Islam in Britain: Missiological Implications and Opportunities

By Oscar Osindo

This article seeks to examine Islam and the place of Muslims in the British Isles with a view to exploring ways and means by which the Church, and in particular the Seventh-day Adventist (SDA) Church, can build meaningful relations with the Muslim community, in the context of our Lord's Great Commission (Matt 28:18-20; Rev 14:6,7).

History of Islam in Britain

There has been a Muslim presence in Britain for over four hundred years (Husband 1994, 79). As early as 1649, Alexander Ross produced the first English translation of the Qur'an from a French version, even though he was not well versed in French (Gilchrist

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1995, 139). Serious and steady settlement of Muslims in Britain came as result of the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, which called for an increase in laborers to work on the ships that were subsequently required in greater numbers to make voyages between the UK and the Far East. Muslim immigrants who came to Britain brought a religion and culture that included such features as mosques or simple prayer rooms, rites connected with birth, circumcision, marriage, funerals and other religious festivals—and all of these evolved within their settlements (Richardson 1997, 13). Muslims cherished a strong sense of community, opting to live within their own communal enclaves as a further encouragement to maintain their religious and cultural practices.

During the 1950s Muslim immigration into Britain increased tremendously. In 1951 the Muslim population was a mere 23,000, but ten years later it had soared to 82,000 and by 1971 it had grown to 369,000 with the majority being males (Richardson 1997, 14). These men had come because of jobs available in the coal mines (Husband 1994, 79).

Half of all British Muslims have their roots in Pakistan and follow a type of Islamic faith interpreted by Mawdudi.[1] The Immigration Act of 1962 allowed immigrant families to choose between being together in Britain or to living separated for long periods of time. As a result, the Pakistani population grew by over 400 per cent as families joined the new male workers (Richardson 1997, 15). During that same period, the growing strength of the Muslim oil-producing countries, with their "petro-dollars", allowed Muslims to assert more influence in many mosques and hundreds of Islamic organizations and institutions in Britain (Darr, 2003).

There was also an influx of Asian Muslims from East Africa because of the Africanization policies in Kenya in 1966, Uganda in 1972 to 1973, and Malawi in 1976 (Nielsen 1990, 53). Asian Muslims have become well integrated into British society and make major contributions to the country's economy. For example, Bangladeshi restaurants in 1997 provided approximately 60,000 jobs, and had a turnover of £1.5 billion (Richardson 1997, 15).

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parts of the world. The influx of Muslims did not set well with British society so in response, the Conservative government passed several legislations in the 1960s to regulate new arrivals (Husband 1994, 84).

Before 1964, only seven mosques were registered in Britain, but in 1964 alone, an additional seven new mosques were listed. By 1996 there were an estimated 613 mosques, of which 96 were new constructions (Richardson 1997, 16). Today there are over 800

Pakistanis (usually Muslims) often concentrate in certain areas, are organized in religious communities and "enjoy a degree of cultural and institutional autonomy that is unknown elsewhere in Europe" (Schnapper 1994, 148).

In the national census of 2001, 8.5 per cent of London's six million inhabitants and 3 per cent of the overall British population were Muslims. North London has more Blacks and Asians than Whites. Muslims have clustered together in the borough of

Tower Hamlets in East London, where 36.8 per cent of the population is Muslim (Editorial 2003). These concentrations of Muslims have given them a great deal of communal strength.

For the first time, the 2001 census included questions on religious affiliation as a result of lobbying by Muslims, who wanted to determine their numerical strength in Britain. The small town of Slough, with a total population of 119,067 in 2001, recorded 15,895 Muslims or 13.35 per cent of the population. The 2001 census found that over half of all Muslims currently living in Britain had been born there, that 33.8 per cent of these Muslims were between 0 and15 years of age and that 18.2 per cent were between 16 and 24 years old (Adil 2003, 8).[2]

Sectarian and Ethnic Composition of Islamic Society in Britain

It may appear to an outsider that Islam in Britain is one solid monolithic bloc, but that is far from reality. There is often more than one mosque on the same street, in close proximity, because of the multi-ethnic composition of Muslim society in Britain. People from the same location or country, speaking the same language, prefer a mosque of their own. Various Muslim sects and different political alliances and views also create divisions in Muslim communities (Joly 1990, 32).[3]

This diversity is well illustrated in Birmingham, where there are complex differences among the various sects and groups of Muslims (Rex 1988, 206). Two groups—*Jamaat-Ahl-e-Hadith* and *Jamaat-Ahl-e-Qur'an*—both reject *hadith*[4] and regard other Muslims as *kafirs,* or unbelievers. These groups are concerned with international affairs and national immigration matters in Britain. Adherents of *Jamaat-e-Islami,* a Pakistani brand of Islam as interpreted by Mawdudi, believe that the existing state must be captured and brought under the control of those who are the true bearers of militant and authentic Islam. This sect is concerned with issues involving the Indian subcontinent and especially the Islamic state of Pakistan. Other groups include the Shias, Ahmaddiyyas and Hanafite Sunnis, the ritualistic and legalistic Deobandis, and the mystical, Brelwis with their Sufism in the form of Naqshabandi, and Chisti traditions from the Indian sub-continent.

The Deobandi and Brelwi movements control the majority of Muslim believers in Britain, but they lack formal structures. Islamic in-fighting in Britain is mainly between the Deobandi and Brelwi groups. The *Ahl-e-hadith* group controls some mosques too, and is headquartered in Birmingham, where the organization produces audio and video cassettes and other literature for promoting Islam. Its supporters encourage separation from non-Muslim society in Britain and are associated with Ahmed Deedat, founder of the International Centre for the

Propagation of Islam in Durban, South Africa. In his day Deedat was a prolific debater who took on Josh McDowell and Anis Shorrosh, among others, in his defense of Islam. *Ahl-e-hadith* is the main distributor of Ahmed Deedat's material in Europe (Nielsen 1995, 45, 46).

The *Jamaat–e-Islami* is a movement but not an organization; its Islamic foundation near Leicester is a center for research and publishing. This group has also translated and published Mawdudi's writings (45). The Muslim Educational Trust is another group that seeks to impart religious knowledge to students in after-school classes. The UK Islamic Mission,

groups, such as the Muhajiroun, Al-Qaeda, Sakina Security Services and supporters of Shari'ah. Omar Bakri Muhammad, the founder of Al Muhajiroun, has raised thousands of pounds for Hizbollah and Hamas (Gibson 2001, 59).[5]

Fundamentalism, radicalism, and revivalism operate interchangeably and have to do with the search for faith and its appropriation (Dekmejian 1995, 4, 5). Dekmejian (51, 52) divides Muslim fundamentalism into two groups, passive and active. Passive fundamentalism involves piety and strict observance of religious demands. There is a concern for the many details of ritual and a strict dress code for both

Presently 3% of the British population is Muslim.

with its national office in London, works through a network of mosques in Birmingham and elsewhere (46).

