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ABSTRACT

BIBLICAL SOURCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE  
CONCEPT OF THE SOUL IN THE WRITINGS OF  
THE FATHERS OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN  
CHURCH, 100-325 C.E.

by

Thomas W. Toews

Adviser: Denis Fortin

## ABSTRACT OF GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH

Dissertation

Andrews University

Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary

Title: BIBLICAL SOURCES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONCEPT OF THE SOUL IN THE WRITINGS OF THE FATHERS OF THE EARLY CHRISTIAN CHURCH, 100-325 C.E.

Name of researcher: Thomas W. Toews

Name and degree of faculty adviser: Denis Fortin, Ph.D.

Date completed: September 2011

The topic of the human soul has seen renewed interest in recent years. Studies have been produced that have looked at the soul in light of modern science and medicine along with a continued focus on the thoughts of the ancients on this topic. The early Church Fathers played an important role in mediating the thoughts of the ancients to more recent times. Because of this role, it is important to understand what function the Scriptures had as a source of authority in this process.

In light of this, the following study researches and analyzes the usage of the two key soul words, ψυχή and *anima* in the writings of the early Church Fathers. Their semantic range and the understanding of the powers and activities of the soul are studied. Following this background examination, the study then looks at the role of Scripture as an authoritative source for the early Church Fathers in the development of this doctrine.

The results of this study highlight the prevalent usage of Scripture and scriptural themes in defining the doctrine of the soul. Ideas such as the soul coming from the breath of God (Gen 2:7) and creation in the image of God (Gen 1:26-27) provide a foundation for discussing the origins of the soul.

In looking at the state of the soul after the death of the body, the early Church Fathers repeatedly look to the scriptural notion of a future judgment to defend the necessity of an immortal soul. This is an important discovery as it is often argued that the concept of an immortal soul comes to the early Church Fathers only from Greek philosophy.

The impact of the philosophical thinking prevalent in the context in which the early Church Fathers lived and wrote can be seen in the similarities of the semantic usage of the terms ψυχή and *anima*. However, this study has demonstrated the necessity of noting closely the usage of their normative writings, the Scriptures, to more clearly understand the foundation of their teaching on nascent church doctrine.

Andrews University

Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary

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Thomas W. Toews

APPROVAL BY THE COMMITTEE

---

Faculty Adviser,  
Denis Fortin  
Professor of Theology

---

Director of Ph.D./Th.D. Program  
Thomas Shepherd

---

Miroslav Kiš  
Professor of Theology

---

Dean, SDA Theological Seminary  
Denis Fortin

---

Fernando Canale  
Professor of Theology

---

John Reeve  
Assistant Professor of Church History

---

George Kalantzis  
Associate Professor of Theology  
Wheaton College

---

Date approved



To my father,  
who sent a farm boy to the university

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS . . . . .	viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . .	x
Chapter	
I. INTRODUCTION . . . . .	1
The Problem . . . . .	4
Purpose of Study . . . . .	6
Justification for the Research . . . . .	7
Scope and Delimitations . . . . .	9
Apostolic Fathers . . . . .	10
Greek Ante-Nicene Fathers . . . . .	10
Latin Ante-Nicene Fathers . . . . .	11
Methodology . . . . .	11
II. BACKGROUND CONCEPTS OF THE SOUL . . . . .	14
Soul in the Hebrew Bible . . . . .	15
Soul in Greek and Roman Thought . . . . .	22
Homer and Hesiod . . . . .	23
Orphism . . . . .	29
Pythagoras . . . . .	33
Pre-Socratic Thought . . . . .	35
Poets . . . . .	37
Plato . . . . .	39
Aristotle . . . . .	47
Epicurean and Stoic Thought . . . . .	48
Neo-Platonism . . . . .	51
Intertestamental Judaism . . . . .	53
New Testament Writings . . . . .	57
Conclusion . . . . .	61
III. THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS . . . . .	64
Clement of Rome . . . . .	64
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	65
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	66
Ignatius . . . . .	67
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	68
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	68
Barnabas . . . . .	69

Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	69
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	71
<i>Shepherd of Hermas</i> . . . . .	72
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	73
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	76
<i>Didache</i> . . . . .	77
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	77
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	78
<i>Epistle to Diognetus</i> . . . . .	79
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	79
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	81
Conclusion . . . . .	83
IV. JUSTIN MARTYR TO MELITO OF SARDIS . . . . .	84
Justin Martyr . . . . .	84
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	85
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	87
Summary . . . . .	99
Tatian . . . . .	99
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	100
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	101
Summary . . . . .	108
Theophilus . . . . .	108
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	109
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	110
Summary . . . . .	113
Athenagoras . . . . .	114
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	114
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	119
Summary . . . . .	129
Melito of Sardis . . . . .	130
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	130
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	130
Summary . . . . .	132
Conclusion . . . . .	132
V. IRENAEUS, CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND HIPPOLYTUS . . . . .	134
Irenaeus . . . . .	134
Usage of <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	135
General Usage . . . . .	135
Powers of the Soul . . . . .	136
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	140
Origin of the Soul . . . . .	141
The Human Person and the Soul . . . . .	141
Immortality and the Soul . . . . .	149
Death, Judgment and the Soul . . . . .	155
Hell and Paradise . . . . .	157
Summary . . . . .	160

Clement of Alexandria . . . . .	161
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	163
General Usage . . . . .	163
Powers and Divisions of the Soul . . . . .	165
The Corporeal and the Soul . . . . .	182
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	193
Origin of the Soul . . . . .	193
The Human Person and the Soul . . . . .	196
Passion, Purity, and the Soul . . . . .	201
Immortality and the Soul . . . . .	212
Death and the Soul . . . . .	213
Hell and Paradise . . . . .	216
Summary . . . . .	218
Hippolytus . . . . .	221
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	222
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	223
Summary . . . . .	225
Conclusion . . . . .	225
VI. ORIGEN AND HIS FOLLOWERS . . . . .	228
Origen . . . . .	228
Usage of <i>Anima</i> and <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	232
General Usage . . . . .	232
The Essence of the Soul . . . . .	236
Powers of the Soul . . . . .	238
The Corporeal and the Soul . . . . .	247
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	251
Origins of the Soul . . . . .	252
Non-human Souls . . . . .	254
The Human Person and the Soul . . . . .	259
Free-Will and the Soul . . . . .	262
Death and the Soul . . . . .	266
Immortality of the Soul . . . . .	276
Hell and Paradise . . . . .	297
Summary . . . . .	303
Gregory Thaumaturgos . . . . .	305
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	306
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	307
Summary . . . . .	308
Methodius . . . . .	308
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> . . . . .	308
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	311
Summary . . . . .	315
Conclusion . . . . .	316
VII. THE LATIN FATHERS . . . . .	319
Tertullian . . . . .	319
Usage of <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	320

General Usage . . . . .	320
The Corporeal and the Soul . . . . .	325
Powers and Divisions of the Soul . . . . .	327
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	337
Origin of the Soul . . . . .	337
The Human Person and the Soul . . . . .	341
Death, Immortality, and the Soul . . . . .	355
Hell and Paradise . . . . .	368
Summary. . . . .	375
Minucius Felix. . . . .	378
Usage of <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	378
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	379
Summary. . . . .	381
Cyprian . . . . .	381
Usage of <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	382
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	387
Summary. . . . .	388
Commodianus . . . . .	388
Usage of <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	388
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	389
Summary. . . . .	389
Novation . . . . .	390
Usage of <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	390
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	391
Summary. . . . .	393
Arnobius . . . . .	394
Usage of <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	394
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	395
Summary. . . . .	400
Lactantius . . . . .	401
Usage of <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	402
General Usage . . . . .	402
The Corporeal and the Soul . . . . .	406
The Powers of the Soul . . . . .	407
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	408
Origins of the Soul . . . . .	408
The Human Person and the Soul . . . . .	410
Immortality and the Soul . . . . .	412
Death and the Soul . . . . .	417
Hell and Paradise . . . . .	419
Summary. . . . .	420
Conclusion . . . . .	422
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS . . . . .	426
Summary . . . . .	427
Usage of <i>Psyche</i> and <i>Anima</i> . . . . .	427
Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources . . . . .	432
Conclusions . . . . .	442
Areas for Further Research . . . . .	446

BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . 447

## LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

Text editions from well-known series are not listed in the bibliography, but the series and volume will appear in footnotes. Abbreviations are those used by the Society of Biblical Literature.

ACW	Ancient Christian Writers
ANF	The Ante-Nicene Fathers
<i>ANRW</i>	<i>Aufstieg und Niedergang der römischen Welt: Geschichte und Kultur Roms im Spiegel der neueren Forschung.</i> Edited by H. Temporini and W. Haase. Berlin, 1972-
CCL	Corpus Christianorum Latinorum
CSEL	Corpus scriptorum ecclesiasticorum latinorum
<i>DECL</i>	<i>Dictionary of Early Christian Literature</i>
FC	The Fathers of the Church, A New Translation. Washington, DC, 1947-
GCS	Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten Jahrhunderte
HB	Hebrew Bible
<i>JBL</i>	<i>Journal of Biblical Literature</i>
LCL	Loeb Classical Library
LXX	The Septuagint
NPNF	Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers
<i>NRTh</i>	<i>La nouvelle revue théologique</i>
<i>PG</i>	J. Migne, <i>Patrologia Graeca</i>
<i>PL</i>	J. Migne, <i>Patrologia latina</i>
SC	Sources chrétiennes. Paris: Cerf, 1943-

- SVF*            *Stoicorum Veterem Fragmenta*. H. von Arnim. 4 vols. Leipzig, 1903-1924
- TDNT*           *Theological Dictionary of the New Testament*. Edited by G. Kittel and G. Friedrich. Translated by G. W. Bromiley. 10 vols.
- TDOT*           *Theological Dictionary of the Old Testament*
- ZNW*            *Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft und die Kunde de älteren Kirche*



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I approached my doctoral studies in many ways unprepared for the journey. Several times throughout my course work, I had the opportunity to study the writings of the early Church. Through this exposure, I came to a much greater appreciation for their love for the church and, more importantly, their knowledge of the Scriptures.

As my faith community is, to a degree, at variance with the doctrine of the soul as it is generally expressed by the early Church Fathers, I wondered how these early scholars of the Christian faith used the Scriptures while developing the doctrine of the soul. Through previous readings in them, I was convinced that they were neither ignorant of the Scriptures nor inclined to set them aside easily. This formed my interest in this time period and specifically with how the Scriptures were used by them in formulating this important church teaching.

I wish to thank the Andrews University Theological Seminary for financial help in pursuing this study. In addition, several people have played an important role. I wish to acknowledge the staff of the James White Library, with special mention going to the Inter-Library Loan department. They worked tirelessly to find documents both near and far and by this have contributed greatly to my ability to access important works and strengthen the secondary source material of this dissertation.

My committee has helped guide this dissertation from beginning to end. Denis Fortin, Miroslav Kiš, and Fernando Canale provided guidance and feedback that made this work better. Special thanks goes to Dr. Fortin, my adviser, who had to work through early drafts, pointing out numerous errors, and helping shape my focus by pressing me to

more clearly articulate my research. As is inevitable in a project of this size, errors surely remain. The responsibility for these rests solely with me.

My parents have been a strong and stable force in my life. Their love has been a source of support through this long process of education. And for instilling in me a love of reading at an early age, my mother is to be thanked. Without that gift, this work would not have been possible. My highest gratitude is reserved for my wife, Lena, with whom I began the journey towards a doctoral degree some years ago. When in the midst of our studies two boys, Matthew and Andrew, brightened our lives, she took time away from her dissertation writing to feed and guide their developing minds. For this, I am most grateful.

*Soli Deo gloria!*

## CHAPTER I

### INTRODUCTION

The study of the soul has long been an important theme in human inquiry.<sup>1</sup> In the conclusion of a recent book on the ideas of the afterlife in various Western cultures, Alan Segal writes:

Consciousness is the truly mysterious obsession of modern Western philosophical inquiry. Technical progress has not brought us much closer to understanding it, though research into the physical action of the brain has dethroned our surety of the self's importance. Although the history of philosophy for centuries has been devoted to a description of the soul and the self, both in the West and the East, it still remains the perennial subject of philosophy, religion, and poetry all over the world, with little hope of achieving a consensus soon.<sup>2</sup>

The resurgence of interest in recent times regarding the understanding of the soul in modern theology has brought about an increase in studies produced on the topic.<sup>3</sup> Issues such as the impact of modern science on the understanding of the soul have led to increased

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<sup>1</sup>For an overview, see Nancey Murphy, "Human Nature: Historical, Scientific, and Religious Issues," in *Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature*, ed. Warren S. Brown et al., Theology and the Sciences (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998).

<sup>2</sup>Alan F. Segal, *Life after Death: A History of the Afterlife in the Religions of the West* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), 715.

<sup>3</sup>See for example Michelle A. Gonzalez, *Created in God's Image: An Introduction to Feminist Theological Anthropology* (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis, 2007); Joel B. Green and Stuart L. Palmer, eds., *In Search of the Soul: Four Views of the Mind-Body Problem* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2005); Nancey Murphy, *Bodies and Souls, or Spirited Bodies?* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). For an overview of current challenges of the doctrine of the soul in theology, see Heino Sonnemans, "Soul, Afterlife, Salvation," *Communio* 14 (1987): 256-261.

study on the soul in the Bible along with its understanding throughout Church history.<sup>4</sup> The following study seeks to be part of this resurgence by drawing attention once again to the development of doctrine in the formative years of the Ante-Nicene era.

There has been much scholarly discussion on the relationship of the Church Fathers to the cultural milieu of the period, especially on the doctrine of the soul. In this context, some have gone so far as to claim boldly that Christianity does not have a doctrine of the soul. Such is the ominous finding of historical theologian Jaroslav Pelikan.<sup>5</sup> In his book on the topic of death in the early Church, he writes that it is more precise to say that Christianity has several doctrines of the soul. He adds, “Either Christians are not to speak about the soul in any consistent and reasoned manner at all, or they must be willing to learn about the soul from other places, in addition to the Scriptures.”<sup>6</sup> Later he more strongly argues, “The Bible has no original and consistent doctrine of the soul. Yet the Bible does speak about the soul, and thus it obliges its interpreters to speak about the soul too.”<sup>7</sup>

Segal writes, “In the modern period, the self has come more and more to be identified with the immortal soul. Personal consciousness is transcendent in society because

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<sup>4</sup>See Warren S. Brown, Nancey Murphy, and H. Newton Maloney, *Whatever Happened to the Soul: Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature* (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998). Cf. Richard Swinburne, *The Evolution of the Soul* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997).

<sup>5</sup>“Christianity has no doctrine of the soul; or, more precisely, it has several.” Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Shape of Death: Life, Death, and Immortality in the Early Fathers* (New York: Abingdon Press, 1961), 33.

<sup>6</sup>*Ibid.*, 34. Fernández-Ardanaz notes that part of the difficulty is in the usage of the term *psyche* by the early Christians which was not corresponding to any one Hebrew term and was loaded with philosophical connotations. Santiago Fernández Ardanaz, *El Mito del “hombre Nuevo” en el Siglo II: El Dialogo Cristianismo-Helenismo* (Madrid: Fundacion Universitaria Española, 1991), 90.

<sup>7</sup>Pelikan, *The Shape of Death*, 51.

we value it as divine.”<sup>8</sup> He later adds, “It was Plato’s doctrine of the immortality of the soul that allowed us to focus on our conscious experiences, that valorized those experiences and eventually made the ‘self’ as well as God, a transcendent value in Western thought.”<sup>9</sup>

The doctrine of the immortality of the soul has been accepted and taught as orthodox doctrine for the greater part of the Christian Church’s history.<sup>10</sup> Pelikan notes that after some “polemic” against the notion of immortality by early Christian writers, their apocalyptic vision waned and the doctrine of the immortality of the soul became a “standard element in Christian teaching.”<sup>11</sup> While some have insisted on a notion of conditional immortality or soul sleep, theologians and ecclesiastics alike have for the most part branded these thinkers as heretical.

Pelikan has shown that some of the early Church Fathers used notions from the surrounding philosophical milieu in developing the Christian doctrine of the soul.<sup>12</sup> Hans

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<sup>8</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 715.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 716.

<sup>10</sup>Cullmann writes, “If we were to ask an ordinary Christian today (whether well-read Protestant or Catholic, or not) what he conceived to be the New Testament teaching concerning the fate of man after death, with few exceptions we should get the answer: ‘The immortality of the soul.’” Oscar Cullmann, *Immortality of the Soul or Resurrection of the Dead? The Witness of the New Testament* (New York: Macmillan, 1958), 15.

<sup>11</sup>Jaroslav Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600)*, vol. 1 of *The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), 30. Cf. Justo L. González, *From the Beginnings to the Council of Chalcedon*, vol. 1 of *A History of Christian Thought* (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1987), 51.

<sup>12</sup>Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600)*, 47-49. For a recent, though rather brief, discussion on this “tense” relationship, see Hans G. Thümmel, “Die Seele im Platonismus und bei den Kirchenvätern,” in *Psyche–Seele–Anima: Festschrift für Karin Alt zum 7. Mai 1998*, ed. Jens Holzhausen, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1998).

Thümmel points specifically to the Christian usage of Platonic concepts of the soul to define the contents of the early Church's doctrine.<sup>13</sup> Roger Olson concludes that "the second-century Christian apologists chose instead to defend the truth of Christianity on the basis of the philosophies of Platonism and Stoicism—or an amalgam of the two—that were widely accepted as superior to the other options."<sup>14</sup> Roman mystery religions were also prevalent in this period and had certain similarities with Christianity.<sup>15</sup>

Segal, in commenting on the concept of an afterlife, has asserted that culture is the more important influence when shaping the notions of the afterlife and the immortality of the soul. "The notion of heaven and the afterlife always reflects what is most valuable to the culture. God may be sending revelations but we are talking to ourselves when we interpret our Scriptures. We are telling ourselves what the Scriptures must mean in the current circumstance; it is not God speaking to us directly."<sup>16</sup> He adds, "It is just as true of fundamentalist doctrines as it is of liberal ones."<sup>17</sup> The biblical writings, then, were not the only source used by the early Christian writers in developing the doctrine of the soul in the early Christian Church.

### **The Problem**

There is no comprehensive study of the concept of the soul in the early Church

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<sup>13</sup>Thümmel, 244.

<sup>14</sup>Roger E. Olson, *The Story of Christian Theology: Twenty Centuries of Tradition and Reform* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), 56.

<sup>15</sup>See, for example, Everett Ferguson, *Doctrines of Human Nature, Sin, and Salvation in the Early Church*, *Studies in Early Christianity*, ed. Everett Ferguson et al. (New York and London: Garland, 1993), 235-281.

<sup>16</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 710.

<sup>17</sup>Ibid.

Fathers nor of the developmental path that this key component of Christian theology took during the Ante-Nicene era. The question of how ψυχή and *anima* were understood and used during this time period is one that has not been answered outside of dictionary articles. In addition, while much has been written on various Fathers and their indebtedness to the cultural philosophies of the day, no study has adequately probed the role that the Christian Scriptures played in this process. This lacunae in contemporary scholarship has led many to conclude that the Greco-Roman ideas of the day along with commonly accepted definitions of these two “soul” terms were the primary stimuli for shaping the early Church’s thought on the human soul. Furthermore, it has led many to assume a rather static “doctrine” of the soul, inherited almost *in toto* from prior thinking, lacking both development and continuity with contemporaneous Christian thinking.<sup>18</sup>

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<sup>18</sup>It is recognized that recent Patristic scholarship has moved beyond the “Hellenization” thesis of Adolf von Harnack’s era. For major works of his on this topic, see Adolf von Harnack, *Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte* (Leipzig: Mohr, 1909); idem, *Die Mission und Ausbreitung des Christentums in der ersten drei Jahrhunderten* (Leipzig: J. C. Hinrichs’sche Buchhandlung, 1924). For a discussion on the decline of the Hellenization thesis in Patristic scholarship, see Wendy E. Helleman, *Hellenization Revisited: Shaping a Christian Response within the Greco-Roman World* (Lanham: University Press of America, 1994). In Seventh-day Adventist circles, however, this is still a widely accepted idea. Thus while this aspect of the study may seem superfluous to some readers, to others it will not be. It should be noted here that while the “Hellenization” thesis has been set aside by many, nevertheless, it has not been demonstrated that this should indeed be done, insofar as it relates to the impact of Greco-Roman philosophies and cultures on early Christian thinking on the soul. Therefore, this study further corroborates this recent trend in Patristic studies. It should be noted as well that some of the questions addressed in the study will be more important to those who approach the early Church Fathers from within the Seventh-day Adventist tradition. As this church’s understanding of the soul is at variance with the picture that emerges from the writings of the early Church Fathers, the role of Scripture in their work has been often misunderstood and is still held to be more closely aligned with the Harnack hypothesis of Hellenization. Thus various topics and even phrases may be used that seem “ecclesial” and not relevant. If the reader comes upon discussions that seem obvious or even out of place, one may safely assume that this point is speaking to a different audience. No disrespect is meant. The purpose is only to allow the study to speak to scholars from both within and without the Seventh-day Adventist tradition.

## Purpose of Study

This study, therefore, seeks to fill the gap in current scholarship on the development of the concept of the soul in the Ante-Nicene period and the role that the Christian Scriptures played in this process.<sup>19</sup> It analyzes the usage of the two soul words, ψυχή and *anima*, in the early Church Fathers and seeks to develop a history of the general understanding of the soul and its powers. It studies the foundational role of Scripture as an authoritative source used by the early Church Fathers in arguing their various understandings of the soul. This study focuses on the variety of Scripture texts used and what aspect of the concept of the soul they supported. Hermeneutical issues regarding how the early Church Fathers used Scripture, while important in recent scholarship, are not the focus of this study.<sup>20</sup>

Throughout this process, this study looks for historical trends and similarities and dissimilarities among the authors of the period under review. It points out areas of consensus and historical trends among the Fathers in their usage of Scripture when developing the doctrine of the soul.<sup>21</sup> It also points out areas of development that only begin

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<sup>19</sup>Throughout this study, reference will be made to the doctrine of the soul. This is done while recognizing that no credal statements were made by the church in this period as the first ecumenical council Nicea lies at the end of this period. This notwithstanding, what is said by these early Church Fathers provides most, if not all, of what will become the Church's teaching on the origin and end of the soul. On the role of the writings of the early Church Fathers in the doctrinal development of the Church, see Pelikan, *The Emergence of the Catholic Tradition (100-600)*, vi-x.

<sup>20</sup>On this, see for example D. Jeffrey Bingham, ed., *The Bible in Ancient Christianity* (Boston, MA: Brill, 2004-); Robert L. Wilken, ed., *The Church's Bible* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003-); Thomas C. Oden, ed., *Ancient Christian Commentary on Scripture* (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1998-).

<sup>21</sup>Cf. Jerónimo Leal, *La antropología de Tertuliano: estudio de los tratados polémicos de los años 207-212 d.C.* (Rome: Institutum Patristicum Augustinianum, 2001), 14-16. Leal groups Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Theophilus of Antioch, Tertullian and Melito of Sardis together under the name Asiatic school of anthropology. He notes that they all place



towards the end of the period under study but become more prominent in the years that follow.

### **Justification for the Research**

Given the importance of the doctrine of the soul, one may rightly ask what place the Bible had in the development of this Christian teaching. While recent Protestant theologians have debated this issue in connection with the doctrine of hell,<sup>22</sup> it does have other implications as well. The first relates fundamentally to the Protestant notion of *sola scriptura*, which has driven Protestant theology since the time of the Reformation. The belief in *sola scriptura* has consistently been an insistence upon having the Bible as the final authority for doctrines of faith. If there is no biblical support for this doctrine, what is its place in church dogma?

In addition, church dogma plays a role in the minds of its adherents. Segal notes that “heavenly journeys and NDEs [near death experiences] have constantly reinforced notions of the immortality of the soul and testified to the reality of resurrection.”<sup>23</sup> Within contemporary culture, belief in the life of the soul after the death of the body has become commonplace. This provides another factor for understanding the Church’s teaching on the soul and its biblical basis.

While theologians and students of philosophy have written much regarding the early

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a high value on the body rather than only the soul as in the Platonic and Stoic schools. This, he notes, is more a cultural than a geographic label.

<sup>22</sup>A recent article in *Christianity Today* details the current, often heated, discussions in Evangelical circles regarding hell and the immortality of the soul. Robert A. Peterson, “Undying Worm Unquenchable Fire,” *Christianity Today*, 23 October 2000, 30-37.

<sup>23</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 714.

Church's concept of the soul, no study to date has undertaken the purpose outlined here. Pelikan surveys the positions of five of the early Church Fathers on the soul,<sup>24</sup> while Heinrich Karpp has a study on the origin of the soul in several of the Church Fathers.<sup>25</sup> Brian Daley did a study on the eschatological hope of the early Church in which he looks at ideas on the state of the soul after death.<sup>26</sup> John Roller attempts to look at all the early Church Fathers up to Nicea, but gives only a cursory sample of statements by each author on the topic. His study is woefully lacking in depth and serious analysis.<sup>27</sup> Le Roy Froom also studied the doctrine of the immortality of the soul in the early Church Fathers but his study focused specifically on whether a writer believed in a conditional or unconditional immortal nature of the soul, often focusing on statements that relate to death and destruction outside of any discussion of the soul itself.<sup>28</sup> Robert Morey has also contributed in this area and offers a critique of the results arrived at by Froom.<sup>29</sup>

Other studies have been done throughout the last century on the theological anthropology of the early Church Fathers. However, these in general have not focused

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<sup>24</sup>Pelikan, *The Shape of Death*. Pelikan looks at Tatian, Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Origen, and Irenaeus. Notably missing from this list are some of the apologists.

<sup>25</sup>Heinrich Karpp, *Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie: Biblische Anthropologie und philosophische Psychologie bei den Kirchenvätern des dritten Jahrhunderts* (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1950).

<sup>26</sup>Brain E. Daley, *The Hope of the Early Church* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).

<sup>27</sup>John H. Roller, *The Doctrine of Immortality in the Early Church* (Charlotte, NC: by the author, 1999).

<sup>28</sup>Le Roy Edwin Froom, *The Conditionalist Faith of Our Fathers: The Conflict of the Ages Over the Nature and Destiny of Man* (Washington, DC: Review and Herald, 1965).

<sup>29</sup>Robert A. Morey, *Death and the Afterlife* (Minneapolis, MN: Bethany House, 1984).

specifically on their psychology; rather they have looked at the entire doctrine of man. One example of this type of study is that done by Juan Ayan Calvo.<sup>30</sup> These also have tended to focus on detailing the relationship between the early Church Fathers and other non-Christian writers. A recent, good example of this type of study is that of Dietmar Wyrwa.<sup>31</sup>

### **Scope and Delimitations**

This study analyzes the writings of the early Church Fathers which are extant in either Greek or Latin. As a rule, works which are generally recognized as spurious or of doubtful origin have been excluded along with writers and/or documents generally considered heretical.<sup>32</sup> Fragments and works for which no modern translation or electronic database of the original text is available have also been excluded. Occurrences where a writer quotes from a scriptural passage in which the word *soul* appears but in which it is apparent from the context that the writer is not attempting to make a point specifically regarding the soul, but is rather using the citation for another purpose, were not considered relevant or part of this study. As for the Scriptures used by the early Church Fathers, this study focuses on the generally accepted canonical texts, thus excluding other works which do not find their way into the “Orthodox” tradition.

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<sup>30</sup>Juan José Ayán Calvo, *Antropología de San Justino: Exégesis del mártir a Gen. I-III* (Córdoba: Publicaciones del Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros de Córdoba, 1988).

<sup>31</sup>Dietmar Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” in *Psyche–Seele–Anima: Festschrift für Karin Alt zum 7. Mai 1998*, ed. Jens Holzhausen, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1998).

<sup>32</sup>Thus, for example, works belonging to the Nag Hammadi corpus are not included in this study. In so doing, it is not the intent of this study to suggest that this literature would not be valuable to a study of the development of doctrine in the early church. Rather, this study has chosen to focus on the writers and works that in the end were more directly a part of the main stream of the doctrinal development of the church.

While the possibility of using an electronic database provides the opportunity for a much wider scope of word study, it is also recognized that this methodology has the inherent limitation of not addressing those citations where an author may discuss a concept related to the doctrine of the soul but where the word soul is not used. As such, this reference does not make it into this study. This limitation, while known, should not prevent access to a sufficient range of references needed in order to achieve a viable study.

The study divides the works into three separate chapters, the Apostolic Fathers, the Greek Ante-Nicene Fathers, and the Latin Ante-Nicene Fathers. Documents from the following authors are analyzed.<sup>33</sup>

#### Apostolic Fathers

Clement of Rome  
Ignatius of Antioch  
*Epistle of Barnabas*  
*Shepherd of Hermas*  
*Didache*  
Mathetes *Epistle to Diognetus*

#### Greek Ante-Nicene Fathers

Justin Martyr  
Tatian of Assyria  
Theophilus of Antioch  
Athenagoras of Athens  
Melito of Sardis  
Irenaeus of Lyons  
Clement of Alexandria  
Hippolytus of Portus Romanus  
Origen of Alexandria  
Gregory Thaumaturgus  
Methodius

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<sup>33</sup>This list is divided according to the commonly accepted format. This arrangement does not imply any prior categorization of the early Church Fathers according to a methodology imposed on them before the research was undertaken.

## Latin Ante-Nicene Fathers

Tertullian of Carthage  
Minucius Felix of Arica  
Cyprian of Carthage  
Commodianus of Africa  
Novatian of Rome  
Arnobius of Sicca  
Lactantius

### **Methodology**

This study is primarily a historical-linguistic investigation carried out by a literary analysis of primary source documents produced by the early Church Fathers. While the scriptural sources used in these writings are noted and cataloged, little exegetical work relating to these occurrences is done, nor are hermeneutical questions regarding how the early Church Fathers used their Scriptural sources addressed. Doing so would have necessitated a much smaller delimitation of authors. While some may argue that this would be preferable, it would have ultimately truncated the results that this study has produced, failing to give the desired “big picture” of the time period. Instead, the study focuses on the variety of Scripture that was used and what aspects of the teaching on the soul were supported by the various scriptural passages used.

The first chapter focuses on the background of ideas in Greco-Roman and Jewish writings along with those in the Jewish and Christian Scriptures that may have influenced the early Church Fathers. This chapter utilizes primarily secondary literature in its investigation in an attempt to provide a useful background to the ideas under investigation in the remainder of the study.

The next chapters investigate the relevant primary documents using searchable

databases of both the Greek and Latin works of the period.<sup>34</sup> The Greek word ψυχή was searched using the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae* database<sup>35</sup> and the Latin *anima* was searched using the CETEDOC database.<sup>36</sup>

In this study of the primary documents, there are two lines of research. The first focuses on the semantic usage of the soul words, ψυχή and *anima*, in the Church Fathers. It also looks at several general concepts such as what a specific author understands the essence of the soul to be, and how he presents the relationship of the soul to the mind, the various powers and divisions of the soul, and its relationship to the corporeal world. By studying the usage of the word soul in the early Church Fathers, a background will be developed which will enable a more careful analysis of the doctrinal nature of their understanding of the soul. In the presentation of data on each writer, this constitutes the first section under the heading “Usage of *Psyche/Anima*.” In general, scriptural usage is not as common in this part but where authors note scriptural arguments, they will be listed.

The second aspect of this study analyzes the doctrine of the soul in each of the authors and the role that Scripture played in this development. This section focuses on four main foci: (1) their teaching regarding the origin of the soul, (2) their understanding of the

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<sup>34</sup>With the continued growth of electronic databases containing the works of the early Church Fathers, it is possible to develop a methodology for a very focused topical study based upon a selected key word or words. For an example of this in current research in the field of historical theology, see Lienhard’s study of Joseph, husband of Mary, in the writings of Augustine. Joseph T. Lienhard, “Augustine, *Sermon 51: St. Joseph in Early Christianity*,” in *In Dominico Eloquentio In Lordly Eloquence: Essays in Patristic Exegesis in Honor of Robert L. Wilken*, ed. Paul M. Blowers et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2002).

<sup>35</sup>*Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, University of California, Irvine (accessed September 2002-June 2005).

<sup>36</sup>*Library of Christian Latin Texts: CLCLT-4*, CETEDOC (accessed September 2002-June 2005).

relationship of the soul to the human person, (3) their teaching on death and the intermediate state of the soul from the death of the body to the eschaton, and (4) their teaching on the final state of the soul after the commencement of the eschaton, both for the righteous and the unrighteous. At times, other notions concerning the soul and an author's biblical defense of it are noted as well.

The conclusions of this study seek to bring together the information noted throughout the study. They note any historical developments in the usage and general understanding of the soul, developments of a doctrinal nature, and the role that Scripture played in this process. This analysis groups together those Fathers with similar doctrines and scriptural usage patterns in order to determine the range of scriptural usage that may have emerged during the period under study.<sup>37</sup>

Scriptural citations are given using the KJV version unless otherwise noted. When citing the works of the early Church Fathers, the edition used is the one listed in the relevant edition of CETEDOC and *TLG*, generally either the *CSEL*, *CCL*, *GCS*, *SC*, *PG* or *PL*. The English translation provided is generally from the ANF. Some document translations are not available in this edition and then other editions have been used, such as ACW and FC. Where I have supplied the translation, this is noted in the text.

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<sup>37</sup>For instance, González notes that in the period of the Apostolic Fathers, “one discovers the beginning of certain schools or theological tendencies.” He further notes that these are assignable to the Church in four distinct geographical regions: Rome; Alexandria; Syria; and Asia Minor. Justo González, 92-94.

## CHAPTER II

### BACKGROUND CONCEPTS OF THE SOUL

This chapter surveys various ideas regarding the soul which existed both in Greco-Roman and Jewish religious thought and in the philosophical ideas leading in to the early years of the first centuries C.E. The purpose is to provide the context in which the early Church Fathers wrote and to identify possible background and/or competing ideas to the various teachings of the Church Fathers regarding the soul. Due to the limitations of being an introductory chapter, this overview is not meant to be exhaustive but rather to provide a survey of the land.<sup>1</sup>

The complexities involved in the early Church's doctrine of the soul and its relationship to those found in the Greco-Roman literature are well documented.<sup>2</sup> Pelikan notes a certain ambivalence in how to deal with this relationship. Werner Jaeger states categorically, "The Greeks ... share with the Jews the honour of creating an intellectualized faith in God; but it was the Greeks alone who were to determine for

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<sup>1</sup>For a more thorough comparison of the Hebrew and Greek understanding, see Graham J. Warne, *Hebrew Perspectives on the Human Person in the Hellenistic Era: Philo and Paul*, vol. 35 (Lewiston, NY: Mellen Biblical Press, 1995), 55-121.

<sup>2</sup>Cf. Pelikan's assessment of the Cappadocians' doctrine of God and of human nature and the interplay with related ideas in other literature. Jaroslav Pelikan, *Christianity and Classical Culture: The Metamorphosis of Natural Theology in the Christian Encounter with Hellenism* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 280. For a recent study on the image of God in the early Church, see Regina Götz, *Der geschlechtliche Mensch—ein Ebenbild Gottes: Die Auslegung von Gen 1,27 durch die wichtigsten griechischen Kirchenväter* (Frankfurt am Main: Josef Knecht, 2003).



several millennia the way in which civilized man would conceive the nature and destiny of the soul.”<sup>3</sup> However, Robert Wilken writes, “The soul’s continuation after death is not, in the minds of early Christians, a philosophical idea imported from the Greeks but part of the Church’s tradition as handed on in the New Testament and the writings of the earliest and most authoritative fathers.”<sup>4</sup> Wilken does allow for a connection between the idea of an immortal soul in Greek philosophy and the Christian doctrine but insists “that the later development rests on traditional ideas ‘preached in the churches’ and interpreted in personal and religious terms.”<sup>5</sup>

The ideas connected with the soul have gone through considerable development throughout both Greco-Roman and Christian history.<sup>6</sup> This survey begins in the earliest recorded documents of Greek civilization and traces these through to the Greco-Roman period. It also looks at the Scriptures which the early Christians held to be normative, these being the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament.

### **Soul in the Hebrew Bible**

An important distinction between Hebrew thought and that of many other accounts regarding the origins of the world is the lack of a stark dualistic concept of

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<sup>3</sup>Werner Jaeger, *The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1936), 73.

<sup>4</sup>Robert L. Wilken, “The Immortality of the Soul and the Christian Hope,” *Dialog* 15, no. 2 (1976): 114.

<sup>5</sup>Ibid.

<sup>6</sup>Jan N. Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife: The 1995 Read-Tuckwell Lectures at the University of Bristol* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 1-9; Segal, *Life after Death*, 249. Cf. Lewis R. Farnell, *Greek Hero Cults and Ideas of Immortality*, Reprinted Lithographically ed. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), 2; Josef Kroll, *Die Himmelfahrt der Seele in der Antike* (Cologne: Oskar Müller, 1931).

matter and spirit where matter is thought of as evil, while spirit is considered good.<sup>7</sup> Another distinction, perhaps connected to the lack of a dualistic perspective, was a phenomenal instead of a metaphysical outlook on reality. “The Hebrew accepted things as they were, or, more accurately, as they appeared to be to the human observer.”<sup>8</sup> This phenomenal view of reality includes the human person.

For all the different parts or aspects which comprise the human phenomenon, the human person was nevertheless seen as a totality, as a psycho-physical unity. . . . The western dichotomy between the psychic and the somatic, between soul and body, spirit and flesh, is foreign to the ‘classically Hebraic’ conception of the human person. In the Hebraic perspective, the human person is viewed from a variety of different perspectives, but human personhood is not seen to consist of any of these in themselves. Rather, by means of synecdoche, particular aspects were used to represent that which was characteristic of the whole.<sup>9</sup>

The idea of using one aspect to look at the whole in Hebrew anthropology is elaborated on by M. E. Dahl. “The Hebrew mind never produces anything quite like an abstraction; ‘soul’ and ‘heart’ and ‘flesh’ mean the totality of man considered from different aspects, and they comprehend concepts like mouth, eyes, lips, reins, belly, bones, and so on in such a way that these refer, not to a physical organ or limb, so much as to the whole of man acting in a certain way.”<sup>10</sup>

In this context, then, it becomes noteworthy when some scholars argue that in Hebrew thought, the human person is not necessarily a whole but can be divided, at least at death. Segal declares, “If the term ‘soul’ . . . in Hebrew means what it appears to mean,

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<sup>7</sup>Warne, 56.

<sup>8</sup>Ibid.

<sup>9</sup>Ibid., 58.

<sup>10</sup>M. E. Dahl, *The Resurrection of the Body (A Study of I Corinthians 15)*, vol. 36 (London: SCM, 1963), 71-72.

then there has to be something that survives death in the ancient Biblical world.”<sup>11</sup> He then proceeds to note that the scholarly consensus is that the Jewish Scriptures do not teach doctrinally an afterlife. He, along with others such as James Barr and John Cooper, has suggested that there is something of the human person that survives death in something of an intermediate state before the “day of the Lord.”<sup>12</sup> With this question in the scholarly community, it will be helpful to outline the arguments to obtain as clear an understanding as possible of the Hebrew understanding.

The concept of soul in the Hebrew Bible<sup>13</sup> is multifaceted.<sup>14</sup> The translation of the HB into Greek, the Septuagint (LXX), itself may have contributed to some of the transfer of ideas between the Greek world and that of the early Church. Thümmel notes this

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<sup>11</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 142. Later, during his discussion of Second Temple Judaism, he states that throughout Hebrew cultures, “the soul is the equivalent of ghost or spirit.” *Ibid.*, 279.

<sup>12</sup>James Barr, *The Garden of Eden and the Hope of Immortality*, 1st Fortress Press ed. (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993); John W. Cooper, *Body, Soul, and Life Everlasting: Biblical Anthropology and the Monism-Dualism Debate* (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1989). Segal notes that Cooper seems quite intent on attributing a life for the soul after death to Hebrew thought. Segal, *Life after Death*, 142.

<sup>13</sup>In order to stay clear of the scholarly discussion regarding the dating of the various books found in the Jewish canon, this study treats them as one unit. In doing so, no attempt is made to trace any historical development within the corpus but rather treats it in its final form. While writing on a related theme, Segal notes that it is not necessary to deal with all of the textual critical issues regarding manuscripts in order to deal with their implications for studying the afterlife. Segal, 276. For further discussion on this difficulty, see Nico van Uchelen, “Death and the After-life in the Hebrew Bible of Ancient Israel,” in *Hidden Futures: Death and Immortality in Ancient Egypt, Anatolia, the Classical, Biblical and Arabic-Islamic World*, ed. Jan M. Bremer et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1994), 77-78.

<sup>14</sup>See Karpp, *Probleme altchristlicher Anthropologie*, 28. For a detailed analysis of soul in the HB, see A. Murtonen, “The Living Soul, A Study of the Meaning of the Word NPS in the Hebrew Language,” *Studia Orientalia* 23, no. 1 (1980), 1-105.

possibility with the translation of *ruach* by *pneuma* and *nefesh* by *psyche*.<sup>15</sup>

The key word in this discussion is the Hebrew term *nefesh* (נֶפֶשׁ). *Nefesh* is used around 750 times in the HB.<sup>16</sup> It occurs several times throughout the creation narrative but perhaps most prominently in regard to the human individual in Gen 2:7.<sup>17</sup> There *nefesh hayah* (נֶפֶשׁ חַיָּה) is translated ψυχη ζῶσα in the LXX, which was translated as “living soul” in the KJV. Based upon Charles Briggs’s study<sup>18</sup> in 1897 and those of other scholars throughout the twentieth century, many modern translators have used “living being” instead of “living soul.”<sup>19</sup>

The KJV translates *nefesh* variously throughout the Jewish Scriptures.<sup>20</sup> Daniel Lys notes that “even in the earliest Old Testament texts this word has several meanings: life; what lives and dies; the affections, i.e., need and appetite, desire and pleasure, the feelings; several localizations (‘interior’, liver, blood, breath’ [*sic*]); the animate, living

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<sup>15</sup>Thümmel, 246. Jacob notes that *psyche* is also used in the LXX to translate several other Hebrew words as well. Edmond Jacob, “The Anthropology of the Old Testament,” *TDNT* (1974), 9:617-618.

<sup>16</sup>The Westminster Electronic Morphology of BHS Release 3.5 2001 was searched using BibleWorks version 6.0.005y 2003. It returned 757 occurrences of נֶפֶשׁ in 686 separate verses. Briggs gives 756, Wolff gives 755, while Anderson and Murtonen list 754 instances.

<sup>17</sup>Johannes Frey, *Tod, Seelenglaube und Seelenkult im alten Israel* (Leipzig: A. Deichert, 1898), 18.

<sup>18</sup>Charles A. Briggs, “The Use of NPS in the Old Testament,” *JBL* 16 (1897): 30.

<sup>19</sup>JB, NSAB, NIV, RSV.

<sup>20</sup>Murtonen lists these as “soul” (465 times); “life” (120 times); “person” (26 times); “heart” (16 times); “mind” (15 times); “creature” (10 times); the personal pronoun (10 times); “dead” (5 times); “body” (4 times); “dead body” (4 times); “pleasure” (4 times); “any . . . man, thing, beast, appetite, ghost, lust” (2 times each); “any . . . desire, will” (3 times each). Murtonen, 7-8, quoted in Warne, 61-62.

being (cf. even the animal), and the Self, I.”<sup>21</sup>

Ellis Brotzman has divided these into ten basic categories of meanings.<sup>22</sup>

1. *Appetitive use*. Here *Nefesh* is often used “to express the seat of desire for physical food or drink (e.g., meat, Deut 12:15; grapes, Deut 23:24 [Heb., v. 25]; and water, Isa 29:8).”<sup>23</sup>

2. *Personal use*. *Nefesh* can also refer to an individual or group of individuals. For instance, in Lev 2:1, a *nefesh* brings an offering.

3. *Reference to life*. In this usage, *nefesh* refers to the life of an individual. This usage is common in reference to taking someone’s life (Exod 4:19).

4. *Pronominal use*. Here *nefesh* is a simple pronoun. It is another way of writing one or one’s self. (Lev 11:43-44) This can be found in prose and poetry.

5. *Emotional use*. *Nefesh* can often be associated with various emotions such as discouragement, bitterness, or sadness (2 Kgs 4:27; Jonah 2:7).

6. *In connection with the heart*. *Nefesh* can be linked with the heart as in Deut 6:4-5.

7. *Used for a corpse*. Interestingly, *nefesh* can also be used to refer to a dead body (Lev 19:28).

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<sup>21</sup>Daniel Lys, “The Israelite Soul According to the LXX,” *Vetus Testamentum* 16 (1966): 182.

<sup>22</sup>Ellis R. Brotzman, “Man and the Meaning of Nephesh,” *Bibliotheca Sacra* 145, no. 580 (1988): 401-407. Briggs classifies the meanings of *nefesh* as: “that which breathes,” “living being,” “life itself,” “man himself,” “seat of the appetites,” “seat of the emotions and passions,” “mental acts,” possibly for “acts of will” and “character.” He argues against the meaning of breath being found in the biblical Hebrew. Briggs, 17-30.

<sup>23</sup>Brotzman, *Man and the Meaning of Nephesh*, 401.

8. *Used for throat.* The *nefesh* can refer to the throat<sup>24</sup> as is indicated by cognates in Akkadian and Ugaritic.<sup>25</sup>

9. *For physical breath.* *Nefesh* seems to mean breath in several HB usages. For instance, when Rachel dies, her *nefesh* leaves. Brotzman argues that this cannot be the soul but could be the breath (Gen 35:18).

10. *Used for animals.* The last usage is different in that it refers to animals such as in the creation account (Gen 1:20).<sup>26</sup>

Graham Warne also emphasizes this idea of the concrete reality. “In any translation of נֶפֶשׁ, the Hebraic trait of thinking concretely must be kept foremost in mind. נֶפֶשׁ has been variously associated with throat, neck and breath as its basic concrete expression.”<sup>27</sup> He concludes that the basic meaning most probably was “throat” or “neck” and that it is from this that the concept of breath developed.<sup>28</sup> Nicholas Tromp indicates a connection to Ugaritic texts. In Isa 5:14, he states that “throat is to be favoured as the translation for נֶפֶשׁ.”<sup>29</sup> Based upon this connection with the throat and then with breath,

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<sup>24</sup>Cf. H. Seebass, “Nefesh,” *TDOT* (1998), 9:504. Seebass suggests that this is usually assumed to be the “concrete primary meaning” while Brotzman lists it as one of the secondary categories. Brotzman, *Man and the Meaning of Nephesh*, 401.

<sup>25</sup>*Ibid.*, 499-502.

<sup>26</sup>For a complete analysis of each of these categories, see Ellis R. Brotzman, “The Plurality of ‘Soul’ in the Old Testament with Special Attention Given to the Use of *Nephesh*” (Ph.D. diss., New York University, 1987).

<sup>27</sup>Warne, 62.

<sup>28</sup>*Ibid.* Lys notes the etymological connection between “*nphsh*” and the “Akkadian *napashu*, ‘to breathe’ (with localization in the ‘throat,’ *naphishtu*), i.e., not merely to live but to get more potentiality in a dynamic way.” Lys, *The Israelite Soul*, 185-186.

<sup>29</sup>Nicholas J. Tromp, *Primitive Conceptions of Death and the Nether World in the Old Testament* (Rome: Pontifical Biblical Institute, 1969), 105.

Warne notes that “most interpreters have interpreted נִפְשׁ as the equivalent of ‘anima’ (Latin), that is, the life-breath of the human person.”<sup>30</sup> Lys has noted that this concept of breath is clearly evidenced when the LXX translates *qol nefesh* (כָּל-נִפְשׁ) as πᾶν ἐμπέον, “every breathing thing” in Josh 10:28, 30, 35, 37, 39 and 11:11 stating, “*nephesh* is understood on the basis of the idea of respiration and life: ‘every soul’ means ‘every breathing being.’”<sup>31</sup>

Lys describes *nefesh* in its most basic meaning as “the primitive idea of ‘potentiality’ manifested in the various aspects of vitality, as expressing the totality of life, the starting point being the act of breathing and its localization in the throat. But if *nefesh* can indicate the living being and be rendered by the personal pronoun, it has no personal quality; it is the animation of a personal being, but not what gives this being his personal identity; in other words, *nefesh* is not an ontological substance.”<sup>32</sup> “*Nefesh*, then, did not refer to an immaterial principle within the human person, which could have its own independent existence apart from the person. *Nefesh* was an integral part of the human organism, and was perceived as inseparable from the concretely existing human person.”<sup>33</sup> Along these lines, Aubrey Johnson writes “that in Israelite thought man is conceived, not so much in dual fashion as ‘body’ and ‘soul’, but synthetically as a unit of

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<sup>30</sup>Warne, 62. Wolff notes that the English translation of soul, the French translation of *âme*, and the German translation of *seele* go back to the Greek translation in the LXX of *nefesh* (נִפְשׁ) by ψυχή and the Latin translation by *anima*. Hans W. Wolff, *Anthropology of the Old Testament*, trans. Margaret Kohl (London: SCM Press, 1974), 10.

<sup>31</sup>Lys, *The Israelite Soul*, 197.

<sup>32</sup>Ibid., 182.

<sup>33</sup>Warne, 62-63.

vital power or (in current terminology) a psycho-physical organism. That is to say, the various members and secretions of the body, such as the bones, the heart, the bowels, and the kidneys, as well as the flesh and the blood, can all be thought of as revealing psychical properties.”<sup>34</sup>

In an overarching statement regarding *nefesh*, Segal concludes, “Although *nefesh* occurs quite frequently in the Hebrew text, there is no evidence that the ancient Hebrews conceived of an ‘immortal’ soul in our philosophical sense of the term. . . . It [soul] is important because it marks the identity of the person but not because it survives death for a beatific reward.”<sup>35</sup> In regard to the notion of personhood, it is important to keep in mind that this does not carry with the modern idea of consciousness. In Hebrew thought, the soul could be diminished in certain people and could be elevated in others.<sup>36</sup> Jan Bremmer notes that the ancient Hebrew concept has no connection to the Pythagorean or Platonic doctrine of immortality.<sup>37</sup> Segal sums up the difference between Hebrew and modern thought, “We think we have a soul; the Hebrews thought they were a soul.”<sup>38</sup>

### **Soul in Greek and Roman Thought**

This study now turns to the idea of the soul in the Greek and Roman world. Bremer states that it is not easy to determine what the Greeks meant by either soul or

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<sup>34</sup>Aubrey R. Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel*, 2d ed. (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1964), 87.

<sup>35</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 143. This notion of identity will prove important in the early Church Fathers.

<sup>36</sup>*Ibid.*, 144. Cf. Johnson, 7.

<sup>37</sup>Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall*, 11-40.

<sup>38</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 144.



immortality, especially in the early stages of its usage.<sup>39</sup> In fact, in the early period the Greeks did not have a word to correspond to the modern notion of soul.<sup>40</sup>

### Homer and Hesiod

The twentieth-century Western mind associates soul (ψυχή) with the rise of psychology and psychiatry as fields of study. One's soul is the seat of one's thoughts and emotions. The ancient Greek at the time of Homer thought along completely different lines.<sup>41</sup> Bremmer notes that, for them, one's soul is only mentioned in times of personal crisis, never as part of the normal functioning person.<sup>42</sup> While there has been much

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<sup>39</sup>Jan M. Bremer, "Death and Immortality in Some Greek Poems," in *Hidden Futures: Death and Immortality in Ancient Egypt, Anatolia, the Classical, Biblical and Arabic-Islamic World*, ed. Jan M. Bremer et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1994). Cf. Dale B. Martin, *The Corinthian Body* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1995), 3-37. Martin argues, at times unconvincingly, that the body/soul dichotomy in modern thought and culture, being mediated through the Cartesian revolution, is unrelated to that found in Plato and others of his time.

<sup>40</sup>See Albrecht Dihle, "Psyche in the Greek World," *TDNT* (1974), 9:608.

<sup>41</sup>For studies on the Homeric understanding of the soul, see D. B. Claus, *Toward the Soul: An Enquiry into the Meaning of Psyche before Plato* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1981), 57-102; Thomas Jahn, *Zum Wortfeld "Seele-Geist" in der Sprache Homers* (Munich: Beck, 1987), 27-38; Ruth Padel, *In and Out of the Mind: Greek Images of the Tragic Self* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1992); Erwin Rohde, *Psyche: The Cult of Souls and Belief in Immortality among the Greeks*, trans. W. B. Hillis (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1950), 3-54; Hans Schwabl, "Homer und die platonische Seelenlehre," in *Psyche-Seele-Anima: Festschrift für Karin Alt zum 7. Mai 1998*, ed. Jens Holzhausen, Beiträge zur Altertumskunde (Stuttgart: B. G. Teubner, 1998); Sonnemans, 249-253; Shirley D. Sullivan, *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say*, vol. 144 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 77-90. Solmsen notes that for Homer, the presence of the soul in the body meant life whereas its absence meant death. F. Solmsen, "Plato and the Concept of the Soul," *Journal of the History of Ideas* 44, no. 3 (1983): 355. For a study on the relationship of the soul and body in antiquity, see Johannes Herschberger, *Seele und Leib in der Spätantike*, vol. 8, no. 1 (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1969)

<sup>42</sup>See for example Homer, *Iliad* 9:322. Cf. Jan N. Bremmer, *The Early Greek Concept of the Soul* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 14-20. One's ψυχή could escape through the mouth or through a gaping wound or even during swoons or

scholarly debate over the Homeric soul, David Claus asserts that “the only meanings of ψυχή clearly attested in Homer are the ‘shade’ and the ‘life’ destroyed at death.”<sup>43</sup> This “modern” function of the ψυχη as the seat of the psychological individual in Greek thought was not located in one place but in many, such as the *thymos*, *menos*, *nous*, and the words for other body organs such as kidney, heart, and lung.<sup>44</sup>

Modern anthropologists have shed light on how “primitive” peoples view the human soul. They have shown that they often looked on themselves as having two souls.

On the one hand, there is what these scholars call the free soul, a soul which represents the individual personality. This soul is inactive when the body is active; it only manifests itself during swoons, dreams or at death . . . but it has no clear connections with the physical or psychological aspects of the body. On the other hand, there are a number of body-souls, which endow the body with life and consciousness, but of which none stands for that part of a person that survives after death.

The Homeric concept of the soul of the living is clearly closely related to these ideas. Here too we find on the one hand the *psyche*, a kind of free-soul, and on the

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dreams. See also Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*, 1-2; John Chadwick, *Lexicographica Graeca: Contributions to the Lexicography of Ancient Greek* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996), 307-320; Dihle, “Psyche in the Greek World,” 9:609; Padel; Rohde, *Psyche*, 6, 8; Sullivan, *Psychological and Ethical Ideas*, 77-78; idem, *Euripides’ Use of Psychological Terminology* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2000), 83. For a comparison with the later Hippocratic understanding, see Beate Gundert, “Soma and Psyche in Hippocratic Medicine,” in *Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. John P. Wright et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000).

<sup>43</sup>Claus, 61. Cf. Athenagoras Zakopoulos, *Plato and Saint Paul on Man* (Thessalonica: n.p., 2002), 3.

<sup>44</sup>Jan N. Bremmer, “The Soul in Early and Classical Greece,” in *Der Begriff der Seele in der Religionswissenschaft*, ed. Johann Figl et al. (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), 160; Sullivan, *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say*, 14-18; idem, *Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New* (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press, 1997); idem, *Euripides’ Use of Psychological Terminology*. For a thorough survey of early studies on this practice, see Jahn, 124-181.

other the body-souls, the *thymos* and all that.<sup>45</sup>

It is this free soul that finds a connection with the notion of breath. The connection in Greek thought between soul and breath is demonstrated etymologically by the connection between ψυχή and ψυχέιν, “to breathe.”<sup>46</sup>

Farnell argues that in Homer’s theory, “a man has one soul only, such as it is, not many souls or selves inside him to which different things may happen after death, as we find in the psychology or the theologic metaphysic of some advanced and some primitive peoples: secondly the departed soul plays little or no part in the lives of the living, the ghost is not an object of terror, nor does his wrath pursue the living.”<sup>47</sup>

The soul in the time of the Homeric poems was known to survive death,<sup>48</sup> after

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<sup>45</sup>Bremmer, “The Soul in Early and Classical Greece,” 160. Bremmer notes in a later work that it is not correct to say that this body-soul is non-physical, rather that it does not have a connection to the physical aspects of the individual’s body. Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*, 2.

<sup>46</sup>See D. Q. Adams, *A Dictionary of Tocharian B* (Amsterdam, n.p., 1999), 41-42; Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*, 2; J. Jouanna, “Le souffle, la vie et le froid: remarques sur la famille de *psychô* d’Homère à Hippocrate,” *Revue des Études Grecques* 100 (1987): 203-224; J. T. Katz, “Shorter Notes—Homeric Hymn to Hermes 296,” *Classical Quarterly* 49 (1999): 318n18; M. L. West, *The East Face of Helicon* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 151-152. West connects to Near Eastern beliefs in contrast to the accepted view of an Indo-European link.

<sup>47</sup>Farnell, 9.

<sup>48</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 3. On the relationship between death and one’s philosophy of soul, see Bartel Poortman, “Death and Immortality in Greek Philosophy,” in *Hidden Futures: Death and Immortality in Ancient Egypt, Anatolia, the Classical, Biblical and Arabic-Islamic World*, ed. Jan M. Bremer et al. (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1994). He notes that the Homeric poems give a picture of Hellenic life during the eleventh and tenth centuries and concludes that the poems generally can be taken to represent beliefs that had not grown up overnight but rather reached even further back into Greek history thus indicating that they did believe in the survival of the soul. The hero cults and the cult of ancestors give evidence of early hope for the continued existence of the individual, if not specifically the soul, after death. Farnell writes, “The souls are not without hope, for special divinities, Hermes and the Earth-mother, have charge of them; and the living kinsmen can supplicate these powers on behalf of their

which it made its way to Hades.<sup>49</sup> Patroclus says to the sleeping Achilles before he is buried, “You sleep, and have forgotten me, Achilles. Not in my life were You unmindful of me, but now in my death! Bury me with all speed, that I pass within the gates of Hades. Afar do the spirits keep me aloof, the phantoms of men that have done with toils, neither suffer they me to join myself to them beyond the River, but vainly I wander through the wide-gated house of Hades.”<sup>50</sup> After hearing Patroclus’s spirit speaking to him, Achilles reached out to take hold of him.

So saying he reached forth with his hands, yet clasped him not; but the spirit like a vapour was gone beneath the earth, gibbering faintly. And seized with amazement Achilles sprang up, and smote his hands together, and spake a word of wailing: “Look you now, even in the house of Hades is the spirit and phantom somewhat, albeit the mind be not anywise therein; for the whole night long hath the spirit of hapless Patroclus stood over me, weeping and wailing, and gave me charge concerning each thing, and was wondrously like his very self.”<sup>51</sup>

Here the soul of Patroclus is described as needing a proper burial in order to cross over to Hades. Achilles hears the plea for a burial and reaches out to touch his slain friend but sees that there is nothing but vapor where he had imagined his comrade.

The gods of the underworld would not allow Patroclus entrance to Hades without his burial. This notion of the underworld being under the control of certain gods is noted

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dear ones. Here for the first time in Europe we have record of a service similar to prayers for the dead; and this implies the feeling that the lot of the soul after death may be the happier if the nether powers can be specially propitiated.” Farnell, 346.

<sup>49</sup>Richardson notes that after the burning of the body, the soul was free to go to Hades and suggests that cremation was possibly noted as a quicker way to release the soul from this world though he notes that the Greeks practiced both inhumation and cremation side by side. N. J. Richardson, “Early Greek Views about Life after Death,” in *Greek Religion and Society*, ed. P. E. Easterling et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 50-51.

<sup>50</sup>Homer *Il.* 23.69-74.

<sup>51</sup>Homer *Il.* 23.99-108.

by Farnell. He highlights this as an important distinction between Homeric thought and that of the Hebrews. “Another fact emerges in the Homeric theory of importance for the future development of a higher belief concerning the soul. The spirit-world, unlike Sheol in the older Hebraic view, is under the control of certain deities, a phenomenon found also in other polytheistic religions.”<sup>52</sup>

Bremmer notes that the “meaning of *psychê* as ‘soul of the dead’ will remain present all through antiquity.”<sup>53</sup> What is important to note is that one’s soul was not the only mode in which one existed after the death of the body. He also notes that

the deceased was also compared to a shadow or presented as an *eidolon* or ‘image’, a word that suggests that for the ancient Greeks the dead looked like the living. Yet, this is only true to a limited extent, as the physical actions of the souls of the dead were described in two opposite ways. On the one hand, the Greeks believed that the dead souls moved and spoke like the living; the image of the deceased in the memory of the living plays a major part in this activity. . . . On the other hand, the souls of the dead are depicted as being unable to move or speak properly.<sup>54</sup>

Maurice Hogan connects the ideas surrounding the soul with the wider world view that was in place. In commenting on the impact of Hesiod he writes,

Hesiod moves beyond the myth in his discovery of the order of existence that can be lost and this gives rise to his experiences of anxiety and hope which lie at the experiential core. His insight is that the just order of living decreed by Zeus demands of man that he shoulder the burden of existence and work in justice with his fellow human beings. However, the life of the soul has not yet become an independent source of order but is still tied to the social and cosmic order so that once society declines, the soul has no option but to follow. The soul’s consciousness of its independence and its attunement to a divine source of order beyond society has yet to be articulated.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>52</sup>Farnell, 9-10.

<sup>53</sup>Bremmer, “The Soul in Early and Classical Greece,” 164. Cf. Sullivan, *Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New*, 150.

<sup>54</sup>Bremmer, “The Soul in Early and Classical Greece,” 164.

<sup>55</sup>Maurice P. Hogan, *The Biblical Vision of the Human Person: Implications for a*

Hogan further argues that the notion of the soul as developed after Hesiod served to provide a new source of order to compete with the older concept of *polis*. He notes that the two centuries after Hesiod “were marked by the appearance of a remarkable succession of individual thinkers which had the effect of letting the soul emerge as the tentative source of order in competition with the myth and the aristocratic culture of the polis. Nevertheless, within the polis occurred the differentiation of personality as the epic was succeeded by the lyric, the lyric by tragedy, and tragedy by philosophy.”<sup>56</sup>

By the end of the Archaic Age, the soul in Greek thought does not leave the body as it had previously in Homer.<sup>57</sup> A development in the doctrine had been taking place throughout the Archaic Age and this is only one of the changes exhibited.<sup>58</sup> During the sixth century, several major developments “helped to provide a richer experience of the soul from which later philosophers could draw. The Orphic movement centred on the

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*Philosophical Anthropology*, vol. 504 (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1994), 35.

<sup>56</sup>Ibid., 30.

<sup>57</sup>Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*, 2.

<sup>58</sup>What is still unclear and open for debate is why this development took place. What were the precise stimuli that acted upon Greek thinkers to bring about this change? Many scholars have suggested an influence from shamanism. Another suggestion is that political changes were taking place and that the changing of the understanding of the soul paralleled this. Bremmer, *Rise and Fall*, 2n15, along with material on shamanism and Bremmer’s ideas at the end of chapter 2. For more on Greek shamanism, see Leonid J. Zhmud, *Wissenschaft, Philosophie und Religion im frühen Pythagoreismus* (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 1997), 107-116. Cf. Voegelin who speaks of the “vexing problem of the soul—vexing because the extant literary documents are so scanty that the development towards the self-understanding of the soul cannot be traced in continuity. There is a period in which a knowledge of the soul does not yet exist, and we may roughly call this period ‘Homeric’; and then, all of a sudden, the meaning of the soul is present in the work of Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Heraclitus, probably under the influence of the Pythagorean movement.” Eric Voegelin, *Order and History* (n.p.: Louisiana State University Press, 1957), 2:221.

purification of the soul, while the Pythagoreans developed a way of life and discipline through which the immortality of the soul could be attained.”<sup>59</sup>

### Orphism

The Orphic notion of the origin of the soul is related to the earlier discussion on the meaning of both ψυχή and *anima*. “The idea behind this is that the soul, the life-principle, either is itself air or being of similar substance is blown about with the winds and is drawn into the body at birth.”<sup>60</sup> Aristotle tells us this about the Orphic soul, stating that it “comes into us from space as we breathe, born by the winds.”<sup>61</sup> A new element here is the notion of heavenly or divine origins.<sup>62</sup>

In the late archaic and early classical eras, Orphism began to develop<sup>63</sup> what

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<sup>59</sup>Hogan, 36.

<sup>60</sup>William Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion: A Study of the Orphic Movement*, 2d ed. (London: Methuen and Company, 1952), 94.

<sup>61</sup>Aristotle *De anima* 1.5 410b28. Guthrie connects this to the idea of the egg which is born by the wind, indicating that the female conceived alone without the aid of a male partner. On this see *ibid.*, 92-104.

<sup>62</sup>Claude Tresmontant, *Le problème de l'âme* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1971), 16-17; Zakopoulos, 9.

<sup>63</sup>The connection between Orphism and Pythagoras is not entirely clear. Rohde states, “In any case we must take it as certain that the correspondence of Orphic and Pythagorean doctrine on the subject of the soul is not purely accidental. Did Pythagoras when he came to Italy (about 532) find Orphic societies already settled in Kroton and Metapontum, and did he associate himself with their ideas? Or did the ‘Orphic’ sectaries (as Herodotos [*sic*] imagined) owe their inspiration to Pythagoras and his disciples.” Rohde, *Psyche*, 337. Cf. Fritz Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung Athens in vorhellenistischer Zeit*, ed. Walter Burkert et al., vol. 33 (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1974), 92-94. For overviews of the Orphic background, see Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, 6-68; G. R. S. Mead, *Orpheus* (London: John M Watkins, 1965), 13-25. For a discussion on the world soul concept in Orphism, see Mead, 174-186.

Redfield refers to as a counter-cultural movement.<sup>64</sup> As Farnell has already noted, a belief in some sort of afterlife seems to have been in existence from the earliest years of Greek thinking. With the Orphics, however, another key development “occurs when the next world is seen as compensatory for the moral inadequacy of this one.”<sup>65</sup> In the middle of the fifth century, Pindar asserts that mortals pay in this life for crimes committed in the previous world and will pay for crimes in the next world for evils committed in this one.<sup>66</sup> He adds to this the teaching that those who pass three times from this world to the next and back without committing crimes will then be granted the right to pass to the Isle of the Blessed.<sup>67</sup>

Behind this Orphic anthropology is earlier Greek mythology. Accordingly, humans were believed to have been created out the ashes of the Titans. The Titans had been destroyed by Zeus because they had murdered and boiled his son Dionysus. Thus, humans were seen as having a body from the Titans and a divine soul from Dionysus.

