

biblical theology. It must be supplemented by contributions such as those mentioned in the review above. But it does make a distinct contribution to the subject by bringing together the various points of view of current Roman Catholic scholarship. For this we are all indebted to the author.

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GERHARD F. HASEL

Hay, David M. *Glory at the Right Hand: Psalm 110 in Early Christianity*. Society of Biblical Literature Monograph Series, 18. Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1973. 173 pp. \$5.00.

The author presents a full systematic analysis of the interpretation of Ps 110 in the NT and early Christian writers to the fourth century. Part I provides background for his study with a history of the interpretation of this passage first in ancient Judaism and then in early Christianity. The Jews had interpreted Ps 110:1 messianically and with reference to this earth, but vs. 4 was rarely applied to the Messiah. In early Christianity, there seems to have been a dependence on some intermediary source—testimonies, confessions, or hymns—instead of the OT directly. Ps 110:1 was attractive from the point of view that it could easily relate to Jesus' post-resurrection glory.

With Justin Martyr the whole Psalm, not only vss. 1 and 4 as in the NT, was used and understood messianically and christologically. Hay does not deal here with the source for the writers beginning with Justin, as to whether this was the OT, the NT, the intermediary sources, or all three together.

In Part II, the author gives a detailed analysis of Christian interpretations up to the time of Justin to determine the meanings and functions they assigned to the Psalm. He concludes that there are four major categories of functions: "expressions of the idea that Jesus or Christians sit at God's right hand, the use of the psalm to support particular christological titles, its use to affirm the subjection of powers to Christ, and its employment regarding his heavenly intercession or priesthood" (p. 155). But there does not seem to be a simple chronological line of development. He finds many different patterns of interpretation going off in many directions. Obviously the similarities are due to the Christians' conviction that Jesus was the Messiah and that this Psalm expressed this fact for them. Beyond this, different passages could be used differently and no serious difficulty would be felt.

The author cites several reasons for the popularity of the Psalm: (1) the prior Jewish messianic interpretation; (2) its capacity to meet vital religious needs of Christians, such as providing a scriptural basis for priestly christology; (3) its affirmation of the supreme exaltation of Christ without calling into question the glory and sovereignty of God the Father; (4) the aura of definiteness of a right-hand session for early believers perplexed about the post-Easter location or precise dignity of their Lord; (5) the attractive vagueness in the session image which could accommodate a variety of meanings.

The author has done his work well with surgical precision in discriminating

between the different functions of the use of this Psalm and has dealt with his material in a meticulous manner. Only because of his careful analysis and adeptness of treatment was he able to develop the relative scantiness and the apparent similarity of the contents of the material with any fullness at all.

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SAKAE KUBO

Heimbeck, Raeburne S. *Theology and Meaning: A Critique of Metatheological Scepticism*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1969. 276 pp. \$7.50.

The problems of religious language in the philosophical milieu of logical positivism have been widely discussed in the literature. Heimbeck's book is a welcome and able attempt to invest the discussion with the precision that only a truly philosophical mind can provide. *Theology and Meaning* explores every side road and alley in its search for *all* the possible alternatives and their justifications with respect to the empirical nature, the "factuality," of God-talk.

This is not to suggest that the book merely *summarizes* positions. On the contrary, there are illuminating insights into the subtle presuppositions operating in religious-language philosophizing and a clear analysis of the tendency of some language philosophers to confuse the "criteria" for truth with the "evidence" for truth, the "checking-conditions" with the "checking-procedures" for verification/falsification. Failure to recognize *their* differences obscures the important difference between God statements such as "God raised Jesus from the dead" (what Heimbeck calls  $G_1$ -statements) and "God loves all human beings" ( $G_2$ -statements). He points out that "the controversies have centered around discussion of the more complex and tricky  $G_2$ -statements" (p. 174) which are very different in kind from the  $G_1$ -statements.  $G_1$ -statements can be shown to be empirical in nature;  $G_2$ -statements cannot. Nevertheless, Heimbeck demonstrates that  $G_1$ -statements are the ultimate warrant for believing the assertions of  $G_2$ -statements, thus giving to a non-empirical assertion (when looked at by itself) an empirical basis.

Heimbeck's attack on metatheological skepticism is convincing in many respects. He shows that God-talk is meaningful even in the restricted sense of "meaning" employed by the strict "verificationist" thinkers, and that religious language is cognitively significant.

I have only one objection to the book: its written style. Heimbeck writes at times with an economy and clarity that carries the reader with him from point to point. But at other times the reader is barraged with a tortuous, ponderous phraseology that uses the worst kind of jargon as its weapons, making the book tedious even for those engrossed in the issues. The following is one example: "There is a parallelism between the argument from criteria of application of summary designation to application of summary designation and the synthetic direction of the entailment-rule that backs it up, a parallelism which explains why and how the entailment-rule can serve to back up that type of argument. (The same point can be made, of course, for the argument from the denial of criteria of application to the rejection of the