Which?

B. Primary and secondary.

A. What is the primary perfection of things?

B. The form, substantial or accidental, having some operation.

A. What is the secondary?

B. The operation of the substantial or accidental form.

A. Explain this.

B. The soul itself, which is the substantial form, is the primary perfection of the body. The operation of the soul is the secondary perfection of the body. And for this reason the soul is called the primary actuality of the body, the operation of the soul, the secondary actuality. Knowledge, which is the accidental form, is the primary perfection of the soul, but the operation of knowledge is its secondary perfection.

A. What is the operation of knowledge?

B. If knowledge is δεικτά, that is, speculative, the operation is to speculate; if πράξις, that is, creative, the operation is to act or make.

A. Is virtue a primary perfection of the soul or a secondary?

B. Primary. But the operation of virtue is secondary, as, justice is a primary perfection of the soul; to give wages to workmen is secondary, because it is the operation of justice.

A. Why is the soul the actuality of the physical, that is, the natural body?

B. Because the soul can animate no body except [one] that has been

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formed by nature and prepared for the reception of a soul. For not every soul is contained by any body whatever. Some souls demand a body suitable for them. And since art cannot form a body in such a way that it is able to receive a soul, but only nature, so the soul is called the perfection of the physical body.

A. Which nature forms the body to be enlivened by the soul?

B. The nature of the seed, which is called by philosophers the formative power; for every seed has the power of transforming itself into a body to be animated.

A. Explain this.

B. [A seed] of parsley thrown onto the ground transforms itself partly into root, partly into stem, [and] partly into bark, so that it may be able to receive a vegetable soul. Likewise, the seed of a tree changes part of itself into root, part into trunk, part into bark. The egg, which is the seed of birds, changes that drop of blood which is in the middle of the yolk into the heart of the bird. The animal itself, on Pliny's evidence, forms its body from the white liquid of the egg.¹

A. Why do seeds go sterile with age?

B. Because they lose the formative force.

A. Why are ὑπνευματικά ("full of wind/unfertilized") eggs sterile and useless.

B. Because they do not have a formative force. They cannot change into the bodies of chickens no matter for how long a time they are incubated.

A. Does the earth have a formative force?

B. It has. If there were not a formative force in the earth, neither any tree nor any plant would have spontaneous growth. Since, however, many plants and trees grow of their own accord from the earth, it is inevitable that the earth has a formative force.

A. Why is the soul the actuality of the organic body?

B. Because the soul is always unwilling to be idle. For this reason it needs an organic body. It cannot operate unless it has ὀργανὰ ("organs"), that is, tools.

A. What bodies are ὀργανικά ("organic")?

B. [Those] that consist of ὀργανοὺς ("organs"), that is, of members having different functions.

¹Pliny Natural History 10.74.148.
A. Are the bodies of trees and plants ὄργανα bodies?

B. They are, for their parts have different functions. The function of a root is to draw nourishment from the earth, and because of this the root of a plant is likened to the mouth of an animal. The function of bark is to protect the tree from harmful cold and heat. The function of branches is to bear fruit; of leaves to protect the buds and fruit.

A. Are elements ὄργανα?

B. They are not, for all ὄργανα bodies are comprised of elements. Elements are uncompounded bodies. Elements are not comprised of elements. For this reason elements have no animation.

A. Are the substantial forms of metals and stones their souls?

B. They are not, since they do not have ὄργανα bodies. No ἔντερογενες ("homogeneous") bodies are ὄργανα, since to have ὄργανα is an attribute of those bodies that are called ἔτερογενες ("heterogeneous").

[A]. What are homogeneous bodies, what heterogeneous?

B. The homogeneous are [those] that are uniform in all their parts. Of this kind are the bodies of elements, of metals, and of stones. The heterogeneous are [those] that are diverse in their parts such as the bodies of animals and plants.

A. Why are the latter called ἔτερογενες and the former homogeneous?

B. Because "one" is translated homos in Greek, while "various" or "diverse" [is translated] ἕτερος. So one is called homogeneous, as it were, of one kind in its parts; the other ἔτερογενες, as it were, of various kinds.¹

A. Does the animate body have life or lack it?

B. It has [life].

A. Why is it said to have it in potentiality, since no one may be said to have [anything] in potentiality except what he lacks?

B. Life is twofold, primary and secondary. Primary life is the soul itself; secondary [life], the operation of the soul. The animate body never lacks primary life: by this alone are animate things distinguished from the inanimate, that the former possess the life of which the latter have no share. But living things do sometimes lack secondary life, for souls sometimes cease their operations. The sensible soul does not always see, nor always hear, although it

¹The Greek prefix ὁμο would be better translated by "like" or "same" than by "one" (unus) as Hegius has done here.
may have the power of seeing or hearing. And because of this the animate body is said to have life in potentiality--not primary life, but secondary.

A. Define the soul by another of its definitions.

B. The soul is that by which we live, feel, move, [and] understand; that is, the soul is that by which a living thing lives or feels or moves or understands.¹

A. Does a living thing live by means of the body or the soul?

B. Both the body and the soul. For a living thing does not have an inanimate body. Just as a white man is white both by means of his body and by whiteness, so that which is alive lives both by means of the body and by life, which is the soul. For the ablative case, construed with a word, signifies sometimes matter, as: *homo corpore albet* ("a man is white by means of his body"), *corpore vivit* ("lives by means of his body"); [and] sometimes form, as: *homo albetudine albet* ("a man is white by whiteness"), *vita vivit* ("lives by life").

A. Why did you say that this was a definition of the soul when it is applicable to both the body and the soul.

B. For this definition to apply only to the soul it is necessary to agree to understand in it the noun, "form." And so, this will be the complete definition: the soul is the form of a living thing, by which it lives or feels or moves or understands.

A. Why, in the definition of the soul, have you changed the copulative conjunction into the disjunctive, the first person into the third, and the plural number into the singular?

B. So that it may be safe from the attacks of Sophists. For trees and plants only live by their soul. They neither feel nor understand. Dumb animals live and feel by their soul, and if they are perfect, they move, but they do not understand. Because of this the copulative conjunction has been changed to a disjunctive. Yet, since not merely men but also dumb animals and plants are animate, it was necessary for the first person to be changed to the third. Since, however, it is impossible for many things to live by one soul, it was necessary for the plural number to be changed to the singular.

A. How many orders of living things does this definition embrace?

B. Four.

A. What are the living things of the first order?

B. [Those] that merely live, that is, are alive.

¹Aristotle On the Soul 2.2.413b.10-12.
A. What [are those] of the second order?
B. [Those] that live and feel.

A. What [are those] of the third?
B. [Those] that live, feel, and move; that is, have progressive motion.

A. What [are those] of the fourth?
B. [Those] that live, feel, move, and understand.

A. Why do the vegetable soul and the sensible soul make two orders of living things?
B. Because the vegetable soul can be separated from the sensible. For there are some living things that only live and are active, and feel nothing. Of this sort are the trees and plants, which by a general name are called plante by the Latins and ψυκτικα by the Greeks.

A. Plants seem to have feeling, for why do they germinate and put out leaves in the spring unless they feel the spring weather?
B. Plants are not properly said to feel: sometimes by μεταφορα ("metaphor") feeling is transferred from animals to plants.

A. Why does the sensible soul make two orders of living things?
B. Because the sensible soul has two powers--the power of feeling and [the power] of moving--of which one is prior and the other posterior, for the power of feeling can be separated from the motive power. There are some animals that have only the power of feeling, but lack progressive motion. These are of the second order. Of this kind are shellfish and anything like them. Others have the power of feeling and moving, and these are of the third order.

A. Why has nature granted progressive motion to some animals and denied [it] to some?
B. Because [some] animals have the need to look for food in places distant from themselves, and to these progressive motion has been granted. But for others, the places in which they are fixed supply enough nourishment, and to these the motive power has been denied.

A. Are all the senses [present] in all animals having the power of feeling?
B. They are not, for just as the vegetable soul can be separated from the sensible and rational, so touch [can be separated] from the other senses. For certain of the animals have only touch, but have been deprived of the other senses. Because of this touch is called the first sense.
A. Sight seems to be the first of the senses, since Aristotle in the Metaphysics places it before the other senses.¹

B. In excellence sight seems to be the first of the senses, but in universality touch [is so], because it is present universally in all animals.

A. Why has touch been denied to none of the animals, since many animals are without the other senses?

B. Touch is necessary to every animal, for an animal cannot preserve its life without touch. How would it be able to avoid those things that are harmful to it and deprive it of life if it lacked touch?

A. Is only touch present in certain animals?

B. If the noun "touch" is taken generally, so that it embraces both taste and touch, one must admit that in certain animals only touch is present. For no animal is so imperfect that it lacks the sense of taste, since nature has given every animal a mouth, [and] the consequence is that she has denied taste to none.

A. Why can taste be called touch by a general name?

B. Because nothing is tasted except what is touched by the mouth. Sometimes we can see, hear, and smell things distant from us, but we are able to taste nothing until [it has been] brought to the mouth.

A. What is the difference between taste and touch?

B. Touch is in the whole of an animal's body, taste only in the mouth. Tangible qualities are recognized by touch, flavors by taste. By taste sweet things are distinguished from bitter things and sour things. Tangible qualities, however, are heat and cold, moisture and dryness.

A. Can the intellectual power be separated from the vegetable power?

B. It cannot in mortals, as Aristotle says, for no mortal animal has intelligence without the vegetable force.²

A. Why does Aristotle say that the intellectual power cannot be separated from the vegetative in mortals?

B. Because in spirits, which are intellectual substances, there is no vegetable power. For they are neither nourished nor increased,

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¹Aristotle Metaphysics 1.1.980a.22-26.

²Aristotle On the Soul 2.2.413a.11-4.416b.32, especially 2.3.414b.28-415a.13.

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nor do they bring forth fruit from themselves, for they lack bodies. On account of this they are called separate substances.

A. Is there a soul in the eggs of birds and of fish, and in the seeds of plants and the fruits of trees, or not?
B. There is not a soul in those things.
A. Demonstrate this.
B. Eggs are put under clucking hens so that they may be animated by their incubation. Whatever is animated changes from inanimate to animal, just as what becomes white changes from not white to white, for to be animated is to change from not living to living. Therefore it is necessary that eggs, in order to be able to be animated and given life, are inanimate.
A. Is there anything one of itself made from the soul and the body?
B. There is.
A. When?
B. When the animated body is made then something one of itself is made from the soul and the body.
A. Is anything one of itself comprised of the soul and the body?
B. It is. For the animated body, which is one of itself, is comprised of those things.
A. What is the difference between being made and comprising?
B. A thing is being made when it is being given birth, but it comprises when it has been brought forth.
A. Are the soul and the body something one of itself?
B. They are.
A. What are they?
B. The animated body.
A. Are the soul and the body things or a thing?
B. They are things because they are soul and body; they are a thing because they are a man, or a dumb animal, or a plant.
A. How can a thing be things and vice versa?
B. Because the whole is its parts and the parts are the whole. What is a man if not a soul and a body; what are a soul and a body if not a man?
A. Why is a thing one of itself comprised of soul and body?

B. Because the body is of that nature that it can be perfected by the soul and animated by it. The soul, on the other hand, is of that nature that it can animate and perfect the body. Thus, of these two things is comprised the animated body.

A. Are the soul and the body comparable with the imprint of a seal and wax, that is, is the soul to the body like the imprint of a seal to the wax?

B. If the word "comparable" is to be taken correctly only quantities can be called comparable. By metaphor, however, comparability can be found in things other than quantity.

A. What things are rightly called related?

B. [Those] that have the same relationship.

A. Give an example.

B. Four and two, [and] six and three, are rightly called related things, because they have the same relationship. For just as there is a relationship of two times between four and two, so there is a relationship of two times between six and three.

A. What is relatedness?

B. A likeness of relationship, as set out in the aforesaid example.

A. Demonstrate that there is a relatedness between the soul and the body, [and] between the imprint of the seal and the wax.

B. Just as the wax is not called a seal until it has the imprint of a seal, so the body is not called animate, or alive, unless it has a soul.

A. Is there a relatedness between the soul and the body and between the imprint of a pickaxe and the iron?

B. There is, just as between the imprint of the seal and the wax. One must think in the same way about sight and the eye, according to Aristotle, for just as sight is to the eye, so is the soul to the animate body.\(^1\)

A. Does the soul have parts or not?

B. If you are speaking of subjective parts, that is, types of soul, I admit that the soul does have parts, for the soul is a genus having three species subject to itself: the vegetable soul, the sensible, and the rational. If, however, you are speaking of parts

\(^1\)Ibid., 2.2.413a.1-5.
of which some whole thing is comprised, and which pertain to the
wholeness of the thing, so that they may be called integral, I say
that the rational soul does not have either parts or magnitude. For
it is a spirit, to which it is foreign to be comprised of parts and
to have magnitude.

A. Since it is comprised of no parts, but is an undivided sub-
stance, so that it can be split into no parts, how can the rational
soul animate the human body of so many members?

B. The members of a man, each and all, are animated and given life
by one and the same soul. It is not a human soul split into its
parts that gives life to the body's members, since it has none; but
the same soul that gives life to and invigorates the hands and their
fingers gives life to and invigorates the feet and their toes.

A. What is to be thought of the vegetable soul. Does it have parts
or not?

B. The vegetable soul of a tree has parts, and it is of as great a
magnitude as the tree itself. For just as the whiteness of a sheet
of paper is of the magnitude of the sheet, and consists of as many
parts as the sheet, so the soul of a tree is as great as the tree
and has as many parts as the tree. For every single part of the
tree there is a part of the soul within it giving it life.

A. By what proof can this be demonstrated?

B. A branch of a tree broken off from the tree is broken off along
with the part of the soul that gives it life, for it does not lose
its soul when it is broken off from the tree, but keeps it.

A. Why does the vegetable soul consist of parts, and not the
rational [soul]?

B. The vegetable soul is not a spirit like the rational soul. For
God Himself, the creator of the rational soul, breathed it into the
body, but nature is the begetter of the vegetable soul.

A. What opinion is to be held concerning a tree in part green and
in part dry?

B. That the dried-up part has lost its own part of its soul.

A. Is the soul of a dumb animal individual or can it be divided?

B. It can be divided. For since an eel can be split into many
living parts it must be that its soul can be divided into the same
number of parts.

A. If an eel be divided into several living parts, does each sepa-
rate part remain an animal?

B. It does, since it keeps its sense of touch. For it feels itself
to be stabbed if it is stabbed, [and] it feels itself burned if it be moved toward a fire.

A. Why do we say that the human soul is not divisible?

B. If any of the members cut from a human body were able to live it would inevitably mean that the human soul also was divisible and consisted of parts, and that the various parts of the body were animated by [the soul's] various parts. But since this cannot occur it is clear that the human soul is indivisible.

A. In the one man, is the same soul vegetable, sensible, and rational?

B. It is, for one and the same soul can give life to the body, feel sensible things, and understand intelligible things. Since nature has given to man nothing unnecessary it is not possible for many souls to be in man's one soul.

A. Why is the vegetable soul likened to a \( \tau \alpha \gamma \lambda \nu \mu \alpha \) ("triangle"), and the sensible to a \( \tau \epsilon \tau \rho \alpha \gamma \lambda \nu \mu \alpha \) ("quadrilateral")?

B. Because just as the \( \tau \alpha \gamma \lambda \nu \mu \alpha \) is the first of the rectilinear plane figures, and the \( \tau \epsilon \tau \rho \alpha \gamma \lambda \nu \mu \alpha \) is the second, so the vegetable force is the first among the powers of the soul.

A. What is a plane figure?

B. It is linear, or enclosed by lines.

A. Which plane figure is enclosed by a line, and which by lines?

B. Only the circle is enclosed by one line. The other plane figures are enclosed by lines.

A. What is a solid figure?

B. [One] that is enclosed by a surface or surfaces, for a solid figure is a body enclosed by a surface or surfaces.

A. Which solid figure is enclosed by a surface, which by surfaces?

B. Only a sphere is enclosed by one surface. The other solid figures are enclosed by surfaces.

A. Why is an angle not a figure?

B. Because it is necessary for every figure to be enclosed, but it is not necessary for an angle to be enclosed, therefore it is not necessary that an angle is a figure.

A. Why is the \( \tau \alpha \gamma \lambda \nu \mu \alpha \) the first of the rectilinear figures?

B. Because none of the rectilinear figures can be enclosed in fewer
lines than the τούς, since two straight lines cannot enclose an area.

A. Can one line enclose an area?

B. It can, but it is necessary for it to be curved. For a circle is enclosed by a single curved line.

A. What is a circle?

B. A plane figure enclosed by a single line that is called the circumference, in the middle of which is a point called the center, from which all lines taken to the circumference are equal.

A. Is any figure enclosed by two lines?

B. It is, but it is necessary for one of them to be curved. The semicircle is enclosed by two lines.

A. What is a semicircle?

B. A plane figure enclosed by the diameter of a circle and half the circumference.

A. What is a τούς?

B. A plane figure enclosed by three straight lines.

A. What is a τετράγωνον?

B. A plane figure enclosed by four straight lines.

A. Why is a τούς said to be in a τετράγωνον?

B. Because every figure having four angles of necessity has three, since every larger number has in itself a smaller number. Or, the τετράγωνον is said to have the τούς in itself because every τετράγωνον is able to be divided by two diagonals into four trigona.

A. Why is the vegetable power in the sensible power?

B. It is inevitable that whatever has sensible force should have vegetable force. For although the vegetable force may be separated from the sensible in plants, since plants have a share only in the vegetable soul, yet nowhere does the sensible force exist without the vegetable, just as touch may not be separated from the other senses in any living things. There are many living things that do not have sight, or hearing, or smell, but nowhere can any one of these things be isolated from the sense of touch.

A. Can the sensible force be separated from the motive [force]?

B. It can, for there are many living things to which progressive motion has been denied, but the sensible force is lacking in no
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living thing. And so it is inevitable that whichever have progressive power also have sensible [power].

A. Why is intellectual power, which is also called rational, the last and the least among the powers of the soul?

B. It is the last because [it is] the most perfect. It is the least because it is present in very few living things, for only human beings have a share of intellect and reason. Although some of the dumb animals have been allotted imagination, they are nevertheless all devoid of intellect and reason--on which account they are called by the Greeks aloga, that is, without speech or reason, for logos signifies both reason and speech.

A. Why is the definition of the soul likened by Aristotle to the definition of a figure?

B. Because, just as the definition of a figure is common to all figures and particular to none of them, so the definition of the soul is common to all souls and particular to none.

A. Why is a rule common for every figure and not particular to any one figure?

B. Because it is necessary for every rule to be the same for that of which it is the rule. That is, it is necessary for a definition to be as universal as the thing defined is universal; that is, for the definition to be interchanged with its defined thing. Since genus and species are unequal things, for a genus is a more universal thing than a species, and thus a greater thing than a species, and a species lesser than a genus, it is not possible for the same definition to be equal to a genus and a species, since no one thing can be equal to two unequals. Whatever things are equal to one and the same equality are equal to one another, as Euclid [fl. 300 B.C.] bears witness in the first [book] of the Elements. This is a common conception.

A. How many souls are there to which the definition of soul is common?

B. Three: the vegetable, the sensible, and the rational.

A. What is the difference between these souls?

B. The vegetable soul is not cognitive, but the sensible and the rational are cognitive. Likewise, the vegetable soul transmutes its object; the other two are transmuted by the object, for the sensible transmutes the sense as the intelligible does the intellect. Just as the sensible engenders in the sense its image, that is, its

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1Ibid., 2.3.414b.20-28.

2Euclid The Elements 1, "Common Conceptions" 8.
likeness, which is called the sensible image, so the intelligible engenders in the intellect its likeness, which is called the intelligible image. The vegetable soul, however, transmutes the nourishment that is its object, changing part of it into the substance of the living thing, part into seed and fruit, part into excrement.

A. What is common to the sensible and the rational soul?

B. [The fact] that they are cognitive of their subjects, for sense recognizes the sensible just as the intellect [recognizes] the intelligible.

A. What is the difference between them?

B. The sensible soul, in its cognition, uses ὀργανος("organs"). On account of this the forces or powers of the sensible soul are called ὀργανικαγ ("organic"). The rational soul, however, in its cognition uses no ὀργανω.

A. Demonstrate this.

B. Each one can say with what part of the body he sees [or] with what he hears, but no one can say with what he understands or desires. Because of this the intellect and the will are called by philosophers non-ὀργανικα virtues.

A. What definition of a figure is common to all figures?

B. A figure is [that] which is enclosed by a boundary or boundaries, for every figure is magnitude enclosed by a boundary or boundaries.

A. Is every figure a magnitude?

B. It is.

A. Why?

B. Because every figure is an area or a body. A plane [figure is] an area, [and] a solid [figure is] a body--from which it is evident that no incorporeal substance is given a shape, since it does not have magnitude.

A. Is every figure bounded?

B. It is, for a plane figure is bounded by a line or lines, a solid by a surface or surfaces. From this it is clear that no infinite magnitude is given a shape, even if it could exist in nature. In addition, it follows that an infinite circle or an infinite sphere do not exist in nature, any more than τὴν ὀφθαλμα ("the sphinx"), or the goat-stag.

[A]. Why do figures have a center?
B. Among plane [figures] only the circle has a center; among solids only the sphere.

A. What is the center of a circle?

B. The point in the circle equally distant from every part of the circumference surrounding the circle.

A. How many powers of the soul are there?

B. Five.

A. Which?

B. Vegetative, sensitive, appetitive, motive, and intellective.

A. Why did Aristotle's translator call the second power of the soul sensitive when the supine of the verb sentio is sensum [and] not sensitum?

B. The translator desired all the names of the powers to be homo-lenta, that is, ending in a like manner. Therefore they all end in -tivum ("-ive"), just as in Greek they all end in -icos, for they are called ἀρετικός, αὐθανατικός, ἐπιθυμωτικός, νοητικός, [and] νοστικός.

A. Why then are there four orders of living things when there are five powers of the soul?

B. Because sense is never separate from appetite. All souls, however little they are, seek out those things that are pleasing and gratifying to touch or to taste. They flee from and avoid [those things] that are harmful and troublesome. Because of this no animal is without appetite, since every animal is hungry when it lacks food [and] thirsty when [it lacks] drink. Hunger and thirst are appetites, therefore appetite is present in every animal.

A. What is the difference between sense and appetite?

B. Sense is the perceptive and cognitive power, for by sense the animal perceives and recognizes what is either pleasant or troublesome. Appetite, however, is a pursuing or fugitive force. An animal pursues or flees by means of appetite those things that have been perceived by means of sense.

A. Are happiness and sadness present in all animals?

B. They are, for when animals sense those things that are pleasant to them they are affected by happiness, [and] when [they sense those things that are] harmful [they are affected] by sadness. It is inevitable that those things that are affected by happiness or sadness should have appetite.

A. What is hunger?
B. Aristotle defines hunger as being an appetite for warm and dry, but thirst an appetite for cold and wet.\(^1\)

A. Classify appetite.

B. Appetite is divided into natural and animal appetite.

A. What is the natural appetite, what the animal?

B. The natural is when unknown things are desired, but the animal when known things are desired.

A. Give an example.

B. The appetite by which matter desires form is natural. Likewise, the appetite by which a heavy thing desires to move downward [and] a light thing upward is natural. But the appetite by which a man desires food or drink is animal.

A. Classify the animal.

B. The animal appetite is divided into sensual and intellectual. The sensual is that by which a thing is desired that has been recognized by one of the senses, as, a desire of taste or smell, ἄρπεται ἀπὸ τῶν νόστων or ἀριστοπνευματικῷ, or μελένδειας ("a tune"), or of any other sensible thing. The intellectual is when those things are desired that have been recognized by the mind and intellect, as the desire of the sciences and the virtues. An appetite of this kind is called will, and is divided into right will and depraved [will]. It is right when honorable things are desired, that is, those things that right reason dictates should be done or left undone. It is depraved when base things are desired.

A. Should one hold the opinion of Pythagoras [fl. 500 B.C.]? For he thought that human souls could transmigrate from body to body. He said that the human soul sometimes transmigrates into the body of a dumb animal. On the evidence of Heraclides [fl. 361-22 B.C.], he was in the habit of saying that at the time of the Trojan war he had been Euphorbus, and had been wounded by Menelaus. When that man was dead, he became Hermothineus. When he came to the end of his life, his soul migrated into Pyrrhus, a fisherman from Lycia; and finally, after Pyrrhus, he became Pythagoras.\(^2\) This same thing is told in Ovid [43 B.C.-A.D. 17], in these lines:

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\(^1\) Aristotle *On the Soul* 2.3.414\(b\).12-14.

\(^2\) Concerning the legends surrounding the life of Pythagoras see *The Oxford Classical Dictionary*, 2nd ed., s.v. "Pythagoras (I)," by Allan H. Coxon. The particular account referred to here by Hegius was written by Heraclides Ponticus and recorded by Diogenes Laertius [fl. ca. 350 B.C.] in his *Lives of Eminent Philosophers* 8.4-5.
Souls know no death, and always, having abandoned a previous resting-place, come to new homes and live there, being taken in. I myself, for I remember, was at the time of the Trojan war Euphorbus, son of Pantous, in whose breast was formerly thrust the deadly spear of the younger son of Atrides[. . . . ] All things change, nothing dies. The spirit wanders from there, comes here, to and fro, and takes possession of what limits it pleases. It passes equally from beasts into human bodies and into beasts again, and perishes at no time.¹

B. One must not hold this opinion with Pythagoras, because the human soul cannot transmigrate into the body of a beast. For the soul was created so that it might work, not that it should be idle and inactive. For this reason it cannot live in that body in which it cannot work, for the body, as Aristotle bears witness, is the ὅψιναμος of the soul.² But, since the body of a beast would not be able to be an organ of the human soul, the human soul would not be able to pass into the body of a beast—just as a smith about to make the works of his craft is not in the habit of going into the workshop of a weaver, nor a weaver into the workshop of a smith. Nor is transmigration of this sort fitting for the human soul, which God Himself created in His own image—just as it is not fitting for a king to move from his palace into a shepherd's hut, nor for a prince [to move] under a thatched roof from his marble dwelling. Nor does nature allow a transmigration of this sort, because there must be a relationship in matter and in form. That is, the form must be of the sort that is able to be adopted by the matter, and the matter of the sort that can adopt the form; nor would anyone be able to introduce a form into matter unless the matter were disposed and prepared in such a way that it could adopt the form to be introduced. Aristotle says this same thing in these words: "The acts of active beings seem to exist in a predisposed tolerance,"³ understanding by "acts of active beings" the forms, [and] by "tolerance" and "predisposed" the matter prepared for the reception of the form. Likewise, the actuality of every individual is born to exist in its proper place.

¹Ovid Metamorphoses 15.158-68. The Latin verse as recorded by Hegius in his Dialogi, fo. C. iv. recto-verso, is given here for comparison with modern critical texts.
Morte carent anime, semperque priore relicta
Sede novis domibus veniunt habitantque recepte.
Ipse ego nam nemini Troiani tempore belli
Pantoides Euphorbus eram, cui pectore quondam
Hec sit in adverso gravis hasta minoris Atride
[ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ]
Omnia mutantur, nihil interit, errat et illinc
Huc venit hinc illuc et quoslibet occupat artus
Spiritus, eque feris humana in corpora transit
Inque feras iterum nec tempore deperit ullo."

²Aristotle On the Soul 2.1.412b.4-6.

³Ibid., 2.2.414a.25-29.
matter, that is, every individual form is born to be given existence in matter appropriate to itself. Nor should one give credit to the ravings of Pythagoras about Euphorbus, Hermothineus, and Pyrrhus. For although many of the ancient philosophers were often in error, none was so insane or lied so shamelessly as to say he remembered who or what sort of man he had been before his birth. Cyrus the king [fl. 559-539 B.C.], as Pliny is the authority in the seventh [book] of his Natural History, in the twenty-fourth chapter, recited the names of all the soldiers in his army; Scipio [ca. 185-129 B.C.] [knew the names] of the Roman people; Cyneas, legate of King Pyrrhus [319-272 B.C.], [knew the names] of the senatorial and equestrian orders in Rome on the day after that on which he had come; Mithridates [the Great (132-63 B.C.)], king of twenty-two nations, gave laws in as many languages by count, addressing them all one by one without an interpreter; Caius Caesar [Julius (100-44 B.C.)] was in the habit of dictating equally four letters at a time to his secretaries. Although it is agreed that all these men were endowed with outstanding memory, yet not one of them claimed to have remembered the transmigration of his own soul.

A. Are the operations of the soul, such as seeing, hearing, and the rest, prior to its power, or subsequent?

B. The operations are prior to the powers in cognition, for they are more known to us than the power. By them we prove that the powers are present in minds. For we do not know that laughter is present in any man except [in one] whom we prove to be laughing, nor hearing except [in one] whom we prove to be hearing. Nor do we judge that men lack sight or hearing except because we have not proved them either to see or to hear. Therefore it is accepted that operations are more known to us than powers, and because of this powers are defined through their actions. For sight is nothing other than the power of seeing, [and] hearing nothing other than the power of hearing. In origin, however, operations are subsequent to powers because they arise from powers.

A. Do the powers of the soul differ from its operations?

B. They do differ, that is, they are proved to differ, and are recognized by us by their own operations. Thus we judge sight to differ from hearing because by means of sight we see, [and] by hearing we hear. Thus we prove that intellect is different from will, because by intellect we understand things; that is, we think about things and proclaim their truths and falsehoods, and prove our pronouncements. For there are three operations of the intellect: thought, which is called the apprehension of simple things; pronouncement, which is called composition or division; and demonstration, which is called discourse. By the will we desire, that

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1Pliny Natural History 7.24.88.

2Ibid., 7.25.91.
is, we choose or shun those things that the intellect has judged either good or evil.

A. Do things differ of themselves?

B. They do differ, for just as everything is of itself that which it is, so of itself it is not that thing which it is not. Just as a man of himself is both man and animal, so of himself he is neither a donkey nor a lion. So everything differs of itself from any other thing.

A. Why are the powers of the soul said to differ in operations if they are different of themselves?

B. They are said to differ in operations for the reason that they are recognized by us to be different in their operations.

A. Are the objects of powers prior to operations, that is, is color prior to vision and sound to hearing?

B. They are prior by definition, for operations cannot be defined except by means of their objects. [A man] who wishes to define vision and hearing has of necessity to say that vision is the perception of color through the eye, and hearing the perception of sound through the ear.

A. What is the difference between sight, vision, and the visible?

B. Sight is the power of seeing, vision is the operation of seeing, [and] the visible is the object.
Concerning the Vegetable Soul:
The Second Dialog

A. How many things, and which, are asked about the vegetable soul?

B. What powers it has, what operations, what ὄργανα ("organs"), what object.

A. What is the object of the vegetable soul?

B. Nourishment, for nourishment is the business with which the vegetable soul occupies itself. Just as a sculptor occupies himself with either woods or metals so that he may introduce into them the shape of an image, so the vegetable soul [occupies itself] with nourishment, so that it may transform and convert it into the substance of the living being. For as a craftsman, if material is lacking, can produce nothing, neither can the vegetative soul if nourishment is lacking, since nothing may be made of nothing.

A. Is the vegetative soul in respect of its object like the sensual in respect of its object?

B. No, for the vegetative soul transmutes its object. It converts part of the nourishment into the substance of the living being, part into seed, [and] part into excrement. The sensual soul, however, only recognizes its object and does not transmute it, but is transmuted by it.

A. Why is the vegetative soul first among the souls?

B. Because it is the most universal, for it is present in all living things, since it is the vegetable soul by whose power it is in all things to live.

A. How many are the powers of the vegetative soul?

B. Three: nutritive, augmentative, and generative.

A. How many are the operations of the vegetative soul?

B. Three: to nourish, to augment, and to generate.

A. What is the most natural operation of the living thing?

B. To generate another of such a sort as itself, that is, to
generate the likeness of itself; as, the most natural work of an animal is to produce an animal, of a tree [to produce] a tree. And this must be understood [to be one] of the operations of the vegetable soul.

A. Why is generation the most natural operation of the vegetable soul?

B. Because it is the goal of all the others, for the vegetable soul nourishes and augments its body so that it may be made suitable for generation. Why are trees nourished and increased in size if not so that they may be able to produce fruit for us? Or why are birds and fish fed and brought to full size if not that they might lay eggs for us, and from them generate things like themselves? Or why does the human soul nourish and increase the human body if not that people for whom it is permissible by law may propagate the human race, that the number of the elect may be made up? From which it follows that whatever a tree or a dumb animal brings forth is brought forth for man, [and] whatever man brings forth is brought forth for heaven. For man reproduces in order that the number of the elect may be made up.

A. To which living things has it been granted by nature to reproduce?

B. To those perfect, those not deprived, and those not having spontaneous generation.

A. Which living things are said to be born or to appear spontaneously?

B. [Those] that are not born of seed.

A. Can trees generate spontaneously?

B. They can, hence Virgil:

Firstly, nature has various ways for creating trees, for some, under no constraint of man, spring up of their own free will and claim the plains and winding rivers far and wide, such as the soft osier and pliant broom, the poplar and the silvery willow-beds with grey-green foliage.1

A. Can plants be produced spontaneously?

1Virgil Georgi 2.9-12. The Latin verse as recorded by Hegius, Dialogi, fo. C.v. verso, is given here:

"Principio arboribus varia est natura creandis,
Namque alle nullis hominum cogentibus ipse
sponte sua veniunt, camposque et flumina late
curva tenent, ut molle siler lenteque geniste,
populus et glauca canentia fronde salicta."
B. They can, for many plants both evil and harmful are produced spontaneously.

A. What is the difference between a natural and a prodigious birth?

B. A natural birth is when something is born from a [being] like itself. A prodigious [birth is] when something is born from an unlike [being], as, in the army which the Persian had gathered together against Greece a mare brought forth a hare. By that birth of a monster a great disaster was foreshadowed for the Persian. For he who overwhelmed the sea with his fleets and the land with his army of foot-soldiers retreated in fear like a timid animal and was forced to return to his own kingdom.¹

A. Do ἔποτοδες² and ηυαυσαμαλο ("dog-headed apes") have natural generation?

B. They have, for they are both born out of [beings] like themselves.

A. Are ἄνδρωποδες ("cannibals"), eating the flesh of humans; ἄγρυφας ("game-eaters"), living ἐν περὶπαθην (sic ταυτηαν) ("on prides of panthers") and on the flesh of lions; ἄκρωσσαγον ("locust eaters"), [who] have captured locusts with smoke and brine for their years supply of food; [and] ξανθοσαγον ("fish-eaters"), living only on fish, to be numbered among the prodigies?

B. No, for they are born from beings like themselves. These take their names from their food, not from any monstrous appearance.

A. Is it appropriate for inanimate things to generate the like of themselves?

B. It is appropriate for the elements. Fire generates fire from the air; and air, air from fire.

A. Is it appropriate for accidents?

B. It is, for knowledge generates knowledge; faith, faith; and error, error; virtue, virtue; and vice, vice.

A. Why is the power of generation given to living things?

B. So that they may be made the partakers and sharers of the divine eternity and immortality. For just as God is eternal and immortal, ¹This appears to be a quotation, but I have not as yet been able to locate the source from which it was taken. ²The etymology of this word is possibly from πους, a bird, and τους, a foot. I have been unable to ascertain from any source whether this is the name of a particular species of bird or whether it is some other kind of animal, real or imaginary.
so living things, by generation, attain that eternity and immortal-
ity which they are able to attain. For although individual living
things are corruptible since they are comprised of transformable
matter, yet the types of living things are maintained through gen-
eration. For if man had not generated man humankind would have
perished many centuries ago. One must judge in the same way about
the other types of living things. It is clear, therefore, that the
generative power was given to living things so that their types
should not perish but remain in nature.

A. Why are those things that are made up of transmutable matter not
able to persist for ever and unceasingly at the same number.

B. Because matter that is capable of transmutation cannot for ever
retain one and the same form. This is too obvious to require proof.
The matter that the human soul now animates will, within a few
years, have the form of earth. On this account man is commanded to
remember that he is ash and will return to ash. Likewise, the
matter that now has the form of earth will, in the springtime, be
transformed into grass, and what had the form of grass has now been
converted into earth.

A. Why does an oak tree generate an oak?
B. So that the genus of oaks may not die out.

A. Does the genus of oaks attain eternity by means of generation?
B. It attains that which it is able to attain for itself, for it
will continue to exist until the last day.

A. Why has the power of generation not been granted to stars?
B. Because they are each able to continue to exist for ever, since
they do not have transformable matter. But philosophers dispute
whether the matter of the sky and the stars is transformable in its
own nature or intransformable, and the case is still sub judice.

A. Will the human race always continue to exist?
B. Indeed, for after the last day part of the human race will be
for ever in heaven, part in hell.

A. Demonstrate this.
B. I cannot, for those things that Christians are commanded to
believe cannot be proved by arguments.

A. Why do you state what you cannot demonstrate?
B. Because I firmly believe it to be true. I dare to affirm
although I am unable to demonstrate it.

A. Is the equine genus going to continue to exist?
B. No, for since there will be no horsemen there will be no horses. The horse was made for the sake of the horseman. Since after the last day there will be no horseman it is evident that after that time there will be no horses.

A. Is the soul the beginning and cause of the living body?

B. It is.

A. What sort of beginning is the soul, internal or external?

B. Internal, for the soul cannot give life to the body unless it is within it.

A. In how many ways is the soul the cause of the living body?

B. In three; for it is the form, the end, and the efficient cause of the living body.

A. Why is the soul the form of the living body?

B. Because the soul permits the living body to live, for to live is to be, since it is to be alive. Therefore the soul is the form, for it is proper to the form to give existence to what it is in. Likewise, what heat is to the hot, and cold to the cold, life is to the living; for just as a hot thing is heated by heat, and a cold thing cooled by cold, so the living thing lives by life. But heat is the form of the hot thing, so life is the form of the living thing. Life, however, is the selfsame thing as the soul. Therefore the soul is the form of the living body.

A. Why is the soul the end of the living body?

B. Because the body is made for the sake of the soul. All parts of the animate body have been made so that the soul may use them in its operations. For why have eyes been made if not that the soul may see by means of the eyes; why noses, if not so that it may smell with them; why the lungs, if not so that with them it may draw in and let out breath? For, on Pliny's evidence, the lungs are the manufactory of breathing, drawing in and letting out the breath.¹

A. Is the soul the efficient cause or effector of the living body?

B. It is not, for the soul does not effect the body, but is the performer of its own operations.²

¹Pliny Natural History 11.72.188. It should be noted that anima may be translated as "breath" or "soul." See above, p. 404; and the introduction to appendix A, p. 382.

²This appears to contradict what Hegius has just said in answer to the earlier question: "In how many ways is the soul the cause of the living body?" Part of the reply given there is that it
A. What does the vegetable soul effect?
B. The vegetable soul effects nutrition, growth, and generation—the nutrition and growth of its own body, but generation not of its own body, but a body like its own body.

A. What does the sensual soul effect?
B. Vision, and hearing, and the other operations of the senses. It also effects troubled feelings and affections, for [those things] that have a sensual soul can be troubled by happiness and sorrow, anger and desire.

A. What does the intellectual soul effect?
B. Its own thoughts, affirmations, denials, reasonings to support and to oppose, knowledges and errors, right and wrong choices, right and wrong precepts of reason, and, universally, all virtues and vices. It is therefore clear that the soul is the effector of all the vital operations of the living body.

A. Is the soul the matter of the living body?
B. It is not, for matter is liable to transformation of substance. Matter that now has the form of earth will in the summer have the form of grass. The soul, on the other hand, is liable to transformation of accident; for it can move from virtues to vices, and vice versa, [and] from knowledge to error, and vice versa. Therefore the soul is not matter.

A. Can form and matter coincide, that is, can one and the same substance be the matter of that of which it is the form?
B. They cannot, for the same thing cannot grant existence and receive existence. Since it is [the property] of form to grant existence and of matter to receive existence, for that reason form and matter cannot coincide.

A. Should one be of the same opinion as Empedocles [ca. 493-ca. 433 B.C.]? He said that the uppermost parts of trees are fed with fire [and] the lowest parts with earth; and therefore he thought that

is "the efficient [cause] of the living body." It might therefore be better to understand the meaning of B's response at this point a little differently. Rather than saying "... the soul does not effect the body, but is the performer of its [i.e., the soul's] own operations," perhaps B means "... the soul does not effect the body, but is the performer of its [the bodies] operations." This is not a better translation of the Latin, but it seems to make sense of an otherwise contradictory remark. This interpretation is supported fourteen lines further on by the comment that "the soul is the effector of all the vital operations of the living body." Emphasis added.
movement of food from the root to the topmost point was natural, since the light is naturally carried upward, the heavy downward. Therefore, he said, the fire, which by nature is light, is carried to the highest parts of the tree and nourishes them. The earth, however, which by nature is heavy, remains in the lowest parts and nourishes them.\(^1\)

B. Aristotle disagrees with Empedocles on the grounds that he does not hold the correct opinion concerning the top and the bottom of the tree, for in Aristotle's judgment, the root is the top of the tree, the crown the base. The root is to the tree what the mouth is to the animal, since the tree takes nourishment with its root, just like an animal with its mouth. Yet the mouth of an animal is its uppermost part, therefore the root of a tree is the tree's uppermost part.\(^2\)

A. Is the uppermost part of the tree the root and the lowest the crown, that is, does that which falls from the crown to the root fall upwards, \(\text{or}\) is a stone that is thrown at the crown thrown downwards?

B. If we call that the uppermost \([\text{part}]\) of the tree \([\text{and}]\) that the lowest which the common people call uppermost and lower, it must be said that the crown is the uppermost part of the tree, the root the lowest. But if, however, that is called uppermost by which nourishment is taken in, \([\text{and}]\) that lowest by which excrement is passed out, the root is uppermost \([\text{and}]\) the crown lowest. Since the root is similar in operation and office to the mouth, it is right that it should be said to be uppermost in the tree, just as the mouth \([\text{is}]\) in an animal.

A. Is the soul the nourisher of the animal body, or \([\text{is}]\) fire, as some philosophers have thought?

B. Both the soul and fire, if by the noun "fire" is meant the natural heat of the stomach. For it is the soul that digests the food taken, and, \([\text{when}]\) digested, converts it into the substance of the animal; but the fire of the stomach is the instrument of the soul digesting food. And for this reason the soul is the principal cause of nutrition, but fire is called the instrumental or joint cause, for the soul would not be able to digest the food if it did not make use of the fire of the stomach.

A. What is the principal cause?

B. \([\text{That}]\) which effects something.

A. What \([\text{is}]\) an instrumental \([\text{cause}]\)?

\(^{1}\)Aristotle On the Soul 2.4.415b.27-416a.10.

\(^{2}\)Ibid.
B. [That] by which something is effected.

A. What is to digest?

B. The same as to dissolve.

A. What is digestion?

B. The same thing as dissolution.

A. What is it, to aid digestion?

B. To provide help for the stomach, so that it can digest.

A. Why is it necessary to digest food?

B. Because [it] cannot be converted into the substance of the living being unless it has been digested. For digestion is an alteration. Alteration precedes every generation. Therefore flesh cannot be generated from the food unless it has been altered by digestion.

A. Does a man digest the food that he takes, or does his soul, or his stomach?

B. All these digest the food. It is obvious that a man digests food, for sick men complain that they cannot digest. It is evident that the vegetative soul digests, for that is its office. It is too well known to require proof that the stomach, that is, the belly, digests.

A. Can medicine digest food?

B. It can. Experience teaches it, and all doctors and φαρμακοπωλαί ("chemists") bear witness.

A. Who are called φαρμακοπωλαί?

B. [Those] who sell φαρμακα, that is, medicines.

A. Why are they so called?

B. Because φαρμα, when it is taken in good part, means medicine. Πωλεῖ means the same as "I sell." From this is derived φαρμακοπωλα, a seller of medicines.

A. Why is it granted to the soul [and] not to fire to increase living bodies, since fire needs food, and without it cannot last, and it converts it [the food] to itself?

B. Because fire increases without measure, and only increases. For it increases as long as something combustible is provided for it, and for this reason is said to increase indefinitely. Whatever is increased by the soul is increased to a fixed extent, for living
bodies increase so that they may be rendered suitable for the soul to be able to use them in its operations. Why does a man by increasing not attain the size of an elephant, except that the size is not proper for the human soul?

A. Why has nature not given a mouse the size of a cat?

B. So that it should not equal a cat in strength, for the cat was made to catch mice.

A. Is fire nourished just like an animal?

B. No, for the nourishment of an animal penetrates its substance and is distributed to individual members. This does not occur in the nourishment of fire, for the combustible wood by which the fire is nourished does not penetrate the fire, nor is it distributed to the individual parts of it—from which it is evident that this argument is sophistical. Whatever is nourished has a soul: fire is nourished, therefore fire has a soul.

A. Is this argument sophistical? Whatever is nourished has a soul: a tree is nourished, therefore a tree has a soul.

B. It is not, for tree and animal are accorded the same definition.

A. What do living things have in common with fire?

B. Just as living things cannot live unless they are fed, so neither can fire persist without nourishment. It is necessary for animals and plants to be fed as long as they are alive. They are fed so that they may not die, for we see that animals that are not fed die of starvation; and it is inevitable that a plant, if it is not fed, will die.

A. Why do animals not grow in size as long as they live, since they are nourished throughout the whole time of their lives?

B. They grow in size until they are rendered suitable for the soul to use them in its operations. After they have become suitable instruments for the soul, however, they cease to grow, so that they may not be increased in size in vain. A horse is increased in size until it is made capable of bearing a rider, an ox until it attains such a size that it is able to cultivate fields, and a dog until it is rendered capable of driving wolves away from sheep.

A. What is the difference between fire and the vegetable soul?

B. Fire feeds itself, but the vegetable soul does not feed itself, but its body. Again, fire increases itself indefinitely, for it increases as long as wood or other combustible things are provided for it, but the vegetable soul does not enlarge its body indefinitely, but to its due measure.

A. Do the powers of the vegetable soul, which are three in number,
have the same object, that is, the same matter on which they act, or a different?

B. They have the same matter. For an oak tree is nourished, increased, and bears acorns; the olive tree olives; and the apple tree and the plum tree their fruits on the same food. A bird is nourished, grows, and produces eggs on the same food. For food, since it is a transformable substance, can be converted into the body of a living thing. Because it has quantity it can increase the quantity of a living thing. Because part of it can be converted into seed it can produce from itself something like the living thing.

A. Is the food like or unlike the thing requiring nourishment, that is, is that which is nourished, nourished by like or unlike?

B. When food is taken by the thing requiring nourishment it is unlike, for acorns are not like the flesh of a pig, nor fodder like the flesh of cattle, since before digestion every food is unlike the thing requiring nourishment. It is digested in order that it may be rendered suitable to be converted into the body of the thing requiring nourishment. After digestion and dissolution the food is like the thing requiring nourishment, since food cannot take on the form of the thing requiring nourishment unless it is rendered suitable by digestion for taking on a form of this sort. As soon as it has been made like the thing requiring nourishment it immediately loses the form of food and takes on the form of the thing requiring nourishment. For this reason Aristotle says that food not cooked is harmful, that is, it is unlike the thing which feeds, but heated-up food is like.

A. Is food different in substance to the thing that feeds?

B. It is, because it is converted into the body of the thing that feeds. The food of an ox is converted into the flesh of an ox, and the food of a pig into pig's flesh. Everything that is converted into another thing is unlike that into which it is converted. From which it follows that all food, as long as it is food, is unlike that of which it is the food. When it has been converted into the body of the nourished thing it is now not food but part of the nourished thing.

A. Is everything that is increased, increased by like?

B. Indeed, for water is increased by water, milk by milk, wine by wine; a flock of sheep is not increased with pigs, nor a herd of pigs with sheep.

A. Why is like increased by like when unlike is fed by unlike?

1See Aristotle Meteorology 4.2.379b.10-380a.10; On the Soul 2.4.416a.19-416b.32; and On Coming-to-be and Passing-away 1.5.321a.32-322a.33.
B. Because when anything is fed it is necessary for one of [two] unlike things to be converted into another. When anything is increased, like is added to like. From which it follows that idiots feed the number of literate, but the literate increase it; for when idiots become literate the number of the literate is fed, that it may not perish, but when literate are added to literate, the number of the literate is increased.

A. What is the nutritive virtue?

B. It is the power of the soul converting food into the body of the thing that feeds.

A. Is the nutritive force active or passive?

B. Active, for that which is fed is not acted upon by food, as a sculptor is not [acted upon] by the matter of a statue, nor a builder by the matter of a house. For the craftsman is not transmuted by the matter, but the matter by the craftsman.

A. Is food animate or inanimate?

B. It is animate in potential, not in actuality; for the food that is digested by the stomach or liver is not animate, but it will be animate when it is converted into the body of the living being.

A. What is the end of the nutritive virtue?

B. To keep individual living beings in life for as long a time as they are able to be kept in it. They are nourished so that they may be kept in life.

A. Does the nutritive virtue at any time interrupt its operation, that is, are dormice and hedgehog nourished when they are asleep in winter?

B. They are not nourished in winter by food outside themselves, that is, taken from outside, since at that time no food is taken; but if they are nourished, they are nourished by food inside themselves.

A. How many virtues are there that are subservient to the nutritive virtue?

B. Four. One is the attractive, by which food is attracted, for on the evidence of Albertus [Magnus (ca. 1206-1280)], food is drawn to the members like iron to a magnet. Just as iron altered by a magnet moves toward the magnet, so altered food moves toward the members requiring nourishment. ¹ The second is the retentive, which retains the food in the body for some time until it can be digested. The third [is] the dissolutive or digestive, which digests the food by

¹Albertus Magnus De causis proprietatum elementorum 1.2.11.
separating the excrement from that which is to be converted into the substance of the living being. The fourth [is] the expulsive. This drives the excrement out of the body as unsuitable for being converted into the body of the living thing.

A. How many are the digestions or dissolutions that are performed in the body?

B. Four. One [is] in the stomach, to which the excrement is sent, and which is the receptacle of excrement, in which the excrement is separated from the purer food and sent to the intestines. The second [is] the liver, where that which has been separated from the excrement takes on the color of blood and is sent to the veins. The third [is] in the extremities of the veins, where it is changed from red to white. The fourth [is] in the individual members to which the food has been attracted. These digestions completed, the food is joined with the living body and converted into its substance. Chewing of food, however, is not rightly to be called digestion, for [one] who chews food does not digest it but prepares it for digestion.
DIALOOG IV

Concerning the Sensual or Sensile Soul:  
The Third Dialog

A. Why does Aristotle in his treatment of the senses and sensible things, which is part of the book On the Soul, teach generally about universal senses and sensible things before he teaches specifically about vision and the visible, or hearing and the audible?

B. Because in the introduction of the Physics he says [that] it is natural for us to proceed from generalities to specifics, that is, from the more universal to the less universal.¹

A. What is it, to proceed from generalities to specifics?

B. It is for an instructor to teach general propositions before specific ones in respect of the things that are dealt with in any μεθοδος ("treatise or scientific enquiry").

A. Is progress made in every μεθοδος from generalities to specifics?

B. Exactly.

A. Demonstrate this.

B. The metaphysician teaches that every substance is different in its qualities inherent in itself before he teaches that the soul is different in its knowledges and powers, for the latter proposition is specific, the former general. The physicist teaches that every motion has a terminus from which it begins [and] a terminus at which it ceases before he teaches that learning is a movement from ignorance to knowledge. The geometrician teaches that every figure is enclosed by a boundary or boundaries before he teaches that a plane figure is enclosed by a line or lines [and] a solid by a surface or surfaces, because the latter are specific propositions [while] the former [is] universal. The arithmetician teaches that every larger number has a share of greater inequality to the smaller before he teaches that τὴν ὀγδοαῖον ("the number eight") has the ratio of one and one-seventh to seven. The musician teaches first that the duple relationship² consists of διατεντεις ("fifth intervals") plus ἕτα τετρακοσιοστον ("a fourth interval"). The astronomer teaches that

¹Aristotle Physics 1.1.184a.16-26.
²The octave.

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every planet moves against the firmament before he teaches that the
sun moves fifty-nine minutes and eight seconds against the firmament on
every natural day. The grammarian teaches that each of τὴν
δυστάξια ([+o]γον (“the diphthong”) is long before [he teaches] that οὗ
or εὗ must be lengthened in a line of poetry. The dialectician
teaches that every syllogism is sophistical whose mean signifies one
thing in the major premise and another in the minor premise before
he teaches that a syllogism is sophistical whose mean in the major
premise signifies an animal [and] in the minor premise a heavenly
star. The rhetorician teaches that an orator’s duty is to win over
the mind of a judge to himself and to alienate it from his adversary
before he teaches that an orator must expound his merits and duties
to the judge without arrogance, but with modesty, and make his
adversary contemptible to the judge, and render him hateful. The
moralist teaches that an honorable thing is whatever reason dictates
ought to be done and a base thing whatever it dictates ought to be
avoided before he teaches that it is an honorable thing to render to
any man what is his, but base to seize the belongings of another.
From the aforesaid it is obvious that, in every ἔνομο, one must
proceed from generalities to specifics.

A. Is every sense a virtue?

B. Virtue signifies two things, a natural virtue and an acquired.
The natural virtues are [those] that are innate in things, such as
are the virtues of plants and stones, and they are called natural
powers. Acquired virtues are [those] that are created by work or
study. Sense, when it is nothing but a power or force of feeling,
is a natural virtue, for there are senses innate in animals not
acquired by study and work.

A. What are the virtues acquired by study and work?

B. The praiseworthy habits of the mind, as Aristotle says at the
end of the first book of the Ethics; for [those] who have been
endowed with habits of this sort are worthy to be praised by all
men.1

A. Classify the acquired virtues.

B. Aristotle divides them at the start of the second [book] of the
Ethics into intellectual and moral.2

A. What is the difference between those virtues?

B. According to Aristotle, the intellective have their origins in
and increase from teaching, while the moral are developed from prac­
tice. From this also they take their name, for no one is made just
except [one] who frequently performs those things that are just,

1 Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.13.1103a.5-10.
2 Ibid., 2.1.1103b.14-20.
[and] no one [is made] generous except [one] who frequently bestows generously--from which it is clear that no moral virtue is present in us by nature.

A. What are the intellective virtues?

B. Wisdom, intellect, knowledge, prudence, and art. They are also called intellectual habits.

A. What are the moral virtues?

B. Fortitude, generosity, temperance, justice, and the other honest practices; for a man who is endowed with these is called well-mannered.

A. Why are virtues called good habits and vices bad?

B. Because just as a healthy body is said to be well, but a sick one ill, so a mind that has virtues is said to be well, [and one] that [has] vices [is said to be] ill. For this reason virtues are called good habits, but vices bad.

A. Classify innate virtue.

B. Innate virtue is divided into active and passive virtue. Active virtue is an active power, or power of acting; passive [virtue] is a passive power, or [power] of being acted upon.

A. What is active power?

B. It is power by which any thing is able to move and to transmute.

A. What is passive?

B. It is power by which something can be moved and transmuted.

A. Are the virtues of plants active or passive?

B. Active, for plants by their virtues can heal the sick. To heal the sick is to move them from sickness into health.

A. Is the curability of a sick man an active or a passive virtue?

B. Passive, for a sick man is called curable because he can be moved from illness to health.

A. What are the virtues of plants?

B. The force of healing the sick; the force of providing remedies for diseases; to be powerful against quartan, tertian, and quotidian [fevers]; to relieve ἄρες[+ε]ταχους ("those suffering a fever") of the lungs, of dropsy, of dysentery, of epilepsy, of coughing, [and] of the heart; to ease the stomach; to loosen the stomach; to halt a harmful flux; to settle the stomach; to rouse the urine; to provide
a remedy for strangury; a remedy for the blows of frequent beatings; to repress the palate with gargles; to offer a cure by mouth against snakes and poisonous things; to bring relief to gouts; and to lessen burning sensations of the head; and to cast out stones or provide a remedy for those suffering from them; to cure angina; to remove pain in the teeth; to stabilize loose teeth; to help the liver and pains of the back; to bring health to the intestines and diseased areas of the midriff; to improve διάθεκμα ("baldness"); to provide a remedy for the royal disease; a remedy for [those] afflicted with poison; to shake off colic; to help the burned, the debauched, [and] those in fear of consumption; to calm sobbing; to halt diarrhea; to cure ulcers; to reduce catarrh; to calm pain in the head; to provide a remedy for wasted, consumptive bodies; to rouse, empty, and purge the stomach; to remove warts; to dispel tumors; to prevail against the fluxions that the Greeks call διαματήματα ("watery discharge"); to preserve health; to drive away torments of the body; to cleanse ulcers and septic places; to banish sneezing and clear the head; to prevent or dispel hangovers; to provoke and put a stop to vomiting; [and] to ease diseases of the joints.

A. Is sense an active virtue or a passive; that is, does sense by sensing act on what it senses, or does what is sensed act on the sense?

B. Sense is a passive virtue related to the sensible thing, for every susceptible virtue is passive. [That] which has susceptible virtue is transmutable, therefore it has passive potentiality. Sense is a susceptible virtue, for every sense, by its own sensory organ, is able to take up the form and likeness of the sensible thing into its own image and appearance--and sense cannot recognize it to be sensible or make a judgment about it unless it has its form and image in itself. From which it follows that sense, related to the sensible, is a passive force. The sensual soul has no power of acting on that which it senses, but, on the contrary, that which is sensed has the power of acting on the sensory organ; for color acts on the eye, not the eye on color; sound on the ear, not the ear on sound; and not color, but the eye is changed when it is seen; and not sound, but the ear when it is heard.

A. What is to act on anything?

B. It is to move and to change something, as the sun illuminating the air is said to act on it because it moves it from darkness to light.

A. What is to be acted on by anything?

B. It is to be moved by something; as the air when it is illuminated by the sun is acted upon by it, because it is made light from [being] shadowy.

A. Can anything act on itself?

B. It can, for it can move itself.
A. Can anything be acted on by itself?

B. It can, for it can be moved by itself.

A. Is [one] who sees anything moved by it?

B. Even so.

A. Whence, and by what?

B. From deprivation into possession, because from not having he becomes having; for before seeing he lacked the image of the visible thing which, in seeing, he has.

A. Does the eye, when it sees, send visual rays from itself to the thing that is seen, as some philosophers have felt, or does the thing that is seen send its own image to the eye, as Aristotle thought?

B. The thing that is seen sends its own image to the eye; that is, we must think with Aristotle,1 for we know for certain that visible things produce their own images from themselves, but we do not know for certain that visual rays are sent from the eyes to visible things.

A. Is it inevitable that the eye of a seeing being has in it the image of the thing that is seen?

B. It is.

A. Demonstrate this.

B. Vision occurs through a transparent body because the thing that is seen is able to send its image into the eye. A visible thing, if it is further away from the eye than the level, cannot be seen because it is not able to cast its image to the eye, for a visible thing cannot cast its image through an infinite space.

A. Why is a visible thing touching the eye not seen?

B. Because it is necessary that every thing that is seen should send its own likeness to the eye through a transparent body, for in all vision between the eye and the visible thing it is necessary that the transparent body intervenes. On this account the eye sees neither itself nor its own color, because it cannot cast its own image into itself.

A. Why is a thing seen in a mirror?

B. Because it casts its own image onto the mirror and that bounces

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1 Aristotle On Sense and Sensible Objects 1.2.437b.10-38b.1.
back from the mirror and is reflected toward the eye. Whatever is seen in a mirror is seen by means of an image bouncing back and reflected. And, for this reason, vision of a thing in a mirror is called reflection; for the thing that is seen casts onto the mirror its own likeness, which bounces back from the mirror to the eye just as the light of a candle thrown onto a bowl bounces back from it onto a wall.