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<sup>64</sup>James Redfield, “The Politics of Immortality,” in *Orphisme et Orphée: en l’honneur de Jean Rudhardt*, ed. Philippe Borgeaud, Recherches et Rencontres (Geneva: Droz, 1991), 105. The ecstatic Thracian worship of Dionysus seems to have been the fertile ground out of which Orpheus drew his religious rites. On this religion of Dionysus, Rohde states, “Wherever a cultus of this kind, making its aim and object the evocation of ecstatic raptures, has taken root—whether in whole races of men or in religious communities—there we find in close alliance with it, whether as cause or effect or both, a peculiarly vital belief in the life and power of the soul of man after its separation from the body. Our comparative glance over the analogous phenomena of other lands has shown us that the exalted worship offered to ‘Dionysos’ among the Thracians was only a single variety of a method, familiar to more than half the human race, of getting into touch with the divine by a religious ‘enthousiasmos’.” Rohde, *Psyche*, 263. For an analysis of the connection between Orpheus and the Eleusian mysteries, see Graf, *Eleusis und die orphische Dichtung*, 22-39.

<sup>65</sup>Redfield, 105. See also Dihle, “Psyche in the Greek World,” 9:611.

<sup>66</sup>Pindar, *Ol.* 2.53-56.

<sup>67</sup>Pindar, *Ol.* 2.68-77. See Rohde, *Psyche*, 414-419.



The body, in this matrix, is conceived of as a prison for the soul from which the soul must escape.<sup>68</sup> This is illustrated in the following Orphic description of life after death.

“Having avoided the dangers of error on the road, the soul addresses the divine guardians of the Lake of Memory in terms that proclaim his kinship with God: ‘I am the son of earth and starry heaven, and by birth I come from God: ye know this well yourselves.’ We have here the claim to immortality based on the presence of the divine element in man’s soul; and the origin of man in this Orphic Confessional is the same as that which Hesiod attributes to the Gods.”<sup>69</sup>

Farnell identifies two other key points in Orphic eschatology and anthropology: “(a) the doctrine of purgative punishments whereby the soul is purified—‘I have paid the penalty for unrighteous deeds’ is the confession of the purified soul; (b) the doctrine of reincarnation through a cycle of existences at the close of which the soul may find deliverance and rest—‘I have fled forth from the wheel of bitter and sorrowful existence.’”<sup>70</sup>

The philosophic base of Orphism is an underlying dualism that is remedied by

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<sup>68</sup>See Kroll, 8; Norman Russell, *The Doctrine of Deification in the Greek Patristic Tradition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 30. On Dionysus as the lord of souls, see Walter Burkert, *Homo necans: The Anthropology of Ancient Greek Sacrificial Ritual and Myth*, trans. Peter Bing (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983), 226-227.

<sup>69</sup>Farnell, 375. On the connection between human souls and astral bodies, see Ioan P. Culianu, *Psychanodia I: A Survey of the Evidence Concerning the Ascension of the Soul and Its Relevance* (Leiden: Brill, 1983), 10-12.

<sup>70</sup>Farnell, 377. See also Mead, 187-195. The idea of reincarnation is described by Plato in the *Cratylus*: “According to some the body is the sepulchre of the soul.” Plato, *Crat.* 5.513. Note the play on words between body and sepulchre. On the idea of a soul/body dualism, see also Rohde, 342. Plato seems to indicate this in *Crat.* 400c. For a bibliography on metempsychosis in the Orphics, see Giovanni Casadio, “La Metempsicosi tra Orgeo e Pitagora,” in *Orphisme et Orphée: en l’honneur de Jean Rudhardt*, ed. Philippe Borgeaud (Geneva: Droz, 1991).

asceticism and various purification rites.

The body is regarded as evil . . . and the soul suffers from its imprisonment within it: this life is a purgation, and the only way to avoid the contamination of the body is to practice extreme and anxious purity. Purity safeguards the divine element within us, which is further maintained by sacrificial communion. The purified soul at once, after leaving the body, enters upon the higher life, but the purgation must continue through a cycle of lives, perhaps three; and the soul that emerges successfully is at last released and henceforth abides perpetually with God, and is itself a god. The soul is here conceived, so far as conception was possible to the average mind, as immaterial, and there is in this system no resurrection of the body.<sup>71</sup>

Purity could be obtained by avoiding certain foods, avoiding certain contaminating situations, and also by priestly purification rituals.<sup>72</sup> “The soul which comes from the divine and strives . . . return thither, has no other purpose to fulfill upon earth (and therefore no other moral law to obey); it must be free from life itself and be pure from all that is earthly.”<sup>73</sup> Purification here concerns the soul, but what the soul is to be purified from is the deeds of the body.

In Orphism, the soul was in a constant cyclical state of being entombed in a body and then released at death only to be reunited with another body a short while later. This imprisonment in the body was a punishment for the faults of its previous life. Those initiated in the orphic mysteries and who kept themselves pure were able, upon the soul’s release from the body, to descend to the underworld and there find the blessed state of eternal existence free from any more bodies.<sup>74</sup>

However another idea slowly makes its introduction here. Whereas, usually, the

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<sup>71</sup>Farnell, 381.

<sup>72</sup>Herodotus mentions that the Egyptians avoid wool in temples or being buried in it (*Hist* 2.81), and Euripides (*Hipp.* 952) speaks regarding not eating animal flesh.

<sup>73</sup>Rohde, *Psyche*, 343.

<sup>74</sup>On this, see *ibid.*, 344-345. Cf. Mead, 187-195.

soul would go down after death, the Orphics also write of the final resting place after release from the cycle of rebirth as above. “That the soul should go to Heaven seems to have been a familiar idea in the fifth century. The word used is not usually Heaven, but *aither*. *Aither* was the substance which filled the pure outer reaches of Heaven, beyond the impure atmosphere (*aer*) which surrounds the earth and extends as far as the moon. It was in this region that divinity dwelt, and the *aither* itself was supposed to be divine.”<sup>75</sup>

### Pythagoras

The connections between Pythagorean thought and that of the Orphic school in regard to anthropology are not clear. Bremmer argues, “It seems, then, that Orphism was the product of Pythagorean influence on Bacchic mysteries in the first quarter of the fifth century, but despite their similarities both movements also displayed many differences.”<sup>76</sup> However, earlier Kroll wrote that Orphic thought on the immortality of the soul was “taken over” and “refined” by the Pythagoreans.<sup>77</sup> Which came first is not entirely clear, but that there are connections is uncontested.

As with the Orphic school of thought, the transmigration of the soul, or metempsychosis,<sup>78</sup> and the immortality of the soul<sup>79</sup> are two important ideas connected to

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<sup>75</sup>Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion*, 185. Guthrie mentions Euripides’ statement in *Hel* 1016 that the mind is an “immortal thing, plunging into the immortal aither.” In the *Placita*, Orphics suggested that the stars were inhabitable. *O.F.* 22.

<sup>76</sup>Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*, 24. For the connection with the Eleusian mysteries, see Graf.

<sup>77</sup>Kroll, 9.

<sup>78</sup>Walter Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, trans. Edwin L. Minar, Jr. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), 120. Cf. J. Barnes, *The Presocratic Philosophers* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1982), 104. He suggests that the connection between transmigration and Pythagoras is “dubious.” For recent opinions regarding where Pythagoras might have obtained this notion, see Bremmer, *The*

Pythagoras.<sup>80</sup> Two ancient documents mention Pythagoras's concept of reincarnation. Aristotle states, "They try to say what kind of thing the soul is, but do not go on to specify about the body which is to receive the soul, as though it were possible, as in the tales of the Pythagoreans, for just any soul to clothe itself in just any body."<sup>81</sup> Bremmer mentions an epigram from first-century Ephesus, "if according to Pythagoras the psyche passes to somebody else"<sup>82</sup> where the notion of a transmigrating soul is again attributed to Pythagoras. An important concept regarding the immortality of the Pythagorean soul which is capable of reincarnation is its distinction from nature.<sup>83</sup> It is only entombed

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*Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*, 24-26. Cf. Karl Hoheisel, "Das frühe Christentum und die Seelenwanderung," *Jahrbuch für Antike und Christentum* 1984/1985 (1985): 25-34.

<sup>79</sup>As noted above, Bremmer suggests that the development of the notion of an immortal soul may have been prompted by a loss of political influence. In order for this to happen, the development in the Greek doctrine of the soul, identifying it with the self was a necessary corollary. Bremmer, *Rise and Fall*, 2n15. For a similar political suggestion regarding the Orphics and Pythagoras, see Redfield, 107-108. Cf. Sullivan, *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say*. She notes that it is difficult to say for sure what Pythagoras's teachings were because of their originally secret nature. For a discussion on whether Pythagoras or Pherecydes is the first to teach these two doctrines, see Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*, 12-13.

<sup>80</sup>Rohde states in regard to the Pythagorean doctrine of the soul, "The soul of man, once more regarded entirely as the 'double' of the visible body and its powers, is a daimonic immortal being that has been cast down from divine heights and for a punishment is confined within the 'custody' of the body. It has no real relationship with the body; it is not what may be called the personality of the individual visible man: any soul may dwell in any body." Rohde, *Psyche*, 375. For recent studies on Pythagoras's view of the soul, see Russell, 30; Sullivan, *Psychological and Ethical Ideas: What Early Greeks Say*, 106-111; Zhmud, 117-128.

<sup>81</sup>Aristotle, *On the Soul*, 407b20. Though Aristotle does not attribute this directly to Pythagoras but rather to the Pythagoreans, it still seems likely that this does give an indication of the master's teaching. Cf. James A. Philip, *Pythagoras and Early Pythagoreanism* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1966), 151-171.

<sup>82</sup>*I. Ephesos* 3901 (*SEG* 31.951), quoted in Bremmer, *The Rise and Fall of the Afterlife*, 12.

<sup>83</sup>See Rohde, *Psyche*, 376.

within the body as a form of punishment. The entire goal of the life of the soul is to find release at death.

### Pre-Socratic Thought

As was hinted at by the Orphics, Heraclitus, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Empedocles begin to relate the soul to the divine. In this, they have been described as being “primarily of a religious nature. . . . They are the first major experiences of the soul in its participation in a transcendent divine reality which are recognized by individuals who were undergoing these experiences.”<sup>84</sup>

In the teaching of the Ionian philosophers, the idea of the soul changed from being connected to an individual person in the Homeric period to a notion of force or movement that was present throughout the world. “Thus, the psyche loses the special singularity that distinguished it from all the other things and substance in the world, and made it incomparable and unique.”<sup>85</sup>

Willem Verdenius notes that for Heraclitus, soul is equated with fire and the human soul is not separated from the world soul.<sup>86</sup> Thus a drunk soul has lost its way and a dry soul is best. For Heraclitus, “The soul of man has a claim to immortality only as an emanation of this universal Reason, and shares the immortality which belongs to it.”<sup>87</sup> This is because Heraclitus has changed the concept of death. For him, everything is

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<sup>84</sup>Hogan, 37.

<sup>85</sup>Rohde, *Psyche*, 365.

<sup>86</sup>Willem J. Verdenius, “Some Aspects of Heraclitus’ Anthropology,” in *Images of Man in Ancient and Medieval Thought* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1976).

<sup>87</sup>Rohde, 370-371. Cf. Zakopoulos, 11.

becoming; a perpetual change from fire to water to earth and back again.<sup>88</sup> This even seems to be true for the One.<sup>89</sup>

Heraclitus connects the notion of divinity and the wisdom of philosophical thought directly with the immortality of the soul.

He began the first differentiated exploration of the soul and his lasting achievement was to state that the soul would have to be a spiritual or divine being (*daimon*) in order to be immortal, thus creating a basis for a critical philosophical anthropology. . . . Wisdom is the attribute of the divine; seeking wisdom is the defining attribute of man so that the philosophical orientation of the soul becomes the criterion of 'true' humanity. The soul therefore is the source of truth only when it is directed to the divine in the loving pursuit of wisdom.<sup>90</sup>

Hogan notes that the new developments in the doctrine of the soul were, in a way, a transition in the source of authority over the individual. "The emergence of the new source of authority in the soul of the mystic philosophers is expressed by Xenophanes in his opposition to the polis. He pits his new *arête*, or excellence of *sophie* (wisdom) against the *aretai* of the Olympic games which were ranked highest by the polis."<sup>91</sup>

Parmenides was the one "who differentiated the soul to the point where its supernatural destiny achieves consciousness and reaches linguistic articulation for the first time."<sup>92</sup> Empedocles also emphasized the Orphic notions of purification in

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<sup>88</sup>Verdenius, 31-32.

<sup>89</sup>See for instance *fr.* 78 where Heraclitus states that "the One that is in all things is at once dead and alive."

<sup>90</sup>Hogan, 39-40. Cf. Rohde who notes that "the individual in its isolation has, for Herakleitos, neither value nor importance: to persist in this isolation (if it had been possible) would have seemed to him a crime. The Fire is for him indestructible and immortal as a totality, not as divided into individual particles, but only as the one Universal Mind that transforms itself into all things and draws all things back into itself." Rohde, *Psyche*, 370.

<sup>91</sup>Hogan, 37.

<sup>92</sup>*Ibid.*

connection with the immortality of the soul.

The transition from the Homeric understanding of the soul, which saw it as existing as a shade in Hades after the separation from the body at death, to a concept of true immortality, understood as an entity which was capable of eternally experiencing regular human pleasures as experienced during its connection to the body, was not one that could be made without outside influence, according to Erwin Rohde.<sup>93</sup> He notes that it was clear in Greek thought that to be immortal was to be divine but yet the separation that existed between the divine and the human was also a key element to Greek thought.<sup>94</sup> Thus there needed to be an introduction, from outside of Greece, regarding the divinity and immortality of the human soul. Rohde sees this as coming from mysticism which he described as “a second order of religion which, though little remarked by the religion of the people and by orthodox believers, gained a footing in isolated sects and influenced certain philosophical schools.”<sup>95</sup>

### Poets

The concept of soul undergoes a further development with the lyric and elegiac poets.<sup>96</sup> It now clearly represents a separate active entity of the psychological self. In

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<sup>93</sup>See Rohde, *Psyche*, 253. He goes so far as to say that it was “impossible, then, that the cult of the souls should produce out of itself the idea . . . of the soul indestructible by its very nature.”

<sup>94</sup>*Ibid.*, 253-254.

<sup>95</sup>*Ibid.*, 254-255. Rohde sees this introduction in the Thracian worship of Dionysus.

<sup>96</sup>Cf. Philip, 154; Sullivan, *Aeschylus' Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New*, 144. For this section on Aeschylus, I rely on Sullivan, *Aeschylus' Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New*.

doing so, it does not lose its previous usage. “The influence of Heraclitus is evident in the works of the Athenian tragedians, Aeschylus, Sophocles and Euripides, in that he had developed a vocabulary for speaking about the soul. . . . The great tragedies of Aeschylus are deliberately created actions and their truth is the process by which the mature man reaches his decision by means of the movements of his soul. The participation of the soul in the unseen transcendent divinity is explored in the action.”<sup>97</sup>

In Aeschylus, several new usages are mentioned. It can be ransomed or destroyed.<sup>98</sup> One can pay with it or find that it has worn away.<sup>99</sup> It even takes on the role of judgment.<sup>100</sup> Aegisthus writes of a ‘cowardly’ soul.<sup>101</sup>

Pindar describes two varying doctrines regarding the soul. In one of them, he suggests that after death, all that is left to the soul is its memory by the living. This falls in line with the cult of the souls that existed previously in popular thought. However, Pindar also could speak of the soul, which is asleep while the individual is awake. It is not representative of the individual person or of one’s mental powers. It follows along the lines of an individual’s double that was seen in previous times also.<sup>102</sup> This soul was subject to the birth/rebirth process well-known by this time. Several faultless lives were needed before one could escape the cycle.

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<sup>97</sup>Hogan, 40.

<sup>98</sup>Aeschylus *Ag.* 965; 1457; 1466.

<sup>99</sup>Aeschylus *Choe.* 276; 749.

<sup>100</sup>Aeschylus *Per.* 29.

<sup>101</sup>Aegisthus *Ag.* 1643. For a more complete analysis of these usages, see Sullivan, *Aeschylus’ Use of Psychological Terminology: Traditional and New*, 150.

<sup>102</sup>On this, see Rohde, *Psyche*, 414-419.



## Plato

Perhaps none has influenced the Western understanding of the soul more than Plato.<sup>103</sup> He combined the mystical elements of the Orphic-Pythagorean approach with the emergent philosophy of the day.<sup>104</sup>

For Plato, an essential aspect of the soul is self-motion.<sup>105</sup> As the principle of movement it becomes also the principle of life. When the soul is in the body, the body moves and can be said to be alive. This is known because the body moves. With the connection between movement and life, the soul can be said to be life itself.<sup>106</sup> Regarding the origin of the soul, there has been a great deal of scholarly debate. Some argue for a soul with no beginning as described in the *Phaedrus* while others look to the *Laws* and

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<sup>103</sup>Johann Figl, "Bilder für die Seele: Eine religionswissenschaftlich-vergleichende Perspektive," in *Der Begriff der Seele in der Religionswissenschaft*, ed. Johann Figl et al. (Würzburg: Königshausen & Neumann, 2002), 22; Thümmel, 244. Cf. Thomas M. Robinson, "The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato," in *Psyche and Soma: Physicians and Metaphysicians on the Mind-body Problem from Antiquity to Enlightenment*, ed. John P. Wright et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 37. In this section, no attempt is made to differentiate between the thought of Socrates in the early dialogues and that of his pupil Plato. For a manuscript devoted entirely to Plato's psychology, see Thomas M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1970). See also John Burnet, "Socratic Doctrine of the Soul," in *Essays and Addresses* (Freeport, NY: Books for Libraries Press, 1930), 126-162; Claus, 163-164; Kenneth Dorter, *Plato's Phaedo: An Interpretation* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1982), 141-191; Rohde, *Psyche*, 463-489; Solmsen; Warne, 105-115. Translations used are from the LCL unless otherwise indicated.

<sup>104</sup>E. R. Dodds, "Plato and the Irrational Soul," in *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 208-210.

<sup>105</sup>Plato *Phaedrus* 245E2-4; *Laws* 896A1-3. See William Guthrie, "Plato's Views on the Nature of the Soul," in *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays*, ed. Gregory Vlastos (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), 240-241; Zakopoulos, 35-36.

<sup>106</sup>Plato *Rep.* 353D7-9.

thus point out that there it is spoken of as being produced first and before the body.<sup>107</sup>

What is clear is that the soul's origin predates that of the body. He argues this by writing, "If those realities we are always talking about exist, the Beautiful and the Good and all that kind of reality, and we refer all the things we perceive to that reality, discovering that it existed before and is ours, and we compare these things with it, then, just as they exist, so our soul must exist before we are born."<sup>108</sup>

In agreement with Orphic teaching, Plato assumes a fundamental dualism in regard to the soul and body.<sup>109</sup> The soul is understood to be "pure spirit" and is connected with the body only as a result of a fall or descent from above.<sup>110</sup> This dualism is also

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<sup>107</sup>Plato *Laws* 892C3-8; 899C7 *et al. Phaedrus* 245C6-246A2. Zakopoulos has an overview of the current interpretative debates. Zakopoulos, 39-45.

<sup>108</sup>Plato *Phaed.* 77D-E.

<sup>109</sup>Lys, *The Israelite Soul*, 182. Cf. Robinson, "The Defining Features of Mind-Body Dualism in the Writings of Plato," 37; Jean R. Zurcher, *The Nature and Destiny of Man*, trans. Mabel R. Bartlett (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969), 17. On this dualism, Guthrie states: "This central doctrine of the Orphics had a tremendous, and one is sometimes tempted to say unfortunate fascination for Plato. . . . I would go so far as to name the Orphics as at least one of the influences which went to form the most characteristic part of Platonism, the sharp separation of the lower world of *sensa* from the heavenly world of the Ideas." Guthrie, *Orpheus and the Greek Religion*, 157. Cf. Josef Pieper, *Enthusiasm and Divine Madness: On the Platonic Dialogue Phaedrus*, trans. Richard Winston et al. (South Bend, IN: St. Augustine's Press, 1964), 79. This section will focus on the personal soul rather than the universal soul, which Plato also discusses in depth. For example, he states in the *Phaedrus*, "do you think it possible to understand the nature of the soul satisfactorily without understanding the nature of the universe." For information on the world soul in Plato, see Luc Brisson, *Timée, Critias* (Paris: Flammarion, 1992), 35-42; Richard D. Mohr, *The Platonic Cosmology* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 171-178; E. N. Ostenfeld, *Forms, Matter and Mind: Three Strands in Plato's Metaphysics* (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), 242-253; Thomas M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology*, 2nd ed. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1995); Peter M. Steiner, *Psyche bei Platon*, Neue Studien zur Philosophie 3, ed. Rüdiger Bubner et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1992), 201-213.

<sup>110</sup>Pieper, 78-79.

related to the concept of a world soul.<sup>111</sup> This connects with Plato's notion that all souls are immortal.<sup>112</sup> Death, then, is seen as the separation of the soul from the body.<sup>113</sup>

In Plato's Socratic dialogues,<sup>114</sup> the notion of the care for one's soul is emphasized. In the *Apology*, Socrates insists that he goes "about doing nothing else than urging you, young and old, not to care for your persons or your property more than for the perfection of your souls."<sup>115</sup> Later in the *Apology*, Socrates states that he urged his listeners "to care for virtue."<sup>116</sup> While proposing a counter-sentence for his conviction, Socrates states that "I tried to persuade each of you to care for himself and his own perfection."<sup>117</sup> This statement appears to connect the ideas of soul, care of virtue, and

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<sup>111</sup>Ibid., 79. Thümmel states, "The intermediary function belongs to the soul as the world-soul which is the intermediary function between the god-spirit, eternal, undivided and the sensible-concrete, divided, variable." Thümmel, 243. On the intermediary function of the soul, see Zakopoulos, 35. For further discussion on the relationship between the world-soul and the human soul, see Richard A. Norris, *God and World in Early Christian Theology: A Study in Justin Martyr, Irenaeus, Tertullian and Origen* (New York: Seabury Press, 1965), 21-23.

<sup>112</sup>Pieper points out that this refers not only to the period after death but also to the time before birth. The soul is unborn. Pieper, 74.

<sup>113</sup>*Phaedo* 64c. See I. M. Crombie, *Plato on Man and Society*, vol. 1 of *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1962), 303-304.

<sup>114</sup>In this section, no attempt is made to divide the dialogues into a developed chronology. As such, this section does not attempt to differentiate between the historical Socrates and Plato. However, with Solmsen, it appears safe to say, "Surely these are Plato's words and in some sense Plato's interpretation of what Socrates has been doing. But that he should have read into his master's activities something quite alien to them seems an unnecessary worry." Solmsen, 357. It is also acknowledged that many now argue that any chronology with regard to Plato's dialogues is futile. For a brief review of the current debate, see Ellen Wagner, "Introduction," in *Essays on Plato's Psychology*, ed. Ellen Wagner (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2001), 22-25.

<sup>115</sup>Plato *Apol.* 30B2.

<sup>116</sup>Plato *Apol.* 31B7-8.

<sup>117</sup>Plato *Apol.* 36C.

one's self.

At the end of the *Apology*, Socrates states that there are two options regarding death. "Either it is virtually nothingness, . . . or as people say, change and migration of the soul from this to another place. And if it is unconsciousness, like a sleep in which the sleeper does not even dream, death would be a wonderful gain."<sup>118</sup> In describing this migration possibility, Socrates calls it a "change of habitation" and continues by describing all the things he would do if he were to meet all of the famous people who had died before him.

The soul also functions as a moral agent, directing between right and wrong. A clear example is seen in the *Crito*: "What about the part of us which is mutilated by wrong actions and benefited by right ones? Is life worth living with this part ruined? Or do we believe that this part of us, whatever it may be, in which right and wrong operate, is of less importance than the body?"<sup>119</sup> Here soul is a moral principle.<sup>120</sup>

The soul and the idea of the forms is not entirely clear. Plato argues that if the soul does exist, it must be as one of the forms. In commenting on this notion, Segal notes that Plato suggested that "it is also possible that the soul is a harmony, not a being in itself but a relationship between the parts, what we would today call an emergent property, which would die with the body and even devolve prior to demise. This latter

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<sup>118</sup>Plato *Apol.* 40C-D.

<sup>119</sup>Plato *Crito* 47E-48A.

<sup>120</sup>Dilman suggests that "reference to the soul" in *Gorgias* "is thus a means of talking about a moral reality that is hidden or disguised by many aspects of our lives." This he terms the impersonal part of the soul. "This is the part of the soul which responds to the affliction of another or cries out against real injustice, that forgives those who have wronged one and is thankful for what it receives." Ilham Dilman, *Morality and the Inner Life: A Study in Plato's Gorgias* (New York: Barnes and Noble Books, 1979), 180-181.

possibility, refuted by Socrates, comes rather close to modern notions of the self.”<sup>121</sup>

Plato’s description in the *Phaedrus* of the soul as a chariot team is well known.<sup>122</sup> Here the concept of harmony seems in mind as the soul is said to be “the union of powers in a team of winged steeds and their winged charioteer.” This highlights a difficult challenge of Plato’s soul theory. Is the soul simple or is it tripartite? How to maintain this view together with a simple, immortal soul has been problematic.<sup>123</sup> Guthrie argues that in its truest nature, it is simple. It is only through a connection with the body and the process of birth and rebirth that it is conceived as composite.<sup>124</sup>

In the *Republic*, the just soul is compared to the just city. Socrates said, ““We must remember, then, that each of us also in whom the several parts within him perform each their own task—he will be a just man and one who minds his own affair.””<sup>125</sup> This statement can also be made of the city as there is a one-to-one correspondence between the parts which perform their task in the city and the parts which perform their tasks in the soul. The soul here is divided into three parts, the rational, spirited, and appetitive, while the city is divided into the philosopher-guardian, the soldiers, and the laborers.

Some have questioned the need of some commentators to focus on the *parts* of

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<sup>121</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 231.

<sup>122</sup>Pieper, 76-78. For a thorough study on the *Palinode*, see Crombie, 341-359; Charles L. Griswold, *Self-Knowledge in Plato’s Phaedrus* (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1986), 74-137.

<sup>123</sup>For a review of the various positions taken by modern scholars, see Zakopoulos, 47-62.

<sup>124</sup>Guthrie, “Plato’s Views on the Nature of the Soul,” 232-233.

<sup>125</sup>Plato *Rep.* 4.441d-e.

Plato's soul.<sup>126</sup> Robert Cross and Anthony Woozley conclude that "if Plato's soul has parts, it has so in a metaphorical sense; and, until the metaphor is cashed into literal language, nothing is gained by asking whether Plato divided the soul into parts, while something is lost, because of the natural association of 'part' with physical division, which in the present context is grossly misleading."<sup>127</sup>

Plato's distinction between the bodily desires of the appetitive soul and the desire for knowledge, which the rational element exhibits, indicates an inconsistency with his doctrine of the immortal soul, which he describes in *Republic X*.<sup>128</sup> Though he does note that three of the four virtues common to the state and the soul relate to the body, he does

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<sup>126</sup>See for example Robert C. Cross and Anthony D. Woozley, *Plato's Republic: A Philosophical Commentary* (London: Macmillan, 1964), 127-133.

<sup>127</sup>Ibid., 128. Cf. Petric who argues that the parts are to be taken literally. James Petric, "Incontinence and Desire in Plato's Tripartite Psychology," *Diálogos* 27, no. 60 (1992): 43. Cross and Woozley acknowledge one difficulty that interpreters have noted. If the soul is comprised of related elements and if our actions might arise from any one or a combination of elements, who is to be held accountable for an individual's actions? "If a man's soul or self is composed of these three elements, how can he be anything over and above them? And if he is not, how can he be held responsible, let alone morally responsible, for his actions?" Cross and Woozley, 129. However, Ostenfeld claims that this is a spurious argument and that "all acts . . . belong to us (the immortal self) and we are responsible." Ostenfeld, *Forms, Matter and Mind*, 218. See also James V. Robinson, "The Nature of the Soul in *Republic* 10," *Journal of Philosophical Research* 16 (1990-1991): 214-222; David T. Runia, *Philo of Alexandria and the Timaeus of Plato* (Leiden: Brill, 1986), 301-302.

<sup>128</sup>"It is impossible to see what he can mean by 'soul', if he wishes both to say that the soul survives the death and decomposition of the body and to specify one of the elements of the soul as that which desires bodily pleasures. At one point in the *Republic* (518d-e) he shows some awareness of this difficulty . . . but even there he does not seem to recognize the extent of the difficulty. It is one thing to say that the soul is separable from the body, while allowing that during its existence in the body it may be temporarily affected by its relationship with it. But it is quite another thing to say both that the soul is separable from the body, and that some elements of the soul have desires for bodily experiences. The latter claim involves an irresolvable contradiction between the account given of the soul and the proposition that it is immortal." Cross and Woozley, 119-120.

not acknowledge the difficulty his theory presents at this point. This inconsistency, caused by proposing a soul which survives the dissolution of the body and of a soul which, in part at least, exhibits bodily desires deserves more attention in Platonic studies.<sup>129</sup>

The immortality of the soul is discussed principally in the *Phaedo*, the *Republic*, and the *Phaedrus*. In the *Phaedo*, he presents three arguments. They are a generation from opposites, from recollection, and from affinities.<sup>130</sup> The affinity argument is important as it seeks to show that the soul is most like the imperceptible and intelligible while the body is more akin to the perceptible and perishable. As what is intelligible does not perish, so then the soul should not be thought to perish. In the *Republic*, Plato gives an argument which states that nothing can be destroyed except by its own specific disease. As the diseases or evils of the soul do not destroy it, then it can be concluded that it will exist forever. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato argues the immortality of the soul on the basis of its definition of being self-moved.<sup>131</sup> “In the dialogues of Plato we see the end of the transition from primitive ideas of the survival of depleted shades or ghosts to the ardent desire for and belief in an immortality in which the highest possibilities glimpsed in this life may be fulfilled.”<sup>132</sup>

Plato also taught the notion of the reincarnation of the soul in connection with

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<sup>129</sup>For instance, Cross and Woosley admit that this involves an “irresolvable contradiction” and that “it is difficult to see how Plato thought that what he says in 611c could be reconciled at all with his previous account of justice.” *Ibid.*, 120.

<sup>130</sup>See Crombie, 303-325.

<sup>131</sup>See *ibid.*, 325-329.

<sup>132</sup>J. Hick, *Death and Eternal Life* (Glasgow: Collins, 1976), 72.

preparation for the ascent back to the divine. “In the *Phaedrus*, Plato suggested that humans are reincarnated for the purposes of discipline, *askesis*, in order to purify the soul by affliction. In the *Symposium*, Plato described the process of ascent as one of intellection, learning by progressive stages of abstraction, to appreciate abstract good, in and of itself. By this process of intellection, and the ascetic processes necessary to perfect it, the soul ascends to heaven again and, with luck, never has to be reincarnated again.”<sup>133</sup>

“Neither Plato nor the Greeks thought that consciousness per se was important—it was merely the experience of a soul caught in the prison-house of matter—but what Plato started was the valorization of the self because the experience of intellection was the key to demonstrating immortality of the soul.”<sup>134</sup> Plato writes, “But if we are guided by me we shall believe that the soul is immortal and capable of enduring all extremes of good and evil, and so we shall hold ever to the upward way and pursue righteousness with wisdom always and ever.”<sup>135</sup> This connection of wisdom with the immortality of the soul continues what Heraclitus introduced.

“The soul’s salvation for Plato was quintessentially an individual process. The soul is on an individual mission to purify itself. It travels through many bodies and cleanses itself from the impurities it gathers in human society. The intellectual achievement of the redemption of the soul is an individual process, though it may find what little solace adheres to life in a community of like-minded individuals.”<sup>136</sup>

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<sup>133</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 234.

<sup>134</sup>Ibid., 716.

<sup>135</sup>Plato *Resp.* 10.620e.

<sup>136</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 237.



## Aristotle

For Aristotle, the soul is the basis of animate life.<sup>137</sup> Segal describes it as “the principle of life.”<sup>138</sup> It is a “system of abilities possessed and manifested by animate bodies of suitable structure.”<sup>139</sup> It is inseparable from “the body as bodies are primary and their forms or ideas are secondary, to be perceived by us by our senses.”<sup>140</sup> For Aristotle, “‘soul’ was not immaterial; even if ‘soul’ is not the same thing as body, neither is it ‘nonmatter’ but can still occupy ‘space.’”<sup>141</sup> It can be separated however. He writes, “Just as the body comes into being before the soul, so also is the irrational prior to the rational.”<sup>142</sup>

“The soul,” Aristotle writes, “will be the actuality of the body.”<sup>143</sup> “The soul is the body’s essential whatness. . . . The soul is the origin of movement where sensation, appetite and thought are each considered movements with respect to the soul.”<sup>144</sup> What

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<sup>137</sup>Aristotle *De anima* 402a. Cf. D. Martin, 7.

<sup>138</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 238.

<sup>139</sup>Hendrik Lorenz, *Ancient Theories of Soul*, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/ancient-soul> (accessed April 27, 2009).

<sup>140</sup>Segal, *Life after Death*, 238. See also D. Martin, 7. Cf. Lorenz, *Ancient Theories*.

<sup>141</sup>Joel B. Green, “‘Bodies—That Is, Human Lives’: A Re-Examination of Human Nature in the Bible,” in *Whatever Happened to the Soul? Scientific and Theological Portraits of Human Nature*, ed. Warren S. Brown et al., Theology and the Sciences (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1998), 160.

<sup>142</sup>Aristotle *Pol.* 1334b22-23.

<sup>143</sup>Aristotle *De anima* 412a16. See Dihle, “Psyche in the Greek World,” 9:613.

<sup>144</sup>Graham Ward, “The *Logos*, the Body and the World: On the Phenomenological Border,” in *Transcending Boundaries in Philosophy and Theology: Reason, Meaning and Experience* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007), 112.

this means is that “he censures all beliefs which speak of soul and body as two separate things. There are not two things, soul and body, there is just one thing, the person. To speak of the body as the tomb or prison of the soul naturally becomes absurd.”<sup>145</sup> This is why he writes regarding the prior Greek thinkers who “join the soul to a body, or place it in a body, without adding any specification of the reason of their union, or of the bodily conditions required for it.”<sup>146</sup> This is an important change that Aristotle introduces to the previous stream of Greek thinking, which had generally developed the notion that the soul is a separate entity with powers that continued to exist after the death of the individual.

### Epicurean and Stoic Thought

Epicurus had the salvation of the soul as his primary goal.<sup>147</sup> He writes that it is the same thing for a doctor to be unable to cure one’s body of disease as it is for a philosopher’s teaching to be unable to cure one’s soul of disease.<sup>148</sup> Diseases of the soul, such as passion or wrong desire, are a “mistaken value judgment.”<sup>149</sup>

The atomist teachings of Epicurus held the soul, “like everything else that there is

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<sup>145</sup>Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion: A Study of the Orphic Movement*, 245.

<sup>146</sup>Aristotle *De anima* 407b 13.

<sup>147</sup>Epicureans and Stoics are grouped together in this section because of their similar doctrine of the soul. On this, see A. A. Long, “Epicureans and Stoics,” in *Classical Mediterranean Spirituality: Egyptian, Greek, Roman* (New York: Crossroad, 1986), 145. This combining in no way suggests that their philosophies were not widely divergent on other matters.

<sup>148</sup>Porphyry *To Marcella* 31.

<sup>149</sup>Niko Huttunen, “Stoic Law in Paul?” in *Stoicism in Early Christianity*, ed. Tuomas Räsänen, Troels Engberg-Pedersen, and Ismo Dunderberg (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic, 2010), 53.

except for the void, to be ultimately composed of atoms.”<sup>150</sup> With this materialist understanding, it naturally follows that “for Epicurus birth and death are limits which contain the existence of a person. *I* have not existed in another body prior to this life, nor am *I* liable to experience a further incarnation following this life.”<sup>151</sup> The soul itself is a material or corporeal soul. He argued that “that which is not body is void. . . . More specifically, soul consists of atoms which act upon and are affected by atoms constituting the body itself.”<sup>152</sup>

The soul also includes a special material that provides it sense-perception. In fact, “the soul then . . . is the ‘primary cause of sensation.’ . . . From the soul the body acquires a derivative share in sensation; there is physical contact, naturally, between the body and the soul, and the movements of atoms within the body affect and are affected by those of the soul.”<sup>153</sup>

The soul, given this atomist/materialist viewpoint, is destroyed at death, along with the body. This understanding leads to Epicurus writing, “Death is nothing to us; for that which has been dissolved lacks sensation; and that which lacks sensation is no concern to us.”<sup>154</sup> Lucretius writes, “But neither eyes nor nostrils nor hand nor tongue nor ears can exist for the soul apart from the body. Therefore souls on their own cannot feel,

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<sup>150</sup>Lorenz, *Ancient Theories*.

<sup>151</sup>A. A. Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics* (London: Duckworth, 1974), 50.

<sup>152</sup>*Ibid.*, 51.

<sup>153</sup>*Ibid.*, 52.

<sup>154</sup>Epicurus *K. D.* 2. This led Tertullian to later remark that Epicurus destroyed even death itself. See below on p. 359.

nor even exist.”<sup>155</sup> Thus the Epicureans denied any life or sensation after death for the human individual.

Because of this view, the Epicureans were an important opponent of the early Church Fathers and their discussions on the soul. The early Church Fathers would come to argue for the necessity of a soul that survives the death of the body since the reality of a future judgment for all people was pivotal to their eschatological hope.

The Stoics, as a school, lasted from Zeno to Marcus Aurelius. It had many major philosophers who followed the general tenets of the school. They, like the Epicureans before them, taught that everything that exists is corporeal.<sup>156</sup> An important distinction which they make regarding the soul is that they no longer refer to a living organism as ensouled. The vital functions given to the soul by previous authors are denied, leaving only the mental, cognitive powers.

The soul is an arrangement of the individual *pneuma*.<sup>157</sup> This *pneuma* “pervades the whole cosmic sphere . . . and is equally at work in every individual body.”<sup>158</sup> So the human soul is a part of the cosmic soul or as it could also be described “the vital, intelligent, warm breath which permeates the entire cosmos.”<sup>159</sup>

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<sup>155</sup>Lucretius 630-633. This argument bears a resemblance to Aristotle’s thought as well. It also has similarities with what will be argued by the Christian apologists regarding the reality of a bodily resurrection where they argue that the soul must rejoin the body for person to exist again as sense involves both the soul and the body.

<sup>156</sup>Green, “‘Bodies—That Is, Human Lives’: A Re-Examination of Human Nature in the Bible,” 160.

<sup>157</sup>*SVF* 2.716. On this idea in ancient Greek thought, see Geoffrey Lloyd, “Pneuma between Body and Soul,” *The Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute* 13 (2007): 135-146.

<sup>158</sup>Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, 156.

<sup>159</sup>*Ibid.*, 171. On this, see Diogenes Laertius 7.143.

Stoicism had eight divisions or faculties of the soul. These included the five basic senses along with the ability to reproduce and to speak, and the ruling (*hegemonikon*) faculty.<sup>160</sup> With the strong emphasis upon assent and reason as powers of the soul, the Stoics introduced the idea that all impulses in adult humans are the result of the assent of the soul. They had to defend this idea against other authors who argued that there are irrational impulses, which according to this school of thought did not exist.

Though Stoicism did not hold to the immortality of the soul, yet most did believe that the soul survived for a limited time after the death of the body.

### Neo-Platonism

The school of Plato was influential during the time period of the early Church Fathers. Several writers from among the Neo-Platonists are thought to have exerted some degree of influence on the doctrine of the soul. Among these are Porphyry, Plotinus,<sup>161</sup> Iamblichus, Damascius, and Priscianus.<sup>162</sup> Here, Plotinus's doctrine of the soul is examined as exemplary of the thought of this school.

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<sup>160</sup>See Long, *Hellenistic Philosophy: Stoics, Epicureans, Sceptics*, 173; Marcia L. Colish, *Stoicism in Classical Latin Literature*, vol. 1 of *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 27-28. This last function of the soul, the governing part, also appears in several of the early Church Fathers' description of the soul.

<sup>161</sup>For a discussion of the soul in Plotinus, see Patricia C. Miller, "Shifting Selves in Late Antiquity," in *Religion and the Self in Antiquity*, ed. David Brakke et al. (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2005); Antonia Tripolitis, *The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen* (Roslyn Heights, NY: Libra Publishers, 1978); Jennifer Yhap, *Plotinus on the Soul: A Study in the Metaphysics of Knowledge* (Selinsgrove: Susquehanna University Press, 2003).

<sup>162</sup>On these latter three, see Carlos G. Steel, *The Changing Self: A Study on the Soul in Later Neoplatonism: Iamblichus, Damascius and Priscianus* (Brussels: WLSK, 1978).

Plotinus was a Platonist and founder of Neo-Platonism.<sup>163</sup> The individual soul for Plotinus was directly related to the world soul. It was also necessary to the body's existence.<sup>164</sup> Blumenthal notes, "Even if the position of the individual soul in relation to other forms of soul is not immediately clear, it follows from its being soul as such that it is both immaterial and essentially separate from body."<sup>165</sup> Though Plotinus does face the challenge of describing the relationship between the soul and body, yet he differs from Plato in that the soul is in the body in an immaterial way.<sup>166</sup>

Plotinus saw the soul as the principle of self-cohesion.<sup>167</sup> It was tripartite in nature consisting of a purely intellectual part, a discursive middle element, and lower vegetative or irrational part.<sup>168</sup> These latter two parts form the logos in the human person. The higher, intellectual part cannot be brought into contact with the lower, irrational part.<sup>169</sup> The middle discursive element must choose which part to be attracted to.

The soul could also be impacted by the body. To those not aware, the soul could be negatively impacted by the body.<sup>170</sup> If the soul becomes "mixed up" with the body, it

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<sup>163</sup>Henry J. Blumenthal, "On Soul and Intellect," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, ed. Lloyd P. Gerson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 82.

<sup>164</sup>Stephen R. L. Clark, "Plotinus: Body and Soul," in *The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus*, 276.

<sup>165</sup>Blumenthal, "On Soul and Intellect," 83.

<sup>166</sup>Plotinus *Enn.* 4.3.20.10-16.

<sup>167</sup>P. Miller, 16.

<sup>168</sup>See Tripolitis, *The Doctrine of the Soul*, 56.

<sup>169</sup>Plotinus *Enn.* 2.9.2.

<sup>170</sup>Plotinus *Enn.* 4.8.2.46-49.

can become “isolated and weak.”<sup>171</sup> The soul was instead supposed to be concerned with spiritual realities. In order to do this, it needed to turn inwards. “Let there, then, be in the soul a shining imagination of a sphere, having everything within it. . . . Keep this, and apprehend in your mind another, taking away the mass: take away also the places, and the mental picture of matter in yourself, and do not try to apprehend another sphere smaller in mass than the original one, but calling on the god who made that of which you have the mental picture, pray him to come.”<sup>172</sup> It is through the vision into the self that the soul gains self-knowledge.<sup>173</sup> The soul originates from the World Soul, descending from it into a body.<sup>174</sup>

The soul for Plotinus is incorporeal, and thus immortal.<sup>175</sup> He argues this based also on the soul’s ability to contemplate eternal realities.<sup>176</sup> The soul also desires to be rejoined with the supreme Good.<sup>177</sup> This power is available to all, though few are aware of it and use it.

### **Intertestamental Judaism**

During the intertestamental period, soul maintained several of the key meanings

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<sup>171</sup>Plotinus *Enn.* 1.6.5.50-58.

<sup>172</sup>Plotinus *Enn.* 5.8.9.8-17.

<sup>173</sup>P. Miller, 20.

<sup>174</sup>Arthur H. Armstrong, *Expectations of Immortality in Late Antiquity* (Milwaukee: Marquette University Press, 1987), 27.

<sup>175</sup>Plotinus *Enn.* 4.7.

<sup>176</sup>So Tripolitis, *The Doctrine of the Soul*, 63.

<sup>177</sup>Plotinus *Enn.* 6.7.22, 31.

from the HB. On origins, Wis 15:11 reads, “Forasmuch as he knew not his Maker, and him that inspired into him an active soul, and breathed in a living spirit.” Here the soul is inspired or breathed in by God. Regarding soul for life, Jdt 7:27 reads, “For it is better for us to be made a spoil unto them, than to die for thirst: for we will be his servants, that our souls may live.” Here soul seems to refer to natural life in the face of death. In the book of Tobit, the author writes, “Because I remembered God with all my heart.”<sup>178</sup> Here heart is rendered for *psyche* but clearly refers to the entire person.

The term soul also began to experience an expanded meaning during this period. One important notion is the “differentiation of body and soul.”<sup>179</sup> From this, the idea that the soul survives the death of the body was able to be incorporated.<sup>180</sup> Second Baruch 30:2-5 reads:

Then all who have fallen asleep in hope of Him shall rise again. And it shall come to pass at that time that the treasuries will be opened in which is preserved the number of the souls of the righteous, and they shall come forth, and a multitude of souls shall be seen together in one assemblage of one thought, and the first shall rejoice and the last shall not be grieved. For they know that the time has come of which it is said, that it is the consummation of the times. But the souls of the wicked, when they behold all these things, shall then waste away the more. For they shall know that their torment has come and their perdition has arrived.<sup>181</sup>

In 4 Macc 18:23, the author writes, “But the sons of Abraham with their victorious mother are gathered together into the chorus of the fathers, and have received pure and immortal souls from God” (NRSV). Here souls are referred to directly as

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<sup>178</sup>Tob 1:12.

<sup>179</sup>Albrecht Dihle, “Psyche in Hellenistic Judaism,” *TDNT* (1974), 9:633.

<sup>180</sup>*Dictionary of Judaism in the Biblical Period* (1999), s.v. “Soul.”

<sup>181</sup>See also 4 Ezra 7:32-101 which has a similar theme of souls waiting in the earth for judgment. Cf. 2 Baruch 21-23; 4 Ezra 4:35; Ps-Philo 32:13 where the souls are stored in storehouses awaiting judgment.



immortal.

The chief exponent of Hellenic Judaism was Philo of Alexandria. He has been described as mediating between Platonism and Christianity.<sup>182</sup> His anthropology is largely developed from the book of Genesis and Plato's writings<sup>183</sup> attributing to the human person a duality between soul and body.<sup>184</sup> He also divided the soul itself into various parts. Generally this was in a bipartite fashion having both a rational and irrational part,<sup>185</sup> but at times he could speak of three parts of the soul. He writes, "The human soul is tripartite, and that intelligence and reason is said to have possession of one part of it, the spirited element of another, and the appetites of the third."<sup>186</sup>

One feature of Philo's thought that distinguishes it from the Hellenistic thinking of his time is his understanding that the soul is created by God, not divine itself seeking to ascend to its prior divine state.<sup>187</sup> Philo relates humans to God through their ability to

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<sup>182</sup>See, for example, Thümmel, 245.

<sup>183</sup>Sarah J. K. Pearce, *The Land of the Body: Studies in Philo's Representation of Egypt*, ed. Jörg Frey (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2007), 85. For a study on Philo's usage of Plato's *Timaeus*, see Runia, 467-475.

<sup>184</sup>*Quod Deterius Potiori Insidiari Solet* 80-85. Cf. Runia, 468. On his doctrine of the soul, see Samuel Sandmel, "Philo: The Man, His Writings, His Significance," in *ANRW*, ed. Wolfgang Haase et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 27-28.

<sup>185</sup>Runia, 469.

<sup>186</sup>Philo *Conf.* 21. See on this John Whittaker, "The Terminology of the Rational Soul in the Writings of Philo of Alexandria," *The Studia Philonica Annual* 8 (1996): 1-2. Whittaker studies specifically the higher soul terminology of Philo, *nous* and *logos*.

<sup>187</sup>See Andrew Louth, *The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981), 25. Runia, however, does allow that on a rare occasion, Philo holds to a divine part of the soul. Runia, 469. Strüder makes this same observation, citing Philo's usage of *νοῦς* in *De gigantibus* 60. Christof W. Strüder, *Paulus und die Gesinnung Christi: Identität und Entscheidungsfindung aus der Mitte von 1Kor 1-4* (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2005), 202. On the relationship between *nous* and *psyche*, see Runia, 329-332; J. Whittaker, 1-19.

reason.<sup>188</sup> Philo does, however, often follow the Platonic notion of the “moral good of the soul,” though rarely he does allow for “lower goods through which the immature soul must pass, before coming to possess the spiritual goods.”<sup>189</sup>

Philo connected sin with the soul. Through the Feast of Yom Kippur, the soul abandons sin and returns to its pure source.<sup>190</sup> The result is a true freedom of the soul.

An important aspect of Philo’s understanding of the soul is evident in his usage of *παλιγγενεσία*. Burnett describes *παλιγγενεσία* in Philo as the

rebirth of the soul into incorporeal existence. Although the migrating soul can envision the intelligible world and experience an ethical rebirth while still in mixture with the body, it is after the mixture is dissolved, i.e., after physical death, that *παλιγγενεσία* occurs in any metaphysical or essential way. Philo does not present a clear, systematic statement about what incorporeal existence for the soul means, but he seems to imply that the soul continues to exist as a distinct entity in the presence of God.<sup>191</sup>

Burnett finds also that Philo does not have the Stoic concept of souls reborn after a general conflagration. Immortality for the soul is a reality but not as an inherent quality of the soul, but because God worked directly in its creation.<sup>192</sup>

Philo speaks about the soul’s assent to God in several places. In commenting on Gen 12:1 and the move of Abraham, Philo writes, “God begins the carrying out of His

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<sup>188</sup>Runia, 472.

<sup>189</sup>Pearce, 107.

<sup>190</sup>Philo *De congressu pruditiois gratia* 107-108. See Moshe Weinfeld, *Normative and Sectarian Judaism in the Second Temple Period* (London: T and T Clark, 2005), 227.

<sup>191</sup>Fred W. Burnett, “Philo on Immortality: A Thematic Study of Philo’s Concept of *paliggenesia*,” *Catholic Biblical Quarterly* 46 (1984): 470.

<sup>192</sup>Dieter Zeller, “The Life and Death of the Soul in Philo of Alexandria,” *The Studia Philonica Annual* 7 (1995): 24-25.

will to cleanse man's soul by giving it a starting-point for full salvation in its removal out of three localities: body, sense-perception, and speech."<sup>193</sup> This illustrates well the way allegory came to be used in regard to the soul. This notion is further illustrated in a commentary on Gen 15:18 where he notes that when Abraham was promised the land from the Nile to the Euphrates, this is to be understood as "our body and the passions engendered in it or by it are likened to the river of Egypt, but the soul and what the soul loves—to the Euphrates."<sup>194</sup> Pearce notes that "Philo is a flexible interpreter; for him, the inspired application of the allegorical method allows the reader to find meanings that are different but true in the same words of Scripture."<sup>195</sup>

Philo also has the concept of a world soul.<sup>196</sup> Robert Berchman interprets Philo's God in terms of the Pythagorean *Nous* and the Logos as both mind and soul, the former being above matter and the latter not.<sup>197</sup>

### **New Testament Writings**

There are several challenges when attempting to determine the understanding of the soul in the NT. One is that the NT does not directly seek to develop such an understanding.<sup>198</sup> Joel Green notes several methodological issues with a "word study

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<sup>193</sup>Philo *Migration of Abraham* 2. See Pearce, 101-103.

<sup>194</sup>Philo *De Somniis* 2.255.

<sup>195</sup>Pearce, 108.

<sup>196</sup>For a listing of this expression, see I. Leisegang, *Register Philonis Alexandrinae opera quae supersunt*, ed. L. Cohn and P. Wendland (Berolini 1896ff., Bd. 7), 872, under Number 14.

<sup>197</sup>Robert M. Berchman, *From Philo to Origen* (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984), 28, 41.

<sup>198</sup>Gutbrod notes that in the case of anthropology in the writings of Paul, *psyche* is

approach” or a method focused primarily on an “eschatological anthropology.”<sup>199</sup> He argues, instead, for looking at the available cultural references and then noting how the NT both “absorbed and censured” these.<sup>200</sup>

In the Gospels, soul often refers to natural, physical life.<sup>201</sup> This is often in connection with giving one’s life, seeking one’s life, taking one’s life, and saving a life.<sup>202</sup> Mark 10:45 speaks of giving one’s life, while John 10:11 describes the shepherd who lays down his life.<sup>203</sup> In Matt 6:25, Jesus urges people not to worry for their life. Matthew 10:39 speaks of losing and finding one’s life.<sup>204</sup> In Acts 20:24, Paul indicates that he does not hold his life dear or value it. In Matt 2:20, Herod seeks the baby Jesus’ life. All these demonstrate the understanding of physical life of an individual using *psyche*.

Soul can refer to the individual *in toto*. This is reflected in the HB expression  $\pi\tilde{\alpha}\sigma\alpha \psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  to speak of “everyone” in Acts 2:43.<sup>205</sup> Similarly, Jesus describes one who loves God with all their heart, soul, and mind in Matt 22:37, clearly referencing the HB

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discussed more for completeness than with any substantial contribution. Walter Gutbrod, *Paulinische Anthropologie* (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1934), 75.

<sup>199</sup>Green, “‘Bodies—That Is, Human Lives’: A Re-Examination of Human Nature in the Bible,” 152-153.

<sup>200</sup>Ibid., 154.

<sup>201</sup>Eduard Schweizer, “Psyche in the New Testament,” *TDNT* (1974), 9:637.

<sup>202</sup>Walter Bauer, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and Other Early Christian Literature*, trans. William F. Arndt et al., 2nd ed. (1958), s.v. “*psyche*.”

<sup>203</sup>See also Matt 20:28.

<sup>204</sup>See also Matt 16:25-26.

<sup>205</sup>Schweizer, 9:639.

passage of Deut 6:5.

Jesus also refers to finding rest for one's soul in Matt 11:29. The soul is also the seat of emotions. God's soul is well pleased in Matt 12:18, and in Mark 14:34, Jesus' soul experiences sorrow. It is influenced by others, both for good or evil (Acts 14:2; 14:22).

The soul is used in contrast to the body in Matt 10:28, where Jesus distinguishes between killing either the body alone or both the body and the soul.<sup>206</sup> In commenting on Luke's usage as exemplified in the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, Eduard Schweizer notes that Luke "is obviously teaching the corporeality of the resurrection as distinct from the Hellenistic survival of the soul."<sup>207</sup>

Paul uses *psyche* thirteen times.<sup>208</sup> Athenagoras Zakopoulos argues for three categories of usage: (1) life or life-principle; (2) seat of feeling, will, and thought; (3) and the individual.<sup>209</sup> Paul uses soul to refer to natural life in quoting 1 Kgs 10:10 where Elijah despairs of his life (Rom 11:3) and to describe Priscilla and Aquila who risked themselves to save Paul's own life (Rom 16:4).<sup>210</sup> Paul quotes Gen 2:7, stating that "Adam became a living soul" (1 Cor 12:45) and he also calls God as a witness against his

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<sup>206</sup>Here Schweizer proposes that this is an example of the authenticate life of the individual before God as indicated in Mark 8:35. *Ibid.*, 9:646.

<sup>207</sup>*Ibid.*, 9:647.

<sup>208</sup>On Paul's anthropology in general, see Gutbrod; W. D. Stacey, *The Pauline View of Man in Relation to Its Judaic and Hellenistic Background* (London: Macmillan, 1956).

<sup>209</sup>See Zakopoulos, 87-91. Cf. Warne, 157-220.

<sup>210</sup>Other examples in Phil 2:30 and 1 Thess 2:8. See also Warne, 158-160.

soul (2 Cor 1:23).<sup>211</sup> As the seat of emotion and will, he urges slaves to do the will of God “from the heart” (Eph 6:6).<sup>212</sup> In referring to the whole person or individual, Paul notes that God will punish “every soul of man that doeth evil” (Rom 2:9). In what seems a similar usage, he also writes of “every soul” referring to all people (Rom. 13:1).<sup>213</sup> Walter Gutbrod argues against the notion that in Paul, *sarx* and *psyche* go together in defining the human person as has been the case with *nefesh*,<sup>214</sup> allowing this only in his analysis of 1 Cor 15:44. In general, he argues that it refers to a person.<sup>215</sup>

In 1 Thess 5:23, Paul invokes a tripartite expression describing the human person, body, soul, and mind.<sup>216</sup> Green suggests that by this, Paul is signifying the completeness of God’s sanctification rather than a “parts” list of the human person as understood in a Hellenized sense.<sup>217</sup> In addressing Paul’s use of “one soul” in Phil 1:27, Warne notes that while this may appear to refer to an “immaterial psyche, . . . the emphasis is not so much on ontological/metaphysical definitions of  $\piνεϋμα$  and  $\psiυχη$ , or even upon a conceptual affinity between the two, but upon a motivational oneness of will in cooperative human ventures.”<sup>218</sup>

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<sup>211</sup>For a discussion of this problematic passage, see Zakopoulos, 87-91.

<sup>212</sup>This idea is repeated in Col 3:23.

<sup>213</sup>Cf. Warne, 185-187. This expression also occurs in Acts 3:23, Jude 1:15, Rev 16:3

<sup>214</sup>Gutbrod, 76.

<sup>215</sup>Ibid., 77.

<sup>216</sup>See Fernández Ardanaz, *El Mito*, 76.

<sup>217</sup>Green, “‘Bodies—That Is, Human Lives’: A Re-Examination of Human Nature in the Bible,” 162. See also Warne, 199-203.

<sup>218</sup>Warne, 190-191. See also Schweizer, 9:649.

Hebrews 12:3 describes the tiredness of souls. Hebrews 4:12 presents an ambiguous usage when it speaks of the sword penetrating soul and spirit. Schweizer contends it means that “the Word has penetrated the πνεῦμα and ψυχή as it has the bones and marrow.”<sup>219</sup>

Schweizer argues that 1 Pet 2:11 is “the most strongly Hellenised ψυχή passage in the NT.”<sup>220</sup> In this verse, the passions of the flesh attack the soul. Here the soul stands in contrast to the flesh with the notion of the passions being a contagion in the soul, similar themes to those found in earlier Greek thought.

The description of the souls under the altar in Rev 6:9 is of interest in that it is limited to the martyrs.<sup>221</sup> Schweizer notes this, and in conjunction with 20:13 suggests that “for non-believers at least there will be no consciously experienced intermediate state.”<sup>222</sup> In a recent commentary, Ben Witherington argues that “*psuche* should probably not be translated ‘soul’ here, for it means the living person or personality, without a body.”<sup>223</sup> Later, writers in the early Church will take note of verses such as these and argue for a corporeal soul as these souls are able to be seen and to talk.

### Conclusion

This survey of beliefs regarding the soul has shown that there were both

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<sup>219</sup>Schweizer, 9:651.

<sup>220</sup>Ibid., 9:653.

<sup>221</sup>Cf. 4 Ezra 4:35.

<sup>222</sup>Schweizer, 9:655.

<sup>223</sup>Ben Witherington III, *Revelation*, The New Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 135.

differences and similarities between the HB and NT understanding of the soul and that found in the writings of the Greco-Roman world. One big difference between the HB and the Greco-Roman writers is that the HB presents a person as being a soul rather than having a soul, as was usual among secular writers. Though early in the Homeric period, the soul was present only at times of mortal danger or as a shade after the death of the body.

The notions of breath and life were present in both the HB and the Greco-Roman writings. In the biblical tradition, the soul stood more for the person as a complete entity. Outside of biblical thinking, the soul came to be clearly understood as referring to a separate entity from the body with the powers of sense and reason and capable of existing separately from the body.

The soul takes on more complex activities in the later periods of its development. Desire and reason exist in the soul. Correspondingly, people are urged to make reason rule over desire in their souls. The notion of purity in the soul is an important development here. This comes to be seen as a way of escape from continued reincarnation into different bodies. Many Greco-Roman writers argued that after the death of the body, the soul continued to exist and only through purification could the soul ascend up to the abode of the divine. The intertestamental Jewish writers taught this also. The Epicureans argued for the cessation of life at death with no further existence of the soul.<sup>224</sup> In the Scriptures, there is little to suggest any notion of divinity connected with the soul or the accompanying belief in the soul's immortality.

In the NT, the soul has many similarities to the usage found in the HB. The soul

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<sup>224</sup>Arguing against this idea would be of considerable importance to the early Church Fathers.



can refer to life and to the entire person. It can experience emotions and weakness. The soul also appears after the death of the body in apocalyptic language. The NT at times also distinguishes between the body and the soul when referring to a person.

## CHAPTER III

### THE APOSTOLIC FATHERS

The Apostolic Fathers form the background to the doctrinal development produced during the Ante-Nicene and Nicene eras. During this early time period, developed theology was the focus of those writings which are extant. In general, ecclesiastical and ethical norms were much more significant in this era. This holds true as well in the area of the doctrine of the soul. As this chapter demonstrates, the Church Fathers were little concerned with formulating a Christian doctrine of the soul. However, they do use soul in ways that will prove consistent throughout the Ante-Nicene period. But they focus little on the nature, origin, or future possibilities of the soul.

#### **Clement of Rome**

Clement of Rome is generally considered to be the first author<sup>1</sup> of any extant extra-biblical material produced by the early Church Fathers. His letter to the Church at Corinth is titled *1 Clement*. The so-called *2 Clement* and the *pseudo-Clementines* are generally considered spurious<sup>2</sup> and are not part of this study.

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<sup>1</sup>On dating see Kurt Erlemann, "Die Datierung des ersten Klemensbriefes—Anfragen an eine communis opinio," *New Testament Studies* 44, no. 4 (1998): 605-606; Thomas J. Herron, "The Most Probable Date of the First Epistle of Clement to the Corinthians," *Studia Patristica* 21 (1989): 106-121; Johannes Quasten, *Patrology* (Utrecht: Spectrum Publishers, 1950), 1:49-50.

<sup>2</sup>F. L. Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers* (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1960), 14; Quasten, 53.

## Usage of *Psyche*

Clement writes that Christ gave his blood for us, his flesh for our flesh, and his soul for our soul.<sup>3</sup> Here soul seems clearly to be used for natural life rather than as an entity separate from the body.

Clement also uses the expression “eyes of our soul.” He writes, “Let us contemplate Him with our understanding, and look with the eyes of our soul to His long-suffering will.”<sup>4</sup> This phrase occurs among various authors in Greek philosophy and quite often later among the early Church Fathers. The parallel between ratiocination and the “eyes of the soul” is readily apparent.<sup>5</sup>

For Clement, a “double-minded” person is described literally as two-souled.<sup>6</sup> The

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<sup>3</sup>“τὸ αἷμα αὐτοῦ ἔδωκεν ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦς Χριστὸς ὁ κύριος ἡμῶν ἐν θελήματι θεοῦ, καὶ τὴν σάρκα ὑπὲρ τῆς σαρκὸς ἡμῶν καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὲρ τῶν ψυχῶν ἡμῶν.” *1 Clement* 49.6.4. Annie Jaubert notes that this should be interpreted from a Semitic point of view. Annie Jaubert, *Clément de Rome: épître aux Corinthiens*, Sources Chrétiennes 167 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1971), 181n3. This notion of exchange exists also in *Epistle to Diognetus* 9 and Irenaeus’s *Against Heresies* 5.1, though one finds the parallel of flesh for flesh, and soul for soul only in Irenaeus’s passage. On the triad of blood, body, and soul, see Andreas Lindemann, *Die Clemensbriefe*, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 17, ed. Andreas Lindemann (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1992), 145.

<sup>4</sup>“ἐμβλέψωμεν τοῖς ὄμμασιν τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς τὸ μακρόθυμον αὐτοῦ βούλημα.” *1 Clement* 19.3.2. The expression comes from Plato; so Lindemann, 69. For a discussion of the expression other ancient sources, see Ysabel de Andia, “The Eyes of the Soul,” *Communio* 14 (1987): 230-236. The expression also occurs in Philo *Sacrifice of Cain and Abel* 69 *et al.* The related expression “eyes of your heart” occurs in Eph 1:18.

<sup>5</sup>Horacio E. Lona, *Der erste Clemensbrief*, Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1998), 2:248-249.

<sup>6</sup>“δίψυχοι.” *1 Clement* 11.2.5; 23.2.2; 23.3.2. See also *Didache* 4.4, *Epistle of Barnabas* 19.5, and *Pastor* 98.2.4. As this form is a variant of ψυχή, it will not be studied in detail. On the term and its origins, see Oscar J. F. Seitz, “Antecedents and Signification of the term Dipsychos,” *JBL* 66 (1947): 211-219.

notion of being “two-souled” is directed towards a believer who is full of doubt.<sup>7</sup> This leads one to suggest that for Clement, faith is an act of the soul. Clement describes the soul as capable of pride. He writes, “Neither let our soul be lifted up.”<sup>8</sup> He also attributes holiness to the soul, writing that the believer should approach God with holiness of soul.<sup>9</sup> Clement also lists meekness as an attribute of Esther’s soul,<sup>10</sup> visible when she fasted and prayed before entering the king’s palace.

Clement urges the believer’s soul to be bound to God.<sup>11</sup> In this context, Clement is exhorting believers regarding the resurrection. It is not clear if he has an ethical or ontological unity in mind in suggesting the notion of binding one’s soul to God. The former may be in mind, prefiguring chap. 30, where Clement urges practical godliness in response to the surety of the resurrection.

#### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Clement claims to be quoting from Scripture when he writes, “Wretched are the double-minded, who doubt in their soul.”<sup>12</sup> The location of this citation is not certain. It

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<sup>7</sup>Cf. *1 Clement* 23.3.2.

<sup>8</sup>“μηδὲ ἰνδαλλέσθω ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν.” Ibid. Lindemann notes that this use of soul is not in a dogmatic sense. Lindemann, 83.

<sup>9</sup>“Προσέλθωμεν οὖν αὐτῷ ἐν ὁσιότητι ψυχῆς, ἀγνάς καὶ ἀμιάντους χεῖρας αἴροντες πρὸς αὐτόν.” *1 Clement* 29.1.1.

<sup>10</sup>“ὃς ἰδὼν τὸ ταπεινὸν τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς.” Ibid., 55.6.6.

<sup>11</sup>“προσδεδέσθωσαν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἡμῶν.” Ibid., 27.1.1.

<sup>12</sup>Ibid., 23.3.2. See also 11.2.5; 23.2.2; 23.3.2. There is some discussion here as to what Scripture this could be referring to. *ANF* 1:11 states that some think it to be a reference to an apocryphal book while others take it as a conflation of Jas 1:8 and 2 Pet 3:3-4.

does again indicate that Clement saw faith and doubt as located in the soul. Beyond this, he does not write specifically on the doctrine of the soul.

In summary, Clement uses soul for natural life. It is the seat of understanding. It is also the location of both good and evil attributes. Both faith and unbelief take place in the soul. He also suggests the notion of the soul's union with God. He does not directly quote from any known passages of Scripture. This is typical of most of the early Church Fathers. It continues among some of the later apologists as well.