Muslims are politically active because of the high unemployment rate among them; the majority have joined the Labor Party since it claims to represent the underprivileged. Many young unemployed Muslim men offer an easy target for the fundamentalist Muslim recruitment machine. This unworthy cause (which may involve terrorism) tarnishes the name of Islam (Richardson 1997, 17, 18). Europe and Britain currently harbor various terrorist

sexes, including long beards for men. Active fundamentalism goes a stage further as the individuals add political activism to their commitment to religion. These people tend to live in their own enclaves and attend their own private mosques where they have the freedom to articulate their political views. The most radical members attend dawn prayers when few others take part and where, after prayers, they can sit and strategize. Occasionally they engage in "cleansing" activities to rid their localities of "sin" such as night clubs, tourist hotels, movie theatres.

A fundamentalist, according to Dekmejian, is not necessarily a terrorist, but goes to extremes (51). There are also Muslim liberals. The difference between them and fundamentalists is one of *Taqlid* (traditional belief without an effort to interpret Islam in the present context) and *Ijthad* (an effort to re-interpret Islam in line with modernism). Both groups are concerned with the survival of Islam, but the revivalist or fundamentalist contends that only a strict adherence to traditional beliefs will ensure the survival of Islam. Many fundamentalists say that Islam must go back to the Medina experience. On the other hand, liberals hold that Islam has to be re-interpreted in the modern context. Afghan warned that a community that persists in *taqlid* is in danger of drifting away from religion and that *ijthad* is the key to true and relevant Islam (Kurzman 1998, 8). Jamal al-Din al-Qasimi finds *taqlid* anathema and likens it to leprosy that eats and stupefies, making a person impotent. Jamal reasons that *ijthad* allows Islam to meet the needs of emerging and dynamic modern societies (9). In Britain, Zaki Badawi calls on Muslims to discard old, valueless cultures and view themselves in the context of modern British society (O'Sullivan 2003, 45).

A survey conducted after September 11, 2001, to determine the views of Muslims, found that 87 per cent were moderates who were loyal to Britain, even though 64 per cent were totally opposed to the attack on Afghanistan (Le Quesne 2001, 52). Young Muslims of the present generation see themselves, not as Pakistani or Turkish Muslims but as European Muslims. Professor Bassam Tibi has coined a new term, "Euro-Muslims", that classifies this new identity (55). It seems that the re-interpretation of Islam is currently progressing under the leadership of moderates, but some are wondering if fundamentalists will allow this experiment to continue.

The concepts of *dar-al-Islam* "house of Islam" and *dar-al-Harb* "house of war" have shaped the political thinking of Muslims for centuries. These concepts clearly divide the world into two distinct categories: Muslims and non-Muslims, or Islamic states and non-Islamic states. This division helps to encourage a continuing effort by Muslims to convert the whole world to Islam.

Abu Hamza, a fiery Muslim preacher, who is the leader of the Supporters of Shari'ah (SOS) in Britain, sees British society as rotten and toxic to Islam because British soldiers attacked Iraq.[6] He, therefore, calls on Muslims in Britain to rise against the establishment in *jihad* [holy war] (Shagufta 1999, 26). Abu Hamza feels strongly that non-Islamic states such as Britain must be taken over and brought under Islamic rule, i.e., the *dar-al-Islam*. Ramadan sees it differently and reasons that such old and fossilized concepts have no place in the modern world in which we live. He further suggests that if

it is a matter of peace versus war, most Western countries are much safer to live in than the so-called Islamic states (Ramadan 1999, 127). Abu Hamza forgets that he is *persona non grata* in his own home country of Egypt (Le Quesne 2001, 58). One could ask why he did not take refuge in Saudi Arabia or Iran or even Libya? This may be because of the freedoms in the West and the fair or humane systems of law, based on traditional Christian values.

tories should be termed *dar-ad-da'wa,* "abode of those who call to God" (1999, 143). Others have proposed *dar ash-Shahada,* "house of testimony", any place where a Muslim is free to worship (Le Quesne 2001, 54). The goal remains the same: Islamic conquest, but through the peaceful means of preaching and spreading Islam. Ramadan radically differs from Abu Hamza in terms of methodology.

Those who hold a different view from Abu Hamza and his

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In this modern world, shaped by globalization, it is too simplistic to divide the global population into two groups, according to religion. At a time in history when we have the United Nations, an African Union, and other groups involving nations that have bound themselves together through international treaties that cut across cultures and religions, traditional Islamic concepts of the "house of peace" versus the "house of war" are out of step with reality. Ramadan suggests that non-Muslim terri-

school of thought are in the majority and are active within British society. The majority of Muslims have traditionally joined the Labour Party because of its claims to champion the cause of the poor. However, both the Labour and the Conservative parties have policies to attract the Asian Muslim vote. Muslims play their political game wisely by threatening that, if they are not listened to, they will vote for the other party (Husband 1994, 84-86). Pakistanis, who are now in their second and even third

generation of living in the UK, have become prosperous. They have evolved from being laborers to becoming professionals and business people who employ fellow Pakistanis in their enterprises. They even run their own TV and radio programs (Werbner 1994a, 98, 99).

Problems Encountered by the Muslim Minority

Many Muslims in Britain see themselves as an oppressed minority. Some feel strongly that the British government has marginalized them. Muslims point out that the British system of education is insensitive to their needs. There is an ongoing debate in Birmingham, the second largest city in Britain, on whether or not to establish Muslim-only schools. Muslims claim that state schools lack discipline and that this is forcing many Muslim parents to send their children to Christian or Jewish schools, with the result that some of these schools now have a majority of Muslim pupils. This, in turn, has raised concern as to whether the Christian and Jewish schools will be able to maintain their intended religious character (Joly 1990, 50).

Another area of concern is the treatment of Muslim prisoners. At present the Prison Act fails to cover the needs of Muslim inmates, yet their numbers have increased in the recent past. In July 1991 there were only 731 Muslims in prison compared with 5,670 in March 2003. Simi-lar feelings of resentment relate to representation in Parliament. Currently there are only two Muslim MPs instead of the twenty who would be needed to reflect the Muslim percentage of the British population. Only one Muslim sits in the European Parliament but there are no Muslims in the Scottish Parliament or in the Welsh Assembly or the Greater London Assembly (Home Affairs Correspondent 2003).

Ironically, although Muslims are at least given a voice in British society and in most non-Islamic states (predominantly Christian lands), there appears to be no equivalent Muslim concern for representation of Christians in Saudi Arabia or similar countries. Anees points out that, Christians in Pakistan, for example enjoy their freedom to the fullest. They also outline the privileged situation of Christians in the Arabian Gulf countries and the entire Middle East in comparison with the British situation (Anees, Abedin, and Sardar 1991, 22-23).