A. Does the sensual soul employ only passive virtue in sensing?

B. No, for it employs each virtue, active and passive. In taking up the form and image of the sensible thing it is acted upon; but in recognizing a sensible entity and making a judgment about it, it acts. Sight, judging snow to be white and pitch [to be] black, is not acted upon but acts, because to pass judgment is to act. Likewise sight, judging a standard that is presented to the eye to be either right or wrong, acts, because it cannot make that judgment without care and effort. In the same way, hearing, making a judgment about the consonance and harmony of sounds, is acting, since it cannot do this without effort and care. From which it follows that sense has a double virtue, passive in taking up, [and] active in passing judgment.

A. In how many ways is the verb "to sense" taken?

B. In two. Sometimes to sense refers to the intellectual soul, sometimes to the sensual. To sense, referring to the intellectual soul, is to judge something in the mind, as to sense that God is the creator of all things. To sense, as it refers to the sensual soul, has two meanings: to have sensory power, that is, the virtue of sensation; and to use sensory power, that is, to perceive something by means of a sense. In the same way, to see, and to hear, and the other words signifying the operations of the senses, have two meanings. For to see sometimes means to have visual power—in this way a sleeping man has sight; sometimes to perceive something by sight—thus waking men see.

A. How many meanings does sense have?

B. Two, for sometimes it means the sensitive force, that is the power of feeling; [and] sometimes the operation of the sensory virtue, that is, recognition and perception of the thing that is sensed, which, by its general name, is called sensation. And it can be called sense if we are willing to keep the analogy.

A. Does a sleeping animal have sense in actuality?

B. It has, if sense is taken as the sensory force or power of sensing. But, if sense is taken as the operation of a sense, a sleeping animal is without sense.

A. Does an animal stand in the same relation to its sense as a grammarian to grammar, an orator to rhetoric, [or] a geometrician to geometry?
B. It does if sense is taken as the virtue of sensing. For just as the virtue of sensing is the prime actuality, that is, the chief perfection of an animal, so geometry is the chief perfection of the geometrician and grammar of the grammarian. Just as [a man] knowing grammar is able to speak correctly, so [any thing] having the virtue of sensing is able to sense. However, if by the word sense is meant operation of sense, the animal stands in the same relationship to sense, that is, to sensing, as the theoretical geometrician [does] to theorizing and proving his propositions, or the practical [geometrician] to measuring, and the orator to speaking correctly. For just as to sense is the secondary actuality, that is, the secondary perfection of an animal, so to speak correctly is the secondary actuality of an orator.

A. What has sense in common with intellect?

B. Sense is moved by the sensible as intellect by the intelligible. For just as nothing is understood unless intelligible, so nothing is sensed unless sensible.

A. What is the difference between sense and intellect?

B. Sense recognizes individually, intellect universally; for the judgment of a sense is in respect of individual things, but the judgment of intellect in respect of universals. Sight is not able to judge that all swans are white, but judges only that the swan presented to it is white. Intellect pronounces all swans to be white. Hearing judges that the sound of a nightingale presented to it is pleasing; intellect judges that every sound of a nightingale is sweet. Also, intellect passes judgment when it wishes, but a sense cannot sense unless a sensible thing is present to its sensory organ. The eye cannot see when a visible thing is removed, nor the ear hear when an audible thing is removed. We are not able to perceive by sense in absence [of a sensible thing], though we are able to think about those things in the mind.

A. Why does Aristotle say that all things exist in some manner in the intellect?

B. Because all concepts exist in the intellectual soul. When I think about swans or make some pronouncement about them, I have a universal concept, that is, a concept of all swans. When I think about all ravens, I have a universal concept. But there is no universal sight; for I cannot, in one seeing, see all the colors in the way that, in one thought, I can think about all things. For this reason intellect is said to be of universals, [and] sense of individuals [things].

A. What is it to change from non-sentient to sentient?

B. If that is said to be non-sentient which lacks a sensual soul,
it must be said that that which brings forth an animal changes non-sentient into sentient; for an animal comes from a non-animal, sentient from non-sentient. If, however, that is said to be non-sentient which does not use the sense that it has and does not perceive anything with it, it must be said that it is the sensible thing that turns non-sentient into sentient. When a sensible thing is made the object of a sensory organ, immediately [that] which does not sense begins to sense.

A. Does a sleeping animal have sense in actuality?

B. If it is taken as sense through the operation of sense, a sleeping animal is without sense; if it is taken as sensory power, a sleeping animal does have sense, just as an orator who is not making a speech [has] rhetoric, or a geometrician who is not measuring [has] geometry.
Concerning the Intellectual Soul:
The Fourth Dialog

A. Is speculation about the intellectual soul proper to natural philosophy?

B. It is proper.

A. Why?

B. Because it is [a function] of natural philosophy to speculate about all mobile things. The intellective soul is a mobile thing, therefore its investigation is proper to natural philosophy. Again, the intellective soul is part of man, for man consists of body and rational soul. Since speculation about man is proper to the physicist, because he is a mobile thing, it is inevitable that speculation about his parts is proper to the same, for it is [the function] of that same to speculate on the whole and its parts. Again, not only mobile things fall under the contemplation of the physicist, but also their movers, for mobile things cannot be recognized except through their movers. Since the intellective soul is the mover of man, therefore its investigation is proper to the physicist.

A. Why is a mobile thing rather than a mobile body the subject of physics?

B. Because the physicist considers all mobile things, not only mobile bodies, and does not put forward all his propositions in respect of mobile bodies.

A. What propositions does the physicist put forward concerning all mobile things?

B. These: everything that moves is moved by a moving thing; [and] concerning that which moves, it moves from some place, that is, from a [+terminus a quo ("point of departure") to a] terminus ad quem ("destination"). Since these pronouncements are proposed in respect of all mobile things, and not only about bodies, the mobile thing is therefore the subject of physics; for the subject of a science must be common to all things under consideration in the science.

A. From what and in what direction is the intellective soul mobile?

B. From ignorance to science, from error to knowledge of the truth, from affirmation to denial and back again, from a knowledge of
indemonstrable principles to a knowledge of those that are demon-
strated through them, [and] from knowledge of demonstrative state-
ments to knowledge of the demonstrating statements. Again, the soul
is mobile from faith to faith, from error to error, [and] from
opinion to opinion; for since it believes or thinks any one state-
ment to be true, it is inevitable that it believes and thinks all
statements which are a necessary consequence of that one to be true.

A. Demonstrate that the soul moves from knowledge to knowledge.

B. [He] who knows that the whole space surrounding any point on a
surface is equal to four right angles can easily know that half of
that same space is equal to two right [angles], because if the whole
is equal to the whole it is inevitable that half is equal to half,
third to third, quarter to quarter, etc.; as, if a peck is equal to
a peck, or a pound to a pound, it is inevitable that half a peck
equals half a peck, and half a pound equals half a pound. If an as
equals an as, it is inevitable that a third of an as equals a third
of an as, and three-quarters equals three-quarters. [He] who knows
that the whole space which surrounds any point on a surface is equal
to four right angles can know that three obtuse angles can equal
four right angles, for three obtuse angles can occupy as much space
as four right [angles], [and] whatever things occupy equal spaces
are equal. If three obtuse angles equal one another occupy the
whole space that surrounds a point on a surface, it is inevitable
that any one of them contains a right angle plus one-third of a
right angle.

A. Demonstrate that the soul is able to move from faith to faith.

B. It is inevitable that he who believes any statement to be true
believes all statements to be true which are a consequence of that
one; as, it is inevitable that he who believes God to be omnipotent
believes that He can make something out of nothing, and can reduce
that which has been made of nothing into nothing again. One must
think the same in respect of error. It is inevitable that a man who
assents to some false statement assents also to everything that is a
consequence of that [statement]. For this reason an error small at
its beginning becomes very great at the end.

A. Can the intellective soul know anything of itself?

B. It can.

A. Why?

B. Because, if it is able in respect of things different from
itself to pronounce those things that it discovers to be true, it is
much more able to state, that is, to affirm and to deny, what it has
discovered to be true in respect of itself. Therefore it is able to

1An ancient Roman unit of weight or value, and a bronze coin
of equal value.
have knowledge of itself, for we all think we know what has been discovered by us.

A. Demonstrate [this].

B. We are certain that we cannot assent to two contradictory statements at the same time. Therefore we know about the soul that it cannot believe that contradictions are true. We are certain that when we agree with the antecedent statement in a good argument it is inevitable that we also agree with its consequence, and we know this about the soul.

A. How is the intellective soul the mover of man?

B. Because man does not move to attain any good thing except by means of recognition and appetite. Recognition and appetite, however, are proper to the intellective soul, therefore that is the mover of man.

A. Is this syllogism good or sophistical? Whatever is known is true, since knowledge is made up of truths: the intellective soul is not true since it is not a statement, therefore the intellective soul is not known.

B. It is sophistical, since, by "that which is known," one thing is understood in the major premise, and another thing in the conclusion. In the major premise it signifies a statement which is known, that is, to which [the one] having knowledge assents; in the conclusion it signifies the thing about which something is known. Or, "that which is known" signifies in the major premise a related tenet, [and] in the conclusion a tenet at a remove. One must pass judgment in the same way on this syllogism. Whatever is known is the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism: the intellective soul is not the conclusion of a demonstrative syllogism, therefore the intellective soul is not known.

A. What is a related tenet?

B. It is a proven statement to which [someone] having knowledge assents.

A. What is a tenet at a remove?

B. The thing about which [one] having knowledge assents.

A. What judgment is to be made about this syllogism? All knowledge is of those [things] that cannot be otherwise, because Aristotle, in the sixth [book] of the Ethics, says that we accept all in such a way that that which we know cannot be otherwise:1 knowledge about the intellective soul is not [one] of those [things] that cannot be otherwise, since the intellective soul, as has been said, is mobile

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1Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 4.2.1139a.18-25.
and mutable; therefore there is no knowledge concerning it.

B. It is sophistical, for by "those things that cannot be otherwise" in the major [premise] are meant the pronouncements that cannot be changed from truth to falsehood, but in the minor, things immutable and immobile.

A. What is one to think about these syllogisms? No error is knowledge: there is error in respect of the soul, therefore there is no knowledge about the soul. No opinion is knowledge: there is opinion about the soul, therefore there is no knowledge about the soul. No belief is knowledge, since belief is brought about by telling, knowledge by showing: there is belief in respect of the soul, therefore there is no knowledge about the soul.

B. They are faulty and debased, for in them the conclusion is indirectly made in the sixth mode of the third figure.

A. Correct them.

B. No error is knowledge: there is error in respect of the soul, therefore something that exists in respect of the soul is not knowledge, etc.

A. What is one to think of this syllogism? If there is belief in respect of the soul there is not knowledge, because that which is believed is not known since it cannot be proved: there is belief in respect of the soul, since we believe that the soul will pay the penalty for its crimes in the life to come; therefore there is no knowledge about it.

B. The reasoning is false. Although there cannot be both belief and knowledge about the same pronouncement, nevertheless, in respect of the same thing, one truth may be known and another believed. One must be of the same opinion about these syllogisms: if there is opinion about the soul there is not knowledge about it, etc.; if there is error about the soul there is not knowledge about it, etc.

A. What is one to think of this syllogism? Everything that exists is either in the soul or outside it: but the intellective soul is neither in the soul nor outside it, therefore it does not exist--and if it does not exist there is no knowledge concerning it. The minor [premise] is proved because the intellective soul is not in the soul, since nothing is in itself as is stated in the fourth [book] of Physics, nor outside the soul, since nothing is outside itself.¹

B. The major [premise] is to be denied. Everything that is other than the soul is in the soul or outside the soul, but it is not necessary for the soul itself to be either in the soul or outside the soul. Or, it can be said that the intellective soul is in

¹Aristotle Physics 4.3.210a.25-210b.23.
itself in the way that everything is said to be in itself, not properly but improperly.

A. What is properly said to be in another?

B. [That] which is either a part of that in which it is, or an accident of that in which it is, or which is contained by that in which it is, as, by its place. Everything that is properly in another is different from that in which it is.

A. Why is a thing not said to be in itself properly?

B. Because no thing is different from itself.

A. What should one think of this reasoning? All knowledge is in the soul: cognizance of the soul is not in the soul, therefore it is not knowledge. The major [premise] is established in natural philosophy; the minor is proved because, as cognizance of stone stands in relationship to stone, so stands cognizance of the soul to the soul. But cognizance of stone is not in stone, so cognizance of the soul is not in the soul.

B. This statement, "just as cognizance of stone stands in relationship to stone, so stands cognizance of the soul to the soul," is ambiguous and must be analyzed, for it has two meanings. One is, as cognizance of stone stands in relation to stone, so stands cognizance of the soul to the soul, and in that meaning it is false. The other meaning is [that] in some way cognizance of stone stands in relationship to stone, and in that same way cognizance of the soul stands in relationship to the soul, in which meaning it is true. But because it is a specific statement, and a syllogism whose major and minor [premises] are specific is faulty, therefore it is itself faulty in that it does not have any universal statement.

A. What is the part of the soul with which it recognizes and is sensible? For the third book On the Soul begins thus: "Concerning that part of the soul with which it recognizes and is sensible, whether it be separable or inseparable in magnitude or in reason."[+B] One must consider first what diversity it has, and how after all it becomes intelligent.

A. Does the rational soul have parts?

B. If parts are taken [to be] the potentiality and the forces of the soul, the rational soul can be said to have parts; for it has the potentiality of understanding, which is called intellect, and the potentiality of wishing, which is called the will. But if they are called parts out of which any whole and complete thing is composed, it must be said that the rational soul does not have parts,

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for it is an incorporeal and indivisible substance that is composed of no parts.

A. Are the powers or forces of a thing properly called its parts?
B. No.
A. Why?
B. Because the powers of a thing are its qualities. Qualities cannot properly be called parts because no thing is made up of its qualities.

A. Does the soul have parts?
B. That is an ambiguous question, for the inquiry is being made either concerning the noun "soul" and its subjective parts, or concerning the thing represented by the noun and its integral parts. If the inquiry is being made about the noun, one must affirm that the soul has subjective parts, and the vegetable soul, the sensual soul, and the rational soul are subjected to the soul as inferior to superior. If the inquiry is being made about the thing, it must be conceded that the vegetable soul of a tree or a plant and the sensual soul of a dumb animal have parts. But one must say that the rational soul does not have parts, for it is a spirit which is composed of no parts.

A. Does the human soul have potentialities?
B. It has, for whatever operates has the potentiality for operating. The potentiality for operating precedes the operation. The soul operates because it recognizes and is sensible, therefore it has the potentiality for recognition. For just as everything that does exist can exist, everything that did exist could exist, [and] everything that will exist will be able to exist, so, everything that acts can act, and has active potentiality, and everything that is acted upon can be acted upon, and has passive potentiality.

A. Is understanding a potentiality of the soul?
B. Understanding in one way signifies an understanding of the words of sentences, and understanding is taken in this way when we say that some sentences have a twofold meaning, that is, significance. In another way, understanding signifies the habit of mind by which the mind assents to the first principles of knowledge, which are called the common concepts of the mind. In a third way, understanding signifies the force of understanding, and that is twofold, uncreated and created. The uncreated is the divine intellect, for, as the Psalmist sings: "God by His intellect made the heavens" [Ps 136:5]. The created is the angelic or the human. The human intellect is a potentiality of the soul.

A. Are recognizing and being sensible operations of the soul different from one another?
B. They are, for we recognize those things of which we are satisfied by speculation—of such a sort are those things that are spoken of in the speculative sciences; but we are sensible of what is to be done and what left undone. For recognition is the province of the theoretic, that is, the speculative intellect; being sensible, [the province] of the practical, that is, the operative. Just as the man has no sense who does not know what he ought to do [and] what he ought to leave undone, so he who does know these things is said to be rightly sensible, as is shown by this line in Greek: ὁ υπομνήματι ὅς τὰς οὐκ αὐτοκοινέως ("He hates wisdom who does not know himself"). This is interpreted thus: "He is uselessly wise who has too little wisdom about himself." For what use to a man is knowledge of the movement of the stars if he is not sensible of what is proper for him and what is not?

A. What is it for one part of a soul to be separated from another according to magnitude?

B. It is to be one, and to function in a different part of the body from another, or, for one to use a different organ from another; as, sight is separated by magnitude from smell, because sight uses the eyes, smell the nose. And in this way Plato said that the parts of the soul are separate.¹

A. What is it for one part to be separate from another by classification?

B. It is for the name of one part to have a different classification, that is, definition, from another. This is the difference between things diverse according to magnitude and those diverse according to definition, that things diverse according to magnitude are forms which are subject in different parts so that they differ in place and subject; but things diverse according to definition are nouns having different definitions.

A. Is the intelligent soul separated from the sensual according to magnitude, that is, does the intelligent soul use a different organ from the sentient [soul]?

B. No, for the sentient soul uses an organ, but the intelligent uses no organ, since intellect is not an organic virtue. For no one can say with what part of his body he understands.

A. Is the intellectual soul separated from the sensual according to definition?

B. Just so, for although the same soul in a man may be intellectual and sensible, nevertheless it is not called rational by that definition by which [it is called] sensual. It is called intellectual

¹See, for example, Plato Theaetetus 184b–186c; Phaedo 79c; and The Republic 4.18.444b, and particularly 10.11.611.b–c.

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because through it we are able to understand [and] sensual because through it we are able to sense.

A. How many sorts of diversity are there?

B. Two, diversity of things and diversity of definitions. The diversity of man and donkey is a diversity of things; the diversity of man and animal is a diversity of definition. The same thing is called man and animal, but not by that definition by which [it is called] animal; for every species differs in definition by its kind, by its own diversity, [and] by its own property.

A. What is to be said to these arguments? The human soul has integral parts, therefore its potentialities are not to be understood through the parts of the soul. The antecedent is proved: because the human soul is the equal of the body, therefore it has parts. The antecedent is proved because either the soul is the equal of the body or [it is] larger or smaller. It is not larger than the body, for if it were larger it would give life to more than its body, if smaller, less. So it is inevitable that it should be the equivalent of the body.

B. One must reply that the soul is neither equal nor unequal to the body, for the soul has no mass or quantity, which it is agreed that the body has.

[A]. Again, just as the soul of a tree is to the tree, so [is] the human soul to the man, since in both the life matches that of which it is the life. But the soul of a tree is the same size as a tree; therefore the soul of a man is the same size as the man.

B. One should reply [that], in as far as it is taken generally, the major [premise] is false; if specifically, [it is] true. That is, in as far as it means that the human soul is in all things like the soul of a tree, the major [premise] is false; [but] if in some things, [+it is true]. But in this way the argumentation is not good.

[A]. Again, the whole human soul is in any one part of the body, therefore any one part of the human soul is in any one part of the body. If that is true, the consequence is that the soul has parts. The antecedent is proved because the human soul is a single and indivisible substance. Wherever a single and indivisible substance is, it all is; therefore the whole human [soul] is in any one part of the body.

B. One must reply that this statement, "the whole soul is in any
one part of the body," is ambiguous, for it has two interpretations. One is, any one part of the human soul is in any one part of the body, and in that interpretation it is false. The other interpretation is [that] the human soul is in any one part of the body, and there is no part of the human soul that is not in some part of the body, since it does not have parts, and in that interpretation it is true. But it does not follow from this interpretation that the soul has parts.

[+A]. Again, one part of the human soul is in the foot, another in the hand; therefore the human soul has parts. The antecedent is proved, since it cannot happen that the same soul should be in the hand as in the foot; therefore one part of it is in the hand [and] another in the foot. The antecedent is proved, since if the same soul is in the hand as is in the foot it follows that one soul is in different places, since what [is] in the hand is in a different place from what is in the foot. Again, it follows that one soul moves upward and downward, for if the hand moves upward its soul moves with it, [and] if the foot [moves] downward the soul moves with it. But since it often happens that the hand moves upward and the foot downward, therefore the soul is able, at the same time, to move upward and downward. Again, it follows that the soul can at the same time move and be still, since if the hand moves its soul moves, [and] if the foot is at rest its soul is still. Again, it follows that the soul is like God, for, just as God is everywhere in the world, so the soul is everywhere in its body. Again, it follows that one soul is in different men, since any one part of man is man, therefore if there is a soul in any one part of man, one soul is in different men. [The fact] that any one part of a man is man is proved, for just as any part of substance is substance, any part of a body is body, any part of an animated body [is] animated body, any part of an animal is animal, so any part of man is man. Again, as any part of water is water, since any part of it is of the matter and the form of water, so any part of an animal is animal, [and] any part of man is man; for any part of an animal is made up of the matter and form of the animal, and any part of a man, of the matter and form of man.

B. To these arguments one must reply that one and the same thing cannot according to nature be in different places, nor move at the same time upward and downward; but at the command of God, who is the author of nature, these things can happen. According to nature nothing can move in opposing directions. Of such a sort are movements upward and downward. Just as the same soul, at God's command, gives life to every single part of the body, so by the command of the same it moves upward with one part, [and] downward with another.

A. Does a man who is sailing toward the east, and [who] passes from the prow to the stern, move eastward or westward?

B. If the man moves more quickly than the ship he moves westward; if more slowly than the ship he moves eastward. If the man and the ship move equally quickly the man does not move, since he does not alter his position. To the argument by which the soul is proved to
be like God, the reply is that the soul is partly like God and partly unlike: like, because just as God is in every part of the world so the soul is in every part of the body; unlike, because the soul animates and gives life to bodies, but God does not give life to the earth. An animal does not consist of God and earth as [it does] of soul and body. To the final argument one must say that it is not possible for one soul to be in different men [as] discontinuous and separate totalities, but it is quite possible for one soul to be in different continuous and coherent totalities.

The text follows: ¹ If, therefore, to understand is the same as to feel or to suffer something, or something else of this kind, as it will be by the intelligible, it is impossible. Therefore the intellect ought to be susceptible to species, and by a potentiality of this sort, but not by this act; and the intellective [ought] to stand in relation to the intelligible just as the sensitive to the sensible.

A. Is intellect a virtue?

B. It is, if by virtue is understood a natural power. Intellect is the potentiality of the rational soul by which the soul recognizes and is sensible: it is a virtue. If by virtue is understood the praiseworthy habit of the mind, in the way that it is taken according to the Ethics, intellect, which is the knowledge of unprovable principles, is a virtue.²

A. How many meanings does this statement, "intellect is a virtue," have?

B. It has two true meanings. One is, intellect is a natural virtue, that is, a natural potentiality. The other meaning [is], knowledge of principles is an intellectual virtue. It also has two false interpretations, for if intellect is taken as the potentiality of understanding, and virtue as habit, it is false that intellect is a virtue. Likewise, if intellect is taken as knowledge of first principles and virtue as natural potentiality, it is false that intellect is a virtue.

¹The last section of B's reply does not make sense as an answer to the preceding questions. The way in which the text reads does not support the idea of an unconscious error. At first glance it appears that this is a quotation from another source, introduced by the words: "The text follows." There is no hint given as to the possible author or the origin of this other source. This leaves the reader to wonder if the phrase, "The text follows:" is not an editorial comment rather than something written by Hegius himself. The most plausible explanation seems therefore to be that Hegius' manuscript had a page or pages missing, resulting in a breakdown in the continuity of the argument. This breakdown was merely being noted by Jacobus Faber, the editor.

²Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.13.1103a.5-10.
A. Is there intellect in infants?

B. If intellect is taken as the power of understanding, it must be granted that there is intellect in infants; if as knowledge of first principles, it must be said that there is no intellect in infants.

A. Is intellect a passive virtue?

B. Passivity is twofold, both perfective and destructive. For there are some things which, when they are acted upon, are perfected; but there are some which, when they are acted upon, are corrupted and destroyed. The human intellect is acted upon with perfective passivity, not destructive, for the intellect, by taking up knowledges and virtues, is perfected and completed.

A. Why is the intellect called a passive virtue?

B. Because it takes up something from that which it understands. It takes up the likeness of the thing it understands. Again, it takes up the understanding that it lacked when it did not understand. Again, it takes up knowledge. All these things that it takes up perfect the intellect.

A. Is the intellect always perfected when it is acted upon?

B. Not always, for an intellect in taking up error is acted upon and is not perfected. But the passivity of the intellect is perfective, because when it is acted upon with the passivity due to itself, it is perfected. When, however, it is acted upon with an undue passivity, it is not inevitable that it should be perfected.

A. Is a sense always acted upon with perfective passivity?

B. Not always, for when a man smells the stench of a corpse, or tastes salt, or hears a discord, it is not perfected. A sense is not perfected when it perceives those things that are hateful to its organ.

A. Is to understand any thing and to think about any thing to be acted upon.

B. To understand and to think is not to be acted upon, but rather action; to take up understanding and thought is to be acted upon.

A. Is to know to act or to be acted upon?

B. It is neither to act nor to be acted upon, but to have a quality. A man is called sleeping when he neither acts nor is acted upon; for just as to be hot is neither to act nor to be acted upon, but to have heat in oneself, so to know is neither to act nor to be acted upon, but it is to have knowledge in oneself. To think, however, is to act, and thought is the operation of our mind. Again, just as to whiten means to act, to be whitened to be acted upon, to
be white, neither; so to teach means to act, to be taught, to be
acted upon, but to know, neither.

[A]. Again, every virtue is either moral or intellectual, for
Aristotle, in the second [book] of the Ethics, divides virtues into
these two parts; but intellect is neither an intellectual nor a
moral virtue, therefore it is not a virtue.

B. In the second [book] of the Ethics, Aristotle splits acquired
virtue, that is, habit of mind, into moral and intellectual; but not
the innate virtue of the soul. Intellect is of this kind.¹

A. Why are habits called acquired virtues?

B. Because they are generated in the soul by frequent actions. [A
man] who frequently chooses to give [to one] to whom it is right to
give acquires generosity. [A man] who frequently chooses to give to
any man what is his acquires justice. [A man] who frequently proves
that a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles acquires
a knowledge of that proof.

A. Why are natural potentialities called innate virtues?

B. Because they are born with the things of which they are the
natural potentialities.

[A]. Again, nothing impassive is a passive virtue; intellect is an
impassive virtue, as Aristotle says in the third [book] On the Soul;
therefore it is not a passive virtue.

B. Aristotle says intellect is called impassive because it is not
acted upon by destructive passivity.² Intellect is everlasting, for
it cannot be destroyed. However, it is not called impassive because
it is acted upon by no passivity, for, as has been said, it is acted
upon by a perfective and salutary passivity.

[A]. Again, intellect is acted upon by destructive passivity,
therefore that reply is false. The antecedent is proved, for when
our mind changes from error to knowledge, it is acted upon with
destructive passivity. It is inevitable that error is destroyed
when knowledge arrives in the soul. Likewise, it is inevitable that
vice is destroyed when virtue is admitted into the soul.

B. Intellect is always acted upon by destructive passivity of its
own qualities, but never with destructive passivity of its own
substance.

[A]. To understand is the operation of the intellect, therefore
intellect is an operative virtue. If it is operative it is active,

¹Ibid., 2.1.1103a.14-25.

²Aristotle On the Soul 3.5.430a.10-25.

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and therefore not passive. Every secondary act is an operation: to understand is a secondary act, therefore it is an operation. The major premise is proved, for the prime act is the soul, as is clear in the second [book] On the Soul;¹ the secondary act, the operation proceeding from the soul. Again, to affirm and to deny, to agree and disagree, to reason and to come to conclusions are actions and operations of the intellect; therefore intellect is an active virtue.

B. All these arguments prove the intellect to be an active virtue, nor is this to be denied, for the human soul does not only have the virtue of taking up the cognition and knowledge of the things that it recognizes, but also an effective virtue. But the intellect is called a passive virtue if it is compared with that which it understands, for it does not act on what it understands, but is acted on by it.

A. On what does the intellect act by understanding?

B. On itself, for it begets in itself cognition of the thing about which it thinks. It begets in itself knowledge of those statements that are proved by reasoning.

A. Is the intellect acted upon by everything that it understands?

B. Just so, for it takes up cognition of the thing that it understands. It cannot understand anything until cognition of it has been taken up.

A. Does intellect stand in relation to the intelligible as sense does to the sensible?

B. If "stand in relation" means to be related in every way, it is false; if to be related in some way, it is true. For just as sense cannot sense unless it has something sensible, so neither can the intellect understand unless it has something intelligible. Again, as a sense senses through appearances, that is, through likenesses, so the intellect understands through appearances, that is, likenesses. The eye does not see a thing except [one] of which it has the likeness in itself. Because of this a blind man cannot think of a color because he does not have a likeness of it. Again, just as sense is sometimes in actuality, sometimes in potentiality, so also [is] the intellect. Again, just as the appearances of sensible things are not innate in the sense, so neither are the appearances of intelligible things innate in the intellect. For the intellect, when it is united with the body, is like tabellae rasae ("small smoothed writing slates").

A. What is the difference between sense and intellect?

B. Whatever sense recognizes it recognizes by some part of the

¹Ibid., 2.1.412a.12-412b.10.
body, for it is an organic virtue. Again, sense is destroyed by sensible excellence, but intellect is not destroyed by intelligible excellence. Again, intellect can understand universally, for it can understand all men with one understanding; but sense senses specifically, for vision cannot see all colors with one seeing. Again, sense cannot turn itself upon itself, nor upon the appearance of a sensible thing, nor upon its own act; vision cannot see itself, nor its own vision, nor the appearance of the visible thing. Intellect, however, can turn itself upon itself, on its own intellect, and on the appearance of the intelligible thing. For intellect can recognize itself, and its own understanding, and the appearance of the intelligible thing.

A. From where is the appearance of the intelligible thing conceived.

B. From the phantasm, that is, the image, of the thing that is in the imagination.

A. From where does the imagination come?

B. From the appearance of the intelligible thing that is in the exterior sense, from which it follows that the appearances are threefold. Some of them are in the exterior senses and are called appearances of sensible things; others are in the imagination and are called images; others in the intellect, and they are called appearances of intelligible things.

A. What is the difference between images and the appearances of sensible things?

B. Through the appearances of sensible things are recognized things present, through images things absent.

A. What is the difference between images and the appearances of intelligible things?

B. An image does not represent universally, as [does] the appearance of an intelligible thing, for an image is in a part of a body, since the image is an organic virtue. On account of this it cannot represent universally.

A. Why is it called phantasma ("an image")?

B. ἡαντασια, which among the Greeks means to imagine: from that, phantasia means imagination, that is, the imaginative potentiality; phantasticus, imaginary; phantasma, the image of the thing that is in the imagination.

A. What is meant by universal things, what by individual things?

B. By universals is meant the whole multitude or universality of any things. By universal men we mean the whole multitude of men, that is, the whole human race. By individual things, however, is
meant any one part of universality, as, by individual men we mean either Peter or Paul.

A. What is to understand universally, what specifically?

B. To understand universally is to have in the mind a universal concept, that is, a cognition of some whole universality. [He] who thinks about universal men thinks universally.

A. What is to understand specifically?

B. It is to have in the mind a single concept, as, a thought about John is a single concept. It is necessary that a man who makes any pronouncement about universal men should be thinking about universal men, for thought precedes pronouncement. No one can make any pronouncement about anything about which he is not thinking, although he can think about something without a pronouncement. A man can have a simple thought about something without any affirmation or denial. On this account, simple thought about a thing is the prime operation of the intellect, whereas pronouncement, that is, affirmation or denial, [is] the second. Reason, however, [is] the third, for no one can reason except [the man] who makes a pronouncement, though a man can make a pronouncement who is not reasoning.

A. How is a universal concept classified?

B. A universal concept is divided into general, special, and transcendent concepts, as, a thought which is thought concerning universal men is a special concept; a thought which is thought about universal animals is a general concept; a thought which is thought about universal entities or things is a transcendent concept, for it transcends all general and special concepts.

A. Why is any vision or hearing or taste not general or special as thought [is]?

B. Because sense only recognizes specifically, but intellect universally.

A. Why is there no vision of vision, and no taste of taste, as there is thought of thought?

B. Because sight does not recognize its own vision, nor taste its own tasting, but intellect recognizes its own understanding; for intellect can turn itself from the thing about which it is thinking to its own thought, and make a judgment on its own thought, whether it is general or special.

A. What difference is there between physics and dialectic?

B. The physicist thinks about things and pronounces something about them, and on this account the thoughts of the physicist are thoughts of things. The dialectician, however, thinks about thoughts and pronounces about them, for he pronounces which thoughts are general,
which special, which transcendent, which singular; and on this account the thoughts of the dialectician are thoughts of thoughts. Thoughts about things are primary thoughts, or primary concepts of our mind; thoughts about thoughts, however, are secondary thoughts, or secondary concepts of our mind. Thoughts of things are called primary intentions, while thoughts of thoughts are secondary intentions. For this reason dialectic is said to be concerned with secondary intentions, the primary being adjoined, for the dialectician thinks about thoughts and concepts of things by means of thoughts of thoughts.

A. What is the difference between the pronouncements of the physicist and the dialectician?

B. What the physicist pronounces he pronounces about things; what the dialectician pronounces, however, he pronounces about thoughts. Hence, these are a physicist's pronouncements: every man is an animal; every animal has touch. But these are a dialectician's pronouncements: man is a species; animal is a genus. That animal is a genus is nothing other than that a thought which is thought concerning universal animals is a general thought, while that man is a species is nothing other than that a thought which is thought about universal man is a special thought. From that it follows that no animal except man can have dialectic, for no animal can make any pronouncements about thoughts and concepts except man alone.

A. How many interpretations does this statement have, [that] man is a universal thing.

B. Two. One is, a thought that is thought about universal men is a universal thought. The other is, the noun "man," by which is meant universal men, is a universal noun. And it is agreed among all philosophers that these interpretations are true. But according to some philosophers a third interpretation of it is [that] human nature is universal nature. It is not, however, agreed among all philosophers that this interpretation is true. Some affirm that natures are universals, some deny that they are. There is no one, however, who can deny that universal thoughts or universal nouns exist in nature.

A. Why are nouns called notes of thoughts?

B. Because [the man] who wishes to reveal his thoughts to anyone, and to make notes, has of necessity to use nouns. On this account nouns are called the notes of thoughts. And Aristotle realized this when he said in the first [book] of his "De Anima." "Those things, therefore, that are in the voice are the notes of those passivities that are in the soul"--where, by "passivities that are in the soul," he means thoughts.\footnote{Aristotle On Interpretation 1.16a.4-7.}
Because there are two sorts of thoughts of which the nouns are notes. Appellative nouns are notes of universal thoughts [and] proper nouns are notes of specific thoughts.

Why is logic said to be concerned with the operations of our intellect?

Because logic is either concerned with thoughts, when it deals with the classes and types that are the thoughts of our mind—for a genus is a general thought, a species a special [thought]; or concerned with statements, when it deals with affirmative or negative, universal and special, categoric and hypothetic statements; or concerned with reasoning, when it deals with syllogisms and enthymemem ("enthymeme"—a logical method using an incomplete syllogism). But because thought, statement, [and] reasoning are operations of our intellect, so logic is said to be concerned with the operations of our mind.

Is intellect susceptible of appearances?

It is, for just as matter stands in relation to corporeal forms, so intellect [stands] to incorporeal. Matter is susceptible of corporeal forms, so intellect is susceptible of incorporeal forms, for of such a kind are the appearances of intelligible things. On this account intellect is said to be in potentiality to those forms that are to be taken up, just as matter is in potentiality to corporeal forms that are to be taken up. And just as no form pertains to the substance of matter, so no substantive appearance pertains to the intellect.

Is the intellect of necessity unmixed, that is, not mixed, with the body?

It is, for intellect understands all things, and for that reason it is not a body, nor a virtue in a body. The intellect is not long, broad, [or] thick like the corporeal virtues; for the intellect recognizes all things, whereas corporeal virtue cannot recognize all things. Again, if intellect were a corporeal virtue it would not be denuded of sensible qualities, nor could it recognize them, for appearing internally prohibits the external.

Is intellect laid bare in respect of everything that it understands?

The intellect is laid bare in respect of everything that it understands by direct thought, but not in respect of that which it understands by reflex thought; for intellect, by reflex thought, understands itself and the appearances that it has in itself, and it has both its own operations and knowledges, by which it is not laid bare.

What is direct thought, what reflex?

Direct thought is thought of those things that are recognized by

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some sense before they are recognized by the intellect. Of this
type is thought of corporeal things that are known by their images.
Reflex thought is thought by which the intellect recognizes itself,
or the things that it has in itself.

A. Can the intellect understand all things?

B. It can, for it can state something about all things, so it can
understand all things. Intellect pronounces something about no
thing that it does not understand, and since the intellect can
understand all things it is inevitable that it is a more excellent
and more sublime virtue than any corporeal virtue may be.

A. Did Anaxagorus [ca. 500-ca. 428 B.C.] realize the truth about
the intellect? He says that intellect is unmixed, so that it may
command all things.¹

B. If Anaxagorus is speaking of divine intellect he speaks the
truth, for that commands all things. The commands of divine intel­
lect make whatever things are in the world.

A. Is intellect the substantial form of man?

B. It is, for the human intellect is the human soul, that is, the
form of man; for it animates the body of a man as the soul of a dumb
animal animates its body.

A. Why is the human soul called the form of man?

B. Because it allows man to be. As soon as a human soul begins to
animate and give life to its body, that body begins to be. That
thing which, coming to matter, allows the composite substance to be,
is called its form.

A. What is the difference between matter and form?

B. Matter is the substance susceptible of forms, and it does not
have any form that pertains to substance; and on account of this it
is called entity in pure potentiality because it is capable of all
forms. Form, however, is the perfection of matter, and on this
account form is called ἔντελεσθαι by the Greeks, by which name is
meant perfection and completion, for ἔντελεσθαι means perfect and
complete.

A. What is the difference between substantial and accidental form?

B. Substantial form pertains to the substance of the thing of which
it is the form, for it is a second part of that of which it is the
form. Accidental form, however, happens to that of which it is the
form; and on this account no thing can lose its substantial form

¹See Aristotle On the Soul 1.2.405a.15-18, where he comments
on the views of Anaxagorus.
without its own destruction, but some things can lose accidental forms without their own destruction.

A. Demonstrate that the human soul is the form of the body.

B. The human soul is the actuality of the body, since every soul is an actuality; but actuality and form are the same thing, therefore the human soul is form. Again, man differs in species from dumb animals in that he has a rational soul that dumb animals lack: but that thing by which any composite substance differs in kind from other substances is its form, therefore the rational soul is the form of man. Again, if the rational soul were not the form of man, man would not excel the dumb beasts, for dumb beasts are given life by the sensual soul because they lack a rational soul. If man is given life only by the sensual soul then dumb animals are to be considered the equal of man. Again, human happiness is constituted in the operation of the rational soul; therefore it must be that the rational soul pertains to the substance of man, for human happiness does not consist of that which is alien to man's substance.

A. Is the intellectual soul a substantial form inherent in the body?

B. There have been three opinions about the human soul: one of Alexander [of Aphrodisias (fl. A.D. 198-211)] the commentator, who said that the rational human soul is a substantial form, and is inherent in the human body, animates it, and gives it life, and is derived from the potentiality of matter, that is, begotten of matter and nature. He said that the human soul is engendered by nature, not created by God, and that it is corruptible and corrupted at man's death, and that it is extended and divisible just as is the soul of a tree or a dumb animal. The opinion of Averroes [1126-98] the commentator was different. He said that the human soul is not divisible, not inherent in the body, but only assistant to man; and he said that the whole human race has one intellect, and that all men understand with one intellect. Again, the commentator Averroes said that a man has two souls, one inherent in the body, and that he called the cogitative. The other, he said, assists in the body and is not inherent, and that he called the intellectual.1 (A). These two opinions erred from the truth. The third is the true opinion, which claims that the human intellect is a substantial form of man,  

inherent in man, not merely assistant in him, indivisible and inex-
tensive, but entirely whole and in every part of him. This opinion
is true because it agrees with our faith.

A. What is it to have been educed from the potentiality of matter?

B. It is that form has been generated from matter and given to
matter by nature.

A. Again, the most excellent thing that is in a man is accident,
therefore the intellect is not a substantial form. The antecedent
is proved because the most excellent thing that is in a man is
happiness, as Aristotle says in the first [book] of Ethics;\(^1\) but
happiness is an accident.

B. It must be said that this statement has two meanings. One is,
the most excellent thing that is in man is an accident, that is, the
most excellent substance that is in man is an accident, and in that
sense it is false. The other is that the most excellent thing that
is in man etc., that is, the most excellent operation that is in man
is an accident, and in that sense it is true, for happiness is the
most excellent operation.

A. Is there one intellect in all men?

B. There is not, for if there were one intellect in all men then
opposing things would be in the same thing, since different men
often have opposing opinions that would of necessity be in one
intellect if there were one intellect belonging to all men. Again,
ignorance and knowledge of the same truth would be in the same
thing, for what one man knows another is ignorant of. Again, jus­
tice and injustice would be in the same thing, for virtues and vices
are in the rational soul. But if there is one rational soul belong­
ing to all men virtue and vice would therefore be in the same thing.

A. Is knowledge opposed to knowledge?

B. It is not, for all knowledge is of true things. Assents to true
things are not in opposition among themselves, for every truth is in
accord with truth.

A. Why is virtue opposed to vice?

B. Because when a man chooses what is right he has virtue in him,
but when he chooses what is evil he has vice in him. But since a
man cannot at the same time choose what is right and what is evil,
virtue is therefore opposed to vice.

A. Why does knowledge not drive knowledge, nor virtue virtue, out
of the human mind?

\(^1\)Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* 1.4.1095a.15-20, 1099a.
20-30.
B. Because knowledge is not opposed to knowledge, nor virtue to virtue.

A. Was the opinion of Averroes concerning the intellect pious or impious?

B. Impious, since he took their rewards from the just and their punishments from the wicked; for he said that men die just like animals, and that wicked men will not pay the penalty for their crimes after this life, nor good men receive rewards for their right-doing. Likewise the opinion of Alexander savors of impiety, since it too takes away the rewards of the good and the punishments of the wicked, for Alexander says that souls die with bodies.

A. Why did the commentator Averroes concede that there is one soul belonging to all men?

B. If he had not conceded that he would have been forced to concede an infinite multitude of souls, since he denied that the human race had a beginning. If, therefore, he had granted to each [person] his own soul, rational, incorruptible, and immortal, he would have been forced to concede that there was an infinite number of rational souls in nature. He conceded that rational souls are mortal and corruptible; but Christians, because they believe that the human race had a beginning and that the generation of men will at some time cease, are not forced to say that there is one soul for all men, nor that the human soul is mortal.

A. Are the differences that exist between sense and intellect true?

B. They are. There are five differences. The first is [that] sense is an organic virtue, intellect is not; for sense senses with some part of the body, but intellect understands with no part of the body [and] therefore is not an organic virtue. The reasoning of Aristotle, by which he proves that intellect is not an organic virtue, is this: if intellect were an organic virtue it would be capable of heat and the other sensible qualities just like its organ, for every organ of the soul has in it sensible qualities. But since intellect is indeed not capable of such qualities, it is therefore not an organic virtue.1 Second, intellect is, however, a locus of intelligible appearances, because it conserves them; but sense is not a locus of sensible appearances, for an exterior sense does not conserve sensible appearances. The third difference is [that] sense is destroyed by sensible excellence; for we find that the eye is destroyed by visible excellence, since by visible excellence sight is rendered less apt for seeing a less visible thing. Intellect, however, is not destroyed by intelligible excellence. The fourth difference [is that] in the intellect an intellectual habit is developed, but in the sense a sensual habit is not developed. The fifth difference [is that] sense cannot sense itself; but intellect can understand itself, since it can express some opinion

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1Aristotle On the Soul 3.4.429a.20-30.
about itself. It is therefore able to understand itself.

A. Is the intellectual soul more excellent than the sensual one account of the fact that it does not use an organ in its operations?

B. It is, for to the extent that a craftsman requires fewer things in his work, to that extent he is more excellent.

A. What is the difference between potentiality and habit?

B. Potentiality makes the soul able to operate, but habit makes it operate easily and without effort, and makes it ready and willing to operate. For we find that when the operations are coming to an end by which the habit has been developed there remains in the soul a certain inclination and readiness for similar operations, just as by frequent playing of a lute a man is made willing and apt to play the lute easily.

A. Why is habit not developed in a sense as in the intellect?

B. Because a sense can easily operate without habit, and, on this account, habit is developed in the intellect [and] not in a sense.

A. Again, the intellectual soul is not a part of man, therefore it is not a form. The antecedent is proved, for every part of a connected body is divisible, but the human soul is not divisible, therefore it is not part of a connected body of such a sort as man is. The major [premise] is proved, for a connected body is divisible into bits still divisible, since it is not made up of indivisible parts.

B. Every part of the totality of a connected body, that is, of length, breadth, and thickness, is divisible. But it is not necessary for every substantial part of a connected body to be divisible. The soul is a substantial or essential part of a connected body.

A. In how many ways is a connected thing divided?

B. In two ways: by one way into parts of the totality; by the other way into parts of the same proportion, which are called proportional parts. When the connected thing is divided into parts of the same quantity it is divided into finite parts, since it may be divided either into two halves or into three thirds or into four quarters. Its parts are always finite in number. When, however, it is divided into parts of the same proportion it is divided into parts infinite in number and multitude, for it is not possible to arrive at the smallest proportional part of a connected body.

A. Why is it not possible to arrive at the smallest proportional part of a connected body?

B. Because if one were to arrive at the smallest [proportional part] it would be indivisible, and it would be the ultimate part of...
it. But if a connected thing has an ultimate [part], it has a pen-
ultimate, and that consists of two indivisibles since it is twice
the ultimate; but that which is the antepenultimate, since it is
twice the other, will consist of four indivisibles. And so the
whole connected thing consists of indivisibles, which is impossible.
Therefore no part of a connected thing is the smallest proportional
[part].

A. Again, man dies and is corrupted just like the other animals,
therefore he is engendered just like other animals. But other
animals are engendered when a soul is engendered in matter, there-
fore a man also is engendered when the human soul is drawn out of
matter. Therefore the human soul [is] able to be engendered and
able to be destroyed.

B. One must reply that man does not die just like the other ani-
mals, for the souls of other animals perish in death, but not the
human soul.

A. Again, man engenders man, so he engenders either the matter of
man or the form: not matter, because that is unable to be engen-
dered, nor form, since that is created; therefore man does not
engender man.

B. One must reply that man is said to engender man because he pre-
pares a body and provides it with organs to receive the rational
soul, for the fetus which is in its mother's womb is prepared and
given shape so that it may be fit to receive the rational soul from
God.

A. Again, the intellect is separate from the body, therefore it is
not the form of the body. The antecedent is obvious because of
not exist without a body, but this is separate"—where the pronoun
"this" refers to the intellect.¹

B. One must reply that the intellect is said to be separate, not
from the body, but from a bodily organ, since no organ is employed
in understanding.

A. Again, God shaped the body of the first people as is evident in
Genesis: "God formed man out of the dust of the earth and breathed
into his face the breath of life" [Gen 2:7]. Therefore nature does
not form the human body of the rest of mankind since the rest of
mankind is not of another species than Adam was.

[+B]. Let the answer be that although God formed the bodies of the
first people, after that he entrusted the formation of the bodies of
the rest of mankind to nature, although he reserved to Himself the
creation of the soul.

¹Ibid., 3.4.429b.3-4.
A. Again, if the rational soul is indivisible it follows that man is both a divisible substance and an indivisible substance, since man is an indivisible soul and a divisible body. Therefore man is both divisible and indivisible.

B. Let the answer be, is that speaking collectively or not collectively?

A. Is the soul an integral part?

B. It can be said that it is, for it is part of a complete man. Integral, when it is possessive, means that which pertains to any complete thing. The soul is an essential part and a substantial part.

A. Again, intellect is not substance, therefore it is not a substantial form. The antecedent is obvious, since whatever is present to an entity in actuality is an accidental form. Intellect is of this kind. The major premise is clear, since there is this difference between substantial and accidental form, that the substantial is present to the entity in potentiality, the accident to the entity in actuality. The minor premise is proved because it is present to matter, which is the entity in actuality, when it is in nature. Again, it is present to the body with its organs, for a soul cannot be received into a body not having organs.

[B's response omitted.]

A. How many are the lines of magnitude?

B. Three: longitude, latitude, and thickness. And they are called dimensions, by which every body may be measured, either by the measure of longitude, or latitude, or thickness.

A. Does every magnitude consist of divisibles?

B. It does. Longitude consists of lengths, latitude of widths, thickness of thicknesses.

A. Is intellect capable of existing in pure potentiality?

B. The commentator Averroes says that the human soul consists of two parts, of which only one receives cognizances of things, whereas the other engenders them. It causes [them] in the receiving part. The part receiving cognizance of things he called possible intellect; the part that engenders them in the receiving part he called active intellect. He likened possible intellect to the prime matter of all bodies, for just as that takes up all material forms, the possible intellect takes up cognizance of all things. And for this reason he said that the possible intellect is substance in potentiality, like prime matter.¹ <B>. This opinion is false, for it is

¹Averroes Epitome of Parva Naturalia p. 46, and Averroes'
not consonant with faith. Faith does not hold that the human soul consists of parts, but affirms that it is indivisible. Nor is it probable, since one and the same soul can engender cognizance of things in itself, and take up those same things. It is not necessary to hold that the soul has two different parts when it is enough for it to have two potentialities, one susceptible of cognizance, the other generative. Again, it is agreed among philosophers that the soul takes up cognizances of things recognized by it; it is agreed that cognizance of things is engendered, and because of this it is inevitable that there is something that engenders them in the soul. If, however, an indivisible soul can take up cognizance of things in itself and engender them, it is not necessary for the soul to consist of two parts of which one may take up and the other engender cognizances of things, since nature does not permit the superfluous. Again, if it can be that some thing can engender and bring about another thing in itself, it is not necessary for the human soul to consist of two parts. It can in fact be that some thing can engender and bring about another [thing in itself], so it is not necessary for the soul to consist of two parts. For the will engenders choice in itself, since the will does not only take up choice. Because choice is sin if wicked, while sin is action, it is necessary to say either that the will engenders choice in itself, or that the will is twofold, engendering and taking up. Thus the soul will consist of four parts. Hot water engenders coldness in itself. Thus, one must reply in another fashion to the question and one must say that the possible intellect is not an entity in pure potentiality, for every soul [is] actuality, since the soul is defined by its actuality. But actuality is not an entity in potentiality. Again, no substantial form is an entity in potentiality; but intellect is the substantial form of man, for man is said to be animated by the intellective soul that is in him as a substantial form. Nothing is said to be animated that has a soul inherent in itself, for animated is translated in Greek ἐννοούσα, which is derived from ἐν, which is "in," and νοός, "soul:" as it were, "having a soul in oneself." Therefore every animated thing has a soul in itself. An inanimate thing, however, is called ὄνοια: as it were, "without a soul."

[A]. Again, no entity in potentiality has operation: the intellect has operation, therefore it is not an entity in potentiality. The major premise is proved because prime matter performs nothing. The minor is proved because the intellect thinks, makes statements, etc., [and] therefore has operations.

B. The intellect is pure potentiality before understanding, that is, before it understands it has no cognizance of the appearances of a thing.

A. Again, a form drawn from the potentiality of matter is inherent in the body: the intellect is not a form drawn from the potentiality of matter, therefore there is not a form inherent in the body.

Commentary on Plato's Republic, 2.9.2.
[+B]. The conclusion must be denied because the minor proposition is negative in the first figure, so the conclusion is not valid.

B. Again, every form inherent in the body is drawn from the potentiality of matter, therefore there is not a form inherent in the body.

[+B]. The major premise is false, since God can cause a form created of itself to inhere in the body and give the body life.

A. Again, if the intellect is inherent in the body, either it is inherent in every part of the body, or inherent in one [part] and not in another. If it is inherent in one [part] and not inherent in another, it is inevitable that that part of the body in which the human soul is not inherent is inanimate, for that thing is inanimate in which there is no soul. That is false since the whole of a man is animate. If, however, it is inherent in every part it follows that it is distant from itself by eight or nine or ten feet, for in a giant that is of the length of twenty feet the soul of the head is twenty feet away from the soul of the feet, which is unbelievable, for it does not seem possible that any thing should be distant from itself. Again, if the intellect is in the foot it follows that the foot is the man, when it has intellect. Again, it follows that the foot understands, for that which has intellect understands. Again, it follows that the human soul passes from the subject, for the soul that is in an infant can pass into those parts of the infant that come to the infant through increase of size; and the same soul can withdraw from those parts that are removed from a man by amputation. Therefore it passes from subject to subject.

B. One must respond that it is truly possible that the soul that has been created by God should pass from subject to subject. But the soul engendered by nature is not able to pass from subject to subject.

A. Does the soul of a tree pass from subject to subject when the tree develops from the sapling?

B. It does not, for the sapling that increases in body also increases in soul, since as much of the body of the sapling increases as of its soul. It is not so in respect of the human soul, for the human soul is not enlarged by the enlargement of the body, since the human soul is an indivisible thing that does not consist of parts, for which reason it cannot in any way be enlarged.

A. Again, this soul, the determinate soul of the hand, moves; and this soul, the determinate soul of the foot, does not move. Therefore that which moves does not move. And the opposites are similarly true: this hand moves, therefore each part of it moves, soul and body; this hand does not move, therefore each part of it does not move, neither soul nor body.

B. Let a reply be given in one way, that soul is a name applied to something, and therefore for this soul to move is for this thing
animating this substance to move, and the same thing animating another substance not to move; just as the same man as a father is more honorable than his son, and the same man as a senator is less than his son as emperor, and not greater than he. If it be said, "this thing moves," where there is no connotative noun, one must say that the human soul is well called the image of the Trinity. For just as the Father is the same thing as the Son is, and is not begotten like the Son; and just as the Son is the same thing as the Father, and is not unbegotten like the Father; and just as the Holy Spirit is the same thing as the Father and the Son, and is not improceeding like the Father nor begotten like the Son; so the human soul that is in the head is the same thing as the human soul that is in the foot, and the human soul of the foot is the same thing as the human soul of the head. But the soul of the head moves with the head, for the head does not move without the soul, and the soul of the foot moves with the foot, for the foot does not move without the soul.

A. Do the right foot of a man and the left differ as much as the right foot of a horse and the left?

B. No, for the right foot of a man differs from the left only in respect of matter, not in respect of form, since one and the same soul animates each foot. The right foot of a horse, however, differs from the left in respect of matter and form, since one part of the soul animates the right foot, another the left.

A. How many differences are there in number?

B. Two: some that have no part in common, as John and Peter; [and] some that have a part in common, as John's right foot and left foot.

A. Is a man's hand consubstantial with his foot?

B. It is in part. \(<A>\). The same soul pertains to the substance of both hand and foot. In part, however, it is not consubstantial, the substance of the hand [being] other than the substance of the foot. Two men are not consubstantial, either in respect of matter or of soul, for they have both different souls and different bodies.

A. How many interpretations has this proposition, [that] the soul is the locus of appearances?

B. Two. In its proper interpretation it is false, for locus is a concave surface of a body containing an ambient contained body--but the soul is not the surface [of a body]. In its borrowed meaning it is true, since the soul is the receptacle of all things like a locus, but just as a subject.

A. Is it true that the intellect becomes individual things, as Aristotle says?

B. It is true in a borrowed sense, not in its proper [one]; for the
intellect can take up cognizances of things, and on that account Aristotle says that it becomes individual things.1

A. How do particulars differ from universals?

B. By universals is understood the multitude, and by particulars are understood the parts of the multitude. Our intellect understands both universally and particularly, therefore it is both universal and particular; as, when it understands that every man is an animal, and when it understands that Peter is an animal.

A. Is the human intellect immortal?

B. To that question different answers must be given—according to faith and truth, according to the opinion of Averroes, according to the opinion of Alexander, [and] according to the opinion of Pythagoras. According to faith and truth, one must say that the human soul will exist forever, and will never perish or come to an end. But it did not always exist, but began to exist, not by generation, but by creation. And because the human soul was created by God out of nothing it can be reduced by the same into nothing, although it is never to be reduced into nothing because God wills that the rational soul be preserved forever, so that after this life it may either pay the penalty for its sins or receive the rewards of its right actions, so that no evil should remain unpunished nor good unrewarded. And since the rational soul did not begin to be by generation, it will not be able to cease to be by corruption. On account of this the death of a man is not the destruction of his soul but its separation from the body. It is clear, therefore, that, according to truth, no rational soul is either engendered or capable of generation, none either corrupted or capable of corruption, because it is not of the number of those forms that have been drawn from the potentiality of matter and that have been stretched out according to the dimensions of the bodies in which they exist. According to the opinion of Averroes one must say that the soul has always existed and will always exist, and that there is one intellectual soul by number for all men.2 According to the opinion of Alexander one must say that the human soul is engendered in the engendering of a man and destroyed in his corruption.3 According to the opinion of Pythagoras one must say that it is neither engendered nor corrupted, but transmigrates from the body of a dying man into the body of a baby beginning to live.4 These three opinions, because they stand opposed to faith, stand opposed to truth, and therefore are to be refuted and rejected as false and impious.

1Aristotle On the Soul 3.4.429b.29-430a.20.

2See above, p. 468, n. 1.

3Ibid.

4See Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 8.4-5.
A. Can it be proved that the rational soul is immortal?

B. It cannot, for the rational soul is not immortal of its own nature, but by the will and kindness of God. No creature [is eternal] of its own nature, for to be eternal by nature is a property only of immortal God. Any creature that will exist for ever will exist for ever because God will preserve it for ever, and will not allow it to be reduced to nothing. For this reason it is only to be held on faith that the rational soul is immortal, for it cannot be proved that God will preserve any creature for ever, since He does not preserve any creature from necessity, but of his free will. Therefore all reasoning that proves that the rational soul is immortal has been invented for the purpose of showing that it is probable and likely that the human soul is [immortal], but not inevitable.

A. Is this argument a proof? Those things that are known by the soul are immortal, therefore the soul is immortal. The antecedent is proved because every science is of immortalities, that is, of propositions of immortal truth; as, this is a proposition of immortal truth, [that] a line drawn from any part of the circumference through the center of a circle to the opposite part is greater than all that are not drawn through the center. Likewise this, [that] every straight line is shorter than a curved one conterminous with it in any part.

B. It is not a proof, for it is not necessary for the soul to be immortal because it knows immortalities. But it is a likely and probable thing that it is immortal because it has knowledge of immortalities, for it is not likely that that soul will perish to which has been given by God the potentiality of knowing those things that are immortal.

A. Again, if the intellect is immortal, man is immortal: but man is not immortal, therefore the intellect is not immortal. The antecedent is proved because, if the intellect is immortal, the form of man is immortal. However, the substance whose form is immortal is incorruptible, for it is not corrupted in respect of matter, since that is incorruptible, nor in respect of form, since immortal form cannot be corrupted.

B. Let the answer be that substances whose forms and matters are immortal are said to be corrupted by the separation of form from matter. For when the human soul is separated from the body the man is corrupted, since man is a substance composed of a body and a rational soul animating that same body. But when the soul has been separated from the body it does not animate [it], therefore the separation causes the man to be corrupted. And therefore it is not inevitable that a man is immortal, even if the soul is immortal, if he is not animated perpetually.

A. Will man be immortal after the resurrection?

B. He will be, for after the resurrection the human soul will perpetually animate its body and never be separated from it.
A. Again, anything that consists of unengendered parts is unengendered: man consists of unengendered parts, therefore man is unengendered. The major [premise] is obvious, because the whole [is] nothing but its parts. If therefore its parts are unengendered, the whole is unengendered. The minor is proved because neither the matter of man nor his soul is engendered.

B. Let the answer be that the minor [premise] is false because it is excessively universal. It can, however, be made true thus: anything that consists of unengendered parts, of which one is not prepared by nature for the reception of the other, is unengendered. But this is not applicable to man, for the matter of man is prepared by nature for the reception of form. Man is said to be engendered at the moment when his body begins to be animated with a human soul, not when his soul is engendered, because that is not able to be engendered, as it is incorruptible.

A. Why are Adam and Eve not said to have been engendered?

B. Nature did not prepare their body for the reception of the soul, but God, the author of nature, by His command ordered their bodies to be fit for the reception of the soul.