### **Ignatius**

Ignatius is one of the few Apostolic Fathers of whom much is known personally.<sup>13</sup> He has authored seven, extant letters considered to be genuine.<sup>14</sup> They are *To the Ephesians*, *To the Magnesians*, *To the Trallians*, *To the Romans*, *To the Philadelphians*, *To the Smyrnans*, and *To Polycarp*. In this study, only the Middle Recension is studied.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>13</sup>Paul Foster, "The Epistles of Ignatius of Antioch (Part I)," *Expository Times* 117, no. 12 (2006): 487.

<sup>14</sup>Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers*, 15; Quasten, 1:73. This view is not universal however. See below on authorship.

<sup>15</sup>For an overview of the debate of the recensions of Ignatius's writings, see C. P. Hammond Bammel, "Ignatian Problems," in *Personalities of the Early Church*, ed. Everett Ferguson (New York: Garland, 1993), 44-97; Allen Brent, "The Enigma of Ignatius of Antioch," *Journal of Ecclesiastical History* 57, no. 3 (2006): 429-431; Foster, 489; Quasten, 1:74; William R. Schoedel, "Are the Letters of Ignatius of Antioch Authentic?" *Religious Studies Review* 6 (1980): 196-201; idem, *Ignatius of Antioch*, Hermeneia (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985), 4-7. Most scholars accept the Middle Recension as being the authentic one. Some, such as Weijenborg, have argued for the Long Recension. Reinoud Weijenborg, *Les lettres d'Ignace d'Antioche* (Leiden: Brill, 1969). More recently, several have attempted to push the date of the letters to the latter half of the second century. Reinhard M. Hübner, "Thesen zur Echtheit und Datierung der sieben Briefe des Ignatius Antiochen," *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum* 1 (1997): 44-72. Cf. Jack W. Hannah, "The Setting of the Ignatian Long Recension," *JBL* 79, no. 3 (1960): 221-238. In the Long Recension, ψυχῆ appears several more times in varying usages from that found in the Middle Recension. This bears further study but falls outside the scope of this work.

## Usage of *Psyche*

Ignatius writes concerning the bishop of Philadelphia, “Wherefore my soul declares his mind towards God a happy one.”<sup>16</sup> Here Ignatius distinguishes between his soul, the mind, or will (γνώμην) of the other bishop. Ignatius then attributes virtue and perfection to the bishop’s mind rather than his soul, describing it as immovable and free from anger.<sup>17</sup> With later authors, these ideas are generally attributed to the soul.

## Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Ignatius writes regarding fellow believers who have helped him, “May the Lord Jesus Christ honour them, in whom they hope, in flesh, and soul, and spirit.”<sup>18</sup> This trichotomy of “flesh and soul and spirit” to refer to the human person becomes quite common among some of the later writers.<sup>19</sup> Ignatius does not elaborate at all regarding whether he understands any distinction between these or if he invokes this as a simple expression of the entire person.<sup>20</sup> It is possible that he sees this as imitating 1 Thess 5:23.

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<sup>16</sup>“Διὸ μακαρίζει μου ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν εἰς θεὸν αὐτοῦ γνώμην, ἐπιγνοὺς ἐνάρετον καὶ τέλειον οὖσαν, τὸ ἀκίνητον αὐτοῦ καὶ τὸ ἀόρητον αὐτοῦ ἐν πάσῃ ἐπιεικείᾳ θεοῦ ζῶντος.” *To the Philadelphians* 1.2.3.

<sup>17</sup>Cf. below on page 407 where Lactantius also clearly distinguishes between soul and mind.

<sup>18</sup>“Τιμήσει αὐτοὺς ὁ κύριος Ἰησοῦς Χριστός, εἰς ὃν ἐλπίζουσιν σαρκί, ψυχῇ, πνεύματι, πίστει, ἀγάπῃ, ὁμονοίᾳ.” *To the Philadelphians* 11.2.5. See Henning Paulsen, *Die Briefe des Ignatius von Antiochia und der Brief des Polykarp von Smyrna*, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 18, ed. Andreas Lindemann (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1985), 89. He suggests there is some manuscript evidence to support πνεύμα instead of ψυχῇ. On the connection to hope, see Henning Paulsen, *Studien zur Theologie des Ignatius von Antiochien* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1978), 67.

<sup>19</sup>See, for example, the discussion of Irenaeus’s usage below on page 146.

<sup>20</sup>The only difference between Ignatius’s trichotomy and that found in 1 Thess 5:23 is that Ignatius uses σάρχ rather than σῶμα. See Robert M. Grant, *Ignatius of*

In summary, Ignatius attributes virtue, perfection, and anger to the soul, connecting it with the mind. He also uses the tripartite expression of the human person similar to that found in 1 Thess 5:23, but does not elaborate further on his understanding of the human person. He does not directly quote from any known passages of Scripture.

### **Barnabas**

The *Epistle of Barnabas* is generally considered pseudonymous, the identification of the author being unknown. This has not, however, prevented this document from being considered an important addition to the Apostolic Fathers.<sup>21</sup>

#### Usage of *Psyche*

Barnabas claims to love those whom he is writing to more than his own soul.<sup>22</sup> In a similar usage, he encourages followers of the way of light to love their neighbors more than their own soul.<sup>23</sup> These examples seem clearly to refer to natural life. Elsewhere he

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*Antioch*, The Apostolic Fathers (Camden, NJ: Thomas Nelson, 1966), 4:109.

<sup>21</sup>On authorship, provenance, and dating, see Berthold Altaner, *Patrology* (New York: Herder and Herder, 1961), 80-82; Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers*, 21-22; James C. Paget, *The Epistle of Barnabas: Outlook and Background*, Wissenschaftliche Untersuchungen zum Neuen Testament 2. Reihe 64, ed. Martin Hengel et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1994), 3-36; James C. Paget, "The *Epistle of Barnabas*," *Expository Times* 117, no. 11 (2006): 441-446; Pierre Prigent, *L'épître de Barnabé I-XVI et ses sources* (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1961), 11-16; Ferdinand R. Prostmeier, *Der Barnabasbrief*, Kommentar zu den Apostolischen Vätern (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999), 8:119-130; Quasten, 89-90; Klaus Wengst, *Didache (Apostellehre), Barnabasbrief, Zweiter Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet: Eingeleitet, herausgegeben, übertragen und erläutert*, vol. 2 (Munich: Kösel, 1984), 114-118. On issues of redaction, see Klaus Wengst, *Tradition und Theologie des Barnabasbriefes*, Arbeiten zur Kirchengeschichte 42, ed. Kurt Aland et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1971).

<sup>22</sup>“ἀγαπᾶν ὑμᾶς ὑπὲρ τὴν ψυχὴν μου.” *Epistle of Barnabas* 1.4.4. See also *ibid.*, 4.6. See Wengst, *Tradition und Theologie des Barnabasbriefes*, 20. Wengst argues this line demonstrates that this part was written by Barnabas rather than a later redactor.

<sup>23</sup>“Ἀγαπήσεις τὸν πλησίον σου ὑπὲρ τὴν ψυχὴν σου.” *Epistle of Barnabas*

writes that “the Lord endured to suffer for our soul.”<sup>24</sup> Here it is not so clear whether soul refers to natural life or to a separate entity from the body, although within the development of the concept of the soul, it seems early to argue that this refers to a separated soul.

Barnabas also employs a usage of soul that seems different from others. In an obvious reference to Jesus’ declaration in Matt 18:3 that only those like children would enter the kingdom of heaven, Barnabas writes “that we should possess the soul of children.”<sup>25</sup> This statement is made in the context of the remission of sins and renewal, which a Christian receives upon accepting Christ and seems to suggest that sin exists in the soul and that it is there that renewal takes place.

Barnabas appears to employ soul for mind when he writes, “My soul hopes that it has not omitted anything,”<sup>26</sup> pertaining to salvation. One might argue that it may simply be an expression of longing, thus suggesting more of an emotive rather than cognitive function. It could also be a means of referring to the self.

Barnabas advises people not to “give loose reins to our soul, that it should have power to run with sinners and the wicked, lest we become like them.”<sup>27</sup> The soul, here, is

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19.5c.1. Prigent translates this as “oneself.” Pierre Prigent, *Épître de Barnabé*, Sources Chrétiennes 172 (Paris: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1971), 202.

<sup>24</sup>“ὁ κύριος υπέμεινεν παθεῖν υπέρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν.” *Epistle of Barnabas* 5.5.2.

<sup>25</sup>“ὡς παιδίον ἔχειν τὴν ψυχὴν.” *Ibid.*, 6.11.2. Prostmeier suggests the sense of καρδιά here. Prostmeier, 272.

<sup>26</sup>“ἐλπίζει μου ἡ ψυχὴ μὴ παραλελοιπέναι τι.” *Epistle of Barnabas* 17.1.2. Prostmeier sees this as a rhetorical device. Prostmeier, 526.

<sup>27</sup>“Μὴ δῶμεν τῇ ἑαυτῶν ψυχῇ ἀνεσιν, ὥστε ἔχειν αὐτὴν ἐξουσίαν μετὰ πονηρῶν καὶ ἀμαρτωλῶν συντρέχειν.” *Epistle of Barnabas* 4.2.2.



that which can run with sinners and be like them. By stating, “Do not give loose reins to the soul,” it seems that some other entity is the controlling party which must choose who the soul comports with. It could be argued, however, that this is simply using soul to refer to the individual. Elsewhere, he warns of an insolent soul.<sup>28</sup> This is a similar usage to the previous one, as is seen from its location in the “way of life” exhortations of chap. 19. In that chapter, he urges people to be pure of soul<sup>29</sup> and commands them not to join their soul to the haughty.<sup>30</sup> The soul then can be influenced for good or evil by those it is in company with.

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

In Barnabas’s description of the way of darkness, he mentions the destruction of the soul. He writes, “But the way of darkness is crooked, and full of cursing; for it is the way of eternal death with punishment, in which way are the things that destroy the soul, viz., idolatry, over-confidence, the arrogance of power, hypocrisy, double-heartedness, adultery, murder, rapine, haughtiness, transgression, deceit, malice, self-sufficiency, poisoning, magic, avarice, want of the fear of God.”<sup>31</sup> The idea that a soul that can be destroyed is connected with the way of “eternal death with punishment.” The author does not make entirely clear what “eternal death with punishment” means or how things along this way lead to the destruction of the soul. In later times, sin can be referred to as leading

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<sup>28</sup>“οὐ δώσεις τῇ ψυχῇ σου θράσος.” Ibid., 19.3b.3.

<sup>29</sup>“Ὅσον δύνασαι, ὑπὲρ τῆς ψυχῆς σου ἀγνεύσεις.” Ibid., 19.8c.1.

<sup>30</sup>“οὐδὲ κολληθήσῃ ἐκ ψυχῆς σου μετὰ ὑψηλῶν.” Ibid., 19.6b.2.

<sup>31</sup>“Ὅλως γὰρ ἐστὶν ὁδὸς θανάτου αἰωνίου μετὰ τιμωρίας, ἐν ἣ ἐστὶν τὰ ἀπολλύντα τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτῶν· εἰδωλολατρεία, θρασύτης, ὕψος δυνάμεως, ὑπόκρισις, διπλοκαρδία, μοιχεία, φόνος, ἀρπαγή, ὑπερηφανία.” Ibid., 20.1b.2

to the death of the soul.<sup>32</sup> As can be seen from the current arguments of both annihilationists and traditionalists, the word eternal can admit of varied meanings.<sup>33</sup>

In summary, the letter of Barnabas employs soul to refer to life and views it as the seat of understanding, hope, sin, and Christian renewal. The soul is also subject to the influence of evil company.<sup>34</sup>

Barnabas also writes of the destruction of the soul referring to the eternal death of punishment. This idea is not supported with direct biblical citations, though the notion of a future retribution is in view which seems to have scriptural overtones and is a theme that is developed more thoroughly by later authors.

### *Shepherd of Hermas*

The *Shepherd of Hermas* is divided into three books.<sup>35</sup> The first records visions,

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<sup>32</sup>Clement of Alexandria, Origen, and Novation all discuss this idea. With the first two, it is clear that this does not refer to the extinction of the soul at a future time. See below on pp. 214, 279 and 391.

<sup>33</sup>For a recent look at the varied interpretation in this controversy, see Edward Fudge and Robert A. Peterson, *Two Views of Hell: A Biblical and Theological Dialogue* (Downers Grove, IL: InverVarsity Press, 2000). As will be seen throughout this study, the early Church Fathers often define certain key terms such as death, life, destruction, etc., in different ways, noting that they are even used in different ways in Scripture. Thus, just because an author uses death or destruction, this does not automatically place that author in either the annihilationists' or traditionalists' camp.

<sup>34</sup>Prostmeier argues that, in general, soul in Barnabas is used as a personal pronoun, suggesting it does not have specific anthropological connotations other than referring to the individual. Prostmeier, 195-196.

<sup>35</sup>For an overview of the document, see Joseph Verheyden, "The Shepherd of Hermas," *Expository Times* 117, no. 10 (2006): 397-401. On dating and authorship, see Altaner, 85; Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers*, 23; Robert Joly, *Hermas Le Pasteur*, Sources Chrétiennes 53 (Paris: Editions du Cerf, 1958), 11-16; Graydon Snyder, *The Shepherd of Hermas*, The Apostolic Fathers (London: Thomas Nelson, 1968), 6:22-24; J. Christian Wilson, *Toward a Reassessment of the Shepherd of Hermas: Its Date and Its Pneumatology* (Lewiston: Mellen Biblical Press, 1993), 9-61.

the second gives commandments, and the third is on similitudes or parables.<sup>36</sup> It was often found in ancient manuscripts among the books considered to be part of Scripture.

#### Usage of *Psyche*

Hermas uses soul for natural life in the context of dying or giving one's life. He writes of those who have "laid down their lives."<sup>37</sup>

Hermas also uses the soul in reference to the individual. When asking for an explanation of Similitude IX, he says so "that every soul, trusting in the Lord, and hearing it, may glorify His great, and marvellous, and glorious name."<sup>38</sup> This seems clearly to be using soul as a reference to an individual rather than denoting a separate entity from the body.

In the *Shepherd*, one's soul can be sick.<sup>39</sup> It can also be in need of repentance.<sup>40</sup> Believers are called on to be humble and to torment their soul.<sup>41</sup> In chap. 39, Hermas discusses the believer who doubts, which is a repeated theme throughout the document. When a believer asks something in faith from God, Hermas calls this a "request of your

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<sup>36</sup>On the issue of unity and multiple authors, see Carolyn Osiek, "The Shepherd of Hermas in Context," *Acta Patristica et Byzantina* 8 (1997): 115-134; idem, *Shepherd of Hermas*, Hermeneia (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1999), 8-10. Citations in this section have a secondary number where S=Similitudes, C=Commandments, and V=Visions.

<sup>37</sup>οἱ καὶ προθύμως ἔπαθον ἐξ ὅλης τῆς καρδίας καὶ παρέδωκαν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν." *Pastor* 105.3.1 (S.9).

<sup>38</sup>ἵνα πᾶσα ψυχή πεποιθυῖα ἐπὶ." *Ibid.*, 95.5.2 (S.9).

<sup>39</sup>καὶ ταπεινοῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν." *Ibid.*, 38.10.7 (C.8).

<sup>40</sup>μετανοήσουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ αὐτῶν." *Ibid.*, 1.9.2 (V.1).

<sup>41</sup>καὶ ταπεινοῖ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν καὶ βασανίζει." *Ibid.*, 30.2.7 (C.4). Cf. *Ibid.*, 66.4.5 (S.7).

soul.”<sup>42</sup> Those who ask and firmly believe that God will grant the request are contrasted with the διψυχία or doubters, who do not believe that God will grant what has been requested.<sup>43</sup> In chap. 43, Hermas speaks of a false prophet who speaks to doubters who ask about their future as one who “fills their souls with expectations, according to their own wishes.”<sup>44</sup> Here again, Hermas discusses the desires of the soul but here the unbeliever is the one who has their soul filled with whatever they desired. Hermas prefaces this by noting that they are wicked desires. Thus belief and desire reside in the soul for Hermas.

Herms uses soul in the context of agitation or concern. He wants some information regarding one of the similitudes and states, “On all these points put my mind at rest, sir, and explain them to me.”<sup>45</sup> Here the soul seeks rest, presumably from worry.

In an admonition to believers against accumulating wealth, Hermas exhorts them to buy afflicted souls and visit widows and orphans.<sup>46</sup> It is not clear what is to be understood by the expression “buy afflicted souls.” Does he intend this to describe the

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<sup>42</sup>“ἀλλὰ τὸ αἴτημα τῆς ψυχῆς σου πληροφορήσει” *Pastor* 39.3.1 (C.9).

<sup>43</sup>On this, see Patricia C. Miller, “‘All the Words Were Frightful’: Salvation by Dreams in the Shepherd of Hermas,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 42 (1988): 330; Carolyn Osiek, *Rich and Poor in the Shepherd of Hermas*, The Catholic Biblical Quarterly Monograph Series 15 (Washington, DC: Catholic Biblical Association of America, 1983), 50; Oscar J. F. Seitz, “Relationship of the Shepherd of Hermas to the Epistle of James,” *JBL* 63 (1944): 136-139; idem, “Antecedents and Signification of the Term Dipsychos”; idem, “Afterthoughts on the Term Dipsychos,” *New Testament Studies* 4 (1958): 27-334.

<sup>44</sup>“καὶ πληροῖ τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν καθὼς αὐτοὶ βούλονται.” *Pastor* 43.3.1 (C.11).

<sup>45</sup>“καὶ πάλιν ἡρμένων καὶ εἰς τόπον ἴδιον ἀποτεθειμένων· περὶ πάντων τούτων ἀνάπαυσον τὴν ψυχὴν μου, κύριε, καὶ γνώρισόν μοι αὐτά” *Pastor* 82.5.1 (S.9).

<sup>46</sup>“ἀντὶ ἀγρῶν οὖν ἀγοράζετε ψυχὰς θλιβομένας.” *Ibid.*, 50.8.1 (S.1).

actual purchase of oppressed people or slaves? Or does it refer to the visitation of widows and orphans? It seems probable that caring for the widows and orphans is the better understanding, especially when compared with his statements in chaps. 51 and 56. In chap. 51, Hermas describes how the “rich, again, aiding the poor in their necessities, satisfy their souls.”<sup>47</sup> Here, “their souls” is to be understood as referring to the souls of the poor who have received help from the gifts of the wealthy. In chap. 56, Hermas, in describing the procedure that should be followed by anyone fasting, describes taking the money that would have been spent to buy food for the day and giving it to a widow or orphan or some other person in need. When this is done, the recipient will be able to “fill his own soul”<sup>48</sup> from the money the one fasting has given. Presumably, here the money would be used to buy food to fill the poor person’s stomach. What seems clear here is that Hermas is using soul to refer to that part of the widows, orphans, and poor which is able to be satisfied by the gifts of the rich. This seems to be referring to the physical part of the body which is aided by eating food rather than referring to the life-spirit.

Hermas writes about the affliction of soul that is needed by those who have repented of sins. He writes that “he who repents must torture his own soul, and be exceedingly humble in all his conduct, and be afflicted with many kinds of affliction; and if he endure the afflictions that come upon him, He who created all things, and endued them with power, will assuredly have compassion, and will heal him.”<sup>49</sup> The parallel of a

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<sup>47</sup>“οἱ πλούσιοι χορηγοῦντες τοῖς πένησι τὰ δέοντα πληροφοροῦσι τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.” Ibid., 51.8.7 (S.2).

<sup>48</sup>“ἵνα ἐκ τῆς ταπεινοφροσύνης σου ὁ εἰληφῶς ἐμπλήσῃ τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν.” Ibid., 56.7.6 (S.5). See Martin Dibelius, *Der Hirt des Hermas*, Handbuch zum Neuen Testament 4, ed. Hans Lietzmann (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1923), 567. Dibelius cites this as an example of a Hebraism similar to Prov 6:30.

<sup>49</sup>“ἀλλὰ δεῖ τὸν μετανοοῦντα βασανίσαι τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ψυχὴν.” *Pastor*

tortured, afflicted soul with one who is humble in conduct suggests a connection between the life of the soul and that of the body. Earlier Hermas described the afflictions which are placed upon sinners. They are “punished with losses, others with want, others with sicknesses of various kinds, and others with all kinds of disorder and confusion; others are insulted by unworthy persons, and exposed to suffering in many ways; for many, becoming unstable in their plans, try many things, and none of them at all succeed.”<sup>50</sup> These afflictions seem to be carried out in one’s life in a similar way that the satisfied soul is filled from eating physical food.

#### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Hermas writes about a soul as that part of a person that can be saved and, correspondingly, apparently lost.<sup>51</sup> He writes that the commandments are described as “excellent, and powerful, and glorious, and able to save a man’s soul.”<sup>52</sup> Later he refers to an “angel of luxury and deceit: he wears out the souls of the servants of God, and perverts them from the truth, deceiving them with wicked desires, through which they will perish; for they forget the commandments of the living God.”<sup>53</sup> He also describes those who do not keep company with believers, stating that “they destroy their own souls.”<sup>54</sup>

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66.4.5 (S.7).

<sup>50</sup>Ibid., 63.

<sup>51</sup>Cf. 1 Pet 1:9, “for you are receiving the outcome of your faith, the salvation of your souls.”

<sup>52</sup>“καὶ ἔνδοξοι καὶ δυνάμενοι σώσαι ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου.” *Pastor* 61.1.3 (S.6)

<sup>53</sup>“οὗτος οὖν ἐκτρίβει τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν δούλων τοῦ θεοῦ.” Ibid., 62.1.2 (S.6)

<sup>54</sup>“ἀπολλύουσι τὰς ἑαυτῶν ψυχὰς.” *Pastor* 103.4.1 (S.9). Cf. *Didache* 16.2.

In summary, Hermas uses the soul for life and to refer to an individual. It is the seat of sin in the person. Doubt on the part of a believer happens in the soul and what goes on in the soul affects the actions of the body. He also uses soul in an apparent reference to the physical person. The soul can be saved and it can be destroyed. While the notions of salvation and damnation clearly refer to biblical themes, still there is no conclusive reference or allusions to specific passages in this document.

### *Didache*

The *Didache*, or *Teaching of the Twelve Apostles* as it is also known, contains little in connection with the doctrine of the soul.<sup>55</sup> It has several statements that are directly related to statements from the *Epistle of Barnabas*.<sup>56</sup>

### Usage of *Psyche*

The *Didache* teaches that “some you shall love more than thine own soul.”<sup>57</sup> This

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<sup>55</sup>Translation based on Kirsopp Lake’s edition for the LCL. For a current bibliography, see Marcello Del Verme, *Didache and Judaism: Jewish Roots of an Ancient Christian-Jewish Work* (New York: T & T Clark International, 2004). On provenance, see Clayton N. Jefford, “The Milieu of Matthew, the Didache, and Ignatius of Antioch: Agreements and Differences,” in *Matthew and the Didache: Two Documents from the Same Jewish-Christian Milieu?* ed. Huub van de Sandt (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005). As to the document’s unity and relationship to the Gospels along with the dating issue, see Aaron Milavec, *The Didache: Faith, Hope and Life of the Earliest Christian Communities, 50-70 C.E.* (New York: Newman Press, 2003), 695-739; idem, “When, Why, and for Whom Was the Didache Created? Insights into the Social and Historical Setting of the Didache Communities,” in *Matthew and the Didache: Two Documents from the Same Jewish-Christian Milieu?* ed. Huub van de Sandt (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2005).

<sup>56</sup>On this, see Jonathan A. Draper, “Barnabas and the Riddle of the Didache Revisited,” *Journal for the Study of the New Testament* 58 (1995): 89-113.

<sup>57</sup>“οὐς δὲ ἀγαπήσεις ὑπὲρ τὴν ψυχὴν σου.” *Didache* 2.7.2. See Kurt Niederwimmer, *The Didache, Hermeneia* (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 1998), 92-93. Niederwimmer suggests that soul here should be understood as either one’s own life or person. Cf. Jean-Paul Audet, *La Didachè: instructions des apôtres* (Paris: Librairie

seems to be an example of soul standing for natural life.

The *Didache* also urges “nor let thy soul be presumptuous.”<sup>58</sup> Another statement on the same theme is, “Thy soul shall not consort with the lofty.”<sup>59</sup> By themselves, these statements locate sin of pride in the soul. However, when compared to the other usages of soul in the *Didache*, one could argue that this also is using soul as referring to one’s self.

The final usage also concerns whom the soul associates with. “But be frequently gathered together seeking the things which are profitable for your souls.”<sup>60</sup> Here the soul seems capable of receiving some harm or benefit for the individual’s salvation from association with others. The author does not elaborate on what benefit may be received or how this may take place, leaving it open to conjecture.

#### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

The *Didache* does not comment on the doctrine of the soul or contain any usage of biblical sources on the soul.

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Lecoffre, 1958), 294. This passage parallels *Epistle of Barnabas* 1.4; 4.6. See Niederwimmer, 92n55.

<sup>58</sup>“οὐδὲ δώσεις τῇ ψυχῇ σου θράσος.” *Didache* 3.9.2. For a parallel, see “οὐ δώσεις τῇ ψυχῇ σου θράσος.” *Epistle of Barnabas* 19.3b.3.

<sup>59</sup>“Οὐ κολληθήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ σου μετὰ ὑψηλῶν.” *Didache* 3.9.2. Cf. “οὐδὲ κολληθήσῃ ἐκ ψυχῆς σου μετὰ ὑψηλῶν.” *Epistle of Barnabas* 19.6b.2.

<sup>60</sup>“Πυκνῶς δὲ συναχθήσεσθε ζητοῦντες τὰ ἀνήκοντα ταῖς ψυχαῖς ὑμῶν.” *Didache* 16.2.2. Klaus Wengst argues that this should be understood as replacing the personal pronoun. Wengst, *Didache (Apostellehre), Barnabasbrief, Zweiter Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet: Eingeleitet, herausgegeben, übertragen und erläutert*, 89n128. See *Barnabas* 4.9 for a parallel statement. Cf. *Pastor* 103.4.1 for the negative admonition. The *Didache* in 4.4.1 also uses the phrase “do not be double-minded” (Οὐ διψυχῆσεις), again mirroring the *Epistle of Barnabas* 19.5a.1, “Οὐ μὴ διψυχήσης.” In the Apostolic Fathers, this terminology is found most frequently in the *Shepherd of Hermas*. Cf. *Pastor* 11.5.1.



In summary, in several statements, the *Didache* echoes ideas and phrases concerning the soul found in the *Epistle of Barnabas*. The soul is used to refer to natural life and called upon not to be proud. It also urges that keeping good company has a positive effect on one's soul. He does not directly quote from any known passages of Scripture.

### *Epistle to Diognetus*

The author of the *Epistle to Diognetus* takes the title Mathetes, or Disciple. Beyond this, little is known about the document's author.<sup>61</sup> This document has the first extended section on the soul in the Apostolic Fathers.

### Usage of *Psyche*

The *Epistle to Diognetus* uses the relationship of the soul and body as a metaphor for describing the relationship of the Christian to the world.<sup>62</sup> The author begins with “what the soul is in the body, that are Christians in the world.”<sup>63</sup> This introductory declaration sets up the remainder of the section. The author clearly intends to convey a dichotomous distinction between the soul and body. The author makes several points regarding this distinction. First, the soul “is dispersed through all the members of the

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<sup>61</sup>Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers*, 28. On dating and authorship, see Altaner, 135-136; Theofried Baumeister, “Zur Datierung der Schrift an Diognet,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 42 (1988): 105-111; Henri I. Marrou, *A Diognète*, Sources Chrétiennes 33 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1965), 241-268; Quasten, 248-249.

<sup>62</sup>Marrou notes the difficulty in precisely understanding the author's theology because of its expression in comparison form. Marrou, 138. On the Platonic backgrounds to this section, see Wengst, *Didache (Apostellehre), Barnabasbrief, Zweiter Klemensbrief, Schrift an Diognet: Eingeleitet, herausgegeben, übertragen und erläutert*, 321-323.

<sup>63</sup>“ὅπερ ἐστὶν ἐν σώματι ψυχῇ.” *Ad Diognetum* 6.1.1.

body.”<sup>64</sup> Second, “the soul dwells in the body, yet it is not of the body.”<sup>65</sup> While both of these statements might seem to imply some physical properties of the soul—the ability to be spread throughout another body and to be located in it—yet it is probable that this is not the case as many subsequent authors will write of this understanding and yet clearly understand the soul as incorporeal.

Furthermore the author writes, “The invisible soul is guarded by the visible body.”<sup>66</sup> Here the soul is explicitly stated to be invisible, which may also hint at a notion of incorporeality as mentioned previously. This statement also suggests that the godliness of the Christian is invisible even though the Christian is visible bodily in the world. Here θεοσέβεια, or acts of godliness, are compared to the invisible soul. It may also be possible to sense the notion of the soul as the principle of movement in this statement. This common idea is that the soul cannot be seen except through the movements of the visible body.

The *Epistle to Diognetus* uses the Platonic concept of the soul being captive to the body stating, “The soul is imprisoned in the body, yet preserves that very body.”<sup>67</sup> Here two important ideas are suggested. First, the body is to be understood as the prison of the

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<sup>64</sup>“Ἐσπαρται κατὰ πάντων τῶν τοῦ σώματος μελῶν ἡ ψυχή.” Ibid., 6.2.2.

<sup>65</sup>“Οἰκεῖ μὲν ἐν τῷ σώματι ψυχή.” Ibid., 6.2.2. This is reminiscent of Stoicism. Marrou, 139. Others have argued differently. R. Godfrey Tanner, “The Epistle to Diognetus and Contemporary Greek Thought,” *Studia Patristica* 15 pt. 1 (1985): 502.

<sup>66</sup>“Ἀόρατος ἡ ψυχή ἐν ὄρατῷ φρουρεῖται τῷ σώματι.” *Ad Diognetum* 6.4.1.

<sup>67</sup>“Ἐγκέκλεισται μὲν ἡ ψυχή τῷ σώματι, συνέχει δὲ αὐτὴ τὸ σῶμα.” *Ad Diognetum* 6.7.1. This notion is found in Plato. Robert Joly, *Christianisme et philosophie: études sur Justin et les apologistes grecs du deuxième siècle*, Université libre de Bruxelles, Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres 52 (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1973), 205; Tanner, 503.

soul. This notion, often referring to the body as a tomb, is well known in philosophical thought and is used by later writers in this study. Secondly, the author suggests that the presence of the soul in the body is what keeps the body alive. This notion of soul as the principle of life is also well attested in earlier philosophical writings.

The *Epistle to Diognetus* finishes the soul/Christian metaphor with, “The soul, when but ill-provided with food and drink, becomes better.”<sup>68</sup> The author here implies a connection between the body and the soul, declaring that bodily fasting is good for the soul.

#### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

The statement in the *Epistle to Diognetus*, “The immortal soul dwells in a mortal tabernacle,”<sup>69</sup> is the first of its kind in the Apostolic Fathers, attributing immortality to the soul. It seems fairly clear that this immortality is to be understood as already present as an attribute of the soul. It is not something that is to be attained at a future time. The notion of a “mortal tabernacle” seems to continue the idea stated previously that the body is the tomb of the soul, thus implying a break from it, which the author brings to view by stating that the Christian is “looking for incorruption in the heavens.”<sup>70</sup> This juxtaposition of an immortal soul with the notion of a future incorruption to be received is not unknown among other writers and perhaps reflects an ambivalence between the clear biblical notion of future heavenly rewards for the believer with the Greek concept of the natural immortality of the human soul.

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<sup>68</sup>“Κακουρογούμενη σιτίοις καὶ ποτοῖς ἡ ψυχὴ βελτιοῦται.” *Ad Diognetum* 6.9.1.

<sup>69</sup>“Ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν θνητῷ σκηνώματι κατοικεῖ.” *Ibid.*, 6.8.2.

<sup>70</sup>*Ad Diognetum* 6.8.2.

The author also writes, “The flesh hates the soul, and wars against it, though itself suffering no injury, because it is prevented from enjoying pleasures.”<sup>71</sup> Here the soul is disconnected from the pleasures of the body, which presumably must only be enjoyed in the “flesh.” Then he adds, “The soul loves the flesh that hates it, and the members.”<sup>72</sup> Whether flesh is to be understood here in metaphorical terms rather than referring simply to the flesh of the earthly body is not made clear, though the addition of the phrase “and the members” seems to focus on the physical aspect. It is possible that this is taken from 1 Pet 2:11, “Beloved, I urge you as aliens and exiles to abstain from the desires of the flesh that wage war against the soul.” This idea of the body at war with the soul is one that is not used much again until the later Latin Fathers where it will be picked up and become a major part of the understanding of the human person.

In summary, the *Epistle to Diognetus* is the first Apostolic Father to have a section devoted to discussing the soul in any sort of detail. The clear distinction between the soul and body, along with an emphasis on the immortality of the soul itself, sets the stage for much of what develops later. The soul is invisible, held captive in the body, functions as the principle of movement in the body, and yet is affected by the actions of the body.<sup>73</sup> All of these notions will be developed further by later authors, but no direct citations of the Scriptures are used.

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<sup>71</sup>“Μισεῖ τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ σὰρξ καὶ πολεμεῖ μηδὲν ἀδικουμένη, δίοτι ταῖς ἡδοναῖς κωλύεται χρῆσθαι.” Ibid., 6.5.1. Cf. 2 Pet 2:11. Note the usage here of σὰρξ rather than σῶμα.

<sup>72</sup>“Ἡ ψυχὴ τὴν μισοῦσαν ἀγαπᾷ σάρκα καὶ τὰ μέλη.” *Ad Diognetum* 6.6.1.

<sup>73</sup>Marrou argues that the author’s usage of soul is based on the world-soul concept of Greek philosophy. Marrou, 141-145.

## **Conclusion**

This chapter has studied both the usage of soul and the scant doctrinal hints that appear in the Apostolic Fathers. The soul often carries the notion of natural life. It is also the seat of emotions and mental activity. Faith and unbelief are found in the soul and the soul can be influenced by the body. The need to guard and guide the soul in relation to sin is also prominent. The idea of the destruction of the soul is discussed along with the notion of an entombed soul. This later development is introduced which also clearly goes the furthest along doctrinal lines when it attributes immortality to the soul.

The authors in this period do not use the Scriptures when discussing the soul. They mention the soul in connection with salvation and punishment, which are clearly biblical themes but these are only allusions at best. It is in the next period that the Scriptures come to play a much more prominent role.

## CHAPTER IV

### JUSTIN MARTYR TO MELITO OF SARDIS

The Greek Fathers of the early and middle second century devoted much of their writing to apologetic works. In these documents, the concept of the soul begins to take on a more important role. Issues especially important in this time period are the origin of the soul and the future life of the soul. These two relate directly to God as creator and God as judge and redeemer, important concepts in the self-definition of early Christianity. Though the Scriptures are not used as much by some authors because of the apologetic genre, others put much more obvious emphasis on the authority of the Scriptures for this developing concept.

#### **Justin Martyr**

The extant documents of Justin Martyr are early examples of Christian apologetics. His *First Apology* along with a shorter *Second Apology* and an extended *Dialogue with Trypho* are his main works.<sup>1</sup> There are several other of Justin's known works that are no longer extant.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>See Altaner, 121-123; Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers*, 49-53; Erwin R. Goodenough, *The Theology of Justin Martyr: An Investigation into the Conceptions of Early Christian Literature and Its Hellenistic and Judaistic Influences*, Reprint of 1923 ed. (Amsterdam: Philo Press, 1968), 80-100; Quasten, 198-204.

<sup>2</sup>See Altaner, 123-124; Claudio Moreschini and Enrico Norelli, *Early Christian Greek and Latin Literature: A Literary History*, trans. Matthew J. O'Connell, vol. 1 (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2005), 202-203; Quasten, 204-207; Oskar Skarsaune, "Justin der Märtyrer," *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (1988), 17:472; Claus P. Vetten,

## Usage of *Psyche*

Justin seems to employ soul to refer to physical life when he writes that one should be a lover of truth even before one's life.<sup>3</sup> It does not appear to make sense if this usage of soul is interpreted as a separate existence from the body.

Justin also uses soul to refer to an individual. He writes "that it was justly recorded concerning the people, that the soul which shall not be circumcised on the eighth day shall be cut off from his family."<sup>4</sup> In a similar usage, he writes "that the word of God speaks to those who believe in Him as being one soul, and one synagogue, and one church."<sup>5</sup> He seems to be drawing upon a concept of the simpleness of the soul as a metaphor for the singleness of those who are believers in Christ.<sup>6</sup>

The concept of soul as a thinking agent is also used by Justin. He writes that "because we are well aware that it is not easy suddenly to change a soul possessed by ignorance, we intend to add a few things, for the sake of persuading those who love the

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"Justin Martyr," *Dictionary of Early Christian Literature*, 357.

<sup>3</sup>"πρὸ τῆς ἑαυτοῦ ψυχῆς." *Apologia* 2.1.6.

<sup>4</sup>"ἐξολοθρευθήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκείνη ἐκ τοῦ γένους αὐτῆς, ἢ οὐ περιτμηθήσεται τῇ ἡμέρᾳ τῇ ὀγδόῃ." *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 23.4.6. The word soul is not in either the Hebrew or Latin text of Gen 17:12-14 to which this passage must allude where "every male" is used. Thus Justin uses soul to refer to any male Israelite person.

<sup>5</sup>"καὶ ὅτι τοῖς εἰς αὐτὸν πιστεύουσιν, ὡς οὖσι μιᾷ ψυχῇ καὶ μιᾷ συναγωγῇ καὶ μιᾷ ἐκκλησίᾳ, ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ λέγει." *Ibid.*, 63.5.4.

<sup>6</sup>In a somewhat different usage, Justin can also accuse Trypho and the Jewish teachers of believing that God is a composite being, believing that He "has hands and feet, and fingers, and a soul." *Ibid.*, 114.3.4. Here the soul, when combined with the various bodily members, indicates a composite being.

truth.”<sup>7</sup> Here one’s soul has the mental capacity to hold tightly to ignorance. He also writes of a “well-conditioned soul.”<sup>8</sup> In addition, Justin mentions a Pythagorean philosopher who told him that he should study those branches of learning which “wean the soul from sensible objects.”<sup>9</sup> These usages suggest a mental capacity in Justin’s understanding of the soul.

Justin writes of the soul as a place of desire by describing a time “when my soul was eagerly desirous.”<sup>10</sup> He writes regarding his conversion that “straightway a flame was kindled in my soul.”<sup>11</sup> He also urges Trypho to “abandon” hope from his soul<sup>12</sup> concerning salvation by virtue of being Abraham’s seed. He also writes of the baptism of the “soul from wrath and from covetousness, from envy, and from hatred.”<sup>13</sup> In this context, he describes the actions of the body as distinct from the sins of the soul. These sins which the soul commits, then, are understood as occurring inside of one’s self rather than as external actions of the body. Thus the soul, for Justin, is capable of a wide variety

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<sup>7</sup>“ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ γνωρίζομεν οὐ ῥᾶον ἀγνοία κατεχομένην ψυχὴν συντόμως μεταβάλλειν.” *Apologia* 12.11.3.

<sup>8</sup>“ἀπειὴ δὲ σωφρονούσης ψυχῆς ἔννοια τοιαύτη περὶ θεῶν.” *Ibid.*, 21.5.1. While σωφρονέω may be understood as a person who has their right mental faculties about them, in Justin it can also have a moral sense. For this, see *ibid.*, 14.2; 15.1.

<sup>9</sup>“ἅ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ τῶν αἰσθητῶν περισπάσει.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 2.4.8.

<sup>10</sup>“τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔτι μου σπαργώσης.” *Ibid.*, 2.4.1

<sup>11</sup>“ἔμοῦ δὲ παραχρημα πῦρ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἀνήφθη.” *Ibid.*, 8.1.3.

<sup>12</sup>“ὡς τεμόντας ὑμᾶς ἀπὸ τῶν ψυχῶν ὑμῶν τὴν ἐλπίδα ταύτην σπουδάσαι δεῖ ἐπιγνῶναι.” *Ibid.*, 44.4.2.

<sup>13</sup>“βαπτίσθητε τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ὀργῆς καὶ ἀπὸ πλεονεξίας, ἀπὸ φθόνου, ἀπὸ μίσους.” *Ibid.*, 14.2.2. This idea of cleansing by water for sins of the soul is repeated again in *ibid.*, 18.2.2. A soul purified from sin is also mentioned in *ibid.*, 41.1.5.



of desires, ranging from the positive feelings of a new convert to Christianity, to the evil desires and wickedness of a sinner.

Justin has one example of the concept “the eyes of the soul” found elsewhere in the philosophers and early Church Fathers. In commenting on Jacob’s marriage to two sisters, Justin asserts that it happened as a typological event, rather than as an example to be imitated by later generations. Leah represents Israel and Rachel represents the Church. Leah, Justin writes, was weak-eyed, “for the eyes of your souls are excessively weak.”<sup>14</sup>

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Justin conceives of the human person as consisting of both body and soul.<sup>15</sup> An example is seen when he describes Christ’s incarnation. He writes, “Christ, who appeared for our sakes, became the whole rational being, both body, and reason, and soul.”<sup>16</sup> Reason seems added here to the body and soul specifically in reference to Christ as Justin is well-known for his logos Christology.

Justin argues that the soul after death has sensation.<sup>17</sup> He describes people

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<sup>14</sup>“Λείας ἀσθενεῖς ἦσαν οἱ ὀφθαλμοί· καὶ γὰρ ὑμῶν σφόδρα οἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμοί.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 134.5.6. Cf. Paul’s metaphor in Gal 4 of Sarah and Hagar. Justin also uses the phrase “eyes of the mind.” *Ibid.*, 4.1. Cf Eph 1:18.

<sup>15</sup>Ayán Calvo, 91-92. For discussions on whether Justin held to a dichotomy or trichotomy of the human person, see Ayán Calvo, 93-101; Leslie W. Barnard, *Justin Martyr: His Life and Thought* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 113-114; Goodenough, 219-220, 240-241; Eric F. Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, *Beiträge zur historischen Theologie* 47, ed. Gerhard Ebeling (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1973), 145-147; Pierre Prigent, *Justin et l’Ancien Testament* (Paris: Librairie Lecoffre, 1964), 59-60.

<sup>16</sup>“τὰ ἡμέτερα διὰ τοῦ τὸ λογικὸν τὸ ὅλον τὸν φανέντα δι’ ἡμᾶς Χριστὸν γεγονέναι, καὶ σῶμα καὶ λόγον καὶ ψυχὴν.” *Apologia Secunda* 10.1.4.

<sup>17</sup>Ayán Calvo notes that for Justin, though the soul does survive the death of the body, yet it does not retain then the notion of *anthropos*. As already noted, both body and soul are required for a human person. See Ayán Calvo, 92, 102.

“calling human souls”<sup>18</sup> and those who are “thrown down by the souls of the dead”<sup>19</sup> as practices in pagan culture that should convince his readers to accept the Christian notion of a sentient soul after death.<sup>20</sup> He argues that if there is no sensation after death, this would be a godsend to the wicked.<sup>21</sup> Justin here connects the notion of a continued state of sensation after death for souls with the necessity of a future judgment.

Justin allows that there is a similarity to this notion as taught by some of the philosophers. He writes that when “we affirm that the souls of the wicked, being endowed with sensation even after death, are punished, and that those of the good being delivered from punishment spend a blessed existence, we shall seem to say the same things as the poets and philosophers.”<sup>22</sup>

As an explanation for this shared idea, Justin discusses the origins of the doctrine

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<sup>18</sup>“καὶ ψυχῶν ἀνθρώπων κλήσεις.” *Apologia* 18.3.2.

<sup>19</sup>“καὶ οἱ ψυχαῖς ἀποθανόντων λαμβανόμενοι καὶ ῥιπτούμενοι ἄνθρωποι.” *Ibid.*, 18.4.2. The throwing of persons by the souls of the dead seems to have a connection with the people possessed by evil spirits in the Gospel accounts.

<sup>20</sup>“ὅτι καὶ μετὰ θάνατον ἐν αἰσθήσει εἰσὶν αἱ ψυχαί.” *Ibid.*, 8.3.5.

<sup>21</sup>*Ibid.*, 18.1.2. Cf. *ibid.*, 57. Goodenough, in comparing this statement with *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 45.4 where Justin writes, “some are sent to be punished unceasingly into judgment and condemnation of fire; but others shall exist in freedom from suffering, from corruption, and from grief, and in immortality,” sees a contradiction which he says means that it is impossible to know Justin’s teaching about the state of souls after death. Goodenough, 224.

<sup>22</sup>“τῶ δὲ κολάζεσθαι ἐν αἰσθήσει καὶ μετὰ θάνατον οὐσας τὰς τῶν ἀδίκων ψυχάς, τὰς δὲ τῶν σπουδαίων ἀπηλλαγμένας τῶν τιμωριῶν εἶ διαγείν, ποιηταῖς καὶ φιλοσόφοις τὰ αὐτὰ λέγειν δόξομεν.” *Apologia* 20.4. It is worth noting that Justin makes it clear that this doctrine “seems” to be the same as that of the poets and philosophers, thus giving the impression that there is not an exact correspondence. Young attempts to connect this with *Dialogue with Trypho* 117.3 to argue unconvincingly that Justin believed in an interim state where souls would be punished before receiving the eternal punishment after the judgment. M. O. Young, “Justin Martyr and the Death of Souls,” *Studia Patristica* 16 pt 2 (1985): 211-212.

of immortality among the Christians and philosophers.<sup>23</sup> He writes, “For Moses is more ancient than all the Greek writers. And whatever both philosophers and poets have said concerning the immortality of the soul, or punishments after death, or contemplation of things heavenly, or doctrines of the like kind, they have received such suggestions from the prophets as have enabled them to understand and interpret these things.”<sup>24</sup> While he admits that the philosophers may have seen truth in their teaching relating to such doctrines as the immortality of the soul, he insists that the origin and true understanding of such teaching are found only in the prophets.<sup>25</sup> In his *Dialogue with Trypho*, Justin discusses the soul and he acknowledges there that some think that it is immortal and immaterial.<sup>26</sup>

Justin adds scriptural proofs to the idea of a sentient soul after death. In the context of discussing Christ’s death, Justin again brings up the idea of the soul surviving the death of the body. He argues that the soul can be possessed by demons at death.

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<sup>23</sup>Barnhard argues that Justin believed in an immortal soul. Barnard, *Justin Martyr*, 113. As will be demonstrated, this does not appear to be the case. So Ayán Calvo, 92-93; Osborn, *Just Martyr*, 145; M. Young, 211.

<sup>24</sup>“καὶ πάντα, ὅσα περὶ ἀθανασίας ψυχῆς ἢ τιμωριῶν τῶν μετὰ θάνατον ἢ θεωρίας οὐρανίων ἢ τῶν ὁμοίων δογμάτων.” *Apologia* 44.9.2. On the immortality of the soul, see Carl Andresen, “Justin und der mittlere Platonismus,” *ZNW* 44 (1952-1953): 162.

<sup>25</sup>Cf. Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, 17-19. On this point, Osborn notes that while it can be said that the source of Justin’s theology is Scripture and Plato, because Justin conceives of the truth of the philosophers as coming from their reading of the prophets, thus one can say that Justin conceived of his theology as coming from Scripture alone. Osborn then shows that though Justin may have believed this to be the case, he did in fact use ideas which were more platonic than scriptural. Justin states that when contradictions are found in the philosophers concerning these teachings, it is because they do not have the full light of truth or Christ.

<sup>26</sup>“ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὑποστησάμενοι ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 1.5.7.

Taking Ps 22 to be a prayer of Jesus, he states regarding v. 20, “And the prayer that His soul should be saved from the sword, and lion’s mouth, and hand of the dog, was a prayer that no one should take possession of His soul: so that, when we arrive at the end of life, we may ask the same petition from God.”<sup>27</sup> In this understanding, the soul can be overcome by demonic forces at death. It is then necessary that the person pray to God to avoid this demonic possession. As further biblical support of this theory, Justin cites the episode from 1 Sam 28:12-13 of Saul going to see the Witch of Endor to ask advice of the deceased prophet Samuel. Justin claims that Samuel’s soul appeared when beckoned by the medium, thus adding further proof that demonic forces have power over the soul of a dead believer. He also cites Luke 23:46 where Christ states, “Father, into Thy hands I commend my spirit.” Justin uses these three instances to prove biblically that the soul does survive the grave and that, in fact, demons have a degree of power over the soul after death.

This concept of a sentient soul after the death of the body is intended to support the idea that, in harmony with what Plato had said about Rhadamanthus and Minos, the wicked would be punished with their soul united again to the body.<sup>28</sup> The punishment is to be eternal fire suffered by the soul and the body rather than for only a period of one thousand years as reported by Plato. As support for the teaching of punishment for both soul and body, Justin quotes Matt 10:28, “Fear not them that kill you, and after that can

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<sup>27</sup>*Dialogus cum Tryphone* 105.3.

<sup>28</sup>“καὶ τοῖς αὐτοῖς σώμασι μετὰ τῶν ψυχῶν γινομένων.” *Apologia* 8.4.4. Ayán Calvo notes that it is on the basis of this text that some conclude that Justin’s understanding of the human person exhibits a dichotomy composed of body and soul rather than a trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit. Ayán Calvo, 93.

do no more; but fear Him who after death is able to cast both soul and body into hell.”<sup>29</sup>

This is his first quotation of Scripture in support of the doctrine of punishment of the wicked used in the context of a teaching on the soul, namely that it will be reunited with the body.<sup>30</sup>

In his *Dialog with Trypho*, Justin states clearly that one’s soul does not go straight to heaven upon the death of the body.<sup>31</sup> Rather, there will be a resurrection of the dead at

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<sup>29</sup>*Apologia* 19.7.3

<sup>30</sup>Note Justin’s statement, “Since we expect to receive again our own bodies, though they be dead and cast into the earth,” in *First Apology* 18 and also “So also judge ye that it is not impossible that the bodies of men, after they have been dissolved, and like seeds resolved into earth, should in God’s appointed time rise again and put on incorruption,” in *First Apology* 19. In both of these statements, Justin clearly states that the souls of the saved will be reunited with their bodies for eternal salvation. Later he writes, “And while we affirm that the souls of the wicked, being endowed with sensation even after death, are punished, and that those of the good being delivered from punishment spend a blessed existence, we shall seem to say the same things as the poets and philosophers” (*Apologia* 20.4.5). Here he mentions only the soul’s salvation for the saved and the soul’s damnation for the lost, failing to mention the body in regard to either. Compare the above statements with others regarding the punishment of the wicked where he first states, “We believe . . . that every man will suffer punishment in eternal fire according to the merit of his deed,” in the *First Apology* 17 and again “Since sensation remains to all who have ever lived and eternal punishment is laid up,” in *First Apology* 18 and finally, “And hell is a place where those are to be punished who have lived wickedly, and who do not believe that those things which God has taught us by Christ will come to pass” *Apologia* 19. In none of these statements does Justin refer to the soul being rejoined to the body prior to its punishment. In *First Apology* 8.4.4, he does indicate that the bodies of the wicked will be joined to their souls for punishment. Ayán Calvo, on the basis of this last statement, also indicates that Justin believes the soul of the wicked will be reunited with the body for punishment. See Ayán Calvo, 92.

<sup>31</sup>“οἱ καὶ λέγουσι μὴ εἶναι νεκρῶν ἀνάστασιν, ἀλλὰ ἅμα τῷ ἀποθνήσκειν τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν ἀναλαμβάνεσθαι εἰς τὸν οὐρανόν.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 80.4. In stating this, Justin acknowledges that there are some so-called Christians who teach this. Cf. Bardo Weiss, “Die Unsterblichkeit der Seele als eschatologisches Heilsgut nach Origenes,” *Trierer Theologische Zeitschrift* 80 (1971): 157-158. Weiss argues this means that Justin does not allow for an immediate happiness for the soul after death. As other authors argue for at least a measure of bliss during the intermediate period, Weiss seems to overstate what Justin is arguing for.

a future time which will be followed by a millennial reign in the earthly Jerusalem. It is unclear if here Justin intends that the soul should be understood to be dead or residing in some place other than heaven. In this next section, Justin's ideas on the soul, as expressed in his reported discussion with an elderly Christian during his conversation with Trypho the Jew, are studied.

In the *Dialogue with Trypho*, the soul receives special attention in the opening chapters dealing with Justin's conversion from philosophy to Christianity.<sup>32</sup> In these chapters, care must be taken to distinguish ideas regarding the soul which are spoken by Justin's elderly interlocutor, from those of Justin before his conversion to Christianity and from those of Justin after his conversion.<sup>33</sup> Some scholars seem to ignore this altogether, using anything admitted by Justin or stated by his elderly Christian interlocutor during the conversation which precipitated Justin's conversion as being Justin's own doctrine.<sup>34</sup>

An example of this difficulty is found in the first chapter of the dialogue. Justin notes that there are some who "having supposed the soul to be immortal and immaterial, believe that though they have committed evil they will not suffer punishment (for that

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<sup>32</sup>On the identity of Trypho and authenticity of the dialogue, see Timothy J. Horner, *Listening to Trypho: Justin Martyr's Dialogue Reconsidered* (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 15-32.

<sup>33</sup>On Justin's conversion, see Oskar Skarsaune, "The Conversion of Justin Martyr," *Studia Theologica* 30, no. 1 (1976): 53-73.

<sup>34</sup>Cf. Ayán Calvo, 89-92. Some scholars use this section of the *Dialogue* primarily to show Justin's philosophical mind-set in Middle Platonism. Cf. Barnard, *Justin Martyr*, 27-38; Goodenough, 57-71; Manfred Hoffmann, *Der Dialog bei den christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten Vier Jahrhunderte* (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1966), 11-12. This has value, but then one must ask what its purpose is in the *Dialogue*. Cf. Joly, *Christianisme et philosophie: études sur Justin et les apologistes grecs du deuxième siècle*, 52-53.

which is immaterial is insensible), and that the soul, in consequence of its immortality, needs nothing from God.”<sup>35</sup> Here Justin is discussing the ideas of others and does not explicitly give his view. It is only from tracing the arguments in the next several chapters that it becomes apparent that Justin does not support the idea that the soul is immortal and therefore it does need something from God, which consequently means it does matter whether one acts in a good or evil manner. Following this, it is implicitly implied that the soul is not divine in origin and thus needs immortality from God. This notion then sets up the rest of the introductory dialogue describing Justin’s conversion which he relates to Trypho.

Chapter 4 of the *Dialogue* begins with the several questions asked by an elderly, Christian interlocutor, whom the unconverted Justin met while walking alone by the sea. The main topic of the inquiry is the soul and how the mind is able to see God. In this conversation, the unnamed man asks, “Is the soul also divine and immortal?”<sup>36</sup> Justin replies affirmatively. Then he asked if the souls of humans and animals are of the same kind or different. Justin replies that they are similar.<sup>37</sup> His interlocutor then asks if the souls of animals shall see God, to which Justin replies negatively, asserting also that not

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<sup>35</sup>“ἄλλοι δέ τινες, ὑποστησάμενοι ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀσώματον τὴν ψυχὴν, οὔτε κακόν τι δράσαντες ἠγοῦνται δώσειν δίκην (ἀπαθὲς γὰρ τὸ ἀσώματον), οὔτε, ἀθανάτου αὐτῆς ὑπαρχούσης, δέονται τι.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 1.5.7.

<sup>36</sup>“ἢ καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ θεία καὶ ἀθάνατός ἐστι καὶ αὐτοῦ ἐκείνου τοῦ βασιλικοῦ νοῦ μέρος.” *Ibid.*, 4.2.2.

<sup>37</sup>On Justin’s connection between ψυχή and νοῦς βασιλικός, see Goodenough, 65-66. Goodenough is one of the few scholars who seeks to find a dividing line between Justin’s thought in Platonism and the subsequent change with his conversion to Christianity. Goodenough does not attempt, however, to clearly distinguish between the two and in his discussion on chapter 5 will fail to make any distinction between the ideas of Justin and that of his interlocutor.

all men will see God either, only the just and righteous. Justin's interlocutor then points out that this must not be on account of the affinity of the human soul with God that a person can apprehend God, or else all humans, or even all animals would be able to do so. The interlocutor asks Justin if the soul can see God while in the body or without. Justin admits that it can while in the body by means of the mind but "especially when it has been set free from the body." The interlocutor then asks if anyone can remember this when they are back in the body. Justin admits that they cannot. The interlocutor in conclusion asks if those who do not receive this vision and are reincarnated as beasts are able to know the reason for their situation. Again Justin admits that they do not. The conclusion is thus admitted that souls cannot see God and there is no reincarnation of souls from one body to another.

Chapter 5 of the *Dialogue* begins with the conclusion that the philosophers do not know anything about the soul. The interlocutor then states, "Nor ought it [the soul] to be called immortal; for if it is immortal, it is plainly unbegotten."<sup>38</sup> This is an important premise in Justin. That is, he understands that to be immortal means to be unbegotten. It does not refer only to the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body. Arguing from the accepted premise that the world is begotten, the interlocutor declares that the soul is also begotten and thus not immortal.<sup>39</sup> He quickly clarifies what the

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<sup>38</sup>"Οὐδὲ μὴν ἀθάνατον χρὴ λέγειν αὐτήν." *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 5.1. See Gregory Telepneff, "The Concept of the Person in the Christian Hellenism of the Greek Church Fathers: A Study of Origen, St. Gregory the Theologian, and St. Maximos the Confessor" (Th.D. diss., Graduate Theological Union, 1991), 140. On this basis, Telepneff argues that Justin does not hold to the notion of an immortal soul. See also Αγάν Calvo, 92-93.

<sup>39</sup>Cf. Barnard, *Justin Martyr*, 34. Here Barnard is indicative of those scholars who fail to make any distinction between the sayings attributed to Justin and his Christian interlocutor, attributing both to Justin's thought.



implications are for this. “But I do not say, indeed, that all souls die; for that were truly a piece of good fortune to the evil. What then? The souls of the pious remain in a better place, while those of the unjust and wicked are in a worse, waiting for the time of judgment. Thus some which have appeared worthy of God never die; but others are punished so long as God wills them to exist and to be punished.”<sup>40</sup> Here again Justin argues that if the soul were to die, this would be a benefit to evil doers. This is used as support for the future existence of the soul. Throughout the rest of chapter 5, Justin reiterates his understanding to the interlocutor that immortality belongs to God alone and thus everything created may cease to exist. In this chapter, Justin changes his mind from the previous one. Having there stated that the soul is immortal, he is now, at the prompting of his interlocutor, seen to be arguing quite the opposite. However, urged on by the necessity of a future judgment, he argues that souls do not die at the death of the body. Rather, they are saved for the judgment.

Chapter 6 of the *Dialogue* offers another argument against the immortality of the soul. Justin’s elderly interlocutor states that either the soul is life or it has life.<sup>41</sup> If it is life, then it would cause something else to be alive. As no one denies that the soul lives,<sup>42</sup>

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<sup>40</sup>“ Ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ ἀποθνήσκειν φημὶ πάσας τὰς ψυχὰς ἐγώ.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 5.3. Cf. *Apologia Secunda* 7.1. Goodenough sees Justin’s appeal to “practical expediency” as a fairly weak argument for setting aside the ability of the soul to obtain a vision of God and the doctrine of reincarnation. He notes, however, that this was acceptable as a legitimate philosophical argument in Justin’s time and was thus probably more acceptable to Justin’s contemporaries than it appears to modern scholars. Goodenough, 66-68. Joly notes that Justin is unique in suggesting the end of the punishment of the wicked, though citing several similar ideas. Joly, *Christianisme et philosophie: etudes sur Justin et les apologistes grecs du deuxième siècle*, 51-52.

<sup>41</sup>“ ἡ ψυχὴ ἢ τοι ζωὴ ἐστὶν ἢ ζωὴν ἔχει.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 6.1.

<sup>42</sup>“ ὅτι δὲ ζῆ ψυχὴ, οὐδεὶς ἀντείποι.” *Ibid.*, 6.1.

it must follow that the soul has life and thus lives as long as God wills it to.<sup>43</sup> The interlocutor thus reasons regarding the soul: “For to live is not its attribute, as it is God’s; but as a man does not live always, and the soul is not for ever conjoined with the body, since, whenever this harmony must be broken up, the soul leaves the body, and the man exists no longer; even so, whenever the soul must cease to exist, the spirit of life is removed from it, and there is no more soul, but it goes back to the place from whence it was taken.”<sup>44</sup>

Justin ends his discussion on the soul here. There are two resultant issues that now need to be discussed. The first of these is to question what was Justin’s purpose in relating this extended discussion of the soul. The second is to attempt to discover which of the statements regarding the soul by the unconverted Justin and his Christian interlocutor may be taken as reflective of Justin’s mature theology.

To answer why Justin inserts this long discussion on the soul, it is necessary to compare both the beginning of this pericope and its conclusion. This section begins with

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<sup>43</sup>“ζωῆς δὲ ψυχὴ μετέχει, ἐπεὶ ζῆν αὐτὴν ὁ θεὸς βούλεται.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 6.1. On the idea of the soul having life rather than being life in ancient thought, see Joly, *Christianisme et philosophie: études sur Justin et les apologistes grecs du deuxième siècle*, 61.

<sup>44</sup>“οὐ γὰρ ἴδιον αὐτῆς ἐστὶ τὸ ζῆν ὡς τοῦ θεοῦ· ἀλλὰ ὡσπερ ἄνθρωπος οὐ διὰ παντός ἐστιν οὐδὲ σύνεστιν αἰεὶ τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλ’, ὅταν δέη λυθῆναι τὴν ἀρμονίαν ταύτην, καταλείπει ἡ ψυχὴ τὸ σῶμα καὶ ὁ ἄνθρωπος οὐκ ἔστιν, οὕτως καὶ, ὅταν δέη τὴν ψυχὴν μηκέτι εἶναι, ἀπέστη ἀπ’ αὐτῆς τὸ ζωτικὸν πνεῦμα καὶ οὐκ ἔστιν ἡ ψυχὴ ἔτι, ἀλλὰ καὶ αὐτὴ ὅθεν ἐλήφθη ἐκεῖσε χωρεῖ πάλιν.” *Dialogus cum Tryphone* 6.2. Cf. Weiss, 157. On this basis, Weiss states that Justin taught the doctrine of Thnetopsychismus. It should be noted that Justin argues that upon the death of the body and the separation of the soul from it, the person no longer exists. Here Justin mentions the place from which souls are taken. He does not elaborate on this location and its relation to the origin of souls. He clearly states elsewhere that they are begotten but he gives no clue as to when he understands this to have taken place, at birth: conception, or some time prior to this. On the idea of the “return” of the soul, see Osborn, *Justin Martyr*, 146-147.

Trypho's desire to learn something of philosophy from Justin. Justin responds with a question, "'And in what,' said I, 'would you be profited by philosophy so much as by your own lawgiver and the prophets?'" Trypho responds, "'Why not? . . . Do not the philosophers turn every discourse on God? . . . Is not this truly the duty of philosophy, to investigate the Deity.'" Justin then lists the ideas of several philosophical schools, concluding with the previously discussed statement of "those who supposed the soul to be immortal and immaterial" and therefore believe they are not responsible for any evil acts they might commit and therefore have no need of the divine.<sup>45</sup> What this demonstrates is that Justin connects the desire of Trypho to know God with the philosophic schools that claim that you can know God by knowing the soul because the soul is divine. Justin rejects this view. This exchange sets up the story that follows in which Justin relays his journey through the various philosophical schools of his day<sup>46</sup> and concludes with an extended discussion between Justin and the elderly, Christian interlocutor, who is the one who leads Justin to convert to Christianity.

Justin begins by telling his interlocutor that philosophy brings happiness, and philosophy itself is the knowledge "of that which really exists and a clear perception of the truth."<sup>47</sup> Justin is then asked to define God to which he answers, "That which always maintains the same nature, and in the same manner, and is the cause of all other things." Then his interlocutor presses Justin regarding knowledge and how one could come to a knowledge of God. He ends by asking Justin, "How then . . . should the philosophers

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<sup>45</sup>*Dialogus cum Tryphone* 1.5.7.

<sup>46</sup>See Barnard, *Justin Martyr*, 27-38; Goodenough, 58-63.

<sup>47</sup>*Dialogus cum Tryphone* 4.

judge correctly about God . . . when they have no knowledge of Him?”<sup>48</sup> It is from this conclusion that the interlocutor leads Justin into a discussion of the soul, attempting, finally, to demonstrate that the soul is not capable of knowing God uninstructed by the Holy Spirit. Chapters 5 through 7 of the *Dialogue* may therefore be seen as demonstrating that the human soul is not capable of knowing the divine by itself.

The argument against the immortality of the soul is prompted by the Christian whom Justin meets while walking by the sea. Thus one can rightly ask which, if any, of these statements arguing against the immortality of the soul may be attributed to the thought of Justin as well. The problem with disregarding this interpretation of the soul’s immortality is that Justin never refutes the conclusions of his interlocutor that the soul is not immortal. In fact, several of the statements regarding the non-immortality of the soul are spoken by Justin himself throughout the course of the conversation with his interlocutor.<sup>49</sup> While some might argue that he was simply answering a question in the midst of a somewhat Socratic style of conversation rather than making a statement of doctrine or belief, such a conclusion still seems to lack an explanation of why the conversation on the immortality of the soul is left in the state it is, that of the accepted conclusion that the soul is not immortal. Later, Justin states to Trypho, his Jewish interlocutor, “Wherefore, Trypho, I will proclaim to you, and to those who wish to become proselytes, the divine message which I heard from that man.”<sup>50</sup> This would further suggest Justin’s high level of confidence in the message of his Christian interlocutor.

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<sup>48</sup>*Dialogus cum Tryphone* 4.

<sup>49</sup>Cf. *Ibid.*, 5. There Justin is asked in reference to human souls, “They are not, then, immortal?” He answers, “No.”

<sup>50</sup>*Ibid.*, 23.

## Summary

Justin has a fairly wide, though typical, usage of soul. It encompasses one's life, person, and location of feelings and desires. It also is seen as a psychological entity that separates from the body and survives the death of the individual.

Justin argues that the soul, though not immortal, survives the death of the individual. This is imperative to maintain the doctrine of a future judgment. The soul awaits the resurrection of the body at a future date, though not in heaven. At death, it is under threat from demonic forces. It may die according to the wish of God at a later point though no certainty is given regarding the final state of the souls of the wicked.