It was reported in the British monthly survey *El-Sheikh* (2002, 9) that in Scotland Robert Wiseman Dairies printed a Saudi flag on milk cartons for the sole purpose of promoting the World Cup. The Saudi flag has Arabic inscriptions on it which invoked a huge cry from Muslims in the area because the cartons would be binned after use! In order to protect the dignity of Islam from this "blasphemous" act, a Glasgow shopkeeper, Ijaz Mohammed, of-

fered 20 pence per empty carton. This incident was reported in the *Sun,* 27 May 2002.

Another complaint Muslims have is that the British architectural and construction codes are rigid, making it difficult for Muslims to obtain permission for building Islamic institutions as they wish (Nielsen 1990, 56). They feel that the codes deny their fundamental right to worship. It should be pointed out, however, that the codes apply to other religious groups and organizations as well.

they live a life of persecution and mental torture, with the result that the desire to live under Muslim rule has become an obsession.

In their earlier days in Britain, Muslims had to band together to buy a sheep and slaughter it to keep within the dietary requirements of Islamic law (Kepel 2002, 192). At present, there is a raging debate in British society on the demand that the animal be stunned before slaughter. Islam requires that an animal's throat be cut while the animal is conscious,

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Another area of contention involves Muslim funeral rites that are different from those of the larger Christian culture in British society. Muslim practice demands that a body be interred a few hours after death, but British laws usually require a much longer interval between a death and a burial because of the time required to give notice to the cemetery authorities and to dig the grave. Muslims would like their own burial grounds and without them they live with the fear that when they die they may not be buried according to their belief. Such fear feeds a sense that

but the Farm Animal Welfare Council states that an animal can only be slaughtered after it has been stunned (to make it unconscious). This matter now rests with the Animal Minister for a final decision. Surprisingly, Muslims are also divided about this matter, with some supporting stunning (Asaad 2003, 8). This difference in opinion may be attributed to the divide between fundamentalists and liberals within Islam.

The Muslim community created the Muslim Parliament of Britain to help articulate and fight for Muslim rights, since most

Muslims wish to live under Islamic law. When a society, such as Britain, denies Muslims the right to practice Islamic law, such action is interpreted as persecution of the entire Muslim community.

A few years ago *Q-News* reported that "the status of Muslims in Europe is precarious, for they represent a group that is viewed as alien, unacknowledged, or threatening throughout the region" (Islamic Human Rights Commission 1997, 28). Ramadan feels that the West views Muslims and Islam as a socio- political problem and that therefore many in Islam seek to re-define themselves, based on this understanding. Some even find themselves trying to be Muslim without Islam (Ramadan 1999, 113). In some instances Muslims have resorted to violence to re-assert themselves. The Islamic Human Rights Commission has reported that Muslims in Europe suffer political brutality, right wing extremist attacks, murder and unlawful confinement, and live as marginalized citizenry (Islamic Human Rights Commission, 28). Contemporary media has not portrayed a positive image of Islam, since Islam is often viewed as the new enemy of the West after the disintegration of communism.

Muslims also feel that the failure of the international community to intervene on behalf of Muslims in Palestine, Kashmir, Bosnia, as well as the two Iraq wars, is further proof of the West's bias against Islam. These factors cause anger and breed radicalism, leading some to issue a worldwide call for Muslims to rise in *jihad* against the "infidel" West and its interests around the world (Ahmed and Donnan 1994, 9). Muslim anger does not always make a clear distinction between the secular and Christian West, which in itself further complicates Christian-Muslim relations.

Muslims also claim that Islamophobic attacks are on the increase. Notice the following recent examples cited in *Muslim News:*

- March 23, 2003, in Sutton, Surrey, men in a passing car lowered their car window and spat at a Muslim woman in *hijab*.
- March 24, 2003, in Batley, West Yorkshire, Madinah Masjid was fire- bombed at 10:30 p.m. Two windows were broken, but no one was hurt (Versi, 2003a).
- The President Saddam Hussein Mosque in Birmingham has suffered several recent break-in attempts.
- In Swansea, Wales, the windows in Omar Williams' Islamic bookshop were broken. The owner also reported that in the past he has been spat at and has received offensive letters.
- April 9, 2003, in Leicester, over 40 graves were damaged at Saffron Hill Cemetery. The incident was condemned by the Leicester Council and the promise given to replace the headstones (Versi 2003).

- May 2, 2003, the Jamia Mosque in Reading, where 4 per cent of the population is Muslim, was attacked in the early hours of the morning and its windows broken. The Imam, Yasir Hafiz, concluded that the incident was related to the Iraq war (Versi 2003).

This sad state of affairs calls for all people of goodwill to speak up against such injustices.

Not surprisingly, some Muslims interpret recent events as a revival of the crusades. "Muslims must realize that the European crusaders are back to finish what they began centuries ago; we must create a united movement to prevent them from achieving their goal" (Mohammed 2004, 2). Ramadan disagrees with this militant view by pointing out that Muslims in the West enjoy more civil liberties than those living in Islamic states, because there is no European constitution or law that is anti-Islam. "We do not have to confuse social, economic and political problems such as unemployment, poverty, exclusion and an increase in racism shared by the whole population with what is specific religious discrimination" (Ramadan 1999, 121). Instead, Ramadan sees post-modernity as the real enemy of religion that results in individuals in the highly industrialized nations of the world being left with little or no time to devote to religious matters. This hectic way of life is reflected in the poor mosque attendance across Europe (121).[7] Ramadan

feels there are more pertinent issues that Muslims in the West need to contend with and argues that Islam in the West is in transition. It is moving away from the original immigrant cultures towards a European Islamic culture, which calls for the community to come to grips with the issue of identity in the context of Western European society (182).

A question that arises during this transitional period concerns the citizenship of the Muslim. Is citizenship possible in the context of *Ummah,* or the host country? Part of the solution may lie in the way in which Muslims live in their own enclaves, where they continue to experience much of their own cultures. It is "home away from home." Ahmed and Donnan argue that, in certain instances, "this search for identity and distinctiveness in a shifting world has, in some Muslim countries, taken the form of demands for a Muslim state" (1994, 3). That is why numbers are very important to Muslim strategists.

The sober-thinking Ramadan calls for Muslims to return to *ijthad* for the sake of their survival in the West, and as an aid to Muslims in re-defining their identity in the West (as noted by Shirwani 1997, 17). European education encourages students to think analytically. Free reasoning and critical thinking are encouraged in students from an early age by schools. British society encourages children in school to reason and question their teachers, but traditional

Islam teaches the Qur'an without expecting any questioning or criticism, because it is *taabudi* (above criticism). Critical thinking is a problem Muslim leadership must address. Muslim leaders are in the process of debating how to improve the teaching of the Qur'an. At present the Qur'an is studied in English since the majority of Muslims in Britain cannot read Arabic but only Urdu, Bangla or English (Joly 1990, 44, 45). The *ijthad* view argues that Muslims should develop their ability to reason so

sponse to Ramadan's call for negotiation between the concerned parties, the issue was resolved to the benefit of the Muslim community.[8] Ramadan has also suggested the need to build bridges between Muslims and Christians, because the enemy of the Muslim is not the believing Christian, but the larger society that has lost its values (Shirwani 1997, 17).