A. Is the engendering of man like the engendering of dumb animals?

B. It is partly similar, partly different; for just as nature prepares the body of a dumb animal and gives it organs for the reception of the soul, so also it prepares the human body. [It is] dissimilar, however, because nature engenders the soul of the dumb animal in the prepared body, but does not engender the human soul, for that is more worthy and more excellent.

A. Again, the rational soul is immortal. The multitude of rational souls is infinite in actuality, for if the world has lasted for ever, infinite men have preceded us, [and], if their souls are immortal, it is inevitable that the multitude of souls is infinite in actuality. But this is not possible, since no multitude is infinite except the multitude of proportional parts of a continuum. Therefore the soul is not immortal.

B. Let the answer be [that] the first conclusion is to be denied, since we who say that the soul is immortal deny that infinite men have preceded us.

[+A]. Again, if the human soul is immortal the human soul is without occupation after death, which is untrue, for nothing is by nature without occupation. The conclusion is proved, for the human soul does not animate and give life to the body when it has been separated from it; nor does it sense, because it cannot sense unless it uses the members of the body; nor understand, which cannot happen when the soul has been separated from the body.

B. The soul separated from the body understands without consideration of appearances, and is therefore not without occupation.
A. Is this argumentation good? These two things are immortal: these two things are a man, therefore a man is immortal. The major premise is true, matter and form proving it. The minor is true, for the whole is nothing but its parts.

B. No, for it does not draw an accurate conclusion, since immortal is plural in the major premise and requires to be the same in the conclusion. It should therefore be concluded thus. These two things are immortal: these two things are a man; therefore a man is some immortal things, or, a man is two immortal things.

A. Is this argumentation good? This twofold being is immortal: this twofold being is a man, therefore a man is immortal. The conclusion is proved because an expository syllogism in the third figure is a valid conclusion. The major premise is true, the soul and the body proving it; the minor is true because the whole is its parts.

B. It is not good, for immortal is an adjective, and in the major premise is applied to the substantive, "twofold being," so that the subject of the major premise is "an immortal twofold being." In the conclusion, however, it is applied to this substantive, so that "an immortal man" is made the subject of the conclusion; and, therefore, one thing is the subject of the major premise, another thing the subject of the conclusion. For this reason it must be brought to a conclusion thus. This twofold being is immortal: this twofold being is a man, therefore man is an immortal twofold being.

A. Why is a twofold being consisting of soul and body conceded to be immortal and man is not?

B. Because soul and body are a twofold being whether the soul be inherent in the body or separated from it, but soul and body are not a man unless the soul is inherent in the body.

A. Is the intellect of a man, lacking an appearance and image of a thing about which he could think, in actuality or in potentiality?

B. In potentiality, because it is able to take it up. And for this reason Aristotle says that the soul is not an appearance, but potentiality in actuality.

A. Is the intellect of a man, having the appearance of a thinkable thing in him, in actuality or in potentiality?

B. In actuality and in potentiality. In actuality because it has the image of the thinkable thing in itself; in potentiality because it can think about the thing whose image it has in itself whenever it wishes.

A. Is the intellect of an ignorant man, who has no knowledge of

1Aristotle On the Soul 3.8.43b.20-30.
making propositions and proofs concerning a knowable thing, in actuality or in potentiality?

B. In potentiality, because it is able to acquire knowledge of a thing unknown to it.

A. Is the intellect of one who knows how to make true propositions and proofs concerning anything in actuality or in potentiality?

B. In actuality and in potentiality. In actuality because it has knowledge concerning the thing about which it can make true propositions and proofs; in potentiality because it can consider whenever it wishes, and use its knowledge in proposing those truths that it knows and that it can prove. For this reason Aristotle says that it can operate of itself, from which it is obvious that the same intellect can be in prime actuality and in potentiality to a secondary actuality.¹

A. Why does Aristotle say that the soul is in potentiality before discovery and learning?

B. Because men acquire knowledge in two ways, some by discovering, others by learning. But the soul that has neither discovered nor learned is in potentiality.² That which has discovered or learned is in actuality.

A. Did the discoverers of knowledge cause to be true those propositions that they had discovered?

B. No, but only observed that they are true. This proposition, [that] every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, does not owe to the mathematician [the fact] that it is true, but it does owe to the mathematician [the fact] that it has been observed to be true.

A. Do the discoverers of knowledge learn those things that they observe to be true?

B. They do learn, if to learn is taken generally.

A. Do masters who teach their listeners make true those things that they teach?

B. Not at all. All knowledge that a man has, he has achieved either by discovery or by learning.

A. To what are due the propositions that are true?

B. To things. For propositions are true to the extent that things

¹Ibid., 2.5.417a.20-417b.17.

²Ibid., 3.4.429b.5-10.
are such as they are stated to be by the propositions.

A. Why is a statement stating man to be an animal true?

B. Because man is what this statement makes him to be.

A. Does a statement owe to the human mind [the fact] that it is true?

B. It does, for it owes to the human mind [the fact] that it exists in nature, so it also owes to it [the fact] that it is true; for if it were not true it would not exist in nature.

A. To what does this statement, [that] a chimaera is not a goat-stag, owe [the fact] that it is true?

B. To things, for the head of a maiden, the tail of a serpent, [and] the chest of a lion are not a goat and a stag.

A. To what does this statement, [that] nothing is nothing, owe [the fact] that it is true?

B. To every thing, for it means that every thing is something. It owes to me [the fact] that it is true, because it means that I am something. It owes to my book [the fact] that it is true, because it means that my book is something.

A. To what does this statement, [that] there is no vacuum, owe [the fact] that it is true?

B. To every place, for it means that every place is filled.

A. To what does this statement, [that] no body is infinite, owe [the fact] that it is true?

B. To every body, for it means that every body is finite.

A. To what does this statement, [that] the chimaera does not exist, owe [the fact] that it is true?

B. To the head of a maiden, the body of a lion, [and] the tail of a serpent, for these three things cannot exist together in one animal.

A. Again, the mind is not the cause of all statements; therefore, just as statements owe to the soul [the fact] that they exist, so also they owe to the soul [the fact] that they are true.

[+B]. Against this it is argued that God is the maker of all the angels, and yet the bad angels do not owe to God [the fact] that they are bad.

A. To what does this statement owe [the fact] that it is true: Adam was, Antichrist will be?
B. To the thing that either has been in time or will be; thus it owes it both to the thing and the time.

One should not here pass over certain comparisons between the senses and the intellect that Aristotle puts forward. Firstly, there is [the fact] that just as sense returns to actuality from the sensible thing presented to it, so [does] the intellect from the intelligible thing, or from the likeness or object. Secondly, there is [the fact] that both the sense and the intellect are in some way acted upon by the object, but not with a passivity either destructive or generative of substance. The third is that the prime actuality of each is simple, that is, without comprehension, and neither affirmative nor negative. The fourth is that each, claiming in advance that a thing is either pleasing or grievous, moves the appetite to seek it out or to avoid it. The fifth is that in each there is an appetite with judgment, mediating, namely, in respect of good and evil, though in different ways, since sense looks only at the present but intellect to the future. Thus it sometimes dismisses what is presently pleasing out of consideration of future sorrow. The sixth is that in them the appetite that is pursuant and [the appetitive] that is fugitive do not differ in reality from one another either by sense or by intellect, but by reason. The seventh [is] that images are of the intellect as sensible things are of the sense, so that just as sense does not sense or move without a sensible thing, so [neither does] the intellect without images. The eighth is that, just as an object engenders an appearance in the exterior sense [and] later in the common sense, which discerns the different sensible things, and thus is in some way one and in some way plural, so different likenesses move the same existing intellect. Ninth [is] that images of the intellect as sensible things are of the sense, so that just as sense does not sense or move without a sensible thing, so [neither does] the intellect without images. The sixth is that in them the appetite that is pursuant and [the appetitive] that is fugitive do not differ in reality from one another either by sense or by intellect, but by reason. The seventh [is] that images are of the intellect as sensible things are of the sense, so that just as sense does not sense or move without a sensible thing, so [neither does] the intellect without images. The eighth is that, just as an object engenders an appearance in the exterior sense [and] later in the common sense, which discerns the different sensible things, and thus is in some way one and in some way plural, so different likenesses move the same existing intellect. Ninth [is] that in the sense, if there is a judgment that this thing is either good or bad, the appetite moves either to pursuance or avoidance. So through reasoning about likeness, if the intellect judges a thing either good or bad, the intellectual appetitive moves either to pursuance or avoidance. But there is this difference in that the sensitive appetite moves of its nature, but the appetite of the intellect [moves] freely. Tenth [is] that in each it happens that both truth and falsehood are composed or split up with regard to either good or evil. But there is a difference between the simply good and the apparent good, as a result of which what is presently pleasing, though great evil follow it, appears to the sense to be good; and that [which] is simply good is apparent to the intellect, looking not only to present pleasure but to the future. The eleventh is that sense does not sense in the abstract, but the intellect understands in the abstract. The sense in seeing curved or white does not differentiate between the subject and the curvedness or the whiteness. The intellect does differentiate between them, understanding the one from the other in the abstract. The sense does not even abstract from particulars, but the intellect does this by understanding universally. The twelfth is that the intellect in actuality, that is, the active mind, is the same as the intellect and the understanding. Not so, however, with the sense. This is to be understood in respect of the prime active mind, which is the divine intellect.
A second part, concerning the potentiality of the rational soul. But let us come to the potentialities of the rational soul that are generally two, namely, cognizant and motive, which we call intellect and volition. For inasmuch as the potentiality is cognizant, it is called intellect, but inasmuch as the potentiality is motive, it is called volition or will. Hence, although different names are used in respect of the soul—as, we call what is the intellect itself reason, mind, memory, will, [and] free choice—nevertheless these names do not speak a difference in the essence of the soul, but differ in classification. Thus, it is called intellect inasmuch as it apprehends, reason inasmuch as it discerns, mind inasmuch as it investigates, memory inasmuch as it preserves, will inasmuch as it has appetite, [and] free choice inasmuch as it makes decisions. All these names are reduced to two general actualities, namely of cognizance and of volition, from which the two potentialities take their names, that is, intellective and volitional, with which these words are concerned. And first one must deal with the intellective.

A third part, concerning the active and the potential intellect. The intellect, then, is divided, according to Aristotle, into the active intellect and the possible or potential intellect. The active intellect is the active power of understanding. But the potential intellect is a passive power, not destroyed by passivity but made perfect, namely, by receiving into itself understanding from the active intellect. About this same active intellect there is a twofold opinion. For some men say that it is itself the divine intellect; others say that it is the same in respect of essence as the potential intellect, but it is called potential inasmuch as it is receptive, active inasmuch as it is active in its intellectual operation. And in the latter sense it is said [to be] nobler than the potential intellect. The second opinion is true, but the first is not denied, because we do not deny that the divine intellect acts on our understanding. Rather, it is necessary to concur principally with that very thing, since in every action it is necessary for there to be something active more noble than the thing acted upon.1

A. Are there two potentialities in the human soul; a potentiality of taking into it cognizances of things, and a potentiality of carrying them out?

B. There are. Hence Aristotle: "For in every nature in which there is any thing that can become all things, it is inevitable that there is something that can do all things."2 That which can become all things is the potential intellect [and that] which can do all things is the active intellect.

1In the preceding three paragraphs Hegius has presented summaries of ideas taken from Aristotle, particularly, though not exclusively, from his treatises entitled On the Soul and the Nicomachean Ethics.

A. Why is it inevitable that there is something that can do all things if there is something that can become all things?

B. Because it is inevitable that every passive potentiality has an active potentiality corresponding to and equal with it.

A. Are these two sayings proper, that the active intellect can do all things, [and] the potential intellect can become all things?

B. They are not, and therefore they are not true in their proper sense, but in a borrowed [one]. That the intellect can become all things means [that] the intellect can take on cognizances of all things; that the intellect can do all things is that the intellect can bring about cognizances of all things.

A. Why is the intellect called potential?

B. Because just as matter is called entity in potentiality for the reason that it can take up all forms, so that intellect is called potential which can take up either cognizances or thoughts of all things.

A. Is this argument good? As matter is to forms, so the intellect [is] to the cognizances of things: but matter does not cause the forms that it takes up, therefore intellect does not cause the cognizances of things.

B. The major [premise] is in no way true, for intellect is in no way like matter, since matter has only passive potentiality and for this reason is called an entity in pure potentiality. The intellect, however, has two potentialities, namely active and passive. For the soul operates by understanding, and therefore must have active potentiality; but matter when it is transformed does not operate, but is only acted upon, so passive potentiality is sufficient for it.

A. Why is sense not divided into active sense and potential sense, since sense stands in relation to cognition of sensible things as the intellect does to the cognition of intelligible [things]?

B. Sense can be divided just like the intellect, for sense can be called active inasmuch as it causes in itself the cognition of sensible things, [and] potential inasmuch as it takes it up. Sight, therefore, inasmuch as it brings about vision, can be called active sight; inasmuch as it takes it up it can be called passive or potential sight. And the same judgment may be made concerning the other senses.

A. Can the intellect alone generate in itself cognition of things?

B. It cannot, for it is necessary in the cognition of things for the intellect to speculate on images; from which it follows that cognition of things has two causes, of which neither can make it known without the other. One of them is the active intellect, the
other the image. And for this reason infants do not have cognition of things, since they lack images; nor can a man born blind cause in himself the cognition of color, nor a man born deaf the cognition of sound, on account of the lack of images.

A. Why does the vegetative soul not have two potentialities, one active, the other passive?

B. Because the vegetative soul experiences nothing from food, but only acts on the food, since it alters it or changes it so that it may be made suitable to be transformed into the body of the thing that it nourishes. The sensual soul, however, experiences something from the sensible thing, since it takes up cognizance of the sensible thing, just as the intellect experiences something from the intelligible thing when it takes up cognizance into itself. Since both the sensual and the intellectual soul operate and act by recognizing, for to understand is to act and operate just as to sense is, it is necessary that they should have two potentialities, the susceptible, I say,¹ and the effective, of which the one is passive, the other active.

A. Why is it necessary for there to be in the soul these two differences, the active intellect that can do all things, and the potential that can become all things?

B. The active and the potential intellect are not properly said to be in the soul, for the active intellect is the soul, as is the potential intellect. The active and the potential intellect are not parts of the soul, for the soul is an indivisible substance that is not made up of any parts; nor are they accidents of the soul, for the soul does not owe to any accident [the fact] that it is able to understand, that is, either to bring about or to take up understanding. If it is owed to an accident [the fact] that it is intellectual, it would thus be by accident worthier than the soul of a dumb beast, since it is not by means of its own substance that the human soul is worthier than the soul of a dumb beast, and is able to understand, which the soul of a dumb beast cannot. Then, if the power of understanding is an accident of the soul, the rational soul is only by accident more worthy than the soul of an animal. From which it follows that this statement, [that] both the active intellect and the passive intellect are in the soul, is improper. It is true in a borrowed sense, for it is true in this sense, [that] the human soul can both take up and cause cognizances and cognitions of things; from which it follows that the active and the potential intellect differ only in classification, for the same soul is called both active and potential intellect, but is called active by one classification [and] potential by another.

A. Why is the active intellect likened to a light?

¹The word translated "I say" is inquam. What results in a rather unusual English translation forms part of a Latin construction often used with the repetition of a thought to add emphasis.
B. Because just as a light causes the colors upon which it falls in its action to be seen if they are presented to the eye, since if they are positioned beyond they cannot be seen, for colors cannot be seen if they are not illumined, so the active intellect causes those things intelligible to its action to be understood, whose understanding it both brings about and generates in the potential intellect.

A. Did the philosophers, speaking of the rays of active intellect, speak rightly? For they say that the active intellect illumines images themselves with its own ray, so that the intelligence can speculate upon itself.

B. They speak incorrectly, for they transfer by metaphor to an incorporeal thing which pertains to a corporeal thing.

A. Is there both truth and falsehood in the intellect or in the will?

B. Truth is threefold. There is truth of the entity or the thing, and that is in all things. There is another truth of affirmation or denial, and that is in the intellect. There is a third truth of the will, and that is the habit of good will inclining to the exposition of truth, and such truth is moral virtue. <A>. By the truth of his will a man is called truthful.

A. Is every thing true?

B. It is, for every thing is truly that which it is. [He] who is a man is truly a man, [that] which is a donkey is truly a donkey; therefore every man is a true man and every donkey is a true donkey. For this reason truth is one of the transcendentals, since it is spoken of every thing.

A. Is every thing its own truth?

B. It is, for truth does not come as an accident to things, since a stone does not owe to accident that it is a true stone, nor does wood owe to accident that it is true wood. Therefore every thing itself is true, and for this reason each thing is its own truth.

A. Is the truth of the will the will itself?

B. No, for the truth of the will is moral virtue. Every moral virtue is a habit, but a habit is a quality differing from that in which it inheres. Just as the will is neither justice nor fortitude, likewise it is not truth.

A. Is truth of affirmation or denial a different thing from affirmation or denial?

B. It is not a different thing, for our affirmation is then true when we affirm that that which will be will be. Since both affirmation and denial are operations of our mind, and like its accidents

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do not have in themselves any accident differing from themselves, since there is not an accident of an accident, nor does any reasoning compel us to say that truth is different from either affirmation or denial, one may not therefore concede that truth differs from either affirmation or denial, since no difference should be conceded without a compelling reason. Truth, again, and falsehood are in the mind, for where [there are] affirmation and denial there [are] truth and falsehood. Affirmation and denial are in the mind, so truth and falsehood are in the mind.

A. How are truth and falsehood in the voice?

B. As a sign, for voices are the signs and notes of our affirmations or denials, since we use our voices to signify the affirmations and denials of our mind.

A. Since every thing is its own truth, why does God say of Himself, I am the way, the truth, and the life [John 14:6]?

B. Because God is of necessity what He is, nor did He ever begin to be what He is, nor did He cease to be what He is. A created being, though it is what it is, is yet not of necessity that which it is since it can cease to be. For this reason God rather than the created being is to be called the truth, for God is uncreated truth, but the created being is] created [truth].

A. Can our intellect understand a non-entity?

B. It can, for it can affirm or deny something about it. It cannot understand the thing about which it cannot make some affirmation or denial. Again, it can have some knowledge about a non-entity, therefore it can understand a non-entity, since everything knowable is understandable. The fact that something can be known about a non-entity is clear, for Aristotle has handed down to us knowledge about the vacuum and the infinite.¹

A. Can the human mind think about those things that do not exist in nature?

B. It can, for when it thinks about the chimaera, the goat-stag, [or] the sphinx it is thinking about things that do not exist in nature. When it thinks about Pegasus, when it thinks about the hippocods, the sciopods, [or] the monopods,² perhaps it is thinking about non-entities.

A. How, in thinking about the chimaera, is it thinking of a non-entity, when it is thinking about the head of a lion, the body of a

¹See Aristotle Physics 4.6.213a.12-9.217b.28 with regard to the vacuum; and 3.4.202b.30-8.208a.25 concerning infinity.

²Fabulous races of men with, respectively, the feet of a horse, monstrously large feet, and one foot.
goat, and the tail of a serpent, according to this verse: "parte leo prima, media caper, anguis in ima" ("lion in the forepart, the middle a goat, snake at the rear")?¹

B. A thought about the chimaera is a thought composed of many parts, for [he] who thinks of the chimaera thinks of an animal consisting of the head of a lion etc. Therefore, although in the individual parts of the thought of the chimaera some thing is being considered, in the total thought no thing is being considered, since no thing consists of those things of which one is thinking when one thinks of the chimaera.

A. Does chimaera have any meaning?

B. It has meaning, for it means that which it causes its hearers to think.

A. Is every simple concept true?

B. A simple concept is a thought that is not composed of many thoughts. Of this sort is the thought of either whiteness or blackness, concerning whiteness or blackness, [or] concerning a man or a donkey.

A. What does "a true thing" mean?

B. "A true thing" sometimes means everything that exists, for every thing that exists is truly that which it is; and sometimes "a true thing" means the concept of a conceived thing that exists in nature, or the thought of a thing that exists in nature, such as the thought of a man or a donkey. In this way a simple concept is true, that is, in every simple thought, one thinks of something that exists in nature. A concept that consists of more concepts is composite or complex. Such is the concept of a man having fair hair on his head; for this concept consists of the concept of a man, and the concept of having, and of the concept of hair, and of the concept of the fair coloring. We always understand or think in simple concepts about those things that exist in nature. But this does not always happen with composite concepts, for the concept of an animal having the head of a lion, the body of a goat, and the tail of a serpent is not a concept of any thing that exists in nature. Although the parts of that concept are true concepts, nevertheless the whole of that concept is invention.

Τέλος ("The end")

¹Homer Iliad 6.179-82.
DIALOG VI

A Dialog on Physics: Interlocutors Q and R

A [sic]. How does the philosopher stand in relation to philosophy?

R. Sicut albus ad albedinae ("Just as the white man does to whiteness"). These four words are proportional by incontinuous proportionality. Just as the white man stands in relation to whiteness, as concrete to abstract, so does the philosopher to philosophy.

Q. What does philosopher mean?

R. Lover of wisdom; for ὄλος means lover or friend, and ὁ σοφός [means] wise, from which σοφία is wisdom.

Q. Does σοφία shorten or lengthen the penultimate [syllable]?

R. It shortens [it], as is evident in this line of Martial [ca. A.D. 40-ca. 104]: "Cum tibi sit sophie par cura et cura deorum" ("Since your devotion to wisdom is equal to your devotion to the gods").¹ But since the penultimate is accented by the Greeks, some men, believing it to be long, lengthen it in poetry.

Q. What is the meaning of sophist?

R. Sometimes wise man, sometimes deceiver; for [those] who deceive men with base and fallacious arguments are called sophists. Sophist is an ambiguous word in Greek.

Q. How many kinds of philosophers are there?

R. According to Diogenes Laertius two.² For some are called dogmatic, others skeptic. Those are called dogmatic who draw distinctions between things as if they were capable of being comprehended; [those are called] skeptic who dispute about things as if they were not capable of being comprehended. They are called skeptic because they withhold their consent, since they do not consent to any proposition. The others [are called] dogmatic because they hand on dogmata, that is, doctrines.

¹Modern critical texts of Martial actually give "sophiae par fama." See Martial Epigrams 1.111.

²Diogenes Laertius Lives and Opinions of Eminent Philosophers 1.16-18.
Q. From where were philosophers allotted the various names?

R. Some were named from their cities, as, the Cyreniacs [and] the Eleatics; others from places, as, the Academics [and] the Stoics; others from an insult, as, the Cynics; others from the arrogance of their self-exaltation, as, the φιλαληθείς ("lovers of truth"), the Elenchics,1 [and] the Analogics;2 others from an occurrence, as, the Peripatetics; others from their leaders, as, the Socratics, the Epicureans, [and] the Platonics; [and] others from the [matters] with which they deal, as, physicists and moralists. Physicists are so called because they deal with the nature of things; moralists because they deal with the behavior of men, teaching what is honorable and what is dishonorable. Others [take their name] from their office, as, dialecticians, for the office of dialecticians is to dispute.

Q. Why are some philosophers called Stoics?

R. Because a certain colonnade in Athens was called the Stoa. In it Zeno [335-263 B.C.], leader of the Stoics, taught his listeners.

Q. Why are some philosophers called Academicians?

R. Because the villa of Plato in which he taught his listeners was called Academia.

Q. Why used some philosophers to call themselves φιλαληθείς?

R. Because they boasted that they alone loved variety.3

Q. Why did some call themselves Elenchics?

R. Because they boasted that they were the reprovers of the erring. Ελεγων is the word for reproof, so a reprover is said to be an elenchic.

Q. Why did some call themselves ἀναλογικός?

R. Because they boasted that they alone knew proportions, for ἀναλογία translates as proportion. The Analogists, however, were full of deceit, since they claimed what is common to all philosophers as peculiar to themselves; for it is the province of all philosophers jointly to know what things are proportionable, that is, in what way they have proportion.

Q. What are proportional things?

R. Proportional things are those of which the first stands in such a relation to the second as the second to the third, and those are

1Refutationists. 2Those who reason from analogy.
3Probably veritas ("truth") was meant rather than varitatis.
called linked ratios; or of which the first stands in such a relation to the second as the third to the fourth, and those are called unlinked ratios.

Q. Give [an example of] linked ratios.
[+R]. As one, two, four, eight.

[+Q]. Give [an example of] unlinked ratios.
[+R]. As four, eight; six, twelve.

Q. Why were some of them called Peripatetics?
R. Because Aristotle, the leader of the Peripatetics, was in the habit of teaching his listeners while walking about, and on account of this they were called Peripatetics, for ἐστίν οὐτὸς means I walk.

Q. What philosophers are called ἐκκληστέχων? For Lamertius\(^1\) names some so.
R. Because out of all the sects of philosophy they choose those things that they themselves approve; for ἐκλέγει means choice, so ἐκκληστέχων means choosers.

Q. From what do the philosophers of our age take their names?
R. From their teachers; for those are called Thomists who follow Thomas Aquinas [ca. 1225-74] and embrace and uphold his teaching, Albertists those who follow Albertus Magnus, Scotists who follow [John Duns] Scotus [ca. 1265-1308], [and] Occamists who follow [William of] Occam [ca. 1285-1347].

Q. Why are some of these philosophers called realists and some nominalists?
R. Because some say that types and species are names, for they say that type is a general name and more common, but species a particular name and less common; whereas others say that type and species are things, for they say that type is a more common thing, [and] species a less common thing. And therefore these latter are called realists, the former nominalists.

Q. Why are nominalists commonly called moderns, realists ancients?
R. Because the doctrine of the moderns is more recent, newer, if I may say so; [that] of the realists of longer standing.

\(^1\)Probably Lambertius of Hersfeld (ca. 1024-post 1077), a medieval chronicler who wrote a history of the world from creation to his own time. See Lamperti monachi Hersfeldensis opera in Scriptores rerum Germanicarum in usum scholarum ex Monumentis Germaniae historicis, ed. Oswald Holder-Egger (Hanover: Hahn, 1894).
Q. Are metaphysicians to be called philosophers?

R. Most of all, for of all the sciences metaphysics claims for itself the name of wisdom, and stands in relation to the other speculative sciences as the knowledge of an architect to the knowledge of his assistants. Therefore the metaphysicians especially are to be called philosophers.

Q. Are mathematicians to be called philosophers?

R. Mathematicians who measure and count, that is, who deal with quantities and their figures and numbers, proportions, and equalities and inequalities, are to be called philosophers, for they have a most certain knowledge, since they employ unquestioned proofs. But whether divinatory mathematicians, who are also called ἰπόγιοστηρον, and casters of horoscopes (since they are often mistaken and more often predict falsehoods than truths) should be called philosophers, I leave to the judgment of others.

A [sic]. Why are metaphysicians and mathematicians not found in the catalog of the philosophers?

B. Because by a general name they are called physicists.

A. Classify philosophy.

B. Philosophy is divided into physics, ethics, and logic; that is, into natural, moral, and rational.

A. Classify physics.

[+B]. Physics, as generally accepted, is divided into metaphysics, mathematics, and physics taken specifically.

A. Classify ethics.

[+B]. Ethics, as generally accepted, is divided into politics, economics, and ethics taken specifically, which is called monastic.

A. Classify logic.

B. Logic, as generally accepted, is divided into grammar, rhetoric, and logic taken specifically, which is called dialectic.

A. What is the difference between metaphysics, mathematics, and physics?

B. Metaphysics deals with the entity inasmuch as [it is] entity, and teaches, concerning every entity, what it is, whether substance or accident, and from what each individual entity differs, and to what it is identical. Metaphysics teaches that man is a substance, and different from his knowledge; [and] that knowledge is an accident, different from man, since every accident is different from the substance to which it is accidental. Again, it teaches that
humanity is not different from man, but in essence the same thing that man is. No complete substance is different from that of which it is the substance. Since humanity is the complete substance of man, it cannot be different from man. Mathematics deals with magnitudes; and numbers and figures, which are accidents only of magnitudes; and proportional relationships. Physics deals with mobile things, with their motions, and motive forces.

A. From what does metaphysics take its name?

B. From the Greek preposition, μέτα, which means through, and φυσική ("physics"): metaphysics surpasses physics and transcends it, for metaphysics deals with universal entities, physics only with mobile things.

A. From where does mathematics take its name?

B. Μάθημα means instruction, hence mathematicus, instructional; hence the science of instruction is named mathematica.

A. With which quantities does mathematics deal?

B. With continuous quantity and separate quantity. Geometry and astronomy deal with magnitudes, arithmetic and music with numbers and relationships of numbers.

A. With which magnitudes does geometry deal?

B. Line, surface, and body; for geometry teaches that every figure is enclosed by a boundary or boundaries, that is, a line or lines, a surface or surfaces. It teaches likewise that a plane figure is enclosed by lines, a solid [figure] by a surface or surfaces. It teaches that the first of the plane figures is the circle, because it is enclosed by a single line; the first of the solids, the sphere, because it is enclosed by a single surface. It teaches likewise that the first rectilinear figure is the trigonal, that is, the triangle, because fewer straight lines than three are not able to enclose an area, just as fewer plane surfaces than four cannot enclose a body. And, therefore, the first solid figure enclosed by plane surfaces is [that] which is enclosed by four surfaces, and it is called by mathematicians a τετραμέδου body, as if of four bases.

A. From what does physics take its name?

B. Η φυσική means nature, hence physicus [means] natural, and φυσικής, φυσικήν [means] the history or science of natural things.

A. Why is physics called a history?

B. Because in physics the nature of things is told, and therefore it is rightly called a history.

A. Why is physics called a science?
B. Because physicists write what has been discovered by them or by others concerning natural things. Cognizance of discoveries is called science.

A. What does politics teach?

B. In what way a state should be administered, for it teaches about the different sorts of states. Every state is either under an aristocracy, that is, the administration of the nobility; or under a democracy, that is, the control of the people; or under an oligarchy, that is, under the control of a few; or under a monarchy, that is, under the command and dominion of a single prince.

A. From where are these words derived?

B. A means city, hence a citizen, civil, civility. Politics is a civil science. Cratos means strength or power, aristos [means] best, demos the people: hence aristocracy and democracy. Again, arch means leadership, oligos [means] few, monos single: hence oligarchy and monarchy. A monarch is a single ruler, monarchy his sovereignty.

A. What sovereignty is called gynecocracy?

B. The sovereignty of a woman, such as the sovereignty of Semiramis, queen of Babylon. , whose genitive is woman. It is included under monarchy.

A. What sovereignty is called a hierarchy?

B. A holy sovereignty, for is translated as holy. It is included under monarchy.

A. What does economics teach?

B. To manage family and domestic matters. Oecos [means] house and nomos law: hence oeconomos, the controller of family matters, and oeconomica, their science.

A. With what does ethics deal?

B. The behavior of individual men, such as fortitude, justice, generosity, [and] temperance. On this account it is called ethics or monastic, for is translated as behavior, while monos means single: hence monasta [means] solitary, monasticus pertaining to the solitary.

Q [sic]. From where does logic take its name?

R. Logos is translated as reasoning or speech, and for this reason the Son of God is, in Greek, called Logos, because He is the speech and word of the Father. Hence, logicus [means] pertaining to reason or speech, and logica the science dealing with speech. In speech
there ought to be three things: for it ought to be complete and unspoiled, true and not false, [and] polished and decorative. For this reason there are three parts of logic: grammar, which makes speech complete and free from barbarity and solecism; dialectic, which makes it true, since it differentiates truth from falsehood; [and] rhetoric, which makes it polished and decorative.

Q. From where does grammar take its name?

R. Gramma is translated as letter; hence grammaticus [means] lettered, and grammatica literature.

Q. From where does dialectic take its name?

R. λεγω in Greek means the same as I say; hence lexis, the verbal noun which means speaking; hence διαλεγω, which is made up of the Greek preposition δια that is written with an iota, and λεγω, the passive voice of which is διαλεγομαι; hence διαλεγεις, the verbal noun which means debate; hence dialecticus, a debater, and dialectic, the art of debating.

Q. From where does rhetoric take its name?

R. [He] is called in Greek a rhetor who is skilled in speaking well, hence rhetoric is the art of speaking well.

Q. What is the difference between grammar and rhetoric?

R. The same as between saying things properly and speaking well. Many men say things properly who do not speak well, for to say things properly is to speak according to the precepts of the grammarians; to speak well is to speak according to the precepts of rhetoric.

Q. What is the difference between rhetoric and dialectic?

R. Rhetoric makes use of continuous speech, dialectic of broken speeches. Dialectic is the art of debate. In debating one must employ brief and broken speeches, not a lengthy and continuous oration. An unbroken speech is long, consisting of introduction, narration, argument, refutation, confirmation, and conclusion. A speech of this kind is the tool, not of the dialectician, but of the orator.

Q. Define physics as taken specifically.

R. Physics is [that] which deals with mobile things, along with their movements and motive forces.

Q. What are mobile things?

R. [Those] that can be generated or destroyed, enlarged or diminished, altered, or change their place.
[+Q]. Why is an engenderable thing said to be mobile?

R. Because it can transfer into nature.

Q. Why is a corruptible thing said to be mobile?

R. Because it can be taken out of nature.

Q. Is God a mobile thing?

R. No, because He can neither begin nor cease to be, since of necessity He always has been and always will be; nor can He change His place, since He is contained by no place; nor His quantity, since He has none. For He is a spirit that is extended by no magnitude, nor by any quality, since no accident befalls God, for God has no quality inherent in Himself, but is of Himself, that is, in His own substance such as we proclaim Him to be.

A [sic]. Classify θύσευς as already defined.

+A>B. θύσευς is divided into universal and particular physics, that is, general and specific [physics].

A. What is general physics?

B. [That] which proclaims truths concerning all mobile things generally.

A. What is specific physics?

B. [That] which proclaims truths concerning some, not all, mobile things.

A. Give examples.

B. Cognizance of these truths is general physics: everything that moves is moved by a mover; everything that moves moves from some place and moves to some place, that is, from the terminus from which it withdraws to the terminus to which it arrives; everything that moves with an acquisitive motion moves towards that thing which it lacks; everything that moves with dismissive motion moves away from that which it has. But specific physics is cognizance of these truths: the heavens move in a circular motion, that is, around the center of the world; earth and water move downward, that is, toward the center; fire and air move upward, that is, away from the center.

A. In which books does Aristotle hand down general physics?

B. In the eight books of Physics, which books of physics are called in Greek Ἀκοουστικα, that is, books of natural listening or of physical hearing.¹ In those books pronouncements are made concerning

¹A translation of the Latin title used by Hegius for each of
mobile things, on those things that are common to all. Of such kind are these: everything that moves is moved by the mover; all movements toward contrary termini are contrary, for movement toward whiteness, which is called whitening, is contrary to movement toward blackness, which is called blackening; movements toward disparate things are disparate, as, the movement toward a triangular figure and the movement toward a quadrangular [figure] are disparate, for they are so opposed that they cannot exist in the same body.

A. In what books is specific physics handed down?

B. In the other books of natural philosophy.

A. Which are these?

B. The books On the Heavens and the World,¹ the title of which indicates what is dealt with in them; the books On Generation and Corruption,² which deal with generation and corruption and the other movements of the four elements; the books Of Meteors³ which deal with those things that have their origin in the heights, of which sort are clouds, hail, snow, thunder and lightning, comets, and rainbows, and the rest—for these bodies are called meteors, that is, lofty and raised up, since meteoros is translated as lofty and raised up; the books of minerals which deal with metals and the other subterranean bodies, such as sulphur, natron, etc.;⁴ the books On the Soul⁵ deal with the parts of the soul and its powers; the

the volumes listed is made in the text. The Latin is given in the relevant footnote. In addition, the common modern Latin title and English equivalent are given in parentheses if these are different. The English titles are from a list in Aristotle Posterior Analytics and Topica, trans. Hugh Treddenick and E. S. Forster, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1960), pp. vii-x. In cases where an English title is not listed, a translation has been made. A note has been added if there is any doubt about the authorship of the work in question. This judgment is based on The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "Aristotle," by Gwilym E. L. Owen. The first title is Physica.

¹ De celo et mundo (De caelo, "On the Heavens," and De mundo, "On the Cosmos"). Hegius combines the two volumes, but they are generally listed separately. De mundo is of spurious origin.

² De generatione et corruptione ("On Coming-to-be and Passing-away"). The four elements mentioned refer to earth, air, water, and fire.

³ Meteororum (Meteorologica, "Meteorology").

⁴ There is no volume by Aristotle entitled Mineralium, but see books 3 and 4 of Meteorologica," to which Hegius may be referring.

⁵ De anima.
books On Vegetables and Plants deal with the natures of plants, that is, of trees and grasses; [and] the books about animals deal with the natures of animals. The books On Sense and the Sensed, On Sleep and Waking, On Memory and Recollection, On Length and Shortness of Life, On Life and Death, On Movement of Animals, the movement of the heart, On Breathing out and Breathing In, On Youth and Old Age, [and] food and the nutritive are all books that is, of the overlooked; for they deal with what has been overlooked in the book On the Soul.

A. Is the sky a mobile entity?

B. It is in respect of its parts; for although the whole sky does not change its position, yet its parts change their positions. The sun by night is in the lower hemisphere, by day in the upper; in spring it is in the spring signs, in summer in the summer [signs], in autumn in the autumnal [signs, and] in winter in the winter [signs]. The rising or setting sun crosses the horizon, that is,  

1De vegetabilibus et plantis (De plantis, "On Plants"). Spurious.

2De animalibus. Besides the one later cited more specifically there are several books to which Hegius is probably referring. These are Historia animalium, "A History of Animals," some sections of which are spurious; De partibus animalium, "Parts of Animals;" De incessu animalium, "Progression of Animals;" and De generatione animalium, "Generation of Animals."

3De sensu et sensato (De sensu et sensibilibus, "On Sense and Sensible Objects").

4De somnio et vigilia (De somno et vigilia).

5De memoria et reminiscencia.

6De longitudine et brevitate vite (De longitudine et brevitate vitae).

7De vita et morte.

8De motu animalium. Probably genuine.

9De motu cordis. No such volume exists, but see On Respiration 20.479b.17-480a.17.

10De respiratione et inspiratione (De respiratione, "On Respiration").

11De iuventute et senectute.

12De nutrimento et nutriti. This work has either been lost or it was not written, but see On the Soul 2.4.416b.19-416b.32.

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the circle dividing the upper hemisphere from the lower, which cannot occur without movement.

A. Does the moon move?

B. The moon does move; for sometimes it is in conjunction with the sun, sometimes it is opposed to it, which cannot occur without its movement.

A. Is the moon capable of alteration?

B. It is; for the moon in its eclipse, that is, in loss of light, is not the same as it is when illuminated by the sun.

A. Is the sun altered in its eclipse?

B. No, for the eclipsing of the sun takes no light from it, but removes the sun's light from the earth. It is otherwise, however, in respect of the moon, for that in its eclipse is deprived of light, since the moon has no light except what it receives from the sun, as its name indicates, for it is called moon because it shines with borrowed light.

A. Is there a knowledge of natural things?

B. There is, because things of necessity true can be propounded about them, and those things can be proved. Therefore there is a knowledge of those things, since things of necessity true, when they are proved, result in the conclusions of demonstrative syllogisms, about which there is knowledge. All knowledge is a habit, that is, a belief or agreement of a consequence acquired by proof.

A. How many kinds of truth are there?

B. Two. Some things are true of necessity, and they are those that cannot lose their truth; others are true conditionally, and they are those that change from truth to falsehood.

A. Is there knowledge of either of these truths?

B. There is, if knowledge is taken generally; for I know that I am alive, which is a conditional truth, no less than that a triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles, which is a thing true of necessity. If, however, knowledge is taken specifically, as the knowledge by which we assent to propositions necessarily true because of proof, then it must be said that there is no knowledge of conditional truths.

A. Why do philosophers so restrict the name of knowledge that it means only knowledge of consequences necessarily true and proved, when the common people take knowledge generally as every cognizance of truth whether it be changeable or unchangeable?

B. Because knowledge of those things that are of necessity true is
permanent, and is customarily entrusted to writing; whereas the knowledge of those things that are conditionally true is not permanent, but perishes as the truth perishes, and is not customarily entrusted to writing. For this reason philosophers claim that there is knowledge only of those things that are of necessity true.

A. Is this argumentation demonstrative or sophistical? Whatever things are known are truths, since there is no knowledge of falsehoods: natural things are not truths, since they are neither sensations of the mind nor propositions; therefore natural things are not known.

B. It is sophistical, because in the major [premise] we understand by "those things that are known" known propositions, but in the conclusion [we understand] known things; and therefore the subject of the major [premise] and the predicate of the conclusion are not the same thing.

A. Are these argumentations good or faulty? No individual things are known: natural things are individual things, therefore they are not known. No corruptible things are known: natural things are corruptible, therefore they are not known. All things that are known are necessary: natural things are not necessary, therefore natural things are not known. No conditional things are known: natural things are conditional, therefore natural things are not known. No things that are known can be other than they are now: natural things can be other than they are now, therefore natural things are not known.

B. They are faulty. The first is faulty because in the major [premise] we understand by "individual things" propositions changeable from truth to falsehood. They are not known by permanent knowledge. In the minor [premise] we understand by "individual things" individual items. All natural things are individual, for the world is composed of individual things, not universals, for there are none. The second is faulty because in the major [premise] we understand by "corruptible things" propositions of which the truth cannot be destroyed, because there is knowledge only of those things; in the minor we understand by "corruptible things" corruptible items. But there can be knowledge of corruptible things by means of propositions of permanent truth. The third is faulty because in the major [premise] by "necessary things" we understand propositions of necessity true; in the minor by "necessary things" we understand things that are not able not to exist. The fourth is faulty because in the major [premise] we understand by "conditional things" propositions that can be both true and false; in the minor things that can exist and not exist. The fifth is faulty because in the major [premise] we understand by "those things that can be other" propositions capable of change from truth to falsehood; in the minor [we understand] alterable things.

A. Why are these argumentations sophistical? No error is knowledge: there is error concerning natural things, therefore there is no knowledge concerning natural things. No belief is knowledge:
there is belief concerning natural things, therefore there is no knowledge concerning natural things. No opinion is knowledge: there is opinion concerning natural things, therefore there is no knowledge concerning natural things.

B. They are sophistical because the minor premises of these argumentations are particular propositions but the conclusions are universal, since the subjects of the conclusions are distributed, that is, taken universally.

A. Is this argumentation sophistical? No knowledge is knowledges: physics is knowledges, therefore physics is not knowledge. The major premise is proved: the singular noun and the plural noun are disparate, a truth about one of which is denied about the other. A man is not men, nor are men a man. The minor is proved, for physics is many cognizances of many physical truths, each one of which is knowledge, so physics is knowledges.

B. If knowledge in the major premise and in the conclusion means the same thing, that is, if it means the cognizance of a single proved truth, the argumentation is good. If, in fact, knowledge in the major premise means something other than in the conclusion, that is, if in the major it means cognizance of one truth, but in the conclusion cognizances of many truths, the argumentation is flawed and is at fault through the fallacy of equivocation.

A. Should one be of the opinion of Heraclitus [fl. ca. 504-501 B.C.], who denied that there was knowledge of natural things because they are corruptible and transmutable?

B. No, for it is possible for truth to be proclaimed about transient and transmutable things, and that same [truth] can be proved. Therefore there is knowledge about them. We can prove elements to be corruptible in this way. Whatever things are composed of transformable matter are corruptible, since transformation of matter cannot occur without corruption: elements are of this sort, therefore elements are corruptible. Nor should one hold Heraclitus' opinion because he has contradicted himself. For when he denied that there is knowledge about natural things because they are corruptible and transmutable, he affirmed that he knew natural things to be transformable and corruptible. Therefore, denying that there is knowledge about them, he affirmed that he had knowledge.

A. Is the mobile entity the subject of physics as a whole?

B. It is.

A. Is there some necessary subject for every science?

B. There is, for every science deals with some universal and is concerned with it, as dialectic deals with universal argumentations;

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1See Aristotle *Metaphysics* 1.6.987a.30-987b.10.
arithmetic with universal numbers; geometry with universal figured magnitudes, or the universal figures of magnitudes, which is the same thing. For this reason some subject is necessary for every science, that is, some most universal name\(^1\) among all the nouns signifying the things that are dealt with in the science—a name that can signify all the things chiefly under consideration in the science, and can tell about the universals considered—for it is not possible to give true pronouncements and proofs concerning the universals considered in a science if there is not some name available common to the universals considered.

A. Why is the subject of a science called the most universal term considered in the science?

B. Because the philosophers of this age call all nouns terms, since pronouncements are defined by nouns; and since the subject of a science is the most universal name among all the nouns signifying things considered in the science, it is called the most universal term.

A. Why must the subject of a science be the thing first known?

B. Because the subject of a science is the proof by which are tested those things that may be suitable for the consideration of the science and [those] that are outside the consideration of the science. For this reason it must be the first thing known to [the man] wishing to pursue the science further, so that he may be able to know what things are suitable for the consideration of the science.

A. Can the subject of a science transcend the bounds of science?

B. It cannot, for, if the subject of a science were to embrace more things than have been considered in the science, there would not be a suitable proof to test what ought to be considered in the science.

A. Why is the mobile entity the subject of physics?

B. Because it is the most universal name among all the nouns signifying things considered in physics, not transcending the bounds of physics. Whatever is considered in physics is either a mobile entity or pertains to a mobile entity.

A. What are [the things] that pertain to mobile entities?

B. The causes and principles of mobile entities, and their parts, and their movements, and the movers by which mobile entities are

\(^1\)As was pointed out in the introduction to this appendix, the Latin nomen may be translated as "name" or "noun." It has been translated in both ways in these Dialogs, depending on the context, but it should be remembered that in most instances either rendering would be acceptable. See above, p. 382.
A. Why is the mobile entity the subject of physics rather than the mobile body?

B. Because the mobile entity is more universal than the mobile body, since all incorporeal substances are mobile entities, except God alone, who is immovable. Again, physics in general, which deals with all mobile things universally, does not only pronounce its general truths concerning mobile bodies, but universally concerning all mobile entities. For when physics says everything that moves moves from the terminus a quo to the terminus ad quem, it is not only speaking about mobile bodies but also about incorporeal substances; since, if the human soul moves from ignorance to knowledge, the terminus from which it moves is ignorance, and the terminus to which it moves is knowledge. Likewise, if it moves from vice to virtue, the terminus a quo is vice, the terminus ad quem virtue.

A. Why is the subject of science the most universal name?

B. Because just as science has certain most universal pronouncements which it pronounces concerning universal things considered by itself, so it is necessary for every science to have a most universal name for all the things considered, and this is called the subject of the science.

A. Why is every subject of science universal?

B. Because every subject of a science signifies universality; for it is the common name of all the things considered in the science, therefore it is universal.

A. Why is every science concerned with universality?

B. Because science is about inevitabilities. Science is not lasting unless it is about inevitabilities. [Things] that are pronounced about universals are inevitable, but not [things] that are pronounced about particulars. For [things] that are pronounced about particular animals cease to be true when the particular animals die. But [things] that are pronounced about universals always remain true, for animals universally never die; as, this universal axiom, "every animal has the sense of touch," is an inevitability, for it will be true for as long as the universality of animals remains. But this specific pronouncement, "John has a sense of touch," is not an inevitability, for as John dies it loses its truth. For this reason science is about universals and not particulars.

A. If the subject of physics is a universal name, why is physics called a real science, and dialectic a rational one, since the subject of each is a universal name? For a science concerning a name should be called rational rather than real.
B. The subject of each science is a name, since every subject of a
science is universal. But a universal, since it can be subjected or
predicated in a pronouncement, and be part of a definition, is a
name, not a thing. For a pronouncement and a definition do not
consist of things, but of the names of things. Physics, however, is
called a real science because the things considered in the science
of physics, which are signified by the subject of physics, are
things made by God or by nature, not by a rational soul. Dialectic
is called rational because the things considered by dialectic are
things made by a rational soul, for the rational soul, not nature,
is the crafter of argumentations.

A. Why is every thing particular, none universal?

B. Because every thing is substance or accident. But every
substance is particular, because particular things have particular
substances. Many things cannot have a single substance. Likewise
every accident is particular, for one accident cannot exist in many
things. Particular white things are in particular white things,
particular blacknesses in particular black things; and universal
blackness and whiteness are not found, for all white things are not
white with one whiteness, nor are black things black with one black-
ness. And so one must judge in the case of other accidents. Thus
every thing is particular; and since science is about universals, it
is necessary for it to be about universal names, not about universal
things, since there are no such things.

A. Why is this argumentation sophistical? No one mobile entity is
the subject of physics; therefore the mobile entity is not the sub-
ject of physics. The antecedent is proved because neither a man,
nor a donkey, nor any of the other mobile entities, is the subject
of physics. The conclusion is proved, since it is arguing from the
subordinating to the subordinate.

B. It is sophistical because, although the conclusion seems to be
subordinate to the antecedent, it is nevertheless not subordinate,
since "mobile entity" means one thing in the antecedent and another
in the conclusion. In the antecedent the statement is made concern-
ing particular mobile entities, none of which is the subject of
physics. In the conclusion [it is made] concerning the name or
concept by which universal mobile entities are named or conceived.
Dialecticians speak of this in these words: in the antecedent "mobile entity" is subsumed personally, in the conclusion [it is
subsumed] materially or simply.

A. What is it to subsume the subject of a pronouncement personally?

B. It is for a subject to be taken for things significant in them-
selves.

A. What is it to subsume a subject materially?

B. It is for a subject to be taken for [things] signified by name.
A. What is it to subsume a subject simply?

B. To subsume simply is for a subject to be taken for a concept of the mind, by which things signified by name are conceived; or for common nature, if the thing is in nature.

A. Give examples.

B. Gold is in the miser's strong-box; gold is in the miser's mouth; gold is in the miser's mind. In the first of these statements gold is subsumed personally, in the second materially, in the third simply.

A. How many meanings has this statement, the mobile entity is the subject of physics?

B. Five. The first is, some particular mobile entity is the subject of physics, and that is untrue. The second is, the universal mobile entity is the subject of physics, and that is true if universal nature is in nature, false if it is not. The third is, mobile entity is the universal name of all things considered in physics. That is true. The fourth is, the thought by which the human mind thinks about universal mobile entities is the concept of universal mobile entities. That is true. The fifth is, the universality of mobile entities is the subject of consideration of physics, and that also is true.

A. Is this argumentation good? The mobile entity is the subject of general physics, which is passed down in the eight books of Physics; therefore it is not the subject of physics as a whole, which is passed down in the four books of natural philosophy. The conclusion is proved, because one thing cannot be the subject of the whole and the part.

B. This argumentation is not good because the same thing can be the subject of the whole and the part; for the mobile entity is the subject of general physics, which is a part of physics as a whole, since general physics pronounces general statements concerning universal mobile entities. It is [also] the subject in physics as a whole, however, because physics as a whole pronounces statements both general and particular about mobile entities.

A. Why is the immobile entity not the subject of physics?

B. Because there cannot be a proof suitable for testing that anything is fit for the consideration of the science of physics, since physics does not consider entities because they are quiescent, but because they are mobile.

A. In physics, should one proceed from principles, causes, and elements to those things of which they are the principles, causes, and elements?

B. One should.
A. Why?

B. Because in every method one should proceed from principles, causes, and elements to those things of which they are the principles, causes, and elements. For a method has a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem, since it is a certain progression. Since physics is a method it is necessary for there to be such a progression in physics.

A. Why is it necessary in every method for there to be the forementioned progression?

B. Because in every method there is a proceeding from ignorance to knowledge. But there cannot be a proceeding from ignorance to knowledge unless unknowns are proved by means of knowns. What is itself unknown cannot make known, because belief in the conclusion is generated by belief in the antecedent. We think we know any particular thing when we have discovered its causes and its principles and its elements, for to know is to discover a thing through its cause.

A. How many sorts of knowledge are there?

B. Two.

A. Which?

B. Knowledge quia ("because") and knowledge propter quid ("on account of which").

A. What is knowledge quia?

B. Quia is known because it is exactly as it is signified by a known pronouncement, as, the knowledge by which it is known that the sun or moon fails, that is, suffers an eclipse.

A. What is knowledge propter quid?

B. [That] by which it is known for what reason it is exactly as it is signified by a known pronouncement, as, the knowledge by which it is known for what reason the sun or the moon fails.

A. What sort of science is physics?

B. A science propter quid; and for that reason it is necessary that the physicist knows the causes, principles, and elements of natural things. For we cannot know for what reason those things are true that we propose concerning natural things unless we know the principles, causes, and elements of natural things.

A. How many kinds of principles are there?

B. Two; for some are the principles of things, others the principles of sciences.
A. What are the principles of things?
B. They are the causes of things. Of this sort are matter and form.

A. What are the principles of sciences?
B. Statements known of themselves and indemonstrable; for in every science there must be a progression from indemonstrable statements to demonstrable statements. For this reason every demonstrative science is called a method.

A. Give examples of knowledge quia and knowledge propter quid.
B. [A man] who sees an eclipse of the moon knows that the moon is failing. But [a man] who knows that the eclipse of the moon is occurring because the sun is in the head of the Dragon and the moon in its tail, or conversely, knows for what reason the moon is failing; for when the sun is in the head of the Dragon and the moon in its tail, or conversely, the earth is interposed between the sun and the moon so that the moon is in the earth's shadow, and for that reason it is inevitable that there is then an eclipse of the moon.

A. Does every science have principles?
B. It has.

A. Why?
B. Because every science makes, concerning the things that are considered by it, certain pronouncements known of themselves and undemonstrable, and those are called the principles of sciences, as, the principles of mathematics are these: every whole is greater than its part; every part is less than the whole; every whole is equal to all its parts; whatever things occupy equal spaces are equal; whatever things occupy unequal spaces are unequal.

A. Is every conclusion known by means of principles?
B. It is, because every thing that is proved is proved by principles; but since nothing is known unless it is proved, it is inevitable that every thing that is known is known by principles.

Q [sic]. By what principles is this conclusion known to be correct, that every triangle has three angles equivalent to two right angles?
R. By these. The first is, whatever is the relationship of whole to whole, the same is the relationship of half to half; as, whatever is the relationship of eight to nine [sic, but he means four], the same is the relationship of four to two. The second is, every regular quadrilateral has four right angles or the equivalent of four right angles. Thirdly, every regular quadrilateral can be divided into two equal triangles (by means of a diagonal line that is also called a diameter) each of which has half the angles of the whole.
quadrilateral. The fourth is, every triangle can be half of some regular quadrilateral, because, if to the triangle is added a triangle equal to itself, a regular quadrilateral will be made from them. From these principles the conclusion is proved thus: every three-sided figure having half the angles of a regular quadrilateral has three angles equivalent to two right angles; every triangle is of this sort; therefore a triangle has three angles equal to two right angles.

Q. How many regular quadrilaterals are there?
R. Four.
Q. Which?
R. The first is a quadrilateral with sides of equal length and right angled, which is called a square. The second is a right angled quadrilateral longer on one pair of sides. The third [is] a rhombus with sides of equal length, which is also called a helmuhamim. The fourth [is] a rhombus longer on one pair of sides, which is also called a rhomboid, or figure like a helmuhamim.

Q. Can the same statement be the proving principle and the proven conclusion?
R. It can; for this statement, [that] every triangle has three angles equal to two right angles, is a proven conclusion by those principles that have previously been mentioned and a principle proving these conclusions, [that] every pentagon has five angles equivalent to six right angles, [and] every hexagon has six angles equivalent to eight right angles. And all that is true in respect of demonstrable principles, because an undemonstrable principle cannot be a proven conclusion; and likewise an ultimate conclusion, which can prove nothing, cannot be a principle.

Q. Why is science called a method?
R. Because it is a transition from first principles to ultimate conclusions.

Q. How many sorts of straight lines are there?
R. Two. Some are straight lines an equal distance apart, and they are called parallel; others [are] an unequal distance apart, and they are called concurrent lines, since if lines an unequal distance apart are extended it is inevitable that they run together, or join.

Q. Can curved lines be parallel, that is, equidistant?
R. They can, because the circumferences of concentric circles are curved lines, and they are equidistant, therefore curved lines can be equidistant.

Q. Of how many sorts are circles?
R. Of two sorts, concentric and eccentric. The concentric are those that have the same center; the eccentric that have different centers.

Q. Give the principles of mathematics.

[R]. The first principle is, if any straight line falls across lines not equidistant from each other, the two interior angles on one side are greater than two right angles because they are obtuse, and on the other side they are less than two right angles; so that the second principle is, if a straight line falls across two equidistant lines, the two interior angles on either side are equivalent to two right angles; so that the third principle is, if from two equal things you take away equals, or the same [amount] in common, the remainders will be equal.

A [sic]. What is known about matter?

B. Every part of an entity is an entity: matter is part of an entity, therefore matter is an entity. The major [premise] is proved because an entity does not consist of non-entities. The minor is proved because it is part of the composite substance that is the entity.

A. Show that matter is entity in potentiality.

B. Whatever can take up a substantial form is entity in potentiality: matter is of this sort, therefore matter is entity in potentiality. The major [premise] is proved because the entity in actuality can take up no substantial form, although it can take up accidental forms. The minor [premise] is proved because no substance can be engendered unless matter takes up some substantial form.

A. Show that matter can neither be engendered nor destroyed.

B. Whatever is engendered is engendered out of matter; for a thing to be engendered is for matter, one form being destroyed, to take up another. The minor [premise] is proved, for if matter were to engender, matter would exist before its own generation. Again, whatever is destroyed is destroyed in its own matter, for matter is not destroyed in the destruction of things; therefore if matter is destroyed it will remain after destruction.

A. Show that matter is the subject of transmutation.

B. Every transformable thing is the subject of transmutation, because every transformation is transmutation: matter is a transformable thing, as experience teaches; therefore matter is the subject of transmutation.

A. How many types of transmutations are there?

B. Two, substantial and accidental transmutation.
A. What is substantial transmutation?

B. Substantial transmutation is when matter loses the form that it has and takes up that which it does not have.

A. What is accidental transmutation?

B. When some subject loses the accidental form it has and acquires that which it does not have.

A. What is prime matter?

B. It is that part of a composite substance which sustains substantial and accidental forms.

A. How is prime matter to be recognized?

B. Firstly, by mind and thought we must take away from the composite substance all forms accidental. When that is done we shall retain nothing but the matter and the substantial form. Then, by mind and thought, we shall separate the substantial form from the matter. When that is done we shall retain nothing but the prime matter.

A. Is this argumentation good? No entity in potentiality exists in nature: prime matter is entity in potentiality, therefore prime matter does not exist in nature.

B. It is not good, for "entity in potentiality" has one meaning in the major [premise], another in the minor. In the major it signifies that which does not exist in nature but can exist in nature, whereas in the minor it signifies that which can take up a substantial form that it does not have, having lost that which it does have.

A. Is this argumentation good? Whatever is known is known through its principles: but matter is not known through principles, therefore matter is not known. The major [premise] is Aristotle's, in the first [book] of Physics.\textsuperscript{1} The minor is proved because prime matter is a simple substance not consisting of principles.

B. It is not good, because by "principles" in the major [premise] are understood demonstrative principles, of which kind are the principles of sciences; but in the minor by "principles" we understand constituent principles.

A. Why is matter called entity in potentiality?

B. Because no form pertains to the substance of matter. Although matter may have some form, yet it can lose every form without its own destruction. For this reason no form pertains to the substance

\textsuperscript{1}Aristotle \textit{Physics} 1.1.184a.10-15.
of matter. From which it is clear that at one time matter, at
another time composite substance, has form. Matter has form as
its subject and receptacle; composite substance has form as the
whole of its own part.

A. Can matter be formless, that is, without any form?

B. While the law stands that God gave to created things, matter
cannot be formless, just as a place cannot be empty. For God
decreed [that] just as body [succeeds] body in place, so let form
succeed form in matter. For this reason, just as nature does not
allow a place to be empty, so neither does she allow matter [to
be] formless, since engendered form always takes the place of
destroyed form continuously.