Justin uses Matt 10:28 to support the notion of the punishment of the entire person, soul, and body. He cites Ps 22:20, 1 Sam 28:12-13, and Luke 23:46 to support the teaching of a continued existence of the soul after the death of the body. Both the Lukan passage and that from the Psalms refer initially to Christ and are referred then to humanity in general. Of note is that neither the witch of Endor story nor Christ's utterance from the cross uses the word soul. Justin gives no exact reference to his belief that the soul suffers eternal punishment along with the body; however, it is clear he believes this to be the teaching of Scripture. While Justin uses it to defend the punishment of the body and soul together, Matt 10:28 is used by several subsequent Latin authors to defend the immortality of the soul.

## Tatian

Tatian, a disciple of Justin Martyr, is an early example of a Christian writer who later in life was declared heretical.<sup>51</sup> Though he is known to have written several

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<sup>51</sup>Robert M. Grant, "The Heresy of Tatian," *Journal of Theological Studies* 4 (1954): 62; Moreschini and Norelli, 204. Cf. Naomi Koltun-Fromm, "Re-imagining

documents, only his *Exhortation to the Greeks* and the *Diatessaron* are extant.<sup>52</sup> The *Diatessaron*, however, though it may have been written in Greek, survives only in several translations.<sup>53</sup>

### Usage of *Psyche*

In contrast to other writers, Tatian proposes a composite soul. He writes, “The human soul consists of many parts, and is not simple; it is composite.”<sup>54</sup> This is because the soul is manifest throughout the body, holding it together.<sup>55</sup> He writes additionally, “The bond of the flesh is the soul; that which encloses the soul is the flesh.”<sup>56</sup> This latter part is similar to the notion of an entombed soul described by many other authors.

Tatian chastises the Greeks because they use poetry to describe the “battles, and the amours of the gods, and the corruption of the soul.”<sup>57</sup> In connection with the combat

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Tatian: The Damaging Effects of Polemical Rhetoric,” *Journal of Early Christian Studies* 16, no. 1 (2008): 1-30.

<sup>52</sup>On his anthropology, see Martin Elze, *Tatian und seine Theologie*, *Forschungen zur Krichen- und Dogmengeschichte* 9 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1960), 88-100; Molly Whittaker, *Tatian: Oratio ad Graecos and Fragments*, *Oxford Early Christian Texts*, ed. Henry Chadwick (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), xvi.

<sup>53</sup>There is some dispute of whether it was originally written in Syriac or Greek. Peter Bruns, “Tatian the Syrian,” *DECL*, 552; Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers*, 66-68; Moreschini and Norelli, 205; Quasten, 224-225.

<sup>54</sup>“ψυχὴ μὲν οὖν ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολυμερῆς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ μονομερῆς. συνθετὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς εἶναι φανερὰν αὐτὴν διὰ σώματος.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 15.1.

<sup>55</sup>*Ibid.*, 15.1.

<sup>56</sup>“ἄσαρκος μὲν οὖν ὁ τέλειος θεός, ἄνθρωπος δὲ σὰρξ· δεσμός δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς ψυχῆ, σχετικὴ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἢ σὰρξ.” *Ibid.*, 15.2.

<sup>57</sup>“ποιητικὴν δέ, μάχας ἵνα συντάσσητε θεῶν καὶ ἔρωτας καὶ ψυχῆς διαφθοράν.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 1.4.

games of the gladiators, he writes, “You purchase men to supply a cannibal banquet for the soul, nourishing it by the most impious blood shedding.”<sup>58</sup> By this, Tatian suggests a connection between the material world and the soul. Both the poetry regarding battles and the actual fights of the gladiators serve to bring about evil in the soul.

The soul also may be subject to grief. Tatian writes that “grief does not consume my soul.”<sup>59</sup> Later he also speaks of his soul having been taught by God.<sup>60</sup> While the former speaks of emotions of the soul, the latter speaks to learning. Tatian also notes that souls among the Greeks are deceived by the demons through ignorance and false appearances.<sup>61</sup>

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Tatian views the human person as a composite of both body and soul. Both are required elements in order to speak of an individual. Tatian writes, “For neither could [the soul] ever appear by itself without the body, nor does the flesh rise again without the soul.”<sup>62</sup> This dualism is one that is intimately linked together. The soul does not appear without the body and vice versa. The context for this discussion is the *imago dei* and the

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<sup>58</sup>“Θύετε ζῶα διὰ τὴν κρεωφαγίαν καὶ ἀνθρώπους ὠνεῖσθε τῇ ψυχῇ [διὰ] τὴν ἀνθρωποσφαγίαν παρεχόμενοι, τρέφοντες αὐτὴν αἱματεκχυσίαις ἀθεωτάταις.” Ibid., 23.2.

<sup>59</sup>“λύπη μου τὴν ψυχὴν οὐκ ἀναλίσκει.” Ibid., 11.1.

<sup>60</sup>“θεοδιδάκτου δέ μου γενομένης τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 29.2.

<sup>61</sup>“οὕτω καὶ οἱ δαίμονες εἰς πολλὴν κακίαν ἐξοκείλαντες τὰς μεμονωμένας παρ’ ὑμῖν ψυχὰς δι’ ἀγνοιῶν καὶ φαντασιῶν ἐξηπατήκασιν.” Ibid., 14.1.

<sup>62</sup>“ψυχὴ μὲν οὖν ἢ τῶν ἀνθρώπων πολυμερῆς ἐστὶ καὶ οὐ μονομερῆς. συνθετὴ γὰρ ἐστὶν ὡς εἶναι φανερὰν αὐτὴν διὰ σώματος.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 15.1. See Fernández Ardanaz, *El Mito*, 44.

loss brought in by sin.

Tatian describes the soul as joined to a spirit.<sup>63</sup> This is similar to what Tatian writes later when he describes two spirits, one of which is called the soul and the other which he terms greater than the soul.<sup>64</sup> The soul pervades the material, while the spirit that is greater than the soul is the divine spirit.<sup>65</sup> Initially, humans possessed both of these spirits but after the fall, only the lower “soul” remained with the more divine spirit departing.<sup>66</sup> This basic description represents the body, soul, and spirit tripartite view of the human person mentioned once by Paul in 1 Thess 5:23. Various authors throughout this era allude to it. The general plan argued for is that the soul needs to choose between the body which houses it and the Spirit which has been lost through the fall into sin. The result of this choice will ultimately determine one’s salvation or damnation.

This is further illustrated by the following. Tatian declares that humans need to obtain what they once had but have since lost. This is the union of the soul with the Holy

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<sup>63</sup>“πνεῦμα γὰρ τὸ διὰ τῆς ὕλης διῆκον, ἔλαττον ὑπάρχον τοῦ θειοτέρου πνεύματος, ὡσπερ δὲ ψυχῇ παρωμοιωμένον, οὐ τιμητέον ἐπ’ ἴσης τῷ τελείῳ θεῷ.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 4.2.10. Grant interprets Tatian as believing that the Holy Spirit had originally been given to humans, referred to in the image and likeness of God from Gen 1:26 and that this had been lost and would be gained later by the saved to produce immortality. Robert M. Grant, “Tatian and the Bible,” *Studia Patristica* 1 (1957): 300, 304. Cf. Elze, 96. Grant’s proposal of the lost image of God through the Holy Spirit may correspond in some ways to the later notion of Origen regarding the change from *nous* to *psyche*.

<sup>64</sup>“Δύο πνευμάτων διαφορὰς ἴσμεν ἡμεῖς, ὧν τὸ μὲν καλεῖται ψυχὴ, τὸ δὲ μείζον μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς, θεοῦ δὲ εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωσις.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 12.1.2.

<sup>65</sup>It has been noted that for Tatian, the soul has a feminine connotation while the higher spirit is understood in masculine terms. Fernández Ardanaz, *El Mito*, 159.

<sup>66</sup>See Daley, 22; William L. Petersen, “Tatian the Assyrian,” in *A Companion to Second-Century Christian ‘Heretics’*, ed. Antti Marjanen et al., *Supplements to Vigiliae Christianae Formerly Philosophia Patrum Texts and Studies of Early Christian Life and Language* (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 150.



Spirit and thus with God.<sup>67</sup> Tatian elsewhere makes a similar point. In a statement that has caused confusion for translators he states, “We, however, have learned things which were unknown to us, through the teaching of the prophets, who, being fully persuaded that the heavenly spirit along with the soul will acquire a heavenly clothing of mortality, foretold things which other minds were unacquainted with.”<sup>68</sup> Another translation is, “We have learned that, of which we were ignorant, through the Prophets; who, being persuaded that the Spirit together with the soul will receive immortality—the heavenly covering of mortality.”<sup>69</sup> The latter translation seems to fit better the context and point that Tatian is making. It would imply that the spirit that is received by the soul from above becomes part of it, even to the point of receiving immortality with it. Either way, the point is clear that the soul must be joined with the spirit in reaching immortality. Tatian concludes, “But it is possible for every one who is naked to obtain this apparel, and to return to its ancient kindred.”<sup>70</sup> In some ways this seems to argue for prior existence of the soul. Or perhaps, Tatian is thinking of all souls at least metaphorically participating in Adam and his fall. It does seem that the clothing referred to by Tatian makes more sense if it is understood as immortal rather than mortal. This then would

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<sup>67</sup>“Καὶ χορὴ λοιπὸν ἡμᾶς ὅπερ ἔχοντες ἀπολωλέκαμεν τοῦτο νῦν ἀναζητεῖν ζευγνύναί τε τὴν ψυχὴν τῷ πνεύματι τῷ ἀγίῳ καὶ τὴν κατὰ θεὸν συζυγίαν πραγματεύεσθαι.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 15.1.2. On the proposed identity of the Holy Spirit and the human spirit, see Ioann. Carol. Theod. von Otto, *Tatiani oratio ad Graecos* (Wiesbaden: Sändig, 1969), 60n1.

<sup>68</sup>“οἵτινες ἅμα τῇ ψυχῇ πεπεισμένοι ὅτι πνεῦμα τὸ οὐράνιον ἐπένδυμα τῆς θνητότητος τὴν ἀθανασίαν κεκτήσεται τὰ ὅσα μὴ ἐγίνωσκον αἱ λοιπαὶ ψυχαί, προὔλεγον.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 20.2.

<sup>69</sup>John Kaye, *Some Account of the Writings and Opinions of Justin Martyr*, 3d ed. (London: Francis and John Rivington, 1853), 188.

<sup>70</sup>*Oratio ad Graecos* 20.2.

connect with the description given earlier in chap. 15 of the *imago dei* which was lost and which believers seek to regain. This notion of the soul needing to be joined to the superior spirit is part of Tatian's understanding that the soul cannot be conceived of as divine.

On the basis of John 1:5, Tatian describes the soul as darkness and preserved by the light of the spirit.<sup>71</sup> He states that the soul does not sustain the spirit but rather the spirit sustains the soul.<sup>72</sup> He writes, "The Logos, in truth, is the light of God, but the ignorant soul is darkness."<sup>73</sup> And then he states, "For the dwelling-place of the spirit is above, but the origin of the soul is from beneath."<sup>74</sup> The Spirit of God combines with "those who live justly and intimately combining with the soul, by prophecies it announced hidden things to other souls."<sup>75</sup> From this it is clear that for Tatian, the soul is not divine or immortal. In fact, Tatian notes that its origin is from below.

Going back to Tatian's discussion of the human person, he notes that it is this constituted entity in which the spirit of God will dwell, should one believe the truth. In

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<sup>71</sup>On Tatian's use of the Bible, see Robert M. Grant, *Greek Apologists of the Second Century* (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1988), 124-129.

<sup>72</sup>“ψυχὴ γὰρ οὐκ αὐτὴ τὸ πνεῦμα ἔσωσεν, ἐσώθη δὲ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 13.1.9.

<sup>73</sup>“τὸ φῶς τὴν σκοτίαν κατέλαβεν ἢ λόγος μὲν ἐστὶ τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ φῶς, σκότος δὲ ἡ ἀνεπιστήμων ψυχὴ.” *Ibid.*, 13.2.2.

<sup>74</sup>“τοῦ μὲν γὰρ ἐστὶν ἄνω τὸ οἰκητήριον, τῆς δὲ κάτωθεν ἐστὶν ἡ γένεσις.” *Ibid.*, 13.2.7. This seems to echo *Oratio ad Graecos* 20.1.4 where he describes the perfect spirit as the “wings of the soul” (πτέρωσις γὰρ ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς πνεῦμα τὸ τέλειον).

<sup>75</sup>“πνεῦμα δὲ τοῦ θεοῦ παρὰ πᾶσιν μὲν οὐκ ἐστὶ, παρὰ δὲ τισὶ τοῖς δικαίως πολιτευομένοις καταγινόμενον καὶ συμπεριπλεκόμενον τῇ ψυχῇ διὰ προαγορεύσεων ταῖς λοιπαῖς ψυχαῖς τὸ κεκρυμμένον ἀνήγγειλε.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 13.3.

the discussion regarding how man bears the image of God, Tatian writes, “The perfect God is without flesh; but man is flesh. The bond of the flesh is the soul; that which encloses the soul is the flesh.”<sup>76</sup> This clarifies the notion discussed earlier regarding the spirit which pervades matter and further confirms his understanding of the human person.

Although Tatian does argue for the composite character of the human person, he also exhibits the negative dualistic understanding regarding matter. While discussing the nature of demons, he writes, “But matter desired to exercise lordship over the soul.”<sup>77</sup> This resulted in death and the loss of immortality. Here matter seems to describe the demons, in contrast to the Spirit of God. In the very least, the material world is clearly connected with sin and death.

In the context of discussing demonic activity against people, Tatian writes, “But the demons who rule over men are not the souls of men; for how should these be capable of action after death? Unless man, who while living was void of understanding and power, should be believed when dead to be endowed with more of active power. But neither could this be the case.”<sup>78</sup> One can conclude that this is in support of Tatian’s idea that the souls of the dead have dissolved and thus cannot be involved in demonic activity. He continues, “And it is difficult to conceive that the immortal soul, which is impeded by

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<sup>76</sup>“ἄσαρκος μὲν οὖν ὁ τέλειος θεός, ἄνθρωπος δὲ σάρξ· δεσμὸς δὲ τῆς σαρκὸς ψυχὴ, σχετικὴ δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡ σάρξ.” Ibid., 15.2. On the notion of the image of God in Tatian, see A. G. Hamman, *L’homme, image de Dieu: essai d’une anthropologie chrétienne dans l’Église des cinq premiers siècles* (Paris: Desclée, 1987), 41-42.

<sup>77</sup>“τῆς γὰρ ὕλης καὶ πονηρίας εἰσὶν ἀπαυγάσματα, ὕλη δὲ τῆς ψυχῆς κατεξουσιάζειν ἠθέλησεν.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 15.3.

<sup>78</sup>“Δαίμονες δὲ οἱ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἐπιτάττοντες οὐκ εἰσὶν αἱ τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαί. πῶς γὰρ ἂν γένοιντο δραστικάι καὶ μετὰ τὸ ἀποθανεῖν.” *Oratio ad Graecos* 16.1.

the members of the body, should become more intelligent when it has migrated from it.”<sup>79</sup> While it may seem that Tatian here declares the soul to be immortal, it appears to be only for the sake of his argument and it is only declared so after death. However, he also writes, “But from us the things which are in the world are not hidden, and the divine is easily apprehended by us if the power that makes souls immortal visits us.”<sup>80</sup> He adds as a further argument that it is difficult to understand how the soul could gain understanding by death when the soul is already inclined to follow the “deceptive scenic representations” of the demons while “impeded by the members of the body.” Seeing that Tatian can describe the soul as being made immortal makes for a clearer understanding of his famous statement which now becomes the focus of this study.

Perhaps Tatian’s most well-known line on the soul is, “The soul is not in itself immortal, O Greeks, but mortal.”<sup>81</sup> Thus begins chap. 13 of his *Oration to the Greeks*. In this context, however, he notes that it is possible for the soul not to die.<sup>82</sup> He explains that the soul which knows God will not die, even though it may be dissolved for a time. Here knowledge of Tatian’s definition of death proves valuable. The soul which does not know God does die and is dissolved with the body, only to be raised again with the body at the judgment to receive eternal punishment.<sup>83</sup> What appears clear is that when Tatian says the

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<sup>79</sup>“καὶ χαλεπὸν οἶεσθαι τὴν ἀθάνατον ὑπὸ τῶν τοῦ σώματος μερῶν ἐμποδιζομένην.” Ibid., 16.1.

<sup>80</sup>“καὶ ὑμῖν εὐκατάληπτον ἔσται τὸ θεῖον τῆς ἀπαθανατιζούσης τὰς ψυχὰς ὑμῖν προσελθούσης.” Ibid., 16.2.

<sup>81</sup>“Οὐκ ἔστιν ἀθάνατος, ἄνδρες Ἕλληνες, ἡ ψυχὴ καθ’ ἑαυτὴν, θνητὴ δέ.” Ibid., 13.1.9.

<sup>82</sup>Cf. John 6:50.

<sup>83</sup>*Oratio ad Graecos* 13.1.3-7. On the death of the soul along with the body, see Elze, 88. On Tatian’s definition of death, see Elze, 95.

soul is not immortal, he does so with the important caveat, “in itself.” Elsewhere, Tatian while discussing demons and their punishment alludes to human souls and their reward after death. He writes, “We, to whom it now easily happens to die, afterwards receive the immortal with enjoyment, or the painful with immortality.”<sup>84</sup> This again displays how Tatian can redefine immortal depending on the context.

In another place, in the midst of a chapter in which Tatian writes strongly against the teachings of the philosophers, he states that Aristotle does not believe in the immortality of the soul.<sup>85</sup> Then to add to the controversy, Tatian states that though some Greeks may state that only the soul is immortal, yet he declares that the flesh also is immortal.<sup>86</sup> This surely is said, though, in the context of its future state, after the resurrection. It seems clear that Tatian’s prior point—that the soul is dissolved after death and before the resurrection of the body and soul on judgment day and that, after the judgment, both the soul and body will receive either immortal happiness or immortal punishment<sup>87</sup>—would be his explanation for his statement that both the soul and the body are immortal. Thus it is not because of any innate natural immortality of either the soul or the flesh but rather according to the will of God.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>84</sup>*Oratio ad Graecos* 14.

<sup>85</sup>“ὁ δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τῆς ψυχῆς διαβάλλει τὴν ἀθανασία.” *Ibid.*, 25.2.

<sup>86</sup>“ἀπαθανατίζεσθαι μόνην τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ τὸ σὺν αὐτῇ σαρκίον.” *Ibid.*, 25.2.

<sup>87</sup>*Oratio ad Graecos* 14.

<sup>88</sup>This is clearly reminiscent of Justin Martyr.

## Summary

Tatian clearly believes that the soul is intimately connected with the body in the constitution of the human person. The soul is affected by the actions of the body and is the seat of temptation, grief, and learning. The soul itself is not divine in origin but is from below and thus not innately immortal. When perfect, it was joined to the Spirit. Having lost this, it is subject to the leadings of demons. Both soul and body dissolve at death and are reunited at the judgment to receive eternal rewards or eternal punishments. It is in this resurrected state that Tatian can write of the soul and body being immortal.

As is seen with several of the Apologists, Tatian does not rely on explicit biblical references for his teaching. However, allusions to the *imago dei*, the inability of the souls of the dead to interact with the living, and the understanding of a future judgment and reward are all clear examples of biblical ideas used in shaping his doctrine of the soul.

## Theophilus

Theophilus was from the city of Antioch. His only extant writing is a work composed of three letters written to a pagan friend and titled *To Autolytus*.<sup>89</sup> Other works written by him are mentioned both in *To Autolytus* and by later writers including Eusebius and Jerome. His work is unique in that he does not mention Christ.<sup>90</sup>

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<sup>89</sup>See Peter Pilhofer, "Theophilus of Antioch," *DECL*, 573; Nicole Zeegers, "Theophilus von Antiochien," *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (2002), 3:370-371.

<sup>90</sup>See J. Bentivegna, "A Christianity without Christ by Theophilus of Antioch," *Studia Patristica* 13 (1975): 107-130. For a study of Theophilus's life and works, see Grant, *Greek Apologists of the Second Century*, 140-174; Rick Rogers, *Theophilus of Antioch: The Life and Thought of a Second-century Bishop* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2000).

## Usage of *Psyche*

Theophilus uses soul for life when he writes, “But the power of God is manifested in this, that out of things that are not He makes whatever He pleases; just as the bestowal of life and motion is the prerogative of no other than God alone.”<sup>91</sup> In a similar usage, he twice uses it for people. In reference to the biblical flood, he writes, “And he says that eight human beings (souls) were preserved in the ark.”<sup>92</sup> He also uses the expression “wakened up in soul” which presumably means “came to one’s senses.”<sup>93</sup>

Theophilus notes that the “the soul in man is not seen, being invisible to men, but is perceived through the motion of the body.”<sup>94</sup> Thus Theophilus accepts the common understanding of the soul as a principle of movement and declares it to be invisible.

Theophilus uses the phrase “eyes of the soul”<sup>95</sup> which, he states, are able to see God, in contrast to the eyes of the body which can see only earthly objects. He also urges that a man should have a “pure soul.”<sup>96</sup>

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<sup>91</sup>“καὶ τὸ ψυχὴν δοῦναι καὶ κίνησιν οὐχ ἑτέρου τινός ἐστιν ἀλλ’ ἡ μόνου θεοῦ.” *Ad Autolytus* 2.4.20.

<sup>92</sup>“ὀκτὼ δὲ φησιν τὰς πάσας ψυχὰς ἀνθρώπων ἐν τῇ κιβωτῷ διασεσῶσθαι.” *Ibid.*, 3.19.3. See also “ὀκτὼ οὖν αἱ πᾶσαι ψυχαὶ ἀνθρώπων διεσώθησαν.” *Ibid.*, 3.19.14.

<sup>93</sup>“πλὴν ἐνίοτέ τινες τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκνήψαντες ἐξ αὐτῶν εἶπον ἀκόλουθα τοῖς προφήταις.” *Ibid.*, 2.8.59.

<sup>94</sup>“Καθάπερ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ βλέπεται, ἀόρατος οὖσα ἀνθρώποις, διὰ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ σώματος νοεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ.” *Ibid.*, 1.5.1.

<sup>95</sup>“τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Ad Autolytus* 1.2.3; 1.2.10; 1.2.12.

<sup>96</sup>“οὕτως δεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἔχειν καθαρὰν ψυχὴν.” *Ibid.*, 1.2.20.

## Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

In describing the creation of man, Theophilus quotes Gen 2:7 and then concludes, “Whence also by most persons the soul is called immortal.”<sup>97</sup> No explicit attempt is made to make clear the connection he sees between “and God made man of the dust of the earth, and breathed into his face the breath of life, and man became a living soul” and the conclusion that “Whence also by most persons the soul is called immortal.” Neither does he say if he agrees with “most persons,” presumably here implying most Christians, since he has just quoted from the Bible. He does, however, state that the Scriptures teach that the soul is immortal. Having earlier discussed immortality as one of God’s attributes, it seems reasonable to assume that Theophilus understood that it was through the breath of God that many hold that the soul is immortal.<sup>98</sup>

Elsewhere Theophilus writes, “And Plato, who spoke much of the unity of God and of the soul of man, asserting that the soul is immortal, is not he himself afterwards found inconsistently with himself, to maintain that some souls pass into other men, and

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<sup>97</sup>“καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ὁ ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν.” ὅθεν καὶ ἀθάνατος ἡ ψυχὴ ὠνόμασται παρὰ τοῖς πλείοσι.” Ibid., 2.19.19. Rogers recognizes that Theophilus is somewhat tentative here. Rogers, 38, 55. Cf. Juan P. Martin, “La antropologia de Filon y de Teofilo de Antioquia,” *Salmanticensis* 36, no. 1 (1989): 51-52; Nicole Zeegers, “La création de l’homme (Gn 1,26) chez Théophile d’Antioche,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 30 (1976): 258-267. Theophilus, in this context, argues for human freedom in choosing death or immortality. See Nicole Zeegers, “Les trois cultures de Théophile d’Antioche,” in *Les apologistes chrétiens et la culture Grecque* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1998), 155. In *Ad Autolycus* 2.27, Theophilus discusses humanity’s immortality in the context of creation, indicating that originally, humans were neither mortal nor immortal but created with the power of choice. Based on *Ad Autolycus* 2.27, Weiss states that Theophilus did not teach the soul’s natural immortality. Weiss, 157.

<sup>98</sup>Cf. Theophilus’s statement in *Ad Autolycus* 1.7 that people breathe “God’s breath.”



that others take their departure into irrational animals.”<sup>99</sup> He clearly does not approve of Plato’s doctrine of transmigration, referring to it as “dreadful and monstrous,” but is one then to assume, since he was setting up opposite statements, that Theophilus agrees with the first statement quoted, namely that the soul is immortal? A compelling reason for this to be the case is not given.

Theophilus writes that in order for the soul’s eyes to see God, they must be enabled to do so. He then points out that Autolycus’s eyes of the soul are diseased by sin and thus cannot see God.<sup>100</sup> He later states that this is “because of the blindness of your soul, and the hardness of your heart.”<sup>101</sup> Throughout this chapter, Theophilus has used the expression “the eyes of the soul” as that part of the human person which can see God. At the end though, he states, after listing many sins, that “to those who do these things God is not manifest” and then twice states, “All these things, then, involve you in darkness.”<sup>102</sup> Here it is clear that the actions of the body affect the ability of the soul to see God.

Elsewhere, Theophilus clarifies how one’s soul can see God. “For as the soul in man is not seen, being invisible to men, but is perceived through the motion of the body, so God cannot indeed be seen by human eyes, but is beheld and perceived through His

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<sup>99</sup>“Πλάτων δέ, ὁ τοσαῦτα εἰπὼν περὶ μοναρχίας θεοῦ καὶ ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου, φάσκων ἀθάνατον εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν, οὐκ αὐτὸς ὕστερον εὐρίσκεται ἐναντία ἑαυτῷ λέγων, τὰς μὲν ψυχὰς μετέρχεσθαι εἰς ἑτέροισιν ἀνθρώπους, ἐνίων δὲ καὶ εἰς ἄλογα ζῶα χωρεῖν.” Ibid., 3.7.15.

<sup>100</sup>“ἔχεις ὑποκεχυμένους τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς σου ὑπὸ τῶν ἁμαρτημάτων.” Ibid., 1.2.17.

<sup>101</sup>“διὰ τὴν τύφλωσιν τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ πήρωσιν τῆς καρδίας σου.” Ibid., 1.7.9.

<sup>102</sup>*Ad Autolycus* 1.2.

providence and works.”<sup>103</sup> The perception of God that Theophilus refers to as possible for the soul is through acknowledging his creatorship of the world and work in it.<sup>104</sup> He uses several metaphors to demonstrate that one can infer God’s existence from what one sees but one cannot behold God. It seems that this is what Theophilus means when he states that the eyes of the soul cannot behold God. Theophilus’s statement that Autolycus could not see God because of sin then makes sense in this understanding as his sin is what prevents him from perceiving God’s work in the world.<sup>105</sup>

Theophilus adds another dimension to this idea, noting that God is perceived through the soul’s acceptance of Him as the creator. He writes, “When you have put off the mortal, and put on incorruption, then you will see God worthily. For God will raise your flesh immortal with your soul; and then, having become immortal, you will see the Immortal.”<sup>106</sup> Here, it could be argued that Theophilus sees the mortal flesh as a hindrance to the soul in perceiving God in his fullness and that this will be taken away at the resurrection when the individual will put on immortality.<sup>107</sup>

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<sup>103</sup>“Καθάπερ γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐν ἀνθρώπῳ οὐ βλέπεται, ἀόρατος οὖσα ἀνθρώποις, διὰ δὲ τῆς κινήσεως τοῦ σώματος νοεῖται ἢ ψυχῇ, οὕτως ἔχοι ἂν καὶ τὸν θεὸν μὴ δύνασθαι ὄραθῆναι ὑπὸ ὀφθαλμῶν ἀνθρωπίνων, διὰ δὲ τῆς προνοίας καὶ τῶν ἔργων αὐτοῦ βλέπεται” Ibid., 1.5.1-2.

<sup>104</sup>See *ibid.*, 1.4.

<sup>105</sup>This seems to be further corroborated when, after listing all of the creative powers and works of God, Theophilus writes, “If you perceive these things, O man, living chastely, and holily, and righteously, you can see God. But before all, let faith and the fear of God have rule in thy heart, and then shall understand these things.” Ibid., 1.7. Thus seeing God is directly linked to living a holy life in faith and fear of God as the creator of the world.

<sup>106</sup>“ὅταν ἀπόθῃ τὸ θνητὸν καὶ ἐνδύσῃ τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν, τότε ὄψῃ κατὰ ἀξίαν τὸν θεόν. ἀνεγείρει γὰρ σου τὴν σάρκα ἀθάνατον σὺν τῇ ψυχῇ ὁ θεός· καὶ τότε ὄψῃ γενόμενος ἀθάνατος τὸν ἀθάνατον.” *Ad Autolycus* 1.7.24.

<sup>107</sup>Cf. Zeegers, “Theophilus von Antiochien,” 370.

Theophilus argued for the notion of sensation after death. He writes that while Homer did state, “Like fleeting vision passed the soul away,” he also said, “To Hades went the disembodied soul.”<sup>108</sup> He quotes the two opposing statements to show that Homer changed his opinion on the notion of sensation (presumably the soul’s) after death, moving from the first opinion to the latter. Theophilus contends that Homer is only confirming what was said by the Hebrew prophets. The context suggests the conclusion that the notion of the soul’s sensation after death is tied to the reality of a future judgment.

### Summary

Theophilus uses soul for life and for individuals. He holds that the soul is the principle of movement in the body and writes of the “eyes of the soul.” He teaches that the soul that is holy can perceive God in His works. He states that it is understood by many to be immortal, based upon Gen 2:7. The usage of Gen 2:7 in connection with the nature of the soul in the early Church Fathers begins with Theophilus. This verse is used by future authors for similar purposes.

Theophilus argues for the soul’s sensation after death, connecting this with a future judgment. This is another key development in the doctrine of the soul. This connection between the reality of a future judgment and the consequent necessity that the dead be alive to receive their judgment is one that continues to appear in future authors.

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<sup>108</sup>“Ψυχὴ δ’ ἡϋτ’ ὄνειρος ἀποπταμένη πεπότηται, ἐν ἑτέρῳ λέγει· Ψυχὴ δ’ ἐκ ῥεθέων πταμένη Ἀϊδόσδε βεβήκει.” *Ad Autolycus* 2.38.22-24. Theophilus was quoting from *Od.* 11.222. and *Il.* 16.856.

## Athenagoras

Athenagoras has two main documents extant. The first is *A Plea for the Christians* and the second is *The Resurrection of the Dead*.<sup>109</sup> There has been some debate regarding the authenticity of the latter document.<sup>110</sup> There is scant witness to him during the time period of the early Church.

### Usage of *Psyche*

Athenagoras uses soul for natural life in the context of death. He uses it in combination with the body, as a reference to the life of the individual which was being sought by those persecuting Christians<sup>111</sup> and also by itself, again in the context of persecution. He writes “that we shall suffer no such great evil here, even should our lives be taken from us, compared with what we shall there receive for our meek and benevolent and moderate life from the great Judge.”<sup>112</sup> He also uses soul for one’s life outside of the context of persecution when he writes that the life of the king is in the hand of God.<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>109</sup>See Leslie W. Barnard, “The Authenticity of Athenagoras’ *De Resurrectione*,” *Studia Patristica* 15, no. 1 (1984): 39-49; Bernard Pouderon, *Athénagore d’Athènes: philosophe chrétien* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1989), 19-114; William R. Schoedel, *Athenagoras: Legatio and De Resurrectione* (Oxford: Carendon Press, 1972), ix-xxxvi. On Athenagoras’s usage of Scripture, see Leslie W. Barnard, “Background of Athenagoras,” in *Epektasis: mélanges patristiques offerts au cardinal Jean Daniélou* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1972), 11-16.

<sup>110</sup>See Peter Pilhofer, “Athenagoras,” *DECL*, 60.

<sup>111</sup>“ἀλλ’ εἰς τὰ σώματα καὶ τὰς ψυχάς.” *Legatio* 1.4.

<sup>112</sup>“καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ἐπιιδόντες.” *Legatio* 3.2; “κἂν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμᾶς ἀφαιρῶνταί τινες.” *Ibid.*, 12.1. See also *Legatio* 3.2. In *Legatio* 12, Athenagoras writes that those who equate death and sleep argue against the notion of a future judgment, tying this to a quotation from Homer’s *Il.* 16.672.

<sup>113</sup>“βασιλέως γὰρ ψυχὴ ἐν χειρὶ θεοῦ.” *Legatio* 18.2.

Athenagoras, in describing the relationship between the body and soul, writes that the “soul [has] been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences.”<sup>114</sup> He also writes that what the body wants is to be “obedient to the reins of the soul, and guided by it as with a bridle.”<sup>115</sup> This describes the close relationship that he sees between body and soul.<sup>116</sup> In using this description of bridle and horse, he is reminiscent of Plato’s understanding, which is repeated in several future authors.

For Athenagoras, the soul can also be where pleasure takes place. He writes, “Therefore, having the hope of eternal life, we despise the things of this life, even to the pleasures of the soul, each of us reckoning her his wife whom he has married according to the laws laid down by us, and that only for the purpose of having children.”<sup>117</sup> It is of note that Athenagoras describes the marital intimacy as a pleasure of the soul rather than the body. This strongly suggests a perceived connection between the body and the soul. This statement must also take into account the following statement on desire and the soul. He writes, while defending the resurrection of the body, “How can it possibly be other than unjust for the soul to be judged by itself in respect of things towards which in its own nature it feels no appetite, no motion, no impulse, such as licentiousness, violence,

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<sup>114</sup>“μάτην μὲν ἢ ψυχὴ συνήρμοσται τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδεία.” *De resurrectione* 15.7.

<sup>115</sup>“ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡνίαϊς ὑπεῖκον καὶ χαλιναγωγούμενον.” *Ibid.*, 15.7. On this, see Leslie W. Barnard, “The Father of Christian Anthropology,” *ZNW* 63 (1972): 258; Pouderon, 221.

<sup>116</sup>Barnard describes Athenagoras’s understanding as “a composite being of the two elements fused into one.” Barnard, “The Father of Christian Anthropology,” 258.

<sup>117</sup>“Ἐλπίδα οὖν ζωῆς αἰωνίου ἔχοντες, τῶν ἐν τούτῳ τῷ βίῳ καταφρονοῦμεν μέχρι καὶ τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡδέων, γυναῖκα μὲν ἕκαστος ἡμῶν ἦν ἡγάγετο κατὰ τοὺς ὑφ’ ἡμῶν τεθειμένους νόμους νομίζων καὶ ταύτην μέχρι τοῦ παιδοποιήσασθαι.” *Legatio* 33.1.

covetousness, injustice, and the unjust acts arising out of these? For if the majority of such evils come from men's not having the mastery of the passions which solicit them."<sup>118</sup> It is almost as if, on the one hand, he is describing a "theoretical" soul which has no contact with the material world, while on the other hand, admitting the close relationship that exists in the actual person compounded of both soul and body. This precise point is one the future authors will struggle with. In general, the consensus will be that the body is the source of desire and it is the soul's job to control those desires temperately. It is clear from this discussion that Athenagoras has a dichotomous view of the human person, consisting of body and soul as two separate entities.

In writing regarding the ability to reason, Athenagoras writes of "irrational and fantastic movements of the soul about opinions" producing a diversity of idols.<sup>119</sup> Here it seems that the soul is responsible for thinking, though this thinking is of an irrational kind. In this context, he notes that "this happens to a soul especially when it partakes of the material spirit."<sup>120</sup> These "irrational and fantastic movements of the soul, then, give birth to empty visions in the mind."<sup>121</sup> Empty visions happen to souls who are "tender

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<sup>118</sup>“ ἡ πῶς οὐκ ἄδικον τὴν ψυχὴν κρίνεσθαι καθ’ ἑαυτὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδ’ ἠντινοῦν ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν οὐκ ὄρεξιν οὐ κίνησιν οὐχ ὄρμην, οἷον λαγνεῖας ἢ βίας ἢ πλεονεξίας [ἀδικίας].” *De resurrectione* 21.3. Cf. Leslie W. Barnard, “Athenagoras: *De resurrectione*: The Background and Theology of a Second Century Treatise on the Resurrection,” *Studia Theologica* 30, no. 1 (1976): 16-17.

<sup>119</sup>“Τί οὖν; πρῶτα μὲν αἱ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄλογοι καὶ ἰνδαλματώδεις περὶ τὰς δόξας κινήσεις ἄλλοτ’ ἄλλα εἰδῶλα τὰ μὲν ἀπὸ τῆς ὕλης ἔλκουσι, τὰ δὲ αὐταῖς ἀναπλάττουσιν καὶ κυοῦσιν.” *Legatio* 27.1. On the Stoic backgrounds of this, see Pouderon, 231.

<sup>120</sup>“πάσχει δὲ τοῦτο ψυχὴ μάλιστα τοῦ ὑλικοῦ προσλαβοῦσα καὶ ἐπισυγκραθεῖσα πνεύματος.” *Legatio* 27.1.

<sup>121</sup>“αἱ οὖν ἄλογοι αὗται καὶ ἰνδαλματώδεις τῆς ψυχῆς κινήσεις εἰδωλομανεῖς ἀποτίκτουσι φαντασίας.” *Ibid.*, 27.2.

and susceptible” and who have no experience or knowledge of sound doctrines.<sup>122</sup> The demons then take advantage of these movements of the soul to take control of one’s mind. Once this takes place, the demons “cause to flow into the mind empty visions as if coming from the idols and the statues; and when, too, a soul of itself, as being immortal, moves conformably to reason, either predicting the future or healing the present, the demons claim the glory for themselves.”<sup>123</sup> Here Athenagoras connects the soul with the mind and attributes the immortal nature of the soul with the ability of the mind to think rationally. However, the soul can be moved in such a way that allows demons to control it. This then leads it to empty visions of idolatry.

In a related statement, Athenagoras writes, “But as for those who are persuaded that nothing will escape the scrutiny of God, but that even the body which has ministered to the irrational impulses of the soul, and to its desires, will be punished along with it, it is not likely that they will commit even the smallest sin.”<sup>124</sup> Here again, the soul is described as having irrational desires which are acted out by the body.

Athenagoras uses the soul in the context of cleansing or purifying the individual of evil. He writes, “Who of them have so purged their souls as, instead of hating their enemies, to love them; and, instead of speaking ill of those who have reviled them . . . , to

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<sup>122</sup>“ὅταν δὲ ἀπαλή καὶ εὐάγωγος ψυχὴ.” Ibid.

<sup>123</sup>“καὶ ὅσα καθ’ αὐτήν, ὡς ἀθάνατος οὖσα, λογικῶς κινεῖται ψυχὴ ἢ προμηνύουσα τὰ μέλλοντα ἢ θεραπεύουσα τὰ ἐνεστηκότα, τούτων τὴν δόξαν καρποῦνται οἱ δαίμονες.” Ibid. See below for a further discussion of Athenagoras’s concept of an immortal soul.

<sup>124</sup>“τοὺς δὲ μηδὲν ἀνεξέταστον ἔσεσθαι παρὰ τῷ θεῷ, συγκολαστήσεσθαι δὲ καὶ τὸ ὑπουργήσαν σῶμα ταῖς ἀλόγοις ὀρμαῖς τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ἐπιθυμίαις πεπεισμένου, οὐδεὶς λόγος ἔχει οὐδὲ τῶν βραχυτάτων τι ἀμαρτεῖν.” *Legatio* 36.2.

bless them.”<sup>125</sup> Here, the soul seems clearly to be the locus of one’s good or evil intentions. In contrast to the picture given of the soul of unbelievers, he concludes his document with a description of the soul of believers, referring to them as “pious, gentle and temperate in spirit.”<sup>126</sup>

In an interesting statement, Athenagoras describes the souls of the giants as the wicked demons who wander the earth.<sup>127</sup> This idea is elaborated on but one might conclude that it is an example of Athenagoras’s belief in the reality of disembodied souls which have the ability to interact with living humans.

In his tirade against the fables of the pagan gods, Athenagoras mockingly writes, “Let them have fleshly forms, but let not Aphrodite be wounded by Diomedes in her body . . . or by Ares in her soul.”<sup>128</sup> Here, Athenagoras allows for a body and soul to be attributed to the gods of the pagans, but then questions how such a body and soul could be hurt. He notes that the pagans here have attributed body and soul to the gods but worse than this, they attributed desire to the gods. He also quotes Tales, the early Greek philosopher, as believing that the demons are those with souls and the heroes are “the separated souls of men, the good being the good souls, and the bad the worthless.”<sup>129</sup>

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<sup>125</sup>“οὕτως ἐκκεκαθαρμένοι εἰσὶ τὰς ψυχὰς ὡς ἀντὶ τοῦ μισεῖν τοὺς ἐχθροὺς ἀγαπᾶν.” Ibid., 11.3.

<sup>126</sup>“δὲ ὅτι καὶ θεοσεβεῖς καὶ ἐπιεικεῖς καὶ τὰς ψυχὰς κεκολασμένοι, τὴν βασιλικὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπινεύσατε.” Ibid., 37.1.

<sup>127</sup>“καὶ αἱ τῶν γιγάντων ψυχαὶ οἱ περὶ τὸν κόσμον εἰσὶ πλανώμενοι δαίμονες.” Ibid., 25.1. Some want to connect the giants here with those found in Gen 6:1-4. See ANF 2:142n3.

<sup>128</sup>“ἢ ὑπὸ Ἄρεως τὴν ψυχ.” *Legatio* 21.3. On the influence on Athenagoras by philosophy and other writers of the time, see Barnard, “The Authenticity of Athenagoras’ *De Resurrectione*,” 37-68.

<sup>129</sup>“ἥρωας τὰς κεχωρισμένας ψυχὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ἀγαθοὺς μὲν



## Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Athenagoras seems to connect the soul with the breath of God.<sup>130</sup> Though the creation account is not mentioned explicitly, and he is speaking in the context of pagan philosophers and poets, he does mention the *afflatus* or breath of God. He writes, “For poets and philosophers, as to other subjects so also to this, have applied themselves in the way of conjecture, moved, by reason of their affinity with the *afflatus* from God, each one by his own soul, to try whether he could find out and apprehend the truth.”<sup>131</sup>

Athenagoras seems to connect one’s soul with the breath received from God in creation together with the ability to comprehend truth. He, however, makes it clear that the philosophers were not successful in their attempt because they did not learn about God from God Himself as the prophets did. Therefore the reader is left unclear exactly what connection is to be inferred between the soul, the breath of God, and the innate human ability of reason.

Athenagoras does not connect gender with the soul, the soul being neither male nor female. He asks how the command to not commit adultery be “properly addressed to souls, or even thought of in such a connection, since the difference of male and female does not exist in them, nor any aptitude for sexual intercourse, nor appetite for it.”<sup>132</sup>

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τὰς ἀγαθὰς, κακοὺς δὲ τὰς φαύλους.” *Legatio* 23.4.

<sup>130</sup>Cf. Pouderon, 222.

<sup>131</sup>“κινηθέντες μὲν κατὰ συμπάθειαν τῆς παρὰ τοῦ θεοῦ πνοῆς ὑπὸ τῆς αὐτοῦ αὐτοῦ ψυχῆς ἕκαστος ζητῆσαι, εἰ δυνατὸς εὐρεῖν καὶ νοῆσαι τὴν ἀλήθειαν.” *Legatio* 7.2.

<sup>132</sup>“οὔτε οὖν τὸ ‘οὐ μοιχεύσεις’ ἐπὶ ψυχῶν λεχθεῖη ποτ’ ἂν ἢ νοηθεῖη δεόντως, οὐκ οὔσης ἐν αὐταῖς τῆς κατὰ τὸ ἄρσεν καὶ θῆλυ διαφορᾶς οὐδὲ πρὸς μῖξιν τινὸς ἐπιτηδειότητος ἢ πρὸς ταύτην ὀρέξεως.” *De resurrectione* 23.4. See Joseph H. Crehan, *Athenagoras: Embassy for the Christians; The Resurrection of the*

Most of Athenagoras's treatment of the human person is developed in the context of defending the resurrection of the body. He holds to an interpretation of the human person in which the body is corruptible and looking forward to incorruption, the soul is immortal and yet the human person in its entirety also looks forward to immortality as the individual is made of both body and soul.<sup>133</sup> Athenagoras begins this explanation in *On the Resurrection* 10.5 while arguing against those who refuse a resurrection of the body.

No person in his senses will affirm that his soul suffers wrong, because, in speaking so, he would at the same time be unawares reflecting on the present life also; for if now, while dwelling in a body subject to corruption and suffering, it has had no wrong done to it much less will it suffer wrong when living in conjunction with a body which is free from corruption and suffering. The body, again, suffers no wrong; for if no wrong is done to it now while united a corruptible thing with an incorruptible, manifestly will it not be wronged when united an incorruptible with an incorruptible.<sup>134</sup>

It is important to see the comparison between body and soul before the resurrection and after it. The body is the only thing that changes from corruptible to incorruptible.

Athenagoras here also makes use of the concept of the body as a dwelling place for the soul.<sup>135</sup>

Athenagoras further supports this concept when he writes that the human person consists of body and soul and that after the resurrection, the soul will continue according

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*Dead* (Westminster, MD: Newman Press, 1956), 20.

<sup>133</sup>Gross sees a development from Justin's and Tatian's views on the soul to that of Athenagoras, finding that Athenagoras has a more nuanced view of the natural immortality of the soul than the other Apologists. Jules Gross, *The Divinization of the Christian*, trans. Paul A. Onica (Anaheim, CA: A & C Press, 2002), 140.

<sup>134</sup>“οὔτε γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀδικεῖσθαι φήσκει τις σωφρονῶν, ὅτι λήσεται γέ ταύτη συνεκβάλλων καὶ τὴν παροῦσαν ζωὴν.” *De resurrectione* 10.5. This further supports what was mentioned above in commenting on *Legatio* 27.2 regarding Athenagoras's concept of an immortal soul.

<sup>135</sup>See Pouderon, 223.

to the nature it was made with, which he describes as ruling over the body and judging and measuring those things which happen from time to time.<sup>136</sup> The body, however, will experience the change of the resurrection. Here Athenagoras reaffirms his description of the soul as continuing unchanged in nature and function from before the resurrection to after it, remaining in its immortal nature.

Athenagoras makes clear his assertion that humans are made “of an immortal soul and a body.”<sup>137</sup> He reiterates this when he writes that “men, in respect of the soul, have from their first origin an unchangeable continuance, but in respect of the body obtain immortality by means of change.”<sup>138</sup> He then continues his insistence that the body is just as important for the constitution of a human person as the soul, though one was originally made immortal and the other must wait the resurrection to receive its immortality. He writes, “The whole nature of men in general is composed of an immortal soul and a body which was fitted to it in the creation, and . . . neither to the nature of the soul by itself, nor to the nature of the body separately, has God assigned such a creation or such a life and entire course of existence as this, but to men compounded of the two.”<sup>139</sup> Here, then,

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<sup>136</sup>“καὶ τῆς μὲν ψυχῆς οὐσης τε καὶ διαμενούσης ὁμαλῶς ἐν ἣ γέγονεν φύσει καὶ διαπονούσης ἃ πέφυκεν.” *De resurrectione* 12.8. See Barnard, “The Father of Christian Anthropology,” 258, 263. On the connection here to Plato, see Pouderon, 221.

<sup>137</sup>“καθ’ ἣν ἐποίησεν ἄνθρωπον ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ σώματος.” *De resurrectione* 13.1. For a comparison of this idea with that of Plato, see Crehan, 19-20.

<sup>138</sup>“κατὰ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπὸ γενέσεως ἐχόντων τὴν ἀμετάβλητον διαμονήν, κατὰ δὲ τὸ σῶμα προσλαμβανόντων ἐκ μεταβολῆς τὴν ἀφθαρσίαν.” *De resurrectione* 16.2.

<sup>139</sup>“εἰ γὰρ πᾶσα κοινῶς ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσις ἐκ ψυχῆς ἀθανάτου καὶ τοῦ κατὰ τὴν γένεσιν αὐτῇ συναρμοσθέντος σώματος ἔχει τὴν σύστασιν καὶ μήτε τῇ φύσει τῆς ψυχῆς καθ’ ἑαυτὴν μήτε τῇ φύσει τοῦ σώματος χωρὶς ἀπεκλήρωσεν θεὸς τὴν τοιάνδε γένεσιν ἢ τὴν ζώην καὶ τὸν σύμπαντα βίον, ἀλλὰ τοῖς ἐκ τούτων γενομένοις ἀνθρώποις.” *De resurrectione* 15.2. Though not

again Athenagoras reaffirms his insistence that God created humans consisting of both an immortal soul and a body. The human person is not to be thought of existing apart from the conjoining of the two.

Adding to this previously stated concept, Athenagoras notes that “one living-being is formed from the two, experiencing whatever the soul experiences and whatever the body experiences, doing and performing whatever requires the judgment of the senses or of the reason.”<sup>140</sup> Again he writes, “there is one harmony and community of experience belonging to the whole being, whether of the things which spring from the soul or of those which are accomplished by means of the body.”<sup>141</sup> Later in this same chapter he reiterates this concept, stating that “understanding and reason” belong to the whole person, both body and soul, “not the soul by itself.”<sup>142</sup> He continues, “Man, therefore, who consists of the two parts, must continue for ever. But it is impossible for him to continue unless he rise again. For if no resurrection were to take place, the nature of men as men would not continue. And if the nature of men does not continue, in vain has the soul been fitted to the need of the body and to its experiences; in vain has the body been fettered so that it cannot obtain what it longs for, obedient to the reins of the soul and guided by it as with a bridle; in vain is understanding, in vain is wisdom, and the

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seeking to make the same point, he also speaks of humans as having both body and soul stating, “λέγω δὲ συναμφοτέρων τὸν ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἄνθρωπον.” Ibid., 18.4. See Fernández Ardanaz, *El Mito*, 49-50.

<sup>140</sup>“πάσχοντος ὅποσα πάθη ψυχῆς καὶ ὅποσα τοῦ σώματος ἐνεργοῦντός τε καὶ πράττοντος ὅποσα τῆς αἰσθητικῆς ἢ τῆς λογικῆς δεῖται κρίσεως.” *De resurrectione* 15.2.

<sup>141</sup>“καὶ τῶν ἐκ ψυχῆς φυομένων καὶ τῶν διὰ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιτελουμένων.” Ibid., 15.3.

<sup>142</sup>“οὐ ψυχὴ καθ’ ἑαυτήν.” *De resurrectione* 15.6.

observance of rectitude.”<sup>143</sup> He concludes by arguing that if vanity is excluded from the works of God, then the body must be raised so that it can receive judgment along with the soul for only as body and soul are united is the human person constituted. This argument for the resurrection rests then on the original purpose of God in the creation of humans, from which follows the nature of the human as created by God. Only after these have been established does Athenagoras directly connect the judgment to the resurrection.

Athenagoras clarifies his definition of life and death in the context of the separation of the soul from the body. He notes that “the separation of the soul from the members of the body and the dissolution of its parts interrupts the continuity of life.”<sup>144</sup> But this interruption does not cause life to cease. Instead he adds, “And for this reason, I suppose, some call sleep the brother of death.”<sup>145</sup> He repeats his definition of life, stating “for a time it is interrupted by the separation of the soul from the body”<sup>146</sup> and later, in describing the person at death, he writes “For both together no longer exist, the soul being separated from the body.”<sup>147</sup> The close connection he sees between the soul and

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<sup>143</sup>“ τῆς δὲ τῶν ἀνθρώπων φύσεως μὴ διαμενούσης, μάτην μὲν ἢ ψυχὴ συνήρμοσται τῇ τοῦ σώματος ἐνδεία καὶ τοῖς τούτου πάθεσιν ... ταῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ἡνίαϊς ὑπεῖκον καὶ χαλιναγωγούμενον, μάταιος δὲ ὁ νοῦς, ματαία δὲ φρόνησις καὶ δικαιοσύνης παρατήρησις.” Ibid., 15.7.

<sup>144</sup>“ ἐπειδὴ χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος μερῶν καὶ μορίων διάλυσις τὴν συνεχῆ διακόπτει ζώην, διὰ τοῦτ’ ἀπογινώσκειν χρὴ τὴν ἀνάστασιν.” Ibid., 16.4. Fischer notes that this is the first patristic usage of the phrase “χωρισμὸς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.” Joseph A. Fischer, *Studien zum Todesgedanken in der alten Kirche: Die Beurteilung des natürlichen Todes in der kirchlichen Literatur der ersten drei Jahrhunderte* (Munich: Max Hueber, 1954), 27.

<sup>145</sup>*De resurrectione* 16.4.

<sup>146</sup>“ καὶ ἐπὶ ποσὸν διακόπτεται τῷ χωρισμῷ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.” Ibid., 16.6. Cf. Pouderon, 165.

<sup>147</sup>“ οὐδὲ γὰρ ἔστιν ἔτι τὸ συναμφοτέρον χωριζομένης μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος.” *De resurrectione* 18.5.

body for the individual is evident. One cannot have a person without both body and soul.<sup>148</sup>

Athenagoras's argument for the immortality of the soul is couched in the context of his argument for the resurrection of the body. He argues that if it is accepted that the soul and the body are both dissolved at death and "the life of men is to be utterly extinguished, it is manifest there will be no care for men who are not living, no judgment respecting those who have lived in virtue or in vice; but there will rush in again upon us whatever belongs to a lawless life, and the swarm of absurdities which follow from it, and that which is the summit of this lawlessness—atheism."<sup>149</sup> His argument is as follows. If the soul is not immortal, then it is also dissolved at death. If the soul is dissolved at death, then there will be no future existence of the human person, whether in heaven or in hell. This is a clear instance of the necessity of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul tied directly to the reality of a future judgment. The soul functions as the principle of personhood or personality, defining who the individual is and thus without this, the individual cannot again exist.

Athenagoras spends a great deal of time dealing with the notion of equity between body and soul regarding the judgment and resurrection. It is helpful to follow his reasoning as it is carried on in the context of his definition of the human person. He reasons that, if good deeds receive a reward and only the soul receives this reward, then the body will be slighted as it also shared in the "toils connected with well-doing." Athenagoras continues, the "soul is often excused for certain faults on the ground of the

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<sup>148</sup>Cf. Pouderon, 164.

<sup>149</sup>*De resurrectione* 20.1.

body's neediness and want."<sup>150</sup> and yet the body still receives no reward for the good it shared in. Athenagoras then makes the opposite case. If the soul alone is to be punished, this also is not equitable. Because, as just stated, the soul often suffers because of the appetites and motions of the body and the soul's own actions carried out willfully on behalf of the body.<sup>151</sup>

The clear dichotomy described by Athenagoras reinforces the distinction which he has between the body and soul. He continues, "How can it possibly be other than unjust for the soul to be judged by itself in respect of things towards which in its own nature it feels no appetite, no motion, no impulse, such as licentiousness, violence, covetousness, injustice, and the unjust acts arising out of these?"<sup>152</sup> As described by Athenagoras, the soul does not have the desires which are peculiar to the body and its needs. He repeats his claim, "How can it be just for the soul alone to be judged in respect of those things which the body is the first to be sensible of, and in which it draws the soul away to sympathy and participation in actions with a view to things which it wants; and that the appetites and pleasures, and moreover the fears and sorrows, in which whatever exceeds the proper

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<sup>150</sup>“καὶ συγγνώμης μὲν τυγχάνειν πολλάκις τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπὶ τινῶν πλημμελημάτων διὰ τὴν τοῦ σώματος ἔνδειάν τε καὶ χρείαν.” *De resurrectione* 21.1.

<sup>151</sup>“καὶ μὴν καὶ πλημμελημάτων κρινομένων οὐ σφίζεται τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ δίκαιον, εἴ γε μόνη τίνοι δίκην ὑπὲρ ὧν ἐνοχλοῦντος τοῦ σώματος καὶ πρὸς τὰς οἰκειίας ὀρέξεις ἢ κινήσεις ἔλκοντος ἐπλημμέλησεν ποτὲ μὲν κατὰ συναρπαγὴν καὶ κλοπὴν, ποτὲ δὲ κατὰ τινα βιαιοτέραν ὀλκὴν, ἄλλοτε δὲ κατὰ συνδρομὴν ἐν χάριτος μέρει καὶ θεραπείας τῆς τούτου συστάσεως.” *Ibid.*, 21.2.

<sup>152</sup>“πῶς οὐκ ἄδικον τὴν ψυχὴν κρίνεσθαι καθ' ἑαυτὴν ὑπὲρ ὧν οὐδ' ἦντινοῦν ἔχει κατὰ τὴν ἑαυτῆς φύσιν οὐκ ὄρεξιν οὐ κίνησιν οὐχ ὀρμὴν, οἷον λαγνείας ἢ βίας ἢ πλεονεξίας [ἀδικίας] καὶ τῶν ἐπὶ τούτοις ἀδικημάτων.” *De resurrectione* 21.3.

bounds is amenable to judgment, should be set in motion by the body.”<sup>153</sup> He again reiterates that the soul “neither needs anything of this sort, nor desires nor fears or suffers of itself any such thing as man is wont to suffer.”<sup>154</sup> He then pauses, perhaps realizing the strict dichotomy which he is creating, and admits that these “affections” should be attributed to the whole person, “yet surely we shall not assert that these things belong to the soul, if we only look simply at its peculiar nature.”<sup>155</sup> He explains that since the soul does not get hungry, it can never desire it, nor can it desire money, since this also does not pertain to it. Neither can it be afraid of anything which is destructive since it is not subject to corruption.<sup>156</sup>

In *Resurrection of the Dead* 22, Athenagoras continues his argument in favor of rewards and punishments for the soul and body together.<sup>157</sup> He rephrases the argument of the previous chapter, instead using the terms virtue and vice. The argument is the same, however. Since one does not assert that virtues and vices exist only in the soul and not in the entire person, then the soul cannot alone receive the rewards or punishments for

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<sup>153</sup>“ποῦ δίκαιον ἐν οἷς πρωτοπαθεῖ τὸ σῶμα καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἔλκει πρὸς συμπάθειαν καὶ κοινωνίαν τῶν ἐφ’ ἃ κινεῖται πράξεων, αὐτὴν κρίνεσθαι μόνην, καὶ τὰς μὲν ὀρέξεις καὶ τὰς ἡδονάς, ἔτι δὲ φόβους καὶ λύπας, ἐφ’ ὧν πᾶν τὸ μὴ μέτριον ὑπὸ δικῶν, ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος ἔχει τὴν κίνησιν.” Ibid., 21.4.

<sup>154</sup>“ἐπὶ τὴν ψυχὴν φέρεσθαι μόνην τὴν μήτε δεομένην τοιοῦτου τινὸς μήτε ὀρεγομένην μήτε φοβουμένην ἢ πάσχουσάν τι τοιοῦτον καθ’ ἑαυτὴν οἷον πάσχειν πέφυκεν ἄνθρωπος.” Ibid.

<sup>155</sup>“οὐ δὴπου γε καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ ταῦτα προσήκειν φήσομεν, ὅποταν καθαρῶς τὴν ἰδίαν αὐτῆς ἐπισκοπῶμεν φύσιν.” Ibid., 21.5.

<sup>156</sup>Ibid., 21.6.

<sup>157</sup>See Leslie Kline, “The *De Resurrectione Mortuorum* of Athenagoras,” *Restoration Quarterly* 11, no. 4 (1968): 259.



them.<sup>158</sup> He argues, based on the previous thesis that the soul is incorruptible, that virtues such as courage or fortitude mean nothing to the soul since it has no fear of death; self-control is not needed as the soul is not hungry nor does have any desire for sexual or other pleasures; practical wisdom is useless when it does not do anything; nor is equity useful as the soul neither wants nor uses anything.<sup>159</sup>

Athenagoras concludes, since laws are set in place to be followed by the entire person, then any reward or punishment must also be received by the entire person, body and soul.<sup>160</sup> He then goes through the Ten Commandments noting that the commands against murder, theft, and adultery all pertain to the body, not the soul.<sup>161</sup> The command to honor one's father and mother also pertains to the entire person as "souls do not produce soul, men produce men."<sup>162</sup> He concludes by stating clearly, "For to an immortal nature everything which is desired by the needy as useful is useless."<sup>163</sup>

Athenagoras then shifts from an argument of equity to one based upon the final cause. Here, he notes that the end of humans is not the same as it is for the animal world, because humans are "possessed of an immortal soul and rational judgment."<sup>164</sup> Neither is

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<sup>158</sup>“ἀνθρώπου γὰρ ἀρετὰς εἶναι γινώσκομεν τὰς ἀρετὰς, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τὴν ταύταις ἀντικειμένην κακίαν οὐ ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης τοῦ σώματος καὶ καθ' ἑαυτὴν οὕσης.” *De resurrectione* 22.1.

<sup>159</sup>Ibid., 22.2.

<sup>160</sup>Ibid., 23.1.

<sup>161</sup>Ibid., 23.2-5.

<sup>162</sup>“οὐ γὰρ ψυχὰι ψυχὰς γεννῶσαι τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς ἢ τῆς μητρὸς οἰκειοῦνται προσηγορίαν, ἀλλ' ἀνθρώπους ἀνθρωποι.” *De resurrectione* 23.3.

<sup>163</sup>“ἀχρεῖον γὰρ ἀθανάτῳ φύσει πᾶν ὅπόσον τοῖς ἐνδεέσιν ὀρεκτὸν ὡς χρήσιμον.” Ibid., 23.5.

<sup>164</sup>“κτηνῶν γὰρ οἶμαι καὶ βοσκημάτων οἰκεῖον τοῦτο τέλος, οὐκ

the human person's final cause found in happiness of soul separated from the body.<sup>165</sup>

Rather, Athenagoras will argue, the final cause is found only in the composite person. He argues that the human person does not exist when the soul is separated from the body.<sup>166</sup>

Thus, the only reasonable solution is to have a resurrection of the body to be joined to the same soul to which it had been joined in life.<sup>167</sup>

Elsewhere Athenagoras describes the heavenly state of the individual, writing, "We are persuaded that when we are removed from the present life we shall live another life, better than the present one, and heavenly, not earthly (since we shall abide near God, and with God, free from all change or suffering in the soul, not as flesh, even though we shall have flesh, but as heavenly spirit), or, falling with the rest, a worse one and in fire."<sup>168</sup> Athenagoras seems to connect this heavenly state of the soul with the divine attributes of impassibility. Here again Athenagoras seems to confuse his ideas on the soul in their "pure" or "theoretical" state with the actual human existence of fused body and soul. This seems evident when he appears to describe the state to which the soul reaches when it is with God, that is "free from change." One would expect according to his definition in other places that this is already an attribute of the soul.

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ἀνθρώπων ἀθανάτω ψυχῇ καὶ λογικῇ κρίσει χρωμένων." Ibid., 24.5.

<sup>165</sup>"οὐ μὴν οὐδὲ μακαριότης ψυχῆς κεχωρισμένης σώματος." Ibid., 25.1.

<sup>166</sup>"οὔτε μὴν ἐν χωρισμῶ τυγχανούσης τῆς ψυχῆς, τῶ μηδὲ συνεστάναι τὸν τοιοῦτον ἄνθρωπον διαλυθέντος." Ibid., 25.2.

<sup>167</sup>"τὸ δ' αὐτὸ σῶμα τὴν αὐτὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολαβεῖν ἄλλως μὲν ἀδύνατον, κατὰ μόνην δὲ τὴν ἀνάστασιν δυνατὸν· ταύτης γὰρ γενομένης καὶ τὸ τῆ φύσει τῶν ἀνθρώπων πρόσφορον ἐπακολουθεῖ τέλος." Ibid., 25.3.

<sup>168</sup>"βίον ἕτερον βιώσεσθαι ἀμείονα ἢ κατὰ τὸν ἐνθάδε καὶ ἐπουράνιον, οὐκ ἐπίγειον, ὡς ἂν μετὰ θεοῦ καὶ σὺν θεῶ ἀκλινεῖς καὶ ἀπαθεῖς τὴν ψυχὴν οὐχ ὡς σάρκες κἄν ἔχωμεν, ἀλλ' ὡς οὐράνιον πνεῦμα μένωμεν, ἢ συγκαταπίπτοντες τοῖς λοιποῖς χεῖρονα καὶ διὰ πυρὸς." *Legatio* 31.4.

## Summary

Athenagoras uses soul for natural life. He locates the will in the soul. The human person is a composite of soul and body. He allows for emotions in the soul, though guardedly, and at other times describes the soul as entirely separate from the needs and desires of the body. Reason takes place in the soul, with the soul at times experiencing fantastic movements that lead to irrational thoughts. The concept of a composite individual, having both body and soul, is what causes some degree of mixing in what is attributed to the soul.

Athenagoras connects the human soul with the breath of God, describing the human soul as having an affinity for God's *afflatus*. The human person does not exist without a composite of soul and body. Thus the body must be reunited with the soul at the resurrection. Though the soul is intimately connected with the body and desire is in the soul, yet, he also argues that because of its immortal nature, the soul does not suffer from the desires of the body nor is it subject to the laws that govern the body. This is a challenge for some subsequent authors as well. They accept that the soul is where decisions are made, for good or evil and yet they also will struggle with allowing that an immortal, almost divine entity should struggle with "desires of the flesh."

Athenagoras clearly argues for a connection between the need for the soul to have an immortal nature and the reality of future judgments. He argues that if the soul were dissolved at death, there would be no possibility of a future judgment. He then notes that the heavenly state of the soul will be one free from change.

## Melito of Sardis

Melito of Sardis wrote many treatises<sup>169</sup> but the remains are mostly fragmentary. His sole, extant treatise is titled *On the Pascha*.<sup>170</sup>

### Usage of *Psyche*

Melito writes of the soul as the seat of emotions such as grief. In describing the feelings of the Egyptians after the plague of death, he writes, “For all Egypt was in pains and disasters, in tears and sounds of mourning, and came to Pharaoh all grief-stricken not only in appearance but also in soul.”<sup>171</sup> In a similar usage, while describing the same event, Melito writes, “And one firstborn, as he clasped dark body in his hand, terrified in soul let out a piteous and dreadful cry: ‘Whom does my hand hold? Whom does my soul dread?’”<sup>172</sup>

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Melito views death as a separation of the soul from the body. He writes,

At these things sin rejoiced, who in the capacity of death’s fellow worker journeys

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<sup>169</sup>For a list and discussion, see Stuart George Hall, *Melito of Sardis: On Pascha and Fragments* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1979), xiii-xvii; Othmar Perler, *Méliton de Sardes: Sur la Pâque et Fragments*, Sources chrétiennes 123 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1966), 11-15.