Recent world events, such as the Salman Rushdie affair, almost caused violent riots in some British cities (Werbner 1994a, 99). Ramadan sees the *fatwah*

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that they can interact meaningfully and enter into dialogue with those in European and even other cultures in this socio-ethnic matrix. Some go even further, suggesting that this could be the answer to Islam's dilemma of reconciling tradition and modernity. The hope would be that the Muslim diaspora could facilitate a similar reform that would affect the entire Muslim world (Le Quesne 2001, 52).

Ramadan cites the case of the headscarf saga in France, which threatened to create serious tensions between Muslims and the rest of French society. But in re-

placed on Rushdie, after the publication of the *Satanic Verses* as a political trap that Khomeini employed to hijack global Islamic leadership. He also feels that Muslims should not have taken sides in the Gulf War, whether with America and her allies or with Saddam Hussein, because war is not the solution (as noted by Shirwani 1997, 17).

Akhtar is another voice making it clear that Muslims will not continue to hide and pretend that they are not part of modern society. He insists that Muslims must go out and meet the rest of the British community, but they

must do it in a way that allows them to survive its influence and degradation (Shabbir 1998, 320). Therefore, some conclude that Ramadan's call to *ijthad* is valid. Muslims must learn how to deal with their modern world.

Impact of Islam on British Society

With current events pitting East against West in a seemingly unending conflict, indigenous British people are becoming increasingly suspicious of the Muslim minorities and Islamic fundamentalists in their midst (Werbner 1994, 83, 84).

European partners sent out missionaries to foreign lands, but now those same, previously "unreached" peoples live among them. What strategy does the Christian church have for reaching Muslim immigrants at a time when the church is in decline? What can Christianity offer if the church is unable to maintain itself in society?

Some missionaries who were sent to convert "those in darkness" to the light of Christ have themselves been converted to Islam. For example, Lord Hadley converted to Islam in India in 1896, when he worked there as

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Thatcherism[9] sought to create a united, homogeneous Britain, with a single national consciousness, but Asians and other immigrants do not fit this mold, since, to them, it means adopting Christian culture (Husband 1994, 83). Therefore, Britain today remains a multicultural, multi-ethnic, and multi-religious society.

It will be interesting to see how British society continues to handle this issue, especially now that Islam is becoming more assertive in its demands. In the past, British society and the UK's

an engineer. More recently, the Runnymede Trust recorded that by 1997 there had been at least 5,000 British converts to Islam, half of whom were of Afro-Caribbean origin (Richardson 1997, 13). By 2002 there were approximately 15,000 converts, with 50 per cent believed to be white British women (Halliwell 2002, 54). It would be beneficial to the church's mission to establish the reasons for these conversions. It is also important to note that most of the black converts have joined the Nation of Islam. It seems that Islam attracts

British White women and British Black men, an observation that requires a separate study.

In Britain some Christian churches are being converted into mosques. For example, the Great Mosque in Brick Lane (East London) was once a Methodist chapel. The Bangladeshi government provided funds to renovate the interior to make it suitable for Islamic services (Husband 1994, 90). While mainline Christianity is in decline in Britain, Islam is on the increase and the number of mosques and prayer houses grows every day. One wonders about the sources of funding for the construction and operation of all the Islamic places of worship. Many believe that substantial sums of money come from Muslim countries such as Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Libya, Pakistan, and other relatively prosperous nations.

One thing remains true; the Muslim community in Britain has had a tremendous impact on society, both culturally and in terms of religion. Today, Islam is the most practiced religion in the United Kingdom. It is active and growing stronger, while in comparison the churches are weakening. But is the entire Christian church in decline, or do groups exist within the larger Christian body that are continuing to grow? Is there any hope that the decline can be reversed? While mainline churches are losing strength, other groups, such as the Seventh-day Adventists and Pentecostals, seem to be expanding.

Christian-Muslim Relations

There have been several attempts throughout the centuries to build cordial relations between Christians and Muslims, but is this a legitimate goal? And if it is, what benefit is sought? Is it a goal that can be achieved? Børge Schantz, a Christian scholar, suggests that after September 11, 2001, there is no longer a need to stress points of commonality, since Islam allows no room for Christians (2002, 6). Sardar, a Muslim moderate, believes that it is worth putting more effort into building relationships between the two faith communities because both faiths are guardians of morality in contemporary society. "The fire of secularism burns thoroughly and post modernism is ever ready to sweep clean the ashes of all atheistic world views; both Muslims and Christians are an endangered species. The survival of religious identities of the followers of Islam and Christianity demands active co-operation"(Anees, Abedin, and Sardar 1991,4.) If that were sufficient reason to build permanent bridges, would it be possible or achievable?

Both religions have a strong sense of mission to all peoples in the world. Larson reminds us that, even when the peoples of these two faiths enter into dialogue in an attempt to encourage understanding between the two groups, Christians still have the obligation to convert Muslims to the Christian faith (1996, 2). This commitment to evangelism does not promote an environment conducive

to bridge building and seems to confirm Muslim fear of dialogue.

Davies cites three additional barriers that hamper good relations between Christians and Muslims. First, there are theological problems that center on the doctrine of the atonement (1991, 1-2), the divinity of Jesus, his crucifixion, and the dualistic understanding of the human and the divine. Second, there is much experiential mistrust, on the part of Muslims, of Christian materialism and secularism. Third, there is the area of academic mistrust and the

Another issue causing mistrust is the development by the International Christian Fellowship and Phil Parshall, of a contextualized congregation in Bangladesh. Anees calls it a "Crypto-Muslim Strategy of Bangladesh" and condemns its attempt to mimic Muslim spirituality and lifestyle as a lack of integrity. He does accept that this approach has been more successful than previous types of evangelism and concedes that in just four years there were seventy-five Bangladeshi Muslims converted

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divide between the oriental and occidental way of reasoning. Academic mistrust is not diminished when Christians take it upon themselves to teach about Islam at those academic institutions that are committed to building bridges between the two faith communities. Many Muslim scholars feel that most Christians maintain a hidden agenda of evangelism and they point to institutions such as Selly Oak (Birmingham, England), where 80 per cent of the teaching staff is Christian (Anees, Abedin, and Sardar 1991, 58, 59).

which exceeded the total conversion numbers in the previous fifty years.

Christian-Muslim relations in Britain cannot be described as cordial, but neither is there much visible tension. Rather, the relationship is one of suspicion. Islam is viewed by the mainly secular (but traditionally Protestant) society as a perversion of truth and the religion of the anti-Christ (Husband 1994, 80, 81). The Salman Rushdie affair in 1989 illustrates this mistrust. Abdul Hussain Choudhry, on behalf of the British Action Front, petitioned the Chief Metropolitan

Magistrate at Bow Street Magistrate's Court, requesting a summons against Rushdie and his publishers, Viking-Penguin, charging them with blasphemy. However, the magistrate, Sir David Hopkin, refused, saying that the law against blasphemy was for Christians only and did not relate to the prophet Muhammad or the *Qur'an* (Brown 2003, 189). Not long ago, Pakistan introduced a law against blasphemy unfavorable to its Christian minority. Perhaps Pakistani lawmakers have taken a cue from their former colonial masters, the British.