A. Is God able to make matter formless?

B. He is, just as He can make a place empty; for God is able to
preserve matter without form just as He preserves accident without
subject. God does not require form for matter to be preserved, as
[He does not require] subject for the preservation of accident. Nor
does form more pertain to the substance of matter than matter to the
substance of form. If anyone should object [that] form is what
gives being to a thing, so what does not have form cannot exist, one
must reply that form gives being to that thing to whose substance it
pertains, and for this reason no composite substance can be without
form. But it does not give being to that to whose substance it does
not pertain. Of such a sort is matter. Nor does form give being to
form, because it is not form; nor to accident for the same reason;
nor to God and the other separate substances, because such as they
do not consist of matter and form.

A. Why is this argumentation flawed? Form gives being to a thing;
therefore form gives being to matter.

B. Because in it the proof is put forward from a universal whole,
not one distributed to its own part, that is, from a non-distributed
major to a minor.

Q [sic]. Why is matter called in Greek ὑάλη?

R. Because ὑάλη is translated as wood. This is an appropriate
translation for matter because matter is the wood from which nature
fashions all its works, that is, the natural things. From what does
nature make grasses [and] plants, from what animals, if not from
matter?

Q. In what does God differ from nature and from art?

R. God can make something out of nothing; but nature and art, if
they lack matter, can make nothing.

Q. What is the difference between nature and art?
R. Nature cannot make a work out of matter unless she strips it of the substantial form that it has [and] introduces into it a substantial form that it does not have. Art cannot do this, for it introduces a shape only into matter, not into substantial form. For this reason the material of art is the composite substance; but the material of nature is the simple substance, since nature introduces substantial form into prime matter.

Q. Is matter body?

R. It is, since matter is substance, because it is not accident. Every entity is substance or accident. Since matter is not incorporeal substance, it is inevitable that it is body. Moreover, whatever has three dimensions is body: matter is of this kind, therefore it is body. The major [premise] is proved since spirit differs from body in this, that spirit lacks the three dimensions which body has. The minor is proved since matter causes every composite substance to have three dimensions, therefore it is inevitable that it has itself three dimensions, since it should not give what it does not have.

Q. Is matter simple or composite?

R. If that is called simple which is comprised of no parts, matter cannot be called simple, since it has magnitude, for the matter of wood is as great as the wood. But if that is called simple which is not comprised of parts of different kinds or differing in their essences as regards use, matter may be said to be simple; for each individual part of matter is as like the other parts in nature and substance as whiteness is like whiteness. And for this reason matter is totally ὅμοιος ("homogeneous"), that is, of one kind in all its parts.

Q. Is matter simple in the same manner as form?

R. It is, for form is called simple because it does not consist of parts of different or dissimilar kinds, and matter is called simple in this way too. The exception is the rational soul, which is simple in a different way from matter; for that is not comprised of any parts, either similar or dissimilar. For this reason it is neither totally ὅμοιος nor ἐντὸς ὅμοιος ("heterogeneous").

Q. Is this argumentation good? Every entity is quid ("kind/thing/having 'whatness'"): matter is not quid, therefore matter is not an entity. The major [premise] is proved, for entity and quid are interchangeable, since quid is the same as "something." [Things] that are interchangeable can be postulated universally about each other in turn. The minor is proved because, according to Aristotle in the seventh [book] of the Metaphysics, matter is neither quid, nor quale ("quality/sort"), nor quantum ("magnitude/number").

Aristotle Metaphysics 7.1.1028a.10-1028b.7. In the same work, see also 5.7.1017a.7-14.1020b.25.
R. No, because in the major premise quid is taken generally, but in the minor specifically.

Q. What is the meaning of quid taken generally?
R. Every thing that exists in nature.
Q. What is the meaning taken specifically?
R. The perfected and completed entity that is in the likeness of some thing.

A [sic]. Is this argumentation good? Every substance subsists of itself: matter does not subsist of itself, therefore matter is not a substance. The major premise is proved by the definition of substance. The minor is proved because matter is preserved by God so that it may not be reduced into nothing, for every created thing is preserved by God.

B. It is not good, because "to subsist of itself" means one thing in the major premise, another in the minor. In the major it signifies to be inherent in no subject accidentally, but in the minor it means to be preserved. The first is appropriate to substance, the other only to God.

A. Is this argumentation good? Every substance is primary or secondary: matter is not a primary substance or a secondary, therefore matter is not a substance. The minor premise is proved, for prime matter is not individual, nor a species, nor a genus.

B. It is not good because substance in the major premise is a noun of second intention, but in the minor it is a noun of first intention.

A. Can matter be said in any way to be engendered and destroyed?

B. It can, for it can be said to be engendered and destroyed accidentally, because form, which is different from the substance of matter, is engendered and destroyed. But it is not engendered or destroyed of itself, because matter itself, according to its own substance, neither begins nor ceases to exist. In the same way substance is sensible accidentally, because its qualities cannot be sensed of themselves since they themselves cannot be sensed. From which it is clear that matter is said to be engendered and destroyed just as a jar is said to become dry. It is said to become dry by metonymy, because its wine dries up.

<B>[+A]. Why is matter said not to be engendered since it is stated as being created.

B. Because whatever is engendered partly begins to exist; partly it existed in nature before its generation. For when a donkey is engendered only the soul of the donkey, which is the form of the donkey, begins to exist. Its matter existed in nature before the
generation. What is created, however, begins to exist in its entirety, since nothing of it existed in nature before its creation. For this reason prime matter is said to be created, not engendered, since when it was made it began to exist in its entirety. For the same reason we say that matter is not corruptible, since whatever is destroyed partly ceases to exist, in respect, that is, of its matter. If, however, matter were destroyed, it would remain in nature after its destruction. Matter can be annihilated because it can be reduced totally to nothing just as it was made totally out of nothing, for prime matter did not always exist, since no created thing is co-eternal with its own creator.

A. Is there one matter for all corruptible things?

B. There is one, not in number, but in kind; for there is not in Plato that very same portion of matter that [is] in Socrates, just as that very same soul is not in Plato that is in Socrates. Even though the matter of Socrates and of Plato is of one kind--for the matter of Socrates is transmutable and transformable just like the matter of Plato, and there is no difference between them on account of which they could differ in species--yet because they are two things in number, so that neither of them is the other, so they are different in number. If anyone should argue thus: all substances of one species are comprised of like forms; but the matter of Plato and of Socrates is not comprised of like forms, since they are not comprised of forms; therefore they are not of one species, [then] the major [premise] is to be denied. For not only composite substances having like forms are of one species, but those very forms are of one species. Likewise the matters of different portions are of one species, since matter does not consist of parts of different species.

A. Why are there only three dimensions?

B. Because only three lines can intersect one another at right angles. Of these one is length, one breadth, and the third thickness.

A. Which of these lines is the line of longitude, which of latitude, which of depth?

B. The longest of them is longitude, the shortest depth, the mean latitude. For example, let a body be four feet long, two wide, [and] one deep. In that body the line of four feet is the line of longitude, of two [feet] latitude, [and] of one [foot] depth.

A. How many dimensions has a surface?

B. Two, length and breadth.

A. Which is the line of longitude, which of latitude?

B. If the length of the surface is not equal to the width, the longer line is the line of longitude, the shorter of latitude.
however, the length is the same as the width, there is the same line of longitude and of latitude. A circle is such a kind of completion. From which it is clear that the longitude of the habitable earth is bounded by east and west, that is, Cadiz and India; the latitude by north and south.

A. In bodies, can the same line be a line of longitude, latitude and depth?

B. It can, as in a globe the longitude is as great as the latitude and the latitude as great as the depth. In a millstone, however, the longitude is equal to the latitude, but the depth [is] less than either of them.

A. Is matter that exists in the engendered and has existed in the destroyed one in number?

B. It is, because matter is the subject of transmutation. But the subject of transmutation is what remains the same in the transmutation as it was before the transmutation and will be after the transmutation; as, when a man is changed into earth, that same thing that before the transmutation had the form of a man, after the transmutation has the form of earth.

A. Is prime matter sensible?

B. It is not sensible, except accidentally. For no substance is sensible of itself, since only qualities are sensible of themselves. Qualities are of that nature that they can be sensed. The substances in which sensible qualities exist are sensible accidentally, since [they are so] by their qualities. Since sensible qualities are present in prime matter the result is that it is sensible accidentally. The same is to be thought concerning the substantial form.

A. Is prime matter intelligible of itself?

B. It is, for everything that exists in nature is intelligible of itself. When I understand every entity to be substance or accident I understand in one concept everything that exists in nature.

A. Why is a thing not intelligible accidentally as it is sensible accidentally?

B. Because nothing exists in nature that may resist being understood. For since our intellect understands universally it can, in one concept, understand all the things that exist in nature; that is, it can in one thought think about all the things that exist in nature. But since there are many things in nature that can be perceived by none of the senses, so not all things are sensible of themselves. Some are sensible accidentally [and] some are sensible neither of themselves nor accidentally. Of that sort are those things that cannot be sensed themselves and do not have sensible qualities.
A. By how many concepts is matter understood?

B. By two, general and specific. When I understand that every entity is one thing, every substance subsists of itself, every principle is prior to that of which it is the principle, [and that] everything that is transmuted remains the same in transmutation as it was before the transmutation and will be after the transmutation, then I understand matter by a general and universal concept. When I understand that substance—which can lose the form it has without its own destruction, and take up a form it does not have without its own generation—remains one and the same by number in the generated and the destroyed, then I understand matter by a specific concept; although a concept of this sort is complex and compounded, for prime matter cannot be understood by a specific and simple concept.

A. Why is matter understood by ἀνάλογων ("analogy/proportion") to form?

B. Because matter and form are proportional in this way: just as form stands in relation to operation, so [stands] matter to transmutation. But form is recognized by its operation, therefore matter [is recognized] by its transmutation. And this is what the commentator said: just as transmutation causes matter to be known, so operation [results in] form [becoming known]. For if a man were not changed into a corpse, and the corpse into earth, and the earth into grass, we should not know that matter is transformable and the subject of transmutation.

A. Can God and matter be conceived in one concept, that is, can the mind by one thought think of God and matter?

B. It can, for [the man] who understands that every entity exists in nature has a concept common to God and matter. [He] who understands that every substance subsists of itself has a concept common to God and matter. And concepts of this sort are absolute and substantial. [He] who understands that every cause is prior to that of which it is the cause has a concept common to God and matter, respective and comparative, from which it is clear that, though God and matter are very different substances, since God is a most perfect substance, matter most imperfect, yet they can be conceived in one concept. And for that reason they can be conceived by one univocal name, for whatever things can be conceived by one concept can be signified univocally. From which it is clear that entity and substance, [and] cause and principle, signify univocally God and prime matter. Nor does this diminish the majesty of God, that He Himself and the matter that is His handiwork may be conceived in one concept or signified by one name; just as it does not diminish the majesty of the king because he and his servant are signified by one name.

A. Is prime matter capable of finite or infinite transmutations?

B. Of infinite, for prime matter cannot be transformed so many times that it refuses to undergo transformation, nor is a certain number of transformations established which may not be surpassed.
For if the world were to continue forever in the transmutations in which it now exists, prime matter would be able to undergo transmutations of this kind in perpetuity.

A. Will matter be transmuted in perpetuity?

B. No, for after the last day all transmutation will cease, since transmutation occurs because of the men living in the world. For why is the earth changed into foodstuff and crops and fruit if not that it may provide food and clothing for mankind? After the last day no men will be living on the earth, therefore there will then be no transmutation.

A. Is the potentiality of matter that can be transformed an active or passive potentiality?

B. Passive, for it is the potentiality of taking up form. To take up is to be acted upon. Matter taking up a form from [that which is] transforming it does not do anything, [but] is only acted upon.

A. How many kinds of potentiality are there?

B. Three; the potentiality to be, the potentiality to act, [and] the potentiality to be acted upon.

A. How many potentialities does matter have?

B. Two. Matter can exist, because everything that does exist can exist, since nothing exists that cannot exist. Matter can also be acted upon, because it can be transformed. The potentiality of acting is lacking in matter because it is an entity in purely passive potentiality.

A. How many potentialities has God?

B. Two. God can exist since He does exist, and He can act since He does act. For God, by His own command, makes all the things that are made in the world. But the potentiality of being acted upon is not in God, for God can suffer nothing, neither annihilation, nor corruption, nor any transmutation. For this reason God is called pure actuality, while prime matter is pure potentiality.

A. Can matter be called potentiality?

B. It can, since the potentiality of matter is not a quality different from the substance of matter, but is the matter itself. For this reason matter is rightly called potentiality. The potentiality of matter, however, does not stand in relation to matter as the knowledge of the soul does to the soul, for the soul existed in nature before its own knowledge, so the soul is different from its own knowledge. But matter never existed in nature before its potentiality, since as soon as it began to exist it was transmutable, and as long as it lasts it will be transmutable. Matter is transmutable
of itself, as man is capable of laughter of himself, and as a triangle of itself has three angles equivalent to two right angles. No thing is by an accident different from itself the same thing as it is of itself. For what a thing is of itself, such it is of necessity; but what it is through some accident inherent in itself, such it is not of itself, nor by necessity, because when the accident is lost it ceases to be such as it was through the accident. Since, therefore, matter is transmutable of itself and of necessity, the result is that the transmutability of matter, which is its potentiality, is not different from its substance. One must judge in the same way of man's ability to laugh, because man is of himself and of necessity able to laugh. It could not occur that he should be able to laugh by any ability to laugh different from his substance, for whatever sort of thing exists of itself, it is such through its own substance and not through anything different from its substance.

A. Does matter seek out form?

B. It seeks it out by natural but not by animal appetite.

A. Demonstrate this.

B. Every perfectible thing naturally seeks out its own perfection: form is the perfection of matter, therefore matter seeks out form. But because matter does not recognize form it therefore does not seek it out by animal appetite.

A. What is the difference between natural and animal appetite?

B. Natural appetite is when that is sought out which is not recognized, as the appetite by which the heavy seeks to move downward and the light upward. Animal appetite, however, is when that is sought which is recognized by the soul; and that only exists in animals, because only the sensual soul of dumb animals and the intellectual soul of men are cognitive souls. From which it follows that there is no animal appetite in trees. The animal appetite is split into sensual and intellectual. The sensual is when that is sought out which has been perceived and recognized by some sense; the intellectual when that is sought out which has been recognized by the intellect and mind. The latter appetite we call will, and it is divided into right will and wrong will. Right will is when we choose the thing that is honorable and that right reason dictates should be chosen. Wrong [will] is when we choose the thing that is shameful and that right reason dictates we should avoid. Prime matter seeks out form only by natural appetite, not by sensual or intellectual.

A. Why is this argumentation faulty? Whatever seeks out, recognizes: matter does not recognize, therefore matter does not seek out.

B. Because "seeks out" in the major [premise] refers to the animal appetite and is taken specifically, but in the conclusion "seeks out" is taken universally.
DIALOG VII

Concerning the Whole and the Part

A. Is the whole its own part?

B. No. Nor is a whole substance, which is called a compounded substance, any one of its parts, because a compounded substance is comprised of parts. No thing consisting of many things is any one of those things of which it consists, nor is the whole quantity any one of its parts. From this it follows that a man is neither his soul nor his body. For although a man is body, that is, corporeal substance, yet he is not his body. If he were his body he would be his own part of himself. It follows secondly that a circle is not a semicircle, nor a sphere a hemisphere. It follows thirdly that the light of two candles is not the light of one of them.

A. Is this statement true, that part of a substance is substance?

B. It is, for substance does not consist of non-substances. But this is false, that part of a substance is that very substance of which it is part.

A. Is a part of a quantity a quantity?

B. It is, for a part of a longitude is a longitude, a part of a latitude is a latitude, etc. But no part of a quantity is the very quantity of which it is part; for half a foot is not a foot, nor a foot and a half; and half a pound is not the pound of which it is part; nor is a sextans ("sixth part") or dextans ("five-sixths part") the as ("complete 12 ounce unit") of which it is a part.

The parts of an as:

A. What are the parts of an as?

B. These, the uncia ("1 oz.") and deunx ("11 oz."); the sextans ("2 oz.") and dextans ("10 oz."); the triens ("4 oz.") and bes ("8 oz."); the quadrans ("3 oz.") and dodrans ("9 oz."); the quincunx ("5 oz.") and septunx ("7 oz."); the semissis ("6 oz.") (and the semissis).

A. Why is no total quantity its own part?

B. Because if a total quantity were its own part, the total quantity would be equal to its own part. If a foot is half a foot, a foot is equal to half a foot. But for the total to be equal to its
part is repugnant to the common conception of the mind; therefore the whole is not its own part.

A. How many parts does a quality have?

B. Two, the parts of extension and the parts of intension; as, a light two feet long consists of two lights one foot long, as it were, by parts of extension; but a light of twelve candles consists of two lights by parts of intension.

A. Is any whole a part?

B. It is, for the whole hand is part of the body.

A. Is every part a whole?

B. No, because some part is indivisible. Nothing divisible is a whole. The indivisible does not consist of parts.

[A question is lacking here.]

B. Because the rational soul is a part of man but it is not any whole. Likewise, Michael is a part of the multitude of angels, and yet he is not a part.\(^1\)

A. Is every whole a part?

B. No, for the whole universality of things, that is, of what is in nature, is a part of nothing.

A. Does the whole consist of a single part?

B. No. For it is inevitable that every whole has two parts, since the fewest parts that a whole can have are two; therefore no whole has a single part. From which it follows that every part has a partner, as the soul is the partner of the body and the body the partner of the soul.

A. Does every whole have a maximum number of parts of which it is comprised?

B. No, for a body is comprised of infinite parts of proportions and therefore does not have a maximum of parts of which it is comprised. It consists of more than a thousands parts, of more than ten thousand parts, of more than a thousand thousand thousand parts; therefore the many parts of which the body is comprised cannot be given or named.

A. Is this argumentation good? Four is two; therefore the whole is

\(^1\)Without the question the meaning of the answer remains uncertain. The most likely explanation is that while Michael is a part of the multitude of angels, he is not a part of himself.
The antecedent is proved because four, or four quarters, is two of two halves, as four quadrantes are two semisses.

B. The conclusion must be denied, for four is not that two which is part of four, but is the twofold number that is the same as four.

A. Is this argumentation good? If man is a body, man is part of himself: but man is a body, therefore man is part of himself. The conclusion is proved because it is argued from a conditional whole, since the positions of the accident, etc. The minor [premise] is proved because the body is the genus of man, therefore man is body.

B. It is not a good argumentation, because "body" means a different thing in the major [premise] from the minor; for in the major it signifies one part of man, in the minor the whole corporeal substance. It is a hypothetical syllogism, in which the proposition or refutation of the antecedent is the minor [premise].

A. Is this syllogism good? If man is his soul, man is part of himself: but man is soul, therefore man is part of himself. The minor [premise] is proved because man is a soul endowed with a body, therefore he is soul. The antecedent is proved: man is a soul endowed with a body or stripped of a body; but he is not a soul stripped of a body, therefore he is a soul endowed with a body. The conclusion is proved because it is argued from the conditional whole, with the refutation of the conclusion to the proposition of the antecedent.

B. It is not a good syllogism, because it is not argued from the whole disjunctive truth but from insufficient [truth]. For man is neither a soul endowed with a body, since the whole is not its part, nor a soul stripped of its body.

A. Is this argumentation good? A triangle is an angle; therefore the whole is its part. The antecedent is proved, because every space contained between two lines touching one another is an angle, since that is the definition of an angle; but a triangle is like this, therefore a triangle is an angle. The minor [premise] is proved because all the space contained between the line AB and the line AC in triangle ABC is an angle, and this same space is a triangle; therefore a triangle is an angle.

B. It must be conceded that a triangle is an angle if the whole space contained between the line AB and the line AC is an angle. The conclusion must be denied, for an angle of this sort is not part of a triangle, but the whole triangle. From which it is clear that the angle and the triangle differ only in definition; for the same space is called an angle because it is contained by two lines, a triangle because it is enclosed by three lines.

A. Why is the angle defined with the verb "contained", and the triangle with the verb "enclosed"?

B. Because it is necessary for every triangle to be enclosed.
Every figure is enclosed by a boundary or boundaries. But it is not necessary for an angle to be enclosed; it is enough for it to be contained by two lines. If it is enclosed, however, it does not cease to be an angle.

A. What is to be said to this argument? The statue is bronze, therefore the whole is its part. The antecedent is proved simulacra gentium argentum et aurum ("the idols of the nations are silver and gold"). The conclusion is proved because the statue is bronze--comprised of bronze and shape--as Porphyrius [ca. A.D. 232-ca. 305] says. For he says a statue is comprised of bronze and shape as species is comprised of genus and difference.1

B. A statue is nothing but shaped bronze. If it is shaped bronze it is bronze in the same way that a white man is a man. Nor did Porphyrius mean anything except that bronze is not called a statue unless it is shaped. He did not mean that the statue consists of bronze and shape, because no substance can consist of shape.

A. Is the whole its parts?

B. The whole is all its parts, not individual [ones], and not some of its parts; for an as is not the individual ounces of which it is made up, nor some of them, since it is not three-quarters, or a third, but it is all the ounces of which it is made up. It is twelve ounces, because it consists of them. Likewise, the senate is not the individual senators, but all of them. Likewise, a man is neither a soul nor a body, but is soul and body. A circle divided by a diameter into two equal parts is nothing other than two semicircles; when divided into two parts, one greater than a semicircle, the other less, it is nothing other than those two parts. If it is divided into several sections it is nothing other than the sections into which it is divided. A square, if it is divided into two triangles by one diagonal, or into four [triangles] by two [diagonals], is always the very same as all its parts. This same opinion is to be held in the case of a rectangle longer on one pair of sides, and in the case of a rhombus and of a rhomboid.

A. Is a right angle two acute angles?

B. It is, if it is made up of them.

A. Can an obtuse angle be two right angles?

B. It cannot, for it cannot be made up of them.

A. Why is a whole not admitted to be different from all its parts?

B. Because neither experiment, nor reasoning, nor the authority of Holy Scripture compels us to admit this thing; therefore it ought not to be admitted. The conclusion is proved since man is compelled

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1Porphyrius Isagoge 11.

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to admit nothing but what experiment, or reasoning, or authority compel him to admit, and especially the authority of Holy Scripture.

A. Is this statement true, [that] man is soul and body.

B. It must be analyzed. If it is a copulative sentence it is false, because it means that man is his individual parts. If it is concerned with a linked predicate it is true, because thus it means that a man is all his parts.

A. Why is the diameter of a square greater than its side?

B. Because if a square is divided into two equal triangles by a diagonal drawn from angle to angle, a greater angle is opposite the diagonal than [is opposite] the side, since the diagonal is opposite the right angle and the side [is opposite] the acute angle. A right angle is larger than an acute angle. Therefore the diagonal is greater than the side. The conclusion is proved by one of those rules of which the first is, the greatest side of a triangle is opposite the largest angle; the second, the shortest side of a triangle is opposite the smallest angle; the third, equal sides are opposite equal angles of a triangle.

A. What is the reasoning that shows that the whole is not different from all its parts.

B. The reasoning is this: because the whole has nothing in it by which it could differ from all its parts, therefore it does not differ from all its parts.

A. Why is the whole different from any one of its parts?

B. Because it has something in itself by which it may differ from any one of its parts, as, a man differs from his body by reason of his soul and from his soul by reason of his body. But a man has nothing by which he may differ from soul and body.

A. Are two wholes not having a common part different from one another?

B. They are, since neither of them has anything in it that the other has.

A. Are two wholes having a common part different from one another?

B. They are, since each of them has something in it that the other does not have.

A. Is a part different from the whole?

B. It is, for a part has less in itself than the whole of which it is a part. Thus the whole is other than the part because it has more in itself than the part. But the whole has nothing in itself that all the parts do not have, nor does it have more or less than
all the parts, therefore it is not different from them.

A. Give me two wholes having a common part.

B. The index finger and the thumb have one soul although they have different matters and bodies, for the same soul that animates the index finger also animates the thumb.

A. What is to be said to this argument? If the whole is all its parts, the finite is infinite things; but the finite is not infinite things, therefore the whole is not all its parts. The first part of the antecedent is proved, for the whole continuum has infinite proportional parts. If, therefore, the whole continuum is all its parts, it is inevitable that a finite body has infinite proportional parts. The second part of the antecedent is proved because the finite is not infinite, therefore the finite is much less than infinite things.

B. It must be allowed that a body finite in magnitude has proportional parts infinite in multitude, but it is not to be admitted that a body finite in magnitude has parts infinite in magnitude.

A. Are the proportional parts of the continuum finite or infinite?

B. They are finite in magnitude but infinite in multitude, for the last proportional is not to be given.

A. Into how many parts is the continuum divided?

B. Into two: into parts of the same quantity, and they are finite in magnitude and in multitude; and into parts of the same proportion, but those are finite in magnitude but not in multitude.

A. Can a number be divided into infinite proportional parts like the continuum?

B. It cannot, for in a number the last proportional part is to be given, as the proportional parts of 44 [sic, 64] are 32, 16, 8, 4, 2, 1. Unity is the last proportional part among these parts into which 64 is divided. From which the difference that exists between a number and the continuum is obvious.

A. Is everything that is made made from a presupposed subject?

B. Every composite substance that is made by the agent of finite power, that is, by a created craftsman, is made from a presupposed subject.

A. What is meant by subject?

B. Matter, because that is subjected to the craftsman. Matter is that in which the craftsman fashions what is transmuted by him.

A. What is a presupposed subject?
B. It is the matter required by a craftsman before he is able to make anything.

A. How is the agent classified?

B. The agent is divided into supernatural and natural agent, or uncreated and created, or into agent of infinite power and of finite power, or into prime and secondary agent. The prime agent is the prime craftsman, the almighty sower, and the inventor of all things; for He, since He is of infinite power, can make something out of nothing. The created craftsman, because he is of finite power, can make nothing out of nothing.

A. Can something be made out of nothing?

B. It can, for the uncreated craftsman can fashion something out of nothing; therefore something can be made of nothing. The conclusion is proved, because from an active statement follows a passive statement equivalent to it; [and this is] in good conclusion.

A. Why is it agreed among all the philosophers that nothing is made of nothing, that is, why have all philosophers jointly held this opinion, that nothing is made out of nothing.

B. Because all philosophers have thought this, since it had been established by them. This is the difference between philosophers and theologians, that philosophers believe things established to be true, theologians things revealed. But since not one of all the philosophers had established that something is made out of nothing, so none of them believed it. Thus, all jointly thought that nothing is made out of nothing. Averroes, the commentator on Aristotle, thought this same thing when he said that the proof of true statements is if they are in accordance with the things apprehended by the senses.1

A. Is this argumentation good? It has been established neither by Plato nor by Aristotle nor by any of the philosophers that anything is made out of nothing; therefore nothing has been made out of nothing.

[+B]. No, because many things have been made that have been known of by no mortal.

A. Is this good? Every thing that is made is made out of something; therefore everything that is made is made out of something.

B. No, because everything that is made has an efficient cause, but not everything that is made has matter from which it is made. For something can be made out of nothing. But it is not permitted in nature that anything should be made and not be made of something.

1Averroes Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Categories 2.1.14.4a.10-4b20.
For this reason grammarians say that every passive verb governs an ablative, with the intervention of the preposition a or ab ("from/away from/out of").

A. Is this argumentation good? Everything that is engendered is engendered from something; therefore everything that is made is made from something.

B. It is not good, because in it the argument is made from the subjective part to the whole with a distribution of the whole.

A. How is an equilateral triangle to be made?

B. Three equal circles should be made of which each one should touch the other two, and three lines must be drawn from the centers of these circles, enclosing a triangle. Such a triangle is equilateral, because each one of its sides consists of two half diameters of equal circles.

A. How is an equilateral quadrilateral to be made?

B. Four equal circles should be made touching one another, from the centers of which four lines are to be drawn, enclosing a quadrilateral. A quadrilateral of that sort is equilateral, because each side consists of two half diameters of equal circles.

A. How is a triangle to be made having two equal sides, which in Greek is called isocheles, in Latin equicrurus?

B. Three circles must be made, two of which are equal, [and] the one remaining smaller than the two. <B. Because>.

[A]. How is a triangle to be made that has three unequal sides, which in Greek is called scalenon?

B. Three unequal circles should be made touching one another.

A. Should one share Plato's opinion about the creation of the world?

B. No, for Plato, as Ambrose writes in his book Hexameron,¹ established three principles for everything—God, Exemplar, and matter; and he affirmed that these were uncreated and without beginning, and that God, not as creator of matter but as a workman, had made the world from matter, looking to the Exemplar, that is, the idea. Thus he denied that the world was made out of nothing. They seem to believe the same thing who say that the world was made out of chaos,

¹This is a reference to the commentary by Ambrose of Milan (ca. 339-97) on the Hexameron. Patristic commentaries on this work are often referred to by the name of the original document. The Hexameron itself is an account of the creation of the world in six days as set forth in Genesis 1.
about whom Ovid wrote in the first [book] Metamorphoses:

The face of nature was the same over the whole orb; they have called it chaos, a rough and unordered mass; and nothing but a lifeless bulk and warring seeds of ill-matched elements heaped in one, etc.¹

This opinion is not in accordance with piety, for it is impious to believe that the work is co-eternal with the craftsman and the creature with the creator.

A. Did Aristotle hold the same opinion as Plato?

B. No, for Plato thought that the world was made of matter, for matter had always existed.² Aristotle seems to have thought that the world had always existed and had not been made, because the movement of the heavens had never had a beginning, but had always existed and always would.³

A. What did the commentator Averroes think about the world?

B. He thought that God had always existed and was unable to create anything out of nothing. For he said with most impious lips: "These three have been in the world who have perverted the world, Moses, Christ, and Mahomet, for they taught that the world was created."

A. Are the argumentations demonstrative that seem to prove that nothing can be made of nothing?

B. They are not, for it is false that nothing can be made from nothing. The false is not demonstrable.

A. Why can the false not be proved?

B. Because it can be proved neither from truths, since the false does not follow from truths; nor from untruths, since the untrue cannot provide credibility. And on account of this the false cannot be proved.

A. Are the argumentations demonstrative that seem to prove that God can make something out of nothing?

1Ovid Metamorphoses 1.7-10. The Latin verse as recorded by Hegius, Dialogi, fo. I.ii recto, is given here.
"Unus erat toto nature vultus in orbe
Quem discere chaos, rudis indigestaque moles
Nec quicquam nisi pondus iners congestaque eodem
Non bene iunctarum discordia semina rerum etc."

2Plato Timaeus 31b, 48e, 51a.

3Aristotle On the Heavens 1.9.277b.27-279b.3.
B. They are not, for no article of faith can be proved. It would take away the merit of faith if articles of faith could be proved.

A. Is this argumentation good? Whatever is engendered is engendered from a presupposed subject, since nothing is engendered out of nothing; matter is engendered, since according to the commentators prime matter is what is engendered in the truth of a thing; therefore it is engendered from a presupposed subject. The conclusion is false, for if matter is engendered from a presupposed subject there would be an infinite regression. Therefore, either the major or the minor [premise] is false; [but] not the minor, therefore the major.

B. It is not a good argumentation, for something is said to be engendered in three ways. In one way, the subject, and this is appropriate to matter; for that [matter] is subject to substantial transformation, which is called generation. In a second way, the termination, and this is appropriate to form; for that terminates generation. In the third way, by way of completion, or subsistently, and this is appropriate to the composite substance; for it is that which subsists when generation occurs. In this argumentation, however, this word engendered in the major [premise] means to be engendered subsistently or by way of completion; in the minor [it means] to be engendered subjectively.

A. Is form engendered from a presupposed subject?

B. Form is not engendered—as a composite substance is engendered—from a presupposed subject in such a way that the subject remains part of the form after generation, because principles are not made from one another; that is, one is not re-created from another. But it is called generation ex subiecto "from the subject," that is, in subiecto presupposito ("in a presupposed subject"). And in this way also an accident is said to be engendered. For there is προσθετων ι[α]παλαισμο ("an exchange of preposition") in these sentences: "Form is engendered ex materia ('from matter');" "Form is drawn de materia ('out of matter');" or, "[Form is drawn] ex potentia materiae ('out of the potentiality of matter')." [This is] a figure that occurs when prepositions are exchanged. For form is said to be drawn from matter because it is induced into matter.

A. Is this argumentation good? Whatever is made naturally is made of something; everything that has been created has been made, therefore everything that has been created naturally has been made of something.

B. It is not good, because this adverb "naturally" modifies one thing in the major [premise] and another in the conclusion. In the major it modifies "has been made," [and] in the conclusion it modifies "has been made from something."

A. Is this argumentation good? Whatever progresses from not being to being is made out of nothing; everything that is engendered progresses from not being to being, therefore everything that is engendered is made out of nothing.
B. It is not good. For to progress from not being to being is to begin to exist in respect of form, and to have existed previously in respect of matter; but to be made out of nothing is to have existed previously neither in respect of matter nor in respect of form. Every single natural thing, that is, every single composite substance produced by nature, is made up of matter and form.

A. How many are the principles of natural transmutation?

B. Three: the subject of the transmutations and the two boundaries.

A. What are the boundaries of transmutation?

B. The *terminus a quo* of acquisitive transmutation is privation, the *terminus ad quem* possession; the *terminus a quo* of deprivatory transmutation is possession, the *terminus ad quem* privation.

A. What is acquisitive transmutation?

B. When having occurs after lack, as when white is made out of not white.

A. What is deprivatory transmutation?

B. When lack occurs after having, as when a blind man is made out of a seeing [man], or a deaf man out of a hearing.

A. What is the subject of transmutation?

B. The substance remaining one and the same under either terminus of the transmutation, that is, under privation and possession.

A. What are the principles of substantial transmutation?

B. Matter, privation, and form. For matter is subjected to transmutation, privation is the *terminus a quo*, and form the *terminus ad quem*.

A. What sort of principles are the principles of transmutation?

B. They are definitive principles, for every noun signifying transmutation is defined by three nouns, of which one signifies the subject of transmutation, the second the boundary from which the transmutation begins, the third the boundary at which the transmutation ceases; as, to whiten is for something not white to become white. By "something" is understood the subject of the transmutation, by "not white" the *terminus a quo*, by "white" the *terminus ad quem*.

A. How is an equilateral triangle to be made?

B. In this way. Two circles should be made, of equal sizes, intersecting each other at their centers. When this has been done a line is to be drawn from the center of one to the center of the other,
which is a half diameter of each circle. Then two lines are to be drawn from the centers of those circles to the point of intersection. When this has been done an equilateral triangle is obtained.

A. Are the principles of natural transmutation contraries?

B. If by principle of natural transmutation we understand definitive principles, and if we take contraries so generally that all opposed things are called contraries, it must be said that the principles of natural transmutation are contraries, since no natural transmutation can be defined except by means of opposites. For whitening is defined by means of not white and white, [and] blackening by not black and black. Whitening is that something turns from not white into white; blackening from not black into black.

A. By what opposition are the principles of natural transmutation contraries?

B. By primitive [sic, privative] opposition. For every natural transmutation is defined by means of two nouns, of which one signifies having and the other lack; as, whitening is defined by means of not white, which signifies lack, and by white, which signifies having.

A. Are white and not white opposed privatively, or in contradiction?

B. "Not white" has two meanings. In one way it signifies what does not have whiteness, and in this way it is opposed in contradiction to white. By the other way it means a thing that does not have whiteness and is able to have it, and in this way not white is opposed to white privatively. Nouns of which one signifies having, and the other lack and the ability to have, are opposed privatively, for privation is nothing but the lack of a thing with the potentiality of having it.

A. Why is transmutation defined by means of things opposed privatively?

B. Because nothing can be transmuted unless it can turn from lack to having, or conversely, from having to lack.

A. Why is transmutation not defined by contraries properly speaking? That is, why is whitening not defined by means of black and white?

B. Because in a transmutation the passage is not always made from contrary to contrary, since often the form that is gained or lost through the transmutation has no form contrary to itself. The substantial form that is gained by generation does not have any form contrary to itself, since nothing exists contrary to substance; nor does the light that is acquired by the air through illumination have any quality contrary to itself. Every natural transmutation, however, is a passage from privation to possession, or the converse;
thus transmutation is to be defined by means of privative opposites, not by things opposed as contraries.

A. Are the principles of a natural thing contraries?

B. They are not, for matter is not contrary to form nor form to matter, since form is the ἐντελεχεία, that is, the actuality or perfection of matter. No perfection is contrary to that of which it is the perfection.

A. Why is the form called the actuality?

B. Because every perfection, which is called by Greek philosophers ἐντελεχεία, is by the Latins called actus.

A. Why is matter called potentiality?

B. Because it can be transformed and transmuted.

A. Why are matter and form called intrinsic principles?

B. Because they are parts of the natural thing. Every part is in that of which it is a part, because no thing consists of externals.

A. Are matter and form called in Latin intrinsic principles, or internal?

B. Internal. Intrinsicus and extrinsicus are adverbs, although the philosophers of our times decline them like nouns.

A. What was the opinion of Parmenides [ca. 515-ca. 449 B.C.] and Melissus [fl. post 541 B.C.] concerning the principles of natural things?

B. They believed that there was one principle of natural things, that is, an immobile essence. Melissus, as Diogenes Laertius writes, thought that this universe is infinite and immutable, and immobile, and one thing like itself, and complete; and [that it is] not moved but only seems to be.

A. How did Melissus persuade himself that the universe is infinite?

B. By these three argumentations. Every thing that is made has a principle: the universe was not made, therefore the universe has no principle. Whatever lacks a principle lacks a limit: the universe lacks a principle, therefore it lacks a limit. Whatever lacks a limit is infinite: the universe lacks a limit, therefore it is infinite.

1Aristotle Metaphysics 1.5.986b.8-987a.2.

A. Are the argumentations of Melissus good?

B. No. The first is not well formulated because it is a syllogism of the first figure, [and] the constant is negative in the minor [premise]. The second is sophistical because "principle" in the major [premise] signifies a principle of duration, in the minor a principle of magnitude. The third is sophistical because "limit" in the major [premise] signifies limit of magnitude, in the minor a limit of duration.

A. How did Melissus persuade himself that the universe is immobile?

B. In this way. Every infinite thing is immobile, because an infinite thing occupies every place (on this account it cannot move from place to place): the universe is infinite, therefore it is immobile.

A. Is everything infinite in magnitude immobile in the way that Melissus asserted? <because>

[+B]. It is not, because nothing is infinite in magnitude, since no infinite body exists in nature; therefore it is neither mobile nor immobile. [The fact] that no infinite body exists is proved because the largest of bodies is the sky; but the sky, since it is an orb, is finite. For a sphere is a solid figure enclosed by one surface, as Theodisius [of Bithynia (fl. ca. 100 B.C.)] says in the first book Of Spheres.1 Every solid figure is enclosed by a surface or surfaces, just as a plane figure [is enclosed] by a line or lines.

A. If a body infinite in magnitude were to exist in nature, could it move?

B. It could move, because it would be able to be altered. It could also move in its parts, just as water, if it were infinite, could move in its parts. But the whole infinite body would not be able to move, either by direct motion, because it would occupy every place; or by circular [motion], because it would have neither axis, nor pole, nor center. Nothing moves in a circular fashion except round an axis, poles, and center.

A. What is the axis of a sphere?

B. It is a line terminated by the two poles, passing through the center of the sphere.

A. Can a natural philosopher dispute against [someone] denying his principles?

B. By principles we can understand two things, the principles of  

1Theodisius was a Greek mathematician, one of whose works was a treatise on sections of the sphere. See The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "Theodisius (4)," by William D. Ross.
natural science, and the principles of natural things. The principles of natural things are matter and form. If anyone should deny these principles a natural philosopher would be able to dispute against him. For he will dispute thus against [those] denying that matter exists: if there is transmutation, there is matter; but there is transmutation, therefore there is matter. He will dispute thus against [those] denying that form exists: if natural things differ in species, form exists; but natural things do differ in species, therefore form exists.

A. What are the principles of natural science?

B. They are the indemonstrable statements in natural science. Of such a kind are these two statements: he is moved; many things exist. A natural philosopher can prove principles of this sort, however, neither by demonstrative proof, since nothing is more known than principles (every demonstrative proof is brought about by means of things more known); nor by proof leading to the impossible, because just as nothing is more true than principles, so nothing is more false than the opposites of principles. On this account, denying principles, one cannot be led to things more false, because one concedes the totally false. Moreover, just as the geometrician stands in relation to the principles of geometry, so [stands] the physicist to the principles of physics; for the geometrician is not able to prove his principles, so neither [can] the physicist [prove the principles] of physics.

A. How many principles of geometry are there?

B. Three. Postulations, definitions, and general conceptions of the mind.

A. How many postulations are there?

B. Five are put forward by Euclid [fl. ca. 300 B.C.]. The first [is]: from any point to any point a straight line can be drawn which is the shortest of all lines conterminus with itself; the second, a circle can be drawn on any center; the third, all right angles are mutually equal to themselves; the fourth, if a straight line falls across two straight lines [+not parallel to each other],¹ the two interior angles on one side will be less than two right angles (it is inevitable that those two lines protracted to the same place will run together)--from which postulation it follows that if a straight line falls across two straight parallel, that is, equidistant, lines it is inevitable that the two interior angles on either side will be equal to two right angles; the fifth, two straight lines cannot enclose any area.²

¹Cf. above, p. 510.

²Euclid The Elements 1, "Postulates." In actual fact, the fifth postulate given by Hegius should rather be listed as a common conception. The postulate actually given by Euclid and omitted by
A. How many general conceptions of the mind are there?

B. Nine. The first [is], every whole is equal to all its parts, hence every whole is greater than a part of itself; second, [things] that are equal to one and the same thing are equal to each other; the fourth [sic], [things] that are mutually equal to each other are not equal to any one thing; the fifth, if equal things are added to equals, or the same common thing, equals will result; the sixth, if equal things are taken away from equals, or the same common thing, equals will be left; the seventh, if unequal things are added to equals, or the same common thing, unequal will result; eighth, if unequal things are taken away from unequals, or the same common thing, equals will remain [sic]; the ninth, if any thing is set by another, and one of them does not exceed the other, they will be equal to one another.2

A. Is definition a principle of geometry?

B. By definition one must understand a pronouncement in which a definition is predicated concerning the definite. Of such a sort is this pronouncement: every triangle is a plane figure enclosed by three straight lines. This is a principle.

A. How many definitions of geometry are there?

B. Countless; and countless types of things are dealt with in geometry. Because of this it is necessary for [a man] wanting to learn geometry to take care to know how to define those things that are dealt with in geometry, since definition is a principle proof.

A. Why does Aristotle argue against Parmenides and Melissus if a physicist cannot refute those who deny the principles of physics?

B. Aristotle argues against those denying the principles of physics

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1But he means if unequals are taken away from equals, then unequals will remain, for the principle as stated would only be true in certain specific cases.

2Euclid The Elements 1, "Common Conceptions." The third common conception has been inadvertently omitted, and the fourth and eighth are not presented as common conceptions by Euclid. In addition to the common conception listed above as a postulate (see p. 534, n. 2.), Hegius has failed to note the following: "things which are double of the same thing are equal one to another; things which are halves of the same thing are equal one to another." See History of Greek Mathematics, pp. 444-45.
not as a physicist but as a prime philosopher, that is, a metaphysician. For it is the function of the metaphysician to establish the principles of the sciences.

A. Show that many things exist.

B. If substance and accident exist, many things exist, since substance is not accident nor accident substance: but substance and accident exist, therefore many things exist. Again, if the whole exists, many things exist, since every whole is made up of many parts: but the whole does exist, therefore many things exist, etc. Again, if there is a principle, many things exist, because every principle is the principle of some thing or things--but it is as untrue that there is an only principle in nature as it is untrue that there is a single, a double, or a triple [principle] in nature: a principle exists, therefore many things exist. If quantity exists [then] many things exist, because every quantity is made up of many parts; but quantity exists, because no body can exist without quantity, since every body, whether it be finite or infinite, of necessity has magnitude.

A. Is it necessary for an entity to be spoken of in multiplicity if substance and accident exist?

B. If by "spoken of in multiplicity" we understand to have different definitions, it is not necessary for an entity to be spoken of in multiplicity because substance and accident exist, since entity, in one definition, can signify substance and accident. If, however, by "spoken of in multiplicity" we understand to speak of different things, it is necessary that the entity be called, in multiplicity, substance and accident, if substance and accident exist, because substance and accident are different things.

A. Can accident be separated from substance?

B. They can in no way be separated naturally, because it is [the attribute] of accident to exist in another. The seventh [book] of Metaphysics.* However, they are sometimes separated by supernatural power, as we firmly believe concerning the accidents of the sacraments of the eucharist. For God can preserve the accident without the substance when substance is not needed for the preservation of the accident.

A. Is everything terminated by a greatest and a least?

B. It is not, for the power of God is not terminated by a greatest or a least. God is omnipotent, and on that account He has immeasurable and unbounded power. But a power that is terminated by a greatest and a least has limits and measure, and is not omnipotence. [The one] whose power has limits is not capable of all things, but only of some.

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1Aristotle *Metaphysics* 7.6.1031a.15-1032a.11.
A. Can God make a body so large that He could not make a larger?

B. He cannot, for the power of God, since it is immeasurable, is not terminated by a greatest.

A. Can God make a body so small that He could not make a smaller?

B. He cannot, because the power of God is not terminated by a smallest.

A. Can a body be made greater than every body?

B. It can by God, just as God can make a body smaller than every body.

A. Is there a largest of all the bodies in nature?

B. There is, because the furthermost heaven is in nature, and that is the greatest of all bodies.

A. Is there a smallest of all bodies in nature?

B. There is not, because every body, however tiny, is made up of parts, since no body is aathomum, that is, indivisible: every part of a body is a body, since a body is not composed of non-bodies; therefore no body is the smallest.

A. Can the largest part of a continuous body be given, that is, is any of all the parts of a continuum the largest?

B. It is not, for any continuum is divided into a large part and a small. If the small part were to be divided into two particles, and one of them added to the large part, then it would become larger; from which it follows that some part is larger than each part of the continuum.

A. Does the smallest part of a continuous body exist in nature?

B. It does not exist, because every part of a continuum is divisible, since anathouov body does not exist in nature; from which it follows that some part is smaller than each part of the continuum.

A. Does a largest man exist in nature?

B. If that man is called largest than whom no man is larger, it must be admitted that some man is largest. If, however, that man is called largest who is larger than every man other than himself, it is doubtful if a largest man exists in nature.

A. Why is this statement ambiguous, [that] a largest man exists in nature?

B. Because every superlative makes a statement ambiguous, for it
has one meaning when it is expounded affirmatively and another when expounded negatively.

A. Are all types of natural things terminated by a greatest and a least; that is, is the human race terminated by the largest and smallest of men, the equine race by the largest and smallest of horses, the race of oak trees by the largest and smallest of oaks?

B. They are, because the constant of all things in nature, as Aristotle says in the second [book] On the Soul, is the terminus of magnitude.1

A. Can any man be so large that no other is or can be larger than he?

B. He can.

A. Can any man be so small that no other is or can be smaller than he?

B. He can; from which it follows that the human race is terminated by a greatest and a least. One is to think similarly of the other types of living things. For a man cannot attain to such a height that his stature might be equal or surpass high towers or oak trees.

A. Is any man so great or so small that no other can become as great or as small?

B. He is not, because for each man there can occur some man equal.

A. Is any man as large as no other, or as small as no other?

B. It is uncertain, and it is unlikely.

A. How many questions are asked concerning greatest and least?

B. Four: for there are two greatests, the greatest that can [be] and the greatest that cannot; and two smallests, the smallest that can [be] and the smallest that cannot.

A. How many questions are asked about human height or stature?

B. Four.

A. Which?

B. First, whether among the statures that man has there is some greatest; second, whether among the same there is some least; third, whether among the statures that a man cannot have there is some greatest; fourth, whether among the same there is some least. The same questions are asked of the quantities of other things.

1Aristotle On the Soul 2.4.416a.16-17.
A. How many questions are asked about weight?

B. Four.

A. Which?

[48]. First, whether among the weights that a man can carry there is some greatest; second, among the same, whether there is some least; third, whether among the weights that a man cannot carry there is some greatest; fourth, whether among the same there is some least.

A. What is an importable weight?

B. It is [one] that is too heavy to be able to be carried.

A. Are importable weights by any chance equal?

B. No, because they are not equally heavy.

A. What relationship must there be between the portative power and the heaviness of the weight?

B. A relationship of greater inequality. A weight cannot be carried by anyone unless his portative power surpasses by some excess the heaviness of the weight. From which it is clear that a portative power of one hundred pounds consists of the power of carrying one hundred pounds and the power of carrying something more than one hundred pounds. Otherwise the portative power would not surpass the heaviness of the weight, nor would it have a relationship of greater inequality to the heaviness of the weight. From which it follows [that] no portative power exists [by] which only one hundred pounds could be carried. From which it follows [that] portative power is not terminated by a greatest weight that could be carried.

A. Why is portative power said to be terminated by a greatest weight?

B. Because it can be given some weight that is almost the greatest among all the weights that anyone can carry. What is almost the greatest is called the greatest.

A. Is the infinite unknown?

B. It is, for we cannot know of the infinite how great it is, since the infinite is not measurable.

A. What quantities are known to us?

B. [Those] that we can measure by some quantity known to us.

A. What quantity is unknown to us?

B. [That] which we cannot measure by any quantity known to us.
A. What is it to measure length?

B. It is to discover how many times some known quantity is contained in a length.

A. What is it [for] some length to be known?

B. If it is a short length, to know how many feet it contains; if great, how many stadia [about one furlong] or how many miles.

A. What is it [for] the length of the habitable earth to be known?

B. It is to know how many miles the length of the habitable earth contains. One must think similarly about the breadth and the circumference of the earth.

A. Why is infinite quantity unknown to us?

B. Because we can measure it by no known quantity. For no one can know how many miles an infinite length contains in itself. One must think similarly about infinite breadth.

A. Can a square whose side is one hundred feet be known to us?

B. It can, because we know how many feet its area contains.

A. How are we able to know this?

B. Let us multiply the side of the square by itself. When that is done the quantity of the area of the square will be the result.

A. What is the area of a square?

B. It is the surface enclosed by the sides of the square.

A. Can the area of an oblong quadrilateral, which is called a quadrilateral longer on the second pair of sides, become known to us?

B. It can. Its longer side must be multiplied by its shorter side, from which multiplication the quantity of the area will result.

A. Can every square have an oblong quadrilateral equal to it?

B. It can.

A. How will this be found?

B. We multiply half the side of the square by twice itself. When that is done we shall have an oblong quadrilateral equal to the square; as, a square whose side is four feet is equal to an oblong quadrilateral of which one side is two feet, the other eight.

A. How is one to find the square equal to an oblong quadrilateral?
B. A line is to be found of a proportion halfway between the longer and the shorter line of the oblong quadrilateral, and that is to be multiplied by itself. From that multiplication will result a square equal to the oblong quadrilateral, just as Aristotle says in the second [book] On the Soul.¹

A. How is the area of a rhombus to be found?

B. Let a perpendicular line fall from one of its angles to the opposite side. Multiply that line by the side to which it falls. From that multiplication will result the quantity of the area of the rhombus. By this same method is to be found the quantity of the area of a rhomboid, that is, an oblong rhombus.

A. How many sorts of infinity are there?

B. There are as many sorts of infinity as there are ablatives with which infinity is construed.

A. What are the sorts of infinity?

B. Infinity of magnitude, which is divided into three parts, namely, into infinity of length, of breadth, and of thickness; infinity of capacity; infinity of duration; infinity of potentiality or power; infinity of divisibility; infinity of transmutability; infinity of heaviness or weight.

A. Do all these infinities exist in nature?

B. They do not. Infinity of magnitude exists nowhere, for no body is infinite in magnitude. Nor does infinity of capacity or of heaviness exist in nature, because every place is finite [and] every weight is finite.

A. Classify infinity of duration.

B. Infinity of duration is twofold. A certain thing exists that has always endured and will always endure, and it is called by the philosophers of our age infinity a parte ante ("from before") and a parte post ("from after"), because it is infinite in both directions. Such an infinity is God, for He neither begins nor ceases to exist. He has never not existed, nor will He ever not exist. The other is what will always endure but has not always endured, and this is infinity in one direction and is called infinity a parte post.

A. Is this statement good Latin: Deus est infinitus a parte ante et a parte post ("God is infinite from the past and into the future")?

B. These statements are good Latin: Deus neque incepit esse neque definit esse; Deus neque ex nihilo factus est neque in nihilum

¹Ibid., 2.2.413a.16-19.
rediget ("God neither began to exist, nor will He cease to exist; God has neither been made from nothing, nor will he be reduced to nothing").

A. What is to be said of this argumentation? Something is known about nothing unknown: something is known about the infinite, therefore the infinite is not unknown.

B. It is faulty. To be unknown means two things. In one way it means that about which nothing is known. With unknown taken that way, the infinite is not unknown. In the other way [it means] that which is of unknown quantity, that is, about which we cannot pronounce how great it is. In this way the infinite is unknown.

A. What is to be thought of this? Every entity is known: the infinite is an entity, therefore the infinite is known. The major [premise] is proved, because, to the man who knows that every entity is one, every entity is known, since by the same reasoning by which every entity is known, also etc. The minor is proved because infinity of duration is an entity, likewise infinity of passibility.

B. It is faulty because "known" has two meanings. In one way [it means] that about which something is truly known--in this way every entity is known. In the other [way it means] that of which the quantity is known--with known taken in this way the infinite is not known.

A. Does this statement prove itself false, [that] the infinite is known to be unknown?

B. If that is called unknown of which the quantity is unknown, it does not prove itself false. If, however, that is called unknown about which nothing is known, it does prove itself false.

A. What is to be thought of this argumentation? Whatever is known is an entity: infinity of magnitude is not an entity, therefore it is not known. If, however, it is not known, it is not known to be unknown. The major [premise] is proved because the truth can be pronounced about every thing that is known: but truth can only be pronounced about an entity, therefore every thing that is known is an entity.

B. It is faulty, because the expression "that is known" in the major [premise] is taken specifically; in the conclusion generally. For in the major it is taken as that which is known by affirmative and absolute knowledge, that is, not by conditional [knowledge].

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1The point being made is that the terms used by philosophers of the late medieval period were not good Latin. Hegius acknowledges that the philosophical terms serve a useful purpose, but he proceeds to show how the same thought may be couched in classical language rather than in what he would consider, in terms of literary style, to be medieval vulgarities.
the conclusion [it is taken] as everything that is known, whether it be known by affirmative knowledge, or by negative, or by absolute, or by conditional.
Questions Concerning the Sensible and the Sense

A. What is the sensible?

B. What can be perceived, of itself or accidentally, by a sense or senses.

A. How many kinds of sensible things are there?

B. Two.

A. Which?

B. The sensible of itself and the accidentally sensible.

A. What is sensible of itself?

B. What can be sensed by its very own nature, that is, what in its nature is such that it can be recognized by some sense; as, color is visible of itself; sound audible of itself; savored able of itself to be tasted; odor able of itself to be smelled; [and] heat and cold, moisture and dryness, [which are] qualities of themselves tangible.

A. What is accidentally sensible?

B. What cannot be sensed of its very own nature, but is sensed by means of some other thing such as accident or inherence; as, a colored thing is sensed by means of color; a noisy thing by means of sound. For when a quality is sensed of itself, the substance in which the quality is inherent is sensed by means of accident. No substance is sensed of itself, but a substance having a sensible quality inherent in itself is sensible accidentally.

A. What things are visible of themselves, what accidentally?

B. Color and light are visible of themselves, but colored things and lighted things are seen accidentally, since colored things are seen by means of color, lighted things by means of light. The same opinion is to be held about bodies that shine by night, and about fire. It also follows that all colors, of such a kind as the colors white and black, that are called extreme colors, and red, green, purple, dark blue, [and] azure, that are called secondaries, are seen of themselves; but snow and pitch and other colored bodies are seen by accident.
A. Can a sense be deceived and err?

B. It can, particularly about things accidentally sensible, which cannot always be distinguished by a sense like things sensible of themselves. And because of this sense sometimes judges bronze and brass to be gold.

A. What is it for a sense to be deceived?

B. It is for the sense to make a false judgment, as, sight is deceived when it judges tin to be gold.

A. Why is sight more deceived about things accidentally sensible than [about things sensible] of themselves?

B. Because sight is better able to distinguish the colors of things than their substances, for sometimes sight is too dull to be able to make out the substances of things.

A. Why does sense often make false judgment about the substances of things?

B. Because substantial forms are not sensible of themselves; for no one ever sees the substantial form of a tree or an animal or a metal. And for this reason a sense cannot distinguish the substances of things. But a sense can easily distinguish qualities because they are sensible of themselves.

A. Why is someone said to see the substance of a thing, since he does not see the substantial form, as has been said, nor the matter. For matter, since it never lacks qualities, is always wrapped round with an envelope of qualities. These are seen by us, not the matter itself.

B. The substance of a thing is said to be seen accidentally, as has been said, or by a communication τῶν ἐλοίων τῶν, "of its properties". For a visible property communicates to ἐλοιωμα, that is, its property, which is to be seen along with the substance in which it is inherent, so that the substance is said to be seen on account of the visible quality inherent in it.

A. What things are audible of themselves, what accidentally?

B. All sounds are audible of themselves. All sounded things are heard accidentally, because [they are heard] through their sounds. From which it follows that all voices of animals are heard of themselves, but the animals [are heard] accidentally. The voice of the nightingale is heard of itself, the nightingale [is heard] accidentally; the voice of the pelican is heard of itself, the pelican accidentally; the grunting of a pig is heard of itself, the pig accidentally.

A. Can a sense err about a thing sensible of itself and proper,
that is, can sight judge falsely concerning color, hearing concerning sound, smell concerning odor, etc.?

B. Every sense can judge correctly and falsely, not only concerning the accidentally sensible, that is, concerning the substance of a sensible thing, but also concerning the sensible of itself, that is concerning the sensible quality. And a sense does not only judge falsely concerning the universal sensible, but sometimes judges falsely concerning the proper sensible.

A. Demonstrate this.

B. Sight judges light to be light, white to be white, black to be black, red to be red, the pale to be pale, yellow to be yellow: it judges correctly. But when it judges light to be red, or black to be white, it judges falsely. Taste judges honey sweet, gall bitter: it judges rightly. The taste of the feverish judges falsely, for to them sweet things seem bitter. When two people have eaten garlic, neither judges the condition of the other to be offensive to the smell. The noses of each, filled with the stench, on that account judge falsely on either side.

A. How many things are there that impede a sense, so that it does not judge correctly concerning sensible things?

B. Three.

A. Which?

B. The first is the sensory organ. When that is not such as the sense requires, it happens that the sense errs. The second is the body [acting as] medium between the sense and the sensible. That makes the sense err when it is not such as it should be. The third is the space that separates the sensible from the sense. When that is more than just, the sense cannot judge correctly concerning the sensible.

A. How many things are there that keep the sense from erring?

B. Three, according to Themistius [ca. A.D. 320-ca. 390].

A. Which?

B. Due disposition of the organ; due disposition of the medium; due distance of the object.

A. Why does sight not always judge correctly concerning the magnitude of the thing seen?

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1Themistius was a Greek philosopher and rhetorician who produced a number of commentaries on the works of Aristotle. See The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "Themistius," by Robert Browning.
B. Because of the great distance of the thing seen from the eye. And for this reason the sun, which is larger than the whole earth, is judged [to be] of a magnitude of two feet. For by as much as the angle of the pyramid under which a seen thing is seen is larger, by that much [the thing seen] appears larger; by as much as [the angle is] smaller, by that much it appears smaller. From which it follows that one and the same thing seems larger to someone who has not moved [from the object] than to one who has moved.¹

A. What is the proper sensible, what the universal?

B. The proper is what is perceived by only one sense, as color; for only sight judges what color each thing is. The universal is what is perceived by many senses, as magnitude; for when we want to discover of what magnitude anything is we consult either sight or touch.