<sup>170</sup>On authorship and dating, see Hall, xvii-xxii; Perler, 16-24. On the function of the document in the church, see Alistair Stewart-Sykes, *The Lamb’s High Feast: Melito, Peri Pascha and the Quartodeciman Paschal Liturgy at Sardis* (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 55-139. Translations follow Hall’s edition.

<sup>171</sup>“ἀφίκετο πρὸς Φαραῶ ὅλη πενθήρης, οὐ μόνον τῷ σχήματι, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ.” *De pascha* 124.

<sup>172</sup>“Εἷ τις πρωτότοκος χειρὶ σκοτεινὸν σῶμα ἐναγκαλισά μενος, τῇ ψυχῇ ἐκδειματωθεὶς οἰκτρὸν καὶ φοβερὸν ἀνε βόησεν· ‘Τίνα κρατεῖ ἡ δεξιὰ μου; Τίνα τρέμει ἡ ψυχὴ μου.’” *De pascha* 166-168.

ahead into the souls of men, and prepares as food for him the bodies of the dead. In every soul sin made a mark, and those in whom he made it were bound to die. So all flesh began to fall under sin, and every body under death, and every soul was driven out of its fleshly dwelling. And what was taken from earth was to earth dissolved, and what was given from God was confined in Hades; and there was separation of what fitted beautifully, and the beautiful body was split apart. For man was being divided by death; for a strange disaster and captivity were enclosing him, and he was dragged off a prisoner under the shadows of death, and desolate lay the Father's image.<sup>173</sup>

In this passage, Melito exhibits a clear dichotomous anthropology.<sup>174</sup> However it is of a different kind than that suggested by other authors. Melito does write of the body as the dwelling of the soul. However, this is a much more harmonious relationship than what is implied by the tomb metaphor of Plato. Instead of a tomb which holds the soul captive only to be freed at death, the soul actually is described as driven from the body, implying that it does not desire to leave. This more positive description of the relationship is further reinforced by his description of this union as that which “fitted beautifully.”

Melito writes that sin makes a mark on the soul.<sup>175</sup> This would indicate that sin affects the soul in some real way. In describing the saving effects of Christ along the lines of the Israelite exodus from Egypt, Melito writes that “[Christ] marked our souls with his own Spirit.”<sup>176</sup> This appears as a counterpart to the marking of sin, suggesting that the

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<sup>173</sup>“Ἐπὶ δὲ τούτοις ἡ ἁμαρτία ἠὺφραίνεται. Ἡ τοῦ θανάτου συνεργὸς ὑπάρχουσα προωδοιπύρει εἰς τὰς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχὰς καὶ ἠτοιμάζειν αὐτῷ τροφὰς τὰ τῶν νεκρῶν σώματα. Εἰς πᾶσαν δὲ ψυχὴν ἐτίθει ἡ ἁμαρτία ἶχνος, καὶ εἰς οὓς ἂν ἔθηκεν, τούτους ἔδει τελευτᾶν. Πᾶσα οὖν σὰρξ ὑπὸ ἁμαρτίαν ἔπιπτεν καὶ πᾶν σῶμα ὑπὸ θάνατον, καὶ πᾶσα ψυχὴ ἐκ τοῦ σαρκίνου οἴκου ἐξηλύετο, καὶ τὸ λημφθὲν ἐκ γῆς εἰς γῆν ἀνελύετο, καὶ τὸ δωρηθὲν ἐκ θεοῦ εἰς τὸν ἄδην κατεκλείετο.” *Ibid.*, 397-402.

<sup>174</sup>Fischer, 27. So also Hall, xlii; Perler, 165.

<sup>175</sup>Cf. Alois Grillmeier, “Das Erbe der Sohne Adams’ in der Homilia de Passione Melitos,” *Scholastik* 20, no. 4 (1949): 492.

<sup>176</sup>“καὶ ἐσφράγισεν ἡμῶν τὰς ψυχὰς τῷ ἰδίῳ πνεύματι.” *De pascha* 479.

redemptive work of the Spirit takes place in the soul.<sup>177</sup>

Death itself, rather than the body, is described as the captor of the soul, and the separation forced on the human person by the death event results in the desolation of the *imago dei*. Thus it seems that Melito held that the image of God in humanity is the union of the body and soul. Upon death, the soul is held in Hades while the body returns to dust.<sup>178</sup>

### Summary

Melito makes the soul the seat of the emotions of fear and grief. The union of body and soul is the *imago dei*. The soul is enclosed in the body but is forced to leave at the time of death whereupon it is taken captive in Hades.

Scripture is not used directly to support a doctrine of the soul. However, *On the Pascha* does exhibit a large amount of allusions and quotations of biblical material.

### Conclusion

This chapter has studied both the general usage of the soul in the second-century apologists as well as the use of Scripture in its doctrinal development. The soul is generally used for life as well as the individual. In this period, the idea of the dichotomy between body and soul, first mentioned in the previous period in the *Epistle to Diognetus*, is further developed. Philosophical notions such as the principle of life, invisibility, and incorporeality of the soul are mentioned only in passing, with no focus yet on these aspects of the soul that will become important in the following sections. The idea of the

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<sup>177</sup>As Melito continues with the description of Christ marking our bodies with his blood, this whole connection may be intended only as a metaphor.

<sup>178</sup>While Melito does not discuss the reunification of soul and body at the resurrection, he does write of raising up the buried and bringing the dead to life, of trampling down Hades and carrying man to heaven. *De pascha* 755-764.

soul's immortality is, however, mentioned and discussed at length.

Theophilus and Athenagoras find special significance for the soul in the idea of the “breath of God” from Gen 2:7. Even when attention is not placed on the idea of God's breath, authors use this verse to draw a connection to its special origin. Though almost all authors refrain from calling the soul divine, it is sometimes—based upon these two passages—referred to as divine-like.

The early authors do not write of death as the separation of the soul from the body. This begins with Athenagoras and Melito of Sardis at the end of this period. Melito argues that the soul is forced from the body by death. Except for Tatian, the soul always survives the death of the body. Tatian argues for the soul's dissolution and then its renewal to rejoin the body for the judgment. Melito argues that the souls of both the righteous and the wicked go to Hades to await the judgment. The idea of the soul rejoining the body to face the judgment is another common motif started in this era. Justin defends this notion by citing the words of Jesus in Matt 10:28.

The idea that the biblical teaching of a future judgment demands an immortal soul is introduced and discussed by Justin Martyr, Theophilus of Antioch, and Athenagoras. The argument is that the soul must be immortal in order for there to be life after death when every person will face the judgment. Justin Martyr and Tatian also discussed the eternal punishment of the wicked in the context of the future life of the soul.

To support the notion of the continued existence of the soul, Justin Martyr cites Ps 22:20, 31; 1 Sam 28:12-13 (Saul, Samuel, and the Witch of Endor); and Luke 23:46 (Christ's death). The use of 1 Sam 28 is one that will be used several more times with later authors.

The idea of the soul experiencing a vision of God is first suggested by Theophilus, who argues that this can happen through perceiving God's work in creation.

## CHAPTER V

### IRENÆUS, CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA, AND HIPPOLYTUS

The works of Irenaeus and Clement of Alexandria dominate this section. While Irenaeus's work is characterized by an anti-heresy tone, Clement begins the work of describing the life and education of the gnostic soul. Both authors feature Scripture as a large part of their arguments with Scripture texts being offered for many of the ideas that have been discussed by earlier Fathers. Hippolytus caps off this section, but is really overshadowed by the other two authors on the topic of the soul.

#### Irenaeus

Irenaeus of Lyon was a very influential figure in the last half of the second century.<sup>1</sup> His two surviving documents that are considered authentic are *Refutation and Overthrow of Knowledge Falsely So-Called*, or simply *Against Heresies* and his *Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching*.<sup>2</sup> While Irenaeus wrote in Greek, complete

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<sup>1</sup>For a historical review of Irenaeus's life and culture, see André Benoit, *Saint Irénée: introduction à l'étude de sa théologie*, ed. R. Mehl (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1960), 47-73; Robert M. Grant, *Irenaeus of Lyons* (London: Routledge, 1997), 1-10; Dietmar Wyrwa, "Kosmos und Heilsgeschichte bei Irenäus von Lyon," in *Die Welslichkeit des Glaubens in der Alten Kirche*, ed. Dietmar Wyrwa (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1997), 443-452.

<sup>2</sup>For a history of the texts, see John Behr, *Asceticism and Anthropology in Irenaeus and Clement* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 25-33. For a brief discussion of the critical editions, see Benoit, 5. On other attributed works, see Ulrich Hamm, "Irenaeus of Lyons," *DECL*, 302.



manuscripts of the original Greek have not survived. Greek fragments do exist of *Against Heresies*, and *The Demonstration* is extant in an Armenian translation.

In *Against Heresies*, Irenaeus deals with teachings he considers heretical. There are many instances, especially in book one, where he discusses the teachings of various writers. While one might assume that Irenaeus disagrees with whatever position he is describing, this is not always clear. Unless Irenaeus specifically criticizes or agrees with a position, rather than simply narrating it, this study does not include that statement.

### Usage of *Anima*

#### General Usage

Irenaeus uses soul for one's life. In writing of the early martyrs among the apostles and early followers of Christ, he writes, "Those, therefore, who delivered up their souls to death for Christ's Gospel—how could they have spoken to men in accordance with old-established opinion?"<sup>3</sup> He later repeats this usage when discussing Matt 16:24, 25. "For these things Christ spoke openly, He being Himself the Savior of those who should be delivered over to death for their confession of Him, and lose their lives."<sup>4</sup> In another place Irenaeus writes, "Since the Lord thus has redeemed us through His own blood, giving His soul for our souls, and His flesh for our flesh."<sup>5</sup> Here it is

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<sup>3</sup>*Qui ergo usque ad mortem tradiderunt animas propter Euangelium Christi, quomodo poterant secundum insitam opinionem hominibus loqui?" Adversus haereses 3.12.13.*

<sup>4</sup>*Haec enim Christus manifeste dicebat, ipse existens Saluator eorum qui propter suam confessionem in mortem traderentur et perderent animas suas." Ibid., 3.18.4.*

<sup>5</sup>*Suo igitur sanguine redimente nos Domino, et dante animam suam pro nostra anima et carnem suam pro nostris carnibus." Ibid., 5.1.1. This is reminiscent of Clement of Rome's thought.*

difficult to determine if Irenaeus simply has *anima* for life or if he rather has the concept of Christ giving His soul in some other manner. While the latter seems implied by the parallel with flesh, it does not fit well with any understanding of what or who Christ would have given His soul to.

Irenaeus also seems to use soul to simply refer to the self. In a similar usage, while writing about the sin of Cain, Irenaeus writes, “For if any one shall endeavor to offer a sacrifice merely to outward appearance, unexceptionably, in due order, and according to appointment, while in his soul he does not assign to his neighbor that fellowship with him which is right and proper, nor is under the fear of God.”<sup>6</sup> Here the soul seems to refer to the person itself or possibly one’s inner thoughts.

### **Powers of the Soul**

Irenaeus locates mental excitement in the soul. In describing women who are enabled to prophesy by Marcus, he writes, “She then, vainly puffed up and elated by these words, and greatly excited in soul by the expectation that it is herself who is to prophesy, her heart beating violently [from emotion], reaches the requisite pitch of audacity, and idly as well as impudently utters some nonsense as it happens to occur to her, such as might be expected from one heated by an empty spirit.”<sup>7</sup> He continues,

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<sup>6</sup>“*Si enim quis solummodo secundum quod videtur munde et recte et legitime offerre temptaverit, secundum autem suam animam non recte dividat eam quae est ad proximum communionem neque timorem habeat Dei.*” Ibid., 4.18.3. This notion of connecting the soul with moral actions is reiterated by Irenaeus in a quote from Isa 1:16, “And inasmuch as they were not by nature so created by God, but had power also to act rightly, the same person said to them, giving them good counsel, ‘Wash ye, make you clean; take away iniquity from your souls before mine eyes; cease from your iniquities.’” *Adversus haereses* 4.41.3.

<sup>7</sup>“*Illa autem seducta et elata ab his quae praedicta sunt, concalefaciens animam a sus/picione quod incipiat prophetare, cum cor eius multo plus quam oporteat palpitet, audet et loquitur deliriosa et quaecumque euenerint omnia uacue et audaciter, quippe*

“Referring to this, one superior to me has observed that the soul is both audacious and impudent when heated with empty air.”<sup>8</sup> Here one sees that Irenaeus locates attributes of boldness and impudence with the soul as well as that part of the individual which becomes excited.

In another place, Irenaeus describes sorrow as an emotion of the soul. “And for this cause, upon His entrance into Jerusalem, all those who were in the way recognized David their king in His sorrow of soul, and spread their garments for Him.”<sup>9</sup>

Elsewhere, Irenaeus writes describing the cries of newborn infants as their souls crying out.<sup>10</sup> It is not entirely clear from the text if this idea is only that of Marcus, or if these are Irenaeus’s words. And if it is attributed to Irenaeus, does soul refer simply to the identity of the infant or rather does he associate the separate soul of the infant with these “primordial” cries?

Irenaeus interprets the soul as the seat of reason.<sup>11</sup> He describes the soul as an artist. “For the body may be compared to an instrument; but the soul is possessed of the reason of an artist.”<sup>12</sup> Elsewhere he writes, “For the intellect of man—his mind, thought,

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*calefacta spiritu.*” Ibid., 1.13.3.

<sup>8</sup>“*Sicut melior a nobis de talibus prophetis exsequitur [eo] quod audax et inuerecunda anima quae uacuo aere excalefacta est.*” Ibid., 1.13.3.

<sup>9</sup>“*Et propter hoc Hierosolymam introeunte eo, omnes qui erant in via David in dolore animae cognoverunt suum Regem et substraverunt ei.*” Ibid., 4.11.3.

<sup>10</sup>“*Ostensionem autem adfert ab his qui nunc nascuntur infantibus, quorum anima simul ut de uulua progressa est exclamat uniuscuiusque elementi hunc sonum.*” *Adversus haereses* 1.14.8.

<sup>11</sup>For a discussion on this and how Irenaeus related to other philosophies on this point, see Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 319-321.

<sup>12</sup>“*Anima autem artificis rationem obtinet.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.33.4.

mental intention, and such like—is nothing else than his soul; but the emotions and operations of the soul itself have no substance apart from the soul.”<sup>13</sup> In describing the Sabbath and how Christ kept it, Irenaeus writes, “For the law commanded them to abstain from every servile work, that is, from all grasping after wealth which is procured by trading and by other worldly business; but it exhorted them to attend to the exercises of the soul, which consist in reflection, and to addresses of a beneficial kind for their neighbors’ benefit.”<sup>14</sup> Here Irenaeus describes for us what the exercises of the soul are, namely reflection or *sententiam*.

Irenaeus writes, “For, though it is not an easy thing for a soul under the influence of error to repent, yet, on the other hand, it is not altogether impossible to escape from error when the truth is brought alongside it.”<sup>15</sup> Here the soul is the rational agent which makes decisions regarding truth and error. In another place, Irenaeus locates faith and understanding in the soul. He writes, “Vain also are the Ebionites, who do not receive by faith into their soul the union of God and man, . . . and who do not choose to

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<sup>13</sup>“*Sensus enim hominis et cogitatio et intentio mentis et ea quae sunt huiusmodi non aliud quid praeter animam sunt, sed ipsius animae motus et operationes, nullam sine anima substantiam habentes.*” Ibid., 2.29.3. On this, see Nathanael Bonwetsch, *Die Theologie des Irenäus*, Beiträge zur Förderung christlicher Theologie, ed. D. Schlatter et al. (Gütersloh: C. Bertelsmann, 1925), 72; Ernst Klebba, *Die Anthropologie des Hl. Irenaeus: Eine dogmenhistorische Studie*, Kirchengeschichtliche Studien, vol. 2, no. 3, ed. Dr. Knöpfler et al. (Münster: Heinrich Schönningh, 1894), 100. It should be noted that this statement is given to contradict the gnostic notion of the soul and body separating after death to be received into the Pleroma.

<sup>14</sup>“*Die sabbatorum continere se quidem iubeat eos lex ab omni opere servili, hoc est ab omni avaritia quae per negotiationem et reliquo terreno arte agitur, animae autem opera quae fiunt per sententiam et sermones bonos in auxilium eorum qui proximi sunt adhortabatur fieri.*” *Adversus haereses* 4.8.2.

<sup>15</sup>“*Etenim si non facile est ab errore apprehensam resipiscere animam, sed non omnimodo impossibile est errorem effugere apposita ueritate.*” Ibid., 3.2.3.

understand.”<sup>16</sup>

Irenaeus, in discussing Sophia and her passion, states that the Gnostics are wrong for calling the *Pleroma* spiritual if Sophia was a part of it. “For even a vigorous soul, not to say a spiritual substance, would not pass through any such experience.”<sup>17</sup> This is in response to the Gnostic doctrine that Sophia was “involved in ignorance, and degeneracy, and passion.” Assuming only one kind of soul, that is the same for humans and other spiritual entities, Irenaeus seems to indirectly argue that souls do not participate in ignorance, degeneracy, and passion.

In this context, Irenaeus argues against the Gnostic teaching that those souls who received the seed of the Mother are superior to the rest.<sup>18</sup> Assuming that the high priests and Herod the king were in this category, he notes that they did not recognize Christ and believe in Him and thus cannot be considered to be superior.<sup>19</sup> Thus, recognizing Christ for who He was constituted an attribute of a superior soul.

The soul could also be instructed by corporeal objects. “For the law, since it was laid down for those in bondage, used to instruct the soul by means of those corporeal objects which were of an external nature, drawing it, as by a bond, to obey its commandments, that man might learn to serve God. But the Word set free the soul, and

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<sup>16</sup>“*Vani autem et Ebionaei, unitionem Dei et hominis per fidem non recipientes in suam animam . . . neque intellegere volentes.*” Ibid., 5.1.3.

<sup>17</sup>“*Haec enim ne anima quidem fortis, non dicam spiritalis substantia, percipiet.*” Ibid., 2.18.2.

<sup>18</sup>“*In eo quod dicant eas animas quae habuerint a Matre semen meliores reliquis fieri.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.19.7.

<sup>19</sup>“*Non itaque erant meliores tales animae propter seminis depositionem neque propter hoc honorificabantur a Demiurgo.*” Ibid., 2.19.7.

taught that through it the body should be willingly purified.”<sup>20</sup>

Irenaeus draws a parallel between one’s power of choice with the possession of one’s soul. He writes, “This expression [of our Lord], ‘How often would I have gathered your children together, and you would not,’ set forth the ancient law of human liberty, because God made man free from the beginning, possessing his own power, even as he does his own soul, to obey the behests of God voluntarily, and not by compulsion of God.”<sup>21</sup> In this quotation of Matt 23:37, Irenaeus compares the possession of one’s soul with the possessing of one’s free will, specifically here in relation to one’s obedience to the divine commands. Irenaeus also writes, “But the righteous fathers [i.e., Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob and the preceding righteous ones] had the meaning of the Decalogue written in their hearts and souls, that is, they loved the God who made them, and did no injury to their neighbor.”<sup>22</sup> Here again, the soul is described in the context of obedience to God’s commands.

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Irenaeus is the first to develop a more comprehensive doctrine of the soul. In

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<sup>20</sup>“*Etenim lex, quippe servis posita, per ea quae foris erant corporalia animam erudiebat, velut per vinculum attrahens eam ad obaudientiam praeceptorum, uti disceret homo assentire Deo; Verbum autem liberans animam, et per ipsam corpus voluntarie / emundari docuit.*” Ibid., 4.13.2.

<sup>21</sup>“*Illud autem quod ait: Quotiens volui colligere filios tuos et noluisti, veterem legem libertatis hominis manifestavit, quia liberum eum Deus fecit, ab initio habentem suam potestatem sicut et suam animam, ad utendum sententia Dei voluntarie, et non coactum ab eo.*” Ibid., 4.37.1.

<sup>22</sup>“*Quoniam lex non est posita justis; justii autem patres, virtutem decalogi / conscriptam habentes in cordibus et animabus suis, diligentes scilicet Deum qui fecit eos et abstinentes erga proximum ab iniustitia.*” *Adversus haereses* 4.16.3. There seem to be verbal allusions to Deut 4:29; 6: 5-6; 10:12-13; 11:13; 26:16; 30:2, 6, 10; Matt 22:37; Mark 12:30; Luke 10:27.

doing so, he also uses the Scriptures more than any other previous author.

### **Origin of the Soul**

Irenaeus turns to the creation story for the origin of the soul. He quotes Gen 2:7 where it states that “God ‘breathed into the face of man the breath of life, and man became a living soul.’”<sup>23</sup> From this verse Irenaeus argues that the soul is equal to the “the breath of life.”<sup>24</sup>

Irenaeus states that the soul originates in the same manner that the body does. “But, as each one of us receives his body through the skilful working of God, so does he also possess his soul. For God is not so poor or destitute in resources, that He cannot confer its own proper soul on each individual body, even as He gives it also its special character.”<sup>25</sup> Here, no specific biblical passage is adduced to substantiate the statement. Rather Irenaeus alludes to the creation story, clearly accepting as proven the notion that God created the body and then arguing that if He was capable of doing that, He must not be so poor as not to be able to give each body He has made its own soul.

### **The Human Person and the Soul**

Irenaeus has a dichotomous view of the human person.<sup>26</sup> He writes, “But every

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<sup>23</sup>“*Quae sunt ergo mortalia corpora? Numquidnam animae? Sed incorporales animae, quantum ad / comparationem mortalium corporum: insufflavit enim in faciem hominis Deus flatum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.7.1.

<sup>24</sup>*Flatum vitae existentem.*” *Ibid.*, 5.7.1.

<sup>25</sup>“*Sed quemadmodum unusquisque nostrum suum corpus per artem Dei sumit, sic et suam habet animam. Nec enim sic pauper nec indigens Deus, ut non unicuique corpori propriam donaret animam, quemadmodum et proprium characterem.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.33.5.

<sup>26</sup>For studies on Irenaeus’s anthropology, see Barbara Aland, “Fides und

one will allow that we are [composed of] a body taken from the earth, and a soul receiving spirit from God.”<sup>27</sup> Here, in defending the real incarnation of Christ, Irenaeus lays out the dichotomy which makes the human person.<sup>28</sup> He does not defend it in any way other than calling upon a shared common knowledge, though one can readily see a strong allusion to the creation story which he explicitly refers to later. He repeats this point. “Now man is a mixed organization of soul and flesh, who was formed after the likeness of God, and molded by His hands, that is, by the Son and Holy Spirit, to whom also He said, ‘Let Us make man.’”<sup>29</sup> Using the expression “likeness of God” and “molded

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Subiectio: Zur Anthropologie des Irenäus,” in *Kerygma und Logos. Beiträge zu den geistesgeschichtlichen Beziehungen zwischen Antike und Christentum*, ed. Adolf M. Ritter (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 1979); Ysabel de Andia, *Homo vivens: incorruptibilité et divinisation de l’homme selon Irénée de Lyon* (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1986); Bonwetsch, 70-81; Antonio Orbe, *Antropologia de San Ireneo* (Madrid, 1969); James G. M. Purves, “The Spirit and the *Imago Dei*: Reviewing the Anthropology of Irenaeus of Lyons,” *Evangelical Quarterly* 68, no. 2 (1996): 99-120; Gustav Wingren, *Man and the Incarnation: A Study in the Biblical Theology of Irenaeus*, trans. Ross Mackenzie (Edinburgh: Oliver and Boyd, 1959); Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 301-334.

<sup>27</sup>“*Nos autem quoniam corpus sumus de terra acceptum et anima accipiens a Deo Spiritum, omnis quicumque confitebitur.*” *Adversus haereses* 3.22.1. On Irenaeus’s usage of spirit, Mackenzie writes that it is “the bond of the relation between God and humanity.” He adds “that in each case, spirit as applied to the human being is not a constituent part of that creation.” Iain M. Mackenzie, *Irenaeus’s Demonstration of the Apostolic Preaching: A Theological Commentary and Translation* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2002), 47. See also Behr, 99-101; Anders-Christian Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” in *Körper und Seele: Aspekte spätantiker Anthropologie*, ed. Barbara Feichtinger et al. (Munich: K. G. Saur, 2006), 73; Eric F. Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 221-225. On the question between spirit and Spirit, see Mary Ann Donovan, “Alive to the Glory of God: A Key Insight in St. Irenaeus,” *Theological Studies* 49 (1988): 295-296.

<sup>28</sup>For a discussion on the bipartite or tripartite view of the human person, see Mackenzie, 48.

<sup>29</sup>“*Homo est enim temperatio animae et carnis, qui secundum similitudinem Dei formatus est et per manus ejus plasmatus est, hoc est per Filium et Spiritum, quibus et dixit: Faciamus hominem.*” *Adversus haereses* 4.prol.1. Mackenzie adds, “The perfection of the *imago Dei* which humanity is, is that relation of the embodied soul and the



by His hands,” he introduces his usage of Gen 1:27 and Gen 2:7 which form the basis for much of his understanding.<sup>30</sup> He also writes, “Now the soul and the spirit are certainly a part of the man, but certainly not the man; for the perfect man consists in the commingling and the union of the soul receiving the spirit of the Father, and the admixture of that fleshly nature which was molded after the image of God.”<sup>31</sup> Here, also, one detects a strong reference to the first two chapters of Genesis.

Irenaeus writes further on the relationship of the soul to the body, “For the body is not possessed of greater power than the soul, since indeed the former is inspired, and vivified, and increased, and held together by the latter; but the soul possesses and rules

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ensouled body to God in which they advance towards him in their inseparable unity as the entity of the human being.” Mackenzie, 49. Cf. Denis Minns, *Irenaeus* (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 1994), 61. For a discussion of the term *image*, see Jacques Fantino, *L’homme image de Dieu chez saint Irénée de Lyon* (n.p.: Les Éditions du Cerf, 1986); A. G. Hamman, *L’homme icône de Dieu: la Genèse relue par l’Église des Pères* (Paris: Migne, 1998), 18-22; Henri Lassiat, *Promotion de l’homme en Jésus-Christ d’après Irénée de Lyon témoin de la Tradition des Apôtres* (Paris: Mame, 1974), 147-213; Véronique Minet, *L’empreinte divine: la théologie du corps chez Saint Irénée* (Lyon: Profac, 2002), 35-44.

<sup>30</sup>On the importance of the creation narrative in Irenaeus’s theology, see Gregory T. Armstrong, *Die Genesis in der Alten Kirche: Die drei Kirchenväter* (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1962), 67-73; Anders-Christian Jacobsen, “The Importance of Genesis 1-3 in the Theology of Irenaeus,” *Zeitschrift für Antikes Christentum* 8, no. 2 (2005): 299-316.

<sup>31</sup>“*Anima autem et Spiritus pars hominis esse possunt, homo autem nequaquam: perfectus autem homo commixtio et adunitio est animae assumptis Spiritum Patris et admixtae ei carni quae est plasmata secundum imaginem Dei.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.6.1. Irenaeus reiterates this point a second time later in the chapter. He explains, in the meantime, that the Spirit is the Spirit of God, not a third part of the human person. Yet it is required to have a perfect person. Here he gives his interpretation of 1 Thess 5:23 and Paul’s prayer for the body, soul, and spirit. The Spirit, he says, is God’s and the person is to then keep their body and soul “blameless.” It is not clear if this is his entire view as he does mention the soul and the spirit together in *Adversus haereses* 5.4.1. On the distinction between the terms *image* and *likeness* in Irenaeus, see Hans Boersma, “Accommodation to What? Univocity of Being, Pure Nature, and the Anthropology of St Irenaeus,” *International Journal of Systematic Theology* 8, no. 3 (2006): 287-292; Fantino, 115.

over the body. It is doubtless retarded in its velocity, just in the exact proportion in which the body shares in its motion; but it never loses the knowledge which properly belongs to it.”<sup>32</sup> The soul gives breath, life, and increase to the body, along with being the bond that holds it together. Regarding the notion of the soul holding the body together, mention should be made of the role of blood in this process. For Irenaeus, the soul and body are held together by the blood. While describing the various parts of the body which God created, he writes of “the blood, which is the bond of union between soul and body.”<sup>33</sup> Irenaeus also mentions the principle of movement as a key factor of the soul.<sup>34</sup> He mentions this slowing of the soul a second time, writing, “So also the soul, by being mixed up with the body belonging to it, is in a certain measure impeded, its rapidity being blended with the body’s slowness. Yet it does not lose altogether its own peculiar powers; but while, as it were, sharing life with the body, it does not itself cease to live.”<sup>35</sup> In describing this connection, Irenaeus describes it as an artist with an instrument. As the mind of the artist works in coordination with the instrument, carrying out its actions

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<sup>32</sup>“*Non enim est fortius corpus quam anima, quod quidem ab illa spiratur et uiuificatur et augetur et articulatur, sed anima possidet et principatur corpori. Tantum autem impeditur a sua uelocitate, quantum corpus participat de eius motione; sed non amittit suam scientiam.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.33.4. On the relation of soul and the body in Irenaeus, see Andia, *Homo vivens: incorruptibilité et divinisation de l’homme selon Irénée de Lyon*, 80-87; Lassiat, *Promotion*, 157; Minet, 32-33; Antonio Orbe, “La definición del hombre en la teología del s. IIº,” *Gregorianum* 48, no. 3 (1967): 548-549; idem, *Antropología de San Ireneo*, 17.

<sup>33</sup>“*Aliud sanguis, copulatio animae et corporis.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.3.2. For a discussion of the relationship between the blood and the soul and possible similarities with other writers, see Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 306-307.

<sup>34</sup>For background in Greco-Roman philosophy, see *Ibid.*, 307.

<sup>35</sup>“*Sic et anima participans suo corpori modicum quidem impeditur, admixta uelocitate eius in corporis tarditate, non amittit autem in totum suas uirtutes, sed quasi uitam participans corpori ipsa uiuere non cessat.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.33.4.

slowly, so also the mind works much slower because of its conjunction with the body. What is clear through this discussion is the insistence upon a clear distinction between the soul and the body.

In defining the human person, Irenaeus insists that “there are three things out of which, as I have shown, the complete man is composed—flesh, soul, and spirit. One of these does indeed preserve and fashion [the man]—this is the spirit; while as to another it is united and formed—that is the flesh; then [comes] that which is between these two—that is the soul, which sometimes indeed, when it follows the spirit, is raised up by it, but sometimes it sympathizes with the flesh, and falls into carnal lusts.”<sup>36</sup> He later writes, “For their soul, tending towards what is worse, and descending to earthly lusts, has become a partaker in the same designation which belongs to these.”<sup>37</sup>

While Irenaeus relies on the creation account for much of his understanding of the human individual, he also goes to other passages. He writes, “For there had been a

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<sup>36</sup>“*Sunt tria ex quibus, quemadmodum ostendimus, perfectus homo constat, carne, anima et spiritu, et altero quidem salvante et figurante, qui est Spiritus, altero quod salvatur et formatur, quod est caro, altero quod inter haec est duo, quod est anima quae aliquando quidem subsequens Spiritum, elevatur ab eo; aliquando autem consentiens carni, decedit in terrenas concupiscentias.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.9.1. Donovan writes, “The capacity of the soul to follow either the Spirit or flesh inserts a dynamism into the human constitution, allowing the possibility of growing into God.” Mary Ann Donovan, *One Right Reading?: A Guide to Irenaeus* (Collegeville, MN: Liturgical Press, 1997), 147. See also John Lawson, *The Biblical Theology of Saint Irenaeus* (London: Epworth Press, 1948), 206; Minns, 61; Jan T. Nielsen, *Adam and Christ in the Theology of Irenaeus of Lyons: An Examination of the Function of the Adam-Christ Typology in the Adversus Haereses of Irenaeus, against the Background of The Gnosticism of His Time* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1968), 20. For a discussion on how Irenaeus uses this understanding of the human person in interpreting Paul’s words in 1 Cor 15:50 over and against the Gnostics, see Donovan, *One Right Reading? A Guide to Irenaeus*, 148.

<sup>37</sup>“*Anima enim ipsorum declinans in peius et in terrenas concupiscentias descendens, ejusdem cujus et illa sunt participavit appellationis.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.12.3. On this, see also Aland, *Fides und Subiectio*, 24.

necessity that, in the first place, a human being should be fashioned, and that what was fashioned should receive the soul; afterwards that it should thus receive the communion of the Spirit.”<sup>38</sup> This clearly separates, chronologically, the appearance of the three parts of the human person. In this context, Irenaeus quotes from 1 Cor 15:45 indicating that Adam was made a living soul. He then concludes, “He who was made a living soul forfeited life when he turned aside to what was evil.”<sup>39</sup> In this, Irenaeus again clearly states his understanding that, after quoting texts which state that God made Adam a living soul, God gave Adam a soul through the breath of life rather than making the formed Adam a soul by the breath of life. This discussion has been precipitated by an attempt by Irenaeus to interpret 1 Cor 15 in reference only to the body and not the soul.

Irenaeus interprets Paul’s trichotomy of body, soul, and spirit from 1 Thess 5 as follows. “These, then, are the perfect who have had the Spirit of God remaining in them, and have preserved their souls and bodies blameless, holding fast the faith of God, that is, that faith which is towards God, and maintaining righteous dealings with respect to their neighbors.”<sup>40</sup> It appears from this that the soul is explained as that which is responsible for faith in God while the body is responsible for living rightly with one’s neighbors.

For Irenaeus, it is clear that the soul’s nature is not fixed but can be moved, either towards the spiritual or to the carnal. He writes, “But if the Spirit be wanting to the soul, he who is such is indeed of an animal nature, and being left carnal, shall be an imperfect

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<sup>38</sup>“*Oportuerat enim primo plasmari hominem et plasmatum accipere animam, deinde sic communionem Spiritus recipere.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.12.2.

<sup>39</sup>“*Sicut igitur qui in animam viventem factus est devertens in peius perdidit vitam.*” *Ibid.*

<sup>40</sup>*Adversus haereses* 5.6.1.

being, possessing indeed the image [of God] in his formation (*in plasmate*), but not receiving the similitude through the Spirit; and thus is this being imperfect.”<sup>41</sup>

The soul of Christ is also used in defining the human soul. Irenaeus compares the souls of the followers of Carpocrates with the soul of Christ writing, “It is certain, too, from the fact that the Lord rose from the dead on the third day, and manifested Himself to His disciples, and was in their sight received up into heaven, that, inasmuch as these men die, and do not rise again, nor manifest themselves to any, they are proved as possessing souls in no respect similar to that of Jesus.”<sup>42</sup> This comparison seems predicated on the notion discussed earlier regarding the change in nature of which the soul can undergo, namely its move toward the good or toward evil. Irenaeus argues from the fact that they have not been resurrected as proof that their souls are not similar to Christ’s.

Irenaeus looks to the parable of the rich man and Lazarus for support of several ideas concerning the soul. These ideas are the understanding that souls continue to exist after death, that they remember their prior deeds after death, and that souls themselves are corporeal.<sup>43</sup> “The Lord has taught with very great fullness, that souls not only continue to

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<sup>41</sup>“*Si autem defuerit animae Spiritus, animalis est vere qui est talis et carnalis derelictus imperfectus erit, imaginem quidem habens in plasmate, similitudinem vero non assumens per Spiritum*” Ibid. On the image of God in Irenaeus, see Jakob Birrer, *Der Mensch als Medium und Adressat der Schöpfungsoffenbarung: eine dogmengeschichtliche Untersuchung zur Frage der Gotteserkenntnis bei Irenäus von Lyon* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1989), 131-132; Jacobsen, “The Importance of Genesis 1-3 in the Theology of Irenaeus,” 306-310. On Irenaeus’s use of *plasma* and *plasmati*, see Birrer, 127-129; Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 70; D. E. Jenkins, “The Make-up of Man according to St. Irenaeus,” *Studia Patristica* 6 (1962): 92-94; Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 303.

<sup>42</sup>“*Et ex hoc autem quod Dominus surrexit a mortuis in tertia die [firmum est] et discipulis se manifestavit et uidentibus eis receptus est in caelum, quod ipsi morientes et non resurgentes neque manifestati quibusdam, arguuntur in nullo similes habentes Iesu animas.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.32.3. See also *ibid.*, 1.25.2.

<sup>43</sup>Wyrwa notes the paradox in Irenaeus’s thought on this point in dealing with the

exist, not by passing from body to body, but that they preserve the same form as the body had to which they were adapted, and that they remember the deeds which they did in this state of existence, and from which they have now ceased.”<sup>44</sup> He concludes, “By these things, then, it is plainly declared that souls continue to exist that they do not pass from body to body, that they possess the form of a man, so that they may be recognized, and retain the memory of things in this world; moreover, that the gift of prophecy was possessed by Abraham, and that each class receives a habitation such as it has deserved, even before the judgment.”<sup>45</sup> What is clear is that Irenaeus relies on a literal interpretation of the parable for his viewpoints.<sup>46</sup> This literal interpretation then allows his interpretations on the soul. In addition to the above listed ideas, Irenaeus finds in this parable the teaching that rewards are experienced by the souls of both the just and the unjust before the judgment. In this way, the judgment does not carry much force in regard to the soul, being more concerned with the rejoining of the body to the soul.

While Irenaeus describes the human person as “compound by nature, and

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platonian notion of an immaterial soul inhabiting a material body. Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 311.

<sup>44</sup>“*Plenissime autem Dominus docuit non solum perseuerare non de corpore in corpus transgredientes animas, sed et characterem corporis in quo etiam adaptantur custodire eundem, et meminisse eas operum quae egerunt hic et a quibus cessauerunt.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.34.1.

<sup>45</sup>“*Per haec enim manifestissime declaratum est et perseuerare animas, et non de corpore in corpus transire, et habere hominis figuram ut etiam cognoscantur et meminerint eorum quae sint hic, et propheticum quoque adesse Abrahae, et dignam habitationem unamquamque gentem percipere etiam ante iudicium.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.34.1.

<sup>46</sup>Wyrwa notes that Irenaeus admittedly interprets this parable literally. Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 311.

consist[ing] of a body and a soul,”<sup>47</sup> he also writes that the soul itself has form and shape, elements of corporeality. He uses the metaphor of water to describe this writing, “Just as water when poured into a vessel takes the form of that vessel, and if on any occasion it happens to congeal in it, it will acquire the form of the vessel in which it has thus been frozen, since souls themselves possess the figure of the body [in which they dwell]; for they themselves have been adapted to the vessel [in which they exist], as I have said before.”<sup>48</sup>

### **Immortality and the Soul**

Though Irenaeus does argue for the corporeal nature of the soul, yet he also, in a different context, will argue for the incorporeal nature of the soul. When comparing souls with bodies, Irenaeus seems clear that the soul is incorporeal while the body is corporeal. He writes, “What, then, are mortal bodies? Can they be souls? Nay, for souls are incorporeal when put in comparison with mortal bodies; for God ‘breathed into the face of man the breath of life, and man became a living soul.’ Now the breath of life is an incorporeal thing.”<sup>49</sup> Genesis 2:7 also functions as support for his notion of the immortality of the soul. He writes, “And certainly they cannot maintain that the very

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<sup>47</sup>“*Et haec quidem in hominibus capit dici, cum sint compositi natura et ex corpore et anima subsistentes.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.13.3.

<sup>48</sup>“*Non enim Angelorum habebit similitudinem et speciem, sed animarum in quibus et formatur, quomodo aqua in uas missa ipsius uasi habebit formam et iam, si gelauerit in eo, speciem habebit uasculi in quo gelauit, quando ipsae animae corporis habeant figuram: ipsi enim adaptatae sunt uaso, quemadmodum praediximus.*” *Ibid.*, 2.19.6.

<sup>49</sup>“*Quae sunt ergo mortalia corpora? Numquidnam animae? Sed incorporeales animae, quantum ad / comparisonem mortalium corporum: insufflavit enim in faciem hominis Deus flatum vitae, et factus est homo in animam viventem: flatus autem vitae incorporalis.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.7.1.

breath of life is mortal. Therefore David says, ‘My soul also shall live to Him,’ just as if its substance were immortal”<sup>50</sup> quoting from Ps 22:29 (LXX). So in comparison with the body, Irenaeus holds to the soul’s incorporeality whereas he elsewhere has argued for its corporeal nature. In both instances, Irenaeus finds biblical support for his idea.

Irenaeus clearly wants to argue for the resurrection of the body in this section. What he says of the soul may therefore be secondary to his main argument. He does make clear, though, other aspects of his understanding of the soul in this comparison. He begins by stating concerning the body, “For this it is which dies and is decomposed, but not the soul or the spirit.”<sup>51</sup> He continues by defining death. “For to die is to lose vital power, and to become henceforth breathless, inanimate, and devoid of motion, and to melt away into those [component parts] from which also it derived the commencement of [its] substance. But this event happens neither to the soul, for it is the breath of life, nor to the spirit, for the spirit is simple and not composite, so that it cannot be decomposed, and is itself the life of those who receive it.”<sup>52</sup> Irenaeus distinguishes here between the breath of life which animates the body and the “life-giving spirit which made him spiritual.”<sup>53</sup> In

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<sup>50</sup>“*Sed ne mortalem quidem possunt dicere ipsum, flatum vitae existentem; et propter hoc David ait: Et anima mea illi vivet, tamquam immortalis substantia ejus existente.*” Ibid.

<sup>51</sup>“*Haec enim est quae moritur et solvitur, sed non anima neque spiritus.*” Ibid.

<sup>52</sup>“*Mori enim est vitalem amittere habilitatem et sine spiramine in posterum et inanimalem et immobilem fieri et deperire in illa ex quibus et initium substantiae habuit. Hoc autem neque animae evenit, flatus est enim vitae, neque spiritui, incompositus est enim et simplex spiritus qui resolvi non potest et ipse vita est eorum qui percipiunt illum.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.7.1.

<sup>53</sup>Osborn, *Irenaeus of Lyons*, 221. Cf. Behr, 109. Irenaeus equates the spirit which is life described here and the Spirit of God which the perfect human receives described in *Adversus haereses* 5.6.1. Compare this with Irenaeus’s statement in *Adversus haereses* 5.8.1 where he writes that “we do now receive a certain portion of His Spirit, tending towards perfection, and preparing us for incorruption.” This seems to suggest that the



this description of the differences between the body, soul, and spirit, Irenaeus attributes simpleness to the spirit but he does not do this to the soul. The spirit, as discussed previously, is the power of God in one's life. The soul, however, is still contrasted with the body, it being noted that the body becomes breathless and inanimate, which obviously the soul does not as it is for the soul to animate.

Since the obvious implication of arguing that the soul has a beginning is that it also has an end, Irenaeus also explains that those who believe that they will not exist after death should understand that God has willed that they exist into a long series of ages.<sup>54</sup> Here the soul's continued existence is the direct will of God rather than an innate characteristic of the soul itself. Irenaeus argues this on two fronts. First he points to the natural world, arguing that as everything in it also had a beginning yet continued for a long period of time, so also humans including their soul and spirit, would continue. He then quotes Ps 148:5-6, "He spoke, and they were made. . . . He hath established them for ever," which he cites as biblical support for the claim just made from the enduring status of the physical creation. Next he quotes Ps 21:4, "'He asked life for You, and You gave him length of days for ever and ever'; indicating that it is through the will of God that life is given and that the Father of all who imparts continuance for ever and ever on those who are saved. For life does not arise from us or from our own nature."<sup>55</sup> This last

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Spirit of God is also the simple, spirit that humans receive, which Irenaeus describes as "the life of those who receive it." He then writes in *Adversus haereses* 5.8.2 that the human person, that is, one's body and soul, having received the Spirit of God, makes a spiritual person.

<sup>54</sup>*Adversus haereses* 2.34.2. Orbe argues that this "will of God" is the key to understanding the apparent contradiction between 2.34.4 and 5.4.1. Orbe, *Antropologia de San Ireneo*, 438.

<sup>55</sup>*Adversus haereses* 2.34.3. Cf. Daley, 29. Daley uses this to argue that, from this perspective, the soul, for Irenaeus, is not naturally immortal.

sentence makes clear Irenaeus's idea that the soul is not immortal of its own nature. It will continue, both for the saved and the lost, as long as God wills this.<sup>56</sup> Later, when writing on the outpouring of the Holy Spirit, he seems to hint at this point. "For our bodies have received unity among themselves by means of that laver which leads to incorruption; but our souls, by means of the Spirit. Wherefore both are necessary."<sup>57</sup> Here, as the laver, presumably of baptism, leads to incorruption, so the reception of the Holy Spirit leads to the incorruption of the believer's soul. The context for this discussion of the reception of the Holy Spirit is the biblical discussion of the Spirit descending on Christ at His baptism and then a recalling of the promise of living water for the Samaritan woman whom Christ calls out of a life of sin. While Irenaeus does not deny immortality in this argument, he does make clear that life is made possible by the will of God rather than a natural power of the soul.

In arguing against those who claim that the Creator of the world is different from the Father of Jesus, Irenaeus admits that the soul remains immortal. He writes the

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<sup>56</sup>There has been some discussion regarding whether Irenaeus actually held to the natural immortality of the soul. For an involved discussion on this, see Henri Lassiat, "L'anthropologie d'Irénée," *NRT* 100, no. 3 (1978): 399-417; Adelin Rousseau, "L'éternité des peines de l'enfer et l'immortalité naturelle de l'âme selon saint Irénée," *NRT* 99, no. 6 (1977): 834-864. Rousseau argues that Irenaeus does hold to the natural immortality of the soul. Lassiat holds that Irenaeus understands the soul only to be immortal according to the will of God and that for the wicked, after some long period of time, it will dissolve. On this, see also Lassiat, *Promotion de l'homme en Jésus-Christ d'après Irénée de Lyon témoin de la Tradition des Apôtres*, 395-396. Here it should be noted that Lassiat uses passages from Irenaeus where he is writing on the notion of incorruptibility, though not necessarily in the context of the soul. Donovan seems to side more with Rousseau's interpretation while Minns falls on the side of Lassiat. Mary Ann Donovan, "Irenaeus in Recent Scholarship," *Second Century* 4, no. 4 (1984): 231-232; Minns, 79-80.

<sup>57</sup>"*Corpora enim nostra per lauacrum illam quae est ad incorruptionem unitatem acceperunt, animae autem per Spiritum.*" *Adversus haereses* 3.17.2.

following in setting up the argument: “For when they say of things which it is manifest to all do remain immortal, such as the spirit and the soul, and such other things, that they are quickened by the Father, but that another thing which is quickened in no different manner than by God granting to it, is abandoned by life, this proves their Father to be weak and powerless, or else envious and malignant.”<sup>58</sup> He later adds, “He feigns to be the quickener of those things which are immortal by nature, to which things life is always present by their very nature.”<sup>59</sup> These two taken together suggest that Irenaeus is well aware of the general opinion that souls are immortal by nature. This, on the surface, seems to contradict what he states elsewhere and which is discussed below. Thus, it may be that here, Irenaeus, for the purpose of the argument regarding the ability or desire of the Gnostic Demiurge to give life to the body, has accepted the prevailing opinion regarding the soul, rather than asserting that he also believes this. In interpreting this statement, the point of the argument in which it occurs needs to be kept in mind. This is, for Irenaeus, to assert the future existence of the body along with the soul.<sup>60</sup> Here, Irenaeus, relying on commonly accepted opinions regarding the nature of the soul and the body, notes that a God who promises to make people immortal is not doing anything especially powerful if all He does is to give immortality to the thing which everyone

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<sup>58</sup>“*Cum enim dicant ea quae omnibus sunt manifesta quoniam perseverant immortalia, ut puta spiritus et anima et quae sunt talia, quoniam vivificantur a Patre, illud autem quod non alias vivificatur nisi Deus illi praestet vitam derelinqui, aut impotentem et infirmum ostendit Patrem ipsorum, aut invidum et lividum.*” Ibid., 5.4.1.

<sup>59</sup>“*Qui ea quidem quae sunt natura immortalia, quibus a sua natura adest vivere, fingit se vivificare.*” Ibid.

<sup>60</sup>On the salvation of the body, see E. P. Meijering, “Die ‘Physische Erlösung’ in der Theologie des Irenäus,” in *God Being History: Studies in Patristic Philosophy* (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing, 1975), 39-51.

already agrees is immortal by nature and thus not in need of immortality. Then, where power is really needed, that is, in the granting of immortality to the body, he fails to do this. Thus, it can be argued that this statement in favor of the natural immortality of the soul should be understood in the context in which it is used and not be taken to override other statements that Irenaeus makes.

Irenaeus argues that the soul is not to be equated with life itself. “But as the animal body is certainly not itself the soul, yet has fellowship with the soul as long as God pleases; so the soul herself is not life, but partakes in that life bestowed upon her by God. Wherefore also the prophetic word declares of the first-formed man, ‘He became a living soul,’ teaching us that by the participation of life the soul became alive; so that the soul, and the life which it possesses, must be understood as being separate existences.”<sup>61</sup>

Here Irenaeus argues from Gen 2:7 that life and soul are two separate existences, thus one cannot argue that the soul is immortal based upon its nature but that it exists only through the will of God. In conclusion, Irenaeus writes, “When God therefore bestows life and perpetual duration, it comes to pass that even souls which did not previously exist should henceforth endure, since God has both willed that they should exist, and should continue

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<sup>61</sup>“*Sicut autem corpus animale ipsum quidem non est anima, participatur autem animam quoadusque Deus uult, sic et anima ipsa quidem non est uita, participatur autem a Deo sibi praestitam uitam. Vnde et propheticus sermo de protoplasto ait: Factus est in animam uiuam, docens nos quoniam secundum participationem uitae uiuens facta est anima, ita ut separatim quidem anima intellegatur, separatim autem quae erga eam est uita.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.34.4. Weiss argues based on this that Irenaeus believed in the doctrine of *thnetopsychismus*. Weiss, 157. Orbe notes the apparent contradiction between this statement and that which Irenaeus makes in *Adversus haereses* 5.4.1 where he states that all agree that the soul is naturally immortal. Orbe, *Antropologia de San Ireneo*, 438. Here Orbe suggests that the proper way to understand Irenaeus’s notion of an immortal soul is that it exists by virtue of God’s will. So also Harry A. Wolfson, “Immortality and Resurrection in the Philosophy of the Church Fathers,” in *Doctrines of Human Nature, Sin, and Salvation in the Early Church*, ed. Everett Ferguson, Studies in Early Christianity, vol. 10 (New York: Garland Publishing, 1993), 305.

in existence.”<sup>62</sup> Thus, Irenaeus makes clear the fact that even though souls are not immortal, yet they can endure for as long as God wills. His reticence to state that souls are immortal does not prevent him from asserting that they are not mortal. In commenting on 2 Cor 5:4, he writes, “He uses these words most manifestly in reference to the flesh; for the soul is not mortal, neither is the spirit.”<sup>63</sup>

### **Death, Judgment and the Soul**

Irenaeus defines death as the separation of the soul from the body. “We must therefore conclude that it is in reference to the flesh that death is mentioned; which, after the soul’s departure, becomes breathless and inanimate, and is decomposed gradually into the earth from which it was taken.”<sup>64</sup>

Irenaeus, in arguing against the doctrine of the Gnostics regarding the salvation of souls, writes,

But if souls would have perished unless they had been righteous, then righteousness must have power to save the bodies also [which these souls inhabited]; for why should it not save them, since they, too, participated in righteousness? For if nature and substance are the means of salvation, then all souls shall be saved; but if righteousness and faith, why should these not save those bodies which, equally with the souls, will enter into immortality? For righteousness will appear, in matters of this kind, either impotent or unjust, if indeed it saves some substances through participating in it, but not others.<sup>65</sup>

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<sup>62</sup>“*Deo itaque et uitam et perpetuam perseuerantiam donante, capit et animas primum non existentes dehinc perseuerare, cum eas Deus et esse et subsistere uoluerit.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.34.4.

<sup>63</sup>“*Manifestissime hoc de carne dicens: nec enim anima mortalis, neque Spiritus.*” *Ibid.*, 5.13.3.

<sup>64</sup>“*Superest igitur ut circa carnem mors ostendatur, quae, posteaquam exierit anima, sine spiratione et inanimalis efficitur et paulatim resolvitur in terram ex qua sumpta est.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.7.1.

<sup>65</sup>“*Si autem animae quae periturae essent inciperent nisi iustae fuissent, iustitia potens est saluare et corpora; quid utique non saluabit quae et ipsa participauerunt*

Irenaeus's argument seems clear. Either souls are saved by virtue of their nature, and thus all souls will be saved (presumably because all souls have one nature), or they are saved by righteousness, in which case, the body will also be saved as it participated in righteousness. The final claim is that if this is not the case, then righteousness will be impotent or unjust.<sup>66</sup> What can be seen from this argument is a repetition of Irenaeus's two-part understanding of the human person. It is on this basis that he can argue that both the soul and body participate in any righteousness of the individual.

Irenaeus elaborates on this charge of the possible impotence of righteousness. He writes, "Either, therefore, all souls will of necessity pass into the intermediate place, and there will never be a judgment; or bodies, too, which have participated in righteousness, will attain to the place of enjoyment, along with the souls which have in like manner participated in it."<sup>67</sup> This argument is significant in that Irenaeus connects the biblical notion of a future judgment with his understanding of the natural immortality of the soul. If, as some argue, souls are saved by virtue of their nature, then all souls will be saved equally as all have the same nature of soul and their immortality is based upon this rather than upon any righteous or evil acts committed while in the body. Irenaeus argues for the

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*iustitiae? Si enim natura et substantia saluat, omnes saluabuntur animae; si autem iustitia et fides, quare non saluet ea quae similiter cum animabus in corruptelam cedere incipiunt corpora? Aut enim impotens aut iniusta huiusmodi apparebit iustitia, si quaedam quidem saluat propter suam participationem, quaedam autem non."* Ibid., 2.29.1.

<sup>66</sup>The claim of injustice is similar to that argued for by Athenagoras in *De resurrectione* 21.4.

<sup>67</sup>*"Aut uniuersae itaque animae necessarie succedent in Medietatis locum, et iudicium nusquam; aut et corpora, quae participauerunt iustitiae, cum animabus quae similiter participauerunt obtinebunt refrigerii locum, siquidem potens est iustitia illuc transducere ea quae participauerunt ei."* *Adversus haereses* 2.29.2.

second scenario, which then allows him to maintain both the reality of a future judgment and, more importantly from his perspective, the reality of the future immortality of the body.

### **Hell and Paradise**

Irenaeus is clear on the state of the soul after death and before the resurrection. In addition to the previously mentioned interpretation of the Rich Man and Lazarus parable, Irenaeus uses his understanding of Jesus and His crucifixion as pattern for interpreting what happens to all believers. He quotes several texts to support that Jesus did not rise to heaven upon His death on the cross but was in the place of the dead. He begins with a quote which is in one place attributed to Isaiah and in another to Jeremiah. “But the case was, that for three days He dwelt in the place where the dead were, as the prophet says concerning Him: ‘And the Lord remembered His dead saints who slept formerly in the land of sepulture; and He descended to them, to rescue and save them.’”<sup>68</sup> He also quotes Matt 12:40 regarding Jesus being in the heart of the earth three days and three nights as Jonah did. He also quotes Eph 4:9 and Ps 86:13, and ends with Christ’s words to Mary in John 20:17 to not touch Him. Using Ps 23:4, Irenaeus writes, “For as the Lord ‘went away in the midst of the shadow of death,’ where the souls of the dead were, yet afterwards arose in the body, and after the resurrection was taken up, it is manifest that the souls of His disciples also, upon whose account the Lord underwent these things, shall go away into the invisible place allotted to them by God, and there remain until the

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<sup>68</sup>Irenaeus attributes this quote to Isaiah in *Adversus haereses* 3.20.4 and to Jeremiah in *ibid.* 4.22.1. Justin, in *Dial. cum Trypho* 72, also uses it. It is not found in any ancient versions of the HB however.

resurrection, awaiting that event.”<sup>69</sup> This argument is given against the suggestion that the souls of the righteous go directly to heaven after death.

Irenaeus argues for a resurrected person composed of soul and body, just as in the original creation. He writes, “And therefore, when the number is completed, which He had predetermined in His own counsel, all those who have been enrolled for life shall rise again, having their own bodies, and having also their own souls, and their own spirits, in which they had pleased God.”<sup>70</sup> He notes also that the wicked shall go to punishment with their body and soul. In another place, Irenaeus describes the complete or perfect person which is to receive salvation as the soul and body.<sup>71</sup>

Irenaeus also argues against the transmigration of the soul from body to body.<sup>72</sup> In addition to the previous argument mentioned in discussing the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, he writes, “We may subvert their doctrine as to transmigration from body to body by this fact, that souls remember nothing whatever of the events which took place in

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<sup>69</sup>“*Cum enim Dominus in medio umbrae mortis abierit, ubi animae mortuorum erant, post deinde corporaliter resurrexit et post resurrectionem assumptus est, manifestum est quia et discipulorum ejus propter quos et haec operatus est Dominus animae abibunt in invisibilem locum definitum eis a Deo et ibi usque ad resurrectionem commorabuntur sustinentes resurrectionem.*” *Adversus haereses* 5.31.2. Cf. also Irenaeus’s anti-Gnostic argument for an intermediate place in *ibid.* 2.29. On the idea of separate locations for the soul of the good and the evil, see Joly, *Christianisme et philosophie*, 51.

<sup>70</sup>“*Et ideo adimpleto numero quem ipse apud se ante definiit, omnes quicumque sunt scripti in uitam resurgent, sua corpora et suas habentes animas et suos Spiritus in quibus placuerunt Deo; qui autem poena sunt digni abibunt in eam, et ipsi suas habentes animas et sua corpora in quibus abstiterunt a Dei bonitate.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.33.5.

<sup>71</sup>“*Et eandem salutem totius hominis, hoc est animae et corporis, sustinentibus.*” *Ibid.*, 5.20.1.

<sup>72</sup>For an overview of this teaching in connection with Irenaeus’s thought, see Hoheisel, 38-39; Wyrwa, “Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon,” 314-315.



their previous states of existence.”<sup>73</sup> He states that the joining of a soul with a body is not enough to erase the memory which the soul should have had from its prior existence. Here he does not resort to a biblical defense but rather an argument from experience. He notes that when the body is asleep, it dreams and these are not lost to the body when it wakes up. “For if that which is seen only for a very brief space of time, or has been conceived of simply in a phantasm, and by the soul alone, through means of a dream, is remembered after she has mingled again with the body, and been dispersed through all the members, much more would she remember those things in connection with which she stayed during so long a time, even throughout the whole period of a bypast life.”<sup>74</sup> This is further enforced when he writes, “If, therefore, the soul remembers nothing of what took place in a former state of existence, but has a perception of those things which are here, it follows that she never existed in other bodies, nor did things of which she has no knowledge, nor [once] knew things which she cannot [now mentally] contemplate.”<sup>75</sup>

In addition to the argument from dreams, Irenaeus also introduces the biblical references to the dreams and visions of the prophets. “But the prophets also, when they were upon the earth, remembered likewise, on their returning to their ordinary state of mind, whatever things they spiritually saw or heard in visions of heavenly objects, and

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<sup>73</sup>“*De corpore autem in corpus transmirationem ipsorum subuertamus ex eo quo nihil omnino eorum quae ante fuerint meminerint animae.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.33.1.

<sup>74</sup>“*Si enim hoc quod in breuissimo tempore uisum est uel in phantasmate conceptum est ab ea sola per somnium, posteaquam commixta sit corpori et in uniuersum membrum dispersa, commemoratur, multo magis illorum reminisceretur in quibus temporibus tantis et uniuerso praeteritae uitae saeculo immorata est.*” *Ibid.*

<sup>75</sup>“*Si itaque nullius praeteritorum meminit sed existentium scientiam hic percipit, non igitur in aliis corporibus fuit aliquando, nec egit quae ne quidem agnoscit, neque nouit quae quidem nec uidet.*” *Adversus haereses* 2.33.5.

related them to others. The body, therefore, does not cause the soul to forget those things which have been spiritually witnessed; but the soul teaches the body, and shares with it the spiritual vision which it has enjoyed.”<sup>76</sup>

### Summary

Irenaeus uses soul for natural life. The soul holds the body together through the blood. It gives it life and rules over it. It is also the principle of movement. The soul can become mentally excited and impudent and bold. Sorrow is experience in the soul and the souls of infants can cry out. The seat of reason is in the soul, and mind and thought at times are other terms for the soul. Free will is found in the soul also. The soul, thus, is also where obedience or disobedience to God takes place.

The soul originates with the creation of the body, both of which are made by God. The soul is connected with the breath of God. As such, it is immortal, though at times he argues that this is not based upon innate nature but upon the will of God. It survives the body’s death and awaits the judgment after which it will be reunited with the body to receive rewards or punishment. The natural immortality of the soul is tangentially connected to the doctrine of a future judgment in his argument with the Gnostics on this point.

Irenaeus, more than any previous writer, explicitly looks to the Scriptures for support for his understanding of the soul.<sup>77</sup> He turns to 1 Cor 15:45 to argue that Adam

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<sup>76</sup>“*Sed et prophetae ipsi, cum essent in terra, quaecumque spiritaliter secundum uisiones caelestium uident uel audiunt ipsi quoque meminerunt, in hominem conuersi, et reliquis adnuntiant; et non corpus obliuionem efficit animae eorum quae spiritaliter uisa sunt, sed anima docet corpus et participat de spiritali ei facta uisione.*” Ibid., 2.33.3.

<sup>77</sup>Some scholars are inclined to minimize the objectivity which Irenaeus had in quoting from the Bible. Wyrwa describes the influence of Irenaeus’s world view on his interpretation of Scripture. He cites as one example of this Irenaeus’s acceptance of the

was made a living soul. He looks to Gen 1:27; 2:7 to describe the soul and its relationship to the *imago dei* and to argue for the incorporeal nature of the soul. He uses Ps 22:29 (LXX) to argue for the immortal nature of the soul. He also looks to Pss 21:4; 148:5, 6 to argue for the enduring status of the physical creation, which then supports his notion of the enduring status of the soul. On the continued existence of souls after death, Irenaeus also turns to Christ's death for support. He quotes from Matt 12:40; Eph 4:9; Ps 86:23; John 20:17; Ps 23:4 to support the notion that Christ appeared to the souls of the dead to preach salvation to them who had died before. Most authors will tend to look to 1 Pet 3:19 for this argument. Though Irenaeus sees plenty of scriptural support for the idea, he does not mention the Petrine text.

Luke 16:19-31, the story of the Rich Man and Lazarus, is used to argue for several different notions regarding the soul. First and foremost, it is further support for the continued existence of souls after death. Beyond this, it also is an indicator of their corporeal nature and is used to argue that souls retain memory of events which happened while in the body. Finally it also is used to argue regarding two different places for the souls of the righteous and the wicked before the judgment. As is consistent with most authors, save the later Latin Fathers, Irenaeus supports the rejoining of the soul with the body at the resurrection.

### **Clement of Alexandria**

Clement was a teacher at Alexandria. His three main works are the *Exhortation to*

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body soul dichotomy of the Greco-Roman philosophy. Wyrwa, "Seelenverständnis bei Irenäus von Lyon," 303. He also points to the notion of the soul as the principle of movement from the same source as being used by Irenaeus in his interpretation of Scripture. Ibid., 307. Wyrwa also points out his usage of the two philosophical notions of an incorporeal and immortal soul. Ibid., 309.

*the Heathen, the Instructor, and the Miscellanies*. Other extant treatises are *On the Salvation of the Rich Man, Excerpts of the Prophets, and Extracts from Theodotus*.<sup>78</sup>

Clement introduces the hermeneutical technique of allegorizing the soul.<sup>79</sup> This adds some degree of difficulty in determining the author's exact meaning. For example, he refers to the *Stromata* as a "sketch of the soul."<sup>80</sup> Another example is when he uses the soul in an allegorical interpretation on a Jewish law from Deut 20:19-20. He writes that the Word "teaches that neither is it right to cut down cultivated trees, . . . nor that cultivated fruit is to be destroyed at all—either the fruit of the soil or that of the soul: for it does not permit the enemy's country to be laid waste."<sup>81</sup> Mosaic commands for sacrifice are described as the cleansing of the irrational part of the soul.<sup>82</sup> This hermeneutical method of allegorizing becomes more prominent with Clement's successor at Alexandria Origen.

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<sup>78</sup>See Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers*, 118-120; Moreschini and Norelli, 251-267; Dietmar Wyrwa, "Clement of Alexandria," *DECL*, 131. On the lost works of Clement, see John Ferguson, *Clement of Alexandria* (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1974), 179-191. For a study on the Greco-Roman backgrounds to Clement's thought, see Salvatore R. Lilla, *Clement of Alexandria: A Study in Christian Platonism and Gnosticism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1971).

<sup>79</sup>See David Dawson, *Allegorical Readers and Cultural Revision in Ancient Alexandria* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992), 183-234; C. W. Macleod, "Allegory and Mysticism," in *Personalities of the Early Church*, ed. Everett Ferguson (New York: Garland, 1993).

<sup>80</sup>*Stromata* 1.1.12.1.

<sup>81</sup>"μηδὲ συνόλως καρπὸν ἡμερον διαφθείρειν μήτε τὸν γῆς μήτε τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς." *Stromata* 2.18.95.2.

<sup>82</sup>"ἢ περιστερὰ ὑπὲρ ἀμαρτιῶν προσφερόμεναι τὴν ἀποκάθαρσιν τοῦ ἀλόγου μέρους τῆς ψυχῆς προσδεκτὴν μηνύουσι τῷ θεῷ." *Ibid.*, 7.6.32.7.

### General Usage

Clement uses soul for natural life. He describes Jesus' death on the cross as giving His life.<sup>83</sup> In another place, Clement urges that as Christ gave His life for us, so we should give ours for others.<sup>84</sup> He also relates the story of the Apostle John in which John stated that he would give his life for another person.<sup>85</sup> However, soul for life is not restricted to humans, in Clement. He also uses soul for life in reference to an animal. Writing regarding the pig, he states, "For life was given to this animal for no other purpose than that it might swell in flesh."<sup>86</sup>

In another place, Clement seems to purposefully play on the interchange of meaning between soul and life. He writes, "For if you would lose, and withdraw, and separate (for this is what the cross means) your soul from the delight and pleasure that is in this life, you will possess it, found and resting in the looked-for hope."<sup>87</sup> He also writes, "Seek God, and your soul shall live."<sup>88</sup> It is not clear here if Clement has only in

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<sup>83</sup>“μεγαλόδωρος οὖν ὁ τὸ μέγιστον ὑπὲρ ἡμῶν, τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ, ἐπιδιδούς.” *Paedagogus* 1.9.85.2. See also *Quis dives salvetur* 37.4.

<sup>84</sup>“ταύτην ἡμᾶς ὑπὲρ ἀλλήλων ἀνταπαιτεῖ. εἰ δὲ τὰς ψυχὰς ὀφείλομεν τοῖς ἀδελφοῖς, καὶ τοιαύτην τὴν συνθήκην πρὸς τὸν σωτῆρα ἀνθωμολογήμεθα.” *Ibid.*, 37.5.