The two Gulf Wars and the destruction of the World Trade Center in New York have further fueled British suspicion towards Muslims. Most troubling is the way that Muslim society in Britain responds to situations of this nature. People in the West wonder if Islam is a religion of peace, or a religion of hatred and war, as they see some Muslims openly rejoicing at the death and destruction of innocent civilians.

Some have suggested that the first Gulf War was fought between dictatorship and oppression, on the one side, and the rule of democracy and international decency, on the other. But British Muslims question whether the greater evil was America or Saddam Hussein (Werbner 1994a, 100).[10] The issue centers on identity. Will Muslims identify with their country of citizenship or with the universal *ummah*? The choice, at its most radical, appears to be one of either being against

their heritage or of committing treason against their nation by fighting alongside the Taliban.

Muslims and Christians joined in opposition to the recent Gulf war. The opposition culminated in a huge London march on 15 February 2003, with crowds in Hyde Park addressed by many MPs and Christian leaders. It was estimated that two million people participated in the march. Such broad support may have helped Muslims see that the war was not being waged against Islam as a religion. British ministers Robin Cook and Claire Short resigned because of their disagreement with British Prime Minister Tony Blair over the sanctioning the war against Iraq. At present, Tony Blair is under pressure from many who claim that the war was unjustified.

Despite a seemingly dark picture, there are isolated efforts to create cordial relations between Muslims and Christians. The best example is the Center for the Study of Islam and Christianity at Selly Oak at the University of Birmingham. Similar endeavors are taking place at London Bible College, Newbold College, and the University of Wales. Attempts are being made to create understanding between the people of these two Abrahamic faiths. Some mosques and churches have been making efforts to establish mutual relations.

In Birmingham, Highgate Central Mosque has joined with the neighborhood Baptist church in working together (Joly 1990, 50). In certain areas Muslims have joined multi-faith celebrations

and encounters where they interact with Jews and Christians. The University of Derby has established a Diversity/Multi-Faith Centre where people of all religions can meet and share themes of common concern. Sardar suggests that "the challenge facing contemporary Muslim scholars is to evolve a body of Islamic law that reflects the demands and needs of our time. Only such a development would put the Christian distrust of Muslims permanently to rest" (Anees,Abedin, and Sardar 1991, 74). Some believe that it is time for reform and a re-interpretation of Islam that will answer the contemporary challenge of modernity (Le Quesne 2001, 52). Even though Schantz feels that after September 11 there is no need to attempt to build bridges to Muslims, Ramadan strongly urges his fellow Muslims to build those bridges of understanding between Muslims and Christians, because the believing Christian is not an enemy of Islam. The enemy is the morally degenerate society of the Western world.[11] Some Muslim scholars who think like Ramadan believe that among so-called Christians there are both those who believe and those who reject faith; but those who believe should be respected.

Seventh-day Adventist Initiatives

The Seventh-day Adventist Church has not remained behind in this area of building bridges of understanding between Christians and Muslims. It has taken the initiative in establishing a Christian-Muslim study program at Newbold College in England, the only program of its kind in the world-wide denomination. The Trans-European Division (TED)[12] and the South England Conference of Seventh-day Adventists have recently begun work on a specific effort to coordinate Adventist-Muslim relations. The initial phase involves educating Adventist members about Islam and the need for meaningful interaction between the two faith communities. The goal is to encourage peaceful and harmonious co-existence with Muslims and to build bridges of understanding, through which Muslims can meet Jesus Christ in their own context.

Like Muslims in Britain, the majority of Seventh-day Adventists

> **Christian-Muslim relations in Britain cannot be described as cordial, but neither is there much visible tension. Rather, the relationship is one of suspicion.**

living in the UK are immigrants. Most Muslims arrived in Britain from the Indian sub-continent while most Adventists came from the West Indies. Both groups came to Britain because of the availability of jobs in the 1950s. Both Islam and Adventism have grown in Britain because of this influx from overseas. Immigrant Muslims and immigrant Adventists have had to contend with issues of culture and racial hatred. These two groups have much in common.

Muslims are relatively cohesive and communal when compared to Seventh-day Adventists. Perhaps the Adventist Protestant heritage has promoted more individualism. However, the close ties within the Muslim community pose a missiological challenge to Adventist witness. Since the Adventist Church in Britain, as compared to Islam, has not developed a strong sense of community, there is the very real possibility that new Muslim converts to Christianity would find nothing in Adventism that could replace the close-knit community they were leaving. The answer to this problem could be an emphasis on strengthening the concept of small groups or cell churches, as David Cox has done for the past twelve years within the British Isles.[13]

Another major issue that confronts the Adventist Church when sharing Christ with Muslims is the process through which an "interest" becomes a "believer" and eventually a member. If the British Seventh-day Adventist Church continues to employ traditional methods that result in the mere extraction of the new believer from Islamic culture and community, few will ever give serious consideration to the claims of Christ. An alternative would be to employ a Faith Development in Context[14] approach, through which a Muslim inquirer would be able to grow in faith within the Islamic community, with the possibility of sharing the truth discovered with others in the community.

Christians should view the presence of Muslims in the West as a God-given blessing. In the past they had to send missionaries to Islamic lands (they still should); today Muslims have moved in as neighbors and live removed from the restrictions imposed upon missionary work in their countries of origin. In other words, if Christians cannot reach a Muslim Pakistani, given the freedoms allowed in Britain, how will they ever be able to reach one in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan? Unfortunately, Christians have not done much to take advantage of these new opportunities.

It is hoped that Newbold College in England, which trains workers for the TED, will take into consideration that 60 per cent of the population of the division territory is Muslim. The ideal would be for its ministerial trainees to take advantage of the Christian-Muslim studies program at the college, since the Newbold program is designed to

prepare Adventists to work with Muslims of different persuasions and in a variety of settings. The course explores ways of relating to Muslims in bridge-building activities such as events and programs involving family issues, racial concerns, education, food and lifestyle issues, church-mosque relationships, human rights, and joint religious and academic programs.

A more complex issue involves the whole debate over traditional versus contextual in the approach tian Background Believers (CBB). Parshall feels it is dangerous for CBBs to "convert" to Islam and affirm Mohammed as a prophet in order to be able to reach out and witness in Muslim communities (Thompson 2002, 7). Others, such as Travis, leave the door open, even suggesting that a few individuals may be called to adopt the C5 method for the sake of Muslims. Some fear that contextualization may result in syncretism. Therefore Hiebert calls for critical contextualization,

> **If the British Seventh-day Adventist Church continues to employ traditional methods that result in the extraction of the new believer from Islamic culture and community, then few will ever give serious consideration to the claims of Christ.**

to Muslim outreach. The debate began when the International Christian Fellowship initiated a contextual approach in Bangladesh in 1959. Travis has categorized these approaches on a scale of C1 to C6 (see insert box).

