
Enrique Quezada

May 15, 2018

Department of Political Science
Rice University
1. Introduction

2. Theory

3. Data and Methods

4. Results

5. Conclusion

6. The 2018 Presidential Election
Introduction
Motivation

- Since its inception in 1929, the Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) has held power over most of Mexico.
  - Held the presidency until 2000
  - Had majority in congress until 1997
- The PRI’s regime made use of client-patron relations
  - Strong ties to the party, but not ideological
  - Expectation of receiving/maintaining private goods or job
- Machine politics began to decline giving way to technocratic governments (Ward 1998)
  - Opposition parties had a chance to prove their worth
  - However, all parties are said to engage in clientelist practices
In Mexico, voters are wooed with gift cards, washing machines and cheap tortillas

By Azam Ahmed and J. Jesus Esquivel

Dec. 20, 2017  Leer en español

CHIHUAHUA, Mexico — A former deputy in President Enrique Peña Nieto’s party has been arrested as part of an investigation into the illegal use of public money to fuel his party’s campaigns in Mexican elections last year, state officials announced on Wednesday.
Theory
Theory

- Machine politics
- Types of clientelist strategies
  - vote-buying
  - turnout-buying
  - abstention buying
  - double persuasion
- Machines use a mix of strategies (Gans-Morse, Mazzuca, & Nichter 2014)
- Patronage: distribution of public goods (Stokes 2011)
- Public officials may experience preferential treatment from media
Theory

- Party in power has access to government resources
- Party leadership can nurture and exploit client-patron relations

Increase in “machine politics”:
- Clientelism
- Media advantage
Hypotheses

- H1: If a party (the PRI) has the mayor in a municipality, their presidential vote in that municipality will be larger than it would be otherwise. This is the *clientelist effect*. 

- H2: The *clientelist effect* will decline over time.

- H3: The higher the level of deprivation in a municipality, the larger the *clientelist effect*.

- H4: The *clientelist effect* will be larger for the PRI than for the PAN and the PRD.
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- H4: The *clientelist effect* will be larger for the PRI than for the PAN and the PRD.
Data and Methods
Data

- Presidential vote at the municipality level (IFE 2012)
  - 692 municipalities; 20 states

- Index of deprivation (CONAPO 1995-2010)
  - Access to water, sewage, and healthcare
  - % of population with basic education

- Mayor’s party
- Governor’s party
Controlling for Partisanship

Increase in “machine politics”:
• Clientelism
• Media advantage

Clientelism_{t-1} → Mayor_t → PresidentialVote_t
PartyID_{t-1} → Mayor_t → PresidentialVote_t
PartyID_t → Mayor_t → PresidentialVote_t
Controlling for Partisanship

- “Normal” vote share as a substitute for partisanship
Controlling for Partisanship

- “Normal” vote share as a substitute for partisanship
- Normal vote = vote share in a municipality without clientelism
Controlling for Partisanship

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- Regress vote of municipalities that have experienced turnover
Controlling for Partisanship

- “Normal” vote share as a substitute for partisanship
- Normal vote = vote share in a municipality without clientelism
- Regress vote of municipalities that have experienced turnover
- Predict normal vote for all municipalities
Models

- Mixed models with random slopes for main independent variable
- Model 1:

\[ VoteShare_{kji} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Mayor} + \theta [Years] \ast \text{Mayor} + \lambda [Years] + \beta_2 \text{NormalVote} + \mu_k + \mu_{kj} + q_{kj} \ast \text{Mayor} + \epsilon_{kji}(1) \]

- Model 2:

\[ VoteShare_{kji} = \beta_0 + \beta_1 \text{Mayor} + \theta [DeprIndex] \ast \text{Mayor} + \lambda [DeprIndex] + \beta_2 \text{NormalVote} + \beta_3 \text{ElectionYear} + \mu_k + \mu_{kj} + q_{kj} \ast \text{Mayor} + \epsilon_{kji}(2) \]
Models

- We are interested in the effect of having the mayor
- So, we need to look at the *implied coefficients*
- Model 1:

\[
VoteShare_{kji} = (\beta_1 + \theta[Years] + q_{kj}) \times \text{Mayor} + \lambda[Years] + \beta_2 \text{NormalVote} \\
+ (\beta_0 + \mu_k + \mu_{kj}) + \epsilon_{kji} (3)
\]

- Model 2:

\[
VoteShare_{kji} = (\beta_1 + \theta[DeprIndex] + q_{kj}) \times \text{Mayor} + \lambda[DeprIndex] + \\
\beta_2 \text{NormalVote} + \beta_3 \text{ElectionYear} + (\beta_0 + \mu_k + \mu_{kj}) + \epsilon_{kji} (4)
\]
Results
## Results - Model 1

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<td></td>
<td>PRI</td>
<td>PAN</td>
<td>PRD</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party has mayor</td>
<td>4.594*** (0.87)</td>
<td>3.656** (1.13)</td>
<td>10.27*** (2.57)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayor X 2000</td>
<td>0.809 (1.03)</td>
<td>4.075** (1.35)</td>
<td>-7.402** (2.73)</td>
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<td>Mayor X 2006</td>
<td>-2.956** (1.01)</td>
<td>1.437 (1.31)</td>
<td>-3.988 (2.68)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Mayor X 2012</td>
<td>-5.694*** (1.01)</td>
<td>-1.893 (1.30)</td>
<td>-6.650* (2.74)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>24.41*** (2.22)</td>
<td>1.002 (0.86)</td>
<td>5.168*** (1.00)</td>
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<p>| | | | |</p>
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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>sd(Mun. X Mayor)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>2.502** (0.80)</td>
<td>3.506*** (0.85)</td>
<td>1.298 (2.21)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Standard errors in parentheses

Note: Baseline is for year 1994. 2,742 observations.