<sup>85</sup>“ὑπὲρ σοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντιδώσω τὴν ἐμήν.” *Ibid.*, 42.13.

<sup>86</sup>“δεδόσθαι γὰρ τῷδε τῷ ζῳῷ ψυχὴν πρὸς οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ ἔνεκα τοῦ τὰς σάρκακας σφριγᾶν.” *Stromata* 2.20.105.2.

<sup>87</sup>“ἐὰν γὰρ ἀπολυῖσαι καὶ ἀποστῆσαι καὶ ἀφορίσαι (τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ σταυρὸς σημαίνει) τὴν ψυχὴν ἐθειλήσης τῆς ἐν τούτῳ τῷ ζῳῳ τέρψεώς τε καὶ ἡδονῆς, ἔξεις αὐτὴν ἐν τῇ ἐλπίδι τῇ προσδοκωμένῃ ‘εὕρημένην’ καὶ ἀναπεπαυμένην.” *Ibid.*, 2.20.108.4.

<sup>88</sup>“ἐκζητήσατε τὸν θεόν, καὶ ζήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ ὑμῶν.” *Protrepticus* 10.100.2.

mind the soul as a distinct psychological entity or rather is simply referring to the individual. He also writes of the martyr who “confesses to salvation that he may save his soul.”<sup>89</sup>

Clement uses soul in the context of breath. In arguing against idols, Clement writes, “For I hold it wrong to entrust my spirit’s hopes to things destitute of the breath of life.”<sup>90</sup> Here Clement plays on ψυχή and ἀψυχή. It is wrong for things with a soul to place their hope in things without a soul.

The nature of the soul, according to Clement, is “to move of itself.”<sup>91</sup> He also writes regarding God that He does not judge “the soul from movement, as we men.”<sup>92</sup> In another description of the soul he describes it as “invisible,”<sup>93</sup> even those of irrational animals.

Clement views the souls of men and women as the same. He writes, “As then there is sameness, as far as respects the soul, she will attain to the same virtue.”<sup>94</sup>

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<sup>89</sup>“ἵνα σώσῃ τὴν ψυχὴν.” *Stromata* 4.7.43.1.

<sup>90</sup>“οὐ γάρ μοι θέμις ἐμπιστεῦσαί ποτε τοῖς ἀψύχοις τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς ἐλπίδας.” *Protrepticus* 4.56.6.

<sup>91</sup>“αὕτη οὖν φύσις ψυχῆς ἐξ ἑαυτῆς ὀρμαῖν.” *Stromata* 6.12.96.2. See Santiago Fernández Ardanaz, *Genesis y Anagennesis: Fundamentos de la antropología cristiana según Clemente de Alejandría* (Vitoria: Editorial Eset, 1990), 351. Fernandez Ardanaz notes that here Clement is suggesting that the soul is not yet immortal but has movement towards it.

<sup>92</sup>“οὐκ ἐκ κινήματος ψυχῆς τεκμαιρόμενον καθάπερ ἡμεῖς οἱ ἄνθρωποι.” *Stromata* 6.12.101.5.

<sup>93</sup>“ψυχαὶ μὲν γὰρ ἀόρατοι, οὐ μόνον αἱ λογικαί, ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἀλόγων ζώων.” *Ibid.*, 6.18.163.1.

<sup>94</sup>“εἰ δὲ μηδὲν ἦν τὸ διάφορον ἀνδρὸς καὶ γυναικός, τὰ αὐτὰ ἂν ἐκάτερον αὐτῶν ἔδρα τε καὶ ἔπασχεν. ἢ μὲν τοίνυν ταυτόν ἐστι, καθὸ ψυχῆ, ταύτη ἐπὶ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀφίξεται ἀρετὴν.” *Ibid.*, 4.8.60.1.

Elsewhere he adds, “For souls, themselves by themselves, are equal. Souls are neither male nor female.”<sup>95</sup> He places the distinctions between them only in regard to the difference in their bodies. This is in line with Athenagoras’s argument. Later, however, Methodius will argue that there is a difference between the sexes.

### **Powers and Divisions of the Soul**

Clement sees a three-fold division of the soul.<sup>96</sup> The intellect “which is called the reasoning faculty, is the inner man, which is the ruler of this man that is seen.”<sup>97</sup> This ruling faculty of the soul is listed as ninth of the human powers by Clement.<sup>98</sup> There is also the part which becomes angry along with the appetite part.<sup>99</sup> Clement, in an interesting statement on the rational soul, writes, “Reason, the governing principle, remaining unmoved and guiding the soul, is called its pilot. For access to the Immutable is obtained by a truly immutable means.”<sup>100</sup> Regarding the rational soul, Clement writes,

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<sup>95</sup>“αὐταὶ γὰρ καθ’ αὐτὰς ἐπ’ ἴσης εἰσὶ ψυχὰὶ αἰ ψυχὰὶ οὐθέτεραι, οὔτε ἄρρενες οὔτε θήλειαι.” *Ibid.*, 6.12.100.3. Cf. *ibid.*, 3.13.93.3.

<sup>96</sup>Cf. Plato *Republic* 4.435-441. For a fuller picture of Clement’s usage of the Platonic divisions of the soul, see Lilla, 80-84. Cf. Karpp, *Probleme*, 93-96; Alexandros K. Koffas, *Die Sophia-Lehre bei Klemens von Aldeandrien: eine pädagogisch-anthropologische Untersuchung* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1982), 119-124. Besides the statement of Clement to this fact in *Paedagogus* 3.1.1.2, Lilla also suggests this notion may be seen in *Stromata* 3.68.5 and 5.12.80.9, though in each of these, it seems more allusion to the notion than a reference to it as established fact. On Clement’s Platonizing in general, see Dietmar Wyrwa, *Die christliche Platonaneignung in den Stromateis des Clemens von Alexandrien* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1983).

<sup>97</sup>“Τριγενοῦς οὖν ὑπαρχούσης τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ νοερόν, ὃ δὴ λογιστικὸν καλεῖται, ὃ ἀνθρωπὸς ἐστὶν ὃ ἔνδον, ὃ τοῦ φαινομένου τοῦδε ἄρχων ἀνθρώπου.” *Paedagogus* 3.1.1.2.

<sup>98</sup>“ἕνατον δὲ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Stromata* 6.16.134.2.

<sup>99</sup>See *ibid.*, 8.4.10.3.

<sup>100</sup>“ὁ λογισμὸς καὶ τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν ἄπταιστον μένον καὶ καθηγούμενον

“And Christian conduct is the operation of the rational soul in accordance with a correct judgment and aspiration after the truth, which attains its destined end through the body, the soul’s consort and ally.”<sup>101</sup> He also writes, “The reasoning faculty, [is] peculiar to the human soul.”<sup>102</sup> Perhaps it is to the rational element that Clement appeals when he writes, “But words are the progeny of the soul.”<sup>103</sup> In another place, Clement writes of only a rational and irrational part of the human person. It is this part that Clement refers to when he writes, “For luxury, that has dashed on to surfeit, is prone to kick up its heels and toss its mane, and shake off the charioteer, the Instructor; who, pulling back the reins from far, leads and drives to salvation the human horse—that is, the irrational part of the soul—which is wildly bent on pleasures, and vicious appetites, and precious stones, and gold, and variety of dress, and other luxuries.”<sup>104</sup>

Clement seems to not clearly define the difference in the individual person

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τῆς ψυχῆς κυβερνήτης αὐτῆς εἴρηται· ὄντως γὰρ ἀτρέπτω πρὸς τὸ ἀτρεπτον ἢ προσαγωγή.” Ibid., 2.11.51.6. On the relationship between reason and the soul in Clement, see Laura Rizzerio, “Le problème des parties de l’âme et de l’animation chez Clément d’Alexandrie,” *NRT* 111 (1989): 400-402. Rizzerio describes a tripartite soul in Clement’s understanding divided into the *pneuma somatikon*, which rules the sensitive faculties and is the base for the development of thought and intelligence, the *pneuma hegemonikon*, which acts as a guide, and the *pneume pneumatikon* which is infused by the Holy Spirit and enables the restoration of the image of God. Cf. *SVF* 1.202, 2.836-9 for similar thought in Stoicism where the *hegemonikon* is the authoritative part of the soul. See also Fernández Ardanaz, *Genesis y Anagennesis*, 108-113.

<sup>101</sup>“καὶ ἔστιν ἡ μὲν πρᾶξις ἢ τοῦ Χριστιανοῦ ψυχῆς ἐνέργεια λογικῆς κατὰ κρίσιν ἀστείαν καὶ ὄρεξιν ἀληθείας διὰ τοῦ συμφυοῦς καὶ συναγωνιστοῦ σώματος ἐκτελουμένη.” *Paedagogus* 1.13.1024.3.

<sup>102</sup>“ἡ λογικὴ δὲ δύναμις, ἰδίᾳ οὖσα τῆς ἀνθρωπείας ψυχῆς.” *Stromata* 2.20.111.2.

<sup>103</sup>“ψυχῆς δὲ ἔγγονοι οἱ λόγοι.” *Stromata* 1.1.1.2.

<sup>104</sup>“τὸ ἄλογον μέρος τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Paedagogus* 3.11.53.2.



between these irrational desires which need to be led to salvation by Christ and the rational element of the soul, which apparently does not need this salvation. In describing the peculiar function of humans, Clement writes, “He is like, it appears to me, the Centaur, a Thessalian figment, compounded of a rational and irrational part, of soul and body.”<sup>105</sup> Here, the soul is considered rational while the body is the irrational. This blurring also seems evident when Clement writes that “the vital force, in which is comprehended the power of nutrition and growth, and generally of motion, is assigned to the carnal spirit . . . and passes in all directions through the senses and the rest of the body.”<sup>106</sup> Elsewhere, he writes of the Gnostic soul who “withstands the corporeal soul, putting a bridle-bit on the restive irrational spirit.”<sup>107</sup>

In discussing the different parts of the soul, Clement shows similarities to the division of the ruling classes used by Plato in the *Republic*.<sup>108</sup> He writes, “And there is a second kind of royalty, inferior to that administration which is purely rational and divine, which brings to the task of government merely the high mettle of the soul.”<sup>109</sup> Here Clement differentiates between the rational and passionate elements of the soul. Clement

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<sup>105</sup>“ἔοικεν δ’ οἶμαι, κενταύρω, Θετταλικῷ πλάσματι, ἐκ λογικοῦ καὶ ἀλόγου συγκείμενος, ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.” *Stromata* 4.3.9.4.

<sup>106</sup>*Ibid.*, 6.16.135.3.

<sup>107</sup>“καὶ τῆς σωματικῆς ψυχῆς κατεξανίσταται, στόμιον ἐμβάλων ἀφηνιάζοντι τῷ ἀλόγῳ πνεύματι.” *Ibid.*, 7.12.79.6.

<sup>108</sup>For a discussion on the notion of virtue in Clement in comparison to that of earlier philosophers, see Lilla, 61-84. Lilla notes Clement’s usage of the Platonic definition of virtue as the “harmony of the soul.”

<sup>109</sup>“δεύτερον δέ ἐστιν εἶδος βασιλείας μετὰ τὴν ἀκραιφνῶς λογικὴν καὶ θεϊάν διοίκησιν τὸ μόνῳ τῷ θυμοειδεῖ τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς βασιλείαν συγχρώμενον.” *Stromata* 1.24.158.3.

also describes the soul as having a high spirit, writing that “the love of good is characteristic of a soul which uses its high spirit for noble ends.”<sup>110</sup>

But the instrument of regal sway—the instrument at once of that which overcomes by virtue, and that which does so by force—is the power of managing (or tact). And it varies according to the nature and the material. In the case of arms and of fighting animals the ordering power is the soul and mind, by means animate and inanimate; and in the case of the passions of the soul, which we master by virtue, reason is the ordering power, by affixing the seal of continence and self-restraint, along with holiness, and sound knowledge with truth, making the result of the whole to terminate in piety towards God.<sup>111</sup>

For Clement, knowledge plays an important part in understanding the soul. It “is a kind of divine understanding; it is that light engendered in the soul from obedience to the commandments which makes everything clear and enables a person to know what is in a state of change, to know his own humanity, to know himself, and teaches him to establish himself within reach of God.”<sup>112</sup> It is responsible for restoring “the pure in heart to the crowning place of rest; teaching to [them] to gaze on God, face to face, with knowledge and comprehension. For in this consists the perfection of the Gnostic soul.”<sup>113</sup>

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<sup>110</sup>“τὸ δὲ φιλόκαλον, εἰς καλὸν καταχρωμένης τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ θυμῷ.” Ibid., 1.24.158.5.

<sup>111</sup>“ἐν μὲν γε ὄπλοις καὶ τοῖς μαχίμοις ζώοις δι’ ἐμψύχων τε καὶ ἀψύχων ψυχῆ τὸ τάπτον ἐστὶ καὶ νοῦς, ἐν δὲ τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς πάθεσιν, ὧν ἐπικρατοῦμεν τῇ ἀρετῇ, λογισμὸς ἐστὶ τὸ τακτικόν.” Ibid., 1.24.159.3. See also *ibid.*, 3.5.42.5.

<sup>112</sup>“τινα ἐπιστήμην θείαν καὶ φῶς ἐκεῖνο τὸ ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ ἐγγενόμενον ἐκ τῆς κατὰ τὰς ἐντολὰς ὑπακοῆς τὸ πάντα κατάδηλα ποιοῦν τὰ [τε] ἐν γενέσει αὐτόν τε τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἑαυτόν τε γινώσκειν παρασκευάζον καὶ τοῦ θεοῦ ἐπήβολον καθίστα.” *Stromata* 3.5.44.3. Cf. *ibid.*, 6.3.34.1; 7.10.57.1.

<sup>113</sup>“τὸν καθαρὸν τῇ καρδίᾳ πρόσωπον πρὸς πρόσωπον ἐπιστημονικῶς καὶ καταληπτικῶς τὸν θεὸν ἐποπτεύειν διδάξασα. ἐνταῦθα γὰρ που τῆς γνωστικῆς ψυχῆς ἡ τελείωσις.” Ibid., 7.10.57.2. On perfection and the soul in Clement and its Platonic overtones, see Jelle Wytzes, “The Twofold Way: Platonic Influences in the Work of Clement of Alexandria,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 11, no. 4 (1957): 227-228.

Clement distinguishes between two types of knowledge. One he refers to is common to all, that is the knowledge of individual objects. The superior knowledge is based on “rational cognitions alone, applying purely to objects of thought, and resulting from the bare energy of the soul.”<sup>114</sup> “Knowledge,” Clement writes, “is the purification of the leading faculty of the soul.”<sup>115</sup>

Clement argues for self-knowledge of the soul when he writes, “For what is useful and necessary to salvation, such as the knowledge of the Father, and Son, and Holy Spirit, and also of our own soul, are wholly requisite; and it is at once beneficial and necessary to attain to the scientific account of them.”<sup>116</sup> Here, the knowledge of one’s own soul is required of the Gnostic on the same level as the knowledge of God is as necessary for salvation.

For Clement, the soul is very much related to clear thinking. This is clear from his use of the expression “rational soul.”<sup>117</sup> He also writes, “For it was difficult for the soul not to be seduced and ruined by the luxuries and flowery enchantments that beset remarkable wealth; but it was not impossible, even surrounded with it, for one to lay hold

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<sup>114</sup>“αἰ τοῖς νοητοῖς κατὰ ψιλὴν τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐνέργειαν εἰλικρινῶς ἐπιβάλλουσαι.” *Stromata* 6.1.3.3. Gross notes that this should be understood to mean “without the aid of the body.” Gross, 138. Cf. J. Ferguson, *Clement of Alexandria*, 123-125.

<sup>115</sup>“ἡ γνῶσις, <ἧ> τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς κάθαρσις ἐστὶ.” *Stromata* 4.6.39.2.

<sup>116</sup>“<Ὀν>των γὰρ εὐχρηστων καὶ ἀναγκαίων εἰς σωτηρίαν, οἷον πατρὸς καὶ υἱοῦ καὶ ἀγίου πνεύματος, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆς ἡμετέρας ψυχῆς, δεῖ πάντως καὶ τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν λόγον, ὅς ἐστι γνωστικός, εὐχρηστον ὁμοῦ καὶ ἀναγκαῖον τυγχάνειν.” *Eclogae propheticae* 29.1.

<sup>117</sup>“ψυχὴν τὴν λογικὴν.” See *Stromata* 5.6.36.4; 5.14.94.6; 6.6.48.6; 6.8.68.3; 6.8.69.2 among others.

of salvation, provided he withdrew himself from material wealth, to that which is grasped by the mind and taught by God.”<sup>118</sup> Here the soul must turn from the physical world to that which is grasped only by the mind.

Wisdom, for Clement, is “rectitude of soul and of reason, and purity of life.”<sup>119</sup> “Wise souls” are those who kindle “their light for the contemplation of things.”<sup>120</sup> Knowledge is “an attribute of the rational soul, which trains itself for this, that by knowledge it may become entitled to immortality. For both are powers of the soul both knowledge and impulse. And impulse is found to be a movement after an assent.”<sup>121</sup> Here knowledge is connected with immortality. It seems that here, immortality should be understood to refer to the blessings which the righteous receive as he elsewhere argues for the immortality of the soul in regard to the wicked who receive punishment. Impulse is then affirmed to be the movement that follows knowledge. It is important here to point

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<sup>118</sup>“καταστράπτεσθαι τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ τῶν προσόντων ἀβρῶν τῶ προδήλῳ πλούτῳ καὶ ἀνθηρῶν γοητευμάτων, οὐκ ἀδύνατον δὲ τὸ καὶ ἐν τούτῳ λαβέσθαι σωτηρίας.” *Quis dives salvetur* 20.2.2.

<sup>119</sup>“ἡ φιλοσοφία, τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τῆς ὀρθότητος τοῦ λόγου καὶ τῆς τοῦ βίου καθαρότητος.” *Stromata* 6.7.55.1. On the connection between a pure soul and pure life for Clement, see Juan J. Sanguinetti, *La antropología educativa de Clemente Alejandrino: el giro del paganismo al cristianismo* (Pamplona: Ediciones Universidad de Navarra, 2003), 417-422.

<sup>120</sup>“τὸ οἰκεῖον ἀνάπτουσαι φῶς εἰς τὴν τῶν πραγμάτων θεωρίαν, φρόνιμοι ψυχὰι.” *Stromata* 7.12.72.6.

<sup>121</sup>“καὶ μή τι ἢ γνῶσις ἰδίωμα ψυχῆς τυγχάνει λογικῆς εἰς τοῦτο ἀσκουμένης, ἵνα διὰ τῆς γνώσεως εἰς ἀθανασίαν ἐπιγραφῆ. ἄμφω γὰρ δυνάμεις τῆς ψυχῆς, γνῶσις τε καὶ ὄρμη. εὐρίσκεται δ’ ἡ ὄρμη μετὰ τινα συγκατάθεσιν κίνησις οὕσα.” *Stromata* 6.8.68.3. This notion of becoming entitled to immortality that appears at times in Clement’s writings has led some to conclude that he did not hold to the notion of the soul’s innate immortality. See Karpp, *Probleme*, 102-103.

out that movement, in regard to the soul, is to be understood as “self-originating.”<sup>122</sup>

Clement assumes that “knowledge is essentially a contemplation of existences on the part of the soul, either of a certain thing or of certain things, and when perfected, of all together.”<sup>123</sup>

It is clear that for Clement, education takes place in the soul.<sup>124</sup> He writes “that the word that is sown is hidden in the soul of the learner.”<sup>125</sup> This was written in the context of Clement defending his right to pass on wisdom as a means of educating the young. This process of educating he describes as “soul . . . joined with soul.”<sup>126</sup> He writes that humanity needs “a divine teacher” since “the soul became too enfeebled for the apprehension of realities.”<sup>127</sup>

The Scriptures play a key role in education. He writes of “those who study the oracles of God night and day, and ruminates them in the soul’s receptacle for instructions”<sup>128</sup> He adds, “The distinction of names and things also in the Scriptures

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<sup>122</sup>“ἐξ ἑαυτῆς κινεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ.” *Eclogae propheticae* 22.1.

<sup>123</sup>“γνώσις δὲ αὐτὸ τοῦτο, θεὰ τίς ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ὄντων ἥτοι τινὸς ἢ τινῶν, τελειωθεῖσα δὲ τῶν συμπάντων.” *Stromata* 6.8.69.3.

<sup>124</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 1.1.7.3; 1.1.11.2.

<sup>125</sup>“σπειρόμενον τὸν λόγον κρύπτεσθαι μηνύει καθάπερ ἐν γῆ τῇ τοῦ μανθάνοντος ψυχῆ.” *Ibid.*, 1.1.2.1.

<sup>126</sup>“ψυχὴ γάρ, οἶμαι, ψυχῆ.” *Ibid.*

<sup>127</sup>“ἐπεὶ γὰρ ἡσθένει πρὸς κατάληψιν τῶν ὄντων ἡ ψυχὴ, θείου διδασκάλου ἐδεήθημεν.” *Stromata* 5.1.7.8.

<sup>128</sup>“τῶν ‘τὰ λόγια τοῦ θεοῦ’ ‘νύκτωρ καὶ μεθ’ ἡμέραν μελετώντων’ καὶ ἀναπεμπαζομένων ἐν τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν μαθημάτων δοχείῳ.” *Ibid.*, 7.18.109.2. Cf. *Quis dives salvetur* 7.1.

themselves produces great light in men's souls."<sup>129</sup> Later, he writes, "The Scripture kindles the living spark of the soul and directs the eye suitably for contemplation."<sup>130</sup>

Clement also lays out a plan of the soul's education beyond the Scriptures. Included in this program is astronomy, which he specifically mentions as able to lead "the soul nearer to the creative power" and to make it "in the highest degree observant, capable of perceiving the true and detecting the false."<sup>131</sup>

"Understanding," Clement urges, is "a faculty of the soul, capable of studying existences,—of distinguishing and comparing what succeeds as like and unlike,—of enjoining and forbidding, and of conjecturing the future."<sup>132</sup> Clement states that the "soul, which is ever improving in the acquisition of virtue and the increase of righteousness, should obtain a better place . . . as tending in each step of advancement towards the habit of impassibility."<sup>133</sup> He adds, "Now everything that is virtuous changes for the better; having as the proper cause of change the free choice of knowledge, which the soul has in

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<sup>129</sup>“ἡ διαστολή δὲ τῶν τε ὀνομάτων τῶν τε πραγμάτων κὰν ταῖς γραφαῖς αὐταῖς μέγα φῶς ἐντίκειται ταῖς ψυχαῖς.” *Stromata* 6.10.82.3.

<sup>130</sup>“συνεξάπτει δὲ ἡ γραφή τὸ ζώπυρον τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ συντείνει τὸ οἰκεῖον ὄμμα πρὸς θεωρίαν.” *Ibid.*, 1.1.10.4.

<sup>131</sup>“τῆς τε τῶν ἄστρον κινήσεως πλησιαίτερον τῆ κτιζούσῃ δυνάμει προσάγουσα τὴν ψυχὴν . . . παρακολουθητικὴν δ' ὡς ἐνὶ μάλιστα τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ τοῦτο παρασκευάζει τὸ μάθημα τοῦ τε ἀληθοῦς διορατικὴν καὶ τοῦ ψεύδους διελεγκτικὴν.” *Ibid.*, 6.11.90.3.

<sup>132</sup>“φρόνησις ἐστὶ, δύναμις ψυχῆς θεωρητικὴ τῶν ὄντων καὶ τοῦ ἀκολουθοῦ ὁμοίου τε καὶ ἀνομοίου διακριτικὴ τε αὖ καὶ συνθετικὴ καὶ προστακτικὴ καὶ ἀπαγορευτικὴ τῶν τε μελλόντων καταστοχαστικὴ.” *Stromata* 6.17.154.4.

<sup>133</sup>“πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν βελτιουμένην ἐκάστοτε ψυχὴν εἰς ἀρετῆς ἐπίγνωσιν καὶ δικαιοσύνης αὐξήσιν βελτίονα ἀπολαμβάνειν ἐν τῷ παντὶ τὴν τάξιν, κατὰ προκοπὴν ἐκάστην 'ἐπεκτεινομένην' εἰς ἕξιν ἀπαθείας.” *Ibid.*, 7.2.10.0.

its own power.”<sup>134</sup> Clement relates the soul to virtue writing, “For virtue itself is a state of the soul rendered harmonious by reason in respect to the whole life.”<sup>135</sup> The virtues come when the Holy Spirit adorns the soul.<sup>136</sup> Clement states that one is happy who “is adorned in his soul with virtue.”<sup>137</sup> In describing the virtue of the soul, he writes, “Salvation does not depend on external things . . . ; but on the virtue of the soul, on faith, and hope, and love, and brotherliness, and knowledge, and meekness, and humility, and truth, the reward of which is salvation.”<sup>138</sup> He also describes asceticism as “a virtue of the soul.”<sup>139</sup> This asceticism, or self-control, did not apply only to one’s sexual desires, “but the other objects which our soul self-indulgently desires, not content with bare necessities but making a fuss about luxury.”<sup>140</sup> It is also those souls who have chosen virtue who “come to the Good itself, to the Father’s vestibule, so to speak, close to the great High Priest.”<sup>141</sup>

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<sup>134</sup>“τῆς μεταβολῆς αἰτίαν τὴν αἴρεσιν τῆς γνώσεως ἔχον, ἣν αὐτοκρατορικὴν ἐκέκτητο ἡ ψυχὴ.” *Ibid.*, 7.2.12.5.

<sup>135</sup>“Καὶ γὰρ ἡ ἀρετὴ αὐτὴ διάθεσις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς σύμφωνος τῷ λόγῳ περὶ ὅλον τὸν βίον.” *Paedagogus* 1.13.101.2.2.

<sup>136</sup>“κεκοσμημένη ψυχὴ ἀγίῳ πνεύματι καὶ τοῖς ἐκ τούτου ἐμπνεομένη φαιδρύσμασιν, δικαιοσύνη, φρονήσει, ἀνδρεία, σωφροσύνη φιλαγαθία.” *Ibid.*, 3.11.64.1.

<sup>137</sup>“εὐδαίμονα τὸν κεκοσμημένον τὴν ψυχὴν ἐναρέτως.” *Stromata* 1.20.98.3.

<sup>138</sup>“οὔτε εἰ πολλὰ οὔτε εἰ ὀλίγα ταῦτα ἢ μικρὰ ἢ μεγάλα ἢ ἐνδοξα ἢ ἄδοξα ἢ εὐδόκιμα ἢ ἀδόκιμα, ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ, πίστει καὶ ἐλπίδι καὶ ἀγάπῃ καὶ φιλαδελφίᾳ καὶ γνώσει καὶ πραότητι καὶ ἀτυφίᾳ καὶ ἀληθείᾳ, ὧν ἄθλον ἡ σωτηρία.” *Quis dives salvetur* 18.1.

<sup>139</sup>“οὔτω καὶ ἡ ἐγκράτεια ψυχῆς ἀρετῇ.” *Stromata* 3.6.48.3.

<sup>140</sup>“ἀλλὰ γὰρ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὅσα σπαταλῶσα ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν.” *Ibid.*, 3.7.59.1.

<sup>141</sup>“ἀεὶ τὴν προκοπὴν προΐεναι ταῖς ἀρετῇ ἐλομέναις ψυχαῖς, ἔστ’ ἂν ἐπ’ αὐτὸ ἀφίκωνται τὸ ἀγαθόν, ‘ἐπὶ προθύροις’ ὡς εἶπεῖν τοῦ πατρὸς

“Salvation,” Clement writes, “is the privilege of pure and passionless souls.”<sup>142</sup>

In accord with his views on education, Clement’s view of the soul is one that involves development.<sup>143</sup> For him, the soul can be in one of three states. “Ignorance, opinion, knowledge—those who are in ignorance are the Gentiles, those in knowledge, the true Church, and those in opinion, the Heretics.”<sup>144</sup> He writes regarding Christ’s words in Matt 23:37 where Christ describes Himself as a hen gathering her chicks as giving a graphic and mystical description of the soul in childhood.<sup>145</sup> He writes that the soul needs “training . . . and an accustoming it to assume a right attitude to the judgments to come.”<sup>146</sup> The study of philosophy rouses and trains “the soul to intellectual objects.”<sup>147</sup> In describing the truth which the Greeks have and which they teach, Clement states that “those [Greek philosophers], to whom we refer, influence souls not in the way

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προσεχεις τῷ μεγάλῳ ἀρχιερεῖ γενόμεναι.” Ibid., 7.7.45.3.

<sup>142</sup>“ἀπαθῶν γὰρ καὶ καθαρῶν ψυχῶν ἐστὶν ἡ σωτηρία.” *Quis dives salvetur* 20.6. He elsewhere states that the passions are a perturbation in the soul contrary to nature. See *Stromata* 2.13.59.6.

<sup>143</sup>Cf. Sanguineti, 114-128.

<sup>144</sup>“Καὶ δὴ τριῶν οὐσῶν διαθέσεων τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀγνοίας, οἰήσεως, ἐπιστήμης, οἱ μὲν ἐν τῇ ἀγνοίᾳ τὰ ἔθνη, οἱ δὲ ἐν τῇ ἐπιστήμῃ ἡ ἐκκλησία ἡ ἀληθής, οἱ δὲ ἐν οἰήσει οἱ κατὰ τὰς αἰρέσεις.” Ibid., 7.16.100.7. Regarding heretics, see Clement’s comment in *ibid.*, 7.16.99.1.

<sup>145</sup>“θαυμαστῶς πάνυ καὶ μυστικῶς τοῦ λόγου τὴν ἀπλότητα τῆς ψυχῆς εἰς ἡλικίαν ὑπογραφομένου παιδικήν.” *Paedagogus* 1.5.14.5.

<sup>146</sup>“τρίτον ἡ ἄσκησις τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ ὁ ἐθισμὸς πρὸς <τὸ> τοῖς κριθεῖσιν ὀρθῶς ἔχειν ἀκολουθεῖν δύνασθαι.” *Stromata* 7.16.98.5. See also *ibid.*, 7.16.100.5.

<sup>147</sup>“συνεργεῖν δὲ πρὸς τὸ διεγείρειν καὶ συγγυμνάζειν πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ τὴν ψυχήν.” Ibid., 1.19.93.5. Cf. *ibid.*, 6.11.91.2 where he suggests that the soul must be prepared and exercised. In *Eclogae propheticae* 28.3, Clement asserts that knowledge (γνώσις) is necessary for this training.



we do, but by different teaching.”<sup>148</sup> In commenting on a saying by Thespis, Clement states that the libation being described is “the soul’s first milk-like nutriment of the four-and-twenty elements, after which solidified milk comes as food.”<sup>149</sup> He elsewhere explains that the milk of the soul is catechetical instruction.<sup>150</sup> Clement also glorifies God who gives a “perpetual supply of the food necessary for the growth of the body and of the soul.”<sup>151</sup>

Clement writes, “The service of God, then, in the case of the Gnostic, is his soul’s continual study and occupation”<sup>152</sup> and “the improvement . . . of the soul of philosophy.”<sup>153</sup> The Gnostic soul embraces “the divine vision not in mirrors . . . but in the transcendently clear and absolutely pure insatiable vision which is the privilege of intensely loving souls.”<sup>154</sup> The Gnostic “exercises moderation in the calmness of his soul.”<sup>155</sup> The Gnostic soul apprehends “essences and things through the words he brings

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<sup>148</sup>“ἐνθεν οὐδ’ ὡσαύτως κινουῦσι τὰς ψυχάς, ἀλλὰ διαφόρῳ διδασκαλίᾳ.” *Stromata* 1.20.98.4.

<sup>149</sup>“αἰνίσσεται, οἶμαι, τὴν ἐκ τῶν τεσσάρων καὶ εἴκοσι στοιχείων ψυχῆς γαλακτώδη πρώτην τροφήν, μεθ’ ἣν ἤδη πεπηγὸς γάλα τὸ βρώμα.” *Ibid.*, 5.8.48.8.

<sup>150</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.10.66.2.

<sup>151</sup>“πεῖσμα τῇ ψυχῇ βέβαιον τὴν ἐκ πάντων ἀσφάλειαν πεπορισμένους.” *Ibid.*, 6.11.90.1.

<sup>152</sup>“Θεραπεία τοίνυν τοῦ θεοῦ ἢ συνεχῆς ἐπιμέλεια τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ γνωστικῷ.” *Ibid.*, 7.1.3.1.

<sup>153</sup>“φιλοσοφία δὲ ψυχῆς βελτιωτική.” *Stromata* 7.1.3.2.

<sup>154</sup>“οὐκ ἐν κατόπτροις ἢ διὰ κατόπτρων ἔτι τὴν θεωρίαν ἀσπαζομένας τὴν θείαν, ἐναργῆ δὲ ὡς ἐνι μάλιστα καὶ ἀκριβῶς εἰλικρινῆ τὴν ἀκόρροστον ὑπερφυῶς ἀγαπώσας ψυχαῖς ἐστιωμένας θέαν.” *Ibid.*, 7.3.13.1.

<sup>155</sup>“σώζων τε αὖ τὴν φρόνησιν σωφρονεῖ ἐν ἡσυχιότητι τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Ibid.*, 7.3.18.2.

his soul.”<sup>156</sup> It is compared to an athlete, “in a condition of extreme health and strength.”<sup>157</sup> In a final accolade, Clement states that “the Gnostic soul, adorned with perfect virtue, is the earthly image of the divine power; its development being the joint result of nature, of training, of reason, all together.”<sup>158</sup> Elsewhere he writes of that “crowning step of advancement the Gnostic soul receives, when it has become quite pure, reckoned worthy to behold everlastingly God Almighty, ‘face,’ it is said, ‘to face.’ For having become wholly spiritual, and having in the spiritual Church gone to what is of kindred nature, it abides in the rest of God.”<sup>159</sup> In order to reach this pinnacle of the image of the divine, Clement urges that “we must as much as possible subject the soul to varied preparatory exercise, that it may become susceptible to the reception of knowledge.”<sup>160</sup> As he also states, “ignorance is the starvation of the soul, and knowledge its sustenance.”<sup>161</sup>

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<sup>156</sup>“οὐσίας τοίνυν καὶ τὰ πράγματα αὐτὰ παραλαβὼν διὰ τῶν λόγων εἰκότως καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἐπὶ τὰ δέοντα ἄγει.” Ibid., 7.11.60.4.

<sup>157</sup>“οἷον ἀθλητοῦ τὸ σῶμα ἐν ἄκρῳ εὐεξία καὶ ῥώμῃ καθεστηκυῖα.” Ibid., 7.11.64.4.

<sup>158</sup>“ἀτεχνῶς οὖν ἐπίγειος εἰκὼν θείας δυνάμεως ἢ γνωστικὴ ψυχὴ, τελεία ἀρετῆ κεκοσμημένη, ἐκ πάντων ἅμα τούτων, φύσεως, ἀσκήσεως, λόγου, συνηυξημένη.” Ibid., 7.11.64.6.

<sup>159</sup>“ταυτὶ γὰρ ὄνόματα εὐγενείας καὶ γνώσεως καὶ τελειότητος κατὰ τὴν τοῦ θεοῦ ἐποπτεῖαν, ἣν κορυφαιοτάτην προκοπὴν ἢ γνωστικὴ ψυχὴ λαμβάνει, καθαρὰ τέλεον γενομένη, ‘πρόσωπον’, φησί, ‘πρὸς πρόσωπον’ ὄραν αἰδίως καταξιουμένη τὸν παντοκράτορα θεόν.” Ibid., 7.11.68.4.3.

<sup>160</sup>“Ἄλλ’ ἡμῖν γε ὡς ἐνὶ μάλιστα προγυμναστέον ποικίλως τὴν ψυχὴν, ἵνα εὐεργὸς γένηται πρὸς τὴν τῆς γνώσεως παραδοχὴν.” *Stromata* 7.12.71.1. Cf. Ferguson, *Clement of Alexandria*, 111. On the notion of apotheosis in Clement, see Russell, 121-140.

<sup>161</sup>“ἀλλ’ ὡς ἔοικεν ἀτροφία μὲν ἢ ἄγνοια τῆς ψυχῆς, τροφή δὲ ἢ γνῶσις.” *Stromata* 7.12.72.4.

Clement also seems to allow that different souls have varying capacities for improvement. He writes, “But the man whose soul is destitute of the ability to reach to acquaintance with many subjects of study, will select the principal and better subjects alone.”<sup>162</sup>

Faith is an important element in the soul’s acquisition of knowledge.<sup>163</sup> In describing this, Clement uses a metaphor which seems to draw on the Old Testament connection between soul and blood. In the context of faith and the acquisition of knowledge, he notes that some approach this with “souls already preoccupied ... [which] have not been previously emptied.”<sup>164</sup> He writes, “For in reality the blood of faith is hope, in which faith is held as by a soul.”<sup>165</sup> Elsewhere he writes that studying true philosophy implants true faith in the soul<sup>166</sup> and purifies it from “sensible things” and excites it so that it is “able to see truth distinctly.”<sup>167</sup> Clement also seems to argue for faith being “the

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<sup>162</sup>“ὄτω δὲ ἀσθενεῖ ἐπεκτείνεσθαι ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὴν πολυμαθῆ ἐμπειρίαν, τὰ προηγούμενα καὶ βελτίω αἰρήσεται μόνα.” *Ibid.*, 6.18.162.3.

<sup>163</sup>See André Méhat, *Étude sur les ‘Stromates’ de Clément d’Alexandrie*, *Pastristica Sorbonensia* 7 (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1966), 314-317.

<sup>164</sup>“τοῖς προκατειλημμένοις ἤδη τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ μὴ προκεκενωμένοις.” *Stromata* 1.1.8.1. Davison argues that Clement does not absolutely distinguish between knowledge and faith. James E. Davison, “Structural Similarities and Dissimilarities in the Thought of Clement of Alexandria and the Valentinians,” *Second Century* 3, no. 4 (1983): 210.

<sup>165</sup>“Τῷ γὰρ ὄντι αἷμα τῆς πίστεως ἡ ἐλπίς, ὑφ’ ἧς συνέχεται, καθάπερ ὑπὸ ψυχῆς, ἡ πίστις.” *Paedagogus* 1.6.38.3. This is reminiscent of Irenaeus who also held that the soul in the blood held together the body. Cf. Denise K. Buell, *Making Christians: Clement of Alexandria and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 143-145. For further discussion regarding possible backgrounds to the connection between blood and the soul in ancient times, see Buell, 154-156.

<sup>166</sup>“ὁ γὰρ ἀπὸ τῶν ἀποδείξεων λόγος ἀκριβῆ πίστιν ἐντίθησι τῇ ψυχῇ τοῦ παρακολουθοῦντος.” *Stromata* 1.6.33.2.

rational assent of the soul exercising free-will.”<sup>168</sup> The soul is also trained “to be willing to select what is noblest.”<sup>169</sup> Clement writes, “Now to will is the act of the soul.”<sup>170</sup>

Clement proposes an etymological explanation for knowledge (ἐπιστημη) which he connects with the soul. He connects knowledge with the notion of settling. He writes, “For our soul, which was formerly borne, now in one way, now in another, it settles in objects.”<sup>171</sup> He then proceeds to note that this also works for faith which is “the settling of our soul respecting that which is.”<sup>172</sup>

The principle of demonstration is key when relating the soul to knowledge and faith. Clement writes, “In strict propriety, then, that is called demonstration which produces in the souls of learners scientific belief.”<sup>173</sup> This is contrasted to that demonstration that is based only on hope and leads only to opinion. In another place Clement writes, “For the highest demonstration, to which we have alluded, produces intelligent faith by the adducing and opening up of the Scriptures to the souls of those

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<sup>167</sup>“καὶ ἀναζωπυρεῖται ἡ ψυχὴ, ἵνα δὴ ποτε ἀλήθειαν διδεῖν δυνηθῆ.” Ibid., 1.6.33.3.

<sup>168</sup>“οὐχὶ δὲ ψυχῆς αὐτεξουσίου λογικὴν συγκατάθεσιν λέγει τὴν πίστιν.” Ibid., 5.1.3.2. Cf. *ibid.*, 5.13.86.1.

<sup>169</sup>“μαθήσει παιδευθείσης τῆς ψυχῆς ἐθέλειν αἰρεῖσθαι τὸ κάλλιστον.” Ibid., 1.6.35.1. Cf. *ibid.*, 7.16.98.5.

<sup>170</sup>“ἔργον δὲ τὸ μὲν βούλεσθαι ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 2.6.26.5. Cf. Fernández Ardanaz, *Genesis y Anagennesis*, 112-113.

<sup>171</sup>“ὅτι ἴστησιν ἡμῶν ἐν τοῖς πράγμασι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἄλλοτε ἄλλως πρότερον φερομένην.” *Stromata* 4.22.143.3.

<sup>172</sup>“τὴν πίστιν ἐτυμολογητέον τὴν περὶ τὸ ὄν στάσιν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν.” *Stromata*, 4.22.143.4.

<sup>173</sup>“κυριώτατα μὲν οὖν ἀπόδειξις λέγεται ἡ τὴν ἐπιστημονικὴν πίστιν ἐντιθεῖσα ταῖς τῶν μανθανόντων ψυχαῖς.” Ibid., 8.3.5.3. See also *ibid.*, 8.3.7.7.

who desire to learn; the result of which is knowledge (gnosis).”<sup>174</sup>

He also insists that faith, which the Greeks disparage, is necessary for the soul to understand. “For how ever could the soul admit the transcendental contemplation of such themes, while unbelief respecting what was to be learned struggled within?”<sup>175</sup> In this context, he asserts, “But we ought to direct the visual faculty of the soul aright to discovery, and to clear away obstacles.”<sup>176</sup> Greek philosophy only “purges the soul, and prepares it beforehand for the reception of faith.”<sup>177</sup>

As the soul is capable of faith, so it is capable of unbelief. Clement writes, “But as for him into whose ears instruction has been poured, and who deliberately maintains his incredulity in his soul, the wiser he appears to be, the more harm will his understanding do him.”<sup>178</sup>

The Stoics claimed that joy and sorrow were passions in the soul. Clement argues otherwise, wanting to preserve the feeling of joy as legitimate for a saved person to feel.<sup>179</sup> Clement also argues that the soul can experience unhappiness. “But since they wish their wives to be unhappy in mind, let the latter, if they would be chaste, make it

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<sup>174</sup>“καὶ διοίξεως ταῖς τῶν μανθάνειν ὀρεγομένων ψυχαῖς, ἥτις ἂν εἴη γνῶσις.” Ibid., 2.11.49.3.

<sup>175</sup>“πῶς γὰρ τούτων ὑπερφυᾶ θεωρίαν χωρήσαι ποτ’ ἂν ψυχὴ διαμαχομένης ἔνδον τῆς περὶ τὴν μάθησιν ἀπιστίας.” Ibid., 2.2.8.3.

<sup>176</sup>“ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν διορατικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποτείνειν πρὸς τὴν εὐρεσιν χρῆ.” Ibid., 5.1.11.4.

<sup>177</sup>“φιλοσοφία δὲ ἢ Ἑλληνικὴ οἶον προκαθαίρει καὶ προεθίζει τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς παραδοχὴν πίστεως.” Ibid., 7.3.20.2. Cf. *ibid.*, 7.3.19.4; 7.4.27.6.

<sup>178</sup>“ὁ δὲ εἰς ὧτα βαλόμενος καὶ τῇ ψυχῇ <παρακούσας> παρὰ τῆς γνώμης φέρει τὴν ἀπειθειαν.” *Protrepticus* 10.100.2.

<sup>179</sup>*Stromata* 2.16.72-73.

their aim to allay by degrees the irrational impulses and passions of their husbands.”<sup>180</sup>

Clement writes that the soul is the seat of desire. As noted earlier, this idea connects directly with education and knowledge as the goal of these is to attain the passionless state of the divine. Clement writes of one who, “having got an inkling of the subject, kindles it within his soul by desire and study, he sets everything in motion afterwards in order to know it.”<sup>181</sup> This is in the context of responding to the call of God to righteousness. Desire is important in understanding the passions. “Passion is an excessive appetite exceeding the measures of reason, or appetite unbridled and disobedient to the word. Passions, then, are a perturbation of the soul contrary to nature, in disobedience to reason.”<sup>182</sup> He also writes, “The simple word, then, of our philosophy declares the passions to be impressions on the soul that is soft and yielding, and, as it were, the signatures of the spiritual powers with whom we have to struggle.”<sup>183</sup> He adds, “The powers, then, of which we have spoken hold out beautiful sights, and honors, and adulteries, and pleasures, and such like alluring fantasies before facile spirits. . . . And each deceit, by pressing constantly on the spirit, impresses its image on it; and the soul unwittingly carries about the image of the passion, which takes its rise from the bait and

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<sup>180</sup>“πλὴν ἀλλ’ ἐπεὶ δυστυχεῖν βούλονται τὴν ψυχὴν.” *Paedagogus* 3.11.57.3.

<sup>181</sup>“ὅταν δέ τις ἔναυσμα λαβὼν τοῦ πράγματος ἐξάψη τοῦτο ἔνδον ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ πόθῳ καὶ μαθήσει, πάντα ἐπὶ τούτοις κινεῖ πρὸς τὸ ἐπιγνῶναι.” *Stromata* 6.17.150.1.

<sup>182</sup>“παρὰ φύσιν οὖν κίνησις ψυχῆς κατὰ τὴν πρὸς τὸν λόγον ἀπειθειαν τὰ πάθη.” *Ibid.*, 2.13.59.6.

<sup>183</sup>“ὁ μὲν οὖν ἀπλοῦς λόγος τῆς καθ’ ἡμᾶς φιλοσοφίας τὰ πάθη πάντα ἐναπερείσματα τῆς ψυχῆς φησιν εἶναι τῆς μαλθακῆς καὶ εἰκούσης καὶ οἶον ἐναποσφραγίσματα τῶν ‘πνευματικῶν’ δυνάμεων, πρὸς ἃς ἡ πάλη ἡμῶν.” *Stromata* 2.20.110.3.

our consent.”<sup>184</sup> “For as the exhalations which arise from the earth, and from marshes, gather into mists and cloudy masses; so the vapors of fleshly lusts bring on the soul an evil condition, scattering about the idols of pleasure before the soul.”<sup>185</sup> He continues, “Accordingly they spread darkness over the light of intelligence, the spirit attracting the exhalations that arise from lust, and thickening the masses of the passions by persistency in pleasures.”<sup>186</sup> Clement states that it does not require many words to explain “how . . . the powers of the devil, and the unclean spirits, sow into the sinner’s soul.”<sup>187</sup> After quoting a passage from the *Epistle of Barnabas* 16.7-9, Clement is quick to clarify this by stating, “He [Barnabas] says, then, that sinners exercise activities appropriate to demons; but he does not say that the spirits themselves dwell in the soul of the unbeliever.”<sup>188</sup> The result of indulging in pleasure is a soul “buried in the mire of vice.”<sup>189</sup>

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<sup>184</sup>“Αί τοίνυν δυνάμεις, περὶ ὧν εἰρήκαμεν, κάλλη καὶ δόξας καὶ μοιχείας καὶ ἡδονάς καὶ τοιαύτας τινὰς φαντασίας δελεαστικὰς προτείνουσι ταῖς εὐεπιφόροις ψυχαῖς . . . ἑκάστη δὲ ἀπάτη, συνεχῶς ἐναπερειδομένη τῇ ψυχῇ, τὴν φαντασίαν ἐν αὐτῇ τυποῦται. καὶ δὴ τὴν εἰκόνα ἔλαθεν περιφέρουσα τοῦ πάθους ἢ ψυχῆ, τῆς αἰτίας ἀπὸ τε τοῦ δελέατος καὶ τῆς ἡμῶν συγκαταθέσεως γινομένης.” *Ibid.*, 2.20.111.3-4. See also *ibid.*, 6.14.112.3.

<sup>185</sup>“οὕτως αἱ τῶν σαρκικῶν ἐπιθυμιῶν ἀναδόσεις καχεξίαν προστρίβονται ψυχῇ, κατασκεδαννύουσαι τὰ εἰδῶλα τῆς ἡδονῆς ἐπίπροσθε τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Ibid.*, 2.20.115.3. Cf. *Quis dives salvetur* 41.3.

<sup>186</sup>“ἐπισκοτοῦσι γοῦν τῷ φωτὶ τῷ νοερωῖ ἐπισπωμένης τῆς ψυχῆς τὰς ἐκ τῆς ἐπιθυμίας ἀναδόσεις καὶ παχυνούσης τὰς συστροφὰς τῶν παθῶν ἐνδελεχεῖα ἡδονῶν.” *Stromata* 2.20.116.1.

<sup>187</sup>“ὅπως δ’ ἡμεῖς τοῦ διαβόλου τὰς ἐνεργείας καὶ τὰ πνεύματα τὰ ἀκάθαρτα εἰς τὴν τοῦ ἁμαρτωλοῦ ψυχὴν ἐπισπείρειν φαμέν.” *Stromata* 2.20.116.3.

<sup>188</sup>“οὐχὶ δὲ αὐτὰ τὰ πνεύματα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀπίστου κατοικεῖν ψυχῇ λέγει.” *Ibid.*, 2.20.117.2.

<sup>189</sup>“ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ αὐτῶν ἐν βορβόρω κακίας κατορῶρκεται.” *Ibid.*, 2.20.118.5.

Clement writes concerning pain, “When pain is present, the soul appears to decline from it, and to deem release from present pain a precious thing. At that moment it slackens from studies.”<sup>190</sup> “The same holds good also in the case of poverty. For it compels the soul to desist from necessary things, I mean contemplation and from pure sinlessness, forcing him, who has not wholly dedicated himself to God in love, to occupy himself about provisions; as, again, health and abundance of necessaries keep the soul free and unimpeded.”<sup>191</sup> Clement concludes by asserting that “these things, then, are to be abstained from, not for their own sakes, but for the sake of the body; and care for the body is exercised for the sake of the soul, to which it has reference.”<sup>192</sup>

### **The Corporeal and the Soul**

“Self-discipline applies, not just to sexual matters, but to everything else for which the soul lusts improperly.”<sup>193</sup> The passions are considered by Clement to be diseases of the soul. “The birth of these means decay in the soul.”<sup>194</sup> “The ascetic,” he

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<sup>190</sup>“Ἔοικε δέ πως παρούσης ἀλγηδόνοσ ἡ ψυχὴ νεύειν ἀπ’ αὐτῆσ καὶ τίμιον ἡγεῖσθαι τὴν ἀπαλλαγὴν τῆσ παρούσῆσ ὀδύνησ.” *Ibid.*, 4.5.20.1.

<sup>191</sup>“Ὁ δὲ αὐτὸσ λόγος καὶ περὶ πενίας, ἐπεὶ καὶ αὐτὴ τῶν ἀναγκαίων, τῆσ θεωρίας λέγω καὶ τῆσ καθαρῶσ ἀναμαρτησίας, ἀπασχολεῖν βιάζεται τὴν ψυχὴν, περὶ τοὺσ πορισμοὺσ διατρίβειν ἀναγκάζουσα τὸν μὴ ὄλον ἑαυτὸν δι’ ἀγάπησ ἀνατεθεικότα τῶ θεῶ, ὥσπερ ἔμπαλιν ἢ τε ὑγίεια καὶ ἡ τῶν ἐπιτηδείων ἀφθονία ἑλευθέραν καὶ ἀνεμπόδιστον φυλάσσει τὴν ψυχὴν τὴν εὖ χρῆσθαι τοῖσ παροῦσι γινώσκουσαν.” *Ibid.*, 4.5.21.1.

<sup>192</sup>“τούτων οὖν ἀνθεκτέον οὐ δι’ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ διὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἡ δὲ τοῦ σώματος ἐπιμέλεια διὰ τὴν ψυχὴν γίνεται, ἐφ’ ἣν ἡ ἀναφορά.” *Ibid.*, 4.5.22.1.

<sup>193</sup>“ἐγκράτεια τοίνυν σώματος ὑπεροψία κατὰ τὴν πρὸσ θεὸν ὁμολογίαν. οὐ μόνον γὰρ περὶ τὰ ἀφροδίσια, ἀλλὰ καὶ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα, ἂ ἐπιθυμεῖ ἡ ψυχὴ.” *Stromata* 3.1.4.1. Translation FC. On the place of self-restraint and the soul, see Hamilton B. Timothy, *The Early Christian Apologists and Greek Philosophy* (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1973), 75-77.

<sup>194</sup>“τούτων δὲ ἡ γένεσισ φθορὰ τῆσ ψυχῆσ.” *Stromata* 3.9.63.3. For the Stoic



writes, “is freeing his soul from passions.”<sup>195</sup> He also writes, “By trusting in God’s own charm, be delivered from passions which are the diseases of the mind, and rescued from sin?”<sup>196</sup> It is in this context that the work of the Instructor is described. He writes, “Hence accordingly ensues the healing of our passions, in consequence of the assuagements of those examples; the Paedagogue strengthening our souls, and by His benign commands, as by gentle medicines, guiding the sick to the perfect knowledge of the truth.”<sup>197</sup> Here again the soul is healed from passions and then led to truth. Clement speaks of things which the law prohibits being “adultery, uncleanness, pederasty, ignorance, wickedness, soul-disease, death (not that which severs the soul from the body, but that which severs the soul from truth).”<sup>198</sup> Here soul disease seems to be a phrase that encompasses the previous vices rather than a specific vice itself. Death is to be understood, not in the

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and Platonic background to Clement’s concept of the diseased soul, see Kamala Parel, “The Disease of the Passions in Clement of Alexandria,” *Studia Patristica* 36 (2001): 449-455.

<sup>195</sup>“ὁ δὲ σώφρων τὴν κυρίαν τοῦ σώματος ψυχὴν ἐλευθεροῖ τῶν παθῶν.” *Stromata* 3.5.41.3. Translation FC.

<sup>196</sup>“καὶ τῇ ἐπωδῇ τοῦ θεοῦ πιστεύσαντες ἀπαλλαγῆναι μὲν παθῶν, ἃ δὴ ψυχῆς νόσοι, ἀποσπασθῆναι δὲ ἀμαρτίας.” *Protrepticus* 11.115.2. Cf. *Paedagogus* 1.8.65.2 where admonition is the regimen of the diseased soul. For a discussion on the diseased soul in Stoicism, see Max Pohlenz, *Die Stoa: Geschichte einer geistigen Bewegung*, vol. 1 (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1964), 142-143. See also *Paedagogus* 1.9.88.1; *Eclogae prophetae* 11.2.

<sup>197</sup>“Ἰασις οὖν τῶν παθῶν ἐνθένδε ἔπεται, κατὰ τὰς παραμυθίας τῶν εἰκόνων ἐπιρρωννύντος τοῦ παιδαγωγοῦ τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ ὡσπερ ἡπίοις φαρμάκοις ταῖς ὑποθήκαις ταῖς φιλανθρώποις εἰς τὴν παντελεῖ τῆς ἀληθείας γνῶσιν τοὺς κάμνοντας διαιτωμένου.” *Paedagogus* 1.1.3.1. Cf. 1.1.3.3; 1.2.6.1. Clement also ascribes regenerative power to God the Father. See *Stromata* 7.16.93.5. For a recent monograph on Christ as instructor in Clement’s anthropology, see Sanguinetti.

<sup>198</sup>“ἀποφεύγειν προστάττει, μοιχείαν, ἀσέλγειαν, παιδερασίαν, ἄγνοιαν, ἀδικίαν, νόσον ψυχῆς, θάνατον, οὐ τὸν διαλύοντα ψυχὴν ἀπὸ σώματος, ἀλλὰ τὸν διαλύοντα ψυχὴν ἀπὸ ἀληθείας.” *Stromata* 2.7.34.2.

normal way of separation of soul from body, but rather by the separation of the soul from truth.

Clement also writes of divine reproof as “the surgery of the passions of the soul . . . which must be cut open by an incision of the lancet of reproof.”<sup>199</sup> “Reproof and rebuke . . . are the stripes of the soul.”<sup>200</sup> “And punishment, in virtue of its being so, is the correction of the soul.”<sup>201</sup> In this context, Clement asks if we should not submit, “for the soul’s sake, to either banishment, or punishment, or bonds, provided only from unrighteousness we shall attain to righteousness?”<sup>202</sup> The soul is also conceived of as apathetic and in need of rebuke, a wound not to death but for life.<sup>203</sup> He urges believers that while they are still in the body, they should “enjoy impassibility and tranquility of soul.”<sup>204</sup>

In the context of the work of the Instructor, Clement also speaks of the health of

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<sup>199</sup>“Ἔστι δὲ οἷον εἰ χειρουργία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς παθῶν ὁ ἔλεγχος, . . . ἃ χρὴ διελέγχειν διαιροῦντα τῇ τομῇ.” *Paedagogus* 1.8.64.4. Cf. 1.8.65.3.

<sup>200</sup>“Ἐλεγχος γὰρ καὶ ἐπίπληξις, ὥσπερ οὖν καὶ τοῦνομα αἰνίττεται, αὐταὶ πληγαὶ ψυχῆς εἰσι.” *Ibid.*, 1.9.82.2. Clement defends this concept both from the Scriptures by quoting Prov 23:13-14 and from Plato *Soph.* 230 DE.

<sup>201</sup>“κόλασις δὲ <δικαία> οὔσα διόρθωσις ἐστι ψυχῆς.” *Stromata* 1.26.168.3.

<sup>202</sup>“τῆς δὲ ψυχῆς ἔνεκα οὐχ ὁμοίως ὑποστησόμεθα.” *Ibid.*, 1.27.171.3.

<sup>203</sup>“Εἰ γὰρ ψέξει χρὴ, καὶ λοιδορεῖσθαι δεῖ, ἔνθα τὴν ἀπηληγηκυῖαν ψυχὴν καιρὸς ἐστὶ τρωῶσαι, οὐ θανασίμως, ἀλλὰ σωτηρίως, ὀλίγης ἀλγηδόνοιο αἰδίου κερδάναντα θάνατον.” *Paedagogus* 1.8.74.2. Here the soul is described as capable of experiencing pain. On the Stoic notion of *apatheia*, see Ernst Hoffmann, *Leben und Tod in der stoischen Philosophie* (Heidelberg: F. H. Kerle, 1946), 12-19; Raoul Mortley, *Connaissance religieuse et herméneutique chez Clément d’Alexandrie* (Leiden: Brill, 1973), 157; John M. Rist, *Eros and Psyche: Studies in Plato, Plotinus, and Origen*, Phoenix Journal of the Classical Association of Canada Supplementary Volume 6 (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1964), 197; Wytzes, 239-245.

<sup>204</sup>“ἀπάθειαν ψυχῆς καὶ ἀταραξίαν καρπούμενοι.” *Stromata* 4.7.55.4.

the soul. He writes regarding Christ, “From which Word springs the true health of the soul, and its eternal happy temperament.”<sup>205</sup> He also writes regarding the help the rich receive “by the grace of the Savior healing their souls, enlightening them and leading them to the attainment of the truth.”<sup>206</sup>

The wounds of the soul, for Clement, are the “fears, lusts, passions, pains, deceits, pleasures” for which the only cure is the blood of Jesus, who has “poured wine on our wounded souls.”<sup>207</sup> Clement writes regarding adolescents who drink alcohol, that upon so doing, “the breasts and organs of generation, inflamed with wine, expand and swell in a shameful way, already exhibiting beforehand the image of fornication; and the body compels the wound of the soul to inflame, and shameless pulsations follow abundance, inciting the man of correct behavior to transgression.”<sup>208</sup>

The drunkard reveals the “shame of the soul”<sup>209</sup> and by only drinking when necessary, the “soul shall be pure, and dry, and luminous; and the soul itself is wisest and best when dry.”<sup>210</sup> Those who have been given over to excess possess a “soul even before

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<sup>205</sup>“ἐξ οὗ λόγου ἡ ἀληθῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ὑγεία.” *Paedagogus* 1.11.96.2.

<sup>206</sup>“τοῦτο δὲ λόγῳ διὰ τῆς χάριτος τοῦ σωτῆρος ἰωμένους τὰς ψυχὰς αὐτῶν.” *Quis dives salvetur* 1.4.

<sup>207</sup>“τὸ αἷμα τῆς ἀμπέλου τῆς Δαβίδ, ἐκχέας ἡμῶν ἐπὶ τὰς τετρωμένας ψυχάς.” *Ibid.*, 29.4.

<sup>208</sup>“Ὁργῶσι γοῦν ἀναιδέστερον ἀναζέοντος οἴνου καὶ οἰδοῦσι μαστοί τε καὶ μόρια προκηρύσσοντες ἤδη πορνείας εἰκόνα καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ τραῦμα φλεγμαίνειν ἀναγκάζει τὸ σῶμα σφυγμοί τε ἀναιδεῖς περιεργίαν διώκουσιν εἰς παρανομίας ἐκκαλούμενοι τὸν κόσμιον.” *Paedagogus* 2.2.20.4. In this context, Clement also refers to a burning or smoldering soul (καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τυφομένην ἤδη καθέξει).

<sup>209</sup>“δι’ ὧν ἡ αἰσχὺνη ἔνδοθεν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθεωρεῖται.” *Ibid.*, 2.2.27.3.

<sup>210</sup>“Οὕτω δ’ ἂν καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ ἡμῶν ὑπάρξαι καθαρὰ καὶ ξηρὰ καὶ φωτεινὴ, αὐγὴ δὲ ψυχῆ ξηρὰ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη.” *Ibid.*, 2.2.29.3.

drunkenness [which] is insane in its desires.”<sup>211</sup> Drunkenness affects even reason in the soul. He writes, “Reason, weighed down in the soul itself by drunkenness, is lulled to sleep.”<sup>212</sup>

Evil speech also has the ability to injure the soul. The Instructor, Clement says, arrays believers with ear-muffs “so that the pulsation of fornication may not penetrate to the bruising of the soul.”<sup>213</sup> On the other hand, good “discourse refreshes the soul and entices it to nobleness.”<sup>214</sup>

The sense of smell along with sight is also an avenue for the soul to be corrupted. “And as we have abandoned luxury in taste, so certainly do we renounce voluptuousness in sights and odors; lest through the senses, as through unwatched doors, we unconsciously give access into the soul to that excess which we have driven away.”<sup>215</sup> Music also can have a corrupting influence on the soul. He writes, “But we must reject superfluous music, which enervates men’s souls, and leads to variety,—now mournful, and then licentious and voluptuous, and then frenzied and frantic.”<sup>216</sup>

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<sup>211</sup>“Πλαδῶσης δὲ ὀρέξεως δι’ ἀκρασίαν αἱ διαπόντιοι οἰνηγίαι, παραφρονοῦσης καὶ πρὸ τῆς μέθης περὶ τὰς ἐπιθυμίας τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 2.2.30.2.

<sup>212</sup>“δι’ ἣν κατακοιμίζεται μὲν ὁ λόγος ἐν αὐτῇ τῇ ψυχῇ καρηβαρήσας τῇ μέθῃ.” Ibid., 2.5.48.3.

<sup>213</sup>“ὥς μὴ δύνασθαι ἐξικνεῖσθαι εἰς θραῦσιν τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ κροῦμα τῆς πορνείας.” Ibid., 2.6.49.2.

<sup>214</sup>“ἀνακτᾶται γοῦν καὶ ὁ λόγος τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐπὶ καλοκάγαθίαν προτρέπει.” *Stromata* 1.10.46.3.

<sup>215</sup>“οὕτως ἀμέλει καὶ τῶν ὄψεων καὶ τῶν ὀσφρήσεων τὴν ἡδυπάθειαν ἐξορίζομεν, μὴ λάθωμεν ἢ ἐφυγαδεύσαμεν ἀκολασίαν, κάθοδον αὐτῇ διδόντες εἰς ψυχὴν διὰ τῶν αἰσθήσεων, οἷονεὶ διὰ θυρῶν ἀφρουρήτων.” *Paedagogus* 2.8.66.3.

<sup>216</sup>“περιττὴ δὲ μουσικὴ ἀποπτυστέα ἢ κατακλῶσα τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ εἰς

Money also has the power to affect the soul. Clement writes in the context of chastising those who praise the wealthy that “wealth is of itself sufficient to puff up and corrupt the souls of its possessors.”<sup>217</sup>

Clement is very clear that practices which the body undertakes influence the soul for ill or good.<sup>218</sup> In addition to those just mentioned, unhealthy dietary practices influence the soul negatively. Clement writes, “But let our diet be light and digestible. . . . The diet which exceeds sufficiency injures a man, deteriorates his spirit, and renders his body prone to disease.”<sup>219</sup> He also writes that “full feeding begets in the soul uneasiness, and forgetfulness, and foolishness.”<sup>220</sup> Food offered to idols and the fine fare consumed at vulgar parties also damages the soul. Concerning this he writes, “The fumes arising from them being dense, darken the soul.”<sup>221</sup> As support for this concept, Clement quotes

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ποικιλίαν ἐμβάλλουσα τοτὲ μὲν θρηνώδη, τοτὲ δὲ ἀκόλαστον καὶ ἡδυπαθῆ, τοτὲ δὲ ἐκβακχευομένην καὶ μανικὴν.” *Stromata* 6.11.90.2.

<sup>217</sup>“αὐτῆς τῆς περιουσίας καθ’ αὐτὴν ἱκανῆς οὐσης χαυνῶσαι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν κεκτημένων.” *Quis dives salvetur* 1.3.

<sup>218</sup>See *Stromata* 7.7.36.4; 8.4.14.4. See Pelikan, *The Shape of Death*, 39. Cf. Michel Spanneut, *Le stoïcisme des pères de l’Église, de Clément de Rome à Clément d’Alexandrie* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil, 1957), 133. He suggests that Clement understands a certain materialness in the soul. For a discussion on the “regimen” described by Clement in the context of ascetism, see Behr, 160-166. On the discussion of the body and health in Clement, see Augidius Decker, *Kenntnis und Pflege des Körpers bei Clemens von Alexandria* (Innsbruck: Felizian Rauch, 1936).

<sup>219</sup>“ἡ δὲ ὑπερβλύζουσα τὴν αὐτάρκειαν δίαιτα τὸν ἄνθρωπον κακοῖ, νωθῆ μὲν τὴν ψυχὴν, ἐπισφαλὲς δὲ εἰς νόσον ἐργαζομένη τὸ σῶμα.” *Paedagogus* 2.1.7.3. Note that neither ANF nor FC translates ψυχὴ as soul choosing instead spirit or mind.

<sup>220</sup>“δυσπάθειαν δὲ καὶ λήθην καὶ ἀφροσύνην ἢ πολυτροφία ἐντίκτει τῆ ψυχῆ.” *Ibid.*, 2.1.17.3.