Parshall's work in Bangladesh followed a C4 approach. Only a few have experimented with the C5 model. Parshall,[15] who is considered to be the architect of this model, cautions that C5 outreach should only be initiated by Muslim Background Believers (MBB) and should not be used by Chris- whereby all beliefs and practices in the target culture are evaluated against scripture (1985, 186). A few scholars are concerned that the C5 approach is deceitful. However, Thompson sees it as a positive way of allowing Muslims to study and investigate scripture without risking the wrath of their society (2002, 6).

Jerald Whitehouse has pioneered an Adventist C5 approach and suggests that "God's remnant in context will require new thinking. It will also require a new reformulation of fundamental be-

liefs in a manner that does not compromise biblical truth, but in fact ensures that the understanding of truth in the host culture is more clearly and accurately understood, as the principles of truth are framed in culturally meaningful ways" (2001, 2). Joshua Massey suggests that since not all Muslims are the same, there cannot be only one effective way of taking the Gospel to them. He sees the whole spectrum from C1 to C6 being useful in a variety of settings (2000, 11). As early as 1979, Charles Kraft had a vision of a C5 model, but could not picture how believers could be established within a seemingly hostile Muslim context (1979, 114).

Today there is growing evidence that a C5 model is a possibility. Massey fully supports this model for those situations where it can work. However, he agrees with Parshall that a C5 approach should be left for MBBs to apply (13).

One of the hot issues connected with a C5 approach concerns identity. Are those in a C5 ministry Christians, Muslims, Christian Muslims, or Remnant Muslims? To answer this question, one must ask how important the label is if the believers are orthodox in faith and beliefs. This matter of labels can be illustrated by an incident that occurred in a refugee camp in Africa, where large numbers of refugees from a neighboring Muslim country were being sheltered. One afternoon Red Cross trucks pulled in with loads of relief food. When the refugees saw the Red Cross symbol, they began to shout, *Haram* (unclean) food! *Haram* food! They could not be calmed down until the trucks pulled out of camp. The Red Cross personnel went back to the drawing board to come up with a way of supplying food to

C1 Traditional Church Using Language of Non-Muslims

C2 Traditional Church Using Language of Muslim Majority

C3 Contextualized Church Using Language of Muslim Majority

C4 Contextualized Church Using Language of Muslim Majority and Biblically Permissible Islamic Forms

C5 Contextualized Church of Messianic Muslims Who Have Accepted Christ as Lord and Savior

C6 Small Christ-centered Communities of Secret Believers

Travis, John. "The C1 – C6 spectrum." *EMQ* 34, no. 4: 407-408.

the hungry refugees. The food they had tried to deliver was lawful according to Islamic requirements, but the refugees would not even allow the trucks to unload because of the Red Cross label on the cartons that they associated with Christianity. Anything Christian, according to their understanding, was unlawful. The next day the relief workers tried another label, the Red Crescent, again taking the same food to the camp. On arrival they were received with joyous shouts of *Allahu Akbar* (God is Great)! *Allahu Akbar! Halal* (clean) food! *Allahu Akbar! Halal* food! Same trucks, same drivers, same food,

Bernard Dutch asks whether Muslims should become Christians and points out that is not always a wise route to take, since such a label keeps most Muslims from ever hearing the Gospel in hostile societies. It would be better, in such contexts, to engage in low profile, C5 ministries (2000, 15).

Some who support a contextual approach to Muslims are cautious about the C5 model. They feel much more comfortable with a C4 approach that has Christian identity while using Muslim forms. The Muslim scholar Anees accuses Parshall and his C4 approach of attempting to create

> **The food they had tried to deliver was lawful according to Islamic requirements, but the refugees would not even allow the trucks to unload because of the Red Cross label on the cartons that they associated with Christianity. Anything Christian, according to their understanding, was unlawful.**

but now accepted because of the label. This is a lesson for those who insist on using traditional approaches for Muslim evangelism that often result in persecution for the new convert. We must realize that an individual may be persecuted for the wrong reason or because he or she has a label that does not represent who that person really is.

"Crypto-Muslims of Bangladesh." Muslims have been warned to look out for this model. They are offended when they see buildings that look similar to mosques and when Islamic names and expressions are used and Muslim forms and styles are followed in order to "win" Muslims to Christianity. They see this as an attempt to "mimic" Islamic beliefs and prac-

tices. Muslims are also critical of approaches to "woo" them, such as efforts made by Christian educational institutions, medical clinics and hospitals, and Christian intervention during natural disasters (Abdullah 1997).

Despite this criticism of the C4 approach, radical or fundamental Islam has not attacked those in a C5 model because the believers' identity remains Muslim. Whitehouse calls the approach "Faith Development in Context" (2001, 19) and bases his strategy on Paul's counsel in 1 Cor 7:20, that each person should remain in the state he was in when God called him. The Gospel should not disturb cultural identities that are not contrary to biblical principles. The Gospel should be allowed to develop within each believer's cultural environment. But how can this be achieved without looking for points of commonality? This is why the foundation for the C5 approach is based on building bridges. Those who do not subscribe to bridge building find that they have very little to offer and few approaches to use in presenting the Gospel to Muslims.

This new way of approaching Muslims by SDAs was a result of the Global Mission[16] initiative introduced by Neal C. Wilson (then General Conference President) in 1986 at the Fall Council in Brazil. As a part of Global Mission, a Global Center for Islamic Studies was established at Newbold College in England, headed by Børge Schantz, a SDA scholar with missionary experi-

ence in Muslim countries (Hole and Schantz 1993, 12). This is not to say that before 1986 SDAs had been doing no work among Muslim peoples. There had been much effort but little result. In 1992 a conference was convened at Newbold College, sponsored by the General Conference, to consider ways of approaching the Muslim world. The conference, coordinated by Børge Schantz, grappled with the widely held attitude that Muslims were impossible to reach. The symposium had the following objectives:

- To keep the proclamation of "the eternal Gospel" for Islamic people in sharp focus so as to foster good relationships and avoid unnecessary confrontation
- To explore those theological and practical areas where Adventists and Muslims agree and the areas where they differ
- To analyze past and present models of SDA approaches to Islamic people
- To become acquainted with and to coordinate SDA evangelistic strategy in Divisions and Unions in Islamic areas
- To outline evangelistic models for Muslim people in their varied cultural situations (8).

Whitehouse presented a paper, "Contextual Adventist Mission to Islam: A Working Model," in which he presented the case study of "Islamex", a Muslim country where the SDA Church had been working for almost

ninety years but, until 1990, had only baptized 22 Muslims. Because of all the difficulties they faced after conversion, only two survived as Christians. In 1990 Whitehouse and others began a C5 model from an Adventist perspective, renaming the options A1-A6 to indicate unique Adventist features (Hole and Schantz 1993, 245). At a 2003 follow-up conference, an updated report from "Islamex" was presented, indicating that, at the moment, there are approximately 7,000 believers practicing an Adventist faith within their cultural context.