A. What are the universal sensible things?

B. Magnitude, quiescence, number and movement, and figure; these things sensible to you are called universal.

A. By what senses are these sensible things perceived?

B. By sight and by touch, the proof of which [is] that not only a seeing [man] but also the blind can discover magnitudes and figures and the other universal sensibles.

A. What is understood by the name of magnitude?

B. The three dimensions: length, breadth, and thickness. These are recognized both by sight and by touch; for when we want to discover of what length any thing is, we consult either our eyes or our hands.

A. Why are length, breadth, and thickness called dimensions?

B. Because all bodies that we measure we measure either according to length or breadth or thickness.

A. By what senses are equality and inequality perceived?

B. By sight and by touch, for blind men perceive equalities and inequalities by touch, but a seeing [man] by sight and touch.

A. By what sense do we recognize movement and quiescence?

¹As the text stands it is difficult to make sense of this reply. Hegius appears to be speaking of the angle of the light rays falling upon the eye from an object. The further away an object is, the more acute the angle—or pyramid—made by the rays. Thus, for one who has not "moved" away from the object, the angle will be less acute and the object will appear larger.
B. By sight and by touch, for we see certain bodies move out of their places, some rest in them. We also perceive the same by touch.

A. Is every motion sensible to a corporeal sense?

B. No, for there are many motions that can be perceived by no corporeal sense. No sense of the body can discover the movement of the human mind.

A. Which of the movements is universally sensible?

B. Local movement, for that is perceived both by sight and by touch.

A. By which sense are alterations perceived?

B. Some by sight, some by touch, some by the other senses. For by sight we recognize when something grows white or grows red, by touch when it grows cold or grows hot, by taste when it grows sweet or grows sour, etc.

A. By what senses are figures recognized?

B. By sight and by touch, for by these senses we recognize which figure is a circle, which a semicircle, which a sphere, which a hemisphere.

A. How many kinds of figures are recognized by sight and by touch?

B. Two.

A. Which?

B. Plane and solid figures; for we recognize by sight and touch of which figure each surface is, that is, whether it is round or angular; and, if it is angular, whether it is a triangle or a quadrilateral, etc. By the same [senses] we recognize of which figure each body is, that is, whether it is spherical or cubic or pyramidal.
DIALOG IX

Here Begin ta Ἡθικα Εθικυα [sic. Eθικυα]: That Is, Questions about the Moral Arts

A. Is there knowledge concerning morals?

B. There is.

A. Why?

B. Because true things can be sensed, affirmed, and proved about them, therefore there is knowledge about them. For we consider ourselves to have knowledge in respect of those things about which we can know, affirm, and prove truths. For falsehoods that are affirmed about things are not known, nor [are] truths that cannot be proved, since knowledge is acquired by means of proof. Knowledge is faith, that is, an agreement by which our mind agrees to the conclusion of demonstrative reasoning.

A. Are all things known that are felt and pronounced about morals?

B. [No], since many falsehoods are pronounced about morals. There is no knowledge of falsehoods.

A. Who makes false pronouncements about morals?

B. [Those] who say that base things are honorable and that [things] which are honorable are base.

A. Is there knowledge of all the truths that are pronounced about morals?

B. No, for some of the truths that are pronounced about morals were revealed to men by God, and there is no knowledge of them, but belief. Some have been discovered by the human intelligence, and there is knowledge of them.

A. State the truths concerning morals.

B. To give to any man what is his is honorable; to steal another's things is base; to keep your hands from another's things is excellent.

A. How are these truths to be proved?
B. In this way. Whatever right reason dictates should be done is honorable: but right reason dictates that one should give to any man what is his, therefore to give to any man what is his is honorable. Likewise, whatever goes contrary to the dictate of right reason is base: to steal another’s things is of this nature, therefore [it is] base.

A. What is the name of the science concerning morals?

B. Ἡ ἁλεκαν. For ἁδεος means morality, ἁδεκος moral, and ἡ ἁλεκαν the science of morals. This deals with the morals of men, for it teaches us what is honorable, what base, what decent, what indecent, what right, [and] what sinful.

A. Is ἡ ἁλεκαν a part of philosophy?

B. Not only is ἡ ἁλεκαν a part of philosophy, but the most powerful part of it. For philosophy has three parts: ethics, physics, and logic; that is, moral, natural, and rational. Ἡ ἁλεκαν is the science of right living; physics is the science of speculating on the natures of things; [and] logic is the science of right disputation, right saying, or right speaking. But knowing how to live rightly is better than knowing the natures of things, or how to dispute or say or speak rightly. Because of this ethics is preferred to the other parts of philosophy. And thus Socrates [469-399 B.C.] was judged the wisest of men, not only by the general agreement of men, but also by the oracle of Apollo. For when the other philosophers were wasting their efforts in examining the natures of things he [was] the first of all [men who] devoted himself to the study της ἁλεκαν.

A. Is ethics to be preferred to the liberal arts?

B. It is, for although the liberal arts are worthy of a free man, and thus in no way to be despised, yet they cannot be compared with ethics. For it is better to know what the difference is between a generous man and a miser than what [the difference is] between a triangle or a quadrilateral, or between the perfection of numbers and the abundance of diminution.

A. Is ethics preferred to astronomy?

B. It is preferred, because it is better to know by what virtues the movements of the mind are restrained than by what motions the sky and the stars are in revolution. It is better to know that anger is to be restrained by gentleness, fear by bravery, pleasure-seeking by continence, greed by generosity, than to know in how long a time Saturn or Mars or one of the other planets travels through the twelve signs of the zodiac.

A. Is ethics preferred to divinatory astronomy, which is called the mathematical art?

B. Even so. Ethics makes men pious but, divinatory mathematics
makes them impious; as Suetonius [f. A.D. 117-38] writes of Tiberias Caesar [42 B.C.-A.D. 37], that he was too neglectful of the gods and the practices of religion because he was addicted to [divinatory] mathematics.¹

A. Is ethics preferred to geography?

B. It is preferred, because it is better to know with what morals a good man ought to be endowed than which provinces [and] what cities are situated in Asia, which in Africa, which in Europe. It is better to know which virtue is allied to which vice and [is] like [it]--in case vice should deceive us with an appearance of virtue--than which province shares a boundary with which province.

A. Is ethics necessary to the human race?

B. It is, for without it no one can achieve blessedness. No one can become blessed who does not know what things should be done by him, [and] what avoided.

A. Is knowledge of the virtues necessary for man?

B. It is, because the recognition of happiness, since it is the goal of the human race, is necessary for man. For just as it is necessary for an archer to see the target at which the arrow is to be fired, so it is necessary for a man to know his goal, that is, happiness. All human actions are to be aimed at acquiring that. And, since happiness cannot be recognized without cognizance of virtue, for virtue comes under the definition of happiness, because happiness is operation according to virtue, it is therefore clear that knowledge of the virtues is necessary for man. Again, unless a man has knowledge of the virtues and vices, he is not to be set above dumb animals, nor does he differ from them except only in the shape of his body; for man is better than the dumb animals for this reason, because he can distinguish the honorable from the base, [a thing] that has been denied to dumb animals.

A. Is the ethics that is concerned with evil morals a science?

B. It is, since there can be true knowledge about wicked things. For just as there is true knowledge about wrong reasonings which distinguishes them from right, so there is true knowledge about evil morals which distinguishes them from honorable.

A. How many kinds of ethics are there?

B. Two.

A. Which?

B. Revealed ethics and ethics discovered by the human intelligence.

¹Suetonius The Lives of the Caesars 3.69.1.
For the precepts of morals are twofold: some discovered by human intelligence—such the philosophers enjoin in [their] writings; some revealed by God—of the kind that has been written in ecclesiastical books.

A. Which of these ethics is the more true?

B. The revealed; for the discovered is true to the extent that it corresponds and accords with the revealed, but the revealed is true in every way. For God, the lover of the human race, has never enjoined any evil thing on man, nor has He ever revealed to him any falsehood.

A. Is moral science speculative or operative?

B. It is operative, because it is not speculation, neither is it content with nor learned for the sake of speculation, but moves on from speculation to operation. For no one who is of sound mind learns moral science so that he may speculate on right and wrong things, which [rather] are to be learned by us so that we may perform the right and avoid the wrong.

A. What is the difference between speculative and operative knowledge?

B. The speculative is in a speculative intellect; the operative in an operative intellect, which is called practical. The goal of the speculative is speculation about the truth, [that] of the operative a work. For although every operative science speculates how it is to function, yet it does [+not] remain quiescent in speculation but moves on from that to operation. Again, the speculative deals with those things that are only subject to the consideration of our mind. But the operative pronounces what kind of an operation should be done, for it pronounces that any man should be given what is his, [and] that dangers should be endured and misfortunes bravely borne for the well-being of the state.

A. Is the goal of speculative science to know the truth?

B. [It is] not, for to know is the same thing as knowledge, just as to love is the same thing as love. No thing is its own goal. For this reason to know is not the goal of speculative science, but to observe.

A. What is the difference between to know and to observe?

B. To know is to have knowledge, to observe is to use knowledge. Because of this, to know is the prime perfection of the human mind, and is called by the philosopher the prime actuality in the second [book] On the Soul.\footnote{Aristotle On the Soul 2.1.412a.5-28; and 2.5.417a.22-417b.27.} To observe, however, [is] the secondary
perfection, and is called the secondary actuality, for no one without knowledge is able to observe.

A. Does every art seek out the good?

B. It does seek out [the good, which is a fact] that is proved by the testimony of Aristotle, who speaks thus in the first [book] of Ethics: every art and every doctrine, both act and choice, seems to seek out some good; [and] because of this they have shown well the supreme good which they all seek.¹

A. Why does every art seek out the good?

B. Because every art seeks to perform its own task properly. For he who hopes that he will be a craftsman provides himself with the skill, so that by [that] skill he can perform his task. To perform something with skill is to perform it with right reason, for whatever has been done with right reason has been done well. Therefore every art seeks out the good, since it is good to do a task well.

A. Does [someone] learning an art seek out the good?

B. He does seek [it] out.

A. Why?

B. Because he seeks out the art. Art is something good, since it is a perfection of the human mind. Therefore, if that man seeks out a good thing who takes pains to learn an art, so much the more does he seek out the good who employs that art than [he who] pursues it by learning.

A. Does all doctrine seek out the good?

B. If by the name of doctrine is understood speculative science, all doctrine does seek out the good, because the goal of speculative science is speculation about truth. To speculate about truth is a good thing, since it is a perfection of the human mind, therefore every speculative science seeks out the good. For just as the skill of a good craftsman makes him fit and disposed to the making of good works and not bad, so a doctrine makes the man who has it disposed to speculating on the true and not the false. For [the man] who is skilled in metaphysics is fit to speculate that man is substance, [but] the knowledge of man is a quality and it is different from the substance of the man. [The man] who is skilled in mathematics is disposed to speculate that every figure is a magnitude enclosed by a boundary or boundaries; that nothing is a figure that is without magnitude— and that for this reason spirits are of no figure; that no thing is figured that is infinite and without boundary; and that for this reason no infinite surface, if such exists, nor infinite

¹Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.1.1094a.1-17. See also 3.3.1112a.18-4.1113b.2.
body, if such exists, is of any figure; that no circle is infinite; [and that] no sphere is without boundary.

A. What does the physicist seek?

B. To speculate on these truths, [that] everything that moves moves from some place to some place; nothing rests in the place from which it moves, or moves from the place where it is resting; no thing moves for as long as it is at rest, nor is any thing at rest for as long as it is moving.

A. Does every act seek out the good?

B. It does seek [it] out, for whoever acts acts so that it is well for him, or will be well. Although there are many men for whom it is not well when they act, yet they act so that it will be well for them. A porter carries heavy loads not because it is well for him when he is carrying [them], but that it will be well for him when he is eating.

A. Does every choice seek out the good?

B. It does seek [it] out.

A. Why?

B. Because whatever a man chooses he chooses because he considers it good for him. Many things are sought which, even if they are evil and harmful, are nevertheless sought by a man because he considers them good for him and desires to gain some advantage from them. For no one seeks any thing, or can seek it, in such a way that it is <not> harmful and dangerous to him.

A. Why is evil not sought after?

B. Because nature, or rather the author of nature, does not permit that anyone should seek out that which is evil. No one functions with a view to evil, as Aristotle says,¹ just as nature does not allow that anyone should believe that which is false. Therefore it is evident [that] every thing that is sought is sought for a good reason, nor can anything be sought for an evil reason. No one, asked why he seeks out anything, says that he is seeking anything because it is evil, but because it is good. From which it follows that the good is the target that all men aim for. The sailor seeks this through the waves and surges of the sea, the farmer when he turns the earth over with the plough, the philosopher seeks this, the idiot, the Stoic, the Epicurean, the Academic, the Peripatetic, the Cynic, the half-wit, the murderer, the embezzler, the plunderer the moneylender—who is also called usurer, the informer, the executioner, the butcher, the assassin seeks this.

¹Ibid., 1.4.1095a.13-25.
A. What is choice?

B. Choice is when a man of free will chooses what he wishes to do or to avoid from things to be done or to be avoided. Choice in Greek is called προσετελεύς, hence the word that signifies the choice of the mind is προσετελέχους.

A. How can inanimate things, which have cognizance of no good, seek out the good, since there is no appetite for an unknown thing?

B. He in whose command all things are has ordered inanimate things to seek out the good, for by His command all things, whether they are animals or inanimate, try to bring advantage to the human race, for the sake of which they were brought into being. Therefore, although inanimate things do not recognize the good that they seek, yet they are driven and moved toward it by Him whose commands they fulfill, just as an arrow is sent toward a target by an archer although it in no way recognizes it.

A. How do inanimate things seek out the good, since for them there can be neither good thing nor evil? For it is not well for the sun when it rises nor evil when it sets, neither good when it is in the summer signs nor evil when in the winter.

B. Inanimate things seek out the good because they seek that it may be well with man for whose sake they have been made. Therefore the sun moves from the signs of winter to [those] of spring to make the earth and the trees put out buds for man; from spring [signs] to summer so that those things that have been torn from the earth in springtime may ripen in the heat of summer; from spring [sic, summer] to autumn so that what has ripened may be gathered; [and] to winter so that the earth, cultivation being interrupted, may recover its strength, in case by unceasing cultivation it should become sterile.

A. What does the surging sea seek?

B. That it should be well for man, for the tide of the sea occurs at fixed hours [and] recedes at fixed hours so that it may bring to the human race those things of which it has need. The rivers flow into the sea through their mouths so that they may bring advantage to those living near them.

A. With what appetite does an inanimate thing seek out the good?

B. The philosophers call the appetite of inanimate things natural.

A. How many appetites are there?

B. Two, natural and animal.

A. What appetite is called natural?

B. When anything seeks that of which it has no cognizance. Heavy
things and light things have an appetite of this sort, for the former seek to be carried downwards, the latter upwards. By this appetite the human mind, when it is like a smoothed tablet and without all knowledge, seeks knowledge. Because of this Aristotle, in the first book of his work which is called Metaphysics, says [that] all men by nature seek to know.\(^1\) By this appetite both the earth and the trees, when spring is new, seek to put out buds.

A. What appetite is called animal?

B. When an animal seeks out that which it knows, that is, of which it has either sensual or intellectual cognizance.

A. How many animal appetites are there?

B. Two, the sensual and the intellectual; just as there is a two-fold cognizance, for an appetite accompanies every cognizance.

A. What is the sensual appetite?

B. When we seek out that which a sense judges pleasant; as, the appetite to eat what tastes good, or to smell what smells good, or to hear what is pleasing to listen to, or to see what delights the sight, or to touch what is pleasant to feel. This appetite is to be restrained by reason; for [he] who gives it reins looser than [is] just departs from moderation, in which virtue is established, and slips into vice.

A. What is the intellectual appetite?

B. When we seek out that thing which our mind knows, that is, which reason judges should be sought out, as when we seek either happiness or those things by which we shall be able to achieve happiness. This appetite is called will, for will is nothing but the power of the human mind desirous of those things that right reason dictates should be sought out.

A. How is the intellectual appetite classified?

B. It is split into the appetite for speculation and for operation. Because of this some men become philosophers, for they are content with speculation; some become ministers of the state, or craftsmen, or workmen, for they, setting speculation aside, move on to operation.

A. How is natural appetite classified?

B. Into active and passive appetite. Some things by nature seek to act, some by nature [seek] to be acted upon. The appetite of matter is passive, for matter seeks to take up form; the appetite of trees and plants is active, for they seek to draw up moisture through the

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\(^1\) Aristotle Metaphysics 1.1.980a.22.

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root to the crown and to convert it into buds, leaves and fruit.

A. What is the difference between these three appetites, the natural, the animal, and the intellectual, which is also called the rational?

B. The natural is common to animals and inanimate things, the animal is common to men and to dumb animals, [and] the intellectual pertains only to men.

A. Do those who perform wicked things seek out the good?

B. They do seek [it], for they do evil that good may result. The killer kills travelers so that he may strip them of their clothes and money, and considers that a good thing for himself; the thief plunders men so that he may be enriched. The same judgment must be made concerning pirates and church-robbers.

A. What do those men seek who do evil from which they can gain no advantage?

B. Pleasure. They do evil to find delight and be provided with pleasure.

A. Do all things seek out the highest good?

B. All things seek out the highest good that they can achieve. For he is not content with a common and insignificant good who can achieve something great and outstanding. [A man] for whom the consulship may be in reach is not content with a questorship or pretorship or some insignificant office.

A. How many kinds of arts are there?

B. Two, the goals of some of which are operations only—as, the goal of the art of lute-playing is the playing of the lute; the goal of the art of dancing, that is, of stepping a measure, is dancing, that is stepping a measure; the goal of the art of flute-playing is the playing of the flute; [and] the goals of some of which are certain works beyond the operation—as, the goal of painting ("molding") is a work in clay; the goal of the art of weaving is the woven fabric; the goal of [the art] of sewing is the shoe). The goals of all arts are operations, for we learn arts so that when we have them we may operate. But works are not the goals of all arts, for many of the arts are content with operations only, seeking no work after the operation.

A. Is the work of an art better than the operation of the same?

B. It is, for a shoe is better than sewing. Cobblers exist for the sake of making shoes, so the shoe is the goal on account of which the sewing is done.

A. How far is the work removed from the operation?
B. The work is durable in substance, the operation lasting just as long as the workman is working. Operation is signified by a verbal noun from a verb in the infinitive mood; as, [from the verbs] to sing [and] to dance, singing and dancing are the operations. But the work is signified by other nouns, as, a house is the work of building, the woven fabric of weaving, [and] ironwork of the blacksmith.

A. Is there one and the same goal of all arts and sciences?

B. [There is] not, for Aristotle says some difference is seen between goals. For some are operations; others, some work apart from them (of which there are, in fact, some goals apart from actions). In these, works are better than operations. But since there are many actualities and arts and sciences, it also happens that there are many goals; for [the goal] of medicine is health, of murder reward, of warfare victory, of economy wealth.

A. Why are there different goals for different sciences?

B. Because by different sciences different things are observed. Some things are the subject of observation of metaphysics, some of physics, others of metaphysics. [sic, but he probably means mathematics].

A. What is the goal of metaphysics?

B. To speculate what each thing is, that is, whether it is substance or accident, and from what each is different.

A. What is the goal of physics?

B. To speculate on the natures of mobile things.

A. What is the goal of metaphysics [sic, but once again he means mathematics].

B. To speculate on quantities and their relationships, that is, equalities and inequalities.

A. About what does geometry speculate?

B. Magnitudes and their relationships, that is, what line is equal or unequal to what line, what area to what area, what body to what body. For there is speculation on [the fact] that a triangle of which one line is the diagonal of a square and the other two its sides is isosceles, because it only has two equal sides. Again, [there is speculation on the fact] that a triangle of which one side is a half diameter of two circles intersecting one another, and [of

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1Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.1.1094a.4-7. Hegius follows the wording of Aristotle quite closely, but the section in brackets is an insertion that merely tends to confuse the meaning.
which] the other two sides are drawn from the centers of these same circles and terminated at the point of intersection, is *isopleuros*, that is, equilateral.

A. Are all arts equally worthy and excellent?

B. They are not, for all arts are awarded their dignity from their goals. Therefore, to the extent that the goals of arts are more excellent, the arts have the greater dignity.

A. Are the ruling arts, which are called architectonic, more excellent than the arts subject to them, which they make controlled?

B. They are. And because of that the military art, that is, the art of conducting wars, is more excellent than the art of making reins or spurs. Again, the art of driving a carriage is more excellent than the art of carriage-building, and the art of steering ships [more excellent] than the art of making them.

A. Why do the architectonic arts excel the arts subject to them?

B. Because they have more excellent goals. The goal of the military art is victory and peace, for wars are fought so that, once victory is won, the victors may live in peace. But the goal of the art of making reins is the rein and its price.

A. Why are the ruling arts called architectonic?

B. Because ἀρχιτέκτων means a worker in wood, hence ἀρχιτέκτων, [he] who excels workers in wood and rules them, hence ἀρχιτέκτονος, that is, pertaining to an architect.

A. Is economics an architectonic art?

B. It is, because the economist controls the cultivators of fields, vineyards, [and] gardens, [and] the herders of sheep, goats [and] pigs. Therefore his art is architectonic.

A. Are there different goals of different actions?

B. There are, for the goal of dancing is to delight the eyes; the goal of singing to delight the hearing; the goal of archery to transfixed stags and wild goats [and] to drive off or to kill enemies.

A. Is there one goal of all human actions?

B. There is.

A. What is the goal of all human actions?

B. Happiness, for whatever we do we do so that we may achieve happiness.

A. Is there a second goal further to any goal?
B. [There is] not, for there is no [goal] further to the final goal.

A. Is there a second goal better than every goal?

B. [There is] not, for there is no [goal] better than the best goal.

A. Is it necessary for there to be some final goal of all human acts and works?

B. It is.

A. Why?

B. Because the mind of man is content only with the ultimate goal and cannot rest unless it has achieved it. Therefore the desire of the human mind is foolish and vain to seek out that which cannot be acquired if there is no ultimate goal of human acts. Because of this Birria, Terence's [ca. 190-159 B.C.] character, rightly urges Charinus [that] he should wish that which can be done, since that which he wants cannot be done.*

A. Why can the natural desire of the human mind not be foolish and vain?

B. Because it has been imparted to him by God, for it has been given to man by God so that he may wish it to be well for himself and not evil. But God has imparted nothing superfluous to the things created by Him, just as He has denied them nothing necessary.

A. What is the ultimate goal?

B. [That] which is desired on its own account, and for the sake of which we seek all others.

A. For the sake of what do we seek blessedness?

B. On its own account, and for the sake of no other [thing], for it is the ultimate goal of human acts. No one can say for the sake of what he wishes to be blessed, that is, for the sake of what he wishes it to be well for himself and does not wish it to be ill for himself. [When] asked why he wishes to eat, he can say in answer that he wants to eat because he is hungry; [asked] why he wants to drink, [it is] so that he may not be thirsty; why he wants to be clothed, so that he may not be cold. But [when] questioned why he wants it to be well for himself he has nothing that he can answer, because for it to be well with a man is the ultimate goal of human acts. There is nothing beyond the ultimate.

A. In goals, is there a progression to the infinite?

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*Terence The Lady of Andros 2.6.
B. No, because there is no series of infinite goals. This is clear to [those] considering the various series of goals. For God has made the earth on account of the trees and plants that are born out of it; the plants and trees on account of the cattle, so that they may supply nourishment for them; the cattle on account of men, so that they may supply them with food and clothing. Men He made on their own account. Man has been made to discover God and to love Him in this life, and to thank Him and enjoy Him in the future. It is clear, therefore, that God terminates the series of goals of all things created by Him. Again, the farmer makes a plow so that he may have [something] with which he can cultivate the earth; he cultivates the earth so that he can sow it; he sows it so that he can harvest crops; he reaps so that he can thresh; he threshes so that he can grind; he grinds so that from the flour he can make bread; [and] he makes bread so that he can satisfy himself and live happily. Again, a sailor obtains a boat for himself so that he can sail to foreign parts; he sails so that he can find merchandise there; he finds it so that he can sell it for more than it was bought for; he wants to sell it for more so that he may become rich and live in happiness. It is clear, therefore, that in every series of goals there is some ultimate goal, for which reason there is not a progression in goals to the infinite.

A. Is there a progression to the infinite in efficient causes?

B. [There is] not, because God terminates the series of efficient causes. Whatever is made in the whole world is made by God, for whatever acts acts at His command, and nothing can act without His command. God, however, acts at no one's command, for God is the chief of all agents. He is the maker of all things, who had no maker. And for this reason He terminates the series of efficient causes.

A. Is cognition of the ultimate goal necessary for a man?

B. It is, for it pertains to each individual to recognize the goal of his own actions. To what can he refer them if he does not know their goal? Just as an archer does not know where he will send his arrows if he does not know his target, so neither can a man know how he ought to live if he does not know for the sake of what thing he is living. From which it follows that every individual must take pains to learn the ultimate goal of his actions.

A. To which of the sciences pertains cognition of the ultimate goal?

B. To that which greatly dominates and controls the others. Such is politics, that is, the science of administration of the state.

A. Is the science of administering the state architectonic, that is, imperious?

B. It is, for it ordains what disciplines there ought to be in cities, and explains what sort and which should be learned, and how
much attention should be given to disciplines. It subdues arts harmful and dangerous to the state, and introduces healthy arts. The most honorable skills belong to it, as military affairs, economics, rhetoric, and other disciplines. It controls these arts subject to itself; they effect its superiority. Moreover, the civil science imposes laws on the citizens and lays down what each should do, and from what each should refrain. Therefore its goal is the highest of human goods, for the highest among human goods is the good of universality. And since this goal embraces the goals of all the other sciences it is rightly to be called architectonic, that is, chief and ruler of all sciences.

A. Since there are parts of moral science, of which one makes good the morals of any man, the second [those] of the home, [and] the third [those] of the city, which of these is the most excellent?

B. [That] which causes good morals in the city; for the morals of a city cannot be good unless the morals of the home and of men are good. And, for this reason, the science that causes good morals in the home and the science that causes good morals in men are subject to that science which causes good morals in the city. For the more universal a good is, the more divine; so the most excellent of the parts of moral science is the science of administering the state, and the greater the state the better its administration. From which it follows that the most worthy of sciences is [that] which brings good morals to the City of God.

A. Is there equal certainty of all disciplines?

B. [There is] not, because the most certain of all the disciplines of the sciences is mathematics. Whatever mathematicians know, they know most certainly, and on this account there are no differences between them. The professors of the other arts often disagree among themselves. There is no agreement between physicists [as to] why the Nile floods in the summer months [and] not in the winter, [or] why Euripus\(^1\) ebbs and flows more often than other seas. Mathematician does not differ from mathematician, but what any one of them thinks, they all think jointly. Among all mathematicians it is agreed that a circle is more capacious than any of the figures isometric with it, that is, equal in periphery; for if a circle is equal to a triangle or a quadrilateral, it is not therefore argued that it is equal to it in capacity. There is no proof of equal capacity from equal periphery. The mathematician knows most certainly that the diagonal of a square is greater than its side, because a square that is made from the multiplication of the diagonal by itself is greater than a square that is made by the multiplication of the side by itself.

A. What is common to a mathematician and an orator?

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\(^1\)Euripus was the name of the channel between what used to be called Boeotia, a district of the Greek mainland, and the island of Euboea, now called Negroponte, in the Aegean Sea.
B. [The fact] that each of them convinces. For an orator speaks according to probability, [and] completes his speeches with arguments so that he may convince his listeners. The mathematician puts forward proof so that he may convince.

A. What is the difference between a mathematician and an orator?

B. The mathematician convinces by means of unavoidable arguments, the orator by means of probabilities. For an orator puts forward arguments from conjectures. A mathematician argues thus: an obtuse angle is greater than a right angle because it can be divided into a right angle and an acute, and for this reason the right angle is part of the obtuse, for every whole is greater than its own part. The orator argues that someone has committed a theft because when he was accused of the theft his face changed color and he blushed. Because of this Aristotle says well, the lips of the man who is a teacher compel certitude in one type to the extent that the nature of the thing will accept it. It seems [to be] the same thing to receive an opinion from a mathematician, I say, and to require a proof from an orator. From which it follows that the proofs of mathematicians are very different from the proofs of orators. The former cause men to know what they prove; the latter [cause men] to think and believe what they prove. And for that reason orators often deceive their listeners, mathematicians never.
DIALOG X

Concerning the Sacred Mystery of the Holy
Incarnation, with Adjoined the Method
of Finding Easter:

Two Dialogs

A. What are the things that may be learned concerning the mystery of the incarnation?

B. These that are contained in this verse: who, of what sort, how great, how, why, where, when? That is, who He is [and] how great He is who is incarnate.

A. Who is incarnate?

B. The only begotten Son of God, of one substance with the Father, not made nor created, through whom all things were made.

A. Of what sort is [He] who is incarnate?

B. Almighty, whose command all things obey; knowing all things, from whom no thing lies hidden; the highest good, who wills the right and the just, and decrees [them].

A. How great?

B. Eternal and unbounded.

A. How?

B. By the Holy Spirit, of the Virgin Mary.

A. Why?

B. That He might redeem the human race. Because God loved men He became their redeemer, for the one who created heaven and earth for man deigned to become man to redeem man from devilish slavery.

A. Where?

B. In the womb of the most Blessed Mary, ever virgin.

A. When?

B. On 25 March. At that time the Son of God was incarnate and put
on human flesh. He was born and brought forth into the light, however, on 25 December.

A. Why is the Son of God said [to be] of one substance with the Father?

B. Because that same thing is evident, since Father and Son have a single substance and are said [to be] consubstantial. For just as they are said [to be] co-pupils who have a single teacher, co-slaves who have a single master, [and] co-freedmen who have a single patron, so things are said [to be] consubstantial that have a single substance.

A. Are Christians bound to believe that the Son of God is of one substance with the Father?

B. They are. For he who does not believe it is full of sin. For he who denies that the Son is of one substance with the Father either holds the opinion that the Son of God is not true God, as Arius [ca. 250-ca. 336] thought, [a thing] that it is sinful to think concerning the savior of mankind, since He had the power of remitting sins (that is, of remitting the punishment which was to be endured for the sin, but not of bringing it about that he who sinned did not sin), of raising the dead, of foretelling the future, and so on, which are functions of God alone; or he holds the opinion that the Son and the Father are two gods, differing in substance, which is also a sinful thing, because the worship of many gods is manifest sin. To avoid this twofold sin the Christian must believe the Son of God to be true God, and of one substance with the Father. Therefore they are bound to believe the Son of God to be God, not a created being, begotten, not made. Because of this it is inevitable that the Son is of one substance with His Father. Therefore it is clear that the Arians had wandered far from holiness. For [the man] who claims that the Son of God is a created being is a long way away from holiness.

A. Are men of one substance, one with another?

B. If things are said to be consubstantial that have substances of the same sort, that is, like substances, in the way that things are said to be concolored that have colors of the same sort, that is, like colors, it must be admitted that men are and may be said to be of one substance. If, however, things are said to be consubstantial that have a single substance by number, it must be denied that any things are consubstantial except for the Blessed Trinity, Father and Son and Holy Spirit. From which it follows that consubstantial is an ambiguous expression. It has one meaning when it is used in respect of the Blessed Trinity, another when used in respect of created things.

A. Do the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit have one single substance?

B. They have one, by number; for the Father has the very same
substance as the Son and the Holy Spirit.

A. Do all men have one single substance?

B. They have, but one by sort. For every man has the same sort of substance as any other, [but] not the very same as any other. For all men have the same substance in the same way that all crows have the same color and all garlic the same smell. From which it follows that "one substance" has one meaning when we say that all men have one substance, another when we say that the Blessed Trinity has one substance.

A. Is the Father, therefore, of one substance with the Son as Marcus with Tullius?

B. No.

A. Why?

B. Because Marcus is the same person as Tullius, and Marcus is not born of Tullius nor Tullius of Marcus. Marcus is the same substance as Tullius and the same person. The Father, however, is the same substance as the Son, [but] not the same person. For the Son of God said, "I and the Father are one" [John 10:30]. By saying "I and the Father," He indicated that He is not the one who is the Father. By saying "one," He indicated that He is the same thing as the Father is.

A. In what part of the year was Christ born?

B. At midwinter, or almost midwinter.

A. At what time was he conceived?

B. At the spring equinox.

A. How many equinoxes are there?

B. Two, the spring and the autumnal.

A. When is the spring equinox?

B. When the sun enters Aries.

A. When the autumnal?

B. When the sun enters Libra; for at these times the sun is in the upper hemisphere for as long a time as in the lower, that is, above the horizon for as long as below the horizon.

A. What is the hemisphere?

1This is a reference to Marcus Tullius Cicero (106-43 B.C.).

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B. It is the half of a sphere, just as hemicycle or semicircle is the half of a circle.

A. How many hemispheres are there?

B. Two, the upper and the lower.

A. What is the upper hemisphere?

B. That part of the heavens which a man standing on a level spot can see.

A. What the lower?

B. What he cannot see.

A. Why can a man not see the lower hemisphere?

B. Because all vision takes place along a straight line; and since from the lower hemisphere a straight line cannot be drawn to the eye we cannot see the lower hemisphere, nor anything that is in the lower hemisphere. A straight line can be drawn to the eye from these things that are above the horizon, [but] not from these that are below the horizon. Therefore nothing that is below the horizon can be seen.

A. Do all men, wherever they live in the world, see the same hemisphere?

B. No, for the Indians see one hemisphere, the Moors another, the Egyptians another, [and] the Germans another. For the Egyptians sometimes see in their hemisphere Canopus, which is never visible to the Germans.

A. Do all men, wherever they live in the world, have the same horizons?

B. No; for as men living in different regions see different hemispheres, so too they have different horizons.

A. What is the rising of the sun?

B. It is the sun moving from the lower to the upper hemisphere.

A. What is the setting of the sun?

B. It is the sun moving from the upper to the lower hemisphere.

A. Does the sun rise at one and the same time for all men?

B. No; for it rises earlier for the Indians than for the Gaditani [Spanish]. The sun rises and sets earlier for the people of the East than for the people of the West. From which it is obvious that
one and the same time is daytime for the Indians and night time for
the Spanish; for the same hour is the first hour of the day for the
Indians and the eleventh or twelfth hour of the night for the Span­
ish. It is obvious moreover that the Indians are permitted to eat
meat when it is not permitted to the Spanish.

A. What is midwinter?

B. Midwinter is when the day is shortest, and the night longest.

A. What is the solstice?

B. The solstice is when the day is longest and the night shortest.

A. What is the difference between midwinter and the solstice?

B. In midwinter the midday shadows are very long, [but] at the
solstice very short. In midwinter the midday sun is very far dis­
tant from the midpoint of the hemisphere; at the solstice the midday
sun comes very close to the midpoint of the hemisphere, for it
approaches it as closely as it can approach. In midwinter the
midday sun is very low, because it is as far as it can go from the
perpendicular line. At the solstice it is the least slanting among
all the midday radians because it approaches the perpendicular line
as closely as it can approach it. For this reason in midwinter
there is usually very great cold, since the slanting ray does not
any longer have the warming force that the perpendicular has, or
that approaching the perpendicular.

A. Why is the midwinter day very short?

B. Because the sun, on midwinter day, is in the first part of
Capricorn; but that area moves through a very brief arc from rising
to setting.

A. Why is the day at the solstice very long?

B. Because the sun on that day is in the first part of Cancer,
which moves through a very long arc from rising to setting.

A. What is an arc?

B. The distance through which the sun passes by its motion. The
arc is the guide, daily and nightly. In midwinter the daily arc is
shorter than the nightly, at the solstice longer. At the equinox
the daily arc is equal to the nightly.

A. What is the daily arc?

B. The distance through which the sun moves from its rising to its
setting, above the horizon.

A. What is the nightly arc?
B. The distance through which the sun moves from its setting to its rising, below the horizon.

A. Was Christ born during the day or the night?

B. At night, for he was born at midnight. And for this reason the church sings: "Dum medium silentium tenerent omnia, omnipotens sermo tuus de regalibus sedibus venit" ("while all things kept silence, at midnight your Almighty Word came from the royal abode.") Baptista Mantuanus realizes this same thing, saying in his Parthenice:

The goat held the lowest part of heaven, the crab the highest, and the queen of ancient times, Erigone, raising her head and watching the joined fish descend, looked towards the young children with gentle light.¹

That is, when Christ was being born Capricorn was in the middle of his nightly arc, Cancer in the middle of his daily arc, Virgo rising [and] Pisces setting. This cannot occur at the midwinter period except at midnight.

A. Show that Christ was born approximately at midwinter.

B. The sun had passed through four physical constellations, thirty-eight degrees, and twenty-one minutes at midday on the last day of December in the year when Christ was born, as is obvious from the tables of the illustrious King Alphonsus,² for the sun was then in the ninth degree of Capricorn. From which it follows that the sun at Christ's birth was in the twentieth degree of Capricorn, and because of this Christ was born at approximately midwinter.

A. How far is Christmas day from midwinter now?

B. On Christmas day the sun is in the thirteenth degree of Capricorn.

A. But why has midwinter moved further away from Christmas day?

B. Because the year is not as long as it is thought to be. It is thought to be 365 days and six hours. For this reason every fifth year an intercalary day is added to the 365, since the year is

¹Baptista Mantuanus (Pope Pius II [1405-64]), Omnia opera Baptistae Mantuani Carmelitae in hoc volumine: Prima Parthenices (Bononiae: Benedictum Hectoris, 1502), fo. 182 recto. The Latin as recorded by Hegius, Dialogi, fo. L.iii recto, is given here: "Ima caper cell, cancer suprema tenebat, Et caput tollens seculi regina vetusti Erigone, iunctosque videns descendere pisces, prospexit teneros clementi lumine partus."

²Alphonso X "the Learned" (1252-84), king of Spain, under whose patronage fifty astronomers at Toledo in Spain produced some astronomical tables.
thought to have 365 days and a quarter, that is, six hours. These hours, over four years, make a complete day, which is intercalated in February, that is, is inserted between 23 and 24 February. And for this reason that year is called bisextile, because in that year we name twice the sixth day before 1 March, for both the feast of [St.] Matthew and the day preceding his feast are called the sixth day before 1 March. A day of this sort is called intercalary, because to intercalate means to insert. On account of this also, a line of poetry is called intercalary because it is often inserted between other lines. Of such a sort is this line in the Bucolics: "ducite ab urbem domum, mea carmina, ducite daphnum" ("Lead Daphnus, my songs; lead him home from the city").

[+]A. Why is the year longer than it is thought to be?

B. Because the sun, in 365+ days, passes through more than the twelve signs, since it moves in that length of time through twelve signs and twenty-six seconds. These seconds cause the midwinter day, each year to draw a little further away from Christmas day.

A. What is a second?

B. The sixtieth part of a minute.

A. What [is] a minute?

B. The sixtieth part of a degree.

A. What [is] a degree?

B. The thirtieth part of a sign.

A. What is a sign?

B. The twelfth part of the zodiac.

A. What is the zodiac?

B. A circle of animals; for ὄ ζῳδίου in Greek means animal. Thus zodiac means "of animals." The zodiac is called a circle of animals because the signs of the zodiac have been allotted the names of animals.

A. What opinion is held concerning the solstice and the equinox?

B. They have receded from the position that they used to have in the calendar; and this occurs because the year, as has been said, is not as long as it is thought to be.

A. What opinion is held about the beginning and extent of the year?

1Virgil Eclogue 8.65-109. This line is repeated nine times in the poem.
B. The year is threefold: of astronomers, of the Romans, and of the Jews. The astronomer's year is the time in which the sun moves, contrary to the movement of the firmament, through the twelve signs of the zodiac. This year consists of twelve months, of which three are spring, three summer, three autumn, and three winter. In the same way, among the signs of the zodiac, three are spring, three summer, etc. This year begins at the spring equinox, and at that same point the Jewish year comes to an end. This year is a period beginning at the first lunar month of the whole year. This year sometimes consists of twelve lunar months, sometimes of thirteen. From which it follows that not all Jewish years are equal to one another.

A. What is the first of the lunar months in the Jewish year? And what do we understand by the first month in the thirteenth chapter of Exodus [sic, Exod 12:18] where it is written: "In the first month, on the fourteenth day of the month at even, you will eat unleavened bread until the twenty-first of that same month?"

B. By the first month we shall understand the first lunar month of the Jewish year. For every lunar month has a day of conjunction of lights and a day of opposition of the same; and therefore the first lunar month [is that] whose conjunction or opposition is nearer to the spring equinox than the conjunction or opposition of the months preceding or following.

A. What do we understand by the calends and the new moon in the first [chapter] of Isaiah, [Isaiah 1:13-14] where it is written: "I shall not endure the new moon and the sabbath and the other ceremonies. Evil are your gatherings. My soul hates your calends and your ceremonies."

B. By the new moon and the calends we understand the first moon, that is, the first day of the lunar month, which is the day of the conjunction of lights, or the feast, because at the first moon the Jews used to celebrate. For neomania is to be translated as new moon: νεός means new, ἔνων moon.

A. What is the extent of the lunar month, according to the Jews?

B. The lunar month has four weeks and one day, that is, twelve hours, and 793 elochim. The extent of a month of this sort is represented by these two words, coniunge mea; for coniunge represents the 793 elochim by the initial letters of its syllables, me represents the twelve hours, [and] a represents one day over and above four weeks.

A. What is elochim?

B. A thousand-and-eightieth part of an hour. The Jew divides the

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1Exod 13:4-7 is a summary of the regulations relating to the Passover, but the actual quotation given here is from chapter 12.
hour into 1080 parts which he calls elochim.

A. What is the Roman Year?

B. [One] that consists of twelve calendar months, and starts in January. It is divided into the common year and the bisextile year. The common year has 365 days, the bisextile 366.

A. What do we understand by the calends, nones, and ides of the Roman year?

B. By calends we understand the first day of the calendar month, by nones the fifth or seventh [day]. For in the months that have four nones [i.e. four days between calends and nones], the fifth day is called nones. [In those] that have six nones the seventh day is called nones. By ides we understand the thirteenth day in the months that have four nones, or the fifteenth in months having six nones. Which months have six nones is made clear in the following verses:

Six nones May, October, July, March;  
Four the rest; each keeps the ides [as] eight.

A. Is it the bisextile year that is a real year, or the common?

B. Neither; for the common is less than a real year, since in 365 days the sun cannot pass through the whole zodiac, while the bisextile is in fact greater [than a real year], because in 366 days the sun passes through more than twelve signs.

A. Are the four Roman years, of which one is bisextile and three common, equal to four true years?

B. No, but [they] are greater, because in four Roman years the sun passes through the zodiac four times, and also passes through one minute and fourteen seconds. And by as much time as it takes to pass through one minute and fourteen seconds, four Roman years exceed four true years. This excess causes midwinter, and the other seasons of the year, to draw away from their [original] positions.

A. What do we understand by the olympiad in the writings of the historians?

B. A period of four years, because the olympiad consists of four years. The Greeks calculate their periods of time by olympiads, writing in how many olympiads an event took place; for they write that certain things took place in the tenth olympiad, certain in the hundredth, etc. And of those [things] that took place in the hundredth olympiad, some are written as occurring in the first year of the hundredth olympiad, some in the second, some in the third, some in the fourth. From which it follows that it is unknown to the Greek at what time those events took place that happened before the first olympiad. The Jews, on the other hand, calculate periods of
time from the foundation of the world, the Romans from the foundation of the city, [and] the Christians from the birth of Christ.

A. How is one to discover the interval, that is, the period of time that intervenes, between the birth of Christ and the Sunday which is called Quinquagesima, or the Sunday [called] Esto mihi?

B. It is easily discovered if one knows on what day of which month Easter is to be celebrated, for Easter is seven weeks away from Quinquagesima. Therefore, when Easter day has been found, Quinquagesima can be found very easily. When that is found, it is easy to discover how much time there is between Christmas and Quinquagesima, for this time is called the interval.

Concerning the Finding of Easter

A. How is Easter to be found?

B. The Easter month, which is also called the first month, must be found in the calendar. When that is found, the Sunday following the fourteenth moon of the same month is Easter day. For on this day the victor, the supreme priest, inaugurated the celebrating of Easter. Easter is never celebrated by Christians on the fourteenth moon of the first month in case they appear to be following Jewish ways, but on the Sunday following the fourteenth moon, that is, either the fifteenth moon, or the sixteenth, or seventeenth, or eighteenth, or nineteenth, or twentieth, or twenty-first.

A. How is the Easter month to be found in the calendar?

B. The golden number must be discovered of the year whose Easter we want to find, from the nones of March, that is, from the seventh day of March, up to the eighth day of the ides of April, between which days there are nineteen golden numbers, of which the first is sixteen and the last eighteen. That day to which the golden number is ascribed is the beginning of the Easter month and is called the first moon of the first month. The fourteenth day from the day to which the golden number is ascribed is called the fourteenth moon. When that has been found the Sunday following it is Easter day.

A. Give an example.

B. When the golden number is two, the feast of St. Gregory the Pope [12 March] is the first moon, and the day of the Annunciation of the glorious Virgin Mary [25 April] is the fourteenth moon. And if in the same year the dominical letter is G, the feast of Easter falls on the calends, that is, on the first day, of April. Whenever the fourteenth moon is a Sunday it is necessary to celebrate Easter on the twenty-first moon, that is, on the Sunday following the fourteenth moon, since Easter may never be celebrated on the fourteenth moon.

A. What is the shortest interval?
B. When the golden number is sixteen and the dominical letter is D; for then the feast of St. Benedict [21 March] is the fourteenth moon, and the day following, because it is a Sunday, is Easter day. And because of this the day after the feast of [St.] Benedict is called the first of Easter.

A. What is the longest interval?

B. When the golden number is eight and the dominical letter is C; for then Easter falls on the feast of St. Mark the Evangelist [25 April], and because of this that day is called the last of Easter.

A. From whence do the disagreements in respect of Easter arise?

B. From two [things], the equinox and the fourteenth moon. For there is a twofold fourteenth moon, one of the calendar, the other of the sky. The fourteenth moon of the calendar is the fourteenth day from the day to which the golden number is ascribed; the fourteenth moon of the sky is the fourteenth day from the day of conjunction. But when Sunday falls between the fourteenth moon of the sky and of the calendar, there are differences in respect of the celebration of Easter. For then some people are of the opinion that Easter ought to be celebrated on the Sunday after the fourteenth moon of the sky, others after the fourteenth moon of the calendar--and the Church holds to the latter method. But the fourteenth moon of the sky is some distance from the fourteenth [moon] of the calendar, because the fourteenth of the calendar is the eighteenth of sky, inasmuch as the first moon of the calendar is the fifth of the sky.

A. How does the disagreement in respect of the celebration of Easter arise from the equinox?

B. Because the spring equinox is twofold--one of the calendar, which is on the feast of [St.] Benedict; the other of the sky, which is on the feast of [St.] Gregory or shortly before. For at that time the sun is above the horizon during the day for as long a time as below during the night. It is inevitable also that the first moon should be twofold--one of the calendar which, as has been said, is found from the golden number; the other of the sky, whose conjunction or opposition is closer in fact to the equinox. It happens, however, that Easter is sometimes celebrated in the second month of the sky, although it is to be celebrated in the first month of the calendar. And this occurs three times in a lunar cycle, that is, in nineteen years. For when the golden number is eleven or nineteen or eight, Easter is celebrated in the second lunar month of the sky, although it is to be celebrated in the first lunar month of the calendar. From which it follows that if Easter must be celebrated in the first lunar month, which truly is the first, [then] in the three years previously stated it is celebrated a whole month later than it ought to be celebrated. And such an error comes from the recession of the spring equinox from its position.

A. Is the Son of God, who for our sake became man, omnipotent?
B. He is, for He is God. It is inevitable that He should be omnipotent, for it could not be that God should not be omnipotent.

A. Did Pliny hold a true opinion of God in his *Natural History*, writing:

The chief consolations for imperfect nature in man are that not even God can do everything. For He cannot commit suicide if He should wish to, which is the best gift He has given to man among the many torments of life; nor can He endow mortals with eternal life, nor call back the dead, nor bring it to pass that twice ten should not be twenty, or that [a man] who has lived shall not have lived, [or that a man] who has held high office shall not have held it; nor [can He] have any power over things that have happened apart from [that of] forgetting.1

B. He did not hold a true opinion of God. For just as God is said to know all things, because He knows everything that can be known—for God does not know that a man is a donkey, or that the diameter for a quadrant is commensurate with the incommensurate part of the same figure—so God is said to be omnipotent, because He can do all things that can be done. For it cannot happen that God could commit suicide; therefore He is not said not to be omnipotent because He cannot do that.

A. Can God endow mortals with immortality?

B. He can, for in a future age He will give mortals the gift of immortality. Therefore it is untrue that God cannot endow mortals with immortality.

A. Can God recall the dead?

B. He can; for Christ, the Son of God, God and man, called the dead back to life by His command.

A. Can it happen that he who has lived shall not have lived?

B. It cannot, because what has been done cannot be undone.

A. Did Pliny, in the first part of his *Natural History*, hold a true opinion about the world, saying:

1Pliny *Natural History* 2.5.27. The Latin text as recorded by Hegius, *Dialogi*, fo. L.v recto, is given here:

"Imperfecte vero in homine nature praecipua solatia sunt, ne deum quidem posse omnia, namque nec sibi potest mortem conscribere, si velit quod homini dedit optimum in tantis vite poenis, nec mortales eternitate donare aut revocare defunctos, nec facere ut bis dena viginti non sint, ut qui vixit non vixerit, qui honores gessit non gesserit, nullumque habere in praeterita ius praeterquam oblivionis."
It is just to believe the world, and this which by another name was pleased to be called the sky, by whose curve all things are covered, to be a divinity, eternal, immeasurable, neither born nor ever doomed to die?¹

B. No, if by the word "divinity" God is to be meant, because the world, since it is the handiwork of God--for God is the creator of the world--cannot be called a divinity. For it is not equal, that is, just, that the work of God, which has been made out of nothing and can be returned to nothing, can be believed to be God, as it is not just either for it to be believed that the tile is the potter or the statue the sculptor.

A. What does Pliny pronounce concerning the sun?

B. The sun travels among the wandering stars [i.e. the planets] in the most vast size and power, and is the ruler not only of the seasons of the earth but also of the stars themselves and the sky. It is the soul of the whole world and, more obviously, the month; it is the principal control of nature, and one must believe it to be a god, considering its works; it outshines the other stars; it regulates the changes of the seasons and the year, [which is] ever being reborn according to the custom of nature; it shakes off the sadness of the sky and even brightens the clouds of the human spirit. It also lends its own light to the other stars, shining bright, outstanding, regarding all things, hearing all things also, as I see that in that one thing it pleased Homer, the prince of letters.²

A. Are all these pronouncements to be believed?

B. Those that are true are to be believed. But those that are false and savor of impiety are to be refuted.

¹Ibid., 2.1.1. The Latin text as recorded by Hegius, Dialogi, fo. L.v recto, is given here:
"Mundum et hoc quod alicio nomine celum appellari libuit cuius circumflexus teguntur cuncta numen esse credi par est, eternum, immensum, neque genitum neque interitum unquam."

²Ibid., 2.4.12-13. The Latin text as recorded by Hegius, Dialogi, fo. L.v verso, is given here:
"Sol medius siderum errantium furtur amplissima magnitudine ac potestate, nec temporum modo terrarumque, sed siderum etiam ipsorum celique rector. Hunc mundi esse totius annum [sic, animum] ac planius mentem, hunc principale nature regimen, ac numen credere decet opera eius estimantes. Hic lucem rebus ministrat auffertque tenebras, hic reliquia sidera occultat, hic vices temporum annumque semper renovantem ex usu nature temperat, hic coeli tristiciam discutit atque etiam nubula humani animi serenat, hic suum lumen ceteris quoque sideribus foenerat, preclarus, eximius, omnia intuens, omnia etiam exaudiens, ut principi litterarum Homero placuisse in eo uno video."
A. Of what duration is [He] who put on flesh for our sakes?

B. Eternal; for God does not begin to be, since He did not make Himself, as some impious men have thought. Nothing can make itself, since nothing can be older than itself. Nor has He been made. Every craftsman is older than his work, but as Thales of Miletus [fl. ca. 585-550 B.C.] has said, nothing is older than God.

A. What are the opinions of Thales of Miletus?

B. Thales of Miletus, being asked what thing was the most ancient, replied, "God. For God is without birth." [When asked] what thing was the greatest and most capacious, he said, "Place. For the world contains all things, but place [contains] the world."¹

A. What thing is the most beautiful?

[B]. He says the world. It is the work of the most beautiful craftsman.

A. What thing is the most useful?

[B]. He says virtue. This makes useful all things that it uses rightly.

A. What thing is most deadly?

[B]. He says sin, for this brings to the one in whom it is present the greatest of loss.

[A]. What thing is the strongest?

B. He says necessity, for this is unconquerable.

A. Is God the most ancient of all those things that are?

B. He is. For this reason He is called the Alpha and O[mega], that is, the beginning and the end. For if anything were more ancient than God, He could not rightfully be called Alpha. Nor could He be called O[mega] if anything were going to be of longer duration than God.

A. Is God infinite?

B. He is infinite in duration, for He always was and always will be. He is also infinite in power because He is omnipotent.

A. Is God boundless?

¹See Diogenes Laertius Lives of Eminent Philosophers 1.35. The origin of these ideas attributed to Thales is suspect, as we have no extant works written by him. See also The Oxford Classical Dictionary 2nd ed., s.v. "Thales," by Allan H. Coxon.
B. He is.
A. Why?
B. Because He is eternal. Eternity is without bounds, for no period of time, however great, can measure out eternity.
A. What is [it] to measure a quantity?
B. It is to know how many times a lesser quantity known to man is contained in a greater quantity, as, to measure any length is to know how many times the length of a foot is contained in it.
A. Why can no period of time measure out eternity?
B. Because no one can know how many times any period may be contained in eternity, since no period of time, however great, is an aliquot part of eternity.
A. What part is called the aliquot?
B. If asked about it, we can reply what fraction it is, as, if asked what part of the number six the number two is, we can reply that two is a third part of six. And on account of this, two is an aliquot part of six.
A. Are a thousand thousand years an aliquot part of eternity?
B. They are not, for no man can say what fraction of eternity a thousand thousand years may be. And it must be considered in this same way in respect of the rest of time. Therefore it is evident that eternity is boundless, because we are able to measure it by no number of years.
A. Is the punishment of a thousand thousand years an aliquot part of the eternal torment that must be endured by the impious in hell?
B. No, for just as no finite time is an aliquot part of infinite eternity, so nothing that is measured by finite time, whether it be joy or torment, is an aliquot part of that which is measured by eternity. Therefore mortal sin is to be shunned with more care than any other evil, since it truly makes man a debtor throughout eternity. The impious in hell pay the penalty for their sins forever, yet never complete the payment, since they will never give the last farthing.
A. Is there any ratio of the finite to the infinite?
B. As there is no ratio of the infinite to the finite, according to the five types of ratio (multiple in qua, superparticular, superpartient, multiple superparticular, [and] multiple superpartient); neither is there any ratio of the finite to the infinite according to these types, which exist between greater and lesser quantities,
and are called submultiple, subsuperparticular, subsuperpartient, submultiple superparticular, [+and submultiple superpartient].

A. What ratio does an aliquot part have to its whole?

B. Submultiple; for every aliquot part is either a half of the whole, that is, a second part, or [it is] a third, or a quarter; because if it is twice contained in the whole it is a half, if three times it is a third, if four times it is a quarter. It is evident then that no period of time can be an aliquot part of eternity, because it is not a half or a third or a quarter.
Concerning the Most Christian Birth of the Savior:
Second Dialog

A. In what part of the year was Christ born?
B. In winter, for He was born after midwinter.

A. In what month?
B. The month of December.

A. On what day?
B. The twenty-fifth.

A. In what part of the year was Christ conceived?
B. In truth, He was conceived around the spring equinox, [and] born around midwinter.

A. At what time was the Word of God made flesh?
B. At the time of conception, for the conception of the Son of God was His incarnation, because at the same point of time He was conceived and He became man.

A. Did Christ become man at His birth?
B. No, but at that time He came forth into the light from the enclosure of the womb of His mother Mary, ever virgin.

A. How did this come about?
B. By the command of Almighty God, who did all things, whatever He wished. For just as Christ came out of a sealed tomb when He rose again, so when He was born He came forth into the light from a closed womb.

A. For how long a time was Christ in the womb of His blessed mother?
B. For nine months, for He was in His mother's womb for three parts of a year--spring, summer, and autumn--which make up nine months.

A. How did the mother of God conceive Christ?
B. Of the Holy Spirit. And therefore she was a virgin both in the conception and in the birth.

A. How many parts of the year are there?
B. Four.
A. Which?
B. Spring, summer, autumn, [and] winter.
A. When does spring begin?
B. At the spring equinox.
A. When summer?
B. At the solstice.
A. When autumn?
B. At the autumn equinox.
A. When winter?
B. At midwinter.
A. Why is Christmas called diecula ("little day") by the blessed Gregory [Pope Gregory I "the Great" (ca. 540-604)]?
B. Because midwinter day is the shortest in all the days of the year. Diecula means little day, because it is short.
A. When is midwinter?
B. When the sun enters Capricorn, or when the day is shortest and the night longest.
A. When is the spring equinox?
B. When the sun enters Aries.
A. When the solstice?
B. When the sun enters Cancer.
A. When the autumn equinox?
B. When the sun enters Libra.
A. How many sorts of signs of the zodiac are there?
B. Four, for some are spring signs, some summer, some autumn, [and] some winter. The spring signs are Aries, Taurus, [and] Gemini; the
summer, Cancer, Leo, [and] Virgo; the autumn, Libra, Scorpio, [and] Sagittarius; the winter, Capricorn, Aquarius, [and] Pisces.

A. Which are the northern, which the southern signs?

B. The spring and summer signs are northern, while the autumn and winter signs are southern.

A. How many sorts of months are there?

B. Four, for the months are solar, lunar, calendar, and common.

A. What is a solar month?

B. It is the time in which the sun makes its journey through any [sign] of the zodiac.

A. What is a lunar month?

B. The time that has intervened between two conjunctions of the luminaries, that is, of the sun and of the moon.

A. Which of these two months is the longer?

B. The solar, because twelve solar months make a year, but twelve lunar months do not make a year unless eleven days are added to them. From which it follows that twelve solar months exceed twelve lunar months by the number of eleven days.

[A]. What is a calendar month?

B. The month of the Romans, beginning at the calends.

A. What is a month?

B. A period of four weeks.

A. Could it happen that the Son of God should have been brought forth into the light from the closed womb of His mother?

B. It could.

A. Why?

B. Because it did happen. What did happen could happen, in the same way that what is happening can happen, and what will happen will be able to happen.

A. By what means did this happen?

[B]. By the command of Almighty God it was brought about that the body of Christ should enter the closed womb of the Blessed Virgin Mary.
A. Can it be that two bodies may enter one another mutually with neither of them yielding to the other?

B. It can, at the command of Almighty God.

A. Can it be, in the course of nature, that one body should enter another?

B. No, since the body that is entered yields to the entering body, and it is in this way that the engraver's tool is said to enter the image.

A. Can it be that two bodies may exist in one place?

B. It can, for when any body enters another it is inevitable that the body that enters and the body that is entered are in one place.

[A]. Why do the philosophers deny that the entering of bodies can take place?

B. The philosophers state those things that they had experienced, and, because they had no experience of any body entering another, they thought it could not occur.

A. Why used they to deny that two bodies can exist in one place?

B. Because it had never been known to any one of them.

A. Does every month have calends, nones, and ides?

B. No. Only the Roman has calends, nones, and ides. The lunar month, which is the Hebrew month, has only calends.

A. Which day of the lunar month carries the name of calends?

B. The first. This is called neomenia, or the calends.

A. What does neomenia mean?

B. 'O vėo means new, ἅλβν [means] moon. Thus neomenia is translated as new moon.

A. Who calls the first day of the month neomenia?

B. David the prophet, when he says: "Sound the trumpet at the new moon on the glorious day of your solemnity." [Psalm 81:3.]