* $p < 0.05$, ** $p < 0.01$, *** $p < 0.001$
Substantive Effects - Model 1

The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.

Andrews Research Conference
Substantive Effects - Model 1

Distribution of Random Effects of the Clientelist Effect

PRI

Election Year

Clientelist Effect in % Points

95% confidence intervals
## Results - Model 2

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) PRI</th>
<th></th>
<th>(2) PAN</th>
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<th>(3) PRD</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Party has mayor</td>
<td>1.272</td>
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<td>3.327***</td>
<td>(0.94)</td>
<td>3.825**</td>
<td>(1.34)</td>
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<td>-1.188</td>
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<td>6.850***</td>
<td>(1.45)</td>
<td>6.556***</td>
<td>(1.96)</td>
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<td>Mayor X Very high</td>
<td>4.544**</td>
<td>(1.66)</td>
<td>7.064**</td>
<td>(2.30)</td>
<td>3.855</td>
<td>(2.85)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
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<td>(0.59)</td>
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sd(Mun. X Mayor)

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<td>Constant</td>
<td>1.410</td>
<td>(0.38)</td>
<td>1.545</td>
<td>(1.76)</td>
<td>0.820</td>
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Note: Baseline is for municipality with a very low level of deprivation. 2,742 observations.

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For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.

Andrews Research Conference
Substantive Effects - Model 2

Distribution of Random Effects of the Clientelist Effect

PRI

Level of Deprivation

Very high
High
Medium
Low
Very low

95% confidence intervals

Clientelist Effect in % Points

Andrews Research Conference
**What about H4? - Clientelist effect for PAN and PRD**

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The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

Clientelist effect in % Points

Election Year


PRI
PAN
PRD

Andrews Research Conference
H4 - Model 1

Distribution of Random Effects of the Clientelist Effect

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Andrews Research Conference
The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

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Andrews Research Conference
The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

PRD

For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.
H4 - Model 2

The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

- PRI
- PAN
- PRD

Andrews Research Conference
H4 - Model 2

Distribution of Random Effects of the Clientelist Effect

Levels of deprivation: 1 – Very low, 2 – Low, 3 – Medium, 4 – High, 5 – Very high
Conclusion
May be capturing not only a clientelist effect, but a *mayoral advantage* more broadly.
Conclusion

- May be capturing not only a clientelist effect, but a *mayoral advantage* more broadly
- This may be a result of the measure of *NormalVote*
May be capturing not only a clientelist effect, but a *mayoral advantage* more broadly

This may be a result of the measure of *NormalVote*

There is a significant *mayoral advantage* for all parties
Conclusion

- May be capturing not only a clientelist effect, but a \textit{mayoral advantage} more broadly
- This may be a result of the measure of \textit{NormalVote}
- There is a significant \textit{mayoral advantage} for all parties
  - Larger for the PAN and PRD
May be capturing not only a clientelist effect, but a *mayoral advantage* more broadly

This may be a result of the measure of *NormalVote*

There is a significant *mayoral advantage* for all parties
  - Larger for the PAN and PRD
    - For the PRI it may be a clientelist advantage that has been in decline
May be capturing not only a clientelist effect, but a *mayoral advantage* more broadly

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**Further research:**
Conclusion

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  - Explore the relevance of municipality- vs. state-level politics for presidential elections (builds on Ames 1994 & Magar 2012)
May be capturing not only a clientelist effect, but a *mayoral advantage* more broadly

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- Explore the relevance of municipality- vs. state-level politics for presidential elections (builds on Ames 1994 & Magar 2012)
- Study the interactions between municipality and state executive power
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- Further research:
  - Explore the relevance of municipality- vs. state-level politics for presidential elections (builds on Ames 1994 & Magar 2012)
  - Study the interactions between municipality and state executive power
  - Create a better control for *NormalVote* using previous congressional vote
The 2018 Presidential Election
Implications for 2018

- The PRI has seen its *mayoral advantage* decline
  - Faces great reputational costs
- Opposition parties can benefit from this
The 2018 Presidential Election

Poll of Polls - Vote Intention

Graph shows 90% confidence intervals around the estimates. Source: Oraculus.
Questions?
Robustness

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<td>-3.122** (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mayor X 2012</td>
<td>-5.694*** (1.01)</td>
<td>-5.754*** (1.01)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Party has governor</td>
<td></td>
<td>1.263** (0.42)</td>
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<td>Constant</td>
<td>24.41*** (2.22)</td>
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## Robustness

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<td>4.901*** (1.08)</td>
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<td>4.544** (1.66)</td>
<td>4.867** (1.67)</td>
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<td>Party has governor</td>
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<td>1.139** (0.40)</td>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
<td>3.759*** (0.98)</td>
<td>3.713*** (0.97)</td>
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</table>

sd(Mun. X Mayor)

<table>
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<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Constant</td>
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### What the data looks like

<table>
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<th>state</th>
<th>municipality</th>
<th>election_year</th>
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<th>PRI_share</th>
<th>PAN_share</th>
<th>PRD_share</th>
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<td>Aguascalientes</td>
<td>El Llano</td>
<td>2000</td>
<td>PRI</td>
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<td>PRI</td>
<td>39.75133</td>
<td>31.90235</td>
<td>23.74245</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

PAN

For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.

Andrews Research Conference
The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

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The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.

Andrews Research Conference
The Clientelist Effect on Presidential Vote

PRD

For a municipality in Morelos. 95% confidence intervals.

Andrews Research Conference