But are these genuine believers, like the rest of the SDA "faithful"? Wolfgang Lepke carried out his doctoral research on this community of believers as an outsider and independent observer, to measure their belief and lifestyle against that of traditional Adventist believers. He found that the people he was studying were true Adventists Lepke 2001). When one remembers the objectives of the symposium in 1992, it can be concluded that the breakthrough in Islamex is consistent with the many prayers by the Adventist Church for Muslims.

After September 11, 2001, Whitehouse wrote an article, "God's Footprints in the Rubble," which appeared in the *Adventist Review* of September 12, 2002 [reprinted in this issue of *JAMS*]. He urged the church to remain focused, despite the horrors of 9/11, on encouraging Muslims

in their journey of faith development within their cultural context. In response to this position, Schantz took a seemingly confrontational approach that demands that erroneous belief must be pointed out and confronted. Post September 11, He regards bridge building as a deviation from the objectives laid out in the 1992 symposium. In his earlier book, *Your Muslim Neighbour,* he seemed conciliatory and saw points of commonality between the two faiths. Currently, in answer to the question, "Is Islam an Antichrist?" he answers, "yes" and says that Christian witness must be of a direct nature that points out the erroneous views in the Islamic system (2002a, 6, 7).

Several other case studies were presented at the 2003 Conference, but only one will be mentioned here. In a predominately Muslim country, "Islamus," where the people are all of one ethnic group, all SDA endeavors to proclaim the Gospel have failed. There have only been three converts, the first of whom was an imam who discovered Jesus and the Sabbath in the *Qur'an.* He embarked on a journey to find those who believed as he did, and when he came in contact with SDAs, he was baptized and enrolled as a disciple in the traditional way. He then decided to go back to his country of "Islamus" to witness. He went to a mosque and began to preach Christ, pointing out the erroneous beliefs in Islam through

a "direct and truthful witness." He was immediately dragged out of town and beheaded.

The second convert was a "sheep stolen" from another Christian church. The new Adventist was employed by the church, but in a short while he disappeared with church funds and his whereabouts are not known. Both are very discouraging stories! The third person was witnessed to while he was in prison. Upon his release, he was baptized and joined the church tors in a team approach that involves people of more than one background.

Not everyone rejoices in these breakthroughs, because they raise questions such as, "When will C5 believers unite with the church?" The question is not so much about unity as it is about uniformity. What is often meant by the questions is, "When will they be like us, take on our Christian identity, sit in pews, dress in Western style, sing Western hymns, have Western names, and

> **The Gospel should not disturb cultural identities that are not contrary to biblical principles. The gospel should be allowed to develop within each believer's cultural environment.**

as a secret believer; when he was mature enough in faith, he was trained to live in his community in the context of the C5 model. He went back into his community at the end of 1999 and was joined by a CBB volunteer. Those two formed a team and continued to be oriented in the C5 approach. At this time there are 3,300 believers and committed followers of Christ in "Islamus". This reminds us of the point raised by Parshall and Dutch. They felt that the C5 approach could only be used by MBBs, but Travis and the above account illustrate that some individuals may be called to work as men- worship in church buildings?" True unity is not uniformity. Unity must be based on shared belief in doctrine. The prophet Elijah complained to God that he was the only righteous person left in Israel, but God proved him wrong by pointing out that there were still 7,000 true worshippers. In the time of Jesus, his disciples saw some other believers casting out demons in the name of Jesus, but because these people were not on their church register the disciples wanted Jesus to restrain the new workers. However, our Lord declined, reasoning that if they were not against them, then they were for them.

Must the followers of Jesus in Muslim cultural settings identify themselves with Western Christians and adopt Western cultural patterns in order to qualify as believers? If they must, is there a superior culture? Perhaps a more appropriate question would be, "Are the C5 believers in doctrinal unity with us?" If they are in doctrinal conformity with the rest of SDA believers, the question of whether they need to join the structure of the church may not be of great concern.

Recent Global Mission guidelines suggest that temporary administrative structures may be put in place for such groups of believers in hostile societies. The document is quick to add that such believers should also be told, soon after baptism, that they belong to the SDA Church, and steps should be taken for them to be brought into the worldwide administrative community of the SDA Church. How this will work out in practice remains to be seen. Of great concern is the whole issue of security. Do C5 converts have to be identified with the existing church structure in order to receive spiritual nurture from Jesus? These questions call for serious thinking as we consider the Muslim challenges in the 10/40 Window.

What about the British situation? Is a C5 model appropriate? Massey has analyzed the different kinds of Muslims found worldwide (2000, 11). His groupings can help give direction to identifying appropriate strategies for witnessing. He found that there are liberal Muslims who can easily combine Western ways and technology with Islam. There are also conservative Muslims who are fundamentalists and, depending on the political climate, could become radical or extreme in their reaction to situations and issues. There are Sufi Muslims who represent the mystical side of Islam and also "rice Muslims" who associate with Islam, not out of conviction, but in order to seek material gain.

Massey sees people in all these brands of Islam as having three types of attitude. First, there are Muslims who are disillusioned with Islam. For them, Islam has not given them what they want out of life. They are "fed up" with Islam, would like to get out of it, and wish to have nothing to do with it. Second, there are Muslims who are ambivalent about Islam. They know very little about Islamic beliefs and practices, and they do not care. Third, there are those Muslims who are content with Islam and who believe that Christianity has nothing to offer them since Islam applies higher moral standards and is therefore superior.

We could add two additional categories of Muslims. There are former Christians who converted to Islam for various reasons, ranging from marriage to doctrinal confusion. There are also Muslims who come from communities where 100 per cent of the people are Muslim, such as the Somali of East Africa, where to

be Somali is synonymous with being Muslim. Any deviation from the *status quo* would most likely elicit an angry and dangerous response from the larger community.

Each of these five categories calls for a different evangelistic approach by Christians (Osindo 1996, 101,102). All five categories of Muslims are also found in Britain. With this kind of diverse situation in Britain, diverse methods must be explored. Whatever approach is employed must ensure the opportunity for sustained witness in the commu-

witness that points out erroneous Islamic beliefs may be an appropriate way of reaching this group, since these Muslims were once Christians. They are conversant with church tradition. What they need is to be shown where they deviated from truth and where they misunderstood. They stand in no danger from their communities, since their families are most likely Christian or at least not Muslim. They will not suffer culture shock when they rejoin a Christian community. Therefore C1 to C3 churches are recommended for them. This

> **Must the followers of Jesus in Muslim cultural settings identify themselves with Western Christians and adopt Western cultural patterns in order for them to qualify as believers?**

nity, minimize institutional conflict between Christians and Muslims, take into consideration the spiritual nurture of converts, and erect structures to facilitate the social and economic elements of the believers' community.