A. Who calls the first day the calends?

B. Isaiah, when he says: "I do not want your calends and your solemnities." [Isaiah 1:14.]

A. What difference is there between the Hebrew and the Roman calends?
B. The Roman calends are fixed, the Hebrew moveable. For the conjunctions of the luminaries in a future year will not fall on the same day on which they have fallen this year.

A. Which day of the Roman month has the name of calends?
B. The first.

A. Which [has the name] of nones?
B. If the month has four nones [i.e., four days between calends and nones], the fifth day is called the nones; if six, we shall call the seventh day the nones.

A. Which day of the month is called the ides?
B. When the fifth day of the month has the name of nones, it is necessary for the thirteenth day to be called the ides, for every month has eight ides [i.e., eight days between the nones and the ides]. When the seventh is called the nones a day is allotted the name of ides in the same way.

A. What day is it said to be that falls on the day preceding the calends, nones, or ides.
B. It is said to be the day before the calends, nones, or ides, and not the second from the calends, etc., for "second" comes from sequor ("I follow"). For this reason it does not mean what goes before but what comes after. Third and fourth, however, can mean what goes before, and so that which occurs on the third day from the calends occurs on a day preceding the calends [and] not [on one] following.

A. Which months have four nones, and which six?
B. The following lines will indicate them:

Six nones May, October, July, March;
Four the rest; each keeps the ides [as] eight.

A. Of how many months does the Hebrew year consist?
B. The common year consists of twelve lunar months, the embolismal [leap] year of thirteen.

A. What is the embolismal year?
B. [That] in which there are thirteen conjunctions; for it sometimes happens that in one Roman month there are two conjunctions, one at the beginning of the month, the other at the end. And when this happens the year is called embolismal.

A. On what account is it called embolismal?
B. Embolizo is the same as I insert or interject; thus ἐμβολίαμος, that is, an insertion or an interjection; thus embolismal, because in an embolismal year we say that the third month is inserted into the other months of the year.

A. How is this year to be recognized?

B. It is recognized by this verse: "Bis est gravatus charitas nisi quis simulatus" ("Being burdened twice is a high price if anything [is] counterfeit") That is, when the golden number is two, which is represented by bis, or five, which is represented by est, the year is embolismal.

A. What is the golden number?

B. It is the token of the lunar cycle, for the golden number explains which year of the lunar cycle that year is to which the golden number belongs.

A. What is a lunar cycle?

B. A period of nineteen years.

A. Why is such a period called a lunar cycle?

B. Because in nineteen years the conjunctions of the lunar months return to those days of the Roman months on which they were nineteen years previously. And because of this, that period is called a cycle, since cycle is to be translated as circle. In a circle there is a return to that [point] from which a departure was made.

A. Why do the conjunctions of luminaries not fall on the days to which the golden number is assigned?

B. Because the lunar month is not an aliquot part of the period of nineteen years, since in nineteen years there are eleven [sic, nineteen] times twelve months and seven months, but these months added together are somewhat longer than nineteen years. On this account it happens that the first month according to the calendar is the same in the sky.

A. In which year from the creation of the world was Christ born?

B. The 5,199th; for between the creation of the world and the birth of Christ 5,199 years intervened, according to Eusebius [of Caesarea (ca. 260-ca. 340)].¹

A. How many years intervened between the flood and Christ’s birth?

¹This calculation does not appear to be in Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History or Chronicles. Though I have not made an exhaustive search of his Preparation for the Gospel or Demonstration of the Gospel, it does not seem to be in these works either.
B. Three thousand years, according to the tables of the illustrious King Alphonsus.

A. In what year from the foundation of the city [of Rome] was Christ born?

B. The 752nd.

A. In what principate of which Caesar was Christ born?

B. In the principate of Caesar Octavian Augustus [63 B.C.-A.D. 14], in the forty-second year of whose empire, which he had held over the whole world, our savior was born, without any pain for His mother. And as Eusebius says, at that time "oil burst out of the ground from the tabernacle of merit in the area across the Tiber, and flowed throughout the day without a break, showing forth the grace of Christ to the nations."  

A. How is the Roman year divided?

B. Into the ordinary and the bisextile [year]. The ordinary is [that] which has 365 days; the bisextile exceeds the ordinary year by one day.

A. How is the bisextile year to be found?

B. If three is an aliquot part of the dominical number of years the year is bisextile; if not, the year is ordinary. It can be found by division.

A. Where was Christ born?

B. In Asia, for He was born in Judea, which is a part of Asia.

A. How many parts of the world are habitable?

B. Three: Asia, Africa, and Europe.

A. What land is said to be habitable?

B. [That] which is not covered by the ocean. The ocean is the sea surrounding the habitable land.

A. In how many ways is the habitable land measured?

B. In three: by length, by width, and by extent.

A. What is the length of the habitable land?

B. A line taken through the habitable land from the east to the west. A line of this kind is taken from the Indian Ocean to the Ocean of Gades [Cadiz, i.e., the Atlantic Ocean].

A. What is the breadth?

B. A line taken from the south to the north.

A. Why is this called breadth [latitude], and the former length [longitude]?

B. Because a surface is measured by two lines of unequal length. The greater is called longitude, the lesser latitude. But since a line drawn from south to north through the habitable land is shorter than a line drawn from east to west, so that is called latitude and the other longitude.

A. What is the difference between a principate and a dominion?

B. A dominion pertains to kings, a principate to caesars and consuls.

A. In what zone of the habitable lands was Christ born?

B. Within the boundary of the third zone, since Judea is situated within the boundary of the third zone.

A. Into how many zones is the habitable land divided?

B. Into seven. The first is called Diameros, the second Diasynes, the third Dia-alexandrias, the fourth Diarhodum, the fifth Diyariones, the sixth Diaboristhenis, the seventh Diarypheon.

A. Were any prophecies fulfilled at Christ's birth?

B. They were.

A. Which?

B. The prophecies of the prophets and the Sibyls.

A. What is the derivation of [the word] prophet?

B. ἐφήμι means the same as I speak, ἐφήμωμι ("I speak on behalf of") [as] I foretell. Thus a prophet [is] a foreteller, and prophecy a foretelling. Thus pseudo-prophet, that is, a false predictor.

A. What did Isaiah predict concerning Christ?

B. This prophecy, in the seventh chapter: "Behold a virgin shall conceive in her womb and shall bear a Son, and His name shall be called Emmanuel" [Isaiah 7:14].

A. How is Emmanuel to be interpreted?
B. God with us.

A. Why?

B. Because emanu means with us, and el [means] God. For in the forty-fifth psalm, where the Latin translation has "dominus virtutum nobiscum" ("the Lord of hosts is with us"), the Hebrew psalter has "adonai sabaoth emanu" [Ps 46:7].1 Adonai is interpreted as "Lord"; sabaoth, of powers or "of armies," and emanu, "with us."

A. Is the name Emmanuel appropriate to Christ, that is, to God incarnate?

B. It is appropriate, because although God has always been with man, yet when He was made man He was with man in a special way, through his assumption of human nature.

A. Why is Emmanuel called the great name of the Lord.

B. Because it symbolizes the Word made flesh, which dwelt among us, that is, God made man. Such a name is to be valued greatly by us; for what greater thing could happen to us than that God, having taken flesh, should have dwelt among us.

A. What did Jeremiah prophesy concerning Christ?

B. This, which he wrote in the thirty-third chapter of his book: "Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, and I shall raise up the just one from the seed of David, and He shall rule as king, and He shall be wise, and He makes judgment and justice in the earth. In those days Judah shall be saved and Israel shall live in trust. And the name which they shall call Him [is] this, our Lord." [Jer 33:14-16.] In this prophecy the prophet foretells that Christ will be true man and true God. He will be true man because He is to be raised up from the seed of David; and, since He is to be called our just Lord, He will be God--for where in our translation it has "dominus iustus noster" ("the Lord our righteousness")[v. 16], the Hebraic truth has the name of God, the tetragrammaton, which is the most personal name among all the names by which God is called.

A. What name of God is called τεταγραμματον?

B. That which is written with these four letters in Hebrew: hdy, hei, vau, bole [sic, he].

A. Why is the name of God, the tetragrammaton, called the ineffable name?

B. Because iod, he, vau, [and] he<t> are not coherent letters, for they cannot make syllables, and no name can be pronounced without

1In the Vulgate, from which Hegius is quoting, this is Ps 45:8.
syllables. And on this account Moses commanded the children of Israel, in place of the ineffable name of God, to say Adonai, which by the Greeks is translated as kyrios, [and] by the Latins as dominus ("Lord").

A. Why is the ineffable name of God said to be [in]communicable?

B. Because this name of God is shared with no created being. Wherever in Hebrew Scriptures the ineffable name of God is found the words are always concerning God [and] never concerning any created being.

A. Wherefore tetragrammaton?

B. Among the Greeks gramma means letter; tetra among them means four in composition, as is evident in these words: tetragonus, tetragonismus, tetrasyllabus, tetrameter ("quadrilateral, quadrangular, tetrasyllable, tetramer"). And therefore tetragrammaton [means] the same thing as having four letters, just as monogrammaton [means] that which [has] one letter, digrammaton two, trigrammaton three, pentagrammaton etc.

A. From where did the Greek and Hebrew nouns take their meanings?

B. If they are simple and primary, they took them from their inventors, that is, from those who attached them to things; if derivative, from their primary sources; if compounded, from their parts.

A. Give an example.

B. Hyppus is translated as equus ("horse"), and since the noun is simple and primary, it took its meaning from its inventor. Hypopolitus [Ὑποπόλιτος] took its [meaning] from its primary sources. It means equestrian. Hyppolytus took its [meaning] from its parts [Ὑπος, i.e., horse, and φιλος, i.e., destroy]. It means dismembering or destroying a horse. One must hold the same opinion in the case of Hebrew words. Beth takes its meaning from its inventor, and is translated as domus ("house"). Bethel is translated as domus dei ("house of God"), for beth [means] house [and] el [means] God. Bethleem is translated as domus panis ("house of bread"), since beth [means] house [and] leem [means] bread.

A. What did Jacob prophesy?

B. That which is written in Genesis 49:10: "The scepter shall not be taken from Judah, nor the leader from his loins, until He shall come who is to be sent, and He is the expectation of the nations." For the scepter was taken from Judah in the time of Herod Ascolonita [the Great (ca. 73-ca. 4 B.C.)], who was the first foreigner among the kings of the Jews, for he was not of the tribe of Judah but an

1There is no record of such a command in Scripture, but Hegius may be making reference to Exod 3:13-15 and 20:7.
Idumean by race. In his reign Christ was born. The consequence is that He who was to be sent has already been sent.

A. How were the prophets able to foretell the future in respect of Christ when God alone knows what will be?

B. The prophets were the instruments of the Holy Spirit because they were His pens; [and] the Holy Spirit was the scribe who spoke through the apostles. In that [same] way the Holy Spirit spoke through the prophets. And just as our Savior said, "It is not you who speak, but the Spirit of your Father speaks in you" [Matt 10:20], so too the Holy Spirit spoke through the prophets. And for this reason the Holy Spirit is the scribe of both Testaments, New and Old. His pens with which He wrote the Old Testament were the prophets; the pens with which He wrote the New Testament were the apostles and evangelists. And so, although the pens were not gifted with foreknowledge of the future, yet the scribe was gifted with foreknowledge of the future.

A. Was Christ born in order to fulfill the prophecies?

B. No.

A. Why?

B. Because Christ was born to free the human race from death. Therefore it is clear that this causal proposition, [that] Christ was born to fulfill the prophecies, must be changed to this temporal proposition, [that] when Christ was born the prophecies were fulfilled, or, after Christ was born the prophecies were fulfilled. [This must be done] on account of the conjunction ut ("in order that") which in the aforesaid proposition is a sign of consequence rather than of cause.

A. What did Daniel predict about Christ?

B. This, that the angel Gabriel revealed to him, for he spoke to him thus: "You, however, pay heed to the speech and understand the vision. Seventy weeks are set aside over your people and your holy city, that transgression may be finished, and sin come to an end, and iniquity be wiped out, that everlasting justice may be brought in, and the vision and the prophecy may be fulfilled, and the Holy One of holy ones be anointed." According to this prophecy written in Daniel 9:23-24, it is clearly seen that Christ, who is the Holy One of holy ones, exists before many centuries, because the seventy weeks were at an end many centuries ago.

A. What is to be understood by the seventy weeks?

B. Hebdomas represents the number seven among the Greeks, and stands sometimes for the number of seven days, sometimes of seven years. In this prophecy it represents the number of seven years, and therefore the seventy hebdomates are seventy times seven years.
This period was fulfilled in the anointing of the Holy One of the holy ones, therefore the Holy One of holy ones has already come—and so the Jews await in vain the advent of the Messiah.1

A. What did the Sibyls prophecy concerning Christ?

B. Those things that Augustine [of Hippo (354-430)] wrote in the twenty-third chapter of book eight [sic, eighteen] of the City of God. For the Erythrean Sibyl [wrote] twenty-seven lines in the Greek language in the capitals of which, that is, in the first letters, are read these five words: Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς Θεοῦ υἱὸς σωτῆρ [sic, σωτήρ], which are translated as "Jesus Christ, Son [+of God], Savior." If the first letters of these five words are put together it makes Ἰχθύς, which is translated as "fish." By this is understood Christ, in that He came into the abyss of this mortal state, in the depths of which He lived, that is, He was able to exist, [and yet] without sin. The other Sibyls prophesied:

He will afterwards come into evil hands and [the hands] of the unfaithful, and they will give God blows upon the cheek with unclean hands, and with filthy mouths [they] will spit out poison spittle at Him. He will give His holy back to beatings, and receiving buffets will keep silence, so that no one may recognize what the Word is or where He comes from, that He may speak to the dwellers in the underworld. And He will be crowned with a crown of thorns. For His food they have given gall and for His drink vinegar. They will show this service of inhospitality. You foolish nation, you have not perceived your God playing with the minds of men. But you have crowned [Him] with thorns; and you have mixed foul gall. Truly, the veil of the temple will be torn, and at midday there will be the darkest night for three hours. And then, having returned from the underworld, He will come to joyous light, the first of the resurrection recalled with His origin made manifest.2

The lines of the Erythrean, or, as others say, the Eumanean Sibyl, are translated by these lines, with several added that are symbolized by the letters σταυρός, found in Eusebius Pamphilius Caesar-iensis, in the work On the Royal Word [Oration of Constantine]:3

1Hegius interprets this prophecy to be a period of seventy times seven years (i.e. 490 years), with its culmination at the time of Christ's "anointing."

2Augustine City of God 18.23.

3The translation of this prophetic song is not as literal as the rest of the translation of the Dialogi. This is the result of an attempt to form the appropriate acrostic in English. Although the wording is not as exact in following the original as elsewhere, the licence indulged is minor, and the meaning of the Latin verse has not been altered.
Judgment's sign: the earth is soaked with moisture. Emerging from the sky, the King: Surely He will through all spans of time be present in the flesh, so He may judge man, of whom the unbeliever and the faithful will see God uplifted with the saints, before whom at this final point souls will be present in the flesh, and He Himself will judge them.

Chaotic briars cover the world which lies untended; Men will reject images; other treasure also; earth and sea and heavens will be burned up by fire, it will seek out and break through the gate of foul Avernus, so long grave of the saints. With You a free light will be given to the flesh, and an eternal flame will burn the guilty, opening up hidden actions. Then each man will speak out secrets, and will disclose his heart to the light of God.

Then too there will be mourning: all will gnash with their teeth. Even the light of the sun will be snatched away, and the singing will come to an end in the stars; ominously the heaven will roll back; the brightness of the moon will depart. Uplifting the valleys from the depths, He will cast down the hills.

High and lofty things will be no more among the possessions of men. Instead the mountains are made level with the plain, and the blue [expanses] of the sea are all obliterated. The broken earth will perish; springs and rivers, also, are burned with fire.

So then, the trumpet will send its mournful note from the heights of the heavens, bewailing wretched sin and its various troubles. The gaping earth will reveal the Tartarean abyss, even every king will be made to appear before the presence of the Lord. Rivers of fire will pour down from the heavens, and streams of sulphur.

Seven lines, not translated, are missing, as we can see in the Greek example from the year 1501, of which the first letters produce σταυρος, cross. The sense of them [is this]: A sign clear then to every man, as the wood among the faithful, the desired horn will be the life of pious men, the world's offense, cleansing the chosen in

1Eusebius The Oration of Constantine 18. Chapter 19 is a vain attempt to impart historical credibility to the utterances of these prophetesses. Augustine and Eusebius cite the same prophecy.
twelve fountains. The shepherd's staff will overcome the wild beast. He Himself who is now written down as our Savior, immortal King, is companion of our suffering.¹

But, as Augustine says,² these Sibyls have nothing in their song, of which these lines are the beginning, that pertain to the worship of false gods. Indeed, on the contrary, they so speak against them and their worshipers that in their number may be seen those who belong to the City of God.

A. What is a squared number?

B. [That] which occurs when any number is multiplied by itself, as, two times two [or] three times three.

A. What is a cubed number?

B. [That] which occurs when any number is multiplied twice by itself, as twice two twice.

A. What did the Magi realize about Christ?

B. They realized that Christ was God and king and man. And for that reason they offered to Him incense, gold, and myrrh [see Matt 2:11]. For incense is due to the God, gold to the king, and myrrh to the man, since God is to be placated with incense, gold is to be possessed by kings, [and] mortal men are to be buried with myrrh and spices.

A. What do we understand by Magi?

B. The Magi, as Basil [Cappadocian Father (ca. 330-79)] says,³ are a great Persian nation, given to prophecies and superstitions.⁴ Marcus Diogenes⁴ writes that they devote themselves to the worship of

¹This paragraph must be an editorial comment introduced by Paffraet, or, more probably, Faber, who would have known some Greek. The mention of a Greek document from 1501, following the death of Hegius, is a cause for some concern. While an editorial insertion is clear in this case, as well as in the Invective Against the Modes of Signification (see below, p. 641), there is no way of telling if any material has been added elsewhere in the document. The translator did, however, note that she suspected a corrupt text at this point, though she was not aware of the anomaly concerning the dates. See also above, p. 459, n. 1.

²Augustine, City of God 18.23.

³Basil Letter 158, to Bishop Epiphanius of Salamis [Cyprus].

⁴The Oxford Classical Dictionary, 2nd ed., s.v. "Diogenes," and "Diogenianus," lists a number of possible individuals, none of
the gods, and offer them prayer and gifts and sacrifices, and dis­
cern as foolish the errors of those who say that gods are masculine
and goddesses feminine. Moreover, they practice divination and
prediction. Aristotle wrote in the book that he entitled Magic
that they were ignorant of magic divination.

A. Why does the evangelist write that the Magi came from the east
when Jerusalem itself is situated in the east?

B. If the Magi came from Persia to Jerusalem they came from the
east, because Persia is further east than Jerusalem. For the longi­
tude of the habitable earth is divided into 180 regions according to
Ptolemy [fl. A.D. 127-51]. The farthest region of India, in which
the Ichthiophagi ("fish-eaters") live, who are called Syene, is 180
degrees distant from the west. The regions of longitude of the hab­
itable earth are called degrees. Jerusalem is 66 degrees distant
from the west, according to the cosmographers; Persia is 90 degrees
away from the west. It is clear, therefore, that Persia is further
east than Jerusalem. If indeed the Magi came from India or Arabia
they are rightly said to have come from the east because each of
those regions is further east than Judea.

A. Why does the number of twenty-seven lines of the Sibyls give a
threefold cube, as Augustine says in chapter twenty-three of the
aforesaid book?

B. A quadrate number is [that] which occurs when any number is
multiplied by itself, and it has two types, the squared and the
cubed. The squared number is [that] which occurs when any number is
multiplied once by itself, as, when we say three times three we make
nine the square. The cubed number is [that] which occurs when any
number is multiplied twice by itself; as, when we say three times
three times three, we make a cubed number, which is also called the
cube, and the cubic number. But because three twice multiplied by
itself makes twenty-seven, the aforementioned number of lines is
rightly said to give a threefold cube.

A. Why is the number which is made from the multiplying of any num­
ber by itself called squared.

B. Because any squared figure is enclosed by equal sides. So, a
number of this sort, written down in its individual parts, is en­
closed by equal sides.

whom is given the name Marcus. Basil writes concerning a certain
philosopher, Diogenes (see Basil, Letters 4 and 9), but I have not
been able to find any reference to the Magi.

1No such title is to be found among the works of Aristotle,
even under works spuriously attributed to him. The book On Magic
mistakenly ascribed to Aristotle by Hegius is probably the work of
Cicero. See Cicero De divinatione 1.41.90-91, where the ideas are
much the same as those presented here by Hegius.
DIALOG XII

The Dialog of Alexander Hegius, Formerly Schoolmaster at Deventer, and Concerning the Uses of the Arts of Grammar, Logic, and Rhetoric; It Begins with Good Wishes

A. What is art?

B. Aristotle defines art as being the creative habit with true reason.\(^1\)

A. What is inertia, which is called in Greek ὀξεύσα?\(^1\)

B. It is the creative habit with false reason.

A. What is common to art and inertia?

B. They are creative habits.

A. What is the difference between them?

B. What art creates, it creates with true reason, but what inertia creates, it creates with false reason.

A. What is it, to create something with true reason?

B. It is to create something in such a way as right reason dictates it should be made.

A. What is it, to create something with false reason?

B. It is to create something in such a way as right reason dictates it should not be made.

A. Why is art defined as a habit?

B. Because habit is a type of art, for every species is to be defined by its type.

A. What is the derivation of [the word] art?

\(^1\)Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 4.4.1140a.9-10.

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B. Some people say that art derives from the Greek noun, ἀπετένα, which means virtue, for every habit by which the intellect proclaims the truth is its virtue, just as every habit by which the will chooses the right is its virtue. And on account of this Aristotle, in the second [book] of Ethics, divides virtues into intellectual virtues, by which the intellect affirms the truth, and moral, by which the will chooses the right. Others, however, say that art derives from arcendum ("to be stunned"), because art by its precepts turns the mind away from errors.

A. Why is every art said to be a faculty?

B. Because [he] who is endowed with an art will easily be able to observe or to work. For [he] who is skilled in rhetoric will easily be able to make speeches; [he] who [is skilled] in dialectic will easily be able to argue cases; [he] who [is skilled] in grammar will easily be able to speak correctly; [he] who is skilled in mathematics will easily be able to measure the equalities and inequalities of quantities.

A. What does inertia mean?

B. Inertia means two things. First, the lack of art, which in Greek is called ἀτέχνη. It is understood in this way in the sixth [book] of Ethics. Secondly, it means idleness.

A. Why is every art called a habit?

B. Because every art in Greek is called ἡ ἔξεσ. Hexis is translated as habit.

A. Is every habit a virtue?

B. No, because only good and praiseworthy habits are called virtues. Vices cannot be called virtues, for they are bad habits. Every habit according to which the will chooses what is base and foul is bad and vicious. Likewise, the habit according to which the intellect errs and thinks wrongly is bad, and not worthy of the name of virtue.

A. Is every art a virtue?

B. It is, for according to every art the intellect thinks what is true. For this reason every art is a virtue, not moral, but intellectual.

A. Why does Aristotle call only the creative habit art when Quintilian [ca. A.D.30-ante 100] divides art into three types: contemplative, active, and effective?

B. Aristotle takes the name of art in a more limited sense than

\[1\]Ibid., 2.1.1130\(a\).14-20. \[2\]Ibid., 6.4.1140\(a\).19-23.
Quintilian, for Aristotle calls an art only the ability to work and to bring something into being, [while] Quintilian numbers among the arts the ability to observe.\(^1\)

A. What is speculative art?

B. That which contents itself merely with the contemplation of things subjective to itself and does not perform any act as a result of contemplation. It is called by the Greeks θεωρεῖν, θεωρεῖν. The Greek word θεωρεῖν means the same as specular ("I observe"). From it are derived theorem, theory, and theoretic.

A. What is active art?

B. [That] whose end is to act, and [which] is content with that same act, and leaves no work behind after the act. Of this sort is the art of dancing, or of playing the lyre. It is called by the Greeks practical, for πράττω means the same as ago ("I act"). From it [come] praxis, that is, action; and practical, that is, active.

A. What is the effective art?

B. [That] whose end is to bring something into being and to leave some work behind after its action. Of this sort is the art of building or sewing. It is called by the Greeks ποιεῖν, for poēta is interpreted as effector ("maker"). From it [comes] poetic, that is, effective. From this it follows that the end of active art is operation, [while] the end of effective art is a piece of work; and Aristotle realizes this at the start of the Ethics, saying that among ends a certain difference is to be seen, for some are operations and others are the works due to them.\(^2\)

\(^1\)Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory 2.18.1-2, and Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, 6.4.1140a.5-20.

\(^2\)Aristotle Nicomachean Ethics 1.1.1094a.1-6.
A. Divide the arts.

B. Some arts are liberal, some mechanical.

A. Which are the liberal arts?

B. [Those] that are worthy of a free man, that is, that are suitable and worthy to be learned and known by free men, for they are to be governed by the liberal arts.

A. Why are arts called mechanical?

B. Μηχανική in Greek means by the effort of the power of inventive thought. Thus μηχανικός is translated machinatus ("contriving") and excogitatius ("inventive"). The arts of manual workers are called mechanical arts, and fabricatory. [Those] who make works of art by their own art and hand are called mechanics because they complete their works with effort and inventiveness.

A. Are the arts of manual workers called mechanical for this reason, that they are adulterated, that is, because they make the minds of men adulterous? For some people say that when the mind of man learns a mechanical art it clings to adultery, but [when it learns] a liberal [art] it clings to its lawful wife.

B. By no means, for they take their name not from adultery but from invention, since mechicus, not mechanicus, is translated adulterious, and there is not the slightest shame attached to the mechanical arts when they are called adulterate. For who could be so barefaced that he would dare to call adulterate the art of that most outstanding painter, Apelles [fl. 4th century B.C.], or that most noble sculptor, Polycletus [fl. 5th century B.C.]?

A. Is grammar a liberal art?

B. Grammar is the most excellent of the liberal arts, for all the others give credit to grammar for the fact that they have been saved and are being saved, that is, that they did not die, and are not dying. Nor is there any of the liberal arts that has deserved better of mankind than grammar.

A. How did grammar save the other arts?
B. Because the masters of the other arts, to save them and to preserve them from extinction, published books about them, which, without a knowledge of grammar, could not have been done.

A. Why has grammar deserved best of us?

B. We ought to give grammar the credit for anything we ever learn from instructors or from books, for we owe to grammar what we learn of dialectic, physics, mathematics, ethics, and the other liberal disciplines. For no one is able to learn anything from any instructor whose conversation he does not understand, nor can anyone learn anything from a book written in Latin if he has no knowledge of the Latin language. We owe to grammar also that we know of the mystery of our redemption—that we know that Christ, the Son of God, equal to the Father Almighty, came into the world for the salvation of mankind, conceived of the Holy Spirit, brought forth into light from the unopened womb of the Blessed Mary, ever virgin. For we learn these things from the evangelists, whom no one illiterate can understand. We owe to grammar the reason why we surpass the dumb beasts. [Those] who are skilled in grammar can make their thoughts known to men, [a thing] that is denied to dumb beasts.

A. Is poetry a liberal art?

B. It is, for just as it is a liberal thing to speak correctly, so it is to compose words correctly and music rhythmically. Poetry, because it is an art of composing rhythmically, is therefore allotted the name of music, and rightly numbered among the liberal arts.

A. Why is poetry called music?

B. Because the lines of which the poet is the creator are called songs. To make verses is said to be to sing or to compose. Since music is the art of singing and of composing, poetry is rightly called music.

A. How many sorts of music are there?

B. Three. One of them is the art of writing songs; the second the art of playing, that is, of singing with some musical instrument; the third the art of making music with the lips. The first is the music of poets, the second of flute-players and horn-players, the third of singers.

A. From where does poetry take its name?

B. Poet signifies maker. From that comes poetica, that is, made, and poesis or poema, that is, making or doing. Thus poetry is the art of making songs.

A. From where is poetry derived?

B. Ποιητής in Greek means the same as facio ("I make"), and it is
written with a diphthong, o and iota. From this is derived ποιητης, ποιηγα, ποιησις, ποιητικης, ποιητηκης. But the Romans, because they wanted to alter the first syllables of these nouns, took away the iota from them and said: poeta, poema, poesis, poeticus.

A. Is it liberal or illiberal to write songs?

B. Liberal, for it is a holy thing to write songs about God and the saints. Whatever is holy is liberal, just as whatever is impious is illiberal and servile.

A. What sort of thing is holy?

B. If it was held to be holy to sing evil things in honor of Apollo, the fabled driver of the chariot of the sun, it is much more holy to sing a hymn to the true God, for by His command He turns the sky and all the stars. If the fabled deeds of fabled heroes, such as were Aeneas, Hercules, [and] Achilles, are celebrated in song, much more the true deeds of true heroes, such as were the apostles and martyrs, are to be celebrated in the songs of the poets.

A. Why are songs called modes and meters?

B. Because meter in Greek and mode in Latin mean measure. And since its own measure is due to each poem, a measure of three feet is due to heroics, as a measure of five feet is due to elegiacs. Thus songs are rightly called modes and meters.

A. Why are they called numbers?

B. Because they consist of a number of times and syllables and feet. The hexameter consists of six feet, the pentameter of five, the tetrameter of four, the trimeter of three, [and] the dimeter of two.

A. From where does music take its name?

B. Musa in Greek is called cantus ("singing") in Latin. Thus musicus [means] of song, and music is the art of singing.

A. Is it a liberal thing to know the quantities of syllables?

B. It is, for if it is a liberal thing to write songs it is inevitable that the knowledge of the quantities of syllables is a liberal thing. [A man] who is ignorant of the quantities of syllables cannot create. [He] who composed this hymn, Festum nunc celebre "Now, celebrate the feast"), for today's feast had a knowledge of the quantities of syllables. Likewise, [he] who composed this for the same feast of the Ascension was not ignorant of the quantities of syllables:

Let us now sing hymns, new hymns of glory proclaiming loudly: Christ already ascends by a new way to the throne of the Father. He, who by death destroyed death, putting an end to mortality,
goes up powerfully to the summit of the heavens in the triumph of glory. For illuminating with light the horrible portents of death and the dark shadows of the underworld, He had bound by his own power the ruler of death. And those who [are] faithful in deeds and firm in faith, He had renewed. And all those who were in the jaws of the underworld He saved from the ferocious [ones]. Glory be to God the Father, etc.

A. What advantages does a knowledge of the quantities of syllables give to men?

B. [A man] who knows the quantities of syllables can write good verses, which the man cannot do who does not know them. He can avoid barbarisms, because he can shorten the syllables that need to be short and lengthen those that need lengthening, which the man cannot do who does not know them. And for this reason those who do not know the quantities of syllables cannot correctly read in church the epistles and gospels, prophets and psalms, and the other things that are read. He [who understands syllables] can know what ambiguous words mean; for levis means one thing when he shortens the first syllable [light/not heavy], another when he lengthens it [smooth]; populus one thing when he lengthens the first syllable [a poplar tree][and] another when he shortens it [the people]. He can distinguish good syllogisms from the sophistical and barbarous. He can understand and translate many songs, which [a man] who does not know these things can neither understand nor translate.

A. Is dialectic a liberal art?

B. It is, for it is a liberal thing to look to the truth and to refute falsehood. These are the offices of dialectic, for from dialectical points are brought forward the arguments with which truth is defended and falsehood defeated. Likewise, it is a holy and a liberal thing to turn one who is erring from his error, so that he may abandon it, which is done by the resources and the service of dialectic. [The man] who concedes any false thing is forced to concede everything which is of necessity bound up with that false thing. He is forced to return to the truth when his error is abandoned, which in his error he was unwilling to do.

A. From where does dialectic take its name?

B. ἀλέξις in Greek means disputatio ("debate"); thus dialectic is the art of debate. It is called by the blessed Augustine the discipline of debate; for he says in the second book On Christian Doctrine: the discipline of debate is of the greatest value for penetrating and solving all kinds of questions in Holy Writ. You must only beware of any delight in quarreling and childish showing-off in catching out your opponent.¹

A. Why is dialectic called logic?

¹Augustine On Christian Doctrine 2.37.55.
B. Because it is the art of reasoning; for λόγος is translated as ratio ("reason").

A. Of how many parts does reasoning consist?

B. Of three: proposition, assumption, and conclusion. Every person when he reasons first makes a proposition, then he makes an assumption, and finally he comes to a conclusion.

A. Give an example.

B. If John is a man, he is an animal: he is a man, therefore he is an animal.

A. What is understood by the noun "proposition"?

B. The major premise of a syllogism.

A. What by the noun "assumption"?

B. The minor premise of a syllogism.

A. What by the name "reasoning"?

B. The whole syllogism, made up of major premise, minor premise, and conclusion.

A. What are the things necessary for proof in reasoning?

B. Truthfulness of propositions and truthfulness of conclusions.

A. What is understood by truthfulness of conclusions?

B. An inevitability of consequence.

A. Can there be true conclusions in reasoning that has false propositions?

B. There can; for there may be true conclusions not only of true propositions but also of false propositions, since conclusions are deduced inevitably, not only from true premises but also from false ones. This reasoning, "if a circle is a triangle [then] a circle is enclosed by three lines: a circle is a triangle, therefore a circle is enclosed by three lines," has false propositions and a true conclusion.

A. Is the truthfulness of conclusions established by men?

B. It is not, as the blessed Augustine says, but it is observed and noted.1 Whether men like it or not, this sequence is true. If he is a man, he is an animal: he is a man, therefore he is an animal.

1Augustine On Christian Doctrine 2.33.32.50.
Similarly, this sequence is true. If a triangle is a quadrilateral, a triangle is enclosed by four sides: a triangle is a quadrilateral, therefore it is enclosed by four sides. Although the minor premise and the conclusion of this latter reasoning are false propositions, the sequence is true and inevitable. For the sequence that exists in good reasoning is not true because there is agreement among men that it should be true, nor is a false sequence false because there is agreement among men that it should be false, but a true sequence is true by its own nature, just as a false one is false by its own nature.

A. What reasoning is good, what faulty?

B. [That] which has a true sequence is good; [that] which [has] a false [sequence] is faulty. This is expressed another way in these words: a good argument is [one] whose antecedent cannot be true without its consequence, a bad [argument is one] whose antecedent can be true without its consequence.

A. Can the truthfulness of conclusions be changed to falseness, or false [ones] changed into truthfulness?

[B]. It cannot, for a correct rule of reasoning can never be made unsound, nor an unsound one correct. Nor can good reasoning be made faulty, nor faulty good.

A. Where is truthfulness of conclusions to be sought?

[B]. From the rules of reasoning, for all arguments formed according to other rules have true consequences [sic, but he means false consequences].

A. What are the rules of reasoning?

B. [Those] that are represented by these words, barbara celarent etc.¹

A. What rule is represented by barbara?

B. This rule: if A is claimed for every B, and B for every C, that it is inevitable that A is claimed for every C.

A. What is understood by A, B, and C?

B. By A is understood the major termination, by B the mean, [and] by C the minor termination.

A. What is understood by "claimed for every B"?

¹Part of a system of mnemonic devices used to remember the rules of reasoning, in this particular case for a syllogism of the first figure.
B. It is that the major termination is claimed for the mean in every case.

A. What is "B claimed for every C"?

B. It is that the mean is claimed for the minor termination in every case.

A. What is "A claimed for every C"?

B. The major termination claimed for the minor. And these things become, in reasoning, what is meant by barbara. In the proposition of which A is claimed for every B, in the minor premise B is claimed for every C, [and] in the conclusion A is claimed for every C.

A. Are enthymemes methods of reasoning?

B. They are imperfect methods of reasoning, for they lack a proposition or a minor premise.

A. What is lacking in this enthymemes: to lie is evil; therefore to commit perjury is evil.

B. The proposition, since with that added it becomes perfect reasoning.

A. Add the proposition.

B. If it is evil to lie, it is evil to commit perjury: it is evil to lie, therefore it is evil to commit perjury.

A. What is lacking in this enthymeme: every animal has the sense of touch; therefore every man has the sense of touch?

B. The minor premise, for with that added it becomes perfect reasoning.

A. Does this reasoning have a true consequence: if Peter is an orator he is a man: he is not an orator, therefore he is not a man?

B. It does not have, even if its premises were true; for [it is] not as the blessed Augustine says, that when the consequence is withdrawn what preceded it will of necessity be withdrawn, and so when the proposition is withdrawn what follows will of necessity be withdrawn.1

A. Do those fallacious arguments that are called sophistical have true conclusions?

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1Augustine On Christian Doctrine 2.33.32.50. Hegius is here refuting the statement made by Augustine, that "when the consequent is false, the antecedent must also be false."
B. They do not have, for whenever a false conclusion is inferred from a proposition and a minor premise it is inevitable that the logical sequence is false.

A. If a man makes the proposition, "what I am, you are not," and, given that, makes the minor premise, "I am a man," and, given that, the conclusion is inferred, "therefore you are not a man," will he reason correctly?

B. No, for his reasoning is fallacious and sophistical.

A. Are all parts of dialectic liberal disciplines?

B. They are. When the whole of any art is liberal it is inevitable that its individual parts are liberal, from which it is obvious that no part of dialectic is to be despised as unworthy of a free man.

A. Is the science of the meaning of nouns, by which propositions are defined, which is called the science of suppositions, liberal?

B. It is; for it is a liberal science [to know] when a noun [that is] the subject in any proposition is taken for the things on which it has been imposed, when [it is taken] for itself, when for the thoughts and the conception of the mind. [The man] who is ignorant of it cannot discern good arguments from sophistries. It is a liberal thing to know what nouns are apportioned in propositions and which are not apportioned, that is, which are meant universally, which particularly. For [he] who does not know that cannot argue rightly. When any noun is meant universally, things lower than itself can be subsumed into it, which cannot occur if it is meant particularly. If every animal has the sense of touch, it is inevitable that man has the sense of touch; but because every animal is a quadruped it is not inevitable that man is a quadruped.
A Dialog About Rhetoric

A. Is rhetoric a liberal art?

B. It is; for it is worthy of a free man, on the evidence of Augustine, who says: "There are certain precepts of fuller dispute, which is called eloquence, which are nonetheless true although by them false things may be enjoined. Because true things can also [be enjoined], it is not the faculty itself [that is] blameworthy, but the perversity of those who misuse it."

A. What is the derivation of [the word] rhetoric?

B. Rhetor is a Greek noun, and means a well-spoken and eloquent man. For this reason Juvenal's [ca. A.D. 60-post 127] lawyers are called rhetores: "Cum fortuna volet, fiet de consule rhetor, cum volet hec eadem fiet de rhetore consul" ("when fate wills, a consul becomes a lawyer; when she wills, a lawyer becomes a consul"). And he writes this with the r aspirated and the t unaspirated. From this [come] rhetoricus and rhetorice, which can be written with the aspirated r.

A. What is rhetoric?

B. The art of speaking well.

A. What is the difference between talking well and speaking well?

B. A person is said to talk well who talks according to the rules of grammar, that is, who makes no barbarism or solecism. A person speaks well who speaks according to the precepts of rhetoric, that is, who advises and dissuades well, praises and blames well, [and] accuses and defends well.

A. What is it to advise well?

B. To advise with skill, that is, to advise according to the precepts of eloquence. Or, to advise well is to advise in such a way as orators learned in eloquence advised. For no one doubts that a man who advises as Marcus Tullius [Cicero] advised in his speeches,

1Augustine On Christian Doctrine 2.36.54.
2Juvenal Satire 7.197-98.
or Titus Livius [ca. 59 B.C.-ca. A.D. 17] and Sallust [ca. 86-35 B.C.] in their discourses, advises well.

A. Do those people give a good definition of rhetoric who say that it is the science of persuasion?

B. No. How does an orator always persuade? For it can happen that an orator may speak very well and not persuade, because sometimes his listeners have so withdrawn their attention that he cannot persuade them to anything. Just as it is not always in a doctor to cure a sick man, so it is not in an orator always to persuade his hearer. Nor is persuasion [the province] of an orator alone, but it is common to him and to many other things. Often money persuade; often the esteem and influence of the speaker; often the remembrance of the deserts of the man who speaks or for whom the speech is made. Often the wretched appearance of a guilty man sets him free; often the loveliness of a form dictates a decision. For, on the evidence of Quintus [Cicero (102-43 B.C.), when [Marcus] Antonius [f. 102-87 B.C.], defending Marcus [sic, Manius] Aquillius [f. 101-89 B.C.], presented to the eyes of the people of Rome the scars that he had received on his breast on behalf of his native land, he compelled the people of Rome to set him free, not by his own speech but by the defendant's wretched appearance.1 And they think that the woman Phryne was rescued from peril not by the pleading of the orator Hiperides [389-322 B.C.], although [that was] admirable, but by the sight of her most beautiful body, which she had revealed by removing her tunic.2 From which it follows that many things have the power of persuasion that are far removed from an orator's speaking. So it is clear that the science of persuasion is not a suitable definition of rhetoric.

A. Who gives a proper definition of rhetoric?

B. [The man] who called it the science of speaking well, for he embraces all its virtues. For since an orator is vir bonus dicendi peritus ("a good man skilled in speaking"), it is inevitable that rhetoric is the science of speaking well, for only a good man can speak well.3

A. Is rhetoric useful?

B. Some men are in the habit of inveighing against rhetoric, claiming it to be useless, because eloquence often snatches the wicked from punishment. By its deceit sometimes the good are condemned, so that they are forced to pay the penalty for crimes they have never

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1Cicero On the Making of an Orator 2.46.194-96; and Quintilian Institutes of Oratory 2.15.7.
2Quintilian Institutes of Oratory 2.15.9.
3Ibid., 2.15.1, and 33-38.
committed. By it not only rebellions, but even most deadly wars, are often stirred up. Since its greatest use is on behalf of the false it is powerful against the truth. In that way neither are generals useful, nor magistrates, nor medicine, nor, in the end, wisdom itself. For as generals have often destroyed armies [and] magistrates have often injured the state, nor will you find any art by which we may not cause harm to those with whom we have dealings. Who is not aware that a lawyer, by a false interpretation of the laws, can turn the highest law into the highest injustice? Who does not know how easily a doctor can attack or destroy the health of a man? But there is no one who for this reason would abolish knowledge of the law or the study of medicine in the state. Therefore rhetoric is not to be blamed, but those who, because they are eloquent, turn eloquence into the ruin of men. We do not spurn foods because they have often been the causes of illness for men, nor do we attack roofs because they have sometimes fallen on the inhabitants. Nothing is so useful that it cannot sometimes be harmful.

A. What advantage does rhetoric bring to men?

B. It is an endless [task] to enumerate all its advantages. An orator by his eloquence accuses the guilty and compels them to pay the penalty for their crimes, but rescues the innocent from punishment, than which nothing can be more just. For what [is] more just than for the wicked to pay the penalty for their wickedness [and] the innocent to be rescued from punishment? Rhetoric gives credibility to the arguments with which we wish to carry a point. It gives us topics out of which arguments are brought forward, creating credibility.

A. If rhetoric creates credibility, when that is also a function of dialectic, there seems to be no difference between rhetoric and dialectic.

B. Although each of the arts creates credibility, there is still a very great difference between them. Dialectic creates credibility by debate, and by questions and answers, which are broken speeches. Rhetoric, however, uses an unbroken speech and creates credibility. Again, dialectic rejoices in perfect syllogisms, rhetoric in enthy-memes. Moreover, dialectic deals in thesis, rhetoric in hypothesis.

A. What is the difference between thesis and hypothesis?

B. A thesis is an unrestricted and general subject, that is, a thesis is restricted neither as to persons nor as to times, as: should one take a wife; should one devote oneself to the liberal arts; should war be undertaken; should capital punishment be inflicted on a murderer. The proposition is called a thesis by Cicero. A hypothesis is a limited and specific subject, which embraces either a person or a time, as: should Plato take a wife; should Milo [fl. 57-48 B.C.] suffer capital punishment because he killed Clodius [ca. 92-52 B.C.]; should Cicero be praised because he caused Cataline's
[f1. 68-62 B.C.] death during his consulship. This is called a case by Cicero.¹

A. How many sorts of cases does the orator deal with?

B. Three: the demonstrative, the deliberative, and the judicial; for every speech is classified in one of these three types.² A speech in which the orator accuses or defends is classed as judicial; the Milonian Oration of Cicero is of this sort. A speech in which the orator gives advice is of the deliberative kind; the Pompeian [Oration] is of this sort. A speech in which the orator praises or finds fault is classified in the demonstrative type; Cicero's speech In Defence of Marcus Marcellus is of this sort.

A. Why are there three types of cases?

B. Because there are three types of listener, one who requires pleasing, another who is taking advice, and a third who is exercising judgment. To the first the demonstrative type is appropriate, to the second the deliberative, to the third the judicial.

A. What is the demonstrative type?

B. [That] which is devoted to the praise or the blame of a certain individual, with amplification.

A. How many parts are there in that type?

B. Two: praise and blame.

A. What is praise?

B. A speech in amplification of the good things that we say are in the nature of a certain individual.

A. What is blame?

B. A speech in amplification of the bad things that we say are in the nature of a certain individual.

A. What is the deliberative type?

B. [That] which, when offered in a discussion, produces the statement of a decision.

A. How many parts does it have?

B. Two: exhortation and dissuasion.

¹Cicero On Invention 1.6.8.

²Ibid.
A. What is exhortation?
B. A speech that points out what ought to be done.

A. What is dissuasion?
B. A speech that points out what ought to be left undone.

A. What is the judicial type?
B. [That] which, when offered in a dispute, produces accusation and defence.

A. How many parts does it have?
B. Two: accusation and defence.

A. What is accusation?
B. A judicial speech by which we seize upon an opponent in accusation or in obligation.

A. What is defence.
B. A judicial speech by which we ward off from ourselves an accusation or an obligation.

A. What is the ultimate aim in the judicial type?
B. Equity.

A. What is the office of the listener?
B. To acquit or to condemn.

A. What is the ultimate aim in the deliberative type?
B. Honest advantage. The orator must urge a useful connection with honesty.

A. What is the office of the listener?
B. To embrace one side of the argument.

A. What is the ultimate aim in the demonstrative [type]?
B. Honesty.

A. What is the office of the listener?
B. To judge if he is worthy of praise or blame, from what is said.

A. How many divisions of rhetoric [are there]?
B. Five.

A. Which?

B. Invention, arrangement, delivery, memory, pronunciation.

A. Why are they called parts?

B. Because rhetoric consists of these five things. For just as a body lacking any member is incomplete so rhetoric, if it is deficient in one of these parts, will not be complete. And on this account they are called integral parts. It is not enough to find things to say if you cannot arrange them [when you have] found [them]. Nor is it enough to arrange what you have found if you cannot express it elegantly, and then commit it to memory, and act it out to the end and deliver it.

A. What is invention?

B. The devising of true things, or verisimilar things, which may make up a convincing case.

A. Why are verisimilar things to be devised by the orator?

B. So that his speech may be made credible and find admittance into the minds of his listeners; for likely things, and things apparently true, find easy admittance into the thoughts of men.

A. What is disposition?

B. The arrangement of the things devised in the most appropriate places; for to dispose is to arrange various things in different places.

A. What is delivery?

B. The fitting of suitable words and thoughts to invention.

A. What is memory?

B. The firm ruler of the mind, and the control also of the disposition of words.

A. What is pronunciation?

B. The government of the voice, face, and gestures with elegance.

A. How can we comprehend the parts of rhetoric?

B. By nature, by art, [and] by practice; for, if the facility of nature is not embellished by art and confirmed by practice, like a field fertile by nature but uncultivated it generally produces in speaking not fruit but many unpleasant and harsh things.
A. What is nature?
B. A facility of speaking innate in men.
A. What is art?
B. [That] which states a certain way and method of speaking.
A. How many parts of speech are there?
B. Six: exordium, narration, division, confirmation, confutation, [and] conclusion. These are the parts of that speech which is the orator's tool, by which he either establishes credibility with his listeners, or finds his way to their hearts with pity, or anger, or any other emotion.
A. What is exordium?
B. The start of a speech, by which the mind of the listener is made ready to listen.
A. What is narration?
B. The setting out of actions that have taken place, or as if they have taken place. Sometimes actions are expressed in narration, sometimes stories are told, sometimes fables. As: one must not believe flatterers; [for] when the crow believed the flattering fox he lost the cheese. Division is a speech by means of which we set out briefly what direction suits us, what is in our argument and on what subjects we are going to speak. Confirmation is a speech in which we set out our arguments, with emphasis. Confutation is the refutation of opposing arguments.
A. What is conclusion?
B. The skillful ending of a speech. This is also called the peroration, and [it] is called the epilogue, for perorare is to put an end to a speech.
A. What are the uses of the exordium?
B. To make the listeners friendly, docile and attentive; for the orator must take pains to be heard in a friendly fashion, with understanding and attention.
A. How are we to make listeners attentive?
B. If we have shown that the things we are going to say are important, or new, or beneficial, and if we say that they concern religion, that is, the worship of immortal God, or the state, or the people themselves who are listening, or others whom they hold dear.
A. How can we make listeners docile?
B. If we express briefly the main point of our case, that is, that of which the argument about which we are going to speak consists—a precept to which the poets from Homer [on] pay most careful attention, for the sake of docility and attentiveness. For this reason an exordium has been devised in the works of Virgil, both in the Georgics and in the Aeneid; and likewise in the works of Ovid, in the book of Metamorphoses; and in the works of almost all the others.

A. Who is called docile?

B. [One] who is willing to listen attentively.

A. How are we to make listeners friendly?

B. By person; and by case, that is, by the thing itself. Either by our own person, or [by that] of our adversaries, or sometimes also [by that] of judges who are outside the case. By our own person if we praise our office without arrogance, that is, if we show that we have been such people to the state, or to our parents, or to our friends, or to those who are listening to us, while all these things of which we are speaking as performed by our office are relevant to the case.

Orator, whoever you are, if you want to be thought eloquent, read our rules and use your talent.
A MISCELLANY BY ALEXANDER HEGIUS, MASTER OF ARTS

Italy was formerly called Latium because Saturn latuerit ("hid") there when driven from heaven by his son Jupiter. From it [comes] latinus, -a, -um, pertaining to Latium.

The Latin language is the language of the people living in Latium.

Latin is an adverb of quality and is construed with verbs of speaking, singing [and] writing, as: Petrus loquitur latine, canit latine, scribit latine ("Peter speaks Latin, sings Latin, [and] writes Latin"), that is, in the way in which the Latins speak, sing, and write.

Petrus scit latine; nescit latine; discit latine ("Peter knows [how to speak] Latin; he does not know [how to speak] Latin; he is learning [how to speak] Latin") are elliptical statements, for "how to speak" is understood in them.

Petrus loquitur latine is a more complete statement than Petrus loquitur latinum, because latinum is an adjective, needing to be attached to a substantive, while latine is an adverb needing no word to be attached to it.

Petrus loquitur latinum sermonem ("Peter speaks Latin words") is a complete statement. Petrus latinum loquitur is incomplete. If we want to complete it it is necessary to add a substantive.

Petrus loquitur gallice/teutonicum/grecum ("Peter speaks French/Dutch/Greek") are complete statements.

Petrus loquitur gallicum/teutonicum/grecum are incomplete, for in these must be understood sermonem. Ovid: "Ipse mihi videor iam dedidicisse latine, nam didici getice barbariceque loqui" ("I seem myself already to have forgotten my learning in Latin, for I have

1The Latin teutonicus would generally be translated as "German." It is used by Hegius with its original collective meaning to include all the "Teutonic" tribes. When he speaks of German, therefore, he includes the Dutch. The language to which he refers in this and most other instances in the "Miscellany" as well as the "Invective Against the Modes of Signification" is in fact not German but Dutch. The Low German of Westphalia was, at the time, even more closely linked with Dutch than it is today. See above, p. 382.
learned to speak in Getic, and in the manner of a barbarian").

Petrus tamdiu habitavit in Gallia ut dedidicerit teutonice loqui:
"Hy heeft so langhe in walsch lant ghewoent dat hy dat duytsch ver-
gheten heeft" ("Peter has lived so long in France that he has for­
gotten how to speak Dutch").

Juvenal in his satire, Credo pudicitiam, where he finds fault with
the Roman women who were not content with the Latin language, but
spoke everything in Greek: "Nam quid rancidius quam quod se non
putat uila formosam nisi que de Thusca Grecula facta est, de Sulmon-
monensi mera Cecropis? Omnia Grece (supple loquentur) cum sit turpe
magis nostris nescire Latine (supple loqui)" ("For what is more
disgusting than the fact that no girl thinks herself attractive who
has not turned from a Tuscan into a Greekling, from a girl of Sulmo
to a pure Athenian? [Understand 'They speak'] everything in Greek,
though it is more shameful for our own people to have no knowledge
[Understand 'to speak'] in Latin").

"Homo currit" est latina oratio ("homo currit is Latin speech") is a better statement than
"homo currit" est bonum latinum ("homo currit is good Latin"), for
bonum [and] latinum are two adjectives that do not hang together,
since an adjective is not put with an adjective.

Some statements are good Latin, some are not good Latin, some
are only just good Latin; that is, some are in proper Latin, some
are not in Latin, [and] some are hardly in proper Latin. Homo cur­
rit ("the man runs") is a statement in good Latin, or in true Latin.
Liber est meus ("the book is mine") is a statement in good Latin, or
in true Latin. Liber est mei is a statement just acceptable in
Latin, for the genitive case mei can be put with a noun.

Petrus loquitur latine sed non bene latine vel non satis latine
vel vix bene latine: "Hy speerct latyn mer gheen gott latyn" ("Peter
speaks in Latin, but not well in Latin, or not in good enough Latin,
or in just acceptable Latin"). Ovid: "Quam legis a rapta briseide
littera venit, vix bene barbarica greca notata manu" ("From the
abducted Briseide is the letter you read, scarcely good Greek, set
down by a barbarian hand"). The order is, littera vix bene greca
("a letter scarcely good Greek"), that is, not sufficiently Greek,
notata ("set down"), that is, written, barbarica manu ("by a bar­
barian hand").

Petrus non bene teutonice loquitur, vel non satis teutonice, vel
vix bene teutonice: "Hy en spreeckt gheen goet duytz" ("Peter does
not speak well in Dutch, or not in good enough Dutch, or in just
acceptable Dutch").

A man born in Germany is called German, as a man born in France
[is called] French. Teutonus: "een duytsche" ("a German"). Gallus:

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1Ovid Tristia 5.12.57-58. 2Juvenal Satire 6.185-88.
3Ovid Heroides 3.2.1-2.
"een wale" ("a Frenchman"). Germany [is] the land of the Germans, France the land of the French. German [and] French are possessive words. Juvenal: "Cum de teutonico vellet descendere curru" ("When he wanted to get down from the German chariot"). It is more correct to say Petrus est teutonus/gallus ("Peter is German/French") than teutonicus/gallicus.

Teutonicalis, [and] gallicalis are redundant words, since we have no need of them: teutonicus, -a, -um has the same meaning as teutonicalis; gallicus, -a, -um the same as gallicalis.

Those who use the word teutonicalis are in error. They believe that the word teutonicus is generic and the word teutonicalis is possessive, which is not in accordance with the truth, for teutonus is the generic word and teutonicus the possessive.

It is useful for those wishing to speak Latin to know whether an infinitive statement, which is called a dictum, ought to be changed into a statement beginning with ut or quod. Scio Ioannem legere ("I know John to be reading") is changed thus: scio quod Joannes legit ("I know that John is reading"). Volo Ioannem legere ("I desire John to read") is changed thus: volo ut Joannes legat ("I desire that John may read"). Joannes fecit me legere ("John made me to read") is changed thus: Joannes fecit ut ego legerem ("John caused that I might read"). Facio, efficio, fio, [and] factus allow a statement to be attached to them beginning with ut, as: paupertas facit Joannes mendicet ("poverty makes John beg"); agritudo fecit ut Ioannes heri non veniret ad scholas ("sickness caused John not to come to school yesterday"); desidia Joannis fecit ut nihil disceret ("John's laziness caused him to learn nothing"); Deus non efficit ut homo peccet, licet permittat hominem peccare ("God does not make man sin, though He allows man to sin"); Deus efficit ut homo bonum faciat ("God causes man to do good"); non fit a Deo ut homo peccet ("it is not brought about by God that man sins"); non est factum a Deo ut homo peccaret ("it was not brought about by God that man should sin"). Every active statement can be changed into the passive. Thus, a statement in which facere is put can be changed into a statement in which fieri is put. Joannes fecit hanc domum fieri ("John has caused this house to be made") is changed thus: Joannes fecit ut hanc domum fieret ("John has caused that this house might be made"). A Joanne factum est ut hanc domum fieret ("That this house might be made has been brought about by John") [is derived from] a Joanne factum est hanc domum fieri ("this house to be made has been brought about by John"). When an active statement is changed into a passive [one], the object of the active verb becomes the subject of the passive verb, as, Joannes amat Petrum ("John loves Peter") is changed thus: Petrus amatur a Joanne ("Peter is loved by John"). Jubeo te legere ("I order you to read") is changed thus: tu ibberis a me legere ("You are ordered by me to read"). Debebo tibi pecuniam ("I shall owe you money") is changed thus: pecunia debebitur tibi a me ("money will be owed to you by me"). When the object of an

1Juvenal Satire 10.282.
active verb is a clause introduced by ut that same clause must become the subject of the passive verb, as, Joannes facit ut ego legam ("John makes me read") is changed thus: fit a Joanne ut ego legam ("that I read is brought about by John").

When a clause introduced by quod is the object of an active verb, that same clause must become the subject of the passive verb, as, Joannes credit quod Petrus sit domi ("John believes that Peter is at home") is changed thus: quod Petrus sit domi creditur a Joanne ("that Peter is at home is believed by John").

§ Sometimes a clause introduced by quod is the subject of the verb, and a clause introduced by ut the object, as: quod Joannes est egris pedibus facit ut non petat templum ("Because John's feet are sore means that he does not go to church"). Wherever ut non is put, ne can also be put there, since ne is the same thing as ut non. Likewise, quominus is the same thing as ut non. Therefore it can properly be said, quod Joannes egrorat, vel laborat febribus, facit ut non petat scholas/ne petat scholas/quominus petat scholas ("Because John is ill, or is suffering from a fever, means that he does not come to school"). Occ[en]pationes impediverunt me quominus venirem ad te: "Van onledicheit en conde ick nicht totti comen" ("Business prevented me from coming to you").

Quid fuit tibi impedimento quominus huc venires: "Wat hynderde di datu hyer nicht en quemest" ("What prevented you from coming here")? Sola desidia tua impedimento tibi fuit quominus hoc facares ("Only your idleness prevented you from doing this").

To the interrogative quid the answer is sometimes a clause introduced with quod, [or] sometimes with ut, ne, or quominus, as: quid files ("what are you crying for")? [or] quid dolet tibi ("what is grieving you")? Quod nihil didici vehementur mihi dolet ("That I have learned nothing grieves me exceedingly").

Quid rogavit te Petrus ("What did Peter ask you")? Ut darem operam litteris ("That I should pay attention to literature").

Quid egritudo fecit ("What effect did the sickness have")? Quo­minus peterem ludum litterarum ("That I did not go to school").

There is a difference between signare ("to mark") and significare ("to express"). A shepherd marks his sheep. Letters, too, are said to be marked, and a will. Ovid: "Flens quoque me scripsit, nec qua signabar ad os est ante sed ad madidas gemma relata genas" ("With weeping, also, he wrote to me, nor was the gem with which I was marked lifted first to his mouth, but to his streaming cheeks").

Signare litteras: "breve besegelen" ("to sign/seal letters").