<sup>221</sup>“καὶ ἡ ἀπ’ αὐτῶν ἀναθυμιάσις θολωδεστέρα οὔσα ἐπισκοτεῖ τῆ ψυχῆ.” *Ibid.*, 2.1.11.1.

from 1 Cor 5:11 and Rom 14:21 and acknowledges that the Pythagoreans also believe likewise. Not burdening one's soul by eating flesh gives one the "advantage of a rational reason."<sup>222</sup>

Just as eating influences the soul, so also does fasting. Clement suggest that fasting is especially suited for the purpose of emptying the soul.<sup>223</sup> He writes, "Especially does fasting empty the soul of matter, and make it, along with the body, pure and light for the divine words."<sup>224</sup>

Sleep even has the potential for disturbing the soul. All the ills suffered during the daytime contribute to maladies at night which affect the soul. "But the hiccupping of those who are loaded with wine, and the snortings of those who are stuffed with food, and the snoring rolled in the bed-clothes, and the rumblings of pained stomachs, cover over the clear-seeing eye of the soul, by filling the mind with ten thousand fantasies."<sup>225</sup> Sleep itself, Clement insists relying on Plato, is not to be over-indulged in. "For much sleep brings advantage neither to our bodies nor our souls."<sup>226</sup> And as if to push the point further, if one is tired as a result of not sleeping enough, they should not take a nap during

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<sup>222</sup>“εἰ δέ τις τῶν δικαίων οὐκ ἐπιφορτίζει τῇ τῶν κρεῶν βρώσει τὴν ψυχὴν, λόγῳ τινὶ εὐλόγῳ χρῆται.” *Stromata* 7.6.32.8. Cf. 7.6.32.9.

<sup>223</sup>Clement draws the “emptying” imagery from Christ’s parable on the one who cleaned and swept his house and then suffered from the evil spirits returning to take up residence once again because it had not been filled.

<sup>224</sup>“ἄλλως τε κενοῖ τῆς ὕλης τὴν ψυχὴν ἢ νηστεία καὶ καθαρὰν καὶ κούφην σὺν καὶ τῷ σώματι παρίστησι τοῖς θείοις λόγοις.” *Eclogae prophetae* 14.2.

<sup>225</sup>“τὸ διορατικὸν τῆς ψυχῆς κατέχωσαν ὄμμα φαντασιῶν μυρίων τῆς διανοίας ἐμπιπλαμένης.” *Paedagogus* 2.9.81.1.

<sup>226</sup>“Υπνος γὰρ δὴ πολὺς οὔτε τοῖς σώμασιν οὔτε ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἡμῶν ὠφέλειαν ἐπιφέρει.” *Ibid.*, 2.9.81.2. Clement here quotes Plato *Laws* 8.808BC.

the day as “fits of uselessness, and napping and stretching one’s self, and yawning, are manifestations of frivolous uneasiness of soul.”<sup>227</sup>

Clement urges that the soul be a place of beauty. Riches, like beauty, exist only in the soul, and the fruit of the soul is generosity.<sup>228</sup> Those who succumb to the pleasures of gaudy dress are likely to find that “a fornicator and adulteress has occupied the shrine of the soul.”<sup>229</sup> “Cosmetics and dyes indicate that the soul is deeply diseased.”<sup>230</sup> In support of this concept, Clement cites 1 Kgs 16:7 where God tells Samuel that he looks not on the outward appearance but upon the heart. Clement concludes that God places more importance on the beauty of the soul than that of the body.<sup>231</sup> In response to those men who do their hair as women, Clement remarks that the soul does not show truth if it has a fraudulent head.<sup>232</sup> He even argues that bathing too much is not good. It is our souls that need to be cleansed in the Word.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>227</sup>“Ἄλυσες <δὲ> καὶ νυσταγμοὶ καὶ διεκτάσεις καὶ χάσμαι δυσαρρεστίαι ψυχῆς εἰσιν ἀβεβαίου.” *Paedagogus* 2.9.81.5.

<sup>228</sup>“καρπὸς δὲ ψυχῆς τὸ εὐμετάδοτον· ἐν ψυχῇ ἄρα τὸ πλούσιον.” *Ibid.*, 3.6.36.1. See Méhat, 343-345. See also Clement’s discussion of the rich young ruler in *Quis dives salvetur* 11.2.

<sup>229</sup>“πόρνη δὲ ἀντ’ αὐτῆς καὶ μοιχαλὶς τῆς ψυχῆς κατείληφε τὸ ἄδυτον.” *Paedagogus* 3.2.5.3

<sup>230</sup>“τὰ ἐντροίμματα καὶ αἱ βαφαὶ νοσοῦσαν ἐν βάθει τὴν ψυχὴν αἰνίττονται.” *Ibid.*, 3.2.9.3

<sup>231</sup>“καὶ οὐκ ἔχρισε τὸν καλὸν τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ τὸν καλὸν τὴν ψυχὴν.” *Paedagogus* 3.2.12.3.

<sup>232</sup>“οὐκ ἔστιν ἀληθινὴν ἐνδεικνύσαι τὴν ψυχὴν τὸν κίβδηλον ἔχοντα κεφαλὴν.” *Ibid.*, 3.3.17.1.

<sup>233</sup>“Τὸ μὲν οὖν ἄριστον λουτρὸν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποσμήχει τὸν ρύπον καὶ ἔστι πνευματικόν.” *Ibid.*, 3.9.48.2.

Clement compares the need for modesty in the soul with that of the light of reason. In discussing marriage and sexuality in it, he writes that married couples “must not forget modesty at night time under the pretext of the cover of darkness; like the light of reason, modesty must ever dwell in their souls.”<sup>234</sup>

Along with the practical remarks on the soul and sleep, Clement seeks to make clear that the soul itself does not need sleep. “The need of sleep is not in the soul. For it is ceaselessly active. But the body is relieved by being resigned to rest, the soul whilst not acting through the body, but exercising intelligence within itself.”<sup>235</sup> Activity for the soul is key to existence. Clement concludes by stating, “For the soul to cease from activity within itself, were destruction to it.”<sup>236</sup>

Dreams, for Clement, are how the mind keeps active during sleep. They “are the thoughts of a sober soul, undistracted for the time by the affections of the body, and counseling with itself in the best manner.”<sup>237</sup> Clement notes that at night, “the soul, released from the perceptions of sense, turns in on itself and has a truer hold of intelligence.”<sup>238</sup>

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<sup>234</sup>“ἀλλ’ ἐγκαθειροκτέον τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ αἰδημον οἶονεὶ φῶς τοῦ λογισμοῦ.” Ibid., 2.10.97.2.

<sup>235</sup>“ὡς οὐ ψυχῆς τὸ δεόμενον ὕπνου ἐστὶν — ἀεικίνητος γὰρ αὕτη —, ἀλλὰ τὸ σῶμα ἀναπαύλαις διαβασταζόμενον παρίεται, μὴ ἐνεργούσης ἔτι σωματικῶς τῆς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ καθ’ αὐτὴν ἐννοουμένης.” Ibid., 2.9.82.1. While Clement notes that the soul does not need sleep, yet he can speak of it being weary from false acts and words happening around it. Ibid., 3.4.27.2.

<sup>236</sup>“ψυχῆς δὲ ὄλεθρος τὸ ἀτρεμῆσαι αὐτήν.” *Paedagogus* 2.9.82.2.

<sup>237</sup>“ἢ καὶ τῶν ὀνείρων οἱ ἀληθεῖς ὀρθῶς λογιζομένῳ νηφούσης εἰσὶ ψυχῆς λογισμοὶ ἀπερισπάστου τὸ τηρικᾶδε οὔσης περὶ τὰς τοῦ σώματος συμπαθείας καὶ αὐτῆς αὐτῇ τὰ κράτιστα συμβουλευούσης.” Ibid.

<sup>238</sup>“ἐπειδὴ τηρικᾶδε ἡ ψυχὴ πεπαυμένη τῶν αἰσθήσεων συννεύει πρὸς αὐτήν καὶ μᾶλλον μετέχει τῆς φρονήσεως.” *Stromata* 4.22.140.1.



There is a similarity between the soul at night and at death. He writes, “And as to what, again, they say of sleep, the very same things are to be understood of death. For each exhibits the departure of the soul, the one more, the other less.”<sup>239</sup> Thus, the soul is understood to be separate from the body at night.<sup>240</sup> In another discussion of dreams, Clement notes that dreams had during sleep are assented to by the soul. However, dreams had while one is awake are lust.<sup>241</sup>

It is of note that Clement can write to such length on the connection between the deeds of the body and the diseases of the soul and then turn to the Stoic thought that there is no connection between the two.<sup>242</sup> He writes, “Fit objects for admiration are the Stoics, who say that the soul is not affected by the body, either to vice by disease, or to virtue by health.”<sup>243</sup> This is understood better when one notes that it is written immediately after a discussion on martyrdom and leading into a discussion on pain with the first example given by looking at the sufferings of Job. Thus, the sufferings of Job in the flesh were not able to affect the virtue of his soul.

Clement discusses the concept of the eye of the soul.<sup>244</sup> He writes, “For the sun

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<sup>239</sup>“ὅσα δ’ αὖ περὶ ὕπνου λέγουσι, τὰ αὐτὰ χρῆ καὶ περὶ θανάτου ἐξακούειν. ἐκάτερος γὰρ δηλοῖ τὴν ἀπόστασιν τῆς ψυχῆς, ὁ μὲν μᾶλλον, ὁ δὲ ἥττον.” Ibid., 4.22.141.1.

<sup>240</sup>See *ibid.*, 4.22.140.3.

<sup>241</sup>*Ibid.*, 4.18.116.1.

<sup>242</sup>Compare his statement in *Stromata* 6.12.103.5 where he writes that the body bears the stamp of the righteous soul (ιδίωμα χαρακτηριστικὸν τῆς δικαίας εἰρήκαμεν ψυχῆς).

<sup>243</sup>“Θαυμάζειν δὲ ἄξιον καὶ τῶν Στωϊκῶν οἵτινές φασι μηδὲν τὴν ψυχὴν ὑπὸ τοῦ σώματος διατίθεσθαι μήτε πρὸς κακίαν ὑπὸ τῆς νόσου μήτε πρὸς ἀρετὴν ὑπὸ τῆς υἰγείας.” Ibid., 4.5.19.1.

<sup>244</sup>Cf. Plato *Republic* 7.533D.

never could show me the true God; but that healthful Word, that is the Sun of the soul, by whom alone, when He arises in the depths of the soul, the eye of the soul itself is irradiated.”<sup>245</sup> Here, Christ is described as the one who can shine in the eye of the mind.<sup>246</sup> In a similar way, he writes, “For how can it be other than desirable, since it has filled with light the mind which had been buried in darkness, and given keenness to the ‘light-bringing eyes’ of the soul?”<sup>247</sup> In commenting on the sin of Israel, he writes, “He [God] shows their offence to be clearer, by declaring that they understood, and thus sinned willfully. Understanding is the eye of the soul.”<sup>248</sup> He also writes that the believer must purge the “eye of the soul.”<sup>249</sup> In a different analogy, Clement describes “faith” as “the ear of the soul.”<sup>250</sup>

Clement also has an interesting expression, the face of the soul.<sup>251</sup> He uses it in discussing the meaning of the cherubim in the Mosaic sanctuary.<sup>252</sup> Comparing the true Gnostic with Moses, Clement writes, that he is revealed in righteousness, “as Moses,

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<sup>245</sup>“οὐδὲ γὰρ ἥλιος ἐπιδείξει ποτ’ ἂν τὸν θεὸν τὸν ἀληθῆ, ὁ δὲ λόγος ὁ ὑγιής, ὅς ἐστιν ἥλιος ψυχῆς, δι’ οὗ μόνου ἔνδον ἀνατείλαντος ἐν τῷ βάθει τοῦ νοῦ αὐτοῦ καταυγάζεται τὸ ὄμμα.” *Protrepticus* 6.68.4. Cf. *Stromata* 3.12.84.4. “The children are holy when the Lord’s words have brought the soul to God as a bride.”

<sup>246</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 5.4.19.2 where the Savior gives undazzled and keen vision to the contemplative soul.

<sup>247</sup>“Πῶς γὰρ οὐ ποθεινὸς ὁ τὸν ἐν σκότει κατορωρυγμένον νοῦν ἐναργῆ ποιησάμενος καὶ τὰ ‘φωσφόρα’ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποξύνας ‘ὄμματα.’” *Protrepticus* 11.113.2.

<sup>248</sup>“Καὶ ἡ σύνεσις ὄψις ἐστὶ ψυχῆς.” *Paedagogus* 1.9.77.2.

<sup>249</sup>“τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκκαθαίρειν.” *Ibid.*, 2.1.1.2. Cf. *Stromata* 1.1.10.1.

<sup>250</sup>“πίστις δὲ ᾧτα ψυχῆς.” *Ibid.*, 5.1.2.1. See also 7.16.103.3.

<sup>251</sup>“τὸ πρόσωπον ψυχῆς.”

<sup>252</sup>“σύμβολον δ’ ἐστὶ λογικῆς μὲν τὸ πρόσωπον ψυχῆς.” *Ibid.*, 5.6.36.4

glorified in the face of the soul.”<sup>253</sup>

## Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

### Origin of the Soul

Clement states that the soul is given by God to each person. He writes of “men who are God’s handiwork, who have received [their] souls from Him.”<sup>254</sup> Later, commenting on creation he asks, “Who breathed soul into the lifeless form?”<sup>255</sup> He also adds, “Rightly then Moses says, that the body which Plato calls ‘the earthly tabernacle’ was formed of the ground, but that the rational soul was breathed by God into man’s face.”<sup>256</sup> Clement clearly relies here on Gen 2:7.

Despite its origin in the breath of God, Clement does not view the soul as divine. He is clear that the soul has not descended to the material world after a higher existence.

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<sup>253</sup>“δεδοξασμένος ἤδη κἀνθένδε καθάπερ ὁ Μωυσῆς τὸ πρόσωπον [τῆς ψυχῆς].” Ibid., 6.12.103.5. In this context, Clement describes the “divine power of goodness clinging to the righteous soul in contemplation and in prophecy, and in the exercise of the function of governance” and impressing “on it something, as it were, of intellectual radiance, like the solar ray, as a visible sign of righteousness, uniting the soul with light, through unbroken love, which is God-bearing and God-borne.” Ibid., 6.12.104.1 (οὕτως καὶ τῇ δικαίᾳ ψυχῇ θεία τις ἀγαθωσύνης δύναμις . . . φῶς ἠνωμένον ψυχῇ δι’ ἀγάπης ἀδιαστάτου).

<sup>254</sup>“εἰ οὐκ ἄτοπον ὑμῖν δοκεῖ πλάσμα ὑμᾶς τοὺς ἀνθρώπους ἐπιγεγονότας τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ παρ’ αὐτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰληφότας.” *Protrepticus* 10.92.2.

<sup>255</sup>“Τίς ἐνεφύσησε ψυχὴν.” *Protrepticus* 10.98.2. On the soul as the *imago dei* for Clement, see Mortley, 153.

<sup>256</sup>“εἰκότως ἄρα ἐκ γῆς μὲν τὸ σῶμα διαπλάττεσθαι λέγει ὁ Μωυσῆς, ὁ γῆινόν φησιν ὁ Πλάτων σκῆνος, ψυχὴν δὲ τὴν λογικὴν ἄνωθεν ἐμπνευσθῆναι ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς πρόσωπον.” *Stromata* 5.14.94.3. On Clement’s use of Plato here, see Daniel Ridings, *The Attic Moses: The Dependency Theme in Some Early Christian Writers* (Göteborg, Sweden: Acta Universitatis Gothoburgensis, 1995), 101. Ridings points out that Clement argues that Gen 2:7 was behind both the Pythagoreans, Plato, and Aristotle. Ibid., 105-106.

He writes that God “would never drive the soul down from a better home to a worse.”<sup>257</sup>

In this argument, he is against what Origen will later posit, the prior existence of souls before the earthly creation. He also writes, “The soul is not then sent down from heaven to what is worse. For God works all things up to what is better.”<sup>258</sup> This, he notes, is in contrast to the Platonists who “hold that mind is an effluence of divine dispensation in the soul.”<sup>259</sup> In this context Clement admits that while Christians believe “that the Holy Spirit inspires him who has believed,” he also states that “it is not as a portion of God that the Spirit is in each of us.”<sup>260</sup> To further emphasize the fact that the soul is not divine, Clement writes that “it was through birth that the universe was constituted, so too the substances, the creatures, the angels, the powers, the souls, the commandment, the Law, the gospel, the revealed knowledge of God.”<sup>261</sup>

In spite of this stance regarding the soul’s nature in contrast to the divine, Clement, while describing how God hears the prayers of the believer, suggests that this is possible “since assuredly soul hears soul, and mind, mind?”<sup>262</sup> Here there seems to be a

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<sup>257</sup>“ὅς οὐκ ἄν ποτε ἐξ ἀμεινόνων εἰς τὰ χείρω κατάγοι ψυχὴν.” *Stromata* 3.14.94.3.

<sup>258</sup>“οὐκ οὐρανόθεν καταπέμπεται δεῦρο ἐπὶ τὰ ἥττω ψυχὴ, ὁ θεὸς γὰρ ἐπὶ τὰ ἀμείνω πάντα ἐργάζεται.” *Ibid.*, 4.26.167.4.

<sup>259</sup>“ἀλλ’ ἡμεῖς μὲν τῷ πεπιστευκότι προσεπιπνεῖσθαι τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμά φαμεν, οἱ δὲ ἀμφὶ τὸν Πλάτωνα νοῦν μὲν ἐν ψυχῇ θείας μοίρας ἀπόρροϊαν ὑπάρχοντα, ψυχὴν δὲ ἐν σώματι κατοικίζουσιν.” *Ibid.*, 5.13.88.2.

<sup>260</sup>*Stromata* 5.13.88.6. Chadwick argues that this also implies that the soul is not immortal in Clement’s understanding. Henry Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1966), 49.

<sup>261</sup>“δι’ ἣν ὁ κόσμος συνέστηκεν, δι’ ἣν αἱ οὐσίαι, δι’ ἣν αἱ φύσεις . . . δι’ ἣν ψυχαί.” *Stromata* 3.17.103.1.

<sup>262</sup>“ὅπου γε ἤδη ψυχὴ ψυχῆς καὶ νοῦς νοὸς ἐπαῖει.” *Ibid.*, 7.7.43.4.

clear analogy between the soul and mind of humans and that of the divine. This is further illustrated in his discussions on peace and the soul. He writes, “So, then, what is really good is seen to be most pleasant, and of itself produces the fruit which is desired—tranquility of soul.”<sup>263</sup> This Clement connects with becoming like God. He concludes, “On this wise it is possible for the Gnostic already to have become God.”<sup>264</sup> Elsewhere he writes, “For the Word of God is intellectual, according as the image of mind is seen in man alone. Thus also the good man is godlike in form and semblance as respects his soul. And, on the other hand, God is like man. For the distinctive form of each one is the mind by which we are characterized.”<sup>265</sup> Clement also describes a “boastful soul” which claims that it will not be “caught doing evil.” This soul, Clement describes as pure by “receiving the Lord’s power, [it] studies to be God.”<sup>266</sup> He concludes by stating that “such a soul is never at any time separated from God.”<sup>267</sup>

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Clement remarks elsewhere that a certain state of the soul is necessary. “Wherefore also he who holds converse with God must have his soul immaculate and stainlessly pure, it being essential to have made himself perfectly good.” *Ibid.*, 7.7.49.1.

<sup>263</sup>“ὅτω τοίνυν <τὰ> τῷ ὄντι καλὰ φαίνεται ἡδιστα, παρ’ αὐτοῦ πορίζεται ὄν ποθει καρπὸν, τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς εὐστάθειαν.” *Ibid.*, 4.23.149.8. Cf. *Quis dives salvetur* 1.5; 33.6.

<sup>264</sup>*Stromata* 4.23.149.10.

<sup>265</sup>“νοερὸς γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ, καθ’ ὃ τοῦ νοῦ εἰκονισμὸς ὁρᾶται ἐν μόνῳ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, ἢ καὶ θεοειδῆς καὶ θεοεἰκελὸς ὁ ἀγαθὸς ἀνὴρ κατὰ ψυχὴν ὃ τε αὐτὸς θεὸς ἀνθρωποειδῆς· τὸ γὰρ εἶδος ἐκάστου ὁ νοῦς, ᾧ χαρακτηρίζομεθα.” *Stromata* 6.9.72.2.

<sup>266</sup>“Καί μοι δοκεῖ κομπῶδους μὲν εἶναι ψυχῆς καύχημα . . . καθαρὰν τὴν ψυχὴν . . . οὕτως δύναμιν λαβοῦσα κυριακὴν ἢ ψυχὴ μελετᾶ εἶναι θεός.” *Ibid.*, 6.14.113.1-3.

<sup>267</sup>“οὐ διορίζεται ποτε τοῦ θεοῦ κατ’ οὐδένα καιρὸν ἢ τοιάδε ψυχῆ.” *Ibid.*, 6.14.113.4.

## The Human Person and the Soul

Clement writes that the soul is “most precious to God,”<sup>268</sup> though both the soul and body are to be sanctified.<sup>269</sup> However, Clement does remind us that “the soul of man is confessedly the better part of man, and the body the inferior. But neither is the soul good by nature, nor, on the other hand, is the body bad by nature.”<sup>270</sup> However, the true Gnostic soul sees itself as only “sojourning in the body.”<sup>271</sup> The soul also rules over the body. In discussing the value of asceticism, he writes that “the soul has authority over the body.”<sup>272</sup> In discussing proper dress, Clement writes, “The covering ought, in my judgment, to show that which is covered to be better than itself, as the image is superior to the temple, the soul to the body, and the body to the clothes.”<sup>273</sup> In a similar context, Clement notes that “in the soul alone are beauty and deformity shown.”<sup>274</sup> This, of

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<sup>268</sup>“ὄθεν ἐπιδεκτικὸν γίνεται τῆς τιμιωτάτης τῷ θεῷ ψυχῆς τὸ οἰκητήριον.” Ibid., 4.26.163.2.

<sup>269</sup>“ὄθεν ἐπιδεκτικὸν γίνεται τῆς τιμιωτάτης τῷ θεῷ ψυχῆς τὸ οἰκητήριον τοῦτο καὶ πνεύματος ἁγίου κατὰ τὸν τῆς ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος ἁγιασμόν καταξιοῦται.” Ibid., 4.26.163.2.

<sup>270</sup>“κρεῖττον μὲν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ὡμολόγηται ἡ ψυχὴ, ἥττον δὲ τὸ σῶμα. ἀλλ’ οὔτε ἀγαθὸν ἡ ψυχὴ φύσει οὔτε αὖ κακὸν φύσει τὸ σῶμα, οὐδὲ μὴν ὃ μὴ ἔστιν ἀγαθόν, τοῦτο εὐθέως κακόν.” Ibid., 4.26.164.3. See H. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition*, 48; Koffas, 116-119; Sanguineti, 114.

<sup>271</sup>“αὐτίκα ἡ τοῦ σοφοῦ τε καὶ γνωστικοῦ ψυχὴ, οἷον ἐπιξενουμένη τῷ σώματι.” *Stromata* 4.26.165.2.

<sup>272</sup>“ὁ δὲ σώφρων τὴν κυρίαν τοῦ σώματος ψυχὴν ἐλευθεροῖ τῶν παθῶν.” Ibid., 3.5.41.3. Méhat sees here a similarity with the Pythagorean and Platonic notion of purification of the soul. Méhat, 369-370.

<sup>273</sup>“Δεῖ δὲ τὴν σκέπην, οἶμαι, αὐτὸ αὐτῆς κρεῖττον ἀποφαίνειν τὸ σκεπόμενον, ὡς τὸ ἄγαλμα τοῦ νεῶ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος καὶ τῆς ἐσθῆτος τὸ σῶμα.” *Paedagogus* 2.10bis.115.3.

<sup>274</sup>“ἐν μόνῃ γὰρ τῇ ψυχῇ καταφαίνεται καὶ τὸ κάλλος καὶ τὸ αἴσχος.” Ibid., 2.12.121.2.

course, is in contrast to the body. However, in discussing Christ, Clement writes that in Him were exhibited “the true beauty of both soul and body,” the beauty of the soul being “beneficence,”<sup>275</sup> or “goodness.”<sup>276</sup>

Clement describes the human person as “composed of body and soul, . . . a universe in miniature.”<sup>277</sup> He adds, regarding the constitution of the human person, that it was “necessarily composed of things diverse, but not opposite—body and soul.”<sup>278</sup> Later, he notes that the Instructor “cares for the whole nature of His creature” and thus “heals both body and soul.”<sup>279</sup> One who partakes of the Eucharist is “sanctified both in body and soul.”<sup>280</sup>

Clement outlines the process that takes place for a soul to enter a body. Citing an ancient authority, he writes that “the soul entering into the womb after it has been by

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<sup>275</sup>“τὸ δὲ ἀληθινὸν καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῦ σώματος ἐνεδείξατο κάλλος, τῆς μὲν τὸ εὐεργετικόν.” Ibid., 3.1.3.3.

<sup>276</sup>“ἡ ψυχὴ καλλωπιστέα τῷ τῆς καλοκάγαθίας κοσμήματι.” Ibid., 3.2.4.1.

<sup>277</sup>“καὶ τὸν σμικρὸν κόσμον, τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ψυχὴν τε καὶ σῶμα αὐτοῦ.” *Protrepticus* 1.5.3. On the body-soul relationship in Clement, see Olivier Prunet, *La morale de Clément d’Alexandrie et le Nouveau Testament* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1966), 140-141; Sanguineti, 234-238.

<sup>278</sup>“ἐχρῆν δὴ οὖν τὴν σύνθεσιν τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ἐν αἰσθητοῖς γενομένην ἐκ διαφόρων συνεστάναι, ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἐξ ἐναντίων, σώματός τε καὶ ψυχῆς.” *Stromata* 4.26.165.1. Cf. 5.10.61.3 where Clement also insists that the whole man consists of both body and soul. On this relationship, see Fernández Ardanaz, *Genesis y Anagenesis*, 320-321.

<sup>279</sup>“ὄλου κήδεται τοῦ πλάσματος, καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν.” *Paedagogus* 1.2.6.2.

<sup>280</sup>“οἱ κατὰ πίστιν μεταλαμβάνοντες ἀγιάζονται καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν.” Ibid., 2.2.20.1. Here Clement describes the Spirit as inspiring the soul and the Word the flesh (μὲν τὸ πνεῦμα ὑπερέκειται τῇ ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ φερομένη ψυχῇ).

cleansing prepared for conception, and introduced by one of the angels who preside over generation, and who knows the time for conception, moves the woman to intercourse; and that, on the seed being deposited, the spirit, which is in the seed, is, so to speak, appropriated, and is thus assumed into conjunction in the process of formation.”<sup>281</sup> The ancient writer supports this statement by referencing Luke 1:41, 44 where the unborn child in the formerly barren Elizabeth leapt for joy at hearing Mary’s voice.

In discussing the creation of man, Clement writes, “But the individual man is stamped according to the impression produced in the soul by the objects of his choice.”<sup>282</sup> Clement recognizes the implications of free will to his understanding of salvation. He thus also asserts that the nature of the soul is such that “it is not without eminent grace that the soul is winged, and soars, and is raised above the higher spheres.”<sup>283</sup> In another place he writes, “For the soul wishes to be its own good; which the Lord, however, gives it.”<sup>284</sup> He then adds, “Wherefore God has endowed the soul with free choice, that He may show it its duty, and that it choosing, may receive and retain.”<sup>285</sup> He states that whether

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<sup>281</sup>“εἰσιούσαν γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν εἰς τὴν μήτραν ἀπὸ τῆς καθάρσεως ἠὺτρεπισμένην εἰς σύλληψιν καὶ εἰσκριθεῖσαν ὑπὸ τινος τῶν τῆ γενέσει ἐφεστῶτων ἀγγέλων προγινώσκοντος τὸν καιρὸν τῆς συλλήψεως κινεῖν πρὸς.” *Eclogae propheticae* 50.1. On this concept in Clement, see Buell, 25-26; Rizzerio, 408.

<sup>282</sup>“ὁ δὲ τις ἄνθρωπος κατὰ τύπωσιν τὴν ἐγγινομένην τῆ ψυχῇ ὧν ἂν αἰρήσῃται χαρακτηρίζεται.” *Stromata* 4.23.150.2. See Fernández Ardanaz, *Genesis y Anagenesis*, 114.

<sup>283</sup>“ἢ φασιν οἱ γυμνασταί, πλὴν οὐ χάριτος ἄνευ τῆς ἐξαιρέτου πτεροῦται τε καὶ ἀνίσταται καὶ ἄνω τῶν ὑπερκειμένων αἴρεται ἢ ψυχῇ.” *Stromata* 5.13.83.1.

<sup>284</sup>“βούλεται γὰρ τῆς ψυχῆς ἴδιον εἶναι τὸ ἀγαθόν, ὃ δίδωσιν αὐτῇ ὁ κύριος.” *Eclogae propheticae* 22.1.

<sup>285</sup>“διὰ τοῦτο [ἐπὶ] τῆ ψυχῇ ὁ θεὸς τὴν αἴρεσιν δέδωκεν, ἵνα αὐτὸς μὲν μηνύσῃ τὸ δέον, ἡ δὲ ἐλομένη δέξῃται καὶ κατάσχη.” *Ibid.*, 22.3.



God draws a soul to Himself or the soul's free-will is at work, yet grace is required. Thus it is not entirely clear what the soul can attain to by nature in Clement's understanding.

In a brief reference to the tripartite division of the human person, Clement allegorizes Matt 18:20 and remarks that a possible interpretation of this is the "flesh, soul, and spirit" of 1 Thess 5:23.<sup>286</sup> Clement also references the tripartite soul in an allegorical interpretation of Matt 13:33 about the kingdom of heaven being like a woman who hid leaven in three measures.<sup>287</sup>

The Gnostic Christian is also used in helping others. Clement writes of "removing the mountains' of his neighbors, and putting away the irregularities of their soul."<sup>288</sup> In this the Gnostic is called to benefit those around him. He also speaks, however, of the work the individual must do in this process. He writes of the "depravity of soul" as "accompanied with want of restraint; and he who acts from passion, acts from want of restraint and depravity."<sup>289</sup> Elsewhere he writes, "For he who has not formed the wish to extirpate the passion of the soul, kills himself."<sup>290</sup> He writes regarding the person who has realized that he/she must turn from outward things to "what is proper and peculiar to man—to purge the eye of the soul, and to sanctify his flesh."<sup>291</sup> Clement also

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<sup>286</sup>“σὰρξ δὲ καὶ ψυχὴ καὶ πνεῦμα.” *Stromata* 3.10.69.1.

<sup>287</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.12.80.9.

<sup>288</sup>“ὠφελῶν τοὺς ἐπιτηδείους, τὰ ὄρη μεθιστὰς τῶν πλησίον καὶ τὰς τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Stromata* 7.12.77.5. See also 7.14.86.5.

<sup>289</sup>“πᾶσα γὰρ μοχθηρία ψυχῆς μετὰ ἀκρασίας ἐστίν, καὶ ὁ διὰ πάθος πρᾶττων δι’ ἀκρασίαν πρᾶττει καὶ μοχθηρίαν.” *Ibid.*, 3.12.84.4.

<sup>290</sup>“ὁ γὰρ μὴ θελήσας τὸ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκκόψαι πάθος ἑαυτὸν ἀπέκτεινεν.” *Ibid.*, 7.12.72.4.

<sup>291</sup>“τό τε ἴδιον τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τὸ ὄμμα τῆς ψυχῆς, ἐκκαθαίρειν, ἀγνίζειν δὲ καὶ τὴν σάρκα αὐτήν.” *Paedagogus* 2.1.1.2.

writes, “For where but in a soul that is wise can you write truth? where love? where reverence? where meekness?”<sup>292</sup> He also writes, “The heavenly and truly divine love comes to men thus, when in the soul itself the spark of true goodness, kindled in the soul by the Divine Word, is able to burst forth into flame.”<sup>293</sup> This gives the notion that the soul itself has qualities which must be present for truth to be instilled or in order to be kindled by the Divine Word.

This notion of individual responsibility and the capabilities of the soul are further elaborated on by Clement in his notion of free will. He writes of the “self-determination of the human soul, and its incapability of being treated as a slave in what respects the choice of life.”<sup>294</sup> Clement finds this in the story of God speaking to Pharaoh through Moses in Exod 3:18-19. Commenting he writes, “For He [God] shows both things: both His divinity in His foreknowledge of what would take place, and His love in affording an opportunity for repentance to the self-determination of the soul.”<sup>295</sup> In the story of the rich young ruler, Clement also finds an indication of the “self-determination of the soul.”<sup>296</sup> The soul is that which says yes or no,<sup>297</sup> where judgments are made.

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<sup>292</sup>“Ποῦ γὰρ ἀλλαχόθι ἢ ἐν σώφρονι ψυχῇ δικαιοσύνην ἐγγραπτέον; Ποῦ ἀγάπην; αἰδῶ δὲ ποῦ; πραότητα δὲ ποῦ.” *Protrepticus* 10.107.1. See also 10.107.2; *Paedagogus* 3.11.58.3.

<sup>293</sup>“Ὁ γέ τοι οὐράνιος καὶ θεῖος ὄντως ἔρως ταύτη προσγίνεται τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ὅταν ἐν αὐτῇ που τῇ ψυχῇ τὸ ὄντως καλὸν ὑπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγου ἀναζωπυρούμενον ἐκλάμπειν δυνηθῇ.” *Protrepticus* 11.117.2.

<sup>294</sup>“τὸ ἀυθαίρετον τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης ψυχῆς καὶ ἀδούλωτον πρὸς ἐκλογήν βίου.” *Stromata* 7.3.15.2. See also 7.2.12.5.

<sup>295</sup>“Ἐμφαίνει γὰρ ἄμφω, καὶ τὸ θεῖον προειδῶς τὸ ἐσόμενον, καὶ τὸ φιλόανθρωπον τὸ αὐτοῦ τῷ αὐτεξουσίῳ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀφορμὰς μετανοίας χαριζόμενος.” *Paedagogus* 1.9.76.4.

<sup>296</sup>“τὸ ‘εἰ θέλεις’ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον τῆς προσδιαλεγόμενης αὐτῷ ψυχῆς ἐδήλωσεν.” *Quis dives salvetur* 10.1.

## Passion, Purity, and the Soul

For Clement, Christ's soul is devoid of passion.<sup>298</sup> In comparing the human soul and Christ's soul, Clement writes, "He is to us a spotless image; to Him we are to try with all our might to assimilate our souls."<sup>299</sup> The true Gnostic will be the same. "To him the flesh is dead; . . . having turned towards God the old sinful soul. Such a one is no longer continent, but has reached a state of passionlessness."<sup>300</sup> Clement also describes this soul as "inflexible"<sup>301</sup> and as having "transcended the whole life of passion."<sup>302</sup>

In describing the work of Christ for the human soul, Clement writes, "And regarding him as its greatest work, regulated his soul by wisdom and temperance."<sup>303</sup> Thus the virtues are used in the healing of the soul by Christ. Righteousness is described as "the concord of the parts of the soul."<sup>304</sup> However, "Haughtiness is a vice of the soul,

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<sup>297</sup>See *Stromata* 1.17.83.5; 1.17.84.1. Cf. 5.14.141.3.

<sup>298</sup>"ἀπαθῆς τὴν ψυχὴν." *Paedagogus* 1.2.4.1.

<sup>299</sup>"οὗτος ἡμῖν εἰκὼν ἢ ἀκηλίδωτος, τούτῳ παντὶ σθένει πειρατέον ἔξομοιοῦν τὴν ψυχὴν." *Ibid.*, 1.2.4.2.

<sup>300</sup>"τούτῳ τέθνηκεν ἡ σὰρξ. . . τὴν παλαιὰν ἀμαρτητικὴν ψυχὴν ἐπιστρέψας πρὸς θεόν. οὐκ ἐγκρατὴς οὗτος ἔτι, ἀλλ' ἐν ἕξει γέγονεν ἀπαθείας." *Stromata* 4.22.138.1. In this context, Clement also writes of "assimilation to God" as "preserving the mind in its relation to the same things." *Ibid.*, 4.22.139.4. Cf. 6.9.72.1-2; 6.9.75.3; 7.7.45.3.

<sup>301</sup>"ἄτρεπτος μένει κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν." *Ibid.*, 7.11.61.5. Cf. 7.11.62.6.

<sup>302</sup>"διάθεσιν τῆς ἐναρέτου ψυχῆς ὑπερβὰς ὅλον τὸν ἐμπαθῆ βίον." *Ibid.*, 7.11.65.4.

<sup>303</sup>"καὶ τοῦτον ἔργον ἡγουμένη μέγιστον, ψυχὴν μὲν αὐτοῦ φρονήσει καὶ σωφροσύνη." *Paedagogus* 1.2.6.6.

<sup>304</sup>"δικαιοσύνη δὲ συμφωνία τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μερῶν" *Stromata* 4.26.163.5.

of which, as of other sins, He [God] commands us to repent.”<sup>305</sup> Clement writes often regarding the work of the Instructor to wound in order to heal the passions of the soul.<sup>306</sup> “His aim is thus to improve the soul, not to teach, and to train it up to a virtuous, not to an intellectual life.”<sup>307</sup> Thus virtue is more important than intellect as a theoretical study. The Instructor, Christ, “heals both our body and soul.”<sup>308</sup> He also adds, “The Savior, who withdraws, by the divine word, the gloom of ignorance arising from evil training, which had overspread the eye of the soul.”<sup>309</sup>

Faith functions in relation to purity as well. Describing this, he writes, “faith, which from instruction is compacted into a foundation, which, being more substantial than hearing, is likened to meat, and assimilates to the soul itself nourishment of this kind.”<sup>310</sup> This is part of his interpretation of 1 Cor 3:2. For Clement, faith is also a prerequisite to knowledge. Thus he writes, “Faith, therefore, and the knowledge of the truth, render the soul, which makes them its choice, always uniform and equable.”<sup>311</sup> The

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<sup>305</sup>“ἀλαζονεία γὰρ ψυχῆς ἐστι κακία.” Ibid., 2.19.97.3.

<sup>306</sup>The passions themselves, which he defines in *Quis dives salvetur* 16.1, are external things used badly.

<sup>307</sup>“καὶ τὸ τέλος αὐτοῦ βελτιῶσαι τὴν ψυχὴν ἐστίν, οὐ διδάξαι, σῶφρονός τε, οὐκ ἐπιστημονικοῦ καθηγήσασθαι βίου.” *Paedagogus* 1.1.1.4. Cf. *Stromata* 5.3.17.3 where the wise soul waits for the appearance of the teacher.

<sup>308</sup>“ὁ ἰώμενος ἡμῶν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν.” *Paedagogus* 3.12.98.2. See also *Stromata* 3.17.104.4.

<sup>309</sup>“οὐκ ἄνευ τοῦ σωτῆρος τοῦ καταγαγόντος ἡμῶν τῷ θείῳ λόγῳ τοῦ ὁρατικοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἐπιχυθεῖσαν ἐκ φαύλης ἀναστροφῆς ἄγνοιαν ἀχλυώδη.” Ibid., 1.28.178.1.

<sup>310</sup>“ἐν αὐτῇ σωματοποιουμένη τῇ ψυχῇ.” *Paedagogus* 1.6.38.2. Buell states that, here, faith is to be understood as “providing the ‘body’ for the soul.” Buell, 142. Cf. *Protrepticus* 1.6.38.3 where the body is likened to faith and the soul to hope.

<sup>311</sup>“ἡ πίστις οὖν ἢ τε γινώσις τῆς ἀληθείας αἰεὶ κατὰ τὰ αὐτὰ καὶ

soul, then, must have faith and truth in order to be unchanging. The lack of faith, or unbelief, can also be present in the soul. In response to Christ's statement, "Blessed are the meek for they shall inherit the earth," Clement writes, "The meek are those who have quelled the battle of unbelief in the soul, the battle of wrath, and lust, and the other forms that are subject to them."<sup>312</sup>

A pure soul, according to Clement, is one that is free from sin. To be as a little child is to be "pure in flesh, holy in soul by abstinence from evil deeds."<sup>313</sup> He describes the righteous soul as one in which all pain is gone and only good remains.<sup>314</sup> This "incorruptibility of body and soul" he allegorizes from the statement regarding Rebecca that "the virgin was fair, and man had not known her."<sup>315</sup> He also allegorizes the statement in Isa 1:2 where the prophet writes, "Hear, O heaven; and give ear, O earth," referring to one "who has applied himself to the contemplation of heaven and divine things, and in this way has become an Israelite."<sup>316</sup> Clement speaks of the Gnostic soul

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ὡσαύτως ἔχειν κατασκευάζουσι τὴν ἐλομένην αὐτὰς ψυχὴν." *Stromata* 2.11.52.4.

<sup>312</sup>“πραεῖς δέ εἰσιν οἱ τὴν ἄσπειστον μάχην τὴν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ καταπεπαυκότες θυμοῦ καὶ ἐπιθυμίας καὶ τῶν τούτοις ὑποβεβλημένων εἰδῶν.” *Ibid.*, 4.6.36.2.

<sup>313</sup>“καθαροὶ μὲν τὴν σάρκα ἅγιοι δὲ τὴν ψυχὴν κατὰ ἀποχὴν κακῶν ἔργων.” *Stromata* 4.25.161.1.

<sup>314</sup>“οὕτως κάπὶ τῆς ψυχῆς ὁ μὲν πόνος παρῆλθεν, μένει δὲ τὸ καλόν.” *Ibid.*, 6.12.103.6.

<sup>315</sup>“τὸ ἀδιάφθορον τοῦ τε σώματος τῆς τε ψυχῆς διαγράφων ἐπὶ τῆς Ῥεβέκκας ὧδέ πως· ἡ δὲ παρθένος ἦν καλὴ, <παρθένος ἦν,> ἀνὴρ οὐκ ἔγνω αὐτήν.” *Ibid.*, 4.25.161.1.

<sup>316</sup>“καὶ οὐρανὸν τὴν τοῦ γνωστικοῦ ψυχὴν τὴν οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν θείων θέαν ἐπανηρημένου καὶ ταύτη Ἰσραηλίτην γεγονέναι.” *Ibid.*, 4.26.169.1.

who has been sanctified “through withdrawal from earthy fires.”<sup>317</sup> He adds, “Why, then, should we any longer change grace into wrath, and not receive the word with open ears, and entertain God as a guest in pure souls?”<sup>318</sup>

While Clement urges that the body, as well as the soul, should be purified, yet he also calls for the soul to be free from the body, referring to the desires of the body. “The Gnostic soul must be consecrated to the light, stripped of the integuments of matter, devoid of the frivolousness of the body and of all the passions, which are acquired through vain and lying opinions, and divested of the lusts of the flesh.”<sup>319</sup> Elsewhere, in describing the true Gnostic, Clement writes, “For passion being cut away and stripped off from the whole soul, he henceforth consorts and lives with what is noblest, which has now become pure, and emancipated to adoption.”<sup>320</sup> Very similar language is used describing the rich young ruler and Christ’s command to sell all he had, which Clement describes as a “stripping off of the passions of the soul.”<sup>321</sup> This command was not to be

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<sup>317</sup>“ἡ γνωστικὴ ψυχὴ ἀγιάζεται κατὰ τὴν ἀποχὴν τῶν γεωδῶν πυρώσεων.” *Ibid.*, 6.7.60.1.

<sup>318</sup>“τί δὴ οὖν ἔτι τὴν χάριν εἰς ὀργὴν μεταλλάσσομεν καὶ οὐχὶ ἀναπεπταμέναις ταῖς ἀκοαῖς καταδεχόμενοι τὸν λόγον ἐν ἀγναῖς ξενοδοχοῦμεν ταῖς ψυχαῖς τὸν θεόν.” *Protrepticus* 9.84.5.

<sup>319</sup>“ἐπειδὴ γυμνὴν τῆς ὑλικῆς δορᾶς γενομένην τὴν γνωστικὴν ψυχὴν ἄνευ τῆς σωματικῆς φλυαρίας καὶ τῶν παθῶν πάντων, ὅσα περιποιούσιν αἱ κεναὶ καὶ ψευδεῖς ὑπολήψεις, ἀποδυσάμενην τὰς σαρκικὰς ἐπιθυμίας, τῷ φωτὶ καθιερωθῆναι.” *Stromata* 5.11.67.4.

<sup>320</sup>“τοῦ γὰρ ἐμπαθοῦς παντὸς περιτμηθέντος καὶ περιαιρεθέντος ἀπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς τῷ κρατίστῳ, καθαρῷ γενομένῳ καὶ ἡλευθερωμένῳ εἰς υἰοθεσίαν, τοῦ λοιποῦ σύνεστίν τε καὶ βιοῖ.” *Eclogae prophetica* 31.3.

<sup>321</sup>“τὸ τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτὴν καὶ τὴν διάθεσιν γυμνῶσαι τῶν ὑπόντων παθῶν.” *Quis dives salvetur* 12.1.

understood as focused on the man's wealth but on the passions of the soul.<sup>322</sup>

The Holy Spirit also plays a role in Clement's doctrine. He writes in a discussion on lustful dreams of a person who "in chaste love looks on beauty, thinks not that the flesh is beautiful, but the spirit, admiring . . . the body as an image, by whose beauty he transports himself to the Artist, and to true beauty."<sup>323</sup> This "thinking" about the spirit, Clement writes, is "the unction of acceptance, the quality of disposition which resides in the soul that is gladdened by the communication of the Holy Spirit."<sup>324</sup> In discussing the metaphor of grafting trees which Paul uses, Clement suggests it be understood as grafting "one's faith in the soul itself. For also the Holy Spirit is thus somehow transplanted by distribution, according to the circumscribed capacity of each one."<sup>325</sup> Elsewhere, the soul is described only as "a temple of the Holy Spirit, when it acquires a disposition in the whole of life corresponding to the Gospel."<sup>326</sup> Thus it is unclear when the Spirit is understood to dwell in the soul, at the beginning of the journey or at its completion.

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<sup>322</sup>Clement defends this concept by pointing out that the riches can be used in a positive way and thus in themselves are neither good nor evil. Thus the command to sell all must refer to ridding oneself of the passions of the soul. See *ibid.*, 14.5-6.

<sup>323</sup>“ἔμπαλιν γὰρ ὁ δι' ἀγάπην τὴν ἀγνήν προσβλέπων τὸ κάλλος οὐ τὴν σάρκα ἡγεῖται, ἀλλὰ τὴν ψυχὴν καλήν, τὸ σῶμα, οἶμαι, ὡς ἀνδριάντα θαυμάσας, δι' οὗ κάλλους ἐπὶ τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ τὸ ὄντως καλὸν αὐτὸς αὐτὸν παραπέμπει.” *Stromata* 4.18.116.2.

<sup>324</sup>“τὸ χοῖσμα τῆς εὐαρεστήσεως λέγω, τὴν ποιότητα τῆς διαθέσεως τὴν ἐπικειμένην τῇ ψυχῇ κατ' ἐπιχώρησιν τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος γεγανωμένη.” *Stromata* 4.18.116.2. See also 4.22.139.4. On this conception of a quality in the soul that welcomes the Holy Spirit, see Fernández Ardanaz, *Genesis y Anagennesis*, 318.

<sup>325</sup>“ἄμεινον δὲ τὴν ἐκάστου πίστιν ἐν αὐτῇ ἐγκεντριῶσθαι τῇ ψυχῇ. καὶ γὰρ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ταύτῃ πῶς μεταφυτεύεται διανενημένον κατὰ τὴν ἐκάστου περιγραφὴν ἀπεριγράφως.” *Stromata* 6.15.120.2.

<sup>326</sup>“νεῶς γίνεται τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος ὅταν διάθεσιν ὁμολογουμένην τῷ εὐαγγελίῳ κατὰ πάντα κτήσῃται τὸν βίον.” *Ibid.*, 7.11.64.7.

Clement also writes of one who “integrates soul and spirit in obedience to the Word,”<sup>327</sup> which then leads to Paul’s “no male or female among you” from Gal 3:28. Thus, soul “stands aside from mere appearance of shape . . . and is transformed into unity.”<sup>328</sup> Clement also speaks of how “the Lord’s word remains firm and anoints the soul and makes it one with the Spirit.”<sup>329</sup>

Elsewhere Clement connects spirit with soul, seeming to use them as synonyms. “Wherefore this exhortation of the truth alone, like the most faithful of our friends, abides with us till our last breath, and is to the whole and perfect spirit of the soul the kind attendant on our ascent to heaven.”<sup>330</sup> Here the soul is described as ascending to heaven after death, accompanied by truth. Clement does make it clear what is behind his idea of the ascent of the soul, though one could easily find this in his notion of the Gnostic soul’s final vision of the divine. This is further suggested when he writes allegorically of the High Priest: “Thus the high priest showed the laying aside of the body, which, like the

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<sup>327</sup>“καταισχυνθεις πνεῦμα καὶ ψυχὴν ἐνώση κατὰ τὴν τοῦ λόγου ὑπακοήν.” Ibid., 3.13.93.2. Translation FC.

<sup>328</sup>“ἀποστᾶσα γὰρ τοῦδε τοῦ σχήματος, ᾧ διακρίνεται τὸ ἄρρεν καὶ τὸ θῆλυ, ψυχὴ μετατίθεται εἰς ἔνωσιν, οὐθέτερον οὔσα.” Ibid., 3.13.93.3. Translation FC.

<sup>329</sup>“καὶ ὁ μὲν χόρτος ξηραίνεται, τὸ δὲ ἄνθος καταπίπτει· ἀλλὰ τὸ ῥῆμα τοῦ κυρίου μένει, τὸ χρίσαν τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἐνώσαν τῷ πνεύματι.” *Stromata* 3.17.103.3. Translation FC.

<sup>330</sup>“προτροπὴ τοῖς πιστοτάτοις ἀπείκασται τῶν φίλων μέχρι τῆς ἐσχάτης ἀναπνοῆς παραμένουσα καὶ παραπομπὸς ἀγαθῆ ὄλω καὶ τελείῳ τῷ τῆς ψυχῆς πνεύματι τοῖς εἰς οὐρανὸν ἀπαίρουσι γινομένην.” *Protrepticus* 11.117.3. On death in Clement, see Fischer, 113; Klaus Schmöle, *Läuterung nach dem Tode und pneumatische Auferstehung bei Klemens von Alexandrien* (Münster: Aschendorff, 1974), 41-47. On the soul’s ascent, see Everett Procter, *Christian Controversy in Alexandria: Clement’s Polemic against the Basilideans and Valentinians*, American University Studies Series 7, Theology and Religion Vol. 172 (New York: Peter Lang, 1995), 105-106.



gold plate, has become pure and light through the purification of the soul.”<sup>331</sup> In this context, he writes of “the uncovered soul, which is in the power of the mind, and which has become like a body of the power, passes over into spiritual things. The soul now has become truly rational . . . because it is directly animated, so to speak, by the Logos.”<sup>332</sup>

Clement also writes of unclean spirits and the soul in the context of baptism. “It [baptism] is accordingly a sign of the sanctifying of our invisible part, and of the straining off from the new and spiritual creation of the unclean spirits that have got mixed up with the soul.”<sup>333</sup>

Clement addresses the issue of God knowing the thoughts of the soul. He writes of “the power which reaches the soul’s consciousness, by ineffable power and without sensible hearing, know all things at the moment of thought”<sup>334</sup> and that “the divine power, with the speed of light, sees through the whole soul.”<sup>335</sup> In describing inspiration,

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<sup>331</sup>“καθάπερ πετάλου χρυσοῦ καθαροῦ γενομένου καὶ κούφου διὰ τὴν κάθαρσιν [τοῦ ὥσπερ σώματος] τῆς ψυχῆς [ἀπόθεσιν].” *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 1.27.1.9. Translations of the *Excerpta* are by Procter. He, along with earlier scholars, suggests that *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 27 is a response by Clement against the Valentinian doctrine of “spiritual seeds ascending into the Pleroma.” Procter, 105-106. Cf. Lilla who argues, rather, that it is gnostic in origin. Lilla, 176-179.

<sup>332</sup>“Τυμνὴ δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν δυνάμει τοῦ συνειδότος, οἷον σῶμα τῆς δυνάμεως γενομένη, μεταβαίνει εἰς τὰ πνευματικά, λογικὴ τῶ ὄντι καὶ ἀρχιερατικὴ γενομένη, ὡς ἂν ἐμψυχουμένη ὡς εἰπεῖν ὑπὸ τοῦ Λόγου.” *Excerpta ex Theodoto* 1.27.3.1-5. See also Lilla on Clement’s ascent of the soul. Lilla, 142.

<sup>333</sup>“σημεῖον γοῦν τοῦ καὶ τὰ ἀόρατα ἡμῶν ἀγιάζεσθαι τὸ καὶ πνεύματα ἀκάθαρτα συμπεπλεγμένα τῇ ψυχῇ διωλίζεσθαι ἀπὸ τῆς γενέσεως τῆς καινῆς τε καὶ πνευματικῆς.” *Eclogae propheticae* 7.3.

<sup>334</sup>“τοῦ συνειδότος ἐπαφωμένη τῆς ψυχῆς δύναμις δυνάμει τινὶ ἀρρήτῳ καὶ ἄνευ τῆς αἰσθητῆς ἀκοῆς ἅμα νοήματι πάντα γινώσκει.” *Stromata* 7.7.37.2.

<sup>335</sup>“φθάνει δὲ ἡ θεία δύναμις, καθάπερ φῶς, ὅλην διιδεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν.” *Ibid.*, 7.7.37.4. See also 7.7.37.6.

Clement writes that “the thoughts of virtuous men are produced through the inspiration of God; the soul being disposed in the way it is, and the divine will being conveyed to human souls.”<sup>336</sup>

Clement argues for the separation of the soul from the body in the present life. Interpreting Christ’s command to watch, Clement suggests that this means, “Study how to live, and endeavor to separate the soul from the body.”<sup>337</sup> Elsewhere he simply states that “death is,” in fact, “the separation of the soul from the body.”<sup>338</sup> Speaking of the Gnostic soul, he writes, “Cleansed, so to speak, from all the stains of the soul, he knows right well that it will be better with him after his departure.”<sup>339</sup>

Clement finds the call for the soul to separate from the body even during this life in the teaching of Christ. He writes, “And, in fine, the Lord’s disciplines draw the soul away gladly from the body, even if it wrench itself away in its removal.”<sup>340</sup> Christ is described as the one who “trains the soul.”<sup>341</sup> This is supported by Christ’s words from Matt 10:39, “For he that loves his life shall lose it, and he that loses his life shall find it.”

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<sup>336</sup>“ἀλλὰ καὶ αἱ τῶν ἐναρέτων ἀνθρώπων ἐπίνοιαι κατὰ ἐπίνοιαν θεῖαν γίνονται, διατιθεμένης πως τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ διαδιδόμενου τοῦ θεοῦ θελήματος εἰς τὰς ἀνθρωπίνας ψυχάς.” Ibid., 6.17.157.4.

<sup>337</sup>“γρηγορεῖτε, ὡς οἷον μελετᾶτε ζῆν καὶ χωρίζειν τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος πειρᾶσθε.” Ibid., 5.14.106.1. Cf. Schmöle, 43.

<sup>338</sup>“ὁ θάνατος ἄχωρισμός ψυχῆς ἀπὸ σώματος.” *Stromata* 7.12.71.3.

<sup>339</sup>“πάντας ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν τοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς ἀποκεκαθαρμένοις σπίλους, ὅ γε εὖ μάλα ἐπιστάμενος ἄμεινον αὐτῷ μετὰ τὴν ἔξοδον γενήσεσθαι.” Ibid., 7.13.83.1.

<sup>340</sup>“καὶ ὅλως ἡ κυριακὴ ἀσκησις ἀπάγει τὴν ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος εὐχαρίστως, εἴ γε καὶ αὐτὴ αὐτὴν κατὰ μετὰθεσιν ἀποσπᾷ.” Ibid., 4.6.27.1.

<sup>341</sup>Ibid., 4.6.36.1.

Clement finishes this quote of Christ's words with the statement, "If we only join that which is mortal of us with the immortality of God." It is unclear if Clement is writing here of the mortal body being joined with the immortality of God or rather the unpurified soul being joined with the immortality of God. Based on what follows, it appears that the latter is the better interpretation.

Clement continues, "He therefore, who, in accordance with the word of repentance, knows his life (soul) to be sinful will lose it—losing it from sin, from which it is wrenched. This, then, is what it is "to find one's life," "to know one's self."<sup>342</sup> Thus the unrepentant soul is considered sinful and can be spoken of by Clement as mortal. Repentance from evil actions provides a foundation for faith for the soul. "There is forthwith proposed to those who have been called, the repentance which cleanses the seat of the soul from transgressions, that faith may be established."<sup>343</sup> In regard to repentance, Clement speaks of two kinds. "That which is more common is fear on account of what is done; but the other which is more special, the shame which the spirit feels in itself arising from conscience."<sup>344</sup> Baptism also has a cleansing function. In speaking about regeneration by water and spirit, he writes, "It is not the body only, but the soul, that we cleanse."<sup>345</sup>

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<sup>342</sup>“ὁ τοίνυν ἐπιγινώσκων κατὰ τὸν τῆς μετανοίας λόγον ἁμαρτωλὸν τὴν ψυχὴν ἀπολέσει αὐτὴν τῆς ἁμαρτίας ἧς ἀπέσπασται, . . . τοῦτ' οὖν ἐστὶ τὸ εὐρεῖν τὴν ψυχὴν, τὸ γινῶναι ἑαυτόν.” Ibid., 4.6.27.3.

<sup>343</sup>“αὐτίκα τοῖς κληθεῖσι πρόκειται μετάνοια ἢ καθαίρουσα τὸν τόπον τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τῶν πλημμελημάτων, ἵνα ἡ πίστις θεμελιωθῇ.” *Stromata* 2.13.56.1.

<sup>344</sup>“τοῦ μετανοοῦντος δὲ τρόποι δύο, ὁ μὲν κοινότερος φόβος ἐπὶ τοῖςπραχθεῖσιν, ὁ δὲ ἰδιαίτερος ἢ δυσωπία ἢ πρὸς ἑαυτὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐκ συνειδήσεω.” Ibid., 4.6.37.7.

<sup>345</sup>“ταύτη τοι οὐ μόνον τὸ σῶμα, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν καθαίρομεθα.”

Clement speaks of the soul of the Christian philosopher who has given his life for Christ as follows, “Hearing from our Savior the words of poetry, ‘Dear brother,’ by reason of the similarity of his life.”<sup>346</sup> The soul, in this case, hears words from the Savior though it is disassociated from the body. He also writes, “If the confession to God is martyrdom, each soul which has lived purely in the knowledge of God, which has obeyed the commandments, is a witness both by life and word, in whatever way it may be released from the body,—shedding faith as blood along its whole life till its departure.”<sup>347</sup> Here again Clement highlights the call for the soul to prepare for its departure from the body.

Clement interprets the heart for the soul in Ps 22:26 when he writes that those who seek God shall receive true knowledge from Him and thus their “souls shall live.”<sup>348</sup> It is difficult to determine from this text alone if Clement believes that without this knowledge, the soul will die, but that is a distinct possibility.

Clement brings the soul into his discussion on the proper dress for a Christian. In this context he writes that believers should manage the “body by the soul” and quotes Christ disciplining the soul by citing Luke 12:22-23, “Take no thought for your life what

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*Eclogae propheticae 7.3.*

<sup>346</sup>“εὐθαρσῆσας τοίνυν πρὸς φίλον τὸν κύριον, ὑπὲρ οὗ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐκῶν ἐπιδέδωκεν, πρὸς δὲ καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, ὡς οἱ δικασταὶ προσεδόκησαν, ἔρχεται, ‘φίλε κασίγνητε’ ποιητικῶς [τε] ἀκούσας πρὸς τοῦ σωτῆρος ἡμῶν διὰ τὴν τοῦ βίου ὁμοιότητα.” *Stromata* 4.4.14.2.

<sup>347</sup>“εἰ τοίνυν ἡ πρὸς θεὸν ὁμολογία μαρτυρία ἐστὶ, πᾶσα ἢ καθαρῶς πολιτευσάμενη ψυχὴ μετ’ ἐπιγνώσεως τοῦ θεοῦ, ἢ ταῖς ἐντολαῖς ὑπακηκουῖα, μάρτυς ἐστὶ καὶ βίῳ καὶ λόγῳ, ὅπως ποτὲ τοῦ σώματος ἀπαλλάττεται.” *Stromata* 4.4.15.3.

<sup>348</sup>“καὶ ζήσεται ἡ ψυχὴ αὐτῶν· καρδία γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ ἀλληγορεῖται ἢ τὴν ζῶην χορηγήσασα.” *Ibid.*, 5.1.12.2.

ye shall eat; nor yet for your body, what ye shall put on; for the life is more than meat, and the body more than raiment.”<sup>349</sup> Also in the context of clothing, Clement speaks of the body obtaining immortality by the “immortal vesture of the Spirit.”<sup>350</sup>

Clement speaks of the natural powers of the soul in the context of desire and the commandments. “The person who makes proper use of the natural powers of the soul has a desire for appropriate objects but hates all that would injure, as the commandments prescribe.”<sup>351</sup> When he speaks of the law, Clement notes that “the true legislator is he who assigns to each department of the soul what is suitable to it and to its operations.”<sup>352</sup> In an interesting description of just what one should hate, Clement writes, “Whether hand, or foot, or soul, hate it.”<sup>353</sup>

In discussing wrong actions committed unintentionally, Clement refers to an irrational passion of the soul. “For, in reality, he that cannot contain the generative word is to be punished; for this is an irrational passion of the soul approaching garrulity.”<sup>354</sup>

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<sup>349</sup>“μὴ μεριμνᾶτε ἑλέγων ἡ ψυχῆ ὑμῶν τί φάγητε, μηδὲ τῷ σώματι ὑμῶν τί ἐνδύσησθε· ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ πλείων ἐστὶ τῆς τροφῆς καὶ τὸ σῶμα τοῦ ἐνδύματος.” *Paedagogus* 2.10bis.109.3.

<sup>350</sup>“τὴν ἀκήρατον τῆς ψυχῆς ἐσθῆτα, τὴν σάρκα, ἀγιάζονται, καὶ ταύτη ἐπενδύονται ἀφθαρσίαν.” *Ibid.*

<sup>351</sup>“ὁ τοίνυν ταῖς κατὰ φύσιν ἐνεργείαις τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν δέοντι χρώμενος ἐπιθυμεῖ μὲν τῶν καταλλήλων, μισεῖ δὲ τὰ βλάπτοντα, καθὼς αἱ ἐντολαὶ προστάττουσιν.” *Stromata* 3.10.69.2.

<sup>352</sup>“ὁ νομοθετικὸς δὲ ἐστὶν ὁ τὸ προσῆκον ἐκάστῳ μέρει τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ τοῖς τούτων ἔργοις ἀπονέμων.” *Ibid.*, 1.26.167.3.

<sup>353</sup>“κἂν χεὶρ κἂν πούς κἂν ἡ ψυχὴ, μίσησον αὐτήν.” *Quis dives salvetur* 24.2.

<sup>354</sup>“τῷ ὄντι γὰρ κολαστέος ὁ ἀκρατὴς τοῦ γονίμου λόγου, ὃ καὶ αὐτὸ πάθος ἐστὶ ψυχῆς ἄλογον, ἐγγὺς ἀδολεσχίας ἰόν.” *Stromata* 2.14.61.2.

Clement also speaks of wronging one's own soul. "If we will have nothing to do, by abandoning ourselves wholly to lust, we shall sin, nay rather, wrong our own soul."<sup>355</sup>

### **Immortality and the Soul**

Though Clement argues against the divine origin of the soul and argues for its creation at the time of conception, he does support the concept of the immortality of the soul. This appears in *Stromata* 5.14. In this chapter, Clement presents beliefs which he asserts were taken by Greek philosophers and poets from the Hebrew Scriptures. He lists ideas from among the Greeks which both agree and disagree with the Old Testament authors. If an idea is the same, Clement attributes it to copying. If it is different, he suggests a misunderstanding took place. In this context, Clement discusses the immortality of the soul immediately after suggesting that Plato believed in a penal punishment by fire as found in the HB. He quotes from *Republic* 10.615e4-616a2. "Then these men fierce and fiery to look on, standing by, and hearing the sound, seized and took some aside and binding Aridaeus and the rest hand, foot, and head, and throwing them down, and flaying them, dragged them along the way, tearing their flesh with thorns." Then he quotes Ps 104:4, "Who makes His angels spirits; His ministers flaming fire." He asserts that Plato's fiery men are referring to the angels. After making this connection, Clement then argues that "it follows from this that the soul is immortal. For what is tortured or corrected being in a state of sensation lives, though said to suffer."<sup>356</sup> Here Clement connects the doctrine of a future judgment to the doctrine of an immortal soul.

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<sup>355</sup>“ἀμαρτησόμεθα, μᾶλλον δὲ ἀδικήσομεν τὴν ἑαυτῶν ψυχὴν.” Ibid., 2.15.63.2.

<sup>356</sup>“ἔπεται δὲ τούτοις τὴν ψυχὴν εἶναι ἀθάνατον. τὸ γὰρ κολαζόμενον ἢ παιδευόμενον ἐν αἰσθήσει ὄν ζῆ, κἂν πάσχειν λέγεται.” *Stromata* 5.14.91.1.

He argues that the soul must be immortal as it is still capable of sensation after the death of the body.

It is helpful to see Clement's understanding of the relationship between the body and soul to help elucidate his argument for the soul's immortality. He declares that the body is the "soul's tomb."<sup>357</sup> This, he states, is clear from Rom 8:10, "The body is a dead thing because of sin." He also writes that it is necessary "in investigating the nature of the body and the essence of the soul, to apprehend the end of each, and not regard death as an evil."<sup>358</sup> Thus, to understand the soul and the body, one must understand what the end of each is. As the end of the soul is to either receive punishment or reward, it follows that it must survive the separation from the body.

Clement argues for the soul's immortality from another point of view also. In discussing the connection between sleep and death, Clement notes that though the body sleeps, the soul does not. Were the soul to sleep, that would be its destruction. Since the soul does not sleep, it is "always contemplating God, and by perpetual converse with Him inoculating the body with wakefulness, it raises man to equality with angelic grace, and from the practice of wakefulness it grasps the eternity of life."<sup>359</sup>

## **Death and the Soul**

Clement finds two senses of humans used in the Scriptures, "the visible and the

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<sup>357</sup>"τάφος δ' ἔστιν ἔτι τῆς ψυχῆς." Ibid., 3.11.77.3.