All approaches presently known can be divided into two groups: "Faith Development in Context" approaches and traditional outreach methods. Former Christians who have become Muslims are not likely to be brought back to Christianity through the first method. Schantz's suggestion of truthful

group could also be useful as future C4 leaders.

Disillusioned Muslims would most likely not wish to retain any form of Islamic behavior. They simply want to get out, so for them a C1 or C2 approach would also be ideal, but they could also fit into a C3 approach. They could suffer rejection from their families and at the same time experience culture shock within a traditional Christian community. The Church would have to take note of their need for appropriate discipleship to enable them to grow spiritually.

Muslims from countries where 100 per cent of the population is Muslim and those content with Islam, such as conservatives, fundamentalists, and even terrorists, would best be served with a C5 model. Typically, they have nothing to do with a Christian witness but they feel comfortable and at liberty to learn from another "Muslim". It is interesting that within Islamic communities Muslims can study the Gospels without raising any suspicion since no one is being asked to convert to some other faith. This is the strength of the C5 approach; it encourages faith

of directions. It could move closer to the church, it could be rejected by the Muslim community, the believers could be branded as crypto-Muslims, or, as they grew in numerical strength, it might be possible for them to move out and establish a separate identity within the Muslim community.

It seems that C5 believers will be a permanent feature of mission to Muslims until the Lord returns. There will always be new believers joining who will want to keep their Muslim identity, at least initially. The "faith development in context" approach allows the new community of believers

> **Many have come to believe that Muslim evangelism is impossible, but with the Faith Development in Context approach there are viable possibilities.**

development within one's own cultural context.

In view of the foregoing observations, the whole spectrum of C1 to C6 is applicable in Britain. However, for a C5 approach to be effective, MBBs would need to create their own enclaves or "homes away from home," where they could develop and practice their faith. The C5 approach would allow inquirers safety as they pursued the study of truth in a less suspicious context.

Thompson predicts that, in the future, the C5 believers' community could move in a variety

to survive on its own against all odds. However, a C4 community, with its clearer Christian identity, could be attacked and destroyed. Even with a C5 approach, there will need to be carefully thought- through strategies to formulate good relationships between C5 believers, Muslims, and Christians, just as there is currently a need to build bridges between Christians and Muslims.

Conclusion

Islam, as a religion, has had a tremendous impact on British

society. It is a permanent feature of life in Britain and it would be unwise to continue to ignore Muslims in our society. The church must recognize its obligation to share its message with all peoples. It is not wise to continue using the same out-of-date approaches when they do not work or to employ one evangelistic strategy for the variety of Muslims when the C1 to C6 models offer a wide choice of effective ways of witnessing. Many have come to believe that Muslim evangelism cannot be achieved, but with the "faith development in context" approach there are viable possibilities.

In view of the above, the following suggestions are offered:

- The SDA Church in Britain should enter into discussions with Muslim leaders and should seek to cooperate in those areas that affect society in general. For example, drug addiction among youth, security in neighborhoods, and many other social issues are areas where Adventists and Muslims can work together.
- The Church should not keep silent when Muslims suffer, but should speak out against Islamophobic anger that is directed towards Muslims by a minority of religious fanatics or racists in society.
- Adventists should give open recognition to moderate and open-minded Muslims and should support them in their

attempts to develop a new Islamic hermeneutic as they endeavor to reform Islam to fit in with modern society.

- The SDA Church should continue to offer sensitivity training to its members, teaching them to respect and enter into meaningful interaction with Muslims in order to bring glory to God and prepare an end- time people for the second coming of Jesus Christ.
- Mission among British Muslims is a possibility. The Church should continue to explore new methods that are in line with the calling of the Seventh-day Adventist Church, to give its special message to every nation, kindred, tongue, and people.

Endnotes

[1] Maulana Abu 'Ala Mawdudi was a gradualist, adaptionist who died in 1979. In 1949 he founded the Jamaat-al-Islami as the solution to human problems. Mawdudi saw the Western political and socio-economic order as Jahiliyyah (a state of ignorance). He believed that the state should be run by just men, and that therefore Muslims should be in charge of the affairs of government. Mawdudi's ideal state was a universal and all-embracing theo-democracy. Sayyid Qutb was highly influenced by Mawdudi's ideology (Adams 1983).

[2] Futher information on the 2001 census can be viewed on: http://www.mcb.org.uk/census2001.pdf.

[3] See also, from a Muslim source, "Divided Indian Muslim community in Britain," *Muslim News* 170 (June 2003): 3.

[4] The *Hadith* is a collection of Islamic traditions, recording what Muhammad said and did. *Hadith* is the second source of Islamic law.

[5] In the editorial, UK targets Hamas' charitable work, *Muslim News* 170 (June 2003): 2, it is explained that Hamas has both a military and a charitable wing. It is made clear that Izz al-Din al-Qasr is not a terrorist organization, but a charitable side of Hamas.

[6] At the time of writing, British soldiers are still in Iraq with a mission to create a just, stable and democratic society. Pictures published in the *British Daily Mirror* in May 2004, exposing abuses upon Iraqi prisoners and reproduced by other newspapers worldwide, have continued to worsen east-west relations (in spite of the fact that the pictures have been shown to be fakes and that the editor of the Daily Mirror has been fired).

[7] At least 80 per cent of Muslims are irregular in their practice of Islam, fewer than 40 per cent attend the Friday weekly prayers, and possibly 30 per cent do not observe the obligatory month of fasting.

[8] In 2004, the French president forbade the wearing of the headscarf or the use of any other religious symbols by adherents of various faiths in France.

[9] Margaret Thatcher was the Conservative Prime Minister of Britain from 1979 to 1990.

[10] In Islamic theology America is perceived as having something to do with the anti-Christ, and believe that Masih Dajall (false Christ) will be a one-eyed individual. Muslim scholars have connected this image with the figure on the American one dollar bill. Search Google for "dajjal" to see thousands of references.

[11] Ramadan believes that Qur'an surah 3:100 and 2:62 make a clear distinction between those who believe and those who do not. He feels that believing Muslims and believing Christians can work together.

[12] The SDA Church is divided into 13 administrative divisions. The TED is one of these entities, covering part of Europe, the Middle East, and parts of Asia and Africa.

[13] David Cox, British Union Conference personal ministries director, and his counterpart at the South England Conference, Pastor Aris Vontzalidis, promote the concept of cell churches, an approach that has been successful in reaching the post-modern mind. The cell church concept provides an atmosphere that encourages the spiritual nurture of converts.

[14] Faith Development in Context (FDIC), first used by Jerald Whitehouse, is the Seventh-day Adventist equivalent (with minor differences) of Travis' C5 approach.

[15] See Phil Parshall , *New paths in Muslim evangelism*, for a detailed explanation of a C4 model.

[16] Global Mission is a department of the SDA Church that is concerned with evangelism and church planting in unreached territories.

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