Authorities are not decided as to whether sigillum ("a seal") forms

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1 Ovid Tristia 5.4.5-6.
Resignare litteras is to take a seal from a letter. Non decet quemquam resignare litteras ad se non datas: "Niamant en sal vreemde brief op breken" ("It is not fitting for any man to unseal letters not given [addressed] to him"). We mark things that are ours, as boys are accustomed to mark their books. But when we give what is ours to another we are said to resign it, because we take our mark from it. Horace: "Hac ego si compellor imagine cuncta resigno" ("If I am forced I resign everything to this fable").

Signare is in Dutch "merken" ("to mark") or "teykenen" ("to sign"). Significare is to make something known to someone, as: Joannes significavit mihi Petrum rediisse ("John informed me that Peter had returned"). Or significare is to make a man think about something, as asinus significat asinum ("ass signifies ass"). That is, this word asinus makes the one who hears it think about the actual thing that is an ass, for as soon as this word asinus is heard by any educated person he immediately begins to think about an ass.

Significare is construed with the accusative, as: Deus significat Deum ("God signifies God"); and with a dictum, that is, with an infinitive statement, as: Deus est significat Deum esse ("'God is' signifies 'God to be'"). But those who say ensis significat tantum sicut gladius ("ensis means just like gladius") do not speak correctly, for sicut does not relate to tantum. A better statement is ensis tantum significat quantum gladius, or id quod gladius ("ensis has the same meaning as gladius"). (Both mean a sword).

Socrates significat sicut Plato ("Socrates signifies the same as Plato") is a correct statement, for each noun has meaning on its own account. Socrates id significat quod Plato ("Socrates signifies that which Plato [signifies]") is an incorrect statement, for Socrates does not signify the same man as Plato.

After a verb of signification an infinitive statement is sometimes put, or an indicative, or a subordinate clause introduced by quod, as: Petrus significavit mihi Joannem esse domi, or quod Joannes sit domi (literally, "'Peter has informed me John to be at home'; or, 'that John is at home'"). Sometimes the subordinate clause begins with ut, as: Petrus significavit mihi ut venirem ad se ("Peter informed me that I should come to him"), that is, by signification commanded me to come to him.

If anyone were to say Petrus significavit mihi quod venirem ad se ("Peter informed me that I was coming to him") he would not be speaking well enough. When these verbs of signification, dico,

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1Horace Epistles 1.7.34.
scribo, nuncio, [and] renuncio, represent a command they require to have put with them a subordinate clause beginning with ut. When, however, they only mean "to inform" they require to have put with them an infinitive statement or a subordinate clause introduced by quod, as: Petrus significavit/dixit/scriptis/nunciavit mihi Paulum redisse or quod Paulus redierit ("Peter has informed/told/written/announced to me that Paul has returned"). [But] Petrus significavit/dixit/scriptis/nunciavit mihi ut venirem ad se, that is, by informing/telling/writing/speaking he ordered me to come to him.

A person wishing to speak [good] Latin must take care that he does not put the particle quod instead of the particle ut, or on the other hand ut instead of quod. [A man] who says Joannes rogavit me quod venirem ad se is not speaking correctly if he is trying to convey the meaning "John bat mi dat ick tot hem solde come" ("John asked me to come to him"). Joannes rogavit me quod venirem ad se means the same as: Joannes rogavit me idcirco quia veniebam ad se that is, "Hie bat my daer om want ick tot hem quam" ("John questioned me because I was coming to him").

It is possible for this pronouncement, Joannes rogavit me quod venirem ad se, to be incorrect, while this, Joannes rogavit me ut venirem ad se, is [always] correct.

When I say Joannes rogavit me quod venirem ad se I signify that I had come to John. When I say Joannes rogavit me ut venirem ad se I do not signify that I had come to John.

Joannes rogavit me quod venirem ad se is changed into this statement: ut ego venirem ad Joannem fecit ut rogaret me ("that I was coming to John caused him to question me"). "Rogavit Jesum quidam Phariseus ut apud se manducaret" ("A certain pharisee asked Jesus that he might eat with him") [Luke 7:36]. There rogavit is construed with ut. "Rogate dominum messis ut mittat operarios in messem" ("Entreat the Lord of the harvest that he may send forth laborers into the harvest") [Luke 10:2]. Boys often put quod instead of ut because in Dutch quod and ut have the same translation, for quod is translated by "dat" and ut is translated by "dat" ("that"). Scio quod Joannis veniat ad me is translated as "Ick wiet dat Johan tot my comt" ("I know that John is coming to me"). Rogo Joannem ut veniat ad me is translated as "Ick bidde Johan dat he tot my come" ("I ask John to come to me"). Joannes dixit mihi quod Petrus esset domi "Johan sachte my dat Peter by huys was" ("John told me that Peter was at home"). Joannes dixit mihi quod venirem ad partes ("John told me because I was coming to the area") is an ungrammatical statement, for it has two solecisms. In it quod is put instead of ut [and] partes instead of patria.1 Partes requires to be construed with the genitive, as: ibo ad partesquasdam Hollandie ("I shall go to certain parts of Holland"); venio de quibusdam partibus

1The statement, if it used ut and patria as suggested, would be translated: "John commanded me to come to the fatherland."
Hollandie ("I come from a certain region in Holland"); [and] "in partes Tyri et Sidonis" ("in the borders of Tyre and Sidon") [Mark 7:24]. In nonnullis partibus Hollandie annona cara est: "In sommighen plaetzen van Hollant is dat koern duyer" ("In some areas of Holland grain is expensive"). Patria means the place of one's birth, and requires a genitive or possessive pronoun to be put with it, as: in patria Petri, in patria mea, in patria tua ("in Peter's fatherland," "in my fatherland," "in your fatherland"). Not only a person has a fatherland, but also each and every fruit, as: nosti patriam vini illius: "Weetstu waer die wijn ghewassen is" ("You know the homeland of that wine"). Que est patria casei/butiri?: "Waer is die kese of butter ghevallen?" ("What is the country of origin of the cheese/butter?"). Patria does not only mean the country but also the city in which a man was born, as Deventer. Daventiensium patria [+mea] est ("Deventer is the city of my birth").

Care must be taken that inscriptions, that is, the titles of books, are not falsified; for it is a shameful thing to cheat things of their proper names.

The Distichs of John of Garland [ca. 1195-ca. 1272]^1 are called Distigla by a corrupt name.

Distichs are double lines of verse containing a full and complete thought, such as the Distichs of Cato [234-149 B.C.],^2 which, since they are written in [good] Latin, may be considered worth reading. But the Distichs of John [of Garland] seem undeserving of being learned by children.

Tetrastichs are fourfold lines of verse containing a complete thought. Martial to Sabellus: "Quod non insulse scribis tetrasticha [. . .] quod belle paucha, Sabelle, facis laudo nec admiror: facile est epigrammata belle scribere sed libros scribere difficile est." ("I laud the fact that you write witty quatrains, Sabellus, because you do few things prettily--and I am not amazed. To write epigrams prettily is easy; to write a book is hard").^3

^1 To be correct we do not say John of Garland, but] Joannes Garlandinus; for Catullus [ca. 84-54 B.C.] was not called Catullus of Verona but Catullus Veronensis; nor are Ovid's works called the works of Ovid of Sulmo but of Ovid Sulmonensis.

^2 The treatises of Petrus Hispanus [Pope John XXI (ca. 1210-77)] are not entitled the treatises of Peter of Spain.

^3 Those who are ignorant of etymology deprive words of their

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1See above, pp. 116-17.

2See above, pp. 114, 118. Cato did not actually write the Distichs. They date from the second or third century A.D.

proper meaning, for they say that words derive from sources from which they have never taken their origin.

Dialectic, if we believe Tortellius [ca. 1400-1466], is named from the Greek word διαλέγομαι, which means to dispute. ¹

For dialectic is the art of disputation.

Dialectic is the art of finding proofs and formulating arguments.

Dialectica, dialectice means the art of disputing.

Dialectica, dialecticorum means writings on the art of disputing.

Dialectic is the inventor of proofs because she reveals to us the grounds of evidence, that is, the places in which it is hidden [and] from which it must be sought.

Dialectic is the formulator of argumentations, because she gives us the rules by which, if we dispute, we dispute well and formulate good argumentations.

Argumentum and argumentatio are different things, because argumentatio is a speech consisting of an antecedent and a consequence, as: Sortes currit igitur Sortes movetur ("Sortes runs, therefore Sortes moves").

Argumentum is the thing to which another thing is the consequence, as: argumentum vere amicitie est non deserere amicum in adversis ("A proof of true friendship is not to desert a friend in adversity").

Argumentum is a name applied to a thing, for every argumentum is the proof of something, as, because grief accompanies a flow of tears the flowing of tears is said to be proof of grief. Seneca: "Primum argumentum composite mentis existimo posse consistere et secum morari" ("I judge the chief proof of an ordered mind [to be] the ability to remain firm and to restrain itself.²"

Dialectic is easily able to find proofs.

Some statements consist of parts of the same tongue, some of parts of different tongues.

A statement consisting of Latin words is called oratio latina, as: liber Petri ("Peter's book"). [One] which consists of Greek [words]

¹Giovanni Tortellius De orthographia dictionum e Graecis, s.v. "Dialectica."

²This remark was probably made by the Elder Seneca in his Controversiae, which is a long work for which I found no index. The statement does not appear to be in his Suasoriae, or in the works of the Younger Seneca, for which there are comprehensive indices.
is called greca [oratio], as: ὁνὸς λυρᾶς, that is, ass of the lyre, for ὁνὸς means ass, while λυρᾶς is the Greek genitive of the noun lyra.

From lyra those poets are called lyric who compose verses to be sung to the lyre.

A statement consisting of two parts of which one is Greek [and] the other Latin can be called by the composite name greca-latina oratio, as: libri τῶν Ἀινείδων ("The Books of the Aeneid"), [or] libri τῶν Βασιλεῶν ("The Books of the Kings").

Eneidos is the Greek genitive of the noun Eneis.

The Aeneid is a poem or song written about Aeneas, whose genitive is Eneidos [and] accusative Eneida [in Greek], as Virgil wrote Eneida.

One must not think that Eneida is an accusative plural, but a singular. For we do not say Eneida, Eneidorum as [we say] Georgica, Georgicorum. When it is said, Statius "Thebais" scripsit, Virgilius "Eneida" ("Statius [ca. A.D. 45-96] wrote Thebais, Virgil the Aeneid"), the accusatives of this sort are of the singular number, for Thebais has the accusative Thebaida.

The Books of the Kings are called τῶν Βασιλεῶν, for ὁ Βασιλεὺς, whose genitive plural is Βασιλεῶν, means king.

Boys must take care not to misuse the names of the liberal arts. Grammatica, which is the name given to Latin learning, must be written with a double "m." Grammatica, -ce, feminine, means the art of speaking and writing correctly. Grammatica, -orum is the name given to the things that pertain to grammar. Therefore the works of the grammarians, that is, those things that have been written about grammar, are called grammatica, as: Priscianus scripsit grammatica ("Priscian [fl. ca. A.D. 500] wrote a grammar").

In the same way that Bucolica, -orum and Georgica, -orum are the names of works, so too Grammatica, -orum; Dialectica, -orum; Rhetorica, -orum; Mathematica, -orum; Physica, -orum; Metaphysica, -orum; Ethica, -orum; Politica, -orum; Deconomica, -orum; Topica, -orum; Arithmetica, -orum; Musica, -orum; Astronomica, -orum, [and] Geometrica, -orum, are all names of works. As it is said in Latin: commoda mihi Georgica Virgilii ("Virgil’s Georgics [are] useful to me") so it is said in Latin commoda mihi Dialectica Petri Hispani ("The Dialectics of Peter of Spain [are] useful to me"); [and] commoda mihi Metaphysica Aristotelis ("The Metaphysics of Aristotle [are] useful to me"). It is correct to say: Aristoteles scripsit dialectica, rhetorica, physica, metaphysica, that is, [Aristotle]

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1 The reference is to the Books of Kings in Greek translations of the Old Testament.

wrote those things that pertain to dialectic, rhetoric, physics [or] metaphysics. *Dialectica,* -ce is written with a Latin i and a. [Anyone] who writes dialectica with a Greek y and without an a makes two uncouth mistakes.

A solecism is a faulty construction of parts of speech, and occurs when one part of speech is construed with [another] part for which it is not appropriate.

A solecism is by a common name called an inconsistency because, when a solecism occurs, a part of speech is being construed with a part with which it is not consistent. Good Latin in a speech is called consistency because, when there is good Latin in a speech, part is consistent with part.

The rules of consistency are the rules of good Latin, that is, the rules by which Latin conversation is made.

There are various sorts of rules. There are rules of living. Of this sort are the precepts of the Decalogue and the canons of the Holy Fathers.

There are rules of disputation, which are the rules of dialectic.

There are rules of speaking, which are the rules of grammar.

There are rules of speaking fluently and fittingly on any subject, and these are the rules of rhetoric.

There are rules of healing, and these are called the canons of medicine.

Statements arranged according to the rules of grammar are called consistent statements. Consistency and inconsistency are found in every language.

"Ick byn, du biste" are consistent statements in German, but "ick biste" is not, since "ick", the German pronoun of the first person, is not consistent with the verb "biste" of the second person.

We have ambiguous statements [and] ambiguous parts of speech.

The nouns that are commonly called equivocal are more properly called ambiguous, since equivocal things are things represented by an ambiguous noun. Ambiguous is the name given to a noun representing many things under different conditions; or an ambiguous noun is a noun that, when it is reproduced, is unclear as to what it represents.

The name Alexander is ambiguous, for Alexander the Great [356-323 B.C.] and Alexander of Troy bear the same name.

Τα τοῦνομα is ambiguous in Greek, for τοῦ means much and σεμα [means] sign; thus *polysemus,* -a, um [means] signifying many things.
Ambiguous words can be called synonyms, for things are synonymous that have the same name.

"Homo" mortuus ("a dead man") is synonymous with "homo" vivus ("a living man"), for a dead man is called a man just like a living man.

When we say the man walks we speak of a living man.

When, however, we say the man is buried [we speak] of a dead one.

A noun is said to be synonymous with something, for no one is called synonymous unless in some respect he has someone of the same name as himself.

Synonymous [in Dutch] is called "ghenanne."

BINOMINIS means having two names. Grammarians are not agreed as to whether binominus, -a, -um may be said.

Ambiguous statements are those that are uncertain in meaning when they are presented. Of this sort are these statements: amor Joannis ("love of John"), odium Petri ("hatred of Peter").

For anyone wanting to speak correctly it is necessary to know what part of speech relates to what. In the way that quantum relates to tantum ("of such greatness"), so tam [relates] to quam ("both . . . and"), as: Joannes est tam doctus quam Petrus ("John is as learned as Peter").

Tam and quam signify equality, for when it is said, Joannes tam doctus est quam Petrus, both are represented as being equally learned.

Joannes tam doctus est sicut Petrus ("John is as learned just as Peter") is not a correct expression. Sicut does not relate to the particle quam. Sicut signifies quality, tam quantity.

Tam and quam are placed with nouns, verbs, adverbs, and causal statements. They can also be put with pronouns, as: quod ex parte meum est non tam meum est quam id quod ex toto meum est ("What is partly mine is not as much mine as what is wholly mine"). The comparative is not incompatible with the pronoun because the adverbs magis ("more") and minus ("less") can be added to it--for what is wholly mine is said to be more mine than what [is] partially [mine].

They [tam and quam] are added to adverbs, as: tam mane veni quam tu ("I came as early in the morning as you"); tam vespere redii quam tu ("I returned in the evening just like you"); tam pene cecidi quam

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1Servius Commentarii in Vergilii Aneidos 1.1.34.
tu: "Ick hadde so nae ghevallen als du" ("I was as near falling as you"); [and] querendum est quam pene perlegisti librum? "Hoe nae heefstu dat boeck uitgelesen?" ("It is necessary to find out how nearly you have completed reading the book"). Quasi does not mean what pene means, therefore it is not correct to say quam quasi perlegisti librum ("how like as you have completed reading the book").

Quasi signifies a simile, as: Joannes salutat Petrum quasi dilegit eum ("John greets Peter as if he likes him"), that is, he pretends to like him.

Everyone who disputes according to the proper rules disputes well; [he] who [disputes] according to faulty rules makes flawed argumentations.

Good syllogisms are formed according to the proper rules, bad ones according to false rules.

A syllogism of the first mode of the first figure is formed according to this rule: if A is said of every B, and B is said of every C, it is inevitable that A is said of every C; that is, if the major termination is said of the mean distribution, and the mean is said of the minor termination, it is inevitable that the major termination is said of the minor termination.

A syllogism of the second mode of the first figure is formed according to this rule: if A is denied for every B, and B is said of every C, it is inevitable that A is denied for every C.

A syllogism of the first figure whose minor premise is negative (such as this--every animal is a substance: but no stone is an animal, therefore no stone is a substance) is faulty, because it is made in accordance with a false rule which is this: if A is said of every B, and B is denied for every C, it is inevitable that A is denied for every C. This is a false rule, because when we reason according to it the major termination, which remains undistributed in the major proposition, is distributed in the conclusion.

Just as syllogisms formed according to false rules are faulty, so statements made according to false rules are faulty.

This is a false rule: the second supine is to be construed with a verb signifying a going back, that is, a movement from a place. For it is not correct to sayredeolectu ("I come back for reading"). None of the authorities spoke thus.

Just as a man does not speak good German who speaks in a way that none of the Germans spoke, so neither does he speak good Latin who speaks in a way that none of the Latins spoke.

Those who speak according to this rule, [that] every gerund governs the accusative case, do not speak correctly. Among the Latins the accusative case is not put with a gerund except when the translators of Holy Scriptures sometimes speak in the manner of the Greeks. It
is not permissible for us to put an accusative with a gerund, for the privileges of the few are not the laws for all to enjoy. So it is not permissible for the pagans to swear an oath in the manner of soldiers.

We say correctly *Tempus est nos surgere* ("It is time for us to get up").

It is also permitted for us to say *tempus est nos surgendi*.

It is not correct to say *tempus est nos essendi sapientes* ("It is time for us to be wise"). *Essendi* is not said because none of the authorities used this gerund, and *nos essendi* is not said because the gerund does not govern the accusative.

*Quod* and *ut* have this distinction, that a statement introduced by *ut* has a final significance, but one introduced by *quod* [has] a causal significance; as, *cedo te virgis quod dignus es qui virgis cerearis,* or *quod meritus es virgis cedi* ("I hand you over to the rods because you deserve to be handed over to the rods"). *Cedo te virgis quo te corrigam,* quo te emendem, quo te bene moratum reddam/faciam/efficiam ("I hand you over to the rods to correct you, to improve you, to render you/make you/cause you to be well-behaved"). Sometimes *ut* and *quod* are put with the same verb, linked with *tam* and *quam,* as: *cedo te virgis non tam quod dignus es qui cerearis quam ut te bene moratum reddam:* "I am handing you over to the rods not so much because you deserve to be handed over as to make you well-behaved").

*Dolet,* a verb in the third person, sometimes has a nominative case put with it, as: *dentes dolent mihi,* in German: "die tande doen my wee" ("my teeth hurt"); *caput dolet mihi,* in German: "dat hoefft doen my wee" ("my head is hurting"). *Doleo caput [and] doleo dentes* (literally, "I hurt the head," "I hurt the teeth;" i.e., "I suffer anguish") are poetic expressions. *Contumelia plus mihi dolet quam damnum,* in German: "Dye spyt doet my weer dan dye schade" ("Insult grieves me more than loss"). *Dictum Joannis dolet mihi* ("John's saying grieves me"). *Dictum [+also] means 'een droghe schoteken" ("a dry, witty, or sarcastic saying"), as, when we want to prove his ignorance to someone we may say: "You have forgotten a few things." Thus a man is called *dicax* who hurls words at others. In German: "Dye droghe schotekens pleckt te scheten" ("[One who] is accustomed to shooting dry sayings"). *Nullius dicta mihi plus dolent quam Petri* ("No one's words grieve me more than Peter's"). *Si iaculaberis dicta in me ego retorquebo ea in te: "schutstu my ick schyete dy weder" ("If you hurl words at me I will turn them back against you"). *Terence:* "Tuumne obsecro dictum erat?" "Was dat dijn scho-""teken?" ("Was that word yours, please?").

Sometimes, too, they mean everything that is said, as: *dicta et*

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1Terence The Eunuch 428.
facta Joannis sunt memoratu digna ("John's words and deeds deserve remembrance").

Sometimes the verb dolet is attached to a clause introduced by quod, as: dolet mi quod feci hoc ("It grieves me that I did this"); dolebit tibi cras quod nunc facis ("What you are doing now will grieve you tomorrow").

Sepe solet hominibus mane dolere quod noctu fecerunt: "Dat plecht dick wijl des morghens berouwen dat die lude des nachtes doen" ("It often happens to men that they grieve in the morning for what they did by night").

Unum and alterum are sometimes followed by ut, sometimes by quod, as: duo sunt que mihi vehementer dolent, unum quod tibi coram adesse nequeo, alterum quod absens tibi opitulari non valeo ("There are two things that grieve me extremely: one, that I cannot be present with you; the other, that being absent I have no power to help you"). Duo sunt quod abs te peto, unum ut tue valetudinis rationem habeas, alterum ut nisi sanus huc non revertaris ("There are two things I ask of you: one that you take care of your health; the other, that you do not return here unless [you are] well").

Due cause fuerunt propter quas te castigavi, una quod dignus eras qui castigareris, altera quod te corrigerem ("There were two reasons why I punished you: one, because you deserved to be punished; the other, to correct you").

Duo sunt que mihi vehementer dolent, que me valde angunt; unum est quod Joannes male habet, alterum quod in dies egritudo eius augescit ("There are two things that grieve me exceedingly and that cause me great anguish: one is that John is ill; the other is that his illness increases daily"). Unum and alterum are followed by ne if they are construed with a verb of fearing, as: duo sunt que timeo, unum ne Joannes egrotet, alterum ne inopiam virtus patiatur ("There are two things that I fear: one, that John is ill; the other, that his courage is suffering hardship").

With the help of the particles one may know after which words the conjunction ut may elegantly be placed.

It is elegant to put ut after tam, tantum, adeo, sic [and] ita, as: Joannes tam doctus est ut nemo sit eo doctior ("John is so learned that no one is more learned"); Joannes tantum eris alieni habet ut id nunquam dissolutorus sit ("John has such a great debt that he will never pay it off"). Habere es alienum is to owe; dissolvere is to pay back a debt.

Joannes adeo fortis est ut nemo eum superare possit ("John is so strong that no one can defeat him").

Care must be taken not to put posset instead of possit, for the word possit is put following a verb of the present tense, but the word
posset [following] a verb of the past tense. Therefore it is cor­
rect to say, Joannes adeo fortis est ut nemo eum superare possit,
and likewise correct to say, Joannes adeo fortis erat ut nemo eum
superare posset ("John was so strong that no one could defeat him").
Horace: Nemo adeo ferus est ut non mitescere possit ("No one is so
fierce that he cannot become tame").

Care must be taken that the indicative mood is not associated
with the conjunction ut. Therefore it is not correct to say, Joannes
adeo fortis est ut nemo valet eum superare ("John is so strong that
no one is being strong to overcome him").

Ut is placed after sic, as in the gospel: "Sic Deus dilexit mundum,
ut fillium suum unigenitum daret" ("God so loved the world that He
gave His only begotten Son") [John 3:16]. Tullius in the Elder Cato:
"Senectus plerisque sic odiosa est ut onus Etna gravior videantur
sustinere" ("For many old age is so hateful that they seem to be
bearing a burden heavier than Etna").

It is also placed after ita, as: beatis ita bene est ut non possit
eis melius esse ("For the blessed it is so well that it cannot be
better for them"); Petrus ita doctus est ut mirum sit eum tam doct-
um esse ("Peter is so learned that it is amazing that he is so
learned"); Non est mihi ita bene ut libeat mihi jocari ("It is not
so well with me that I want to joke").

An adverbial ut follows ita, as: ita te amo ut meum ipsius cor ("I
love you like my own heart").

There is this distinction between the adverbial ut and the conjunc-
tion ut, that the adverbial ut may be construed with the indicative
mood, whereas the conjunction ut is always construed with the sub-
junctive. When one says, Ita me Deus amet ut ego tibi cupio bene
esse ("May God so love me as I hope it goes well with you"), the ut
is adverbial. Ita me Deus adiuvet ut ego tibi nihil debeo ("May God
so prosper me as I owe you nothing"), [and] Ita me Deus adiuvet ut
mihi debes quod a te exigio ("May God so prosper me as you owe me
what I demand of you") are oaths, for it is possible for the one who
speaks to be swearing falsely.

After ablatives showing a state of being, ut may be put, as: Joannes
tanta proceritate est ut nemo eo procerior sit ("John is so tall
that no one is taller than he"); Maria quedam tanta altitudine sunt
ut vada eorum inveniiri nequeant ("Some seas are of so great a
depth that their bottom cannot be found"); Trabs hec tanta crassitudine
est ut nemo eam ulinis complecti possit ("This beam is so thick that
no one can embrace it with his arms").

Crassitudo ("thickness") sometimes signifies quantity, sometimes

1Horace Epistles 1.1.39.
2Cicero Cato maior de senectute 2.4.
quality. The thickness of a beam is quantity, but the thickness of blood is quality. Animus humanus tanta capacitate est ut eum nisi summum bonum nihil impetrare possit ("The human soul is of so great a capacity that nothing but the supreme good can fill it").

Care must be taken that the particle quam is not put instead of nisi. Avarus nihil amat quam divitias ("A miser loves nothing than money") is not a correct statement. Change quam into nisi and say, avarus nihil amat nisi divitias ("A miser loves nothing excepting money"). If you do this you will speak correctly.

We must take care that we do not employ barbaric interrogatives.

Quotarius does not appear to be Latin word, for if quotarius were said in Latin, totarius could also be said in Latin, and this would be a [proper] Latin sentence: Ego totarius sum quotarius Petrus.

If quotennis is said in Latin it seems that totennis can also be said in Latin, and therefore this will be a [proper] Latin statement: Ego totennis sum quotennis tu es ("I am the same age as you").

If we are not willing to use the word quotennis we can ask it thus: quot annos natus es, [or] quot annorum es [or] quotum annum agis ("[I am] as old as you are").

If quotuplex is said in Latin it seems that totuplex can also be said in Latin, and this will be a [proper] Latin statement: nomen totuplex est quotuplex verbum ("a noun is as many-fold as a verb").

The interrogative quotuplex is necessary to us, for we ask how many both of the single ones of types, that is, of individuals, and of the types of the single ones, that is, of the species. This question, Quot sunt animalia? ("How many animals are there?"), is ambiguous, for it is ambiguous whether we are asking about the number of animals or about the number of species of animal. Just as this question, Quot sunt animalia? is ambiguous, so is this answer, Tantum duo sunt animalia ("There are two kinds of animals"), for it has two meanings. One is, the animals are only two in number, the other that there are only two kinds of animal, of which one is the genus of man and the other the genus of dumb beasts.

Phalera is an ornament for horses. Juvenal: "Magnorum artificum frangebat pocula miles ut phaleris gauderet equus" ("The soldier was smashing the goblets of great craftsmen so that his horse could rejoice in its trappings").2 And if we believe Tortellius, phalera

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1 In classical Latin the words totarius and quotarius have no meaning, and the sentence cannot be translated. If we are willing to tolerate these "barbarisms," the translation is: "I am as old as Peter."

2 Juvenal Satire 11.103-4.
derives from the Greek verb παυεωμαι, which is, I illumine.¹

A certain wine is called Phalernum, from a certain mountain in Cam­pania that is called Phalernus, on which it grows; just as we call certain wine Alsatian from its place of origin, that—is, Alsace. Neither phalera nor Phalernum derives from phalon.²

Ἡ γλώσσα is a Greek noun and is compounded only with Greek nouns. The ox's tongue is called buglossa, the dog's tongue cynoglossa. Glossa is, however, not compounded with a Latin noun, so cerviglossa ("hart's tongue") is not said.

Ὁ καλός in Greek means good. Thus φιλοκαλός means good friend, for ὁ φαλός means friend or lover. The Greek verb φίλεω has the same meaning as amo ("I love"). Philos does not mean love as many men say, but friend, for it is a concrete noun, not an abstract. Philtrum derives from philo, for philtres are poisons of love, that is, [poisons] that make men love and go mad. Ovid: "Philtra nocent animis viume furoris habent" ("Love-potions harm the senses and have the power of madness").³ Let grammarians be consulted as to whether philtrum means the same as the German vilt ("wild"). Let the same men be consulted as to whether cento⁴ means the same as philtrum.

Boys are in the habit of construing verbs of fearing with clauses introduced by quod. These clauses are made commonplace by boys: Timeo quod magister sit in scholis ("I am afraid that the teacher is in the school"); Timeo quod magister veniet ("I am afraid that the teacher will come"); [and] Timeo quod magister percipiet ("I am afraid the teacher will find out"). [Those people] who speak in better Latin, however, construe verbs of fearing with clauses begin­ning with ne and ut, as: Timeo ne magister venerit: "Ick vruchte dat die meister gecomen sy" ("I am afraid that the teacher has come"); Timeo ne veniat: "My is leyde dat he come" ("I fear that he is coming"); Timeo ne venturus sit, in German: "My is leyde dat he wert comen" ("I fear that he will come"); Timeo ne magister reciscat: "My is lede he vernimpt" ("I fear the teacher is finding out"); Timeo ne resciverit: "My is leyde hi heeft dat vernomen" ("I fear he has found out"); Timeo ne rescisciturus sit quod intramus tabernam: "My is leet hy soldet vernemen dat wy in die tavernen gaen" ("I fear

¹Tortellius De orthographia dictionum e Graecis, s.v. "Phalera."

²Phalon is not a word in Latin. In Greek ὁ φαλός means the horn of a helmet, or an ornament. The adjective φαλος, -η, -ον can mean white, or stupid. Contrary to what Hegius indicates, there appears to be a connection between φαλος and φαλεα. Both relate to military ornaments.

³Ovid The Art of Love 2.106.

⁴Perhaps relating to κεντον, "deadly venom."
that he will find out that we are going into the tavern"). Rescisco, rescivi, rescitum means "vernemen" ("to find out"), as: Magister rescivit omnia que heri fecimus; non dubito quin de nobis supplicium sumpturus sit ("The teacher has discovered all that we did yesterday; I do not doubt that he will punish us"). Verbs of fearing are also construed with ne non. These two particles have the same meaning as ut, as: Timeo ne Petrus non veniat/ne non venerit/ne non venturus sit: "My is lede he en come nicht/he en sy nicht gecomen/he en werden nicht comende" ("I fear that Peter is not coming/did not come/will not come"). Timeo ut magister venerit means exactly the same as timeo ne magister non venerit, since ut means the same as ne non: "My is lede he en sy nicht gecomen" ("I am afraid the teacher did not come"); Non timeo ne Petrus hodie veniat: "My is nicht leye that Peter huden come" ("I am not afraid that Peter is coming today"). Boethius [ca. 480-524] puts the particle ne after a verb of fearing in the second book of the Consolation of Philosophy, where he leaves it written thus: "Si scit metuat necesse ne est amittat quod amiti posses non dubitat" ("If he knows, of necessity he is afraid to lose what he does not doubt can be lost"). In the first book it is written thus: "Nam qui vallo eius ac munimine continetur nullus metus est ne exul esse mereatur" ("[For the man] who is contained by its wall and fortification there is no fear that he may deserve to be an exile"). It must be confessed that it is also possible to say Timeo quod Joannes veniet ("I fear because John will come"). There is a lot of difference between these two statements: Timeo ne Joannes venturus sit ("I am afraid that John will come") and timeo quod Joannes veniet ("I am afraid because John will come"). For the latter can be false while the former is [always] true. Timeo quod extremum iudicium futurum est ("I am afraid because the Last Judgment is about to take place") and timeo ne extremum iudicium futurum sit ("I am afraid that the Last Judgment will take place") do not mean the same thing. When there is a construction with a verb of fearing an infinitive statement has to be changed into a subordinate clause beginning with ne; so timeo Petrum reversurum esse is changed thus: timeo ne Petrus reversurus sit ("I am afraid that Peter will return").

The particle quod causes three errors: first, when it is redundant, as, nescio quam quod Joannes veniet ("I do not know how [because] John will come"); secondly, when it is omitted, as, nihil aliud scio quam Joannes est domi ("I know nothing other [than that there is a reason why] John is at home"); [and] thirdly, when it is

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1 Boethius The Consolation of Philosophy 2.4.87-88.

2 Ibid., 1.5.17-19.

3 Hegius means that if you want to say, "I am afraid that John will come," and you say timeo quod Joannes veniet, you will in fact be making a false statement and saying instead, "I am afraid because John will come."

4 If quod is added after est in this sentence the result is a
put instead of ut or ne or another particle, as, *timeo quod Joannes veniet* ("I am afraid because John will come").

'Ἡ ὁδὸς, meaning road, is written with an aspirated ο, and ends in -ος. 'Ὠν ("here"), however, never means road. Ὁδὸς is of the feminine gender, along with its compounds. Thus *exodus, periodus, [and] methodus* are of the feminine gender. *Exodus* means a going out, *periodus* a going round, [and] *methodus* a going through. Every art is by metaphor called a *methodus*, because every art is a certain going through. Grammar is going through those things to which the science of grammar pertains, just as dialectic is going through those things to which a knowledge of dialectic pertains.

Virgil signifies that every art is a "going through," and a sort of a road, when he says in the first [book] of the *Georgics*: "*ignaros-que mecum vie miseratus agrestes ingredere*" ("pitying with me the country-folk ignorant of the way"), where by the word *via* he symbolizes the way, that is, the art of agriculture.

[Those] who write *methodum*, with an a, make and uncouth error. 'Ὁ λόγος means word and reasoning, and is compounded with the Greek preposition *α*, which means the same as without. 'Ἀλογος is the word that means just the same as without speech or without reasoning. Derivations from the noun *logos* are to be written with a *g*, so they are in error who remove the letter *g* from these words: *logicus, logica, theologicus, [or] astrologicus* ("logical, logic, theological astronomical").

commonly used Latin expression indicating that there is a reason for some occurrence.

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1See above, p. 631, n. 3. 2Virgil *Georgics* 1.41-42.
AN INVICTIVE AGAINST THE MODES OF SIGNIFICATION

Against Those Who Believe a Knowledge of the Modes of Signification Necessary for the Grammarian, Who Are Called by the New Name of Modist

1. Those who say that knowledge of the modes of signification makes a grammaticus ("grammarian") are mistaken. A man is not called a grammaticus for the reason that he knows that the material mode of signification of the noun is that which is common to the noun and the pronoun, and [that the] formal [mode] is that which is more proper to the noun. But a man who knows how to speak and to write in [correct] Latin is worthy of the name of grammaticus.

2. No one is said not to be a grammaticus for the reason that he does not know what are the essential and accidental, the material and formal modes of signification, [or] the absolute and respective modes of the parts of speech. But a man who does not know how to speak and write correctly, however many words he may make according to the modes of signification, is unworthy of the name of grammaticus.

3. A man is not called a grammaticus who knows that the genitive case expresses in its modes ut cuius est alterum ("whose is another thing"), but does not know that it is not correct to say genitivum

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1The modes of signification are grammars that reflected the "metalogics" of the late medieval period. See above, pp. 96-99, 255, 292-94. Their authors, the modistae, were vehemently attacked by the humanist scholars. Hegius singles out Michael de Morbosio (fl. ca. 1280) for special criticism, contrasting his work with that of the ancient and humanist scholars. See below, p. 639, par. 28. For further analysis of the modistae and their theories see, for example, Jan Pinborg, "Die Entwicklung der Sprachtheorie im Mittelalter," Beiträge zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters 42 (1967) 2:1-367; Pinborg, "Speculative Grammar," in The Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy, ed. Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, and Jan Pinborg (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1982), pp. 254-69; and Jozef Ijsewijn, ed., "Alexander Hegius (†1498): 'Invectiva in Modos Significandi'," Forum for Modern Language Studies 7 (4 October 1971):301-2. The reader is reminded that it is from the critical edition of the Invectiva by Ijsewijn rather than from the 1503 edition of Hegius' Dialogi that this part of the translation has been made.
significare per modum ut cuius est alterum ("the genitive expresses in its modes whose is another thing").

4. Grammatici who wrote according to the modes of signification—if indeed they are to be called grammatici—wrote barbarously. Yet the ancients, who made not even one word according to them, spoke very correctly; from which it is evident that knowledge of the modes of signification is not only of no advantage but actively hinders those who make a profession of grammar. Why do the Italians not teach their children the modes of signification, if not because they have more concern for them than to force into them things so useless and so harmful?

5. What is the use of knowing that the material mode of signification of the pronoun is to signify by the mode of possession and quittance, while the formal is to signify by the mode of definite perceptions, if you do not know that it is better Latin to say liber est meus ("the book is mine") than liber est mei; [to say] liber est meus Ipsius ("that book is my very own") than liber est mei ipsius; [to say] liber est meus et Joannis ("the book is John's and mine") than liber est mei et Joannis; [to say] liber est meus qui lego ("the book that I read is mine") than liber est mei qui lego;[1]

6. What is the use of a knowledge of the modes of signification if you do not know that these expressions are ungrammatical and incorrect: Ego dedi sibi librum ("I have given the book to himself"); tu dedisti sibi librum ("You have given the book to himself"); ego misereor sui ("I have compassion of himself"); tu misereris sui ("You have compassion of himself"); ego diligo socium suum ("I love his friend"); tu diligis socium suum ("You love his friend")?[2]

Attention must be given to children so that they know what construction is required with reflexive relative pronouns [and] what with non-reflexive; that is, they should know when the pronoun suus is to be used [and] when the pronouns is ("he") or eius ("of him, of her, their") used as a possessive adjective rather than by the genitive of the personal pronoun.

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[1] Hegius' point is that the Latin used by the modistae in making their original definition is itself, by classical standards, ungrammatical.

[2] That is, ungrammatically according to classical standards.

[3] In classical Latin possession is shown by the possessive adjective rather than by the genitive of the personal pronoun.

[4] The point here is that, like the reflexive pronoun se ("himself, herself, itself, themselves"), suus ("his, hers, its, their") used as a possessive adjective is reflexive. It signals that the object to which it is attached relates directly to the subject of the sentence. Se and suus can only be used with a third person subject—never, as in these examples, with a first or second person subject. Eium rather than suum would have to be used to say "I love his friend" in good Latin. See below, p. 635, n. 1.
of it") in the oblique cases. *Joannes diligit socium suum* ("John loves his friend") is a correct statement. For the pronoun *suus* is then correctly put with the word, since its antecedent is implied by the word. So, *Joannes socium suum diligit*.

The man who puts a reflexive pronoun instead of a non-reflexive does not speak correctly. And again, the man who puts a non-reflexive for a reflexive is not free from faults. *Joannes socium suum diligit* ("John loves his [own] friend") is a complete statement. *Joannes diligit socium eius* ("John loves the friend of him [i.e., of somebody else]") is an incomplete statement, which we shall be able to complete thus: *Joannes diligit socium eius, cui heri librum commodavi* ("John loves the friend of him to whom I loaned the book yesterday").

7. The modes of signification do not control the construction of the parts of speech. For the genitive *mei* has the mode of signification that other genitives [have] and does not have the construction of other genitives. For it is right to say *liber Joannis* ("John's book"), but it is not right to say *liber mei* ("the book of me"). It is right to say *liber est Joannis* ("The book is John's"), not right to say *liber est mei* ("The book is of me").

8. What use is it for the genitive *mei* to signify *rem cuius est alterum* ("the thing to which another thing belongs") when it cannot be construed with a noun signifying a thing which is another's, because in fact it is not correct to say *liber mei*?

9. The conjunction *que* ("and") has the mode of signification that the conjunction *et* ("and") [has]; and [yet] it does not have the construction that the conjunction *et* has. For it is correct to say *Ego et tu damus* ("You and I give"), but not correct [to say] *Ego que tu damus*.3

10. *An* ("whether") and *ne* ("not") have the same mode of signification, but not the same construction. For it is correct to say an *Joannes est domi* ("I do not know whether John is at home") but not correct [to say] *ne Joannes est domi?* ("Is John not at home?"). The prepositions *tenus* ("down to, as far as") and *versus* ("toward") have the same mode of signification as the other prepositions, but

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1The word used for expressing possession in the third person if the possessor is not the subject is *eius* ("of him, of her, of it").

2This is a return to the point made on p. 634, par. 5. With nouns, possession is expressed by the genitive case, but with pronouns the construction is different.

3Et corresponds exactly to the English "and." Que is a particle and must attached to the second word of the pair it links. The correct form of the example is therefore *ego tuque damus* ("You and I give").
not the same construction as the rest. For it is correct to say in capulo ("in the grave"), but not tenus capulo. One must say capulo tenus ("down to the grave"). To what mode of signification is it due [that] these genitives—pluris ("dearer, more"), minoris ("cheaper, less"), tanti ("so much"), quanti ("how much")—are construed with words related to buying and selling, rather than these genitives—

"aureorum, philipporum." This is, why in Latin it is said liber meus tanti emptus est, quanti tuus ("My book was bought at as great a price as yours"), although it cannot be said in Latin liber meus tot aureorum emptus est, quot aureorum tuus ("My book was bought with as many gold coins as the gold coins of yours").

11. If grammar, which is the art of speaking, could speak for herself, [there is] no doubt but that she would be extremely angry with those who so tear her into pieces, so disfigure her that she does not deserve even to be called grammar. Certainly grammar is a liberal art. Not all grammar, however, but that which is the art of speaking and of writing correctly. That which is now learned by children, at a great price, is hardly to be called a liberal art, for it is the art of speaking not correctly but barbarously. And so this latter, which most children learn from their instructors, is unworthy of being called a liberal art; but not that former, which is the art of speaking and writing correctly. For now the names of books are infected, now [those] of arts, now of figures; now words have been taken over on loan from the Greeks. There is so little concern for Latin that they [children] are even infected by the titles of books! The Teutonic tongue is more indebted to laymen than the Latin language [is] to educated men. For the former take pains to speak correctly and not to misuse their own tongue. The latter, truly, neither make an effort to speak correctly, nor call it shameful to speak ungrammatically. The Greek language is more indebted to the Greeks than Latin to the Latins. For the former do not so tear it to pieces in the way that the latter do [theirs]. It is not easy for a man to say how seriously the instructors are at fault, concealing the faults in the speech of the children with whose instruction they have been entrusted and whom they teach for pay. For they do not conceal the faults of the coins that they are to carry away if any of them are proved counterfeit.

12. They complain if the payment owing to them is not paid if they are cheated of their dues by the children, if they offer them counterfeit [coins]. But knowing nothing of grammar, they are cheats. For they defraud their pupils of their money when they teach them to speak ungrammatically for pay. Oh, how wretchedly are they cheated of their cash, who for the payment learn to speak ungrammatically.

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1These are genitives of value, and a construction appropriate to them is not be applicable to other genitives.

2An aureus was a gold coin valued at twenty-five Roman denarii, while a philippus was a gold coin valued at twenty Greek drachmae.
13. Clearly, three things are necessary for Latin oratory: it consists, I say, of words in good Latin, familiar, and perfect. Let there not be in it mistaken abuses of vocabulary.

14. For mistaken abuses of vocabulary occur when words are mistakenly deprived of their meanings; as when *dictare litteras* ("to dictate documents") has the meaning *litteras scribere* (to write documents). For *dictare* is to say something to someone to be written down.

15. Let there not, then, be in it [i.e., oratory] either faulty conjunctions of words or constructions or compositions.

16. Moreover, knowing nothing of orthography, they are cheats. For they rob the words of either their due letters or their due sound. What sort of men are they who say *perhennis, habundo*? Surely they are robbing the words!

17. Some men rob them of their meanings, like those who say that *dictare* ("to dictate") means the same as *scribendo scribere aliquid* ("to write something in writing")—in Dutch, *dychten*—inasmuch as they are not of the same meaning. But *dychten* is more general than *dictare*, inasmuch as *dictare* means *alicui aliquid scribendum or dicendum dicere* ("to say something to someone to be written or said"), and has the meaning, *toe segghen* ("to say").

18. Grammar is therefore necessary for all these men who do not wish to misuse words. Those who misuse Dutch words in respect of either the letters or the sound are mocked by all. The corruptors of Latin words, however, pay no penalty for their faults. They are, therefore, in a numerous multitude, although the man who robs Latin nouns either of their rightful sound or of their due letters is no less deserving—indeed more so—of being mocked by all than he who robs Dutch nouns of these things. As the man who corrupts Dutch words is laughed at by his hearers, so indeed he who corrupts Latin words makes himself ridiculous. As the Dutch, when they try to mingle Gallic words with their speech, frequently corrupt them, so indeed [do] the Latins when they mix Greek with their speech.

19. A man speaks well who mars his speech neither with grammatical fault, nor with solecism, nor with any corrupt misuse of words.

20. The modes of signification, truly, do not deserve to be learned by children. It is likely that the children's instructors who teach the children the modes of signification are as undeserving of their salary as men who sow fields with ferns. Let those who exalt the modes of signification to the stars with praises tell me to what mode of signification belongs the infinitive mode, that it should annex to itself the accusative? Likewise, to what mode of signification belongs *interest* ("it is of importance"), that it should be

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1These are examples of the intrusive "h." The classical forms are *perennis* ("perennial") and *abundo* ("to overflow").
construed with these ablatives, mea, tua, sua ("for me, for you, for her"), etc.?

21. Those who are called grammatici are not called grammatici because they know the modes of signification, but because they know how to speak Latin! Those who are said not to be grammatici are said not to be grammatici for this reason, that they cannot speak Latin, not because they do not know the modes of signification.

22. Knowledge of the modes of signification does not make a grammaticus, because those who wrote about the modes of signification were not, even they, grammatici; for all their conversation was full of faults.

23. The Latin language alone is defiled by the modes of signification. Neither Greek nor any barbarian tongue has been defiled thus by modes of signification in the way that Latin [has]. The Dutch admit that this statement in Dutch is congruous: ick byn ("I am"), men who nevertheless lack knowledge of the modes of signification!

24. Therefore a man is not denied the status of grammaticus because he does not know that amare ("to love") governs the accusative because it signifies per modum transeuntis in alterum ("the mode of transferring to another"), but because he does not know that it has been agreed among grammatici that it should govern the accusative.¹

25. Habeo pecuniam ("I have money") is a correct statement, as [is] careo pecunia ("I am without money"). Pecunia habetur a me ("money is had by me") is a correct statement, but pecunia caretur a me² is not correct. For it has not been agreed among the grammatici that one may say pecunia caretur a me.

26. Should one not feel sorry for the children, therefore, who for their fee learn such useless and incorrect things? Habeo pecuniam ("I have money") is therefore correct, in the same way pecunia habetur a me ("money is had by me") is correct. Certainly it is agreed among grammatici that this is the way it is to be said. If it had been agreed among grammatici that one should say careo pecuniam,³ it

¹This is the mode of signification by which the verb amare is declared to be transitive. Hegius' point is that amo is not transitive because it is in the transitive mode, but simply because we know that it takes a direct object in the accusative.

²Habeo is transitive, taking a direct object in the accusative. It may be turned into the passive without difficulty. Careo, on the other hand, governs the ablative, and to express the passive it requires different treatment. Pecunia caretur a me is not a correct statement in Latin, and it would have to be translated into English as something like "money is 'without' by me."

³Because careo governs the ablative case it cannot take the accusative pecuniam.
would be correct to say *careo pecuniām*; and similarly correct [to say] *pecunia caretur a me*. But because it is agreed among *grammatici* that one may not say *careo pecuniām* it is therefore not correct to say so.

27. Why does one not say *amo Joannis* as [one says] *memini Joannis* ("I remember John"),¹ that is, *memoriam Joannis habeo* ("I have the memory of John"); and also [why does] *amo Joannis* not signify what *amorem Joannis habeo* ("I have John's love") does, if not because *grammatici* do not wish *amo* to be construed with the genitive. Yet they prefer *memini* to be construed with the genitive.

28. Why did Augustine, Jerome [ca. 342-420], Gregory, Ambrose, Bernard [of Clairvaux (1090-1153)],² Cyprian [ca. 200-258] and Lactantius [ca. 240-ca. 320], and the other ecclesiastical writers write in Latin, if not because they wrote as the ancients, that is, as Cicero, as Sallust, as Livy, as Virgil, as the other ancients wrote? [They were] men who neither knew nor had read Michael de Morbosio!³ But still they wrote good, indeed, excellent Latin. For they wrote like the ancients.

29. Nor did they write good Latin because they knew the modes of signification, without knowledge of which some men believe that it is impossible either to write or to speak Latin. For they wrote good Latin because they copied the ancients and wrote just as the ancients [wrote].

30. Just as he paints best who paints just like the man who has painted best, and again, he carves best who carves just like the man who has carved best, so he speaks best who speaks just as the man has spoken who has spoken best. Thus he sings best who sings just as the man has sung who has sung best.

31. Let us, therefore, make every effort to speak as he spoke who spoke best—who is agreed among all to have been Cicero—paying no attention to that most barbarous work, the *Scholarium disciplina*.⁴

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¹Amo is a transitive verb, while *memini* governs the genitive case. There is, therefore, no parallel construction, and one cannot extrapolate from *memini Johannis* to *amo Johannis*. *Amo Johannis* would have to be translated "I love of John."

²Ijsewijn, commenting on paragraph 28, notes that it is a little unusual for Hegius to have included a medieval writer such as Bernard of Clairvaux in a list of early ecclesiastical authors. He points out, however, that this was not without precedent. See Ijsewijn, "Hegius Invectiva," p. 303, especially n. 16, and p. 312.

³For more on Michael de Morbosio see Pinborg, "Sprachtheorie," pp. 91-94; and above, pp. 292-94.

⁴See above, pp. 124, 338.
(for it does not [+even] have a proper Latin title!), which men falsely claim that Boethius wrote.

32. This pamphlet is packed with such absurd tropes that it is quite unsuitable as a means of teaching children. To this we owe [the fact] that we speak of naturam naturantem and naturatam.¹ From it are derived [the words] magistrarii ("to be directed"), intitulari ("to be given a title"), and discolus ("evil"). For in it there is written: non est dignus magistrare qui se non novit subjici ("It is not proper [for one] to rule who has not come to know that he is to be subject"). In it magistratus ("the office of magistrate") is called magisterium. From there has been brought the form presbyterarii ("to be made a presbyter"). Magistratus, when it is a noun, is good Latin; when it is a participle it is an error of grammar.² From there has been brought [the word] dyscholus, which means evil and harmful and hard to endure. For δύσ, when it is written as a Greek word, signifies evil; and χολή, anger. Hence discolus. From there has been brought: non enim discentis est probris contumeliosisque affatibus regentem incitare ("It is certainly not for learners to stir up the teacher with shameful acts and insulting speeches").³

33. Perhaps my opponents, who support the party of barbarism, will say, "Indeed, it is permissible to write some words otherwise than was the convention among the ancients that they should be written. It is permissible to corrupt some words."

34. Having admitted that, it will thereafter be permissible that all words should be written otherwise than was the convention among the ancients. Let the rules of grammar, therefore, be removed [and] let the professors of grammar, therefore, retire!

35. One must cling to vocabularies both barbaric and corrupt: to Gemma,⁴ I say (changing a title by which it will not be easy to say how many have been and are being deceived. Those who praise it alone, those who cultivate it, are men who—as happens with those youths who are untaught in matters of business—inflict starvation on their own belly as the cash runs out!), and to many others of

¹Naturantem and naturatam are non-classical words derived from natura ("nature"). Their meanings are not clear, but they seem to relate to created and creative nature.

²Magistratus is the classical word for an office of state. It happens to have the same form in the nominative case as the non-classical past participle derived from the verb magistrare.

³See Ijsewijn, "Hegius Invectiva," pp. 312-13, where he has cited, from the Scholarium disciplina, some of the relevant passages to which Hegius makes reference.

⁴See, for example the Vocabularius optimus gemma vocabulorum merito dictus (Deventer: Richard Paffraet, 1495). Also, see above pp. 123-25, 337, where the Gemma are discussed.

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this sort, Huguccio, Catholicon, Briton;\(^1\) abandoning the most approved M[arcus] Varo [116-27 B.C.], [Sextus] Festus, [fl. post A.D. 150] Nonius Marcellus [fl. post A.D. 300], Tortellius the Tul- lian Nestor, and as many others as possible!

36. Words, clearly, are to be written and pronounced and construed as was the convention among the ancient grammarians that they should be written or pronounced or construed. A man who either writes or pronounces or construes otherwise commits an error of grammar.

37. One must assign a signification to words exactly as it was the convention among the ancients to assign a signification to them.

38. How different this [is] from that Gemma which is passed around, they will see most clearly who compare it, in respect of approved words, with the ancients.

39. [I am passing over the Medullam utramque partium opus minus utrarumque in the same manner, and countless other pamphlets quite unworthy to be bought and read].\(^2\)

40. Despising fruits, some men, not being rightly persuaded, wish to be fed on acorns—[I say] these things prompted by love—unless in good time studious youth should take counsel with itself for the common good. The icy poison hidden in the grass being thus recognized, let the children, forewarned, flee therefore from the acorns. For a serpent lurks in the grass. Farewell.

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\(^1\)These are three medieval dictionaries. The first, entitled Liber derivationum is by Huguccio of Pisa (fl. 1190-1214). The Summa quae vocatur catholicon is the work of John Balbi (ante 1298). William Brito (fl. 1225-50) is the author of the third one, which bears the title Expositiones difficiliorum verborum. With regard to these works see above, pp. 123-24, 337; and Ijsewijn, "Hegius Invectiva," p. 314.

\(^2\)The Medullam utramque mentioned in this paragraph was only printed by Richard Paffraet about 1500, and in all likelihood only written by Timannus Kemenerus [fl. 1490-1510] in 1500. Hegius could therefore never have seen this pamphlet. Paragraph 39 must have been added after Hegius death by Jacobus Faber, the editor of the 1503 version of the Dialogi. For further comments on the problem of editorial interpolation in the Dialogs, see above, p. 593, n. 1. The Medullam utramque is a commentary on the Doctrinale of Alexander de Villa Dei (ca. 1170-ca. 1260). The introduction to the Medullam is printed as an appendix in Ijsewijn, "Hegius Invectiva," pp. 316-18.
APPENDIX B

THE CORRESPONDENCE OF ALEXANDER HEGIUS

Letter no. 1: Rudolf Agricola to Alexander Hegius, dated 20 September 1483, from Groningen.

Rudolph Agricola sends greeting to his friend Alexander Hegius.

I was grieved, most pleasant Alexander (if you believe me at all), and bore it with the greatest possible distress that, as I learned from your letter, you had been here while I was away. You have been frustrated in the hope of your trip, which was our meeting and converse; while from me, though short, though meager, yet some exercise of study has been snatched away, tiny as it would have been. For I should have thought it great, since now no chance is given to me for study that is not great. For me who lack all, whatever happens to come is of the greatest good.

It is hard for me to explain to you how much I am dissatisfied with all my affairs and, above all, with myself. I do not know whether to say my love for or my skill in study is dying daily; certainly my skill, and on that account perhaps little by little my love, too. I feel I have suffered a great loss in scholarship since leaving Italy, if indeed my scholarship is such that a great loss can fall upon it. Now my memory of classical authors is starting to slip and that of history to fall down, now the proper meaning, the facility, the beauty of words to flow away. If I try to write prose I can produce ideas only with difficulty, and they are reluctant and sluggish and do nothing more than fill the space. My language itself is uncouth, disjointed, and disorderly, as perhaps it always has been, but now, however, more than usually so, and it is such as suggests rather than explains the thing I desire to say. I hardly ever try verse, but, if I indeed do, neither the scansion nor the sound of poetry, nor its spirit comes in response. And I pour out lines, when they have appeared, not such as I approve, but such as I can; or rather (I speak truly), I squeeze and tear them out of a reluctant breast.

The translation of letters 1-4 in this appendix was made by D. John Dunnett, retired Professor of Biblical Languages in the Department of Religion at Newbold College in England. I have subsequently done some minor editorial work on these translations. The Latin source used for letter no. 1 is Rudolf Agricola, Rodolphi Agricolae Phrisii Lucubrationes, ed. Alardus of Amsterdam (Köln: Johannes Gymnicus, 1539), pp. 187-91.
For me the supreme cause for this, which, while I believe it to be great for others, yet I perceive it to be greatest for me, is the following: I am lacking the keenest incentive for study, a taskmaster and ally with whom I may confer, into whose ears I may pour, as likewise he into mine, whatever he has found in meditating, accomplished in writing, learned in reading, and noted as worthy of praise or severer judgment; who is always introducing something, investigating, doubting, disputing; sometimes he will restrain with freely-spoken censure of our neglects, at other times he may encourage our endeavor with liberal praise; and--honestly to embrace in one all the fruits of goodwill in the midst of study--one who understands how and wishes to speak and also to hear the truth. Such a one I persuade myself you are, by virtue of your outstanding love of study and the frankness of your mind. Therefore there is nothing at all that I should prefer rather than for us to be able to spend our lives together. Since our activities do not allow us this, you will easily reckon how much it has pained me that what alone remains for us--to meet and converse sometimes--has been frustrated for us by my latest trip. Because, in truth, I foresee that this exercise of friendship is going to be quite rare, I vote that we return to letterwriting and restore with the delight of our minds the loss of each other's presence.

Meanwhile, however, lest I permit your kindness to be at all inactive, let me demand another pledge of your affection for me, the nature of which I will briefly mention. I have a brother Henry, younger than John, who has begun to have the desire to study literature, whether after due consideration I do not know, but as I cannot dissuade him I do not want to frighten him off. For just over six months he has been at Münster with our friend Frederick [Mormann (d. post 1483)], and there, as much as he has been able in that time, he has picked up again the rudiments gained in his early youth. Now Frederick has gone off elsewhere, having been given the position of rector to a certain house. Henry has returned home and is begging and insisting that I send him to study with someone else. I have racked my brains as to whom, and you seem the best choice. I am reasonably certain that for my sake you will willingly do him this favor to the best of your ability. For the moment you will keep an eye on and give your attention to him to see if only he displays any true love of learning that his teacher's diligence may encourage.

He will bring with him the personal necessities our students usually do, money will be sent as circumstances require, and he will find himself lodging where you think convenient. Everything else I leave to your judgment. Also I should very much like to know if there is anyone near you who teaches young people in their spare time, when they are free from school, as you know our friend Frederick is accustomed to do, and whether any pupils are free to go to him on payment of fees, even if not candidates for orders. You see, I should very much like him to master the elements as fast as possible, since, in my opinion, with longer delay on those, not only do boys lose time but, as you know comes down from our generation, they get filled with a kind of roughness and barbarism, so that afterwards not only too late but also with difficulty do they grasp better things. Let me know about all this as soon as you can, I beg you. I will send him to you a day or two after I get your letter.
The Pliny that you ask me for, although I frequently have it in my hands, I will give him to be brought to you.

I may seem to have exceeded, let alone fully reached, the right length of a letter, which Demetrius Phalereus [ca. 350-post 297 B.C.] wished, if it was any longer, to be seen as a short book, at the beginning of which a greeting had been written, rather than as a letter. However, to me on the other hand (who will have violated more easily the laws of letterwriting than of our friendship), great is the author who says it is stupid to decree that a letter must have a fixed limit when it needs to be made larger or smaller according to the nature of its subject. Why, says he, is it necessary for wisdom to be measured by infantile cubits or Persian spectacles? So with peace of mind I shall oppose this law, because even if I did not have many things to write, yet this in itself would be an abundantly just cause for writing much, namely that I am writing to you.

You ask what is the difference between a mimus ("mimic actor"), a histrio ("stage-player"), and a persona ("character"). I should have thought that a mimus and a histrio were the same—I call him someone who acts stories on the stage—apart from the fact that mimus has its origin in the Greek μίμης, meaning "I imitate", while authors declare histrio to be an Etruscan word. But there was also with the ancients a kind of poem which they called mime [or farce], giving pleasure only by its wit and clever satire and the meanest kind of all the ὁπάους ἔρημος ("dramatics"). From this I find also that in the [classical] authors the name of mimus is usually meaner than that of histrio. All the same, Juvenal calls Paris a histrio: "What great men will not give, a histrio ("actor/stage-player") will give."2

Persona is said to come from personando ("sounding through"). It is that with which actors used to cover their face on stage and show it as someone else's, as it is in Juvenal: "They hold the persona ("mask"), the Bacchic wand, and the shorts of Accius."3 So then, it is what the Greeks call προσωπείον ("mask") or υφομολοκία ("hobgoblin"), although the word υφομολοκία relates more to striking with terror. Persona is also applied, κατὰ συνεκδοχήν ("by synecdoche"), to him who plays the part, as: "To be sure, it appears to be a woman in person speaking, not a persona" ("mask," i.e., "male actor").4

I think the Latin name scurra is what the Greeks call a parasitus ("sponger/one who entertains in order to earn his meals"), and is in no way different except that a parasitus takes his name from ἀρετὰ του παρασιναθάντα ("eating at another's table"), as though from a more honorable role. Scurra seems to be derived from freedom and licence of the tongue. In truth, both refer to him who, in order to seek a living, has surrendered himself to the enduring of all kinds of ridicule. On parasitus Juvenal remarks: "He will order

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1Literally, spectacular scenes, i.e., using lavish rhetoric.
2Juvenal Satires 7.90. 3Ibid., 6.70.
4Ibid., 3.95-96.
a green waistcoat and tiny nuts to be brought to him, as well as the pennies requested, whenever the infant parasite comes to his table. 1 About a scurra he says: "More brazen is the shamelessness of this people that sit and watch the gross scurrilities of the patricians." Then he goes on to explain what these are: "He listens to the barefooted Fabii," and so on. 2

The same author teaches what a nebulo is: "And he has learned from a nebulone ("spendthrift") father to swallow down fig-peckers soused in their own juice." 3 Although, as seems to be indicated from the words of [Aulus] Gellius [ca. A.D. 130-ca. 180], 4 these are most nearly understood by the name nebulo who today carry nets [perhaps bags for money] round and seek a living by contest in witty repartee. Nepos--in my judgment--indicates one having no control over appetite, which is almost the same as he who is called ἄσωτος ("profligate") by the Greeks.

The word leccator ("lecher") is German, like a number of others we have corrupted, such as reisa ("military expedition"), burgimagister ("mayor"), and scultetus ("municipal official"), just as we have received from France passagium for a military expedition, guerra for war, and treuga for a truce. The word ἄνθρωπος ("man") comes from the Greeks, and I think it as useless to search for its origin as it is for us whence homo ("man") comes, as if men's concern about naming anything ought to be more ancient than that about themselves. Whether anyone wants it to be said to come from ἀνά καὶ τρέπω ("up and I turn"), or, as others say, ἔσω κατὰ μετάθεσιν του [sic, μετάθεσιν τού . . .] ("I creep by transposition of the . . ."), 5 or τρέψω ("I nourish"), I should have thought whichever way it is argued [is] more a matter of inclination than of truth.

Vesper is the last part of the day. "Now the vespers of the day was at hand:" Sallust in Jugurtha. 6 "Vesper is at hand. Young men, rise up. Now at last Vesper from Olympus is just raising his long-expected light:" Catullus. 7 For in Ovid what you read as vespere ("in the evening") stands for "the western region." 8 Aurora is used τροπήως ("in the opposite sense") in the same author:

1 Ibid., 5.143-45.
2 Ibid., 8.189-91. Tragic actors wore a high boot, comic a low shoe, and mimic went barefoot. The Fabii family are used as a type of the patricians.
3 Ibid., 14.8-9. A fig-pecker is a small bird.
4 No direct reference is made, but see Aulus Gellius Attic Nights 1.2; the title of 8.10; 9.2; 16.6.
5 There seems to be a mistake or omission in the Greek at this point. The article του does not qualify any other word.
6 Sallust War with Jugurtha 52.3.
7 Catullus Carmina 62.1-2. 8 Ovid Metamorphoses 1.63.
"Eurus drew off to aurora ("the eastern region") and the Nabataean Kingdoms." For properly we say aurora for the appearance of the sky when the redness of the approaching sun is spread over it, and hence for the time when it grows light; but also, κατα συνέκδοχην ("by synecdoche"), for the territories of the East. Vespera is in Pliny, too, in his eighth book of letters: "The evening, he says, is prolonged with varied talk." And, Caesar says sub vesperrum ("about evening") in his Commentary on the Civil War. For, in that we say vesperrae ("vepsers") for the evening service, in the same way as we say matutinae ("matins") for the morning service, as [+comparing with how] the ancients spoke, I think that what is said is not good enough Latin. Whether sero ("evening") is good Latin, as mane ("dawn") is good Latin, I call in question. For mane, though it is an adverb, we find even in Persius: "Already bright mane ("morning") is coming in through your windows and showing the narrow . . . .," etc. As to whether sero too was sometimes used thus in the ancients in place of a noun, I do not know in any author who is extent of any example of this style of speech. It is certain that, just as for the true law of speech it [sero] is corrupt, so serum is good speech, not bad, for thus it is in Suetonius, in his Augustus: "And now it was serum ("late") in the day."5

As for rubeus ("red"), I have heard of some who think it barbarous speech, but I find it in Pliny, unless indeed there is a mistake in a letter, and "u" is put instead of "n," and it ought to be rubens. I, when I have the word ruber ("red"), would prefer to speak safely rather than freely.

On the analogy between deriving and constructing words, I should scarcely allow myself to make up anything which I did not find in the [classical] authors. This is a diverse and complicated matter, one about which no universal rule can be given, and in which I venture nothing, unless perhaps it is necessary (as Horace says) to make manifest obscure ideas with up-to-date evidences. Yet I might perhaps say Socraticitas ("Socraticism"), Platonitas ("Platonism"), and entitas ("entity"), though our friend Valla

1Ibid., 1.61.
2This quotation is not found in book 8 of the Letters of the Younger Pliny. See, however, his Letters 2.11.18, where a vaguely similar statement is made.
3Julius Caesar Civil Wars 1.43.
4Persius Satires 3.1-2. The preferred reading in Persius, and the one that makes more sense, is extendit ("widening") rather than ostendit ("showing").
5Suetonius Lives of the Caesars 2.17. The word serum is used to indicate that it was late in the day, but Agricola has not quoted accurately.
6Horace Ars Poetica 48-49.
would object. Why not be so free, when it is necessary, as Cicero was when, with no necessity, he used Appieta ("Appiis—-the antiquity of the Appian family"); and Lentulitas ("Lentulism—the family pride of the Lentuli"); and Pollio [76 B.C.—A.D. 4] said T. Livy had the ring of a certain Patavinita ("a provincialism that was a consequence of Livy's origins in Patavium")? 1

Tignon ([a piece of timber]) is lignum ("a piece of wood") smaller than a trabs ("beam"), on which roofs of houses lie, perhaps coming from tegendo ("covering"), though Caesar says: "Pairs of tigna eighteen inches thick sharpened a little way from the base," etc. Then he continues: "These pairs had two-foot trabibus let into them on top," so that it seems to me that the two differ not in size but in their use in buildings, so that a tignon is what something lies on and a trabs what floors are spread on.

Asser ([pole on which a litter is carried]) takes its name from asserendo ("attaching oneself to"), being that by which, with our hands, we attach ourselves to, that is, we lay hold on, any carriage or bier; for what we commonly call an asser is properly termed a board.

Contignatio is a nailing together of tigna (timbers). In the Pandects there is a heading about a fastened timber.5 I judge you should read it.

Dioecesis ("the district of a magistrate") comes from διοικεῖν, διοικησ [sic, διοίκησ] ("an act of serving"), that is, service, or management. Even Cicero used this word in his To Atticus: "The dioecesis of Campania has been assigned to me."6 It ought to be pronounced in Latin speech with a circumflex accent on the penultimate syllable, just as we ought also to say paracletus ("paraclete"), which comes from the Greek παρακλητος.

You write saying you would like my Dialectica to be published. Dialectica in the feminine gender is the art itself. Αὐτὸς ὁ διαλεκτικός ("dialectic") [is] like ἡ ἀριθμητική ("arithmetic"). Τὰ διαλεκτικά (the Dialectics) [and] τὰ ἀριθμητικά ("the Arithmetic"), like the Georgica ("Georgics") and the Bucolica ("Bucolics"), are books. Likewise the title of Marcus Manlius' [fl. ca. A.D. 10] book is written as Astronomicus ("Astronomy"), not Astronomice; and of Aristotle's, Ethicus ("Ethics"), not Ethice.

1Cicero Letters to His Friends 3.7.5. 2Ibid.
3Pollio, cited in Quintilian, Institutes of Oratory 1.5.56; 8.1.3.
4Caesar Gallic Wars 4.17. This is part of a description of a bridge.
5Neither tignon nor inuncto appears in the modern Latin titles of any of Justinian's Pandects.
6Cicero To Atticus 5.15. The word dioecesis does not occur anywhere in Cicero in connection with his assignment to Campania. It is used with the meaning that Agricola attributes to it in the letter to Atticus cited here.
Also, you write *quanto tempore* ("in how much time") you will instruct him to come back to you. Have no doubt that if you write it in those characters, and with what else [+you have written], *quanto tempore* is [good] Latin. But in the meaning which you want it is incorrect. For you are not asking in how much time, that is, how quickly; or how, in the end, he is going to arrange his journey back to me; but within how much time or after how much [time] he is going to come back to me; as, if you use the same figure of speech in other words and say that he will come back to you in two months, you will understand that he will be two months on the journey.

Next there is *ut plura brevibus complectar* ("that I may encompass more with short words"). The correct phrase was *ut plura paucis complectar* ("that I may encompass more with few words"). *Brevia verba* ("short words") are those which consist of few syllables; likewise *longa* ("long"), those of many. It is from the use of many or few words that a speech may as a consequence be long or short.

There is also *iuvenum institutores* ("educators of youth"). You know and I know that whoever are called *iuvenes* ("young men") are younger in age. I should prefer you to have said *adolescentium* ("youth") or *puerorum* ("boys"). For they are *iuvenes* who are next to manhood, who now no longer go to grammar school.

Moreover you write asking what *tignum* ("a piece of timber"), or what *contignatio* ("a nailing together of timber") is, and the rest. Then at the end you add: *ubi ex te rogavero, quaerendi finem faciam* ("When I have questioned you I shall make an end of asking"). If this had preceded the questioning you would expertly have pronounced about the future by the use of a future verb, so that it would be: *reliqua sunt, quae ubi ex te rogavero, quaerendi finem faciam* ("There are things remaining, and when I have questioned you about them I shall make an end of asking"). Then would follow: "What is *tignum*?" or what is *contignatio*?" Now, when the thing has gone past about which you were going to question me, I should prefer you to have said: *quod quum rogaverim, dicendi finem faciam* ("Now that I have questioned you I shall make an end of speaking").

It does not escape my notice that that was said ΚΑΤ' ἐπεξεργασίαν ("by transposition"), and that there is no other figure more frequently used in any kind of adorning of speech. But many things come about that disagree with either the kind of words or the plan of constructing the speech, so that all the ornament does not meet in one place.

You have [+in this letter] what I should like you to do, any reply to your questions, and my criticism of your letter. If these things are going to give you little pleasure, after this you will leave off presenting your business to me; or, if you continue to be irksome, you will doubtless expect equal for equal.

Among the Greeks there is proverb saying that one must not grasp a cricket by its wings, for if it once starts chirping it does not know how to stop. So, when you seek to hear from me something that you wish, as a cruel fee you must also hear what you do not wish, and you will call forth my talkativeness more easily than restrain me.

Why not grab a pen for yourself and do not let me carry this off unavenged. While you defend your own territory, at the same
time attack mine. Beat me at my own game. For this my careful work of the night watches will have given you plenty of material; so much the more a letter poured out carelessly. Do not be afraid that you are going to offend me. On the contrary, I shall thank you heartily and count it an outstanding act of your benevolence. I shall not so much think that there is nothing in my letter that will have displeased you if you praise it in its entirety as that you have considered it totally despicable if you have disapproved of nothing in it.

Goodbye. Greet in my name Arnold [of Hildesheim],¹ our presbyter and philosopher friend. My brother John bids me greet you with words of greatest esteem. Goodbye again.

Dated in Groningen
20 September 1480

¹Arnold of Hildesheim was at this time a colleague of Hegius in the school at Emmerich.
Letter no. 2: Rudolf Agricola to Alexander Hegius [Fall 1483], from Groningen.

Rudolf Agricola writes to his friend Alexander Hegius

Your letter was delivered to me on my return home, for I had been away for fifteen days in order to see to some business—sent by our government in Holland in the name of our Republic. But as to what you have heard, that I have been seen at Antwerp, that is another matter and it is true. So now you know, for it has been told to you.

Now that you have made a good start in opening the grammar school in Deventer I wish you happiness and success. I know that at first the work will not be too flattering to you. The city itself has been wasted by the plague and must be to you a cause of terror and loathing. As a consequence it is inevitable that the assembly hall will not be crowded and may almost seem deserted rather than being thronged and in a state worthy of your expectations. But I hope that your loss will be easily borne, short-lived, and made good, and that a happier, more fruitful time will come, and heaven's blessings be restored.

As for me, I have remained in town till now, although I am sometimes censured, and there are some who, tending to be more hasty, consider this either an inflexibility or, more truly perhaps, a stubbornness of my mind. I am wont to see and to reply only this: if an end awaits me here so that I am taken by the plague, the danger is not to be approached by me as though my nose is pierced with a feather, like young chicks afflicted with a cold. What are you striving to gain? I think all things will be, not indeed of necessity, for I am not of that opinion, but only they will be. Whether I die of the plague or not, whichever of these is true, that will come to pass. But whatever I do, this remains true. Whatever I do, therefore, it will likewise come to pass.

I know what you will reply. If what is said will be is true and will therefore take place, those things that prepare the way and the approach to that which it is truly said will happen must also occur. You can see this is answered with too little logic, since you can deny nothing of what is set forth nor find fault with the form of the argument. Next, it will be legitimate to raise the same controversy about those means through which the end is reached as has been raised about the end itself—whether it also becomes true of itself that those [intermediate] things must be, and whether it becomes true that a future end will be reached through them.

Lastly, that I may cause this sophistical quibbling to be discarded and may speak more openly, what is said to be going to happen lies outside of my knowledge and outside of my control. What prophet, or rather what god of those who bring us through to that place which we desire, or on the other hand of those who take us away from it—this is of useful or useless things—will of

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1The Latin source for the translation of this letter is Agricola, Lucubrationes, pp. 181-83.
a certainty show a sign to me, that it may be within my control
to choose those things through which I believe that future to be
capable of being grasped or avoided, since we see that many exits
lead forth from one road, and on the other hand very often many
roads lead to a trunk? For that reason, since we have done every­
thing [and] have seen to everything that we believe will be of
benefit, we thereupon seem at last to have comprehended in what way
we may hope more rightly and make prayers in greater trustworthi­
ness. Because of this, of course, it is commonly said that fortune
dominates everything. Hence Juvenal says: "That man bore the cross
of the curses of crime, this man the diadem."¹ The tragic poet also
exclaims: "Many have come to their own fate while they fear the
fates."

Let me certainly agree, therefore, that if it is truly said
that something will happen, that will definitively happen. It will
happen in any event. [Though] it is allowed that I may flee, never­
theless it will come to pass. But, you say, it is possible for it
not to be. To be sure, it may be possible; but to what advantage?
It may be possible, or it may not be. In both cases [it is] the
same. It may be the end of life, or else what you believe is impor­
tant to me, that I may be able to live with myself, although I
cannot, unless, along with this power, hope and fear in perpetual
torment are tearing my breast apart and appropriating it to them­
selves by turns, and, even more agitated, I reach that place will­
ingly or unwillingly that I am in any case to reach. With these
reasonings I have repulsed meaningless fear, yet I do what I think
will benefit and attempt as much of what is ordinary as I can accom­
plish with care and diligence, so that perhaps (though by no means
more safely than he who does it most dangerously) I may be secure in
this light in whatever way I live. But whence or to what end is
this philosophy a more unhealthy thing for us?

My brother Henry was sent to me from Master Bartomagensis.
I gave him my books to be carried to Heidelberg. Through him I
should like to know if he has spoken to you en route, for he said he
was going to do that; and if he has, what do you think of him?

With regard to the plague, let me know as soon as you can
whether it is either stopping or raging at your place. For I want,
as soon as I shall conveniently be able to do so, to undertake a
journey and meet you in Deventer if you think it is safe. Goodbye.

Written at Groningen.

¹Juvenal Satires 13.105.
Letter no. 3: Alexander Hegius to Rudolf Agricola, dated 17 December [1484], from Deventer.1

Alexander Hegius writes to his friend Rudolf Agricola

As to the fact that you have received no letter before this where you now are, since it is hard to excuse, what else remains but that I frankly confess my idleness? For in my opinion it is more disgraceful to excuse faults badly than to confess them sensibly. If your brother Henry had made his return journey to you this way (unless I am mistaken) I should have given him something of a letter for you. Now, because he has disappointed my expectation, I have been detected in my fault.

You asked about my school affairs, how they were progressing and how much profit they were to me. I will reply in a few words. Now I have the school full, but in the summer it was a little less crowded, for the plague, which at that time killed over twenty of my students, took many away from here, and also (as I believe) scared some from coming here.

Thank you for translating Lucian's dialog about the shoemaker and the cock for my sake. Look how far I have progressed in self-confidence, I who have convinced myself about that. I ask you to dedicate it to me, that thereby our friendship may be made more renowned, for I know that it will afford no ordinary pleasure to me and its other readers. I will have it printed as soon as it gets here. I do not dare to request you to make an abridgement of your book On Dialectic, for I consider my modest shamelessness too little disgrace for me, but, I have decided, too great to escape by order of Comicus. Yet I cannot fail to say that you will deserve the best from the students of rhetoric if you have shared it with them, for you know how much they deceive.

You have translated Isocrates On the Education of Princes. If I had it I should expound it to my hearers, for I have no doubt that from among them some will become princes and be appointed to the helm of state government.

I have been reading Valla's book On the True Good, according to which Vegius defends the side of pleasure, Cato that of honor. Vegius has made me an Epicurean, for he has persuaded me that anything is good to the extent that it brings pleasure. For what does honor profit anyone if it should perpetually give trouble among pitiful people? I do not think that what is done rightly is good because it is done, but because it brings or will bring pleasure.

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None (as I believe) is so steadfast a defender of honor that he is willing for the honorable man to be beset with constant punishment.

The same book has persuaded me that particular vices are contrary to particular virtues. For it is agreed among all who speak about virtues and vices that rectitude is a virtue and depravity a vice, but in my opinion each depravity has its own opposing rectitude. For rightly giving and wrongly giving stand contrary to each other, in the same way as do rightly not giving and wrongly not giving. For I see there is no reason why for one rectitude God should wish there to be two contrary depravities, when we see that each has its own rectitude opposing it. I wish you would let me know whether I am perceiving [correctly] or otherwise, and whether I appear to you to be perceiving the truth or not. And I should also like you to discuss why, out of two people endowed with equal genius, one and the same argument produces belief for the one and scarcely any for the other, when, nevertheless, to use your very beautiful words, logic follows necessity in a disputation, but reason follows choice.

I also want to find out from you whether your Heidelberg people have now abandoned their Marsilius and discuss their universals and first principles of individual objects ante rem ("prior to the object"), in re ("along with the object") and post rem ("after the object"), or still take his side.

Your Pliny, nay rather ours, I have communicated in my discourses to great advantage, for it cannot be that he should not be dear to me whom you hold most dear.

As a private citizen I do not dare to send greetings to the Bishop of Worms, an eminent man. Yet I wish, and always will wish, what is allowed to me, that he should be in good health, for he is worthy that nothing adverse should happen to him and that all should honor him with praises.

He who will carry this letter through to Worms will return in six weeks. Whatever letter you give for delivery to me send to the house of the Bishop of Worms. He will look for it there when he is returning here.

If you defraud your genius there I bear it very distressfully that you left here, but if not, however much less distressfully, nevertheless in like manner I confess I bear it with too little heart. For as you know I have become Epicurus.

Tell me about all your affairs. Goodbye.

Deventer
17 December

1The word in the original is tercium, which is not a classical word but a medieval derivation from tertius -a -um, meaning third. It makes no sense as it stands in this sentence. In order to clarify the meaning of the sentence the word "correctly" has been supplied, even though there is no connection between it and tercium.
Letter no. 4: Rudolf Agricola to Alexander Hegius, dated Tuesday [ca. January 1485], from Worms.

Rudolf Agricola wishes his friend Alexander Hegius well.

I cannot easily tell you how much pleasure your letter has brought me, not only because it came from you, the dearest of men to me, but also because I perceive that you are daily becoming more polished and refined, and I am led into the highest hope that through your guidance, admonition, and educating—otherwise by the ability of none—more civilized literature will reach Germany and eventually occupy this stronghold.

I showed the letter to the Bishop of Worms, who expressed his joy in the same way as I in the hope of our Germany. "A blessing on you!" he said: "In this manner we reach the stars!"

As to what you ask, that I send to you and dedicate to your name Lucian's Mycillus, which I have rendered into Latin, I should have done both even if you had not asked. But I am afraid I shall not be able to send it to you quickly. I have not yet revised it or recopied it from its first rough draft. So far I have not even looked at it again since translating it. The bishop's studies occupy me, although not as much as they should, because there is not enough time for him on account of the great amount of business that daily distracts me. Furthermore, a good deal of my time is taken up by my public lecturing, even though I accomplish that in itself lightly enough.

My lecture hall is at this moment quite well filled, but my students are mostly of the kind whose zeal for their study outweighs their ability. The majority are masters, or scholars (as we say), in the arts course, who are obliged to spend all their time on their disputations, so only a very slender and, as it were, extra fragment of their day is left to them for this study, with the result that they can do very little and my efforts are pretty sluggish. Therefore what I say, though lightly, indeed yet does take my time.

In addition there are the Latin and Greek, which I must maintain in whatever way I can, though I notice also I am making some loss in them. As well as these (I may say) there is my study of Hebrew, which presents me with a task new and full of trouble, so that I seem to myself to be wrestling with Antaeus, and to be expending on it, which I had judged would require very little, more labor than on Greek, unless indeed it chances that we remember past.

1The Latin source for the translation of this letter is Alexander Hegius, Alexandri Hegii gymnasiarche iampridem Daventriensis diligentissimi artium professoris clarissimi philosophi presbyteri poete utriusque lingue docti carmina et gravia et elegantia, ed Jacobus Faber (Deventer: Richard Paffraet, 1503), fo. A.iv verso-A.v verso; and Krafft and Crecelius, Beiträge, 2:7-9.

2Virgil Aeneid 9.641.

3A Libyan giant killed by Hercules.
labors with a calmer mind than we endure present ones. But, however it may be, I am determined to persist, first because I have begun, that I may correct my wavering with steadfastness; secondly because in Greek, in which, however little I have achieved, we can nonetheless declare that I regret neither the labor nor the expense. Because the very great pleasure in it which I was receiving and still receive is failing somewhat, and perhaps by that very failing is tending towards fruit, I have thought my mind should be inspired once again by some new enticements to study. Furthermore, I think I ought to prove to someone more distinguished that, because I am pursuing this sterile study of literature all my life, I am seen to do it with discretion and not with dilatoriness. But I have resolved to set apart my old age, provided old age awaits me, to the study of sacred literature, that I may say what is most true and equally most right, and I seem now at the same time to belong to old age, etc.

You know, to be sure, my disposition, that I cannot follow the barbarism, impurity, and roughness of language used by those who now fill up every place. You know too, on the other hand, their disposition—how they shout, act crazily, and count it as an insult if anyone dares to tear their opinions to pieces and tries to show them that as boys they learned superfluous, distorted rules which now at an advanced age they must unlearn again. They may do what they can to make me give mine up, but they will not be able to force me to abandon them.

Goodbye now. With most honourable words greet on my behalf your host Master Richard and that most modest lady, his wife.

Given in great haste at Worms on the third day of the week.

It seems proper to me to call thus what we term either unclassically second feria,\(^1\) third feria, and so on; or else, in heathen manner, Moon's Day, Jove's, Mars's, Mercury's, etc.

\(^1\)Ecclesiastical Latin singular meaning "weekday," derived from the classical plural, feriae -arum, meaning "festivals."
Letter no. 5: Alexander Hegius to Wessel Gansfort [dated between 1482 and 1489], from Deventer.

Alexander Hegius sends greetings to the most learned and excellent Master Wessel of Groningen, who is "the light of the world"

I am sending you, most excellent sir, the Homilies of John Chrysostom. I hope the reading of them will afford you delight. For golden words always pleased you more than golden coin.

I have been, as you know, in the Cusan Library. There I found many Hebrew books, altogether unknown to me; but fewer of the Greek. The following, I recall, were there: Epiphanius Against Heresies, a very large work; Dionysius [the Pseudo-Areopagite] On the Hierarchy; Athanasius Against Arius; Climacus: These I left there. But I brought with me Basil On the Hexameron and his Homilies on the Psalms; the Epistles of Paul together with the Acts of the Apostles; the Lives of certain Romans and Greeks written by Plutarch, and also his Symposium; some grammars; some mathematical works; some songs of deepest feeling concerning the Christian religion, composed as I believe by Gregory Nazianzen; some prayers, εὐχας.

If you want any of these, let me know; they shall go to you. For it is not right that I should have anything that I would not share with you. If it will not inconvenience you to be without the Greek gospels, I beg you to lend them to me. You asked to be informed about my tutoring. I have followed your counsel. For all learning is pernicious that is attended with loss of honesty. Farewell, and if you want me to do anything, signify it to me and consider it done.

From Deventer.

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Letter no. 6: Jacobus Faber to Desiderius Erasmus, dated 9 July 1503, from Deventer.1

Jacob to his friend Erasmus, an accomplished scholar in Latin and Greek and a canon regular, greetings

The writings of that excellent scholar, your teacher and mine, dearest Erasmus, are well worth my editing with your blessing; and I shall take every possible care to see that as far as in me lies they are produced in elegant characters. I could justifiably be held guilty of disloyalty, indeed of malice, towards studious youth, if, observing as I do that none of his close friends is undertaking this charge and that they shrink from the toil it involves, I were to fail to rescue those products of his pen, filthy with dust and buried in darkness, from the devouring worm; for they are works that deserve to be preserved by the cedar oil of Pallas Athene, drawn by our Hercules from an inner shrine. I recognize how much I am indebted to the teacher under whom you and I served, though at different times. Who has ever responded worthily to all he did for us? I have even more for which to be grateful, inasmuch he was closer to me personally. How loyal you yourself have been to him the Greek adages which you translated some time ago show very clearly; for, near the beginning of that work, in the adage called, as I remember, "Quid canis in balneo," you did not forget to mention him in these terms: Rodolphus Agricola, "whom I named to the general honour of the entire German nation; and name all the more gladly because as a boy I had for my own teacher his pupil Alexander of Westphalia, so that I owe to the latter filial duty, to the former as it were a grandson's affection. But, in case I as a German should arouse resentment by singing the praises of my fellow-countryperson Rodolphus, I shall add the epitaph composed by Ermolao Barbaro, whom everyone, I think, must agree to have occupied the pre-eminent place among Italians, both for personal honour and for scholarship:

In this cold tomb hath envious fate sealed up
The hope and glory of the Frisian name;
Whate'er of praise to Rome or Greece belong,
He living, won for Germany that same."

How highly Agricola himself respected Hegius is made clear by the following: he was convinced that by virtue of his intense

1This translation is from Desiderius Erasmus, Collected Works of Erasmus, vol. 2: The Correspondence of Erasmus: Letters 142 to 297—1501 to 1514, ed. Beatrice Corriag, trans. R. A. B. Mynors and D. F. S. Thomson (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1975), pp. 65-69, letter no. 174. It is reproduced here with permission of the publishers. The line numbers and footnotes from the Collected Works are not included. The letter was first published in 1503 in Hegius, Carmina, fo. a.i verso-a.ii recto. It serves as an introduction to both the Carmina and the Dialogi.
enthusiasm for study and his sincere good will, such as he himself
longed to possess, our master was most effective in evoking, prompt­
ing, and assisting others' studies. With him he loved to share
whatever he had discovered by reflection, or created in writing, or
learned by reading, or marked as deserving either praise or censure.
And these things he poured into our master's ears, just as Hegius
did into his. He always made some relevant point, or expressed
reluctance or hesitation, or debated the matter, sometimes chiding
carelessness with an outspoken rebuke and sometimes encouraging
an attempt with kindly words of praise, but always both able and
willing to speak and to listen. And therefore there was nobody with
whom he would have preferred to spend his life than with our master;
and he was very sorry that their circumstances made it impossible.

Who could easily chronicle all our master's good qualities?
Though he surpassed others in rank and authority, he showed excep­
tional affability in condescending to men of low estate. He was
extremely energetic, and always preferred a busy life to a quiet and
restful one; he was extraordinarily anxious to find the best way of
serving the interests of studious youth, and his life-story shows
that he regarded it as his destined task to educate youth well. He
took infinite pains to achieve what would be most permanent without
calculating what struggles it would cost him; for, in order to
deserve well of youth and win its affection, he thought no kind of
fatigue was of any consequence, and when he sought hard work, he did
so not under the spell of foolish Midas' hidden gold, but out of a
longing to do good. In fairness he would not allow those who were
obviously poor to be disappointed by others who claimed the same
benefits in return for fees, and he was very ready to admit them,
regarding Heaven as his recompense; and he taught the liberal arts
to them with the same careful attention as to the rich. Thus while
he was alive he did all that one could do to live a virtuous and
unselfish life; he relied on God, and did not hope in vain; indeed
he lived up to his own hopes in generous measure, for he was filled
with goodness and made perfect in goodness. He was most assiduous
in encouraging the pursuit of virtue, to the exercise of which
he earnestly called his pupils; he preached and praised virtue,
exhorting them to abandon vice, which he hated. The extent of his
hostility to it is shown with perfect clarity in the many deeply
serious poems he published each year, as was his custom; these I
have deliberately decided to issue in advance of his other produc­
tions, even though the latter were far more accomplished, for I
shall thereby come to know what reception they can expect. When I
perceive that they have won approval (and they are sure to receive a
warm welcome from every educated person with any taste for litera­
ture, both for their profound learning and for their restrained
moral exhortations), I shall then be more ready, without suffering
the printer's importunate insistence as I do now, to send his other
works to the press to be printed. They consist of the following:

An enquiry in the form of a dialogue on the true method of
determining the date of Easter, which depends upon the Bible;
this he evidently derived from the Greek, Isaac Argyros [fl.
ante 1372, a Byzantine monk and astronomer]; together with a
lengthy treatment of the mystery of the incarnation
On knowledge and the known; against the philosophers of the academic school
On philosophy
On the tripartite soul: vegetable, sensory, and rational
On ability and its absence
On rhetoric
On morals
On sensation and its object; also several other writings

And thus, as treasures of the mind are finer than transitory and ephemeral possessions, so may his glory ever grow greater from his enduring achievements; for by his teaching he deserved excellently well of his pupils, whom he never teased with circumlocutions, obscurities or vain and petty cleverness of no relevance to the subject; who never learned the art of adding light to the sun; who did not wrap up in thick veils matters that were clearer than daylight, blunting the understanding with useless additions. On the contrary, he set whatever was obscure in the clearest possible light, in such a way that anyone save he whose "blood within his breast did coldly run" could understand it with the greatest of ease. For this reason he deserves to enjoy eternal remembrance among posterity through the literary memorials he has left.

Enough on this subject. For the rest, dearest Erasmus, I fail to comprehend why you have not given me, as we agreed, the Greek oration of Libanius when you have done it into Latin; I am waiting for it. I can glimpse your intention; you have decided to add to my Libanius the books you are now engaged upon: on famous metaphors, on ecclesiastical allegories, on allusions in classical authors, and on witty sayings and replies. This is the one thought I console myself with that I may bear patiently the rather long delay. So now accept our teacher's most important poems, to which will also be added, when I see that it would please you and my other kindly readers, his enquiries into a variety of topics, composed in dialogue form; in this respect he follows the example of Plato, who was most intimately known to him. Finally I shall see to it that any of Rodolphus Agricola's works that come to hand here are sent on to you, except those that have been published in previous years and are now in the booksellers' shops. Also I thought it not inappropriate to add a rough and ready dirge that I composed in honour of our departed friend, which touches on certain admirable qualities in him, which may ever serve to commend him to your friends. Farewell.

Deventer,
9 July 1503.
APPENDIX C

PUBLICATIONS IN DEVENTER PRIOR TO 1501

Introduction

In this appendix are listed all the incunabula known to have been published by the two Deventer printers. These incunabula are first listed alphabetically and then according to their date of publication. The purpose of the appendix is to give an idea of the kinds of books printed by Richard Paffraet and Jacob van Breda, to offer a tentative analysis of the nature of these publications, and to allow for an investigation of trends that might have developed with regard to printing while Hegius was rector in Deventer.

It should be noted that this appendix does not constitute primary research. The secondary sources from which the information is drawn are Marinus F. A. G. Campbell, Annales de la Typographie Neerlandaise au XVe Siècle, with its four supplements; the Catalogue of Books Printed in the XVth Century Now in the British Museum, part 9, fascicule 1: Holland; Maria E. Kronenberg's Campbell's Annales ..., Contributions to a New Edition; and "More Contributions and Notes to a New Campbell Edition," also by Kronenberg.1

The researchers who have contributed to a study of the Dutch incunabula are the first to admit that there is still much work to be done. The major problem is that it has been difficult to compare these early publications because they are scattered in libraries and archives all over the world. It is therefore likely that a number of works listed as separate editions may in fact be from the same printing. The almost six hundred titles should probably as a consequence be reduced to a figure closer to five hundred.

The first part of the appendix is alphabetized according to either the author or title, but with the following exception. Where a book is divided into parts that were printed separately, part one is listed before part two irrespective of any variations in the title that would otherwise alter the sequence. See, for example, the Doctrinale of Alexander de Villa Dei.

Following the author and title in the alphabetized section, the publisher is identified. After this the year of publication is entered. A date in square brackets indicates some uncertainty, and especially where these are close to 1500 or where there is no date, the works may in fact not be incunabula. The information given in square brackets after the date is either the Campbell number or that

1For full bibliographic information on these books please consult the bibliography.

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of Hain's *Repertorium* used by the *Catalogue of Books Printed . . . Now in the British Museum*. In the latter case the number is identified by the abbreviation "BM." This is followed in parentheses by the source of the information if this is other than Campbell's *Annales*. In addition, there is a tentative categorization of the subject matter of each work. Where more than one author was printed in a single publication, only the content of the first work in the compendium has been categorized. Much of this information is given in abbreviated form following the list of abbreviations below.

In the second part of the appendix where the focus is on date of publication, the author and title have been shortened. Abbreviations used in these titles have not all been given in the list of abbreviations. The full titles can easily be found by referring to the alphabetized section. In the chronological section a compendium is indicated when the title is followed by "etc." For purposes of analysis this section also includes the categorization according to subject matter.

A brief analysis of this material is given in chapter 6 and at the end of this appendix.¹

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### Abbreviations

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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Meaning</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>bib.</td>
<td>Bible/biblical</td>
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<tr>
<td>BM.</td>
<td>Catalog of Books in British Museum²</td>
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<td>c.</td>
<td>Century</td>
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<td>C.</td>
<td>Campbell, Annals</td>
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<td>C-I.</td>
<td>Campbell, <em>Supplement 1</em></td>
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<td>c-eval.</td>
<td>Currency evaluation</td>
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<td>ca.</td>
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<td>Church Fathers</td>
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<td>nt.</td>
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<td>RP.</td>
<td>Richard Paffraet</td>
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<td>sch.</td>
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<td>s-cl.</td>
<td>Semi-classical</td>
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<td>txt.</td>
<td>Text</td>
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¹See above, pp. 332-42; and below, pp. 690-91.

²Full bibliographic information for the books mentioned in these abbreviations may be found in the bibliography under the first word of the name or title listed with the particular abbreviation.
Publications Listed Alphabetically
by Title or Author

Aeneas Silvius [Pius II], *Epistola de fortuna ad Procium militem*. JB.: 1489. [No. 17. Hum.: It.]

Aesopus Graecus, *latinus per Laurentium Vallium factus*. JB.: [1486].

Aesopus Graecus, *per Laurentium Vallensem traductus*. JB.: [1490].

Aesopus moralisatus cum bono commento, L. Valla. JB.: 1494. [No. 43. S-cl.: hum. com.]


Alanus ab Insulis, *Doctrinale altum sive liber parabolaeum cum glossa*. JB.: 1492. [No. 55. Phil.: eth.]


Die conste om te leeren spreken ende swyghen. JB.: 1496. [No. 67a (C-II). Phil.: eth. (Dutch)].

Die conste om to leeren spreken ende swyghen. JB.: 1496. [No. 67a (C-II). Phil.: eth. (Dutch)].

Die conste om te leeren spreken ende swyghen. JB.: 1496. [No. 67a (C-II). Phil.: eth. (Dutch)].

Die conste om te leeren spreken ende swyghen. JB.: 1496. [No. 67a (C-II). Phil.: eth. (Dutch)].


Pt. 1. JB.: 1496. [No. 120. Med.: grm., hum. com.]

Pt. 1. RP.: 1495. [No. 120. Med.: grm., hum. com.]


Pt. 2. RP.: [post 1487]. [No. 122a (C-III). Med.: grm.]


Pt. 2. RB.: 1495. [No. 120c (MC-C). Med.: grm., hum. com.]


Pt. 2. RP.: 1491. [No. 124a (C-III). Med.: grm., hum. com.]


Pt. 3-4. RP.: [post 1480. [No. 111a (MK-C). Med.: grm.]

Pt. 3-4. RP.: 1484. [No. 127. Med.: grm.]

Pt. 3-4. RP.: 1499. [No. 129. Med.: grm.]


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__, ____, Doctrinalis cum explanatione Ascensiana. Pt. 3-4. RP.: 1500. [No. 133. Med.: grm., hum. com.]

Almanac. RP.: [1480]. [No. 148a (C-III).]

Antoninus, Archiep, Decisio consiliaris super dubio producito de indulgentiis. RP.: [1476]. [No. 160. Rlg.: cn-lw]


Apuleius, Lucius, Fabulosa narratio de nuptiis Psych. RP.: [1495]. [No. 166. Clas.]


Ars oratoria. JB.: [1486]. [No. 185.]


Augusta, David de, Profectus religiosorum. RP.: [1486]. [No. 1442. Rlg.: ptI.]

Augustinus, Confessionum libri tredecim. RP.: 1483. [No. 195. Rlg.: CF.]


Balbus, Hieronymus, Epigrammata. RP.: [1500]. [No. 216. Hum.: Nt.]

Baptista Mantuanus, Carmina de beata Virgine Maria, quae et Parthenice prima dicuntur. JB.: 1497. [No. 225. Hum.: It.]

__, ____, De morte Colle. RP.: [1500]. [No. 226a (MK-C). Hum.: It.]

__, ____, De vita beata. RP.: [n.d.]. [(BM). Hum.: It.]

__, ____, De vita Lud. Morbigi et de contemnenda morte. JB.: 1497. [No. 235. Hum.: It.]

__, ____, In praenconium R. Severinatis panegyricum carmen: Epigrammum opus ad Falconem. RP.: 1496. [No. 239. Hum.: It.]

__, ____, Opus de mundi calamitatibus. RP.: 1495. [No. 228 (C-II). Hum.: It.]

__, Parthenices commendatio. JB.: [1491]. [No. 220. Hum.: It.]

__, ____. JB.: 1498. [No. 221. Hum.: It.]

__, ____. JB.: [1498]. [No. 222. Hum.: It.]

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Baptista Mantuanus, Parthenices commendatio. RP.: 1491. [No. 218. Hum.: It.]

Baptista Mantuanus, Secundae Parthenices opus S. Catharinae passionem heroico carmine illustratus. JB.: 1497. [BM]. Hum.: It.

Bartholomaeus Coloniensis, Ecloga bucolici carminis. JB.: [1485]. [No. 255a (MK-C). Hum.: Nt.]

Bernardus [Beatus], Liber Floretus sive carmina de virtutibus. [n.p.]: [1490]. [No. 270. Rig.: ptl., med.]

Bertorius Petrus, Reductorium morale figurarum bibliorum. RP.: 1477. [No. 286. Rig.: ptl.]


Bonaventura [Beatus], Tractatus qui dicitur stimulus amoris. RP.: [1491]. [No. 348. Rig.: ptl., med.]

Boort, Henricus, Fasciculus morum. RP.: [1495]. [BM].

Breviarum monasteriense. RP.: [1490]. [No. 365d (MK-C). Rig.: ltg.]

Breviarum traiectense. JB.: 1492. [No. 374a (MK-C). Rig.: ltg.]

Buschius, Hermannus, Carmina tumultuaria RP.: [1495]. [No. 389. Hum.: Nt.]

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Buschius, Johannes, Philippi et Jacobi: Speculum exemplorum ex diversis libris in unum collectum. RP.: 1481. [No. 1568. Rg.: ptl., 15 c.]


Carolus Fernandus, Sermones quatuor novissimerum. JB.: [1486]. [No. 1536. Rg.: ptl.]

Cato [Pseudo-], Moralia Catonis ad filium suum. RP.: 1491. [No. 409 (C-II)].

Chrysostomus [Beatus], De providentia Dei liber: Sermo de dignitate humanae originis. [n.p.]: 1491. [No. 426. Rg.: CF.]

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, Cato maior. JB.: [1491]. [No. 432. Clas.]

Cicero, Marcus Tullius, et Plinius Secundus, Quaedam epistolae. RP.: 1499. [No. 442. Clas.]


Collenutius, Pandulphus, Apoloqus cui titulus Agenoria. JB.: 1497. [No. 462.]


Disticha. JB.: [1495]. [No. 411a (MK-C). Clas.]

Disticha. JB.: 1496. [No. 412. Clas.]

Disticha. JB.: 1499. [No. 414. Clas.]

Disticha. RP.: [1491]. [No. 410. Clas.]

Disticha. RP.: [1495]. [No. 411. Clas.]

Disticha. RP.: 1497. [No. 413. Clas.]

Disticha. JB.: [1495]. [No. 409b (MK-C). S-cl.]

Disticha. JB.: [1500]. [No. 409c (MK-C). S-cl.]

Disticha. JB.: [1500]. [No. 409d (MK-C). S-cl.]


Disticha. RP.: 1491. [(BM). S-cl.]

Cato [Pseudo-], Moralia Catonis ad filium suum. RP.: [1489]. [No. 430. Clas.]

Cato maior et Liber de amicitia. RP.: [1486]. [No. 428 Clas.]

De oratoru" " laelius sive de amicitia dialogus. JB.: [post 1497]. [No. 436. Clas.]

De officiis. RP.: [1486]. [No. 439. Clas.]


Laelius sive de amicitia dialogus. JB.: [post 1497]. [No. 437. Clas.]

Laelius sive de amicitia dialogus. JB.: [post 1497]. [No. 438. Clas.]

Laelius sive de amicitia dialogus. JB.: [post 1497]. [No. 439. Clas.]

Laelius sive de amicitia dialogus. JB.: [post 1497]. [No. 440. Clas.]

Oratlonculc elegantiore ex diversis Ciceronis epistolis. RP.: [1490]. [No. 444a (MK-C). Clas.]

Oratlonculc elegantiore ex diversis Ciceronis epistolis. RP.: [1490]. [No. 444a (MK-C). Clas.]

Oratlonculc elegantiore ex diversis Ciceronis epistolis. RP.: [1490]. [No. 444a (MK-C). Clas.]

Ora" "ticonc elegantiore ex diversis Ciceronis epistolis. RP.: [1490]. [No. 444a (MK-C). Clas.]

Ora" "ticonc elegantiore ex diversis Ciceronis epistolis. RP.: [1490]. [No. 444a (MK-C). Clas.]

Ora" "ticonc elegantiore ex diversis Ciceronis epistolis. RP.: [1490]. [No. 444a (MK-C). Clas.]

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Collationes quas dicintur fecisse rex Salomon et Marcolphus. RP.: 1490. [No. 454a (MK-C). Rlg.: fic.]

Conradi de Brundelsheim, Sermones Socci de sanctis per circulum anni. RP.: [1477]. [No.1539. Rlg.: pt1.]

Curia pallatium. JB.: [1500]. [No. 516a (MK-C). Dict.: 15 c.]

Cyprianus, Caecilius [Beatus], Epistolae; Sermo Augustini de S. Cypriano; Oratio et passio S. Cypriani; et Libri tres B. Cypriani contra Judacos. RP.: [1477]. [No. 520. Rlg.: CF.]

Danielis sonnia et interpretationem sovmiorum. RP.: [1496]. [No. 525. Sci.]

Datus Augustinus Senensis, Ars scribendi epistolae. JB.: 1496. [No. 527. Hum.: It.]

Datus maior [Elegantiolae]. JB.: 1497. [No. 533. Hum.: It.]

Datus minor et Summulae praecceptorum. JB.: 1490. [No. 538. Hum.: It.]

De varis loquendi figuris sive de modo dictandi libellus. JB.: [1485]. [No. 536c (MK-C). Hum.: It.]

David, Psalterium. JB.: 1494. [No. 545. Rlg.: Itg., bib.]


Dionysius Afer Halicarnasseus, De situ orbis versio metrica Prisciani. JB.: [1497]. [No. 578. Clas.: geog.]

Dirck van Munster, Kerstenspiegel. RP.: [1499]. [No. 601a (MK-C). Rlg.: pt1., Itg.]


Dogma de virtutibus et vitiis oppositis. RP.: [1486]. [No. 605. Phil.: eth.]
Dominicus Sabinensis, De commodis et incommodis mulierum. RP.: 1479. [No. 606. Hum.: Nt.]


Donatus, Aelius, De octo partibus orationis. JB.: [1493]. [No. 645. S-cl.: grm.]

Elegantiarum viginti praecep. Hum.: [1486]. [No. 661a (MK-C).]

Epistelen ende evangelien mitten sermonen vanden gehelen iaer. JB.: 1493. [No. 703. Rig.: ltg. (Dutch).]

Epistolare et evangelicam per totum annum tam de tempore quam de sanctis. JB.: [post 1486]. [No. 680b (MK-C). Rig.: ltg.]

Eucherius [Episcopus], Epistola ad propinquum suum ex graeco per Rod. Agricolam traducta. JB.: [1487]. [No. 1699. Rig.: cf.]

Exercitium puerorum grammaticale. RP.: 1489. [No. 718. Grm.]

Exhortationes novitiorum et Colloquium Jesu cum puero. RP.: 1491. [No. 719. Rig.: ptl.]

Faber Stapulensis, Jacobus, In Aristotelis Ethica Nichomachea introductio. JB.: [1500]. [No. 724a (MK-C). Hum.: eth.]

Facetus: Liber faceti docens mores hominum, praecipue juvent, cum notabili glossa Reinerius Alemannus. JB.: 1492. [No. 728. Hum.: Nt.]


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Fliscus de Soncino, Stephanus, Sententiarum variationes sive synonyma. RP.: [1483]. [No. 748. Hum.: grm.]

Fundamentum artis metricandi. JB.: [1487]. [No. 765. Sci.]

Fundamentum scholasticorum. RP.: 1500. [No. 766. Phil.]

Gaguinus, Robertus, De intemeratae Virginis conceptu adversus Vincentium quendam de castro novo decertatio. JB.: 1494. [No. 768. Rig.: ptl.]

Gasparinus Pergamensis [Barzizius], Epistolarum liber. JB.: [1486]. [No. 775. Hum.: It.]

Gemma vocabulorum. JB.: 1498. [No. 784. Dict.: 15 c.]

Gemmula vocabulorum cum addito. JB.: 1491. [No. 793a (C-I). Dict.: 15 c.]

Gerardus de Zutphania, Tractatus de spiritualibus ascensionibus. RP.: [1486]. [No. 797. Rig.: ptl.]

Gerson, Johannes, J. de Jersona de caloq. de confessione, et de arte moriendi. RP.: [1480]. [No. 801a (C-II). Rig.: ptl.]

Gresemundus Junior, Theodoricus, In septem artium liberalium defensionem dialogus. JB.: 1497. [No. 858.]

Guido de Columna, Historia destructionis Troiae. RP.: [1481]. [No. 873. Fic.]

Guilelmus de Gouda [?], Dialogus inter clericum et laicum super dignitate regiae. [n.p.]: 1497. [No. 879. Hum.: Nt.]

Guilelmus de Gouda, Tractatus de expositione missae. JB.: [1486]. [No. 882. Rig.: hum., ptl.]

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<tr>
<td>1499</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aesopus Graecus.</td>
<td>JB. [S-cl.: hum. com.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499</td>
<td></td>
<td>Dirk van Munster, Kerstenspiegel.</td>
<td>RP. [Rig.: ptl., Itg.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499</td>
<td></td>
<td>Prudentius, Psychomachia.</td>
<td>JB. [Clas.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1499</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sulpiitus, Carmen juvenile.</td>
<td>JB. [Hum.: It.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>28/01</td>
<td>Petrus Hispanus, Summula.</td>
<td>JB. [Med.: grm.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>28/02</td>
<td>Phililephus, Epistolarem.</td>
<td>JB. [Hum.: It.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>10/03</td>
<td>Alexander, Doctrinale: 1.</td>
<td>RP. [Med.: grm., hum. com.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>17/03</td>
<td>Stella clerorum.</td>
<td>RP. [Rig.: ptl.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>18/03</td>
<td>Elegantiarum.</td>
<td>[n.p.]. [Hum.: grm.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>24/03</td>
<td>Cicero et Plinius, Quaedam epistolae.</td>
<td>RP. [Clas.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>31/03</td>
<td>Gemma.</td>
<td>JB. [Dict.: 15 c.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>01/04</td>
<td>Baptista Mantuanus, De vita Lud, etc.</td>
<td>RP. [Hum.: It.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>10/04</td>
<td>Baptista Mantuanus, In praeconium, etc.</td>
<td>RP. [Hum.: It.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>06/06</td>
<td>Fundamentum scholasticorum.</td>
<td>RP. [Phil.]</td>
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<td>1500</td>
<td>18/08</td>
<td>Boethuis, De disciplina.</td>
<td>JB. [Med.: grm.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>21/09</td>
<td>Der sielen troest.</td>
<td>JB. [Rig.: ptl. (Dutch.)]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td>29/11</td>
<td>Cyprianus [Pseudo-] Sermones.</td>
<td>RP. [Rig.: ptl., med.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aesopus moralisatus.</td>
<td>JB. [S-cl.: hum. com.]</td>
</tr>
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<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Alexander, Doctrinalis: 3-4.</td>
<td>RP. [Med.: grm., hum. com.]</td>
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<tr>
<td>1500</td>
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<td>Baptista Mantuanus, Epigrammatum.</td>
<td>RP. [Hum.: It.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Henricus de Hassia, Secreta.</td>
<td>[n.p.]. [Rig.: ptl.]</td>
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<td>1500</td>
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<td>Phililephus, Epistolarem.</td>
<td>RP. [Hum.: It.]</td>
</tr>
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<td>1500</td>
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<td>Sinthius, Composita verb.</td>
<td>JB. [Med.: grm., hum. com.]</td>
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<td>Terentius, Phormio.</td>
<td>[n.p.]. [Clas.]</td>
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<td>Virgilius, Georgica cum novo com.</td>
<td>RP. [Clas.]</td>
</tr>
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<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aesopus Graecus.</td>
<td>JB. [S-cl.: hum. com.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Aesopus Graecus.</td>
<td>JB. [S-cl.: hum. com.]</td>
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<td>Arator, Actus Apostolorum.</td>
<td>RP. [Rig.: Itg., bib.]</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Balbus, Epigrammatum.</td>
<td>RP. [Hum.: Nt.]</td>
</tr>
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<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Baptista Mantuanus, De morte.</td>
<td>RP. [Hum.: It.]</td>
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<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cato [Pseudo-], Disticha.</td>
<td>JB. [S-cl.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Cato [Pseudo-], Disticha.</td>
<td>JB. [S-cl.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Curia pallatium.</td>
<td>JB. [Dict.: 15 c.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Curia pallatium.</td>
<td>JB. [Dict.: 15 c.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Faber, J., In Aristotelis Ethica.</td>
<td>JB. [Hum.: eth.]</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1500</td>
<td></td>
<td>Hegius, Dialogus de arte et inertia.</td>
<td>JB. [Hum.: Nt. grm.]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Hieronymus, Epistola duae, etc. RP. [Rig.: CF.]

Historia de veneranda. JB. [Rig.: pt1.]

Johannes de Hese, Itinerarius, etc. RP. [Geog.]

Juvences, Quatuor evangelia. JB. [Clas.: rig.]

Juvences, Quatuor evangelia. RP. [Clas.: rig.]

Kemenerus, De arte grammatica. RP. [Hum.: Nt. grm.]

Kemenerus, Medulla. RP. [Hum.: Nt. grm.]

Manuale scholarium. JB. [Med.: grm.]

Petrarca, Die hystorie . . . Griseldis. RP. [Hum.: It. (Dutch).]

Petrus Cracoviensis, Computus astronomicus. RP. [Sci.]

Plato, Hipparchus et Theages. JB. [Clas.]

Pomponius, Liber de . . . Senecae. RP. [Clas. (?)]

Prudentius, Psychomachia. JB. [Clas.]

Rituale Romanum. JB. [School txt.]

Sallustius, Bellum Catilinarium. JB. [Clas.]

Sallustius, Bellum Catalinarium. RP. [Clas.]

Sinthius, Verbia deponentialia. RP. [Hum.: grm.]

Stella clericorum. JB. [Rig.: pt1.]

Sulpitius, De arte grammatica. JB. [Hum.: It. grm.]

Thomas de Aquino, Tractatus, etc. JB. [Rig.: sch.]

Torrentinus, Opsiolum. RP. [Hum.: grm.]

Torrentinus, Opusculum, etc. RP. [Hum.: grm.]

Alexander, Doctrinalis: 1. RP. [Med.: grm. hum. com.]

Baptista Mantuanus, De vita beata. RP. [Hum.: It.]

Baptista Mantuanus, Parthenices commend. RP. [Hum.: It.]

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Cato [Pseudo-], Disticha. RP. [S-cl.]

Cicero, De amicitia. RP. [Clas.]

Datus Senensis, De variis . . . figuris. RP. [Hum.: It.]

David, Psalterium. RP. [Rig.: Itg., bib.]

Dominus quae pars? JB. [Sci.]

Dominus quae pars? RP. [Sci.]

Donatus, De octo partibus. JB. [S-cl.: grm.]

Donatus, De octo partibus. JB. [S-cl.: grm.]

Elegantiarum. JB. [Hum.: grm.]

Epistolare et evangelicae. JB. [Rig.: Itg.]

Gasparinus Pergamensis, Epistolarum. JB. [Hum.: It.]

Guilelmus de Gouda, Tractatus. JB. [Rig.: hum., pt1.]

Guilelmus de Gouda, Tractatus. RP. [Rig.: hum., pt1.]

Historia de veneranda. JB. [Rig.: pt1.]

Horatius, Ars poetica. JB. [Clas.]

Horatius, Ars poetica. RP. [Clas.]

Horatius, Aureae. JB. [Clas.]

Hymni de tempore. RP. [Rig.: Itg.]

Hymni non eo quo ab Ecclesia canuntur. JB. [Rig.: Itg.]

Johannes de Garlandia, Verba deponentialia. RP. [Med.: grm., hum. com.]

Johannes de Garlandia, Textus equivocorum, etc. RP. [Med.: grm., hum. com.]

Juvences, Quatuor evangelia. RP. [Clas.: rig.]

Langhen, Historia de urbis. RP. [Hist.]

Libellus de modo confitendi. JB. [Rig.: pt1.]

Liden: die passy. RP. [Rig.: Itg.]

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Statistical Analysis of the Categories of Books

Any statistics extrapolated from this appendix must be considered tentative. It has already been acknowledged that the number of titles may have been overestimated, and that, in cases where more than one title is included in a publication, only the first title has been categorized. In addition I have classified most of the books without ever seeing them. This has been done by examination of the titles and knowledge of the authors, or on the basis of comments made in secondary sources to which reference has been made. For this reason the statistics are presented as approximations rather than exact numbers. They are, nevertheless, very informative when compared with the figures established for Europe as a whole.

The total number of incunabula listed is 588. Of these, about seventy-two (12.3 percent) may be classified as strictly classical. In addition, there are four religious works that were written early in the Christian era, but which do not quite qualify as works of the Church Fathers. If these are added to the classics then about 13 percent of the titles may be considered classical in origin. An additional six works are Dutch translations of the classics, but these have not been included in the 13 percent.

As would be expected, a large number of the books are religious in their orientation. Of these about thirteen (2.2 percent of the total number of books printed) may be classified as biblical material or works by the Church Fathers.
Semi-classical texts such as Donatus, Aesop, and Boethius constitute a further forty-three (7.3 percent) of the 588 titles.

These three categories of books, all of which have their origins in classical antiquity or in the period just prior to the Middle Ages, make up about 22.5 percent of the works that were published in Deventer prior to 1501.

There are in addition about 232 books that must be categorized as being to a greater or lesser degree humanistic in their orientation. This makes up 39.3 percent of the Deventer incunabula. All these are books that were written by humanist scholars, school texts that were compiled under their influence, and grammars that were either written by them or for which they wrote commentaries.

If the classical and semi-classical works, the writings of the Church Fathers, and the publications of the humanists are added together, over 60 percent of the titles may be seen to reflect at least to some degree the spirit of the Northern Renaissance. This figure, approaching two-thirds of all the Deventer incunabula, is quite staggering when compared with the average over the rest of Europe. A brief evaluation of these statistics is made above.1

The actual breakdown into categories is as follows:

C-eval. (Dutch). -- 1 Phil. -- 1
Clas. -- 80 Phil.: eth. -- 18
Clas. (Dutch). -- 6 Pol. -- 1
Clas.: Rig. -- 4 Rlg. -- 4
Dict. -- 6 Rlg.: bib. -- 2
Dict.: 15 c. -- 12 Rlg.: bull. -- 4
Early hum.: Nt. -- 2 Rlg.: CF. -- 9
Early hum.: Nt. grm. -- 5 Rlg.: cn-lw. -- 1
Fic. -- 2 Rlg.: fic. -- 6
Fic. (Dutch). -- 1 Rlg.: hum. -- 6
Geog. -- 2 Rlg.: hum., ptl. -- 12
Geog., hist. -- 1 Rlg.: itg. -- 20
Gm. -- 5 Rlg.: itg., bib. -- 3
Hist. -- 7 Rlg.: itg. (Dutch). -- 2
Hum.: eth. -- 1 Rlg.: ptl. -- 55
Hum.: grm. -- 29 Rlg.: ptl. (Dutch). -- 2
Hum.: It. -- 65 Rlg.: ptl., itg. -- 3
Hum.: It. (Dutch). -- 1 Rlg.: ptl., med. -- 3
Hum.: It. grm. -- 16 Rlg.: sch. -- 15
Hum.: Nt. -- 27 School text. -- 1
Hum.: Nt. grm. -- 18 Sci. -- 6
Late med.: grm. -- 5 Sci.: bestiary. -- 2
Med.: grm. -- 18 S-cl. -- 5
Med.: grm. (Eng. glosses). -- 3 S-cl.: grm. -- 7
Med.: sch. -- 2 Unclassified. -- 8
Phil. -- 1

1See above, pp. 333-34.
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¹The following volumes have already been published: 1-7, 23-28, 31, 42. The volumes do not all have the same members making


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Johnson, Lawrence J. Assistant Professor of the Department of English, University of Texas at El Paso. Telephone interview, 7 June 1981.


¹It goes without saying that a number of interviews were held with each of the members of my doctoral committee. The reason that this particular interview is recorded is that an idea of quite some significance to the investigation of one aspect of this dissertation was suggested by Augsburg at the time of this discussion. See above, pp. 232-33.
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