<sup>358</sup>"δεῖ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὴν γε τοῦ σώματος φύσιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν πολυπραγμονήσαντας τὸ ἑκατέρου τέλος καταλαβέσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν θάνατον ἡγεῖσθαι κακόν." *Stromata* 4.3.11.2.

<sup>359</sup>*Paedagogus* 2.9.82.3. See above discussion on Clement, the soul, and sleep.

spiritual, one subject to salvation and one not. Sin is called the death of the soul.”<sup>360</sup> Here the spiritual clearly refers to the soul. For Clement, the visible, or the body, is not even subject to salvation. Thus sin is death not to the visible body but rather to the invisible soul. This sets up his quotation from Rom 5:12, 14 where sin enters the world through one human person and then spreads to all. In this context, he also talks about death as the separation of the soul from the body. In discussing the entrance of sin into the world, he writes, “Death follows birth, and the union of soul and body is followed by their dissolution.”<sup>361</sup> Here he fails to follow the connection that Paul makes between sin and death and rather inserts the notion that this is a divine arrangement.<sup>362</sup> Death, here, is not to be understood as something evil. He writes that it is necessary “in investigating the nature of the body and the essence of the soul, [to] apprehend the end of each, and not regard death as an evil.”<sup>363</sup> He further adds, “The assertion, then, may be hazarded, that it has been shown that death is the fellowship of the soul in a state of sin with the body; and life the separation from sin.”<sup>364</sup> Here it should be noted that he appears to admit that this

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<sup>360</sup>“ἄνθρωπον δὲ καλεῖ ἡ γραφή διχῶς, τὸν τε φαινόμενον καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν, πάλιν τε αὖ τὸν σωζόμενον καὶ τὸν μὴ. καὶ θάνατος ψυχῆς ἢ ἁμαρτία λέγεται.” *Stromata* 3.9.64.1. Translation FC. Cf. Philo’s statement that the loss of virtue is the death of the soul. Philo *Leg.* 1.105. See also Wis 1:11.

<sup>361</sup>“φυσικῆ δὲ ἀνάγκη θείας οικονομίας γενέσει θάνατος ἔπεται, καὶ συνόδῳ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος ἢ τούτων διάλυσις ἀκολουθεῖ.” *Stromata* 3.9.64.2. See also 6.17.153.3. Cf. Plato *Phaedrus* 67 D.

<sup>362</sup>Fritz Buri, *Clemens Alexandrinus und er paulinische Freiheitsbegriff* (Zürich: Max Niehans, 1939), 78-79.

<sup>363</sup>“δεῖ δὴ, ὡς ἔοικε, τὴν γε τοῦ σώματος φύσιν καὶ τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐσίαν πολυπραγμονήσαντας τὸ ἑκατέρου τέλος καταλαβέσθαι καὶ μὴ τὸν θάνατον ἡγεῖσθαι κακόν.” *Stromata* 4.3.11.2.

<sup>364</sup>“Κινδυνεύει τοίνυν δεδειχθαι θάνατος μὲν εἶναι ἢ ἐν σώματι κοινωνία τῆς ψυχῆς ἁμαρτητικῆς οὐσης, ζωὴ δὲ ὁ χωρισμὸς τῆς ἁμαρτίας.” *Ibid.*, 4.3.12.1.



is a position which “may be hazarded” but not definitively proven. He concludes by stating, “The severance, therefore, of the soul from the body, made a life-long study, produces in the philosopher Gnostic alacrity, so that he is easily able to bear natural death, which is the dissolution of the chains which bind the soul to the body.”<sup>365</sup> Clement here quotes Rom 6:20-23 as his support for the notion that death is when the soul, in a state of sin, is combined with the body. It appears here that Clement wants to take an allegorical interpretation of death by Paul and uses it to make a literal definition of death. Why he does this is not clear. He has elsewhere clearly dealt with sin and its effects on the soul. Here, he wants to say that death is the soul in sin when he has just quoted Paul as stating that death is the wages of sin, not sin itself. He also supports this notion with quotes from the words of Christ. “For what should it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul”;<sup>366</sup> “Take no thought for your life . . . for your life is more than meat”;<sup>367</sup> “Seek you first the kingdom of heaven and its righteousness.”<sup>368</sup> Here, though, Clement is again slipping between the metaphorical using of the soul separating from the body in becoming a true Gnostic and the literal separation of the soul from the body in death.

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<sup>365</sup>“τοῦ σώματος τῆς ψυχῆς χωρισμὸς ὁ παρ’ ὅλον τὸν βίον μελετώμενος τῷ φιλοσόφῳ προθυμίαν κατασκευάζει γνωστικὴν εὐκόλως δύνασθαι φέρειν τὸν τῆς φύσεως θάνατον, διάλυσιν ὄντα τῶν πρὸς τὸ σῶμα τῆς ψυχῆς δεσμῶν.” Ibid., 4.3.12.5.

<sup>366</sup>Matt 16:26.

<sup>367</sup>Matt 6:31; Luke 12:22-23.

<sup>368</sup>Matt 6:32-33; Luke 12: 30-31.

## Hell and Paradise

Clement makes clear that the souls of the righteous and the souls of the sinners are not in the same place after death. He writes, “For who in his senses can suppose the souls of the righteous and those of sinners in the same condemnation, charging Providence with injustice?”<sup>369</sup> This general argument based upon a sense of justice is then coupled with an interpretation of 1 Pet 3:19-20 to develop the concept that the souls of the unrighteous had the gospel preached to them by Christ.<sup>370</sup> Those of the Gentiles who had not heard the gospel are thus able to be saved. This point is further supported by Clement’s claim that “souls, although darkened by passions, when released from their bodies, are able to perceive more clearly, because of their being no longer obstructed by the paltry flesh.”<sup>371</sup> This is combined with support from *Hermas* 3.6.49 and the statement from Matt 27:52 regarding the resurrection of bodies at Christ’s resurrection. Clement also quotes Isa 1:19-20 and David’s words from Ps 16:9-11, “My heart was glad. . . . For You shall not leave my soul in hell, nor will You give Your holy one to see corruption.”

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<sup>369</sup>“ἐπεὶ τίς ἂν εὖ φρονῶν ἐν μιᾷ καταδίκη καὶ τὰς τῶν δικαίων καὶ τὰς τῶν ἁμαρτωλῶν ὑπολάβοι εἶναι ψυχάς, ἀδικίαν τῆς προνοίας καταχέων.” *Stromata* 6.6.45.3.

<sup>370</sup>On Christ’s descent into Hell in early Jewish-Christian theology, see Jean Daniélou, *The Theology of Jewish Christianity*, trans. John A. Baker, vol. 1 of *The Development of Christian Doctrine before the Council of Nicaea* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1964), 233-248.

<sup>371</sup>“καὶ ταῦτα καθαρῶτερον διορᾶν δυναμένων τῶν σωμάτων ἀπηλλαγμένων ψυχῶν, κὰν πάθουσιν ἐπισκοτῶνται, διὰ τὸ μηκέτι ἐπιπροσθεῖσθαι σαρκίῳ.” *Stromata* 6.6.46.3. See also 6.6.47.3; 6.6.48.6; 6.6.49.3. On the interpretation of the Petrine text, see Hans Küng, *Eternal Life? Life After Death as a Medical, Philosophical, and Theological Problem*, trans. Edward Quinn (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1984), 125-129; Alfred Stuiber, *Refrigerium Interim: Die Vorstellungen vom Zwischenzustand und die Frühchristliche Grabeskunst* (Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1957), 33-34.

These are used in support of his concept that the Gentiles who died before Christ were preached to and given an opportunity to repent when Christ preached to them after His death on the cross.

In further support of this, Clement, in writing regarding the deaths which occurred as a result of the flood, writes, “Then, too, the more subtle substance, the soul, could never receive any injury from the grosser element of water, its subtle and simple nature rendering it impalpable, called as it is incorporeal. But whatever is gross, made so in consequence of sin, this is cast away along with the carnal spirit which lusts against the soul.”<sup>372</sup> Clement also speaks of fire purifying the soul.<sup>373</sup> Some might argue for an early concept of purgatory, but as this is undeveloped, it seems speculative.

Clement speaks in several places about the soul moving towards God. He writes, “The soul is raised to God.”<sup>374</sup> He also writes of the soul being brought to God as a bride.<sup>375</sup> The Gnostic soul also becomes like God. Clement writes, “For pre-eminently a divine image, resembling God, is the soul of a righteous man.”<sup>376</sup> Elsewhere he writes,

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<sup>372</sup>“ἔπειτα δὲ καὶ τὸ λεπτομερέστερον, ἡ ψυχὴ, οὐκ ἂν ποτε πρὸς τοῦ παχυμερεστέρου ὕδατος πάθοι τι δεινόν, διὰ λεπτότητα καὶ ἀπλότητα μὴ κρατουμένη, ἣ καὶ ἀσώματος προσαγορεύεται. ὁ δ' ἂν παχυμερὲς ἐκ τῆς ἀμαρτίας πεπαχυμένον τύχη, τοῦτο ἀπορρίπτεται σὺν τῷ σαρκικῷ πνεύματι τῷ κατὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμοῦντι.” *Stromata* 6.6.52.1-2.

<sup>373</sup>“ἀλλὰ τὰς ἀμαρτωλοὺς ψυχάς, πῦρ οὐ τὸ παμφάγον καὶ βάνουσον, ἀλλὰ τὸ φρόνιμον λέγοντες, τὸ ‘δικνούμενον διὰ ψυχῆς’ τῆς διερχομένης τὸ πῦρ.” *Ibid.*, 7.6.34.4. On this, see Daley, 4647; Schmöle, 48-128. Daley argues that Clement’s use of fire, whether before or after death, demonstrates that he is the first to develop the notion of purgatory.

<sup>374</sup>“τέταται δὲ ἡ ψυχὴ πρὸς τὸν θεόν.” *Stromata* 4.3.9.5.

<sup>375</sup>“αἱ εὐαρεστήσεις, τῷ θεῷ τῶν κυριακῶν λόγων νυμφευσάντων τὴν ψυχὴν.” *Ibid.*, 3.12.84.4.

<sup>376</sup>“μάλιστα γὰρ ἄγαλμα θεῖον καὶ θεῷ προσεμφερὲς ἀνθρώπου δικαίου ψυχὴ.” *Ibid.*, 7.3.16.5. See Sanguinetti, 238-241.

“Here, too, we shall find the divine likeness and the holy image in the righteous soul.”<sup>377</sup>

Clement is clearly against the transmigration of souls. He writes, “But with reference to these dogmas, whether the soul is changed to another body, also of the devil, at the proper time mention will be made.”<sup>378</sup> He does mention that abstaining from meat influences the soul but not “as Pythagoras and his followers dream of the transmigration of the soul.”<sup>379</sup>

### Summary

Clement does not often use soul for natural life as did previous authors. He much more often uses it in the context of referring to a separate entity from the body. The soul is invisible and the source of movement. It also has a tripartite division, resembling that of Plato. Along with Justin Martyr, Clement attributes simpleness to the soul.

Clement closely connects the soul with education and knowledge, the purpose of which is to rid the soul of passion, which has entered the soul, contrary to its nature. When the process is complete, the soul can then behold God. The Scriptures play an important role in this education by kindling a spark in the soul to life and by directing the soul in its study. The soul’s program of study goes beyond the Scriptures however. It also

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<sup>377</sup>“τὸ θεῖον καὶ ἅγιον ἄγαλμα, ἐν τῇ δικαίᾳ ψυχῇ.” *Stromata* 7.5.29.6. Parel argues that Clement sees the soul as created in the image of God. However there does not seem to be evidence to support this. Rather, the gnostic soul is what is referred to as the image of God. Kamala Parel, “The Theological Anthropology of Clement of Alexandria” (Ph.D. diss., University of Cambridge, 1995), 71.

<sup>378</sup>“ἀλλὰ πρὸς μὲν τὰ δόγματα ἐκεῖνα, εἰ μετενσωματοῦται ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ περὶ τοῦ διαβόλου κατὰ τοὺς οἰκείους λεχθήσεται καιροῦς.” *Stromata* 4.12.85.3. See Hoheisel, 40-41.

<sup>379</sup>“οὐχ ὧς Πυθαγόρας καὶ οἱ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ τὴν μετένδεσιν ὄνειροπολοῦντες τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Stromata* 7.6.32.9.

includes much of the Greek mode of thinking and includes areas of study such as philosophy, geometry, and astronomy. Male and female souls, alike, are called to this education. Both implicitly and explicitly contained in this notion of the soul's education is that the soul is called to develop itself.

Clement, in contrast to earlier authors, is quite explicit in arguing that the actions of the body affect the soul. He argues that drinking, eating, and sleeping all have an effect on the soul. He gives varied and detailed advice to be followed so that the impact of these actions on the soul is positive and not negative. The human person is composed of both soul and body, and Christ, the Paedagogos, can be said to heal both in places, and in others, only the soul is described as being saved.

Salvation for the soul is based upon its attainment of virtue. He describes virtue as reason leading to a harmonious state of the soul. The soul that attains virtue is the one that can come to God. This happens only to those souls that have devoided themselves of passion. Faith plays an important role in regard to the soul as well. The soul is capable of both faith and unbelief. The one who disparages faith, as the Greeks do, will appear wise only in one's own eyes. Philosophy prepares the way in the soul only for the reception of faith.

The soul is given by God to each person. Drawing on Gen 2:7, Clement argues that the soul is given by the breath of God. He also draws on non-biblical sources in describing the actual process that takes place at conception in the mother's womb. This divine origin is the basis for it being understood as a rational soul. Its origin, however, does not give it a divine status of its own. It does lead, though, to several comparisons and analogies between the divine and the human. Most significantly, he rejects a platonic descent of the soul, but does seem to hold ultimately to the deification of the soul as its supreme goal.

Clement supports his notion of the soul being entombed in the body by quoting Rom 8:10. He calls for the soul to be pure as a “little child.” To this end, the soul is called upon to exercise its free will in “self-determination.” This is indicated in the Bible by the interaction of God with Pharaoh at the time of the Exodus and also the parable of the Rich man and Lazarus. In this context, the soul is called upon to exercise its powers to regulate its desires, both for appropriate and inappropriate objects.

While Clement does say that the body is not evil, yet he also quotes Rom 5:12-14; 6:20-23; 8:10 for support of his interpretation of death as the soul’s entombment in the body in a state of sin. He even refers to death as when the soul is joined to the body. He also quotes from Matt 16:26 for support of this idea. The usage of these verses in discussing the soul is new with Clement of Alexandria. The notion of the entombment of the soul in the body is previously mentioned in the *Epistle to Diognetus* and by *Athenagoras*, but without any scriptural support.

As the soul is separated from the body at death, so should the Gnostic soul seek to separate itself from the body during life. Asceticism is called for in this context and is supported by Luke 12:22-23. This is what Christ aids the soul in doing through His work as the Paedagogos. Clement allegorically supports this statement with Christ’s words in Matt 10:39. A believer’s martyrdom also can be seen as a way for the soul to separate from the body.

Clement looks to 1 Pet 3:19-20 for support of the notion of the soul’s existence after death. He thus argues that Christ preached to the souls of people who had died before His incarnation and not had the opportunity to hear His preaching. The soul is helped in this process by no longer being darkened by the body. This is the first usage of this passage in the development of the doctrine of the soul. Its usage in this manner becomes more frequent with subsequent authors and will prove to be a pivotal passage in

the statement of this doctrine.

The soul's movement toward God is key to Clement's understanding of salvation. In this, he is against the transmigration of souls. The soul is, through purification and the avoidance of sin, to take the Holy Spirit into itself. This is the beginning of its deification.

Clement connects the immortality of the soul with the doctrine of a future judgment, based on his interpretation of Ps 104:4. He argues that since there is a future judgment, then the soul must be immortal. This connection between a future judgment and the immortal nature of the soul is a key idea. He also states that should the soul sleep, that would be its destruction.

### **Hippolytus**

The writings attributed to Hippolytus are many and varied.<sup>380</sup> Eusebius gives the list as *On the Hexaemeron*, *On What Follows the Hexaemeron*, *Against Marcion*, *On the Song of Songs*, *On Sections of Ezekiel*, *On Easter*, and *Against All the Heresies*. Jerome adds twelve other books to this list including *On Daniel*, *On the Antichrist*, and *On the Resurrection*. Other manuscripts include *Against Noetus*, *On the Universe*, and *The Apostolic Tradition*. There is still much current debate regarding exactly who Hippolytus was and which documents are to be attributed to him.<sup>381</sup>

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<sup>380</sup>See Altaner, 183-188; Moreschini and Norelli, 232-237; Beate R. Suchla, "Hippolytus," *DECL*, 287.

<sup>381</sup>See for example Paul F. Bradshaw, Maxwell E. Johnson, and L. Edward Phillips, *The Apostolic Tradition: A Commentary*, Hermeneia (Minneapolis, MN: Fortress Press, 2002), 1-6; Allen Brent, *Hippolytus and the Roman Church in the Third Century: Communities in Tension before the Emergence of a Monarch-Bishop* (Leiden: Brill, 1995); Robert Butterworth, *Hippolytus of Rome: Contra Noetum* (London: Heythrop Monographs, 1977), 7-33; J. A. Cerrato, *Hippolytus between East and West: The Commentaries and the Provenance of the Corpus*, Oxford Theological Monographs (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002); Ronald E. Heine, "Hippolytus, Ps.-Hippolytus and the Early Canons," in *The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature*, ed.

## Usage of *Psyche*

In describing some biblical passages that he is going to interpret, Hippolytus writes, “For these are truly divine and glorious things, and things well calculated to benefit the soul.”<sup>382</sup> Thus Scripture is seen as prepared to do positive things for the soul. This seems to be more in line with understanding the soul as a separate existence from the body rather than speaking about life itself. Being divine and glorious seems to be the focus, which could indicate themes that are specifically calculated to “benefit the soul.”

Hippolytus speaks of prophets using signs and symbols at times “lest they should disquiet the souls of men.”<sup>383</sup> Thus, in the same way that certain themes could benefit the soul, other themes needed to be veiled in order not to cause undue concern to the soul. Thus souls are described as having the capacity of negative emotions.

Hippolytus writes of “all that the soul perceives.”<sup>384</sup> He also speaks of the eyes of the soul. He writes in regard to the Jews, “And surely ye have been darkened in the eyes of your soul with a darkness utter and everlasting.”<sup>385</sup> Here he uses the philosophical notion of the perception of the soul in contrast to that of the body.

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Frances Young et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004); Charles E. Hill, “Hippolytus and Hades: The Authorship of the Fragment *De Universo*,” *Studia Patristica* 21 (1989): 254-259; Miroslav Marcovich, *Hippolytus: Refutatio omnium haeresium* (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1986), 9-17; Marcel Richard, *Kommentar zu Daniel*, GCS (Berlin: Akademie Verlag, 2000), i-xxxvii.

<sup>382</sup>“ἔστι γὰρ ὄντως θεῖα καὶ ἔνδοξα, δυνάμενα ὠφελῆσαι ψυχὴν.” *De antichristo* 8.4

<sup>383</sup>“ἵνα μὴ τάρραχον ἐγγεννήσωσι ταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς.” *De antichristo* 29.4.

<sup>384</sup>“ὅσα ψυχὴ διανοεῖται.” *De theophania* 1.2.

<sup>385</sup>“ἀλλ’ ἐσκοτίσθητε τοῖς τῆς ψυχῆς ὀφθαλμοῖς σκοτισμὸν ἀφεγγῆ καὶ αἰώνιον.” *Demonstratio adversus Judaeos* 20.25.



## Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Hippolytus uses the body and soul composite to refer to the human person. He writes in describing his work of writing as “laboring with every energy of body and soul.”<sup>386</sup> In describing Christ’s birth and incarnation, Hippolytus writes of him “taking the flesh from her [Mary], and assuming also a human, by which I mean a rational soul, and becoming thus all that man is.”<sup>387</sup> This shows his composite understanding of the human person of flesh, or body, and soul.

Hippolytus, in commenting on the Platonic notion of the immortality of the soul, writes that the soul is made of the same substance as the body. “For if ye believe that the soul is originated and is made immortal by God, according to the opinion of Plato, in time, ye ought not to refuse to believe that God is able also to raise the body, which is composed of the same elements, and make it immortal.”<sup>388</sup>

Hippolytus writes of baptized people being immortal. He notes that Christ “begetting us again to incorruption of soul and body, breathed into us the breath (spirit) of life, and endued us with an incorruptible panoply.”<sup>389</sup> This seems to clearly play on

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<sup>386</sup>“ἀλλ’ οὐδὲ πάση ψυχῇ καὶ σώματι ἐργαζόμενοι.” *Refutatio omnem haeresium* 1.prol.6.6.

<sup>387</sup>“ἵνα σαρκωθεὶς ἐξ αὐτῆς, λαβὼν δὲ καὶ ψυχὴν τὴν ἀνθρωπείαν, λογικὴν δὲ λέγω, γεγονῶς πάντα ὅσα ἐστὶν ἄνθρωπος.” *Contra haeresin Noeti* 17.2.4

<sup>388</sup>“τὴν γὰρ ψυχὴν γενητὴν καὶ ἀθάνατον ὑπὸ θεοῦ γεγονέναι πιστεύσαντες κατὰ τὸν Πλάτωνος λόγον χρόνῳ μὴ ἀπιστήσητε καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἐκ τῶν αὐτῶν στοιχείων σύνθετον γενόμενον δυνατὸς ὁ θεὸς ἀνα βιώσας ἀθάνατον ποιεῖν.” *De universo* 51.

<sup>389</sup>“καὶ ἀναγεννήσας πρὸς ἀφθαρσίαν ψυχῆς τε καὶ σώματος, ἐνεφύσησεν ἡμῖν πνεῦμα ζωῆς, περιαιφιάσας ἡμᾶς ἀφθάρτῳ πανοπλίᾳ.” *De theophania* 8.6.

Gen 2:7. Here again, though, Hippolytus is following the custom of the time to insist on the immortal nature of both soul and body.

Hippolytus mentions Christ preaching to the souls of the saints.<sup>390</sup> This is a popular notion based upon an interpretation of 1 Pet 3:19. Hippolytus also describes John the Baptist doing the same thing. He writes, “He also first preached to those in Hades, becoming a forerunner there when he was put to death by Herod, that there too he might intimate that the Savior would descend to ransom the souls of the saints from the hand of death.”<sup>391</sup>

Hippolytus remarks, in commenting on the raising of Lazarus from the dead, that his “soul rose out of the under-world.”<sup>392</sup> This under-world elsewhere he refers to as Hades “in which the souls both of the righteous and the unrighteous are detained.”<sup>393</sup> He describes it as a “guard-house for souls.”<sup>394</sup> Here the righteous souls have rest while the wicked behold the lake of fire which is prepared for them.

Hippolytus writes regarding the resurrection that there will be “a resurrection of

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<sup>390</sup>“καὶ ἐν νεκροῖς κατελογίσθη, εὐαγγελιζόμενος τὰς τῶν ἁγίων ψυχὰς, διὰ θανάτου θάνατον νικῶν.” *De antichristo* 26.16.

<sup>391</sup>“οὗτος προέφθασε καὶ τοῖς ἐν ἄδη προεναγγελίσασθαι, ἀναιρεθεὶς ὑπὸ Ἡρώδου· πρόδρομος γενόμενος ἐκεῖ, σημαίνων μέλλειν κάκεῖσε κατελεύσεσθαι τὸν σωτῆρα, λυτρούμενον τὰς τῶν ἁγίων ψυχὰς ἐκ χειρὸς τοῦ θανάτου.” *De antichristo* 45.10.

<sup>392</sup>“ἡ ψυχὴ ἐκ τῶν καταχθονίων ἀνασπαστὸς ἐγένετο.” *In evangelium Ioannis et de resurrectione Lazari* 227.10.

<sup>393</sup>“περὶ δὲ ἄδου ἐν ᾧ συνέχονται ψυχαὶ δικαίων τε καὶ ἀδίκων ἀναγκαῖον εἰπεῖν.” *De universo* 2. See also 47.

<sup>394</sup>“τοῦτο τὸ χωρίον ὡς φρούριον ἄπενε μήθη ψυχαῖς.” *Ibid.*, 7. On Hippolytus’s understanding of the interim state, see Daley, 39-40.

all, not by transferring souls into other bodies, but by raising the bodies themselves.”<sup>395</sup> Later he adds, “And to every body its own proper soul will be given again; and the soul, being endued again with it, shall not be grieved, but shall rejoice together with it, abiding itself pure with it also pure.”<sup>396</sup>

### Summary

Hippolytus uses soul to refer to a separate entity from the body. He views the human person as a composite of body and soul. The soul can be affected by the Scriptures for good. He also notes that the prophets used signs to avoid disconcerting the souls of people.

Hippolytus relies on 1 Pet 3:19-20 for support of Christ preaching to those souls kept in Hades. This is clearly the continuation of a trend in understanding the soul. In a unique way, he also describes John the Baptist as doing this as well. He also looks to the story of the Rich Man and Lazarus in Luke 16:19-31 for demonstration of the sentient nature of the soul after the death of the body. Hippolytus taught that the substance of the body was immortal in the same manner that the soul was. He taught that at the resurrection of the body it would be rejoined with its original soul.

### Conclusion

This chapter has studied both the general usage of the soul in the late-second-century Greek Fathers as well as the use of Scripture in its doctrinal development. Both

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<sup>395</sup>“ἀνάστασιν τότε πάντων ποιησάμενος, οὐ ψυχὰς μετενσωματῶν ἀλλ’ αὐτὰ τὰ σώματα ἀνιστῶν.” *De universo* 49.

<sup>396</sup>“ὡς ἐκάστῳ σώματι ἡ ἰδία ψυχὴ ἀποδοθήσεται καὶ τοῦτο ἐπενδυσασμένη οὐκ ἀνιαθήσεται ἀλλὰ συγχαρήσεται καθαρὰ καθαρῶ παραμείνασα.” *Ibid.*, 68.

Irenaeus and Clement use soul to describe natural life, though this usage declines somewhat with the latter as he more often uses it to denote a separate entity from the body. The soul is described by both Irenaeus and Clement as the principle of movement for the body. Both also describe the soul as incorporeal, with Irenaeus also describing the soul as invisible. In addition, both connect the soul to the blood. They do not cite Lev 17:14 for support of this, leaving this to the later work of Origen, although it is unclear where else they may have found support for this idea.

Clement describes the body as the tomb of the soul, continuing this idea that has been suggested by a few previous authors. He turns to Rom 8:10; 5:12-14; 6:20-23 for support of this thesis. In addition, he adds to this soul/body relationship by introducing the idea that the actions of the body directly impact the soul. Thus bodily fasting is argued to be good for the soul. This idea will be further developed by later authors.

With Irenaeus and Clement, the soul is clearly the seat of knowledge and reason. As such, the education of the soul is vital for Clement. For him, it also develops and is not the same in everyone. In this context, free will also becomes closely associated with the soul, both for Irenaeus and Clement. It is also the seat of emotions. Interestingly, it is described by both Irenaeus and Clement as pleasureless at times and then in other places, the soul is described as having both positive and negative emotions. Clearly, however, the notion of an impassible soul is developing.

The breath of God from Gen 2:7 plays an important role for all three authors. This idea is put to more use in this era, with Irenaeus using it to attribute both incorporeality and immortality to the soul. In another place, however, Irenaeus, based upon Luke 16:19-31, will argue that the soul is corporeal.

For Clement and Hippolytus, death is defined as the separation of the soul from the body. Clement turns to Matt 6:25; 10:39; 16:16; Rom 6:20-23; 8:10 for support of this

view. The general view among these authors is that death allows the soul to escape the confines of the body. All authors agree that the body and soul will be reunited at the judgment to share either in the rewards or punishments of God, though none mention eternal punishment in the context of the soul.

For all three authors, the soul survives the death of the body with the soul being described as immortal. Clement introduces a new Scripture text for support of this view. He cites 1 Pet 3:19-20 for the idea of the descent of Christ's soul to preach to the souls of the unrighteous. This was seen as a parallel to the existence of all souls after the death of the body. Hippolytus also uses this Scripture text as support for the same idea. Both Irenaeus and Clement continue the earlier practice of citing the biblical teaching of a future judgment as a reason for defending the doctrine of an immortal soul. Clement argues this based on his interpretation of Ps 104:4. Irenaeus uses Pss 21:4; 22:29; 148:5-6; and Luke 16:19-31 (Rich Man and Lazarus) for support of this idea. Hippolytus also uses Luke 16:19-31 in a similar fashion.

Irenaeus uses Luke 16:19-31 along with several other verses to argue that the souls of the righteous and the unrighteous are not in the same place after death. He argues that the righteous are in a better part of Hades than the unrighteous, awaiting the resurrection to go to heaven. The goal of the soul in experiencing a vision of God is suggested by Clement who notes that it happens through the education of the soul.

## CHAPTER VI

### ORIGEN AND HIS FOLLOWERS

No other author of this time period can compare with Origen, either in breadth or depth of focus on the soul. The life of the soul was everything in the writings of this monumental figure and he, more than any prior author, probed the Scriptures and the ideas of prior thinkers in his efforts to develop a thorough picture of what might be understood concerning the soul. Such was his effect that the following two authors, Gregory Thaumaturgos and Methodius, write almost exclusively in direct conversation with him. The former is completely in agreement and the latter generally opposed, though on the concept of the soul, they are in general agreement. While, ultimately, many of Origen's developments were set aside by later authors, a few of his ideas did ultimately stick and find their way to the present day.

#### Origen

Origen was one of the most prolific writers of the early Church Fathers.<sup>1</sup> His

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<sup>1</sup>On his works, see Moreschini and Norelli, 268-303; Quasten, 2:43-75; Hermann J. Vogt, "Origen," *DECL*, 445-447; Rowan Williams, "Origenes," *Theologische Realenzyklopädie*, 25:403-407. A major issue in understanding Origen and his works is whether to see him as a philosopher or a biblical exegete. Dillon notes that Origen "is indeed a philosopher, but one who, rather than adopting Platonism or the doctrine of any other Hellenic school, has forged a system of his own out of the Christian Scriptures and tradition, to which he lays Platonism in tribute for concepts and formulations which he finds useful, without surrendering to the Greeks any principle whatever." John Dillon, "Origen and Plotinus: The Platonic Influence on Early Christianity," in *The Relationship between Neoplatonism and Christianity*, ed. Thomas Finan et al. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1992), 8.

known writings are around eight hundred with some early sources claiming between two and six thousand. He is a Greek Father, writing in Greek, but much of his work was destroyed as a result of the later controversy over his theology. Many of his writings which remain are works that were translated into Latin by others such as Rufinus and Jerome.<sup>2</sup> Thus, this study looks at both *psyche* and *anima* in his works.<sup>3</sup> His works included a great many exegetical and homiletic treatises on Scripture, his famous dogmatic work *On First Principles*, the apologetic treatise *Against Celsus*, practical works, along with other miscellaneous writings.

Origen presents a special challenge with his usage of soul.<sup>4</sup> He himself notes that “the doctrine of the soul is vast and difficult to interpret, being gathered from words occurring here and there in the Scriptures.”<sup>5</sup> This difficulty, as it pertains specifically to Origen, is directly related to his hermeneutic for interpreting Scripture.<sup>6</sup> Doutreleau notes

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<sup>2</sup>On the issue of Origen’s translators, see Jean Daniélou, *Origen*, trans. Walter Mitchell (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1955); Pierre Nautin, *Origène: sa vie et son oeuvre* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1977), 150-153, 227-241; Monica Wagner, “Rufinus the Translator: A Study of His Theory and Practice as Illustrated in His Version of the Apologetica of S. Gregory Nazianzen” (Ph.D. diss., The Catholic University of America, 1945), x-xii; F. Winkelmann, “Einige Bemerkungen zu den Aussagen des Rufinus von Aquileia und des Hieronymus über ihre Übersetzungstheorie und methode,” in *Kyriakon: Festschrift Johannes Quasten*, ed. Patrick Grandfield et al. (Münster: Verlag Aschendorff, 1970).

<sup>3</sup>On his works, see Moreschini and Norelli, 268-303; Quasten, 2:43-75; Vogt, “Origen,” 445-447; R. Williams, “Origenes,” *DECL*, 25:403-407.

<sup>4</sup>Thümmel argues that in Origen’s anthropology, soul moves into the background to make room for the *logos* concept. Thümmel, 246. On the relation of soul and *logos*, see Robert M. Berchman, “Self-knowledge and Subjectivity in Origen,” in *Origeniana Octava*, ed. L. Perrone (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 2003).

<sup>5</sup>*Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 6.14.87.

<sup>6</sup>For a discussion on the difficulties in dealing with Origen specifically relating to his exegetical works, see Jean Daniélou, “Origène comme exégète de la Bible,” *Studia Patristica* 1 (1957): 280-281.

that for Origen, all Scripture relates to the soul.<sup>7</sup> Thus, Origen seems sometimes prone to searching for anything to apply to the soul, especially in his commentaries and homilies on the books of Scripture. For example, Origen writes of the “soul of Scripture.”<sup>8</sup> He also writes of the “soul and body and spirit of Scripture.”<sup>9</sup> Interpreting this, he writes, “the body certainly for those who were before us, the soul for us, but the spirit for those who ‘will attain the inheritance of eternal life in the future,’ through which they come to the heavenly kingdom.”<sup>10</sup> This “soul of Scripture” he also appears to refer to as the “spirit of the law.”<sup>11</sup>

Because Origen makes wide use of the mystical, “third interpretation” of Scripture,<sup>12</sup> and because Origen’s references to the soul that are based on this mystical

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<sup>7</sup>Louis Doutreleau, *Origen: Homélie sur les Nombres*, 415 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1996), 32n1.

<sup>8</sup>“*Scripturae anima aedificentur.*” *De principiis* 4.2.4.

<sup>9</sup>“*Qui fecit Scripturae animam et corpus et spiritum.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 5.1.

<sup>10</sup>“*Corpus quidem his, qui ante nos fuerunt, animam vero nobis, spiritum autem his, qui ‘in futuro haereditatem vitae aeternae consequentur’, per quam perveniant ad regna coelestia.*” *Ibid.*

<sup>11</sup>“*Legis animam.*” *Ibid.*

<sup>12</sup>See *ibid.*, 5.7. On Philo’s influence on Origen’s hermeneutics, see Daniélou, *Origen*, 178-191; Fearghus O. Fearghail, “Philo and the Fathers: The Letter and the Spirit,” in *Scriptural Interpretation in the Fathers: Letter and Spirit*, ed. Thomas Finan et al. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1995), 55-57. On Origen’s hermeneutic in general, see Daniélou, *Origen*, 139-173; David Dawson, “Allegorical Reading and the Embodiment of the Soul in Origen,” in *Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community*, ed. Lewis Ayres et al. (London: Routledge, 1998); Elizabeth Dively Lauro, *The Soul and Spirit of Scripture within Origen’s Exegesis* (Boston: Brill, 2005), 131-194; Henri de Lubac, *Histoire et esprit: l’intelligence de l’Écriture d’après Origène* (Paris: Aubier, 1950), 346-355; Karen Torjesen, “‘Body,’ ‘Soul,’ and ‘Spirit’ in Origen’s Theory of Exegesis,” *Anglican Theological Review* 67, no. 1 (1985): 19-22; Gerard Watson, “Origen and the Literal Interpretation of Scripture,” in *Scriptural Interpretation in the Fathers: Letter and Spirit*, ed. Thomas Finan et al. (Dublin: Four Courts Press, 1995); Frances Young, “Alexandrian and Antiochene Exegesis,” in *A History of Biblical*



hermeneutic often do not have much that is helpful in further understanding of Origen's doctrine of the soul, this study does not present each of these. Various examples are used when they are deemed useful in clarifying Origen's doctrinal position on the soul. It must be admitted at the outset that making the distinction between helpful and not helpful is not always easy.<sup>13</sup> When one tries to analyze these interpretations in order to help elucidate Origen's doctrine of the soul, it sometimes appears that it has nothing to do with the soul at all. Once looked at in the context of Origen's hermeneutic, several ideas are apparent however. First, whenever Origen discusses a person in the context of faith or lack thereof, he most often uses the term *soul* rather than any other word to denote the individual person. Secondly, almost every historical event described in the Old Testament can be interpreted in such a way as to discuss the soul's experience with God, either for

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*Interpretation*, ed. Alan J. Hauser et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 1:334-354. On Philo's exegetical method, see Peder Borgen, "Philo of Alexandria as Exegete," in *A History of Biblical Interpretation*, ed. Alan J. Hauser et al. (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2003), 1:114-143.

<sup>13</sup>See David Dawson, "Plato's Soul and the Body of the Text in Philo and Origen," in *Interpretation and Allegory: Antiquity to the Modern Period*, ed. Jon Whitman (Boston: Brill, 2003). As an example, take Origen's mystical interpretation of the pregnant woman who experiences premature delivery of her fetus as a result of being struck by two quarrelling men. He writes, "The soul which has just conceived the word of God is said to be a woman with child." He adds further to this interpretation writing, "Those, therefore who conceive and immediately give birth are not to be considered women, but men, and perfect men. . . . They, therefore, are perfect men and strong who immediately when they conceive give birth, that is, who bring forth into works the word of faith which has been conceived." Thus the soul which conceives and gives birth immediately is a perfect man, for Origen. However, he adds, "The soul, however, which has conceived and retains the word in the womb and does not give birth is called woman. . . . This soul, therefore, which is now called a woman because of its weakness, is stricken and made to stumble by two men quarreling between themselves."<sup>13</sup> *In Exodum homiliae* 10.3. Origen then concludes that the man who was fighting and caused the soul which had conceived to prematurely give birth is at fault. Thus the law is not about literal men fighting with one of them striking a pregnant woman but about someone who has just received the word of God and either puts the faith received into works or loses it because of the fighting of others.

good or bad.<sup>14</sup> But even these two general observations provide little in the way of helpful information that can be used to understand more clearly Origen's view of the soul.

### Usage of *Anima* and *Psyche*

#### General Usage

When Origen uses soul, it is not always clear whether he is referring to nature life or to a separated, sentient, psychological entity. For instance, he writes that “regarding the sun, moon, and stars, whether they are living beings or without soul, there is no distinct deliverance.”<sup>15</sup> Here soul would seem to refer to natural life. Similarly he writes

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<sup>14</sup>Though Origen does discuss in other places “female fragility” (see, for example, *In Leuiticum homiliae* 1.2.8; 8.9.), it does not seem that he applies gender to the soul. Rather, the woman is generally a symbol of weakness. For instance, he writes while discussing the creation of male and female in Gen 1, that “our inner man consists of spirit and soul. The spirit is said to be male; the soul can be called female” (*Interior homo noster ex spiritu et anima constat. Masculus spiritus dicitur, femina potest anima nuncupari. In Genesim homiliae* 1.15). Origen also mentions a “manly soul” (*virilem animam. In Genesim homiliae* 5.6). He writes, “So the things after the manner of women should cease also in your soul and you no longer have anything womanish or effeminate in your soul but ‘you act manfully’ (*ut nihil iam muliebre et effeminatum habeas in anima tua, sed ‘viriliter agas’ et viriliter ‘praecingas lumbos tuos’, si sit pectus tuum ‘thorace iustitiae munitum, si galea salutari et gladio spiritus accingaris’*). Origen, in *In Ieremiam* 5.7.13, also writes of “children of the soul” indicating “that the thoughts are the sons and the works and deeds are the daughters through the body” (Πολλάκις εἶπομεν τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς γεννήματα, ὅτι τὰ νοήματα μὲν εἰσιν υἱοί, τὰ δὲ ἔργα καὶ αἱ πράξεις αἱ διὰ τοῦ σώματος θυγατέρες). Cf. C. P. Hammond Bammel, “Adam in Origen,” in *Making of Orthodoxy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989), 71; Elena Giannarelli, “Christian Thought and Alexandrian Methodology: Origen on Sarah, Rebecca, Rachel,” in *Origeniana Quinta*, ed. Robert J. Daly (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1992), 129.

<sup>15</sup>“*De sole autem et luna et stellis, utrum animantia sint an sine anima, manifeste non traditur.*” *De principiis* 1.praef.10. On the notion of stars and immortality, see Alan F. Segal, “Heavenly Ascent in Hellenistic Judaism, Early Christianity and Their Environment,” in *ANRW*, ed. Wolfgang Haase et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 1340.

of “rational beings and in dumb animals; nay, even in those things which are without life, and in all things universally which exist.”<sup>16</sup> Origen several times uses soul for natural life in discussing the Mosaic law of “life for life” but this seems to be based on texts which also uses soul for life rather than an intentional usage of the word.<sup>17</sup> One might think that he uses soul for life in commenting on Jesus’ words, “For whosoever would save his own life shall lose it.”<sup>18</sup> However, he is quick to explain and interpret these words to mean, “Let each one therefore lose his own sinning life,” meaning one’s sinful soul, not one’s bodily life.<sup>19</sup> Here Origen uses soul to refer not to life, in contrast to death, but rather to a psychological entity, apart from the body, which makes up the human person. Elsewhere he writes of those who “are not ready to come into His [God’s] service, and to prepare their souls for trial.”<sup>20</sup>

Origen often writes of someone’s soul. It is difficult in many of these cases, however, to determine in just what senses he does so. He can write of “the souls of children [who] are not yet old enough to be numbered.” He also writes of “the soul who does not remember God”<sup>21</sup> and the “souls of the believers.”<sup>22</sup> In commenting on the

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<sup>16</sup>“*Quae sine anima sunt.*” *De principiis* 1.3.5.

<sup>17</sup>*In Exodum homiliae* 10.

<sup>18</sup>*Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 12.26-28.

<sup>19</sup>“ἀπολλύτω οὖν ἕκαστος τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἀμαρτάνουσαν ψυχὴν.” *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 12.27.30.

<sup>20</sup>“*Qui nondum se tanta constantia neque tanto affectu offerunt deo neque parati sunt accedentes ad servitutem dei praeparare animas suas ad temptationem.*” *De principiis* 3.1.12.

<sup>21</sup>“*Non mihi videtur huiusmodi anima habere memoriam Dei.*” *In Numeros homiliae* 11.2.

<sup>22</sup>“*Animas credentium.*” *Ibid.*, 11.4.

spread of Christianity, he writes that Christ had “convened countless numbers of souls to His religion.”<sup>23</sup> He adds, “That so by this means the souls of others might be assisted in the work of enlightenment.”<sup>24</sup> In these examples, it is not clear that these should necessarily refer simply to a person instead of a separate soul.

Origen uses soul as a way of referring to people. He writes regarding the seventy people who went down to Egypt with Jacob: “They grow from being seventy souls to be an important people, and as the ‘sand by the sea-shore innumerable.’”<sup>25</sup> This type of usage is very common in Origen’s Homilies and Commentaries on various books of the Bible. Because the mystical or “third interpretation” of Scripture is quite important for Origen,<sup>26</sup> and this can only apply to souls as distinct from the material world, he speaks of souls quite often where one might have expected people. For example, he writes of women as “those souls who cannot become the head of another, but are themselves subordinated to others as to a head.”<sup>27</sup> He writes of the Jordan River as able “to water and irrigate thirsty souls, and the senses that are adjacent to it.”<sup>28</sup> In commenting on the Bride

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<sup>23</sup>“μετεποίησε μυριάς ὅσας ψυχὰς ἐπὶ τὴν κατ’ αὐτὸν θεοσέβειαν.” *Contra Celsum* 1.27.11. See also 1.27.17 where he describes the Christian religion as that “which reaches to every soul under the sun.”

<sup>24</sup>“*Ut per eos ceterae animae inluminatae iuarentur.*” *De principiis* 4.3.12.

<sup>25</sup>“*Ex ipsis septuaginta animabus fiunt aliqui et ‘sicut arena, quae est ad oram maris innumerabilis.’*” *De principiis* 4.3.11. It should be noted that in this context, Origen is defining his understanding of nations and is in this section fond of using soul for the inhabitants of a country, whether a literal or a spiritual one.

<sup>26</sup>Dively Lauro, 191-194.

<sup>27</sup>“*Pueriles namque animae nondum tempus habent ex divino praecepto numerari, sed ne illae quidem animae, quae non possunt fieri alterius caput.*” *De principiis* 4.3.12.

<sup>28</sup>“*Rigare et inundare animas sitientes et sensus adiacentes sibi.*” *Ibid.*

of Solomon, he writes that she “represents the Church gathered from among the Gentiles; but the daughters of Jerusalem to whom she addresses herself are the souls who are described as being most dear because of the election of the fathers, but enemies because of the Gospel.”<sup>29</sup> The Church is called “the aggregate of many souls.”<sup>30</sup> He writes in commenting on Lev 4:27, “For who would doubt that the things the Law says were spoken to souls or to the people.”<sup>31</sup>

Similarly, Origen describes “a race of souls” which is called Israel.<sup>32</sup> These are those who will accept God. Elsewhere, in commenting on Jesus’ encounter with a Canaanite woman, he writes describing the lost sheep of Israel as “a lost race of souls possessed of clear vision.”<sup>33</sup> He also speaks of the “the souls . . . called Egyptians, Babylonians, Tyrians, and Sidonians.”<sup>34</sup> These souls are in a sort of captivity. He writes that prophecies made against the named nations are rather to be understood as happening

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<sup>29</sup>“*Haec sponsa, quae loquitur, ecclesiae personam tenet ‘ex gentibus’ congregatae; ‘filiae’ vero ‘Hierusalem’, ad quas ei sermo est, illae sunt animae, quae ‘carissimae quidem dicuntur propter electionem patrum, inimicae autem propter evangelium.’*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 2.113. On the soul and its marriage to God in Origen, see Marie Joseph Pierre, “L’âme dans l’anthropologie d’Origène,” *Proche Orient chrétien* 34, no. 1-2 (1984): 37-55.

<sup>30</sup>“*Ex multis animabus congregata est ecclesia.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 2.153.

<sup>31</sup>“*Quis enim dubitaret quod ea, quae dicit lex, ad animas vel ad populum.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 2.5. Here Origen seems forced, however, by the wording of the text itself. This usage is not found elsewhere.

<sup>32</sup>“*Sed intellegimus genus esse animarum, quae Israhel nominantur.*” *De principiis* 4.3.8.

<sup>33</sup>“*γένος ψυχῶν διορατικῶν ἀπολωλός.*” *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 11.17.33.

<sup>34</sup>“*Animae, si quae in illis habitant locis, Aegyptii et Babylonii et Tyrii ac Sidonii appellentur.*” *De principiis* 4.3.9.

“to those nations of souls who inhabit that heaven which is said to pass away, or who even now are supposed to be inhabitants of it.”<sup>35</sup> As this is couched in his interpretation of Scriptures, it is not surprising that Origen acknowledges that this view is not readily apparent in Scripture.

Origen seems to use soul for mind when he refers to heretics who hold some doctrines “according to the vain and fanciful suggestions of their own soul.”<sup>36</sup> Elsewhere, in describing his theory of hermeneutics, he adds, “Each one, then, ought to describe in his own soul, in a threefold manner, the understanding of the divine letters.”<sup>37</sup>

### **The Essence of the Soul**

Origen defines a soul as “a substance φανταστική and όρμητική, which may be rendered into Latin, although not so appropriately, *sensibilis et mobilis*.”<sup>38</sup> As Butterworth notes, this definition is drawn from Aristotle where “the soul of living creatures is defined by its two powers, that of discernment, which is a function of thought and perception, and that of movement in space.”<sup>39</sup> He also writes, “Nor can any rational

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<sup>35</sup>“*Magis ista convenient illis gentibus animarum, quae in caelo isto, quod ‘transire’ dicitur, habitabant vel etiam nunc habitare putandae sunt.*” *De principiis* 4.3.10.

<sup>36</sup>“*Prout eis animae suae fantasia vanitas que suggesserit.*” *De principiis* 4.2.1.

<sup>37</sup>“*Tripliciter ergo describere oportet in anima sua unumquemque divinarum intellegentiam litterarum.*” *Ibid.*, 4.2.4.

<sup>38</sup>“*Definitur namque anima hoc modo, quia sit substantia φανταστική et όρμητική, quod latine, licet non tam proprie explanetur, dici tamen potest ‘sensibilis et mobilis.’*” *Ibid.*, 2.8.1. In *De oratione* 8.2.10 while describing prayer, Origen writes of God knowing “the motions in the secret part of our soul” (κατανοοῦντος τὰ ἐν τῷ ἀδύτῳ τῆς ψυχῆς κινήματα).

<sup>39</sup>Aristotle *De anima* 3.9.1. Cf. Philo *Legis. alleg.* 2.7 (71) and Tertullian *De anima* 14-16.

and sentient being, i.e., a mind or soul, exist without some movement either good or bad.”<sup>40</sup>

In further defining the soul, Origen concludes that the notion “there are souls in all living things . . . is, I suppose, doubted by no one.”<sup>41</sup> He notes regarding things that move that some “have the cause of motion in themselves, as animals, or trees, and all things which are held together by natural life or soul.”<sup>42</sup> He notes that when the soul is inserted into the body, it “moves all things in it, and exerts its force over everything on which it operates.”<sup>43</sup> He quotes Gen 1:21 as scriptural support for creatures in the sea and Gen 1:24 for land creatures and asserts that without Scripture the same must be true of the birds. He quotes Lev 17:14 as support for life being in the blood of living creatures and notes that this verse “intimates most clearly that the blood of every animal is its life.”<sup>44</sup> Origen connects the soul with the heart, also writing that the “soul of all flesh, which is synonymous with the governing mind that dwells in the body and is called

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<sup>40</sup>“*Nec unquam rationabilis sensus, id est mens vel anima, sine motu aliquo esse vel bono vel malo potest.*” *De principiis* 3.3.5. He speaks elsewhere about the movement of the soul in regard to sin in *In Ieremiam* 1.7.

<sup>41</sup>“*Esse namque animas in singulis quibusque animalibus . . . a nullo arbitror dubitari.*” *De principiis* 2.8.1.

<sup>42</sup>“*Alia vero in semet ipsis habent movendi causam, ut animalia vel arbores et omnia, quae vel per naturalem vitam vel per animam constant.*” *De principiis* 3.1.2. On Origen’s idea of animal souls, see Patricia Cox, “Origen and the Bestial Soul: A Poetics of Nature,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 36, no. 2 (1982): 115-140.

<sup>43</sup>“*Enim anima per omne corpus inserta movet omnia et agit atque operatur universa.*” *De principiis* 2.8.5. Note the emphasis placed on this citation in Karpp, *Probleme*, 186.

<sup>44</sup>“*In quo evidentissime ‘sanguinem’ omnium animalium ‘animam’ ipsorum esse designat.*” *De principiis* 2.8.1. Karpp, *Probleme*, 186-187; Weiss, 164-165.

‘heart.’”<sup>45</sup> In regard to those animals that do not have blood, he argues that they have another substance that is not red, as the color is not important.

Origen approvingly quotes Plato’s words, “For the essence, which is both colorless and formless, and which cannot be touched, which really exists, is the pilot of the soul, and is beheld by the understanding alone; and around it the genus of true knowledge holds this place.”<sup>46</sup> He supports this notion by quoting Paul’s words in 2 Cor 4:17-18, “For our light affliction, which is but for a moment, works for us a far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory; while we look not at the things which are seen, but at the things which are not seen: for the things which are seen are temporal; but the things which are unseen are eternal.” This is a favorite verse of Origen’s, which he uses multiple times to support the notion of the unseen world of the soul outweighing in importance the material world of this life. Origen writes that “we, however, who know of only one nature in every rational soul, and who maintain that none has been created evil by the Author of all things.”<sup>47</sup>

### **Powers of the Soul**

Origen suggests that the unconverted soul feels emotions when he writes that the soul of one who has received the Holy Spirit “can in no respect be troubled, or admit any

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<sup>45</sup>“πρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν ‘πάσης σαρκὸς’ (ἥτις ἐστὶν ὁμωνύμως ᾧ ἐγκατοικεῖ σώματι τὸ ἡγεμονικόν, ὃ καλεῖται καρδία).” *De oratione* 29.2.11.

<sup>46</sup>“Ἡ γὰρ ἀχρώματός τε καὶ ἀσχημάτιστος καὶ ἀναφῆς οὐσία ὄντως οὐσα ψυχῆς κυβερνήτη νῶ μόνῳ θεατῇ, περὶ ὃν τὸ τῆς ἀληθοῦς ἐπιστήμης γένος τοῦτον ἔχει τὸν τόπον.” *Contra Celsum* 6.19.29. See also *ibid.*, 7.32.15 where he asserts that “we know that the soul . . . is immaterial and invisible in its nature” (ἀλλ’ εἰδότες ὅτι ἡ τῆ ἐαυτῆς φύσει ἀσώματος καὶ ἀόρατος ψυχῆ).

<sup>47</sup>“Ἡμεῖς δέ, μίαν φύσιν ἐπιστάμενοι πάσης λογικῆς ψυχῆς.” *Ibid.*, 3.69.3.



feeling of sorrow; nor is he alarmed by anything.”<sup>48</sup> His understanding regarding the soul and emotions is further clarified when he writes that “concupiscence and wrath, which are in every soul, are necessarily said to be unclean in the sense that they serve to make man sin.”<sup>49</sup> He notes, however, the concupiscence is necessary to promulgate the human species and anger is necessary in order to have discipline and correction.

This understanding of feelings, especially with that of desire, and their relationship to the soul is connected to Origen’s understanding on the infirmities of the soul. He writes, “Avarice is one of the worst of its infirmities; pride, anger, boasting, fear, inconstancy, timidity, and the like.”<sup>50</sup> Elsewhere he adds that “if you wish to see of what nature are the sicknesses of the soul, contemplate with me the lovers of money, and the lovers of ambition, and the lovers of boys, and if any be fond of women.”<sup>51</sup> Speaking of one who looks on a woman in lust, he writes, “For his heart touched the vice of lust and his soul became defiled.”<sup>52</sup> Origen talks of a leprous soul which is one “who is bound by

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<sup>48</sup>“*In nullo utique conturbari eius anima poterit aut ullum sensum maeroris accipere; nec in aliquo terretur.*” *De principiis* 2.7.4.

<sup>49</sup>“*Puto quod concupiscentia et ira, quia inest omni animae, necessario istae secundum hoc, quod ad peccandum homini famulantur, immundae dicuntur; secundum hoc vero, quod neque posteritatis sine concupiscentia successio reparatur neque emendatio ulla sine ira potest neque disciplina constare, necessariae et conservandae dicuntur.*” *In Genesim homiliae* 2.6.

<sup>50</sup>“*Sunt enim multi animae ‘languores’: avaritia ‘languor’ eius est, et quidem pessimus; superbia, ira, iactantia, formido, inconstantia, pusillanimitas et horum similia.*” *In Numeros homiliae* 27.12.

<sup>51</sup>“*Εἰ δὲ θέλεις ἰδεῖν ποῖά ἐστι τὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἀρρωστήματα, κατανόημι μοι τοὺς φιλαργύρους καὶ τοὺς φιλοδόξους καὶ τοὺς φιλόπαιδας καὶ εἴ τίς ἐστι φιλόγυνος.*” *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 10.24.1.

<sup>52</sup>“*Tetigit enim cor eius concupiscentiae vitium et immunda facta est anima eius.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 3.3.

sins.”<sup>53</sup> Not every sin is vice, however. He writes, “For not every sin is to be considered a sickness, but that which has settled down in the whole soul.”<sup>54</sup> He also writes of a “weak and sick soul.”<sup>55</sup>

As he describes the sicknesses of the soul, Origen also writes of the health of the soul. He writes, “For the soul acquires health from the Lord in order to accept toils with delight.”<sup>56</sup> He also states that one who has taught the way of salvation and enlightened and instructed other souls “bestows health” on these souls.<sup>57</sup> Origen speaks of the “salvation of his soul.”<sup>58</sup> He writes of one who heals the soul<sup>59</sup> while also noting that Isa 1:6 “teaches that there are certain wounds of the soul.”<sup>60</sup>

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<sup>53</sup>“*Qui in anima leprosus est, id est qui peccatis confixus est.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 8.10.

<sup>54</sup>“Ὁὐ πᾶν δὲ ἁμάρτημα νομιστέον ἀρρωστίαν εἶναι, ἀλλ’ ὅπερ ἐναπέσκηψεν ὅλη τῇ ψυχῇ.” *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 10.24.6.

<sup>55</sup>“*Aegrae atque invalidae non competant animae.*” *In Numeros homiliae* 27.1. See also “*infirmitas est in anima nostra.*” *Ibid.*, 27.1. See also *In Leuiticum homiliae*, 12.2, “so understand that the sickness of sin also certainly makes the soul lowly and small” (*ita intellige quia et animam aegritudo quidem peccati humilem facit et parvam*).

<sup>56</sup>“*Propterea enim et adipiscitur a Deo anima sanitatem, ut labores delectabiliter et non invita suscipiat.*” *In Numeros homiliae* 27.12.

<sup>57</sup>“*Viam Dei ostendit et animae salutem divini Verbi illuminationibus confert.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 3.187. See also *In Ieremiam* 17.5.8. Cf. *In Ieremiam* 14.1.11 where prophets are described as “healers of soul” (εἶναι ἰατροῦς ψυχῶν).

<sup>58</sup>“*Animae salutem prodesse iudicabit.*” *In Numeros homiliae* 27.1. Compare later his discussion of a dead soul.

<sup>59</sup>“πόσω πλέον ὁ πολλῶν ψυχᾶς θεραπέυσας.” *Contra Celsum* 1.9.43. See also *ibid.*, 1.63.31; 4.15.17.

<sup>60</sup>“*Quod autem sint quaedam animae vulnera, Esaias docet.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 8.5.

Origen sees a connection between the acts of the body and the state of the soul. Based upon the command of Lev 16:29 to humble one's soul and Matt 9:15 where Christ says that when the bridegroom is gone, they will fast, Origen argues that one humbles their soul by bodily fasting.<sup>61</sup> He also notes that "the soul is wounded by the tongue, it is wounded also through the thoughts and evil desires, shattered and bruised by the works of sin."<sup>62</sup> Elsewhere Origen writes, "Drunkness of wine is destructive in all things, for it is the only thing which weakens the soul along with the body."<sup>63</sup> He does write of those who "are taken up from love of pleasure, and from deifying the belly which is treated with honor, when it, with its appetites, and not reason, rules our souls."<sup>64</sup> He also writes of "the corruptible body which presses heavily on the soul."<sup>65</sup>

He writes, "We train to habits of self-restraint boys just reaching the age of puberty, and feeling a desire for sexual pleasures, pointing out to them not only the disgrace which attends those sins, but also the state to which the soul of the wicked is

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<sup>61</sup>"*Quomodo 'humiliat' populus 'animam' suam, ipse dicit: 'venient' inquit 'dies, cum auferetur ab iis sponsus, et tunc ieiunabunt in illis diebus.'*" *In Leuiticum homiliae* 9.5.

<sup>62</sup>"*Vulneratur ergo et per linguam anima, vulneratur et per cogitationes et concupiscentias malas, frangitur autem et conteritur per opera peccati.*" *In Numeros homiliae* 8.1.

<sup>63</sup>"*Est ergo ebrietas vini pernicioosa in omnibus; sola namque est, quae simul cum corpore et animam debilem reddat.*" *In Leuiticum homiliae* 7.1. Origen argues that anger, desire, fear, vain suspicion, envy, and spite all inebriate the soul. On Origen's concept of body, see Mark J. Edwards, "Origen No Gnostic, or, On the Corporeality of Man," *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 43, no. 1 (1992): 31-36.

<sup>64</sup>"καὶ ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοποιεῖσθαι τιμωμένην τὴν γαστέρα, ὅταν αὐτὴ καὶ αἰ κατ' αὐτὴν ὀρέξεις καὶ μὴ ὁ λόγος ἄρχῃ τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν." *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 11.12.48.

<sup>65</sup>"ὄνικὸν μύλον τὸ φθαρτὸν σῶμα τὸ βαρῦνον ψυχὴν ἀναλήψεται." *Ibid.*, 13.17.90.

reduced through practices of that kind, and the judgments which it will suffer, and the punishments which will be inflicted.”<sup>66</sup> However, Origen also asserts that the essence of the soul does not change.<sup>67</sup> Concerning wealth and its effect on the soul, he writes, “For material wealth ought to be regarded as the ruin of the soul rather than its redemption price, unless it should be converted into good works and becomes righteousness and mercy and is transformed from material wealth into the wealth of the soul.”<sup>68</sup>

In arguing with Celsus regarding the incarnation, Origen writes of those non-Christians who acknowledge a connection between the rational capabilities of the soul and the constitution of the body that it inhabits. He then writes of a soul that “for certain mysterious reasons, is not deserving of being placed in the body of a wholly irrational being, nor yet in that of one purely rational, but is clothed with a monstrous body.”<sup>69</sup> He then notes that a good body would allow for more reasoning powers in the soul. The argument is that the goodness of one’s body impacts that ability of the soul to act rationally. Elsewhere he quotes from Wis 9:15, noting that Scripture teaches that the “corruptible body weighs down the soul, and this earthy tent depresses the thoughtful

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<sup>66</sup>“παρατιθέντες οὐ μόνον τὸ ἐν τοῖς ἀμαρτανομένοις αἰσχρὸν ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν οἷς ἔσται διὰ τὰ τοιαῦτα ἢ τῶν φαύλων ψυχῆ, καὶ οἷας τίσει δίκας καὶ ὡς κολασθήσεται.” *Contra Celsum* 3.56.26.

<sup>67</sup>Ibid., 4.18.30.

<sup>68</sup>“*Nam corporales divitiae pernicies magis animae quam redemptio ejus esse credendae sunt, nisi ad bonum opus conversae justitiae et misericordiae fiant, et ex corporalibus divitiis ad animae divitias transferantur.*” *Commentarii in epistolam ad Romanos* 3.7.14.

<sup>69</sup>“Εἰ γὰρ ἦδε μὲν ἡ ψυχῆ, κατὰ τινὰς ἀπορρήτους λόγους ἀξία γενομένη μὴ πάντῃ μὲν ἐν ἀλόγου γενέσθαι σώματι οὐ μὴν καὶ καθαρῶς ἐν λογικοῦ.” *Contra Celsum* 1.33.1.

mind.”<sup>70</sup>

The soul is also capable of growth. Origen writes, “For as the understanding of the soul grows, it is also furnished with an acquaintance with high things and is given judgment by which to cut what is eternal away from what is temporal.”<sup>71</sup> However he points out that no one should think that “because we call the soul a little child, she is so essentially; no, she is such only in that she lacks learning; because she has but small understanding and very little skill, do we speak of the soul as little.”<sup>72</sup> Origen, in fact, writes that “in the first stage of growth false teachings certainly arise in the soul, for it is impossible from the beginning that man receive pure and true doctrines.”<sup>73</sup> Thus, “every soul, therefore, which comes to childhood, and is on the way to full growth, until the fullness of time is at hand, needs a tutor and stewards and guardians.”<sup>74</sup> Origen uses the call of Simon and Andrew as disciples to become fishers of men as a means of discussing

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<sup>70</sup>“*Ut ait Scriptura ‘Corruptibile corpus aggravat animam, et demergit terrena habitatio sensum multa cogitantem.’ Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos 3.3.14. See also 7.4.10.*

<sup>71</sup>“*Crescente namque intellectu animae et notitia ei excelsorum praebet et iudicium datur, quo sciat a temporalibus aeterna intercidere et a perpetuis caduca separare.’ In Numeros homiliae 27.12.*

<sup>72</sup>“*Verum quod ‘parvulam’ nominamus animam, nemo ita accipiat, quasi secundum substantiam ‘parvula’ dicatur, sed cui deest eruditio et in qua exiguus est intellectus ac minima peritia, hanc ‘parvulam’ dicimus animam.’ Commentarium in Canticum canticorum 2.164.*

<sup>73</sup>“*παραθήσομαι ὅτι κατὰ τὴν πρώτην ἡλικίαν ψευδοδοξίαί πάντως γίνονται ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ· οὐ γὰρ οἷόν τέ ἐστιν ἀρχῆθεν ἀληθῆ δόγματα <καί> καθαρὰ λαβεῖν τὸν ἄνθρωπον.’ In Ieremiam 5.15.4.*

<sup>74</sup>“*Πᾶσα τοίνυν ψυχὴ ἐρχομένη εἰς νηπιότητα καὶ ὀδεύουσα ‘ἐπὶ τὴν τελειότητα’ δεῖται, μέχρις ἐνστικτῆς αὐτῆς ‘τὸ πλήρωμα τοῦ χρόνου’, παιδαγωγῶν καὶ οἰκονόμων.’ Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei 10.9.19.*

the change in the soul that happens when one is caught in the nets of Jesus' disciples.<sup>75</sup> Origen also speaks of the varying capacity of souls to take the Word of God.<sup>76</sup> Here he refers to the varying abilities of people to understand the Scripture.

In referring to the soul's ability to know, Origen writes, "The soul cannot come to the perfection of knowledge otherwise than by inspiration of the truth of the divine wisdom."<sup>77</sup> He connects the soul with the place where truth is known. He writes, "It is not therefore matter of surprise that the same God should have sown in the hearts of all men those truths which He taught by the prophets and the Savior."<sup>78</sup> He writes of "uneducated souls" who went astray.<sup>79</sup> In commenting on Sir 23:2, he writes, "The whips of God whip the thought. For the Word, by guiding the soul to a perception of how it has sinned, whips it."<sup>80</sup> Here Origen connects the thoughts of an individual with their soul. Regarding the soul's knowledge of human wisdom, Origen writes, "We maintain, indeed, that 'human' wisdom is an exercise for the soul, but that 'divine' wisdom is the 'end.'"<sup>81</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>*In Ieremiam* 16.1.

<sup>76</sup>"*Quae Dei verba sunt et in quibus diversus pro captu animarum cibus est, unusquisque, prout sanum se et validum sentit, adsumat.*" *In Numeros homiliae* 27.1.

<sup>77</sup>"*Quia nec aliter potest anima ad scientiae perfectionem venire, nisi divinae sapientiae fuerit inspirata veritate.*" *De principiis* 4.2.7.

<sup>78</sup>"οὐδὲν θαυμαστὸν τὸν αὐτὸν θεὸν ἄπερ ἐδίδαξε διὰ τῶν προφητῶν καὶ τοῦ σωτήρος ἐγκατεσπαρκέναι ταῖς ἀπάντων ἀνθρώπων ψυχαῖς." *Contra Celsum* 1.4.9.

<sup>79</sup>"διὰ τοῦτο ἀπαίδευτοι ψυχαὶ ἐπλανήθησαν." *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 6.54.278.

<sup>80</sup>"Αἱ μάστιγες τοῦ θεοῦ τὸ διανόημα μαστιγοῦσιν· λόγος γὰρ καθαπτόμενος τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ εἰς συναίσθησιν αὐτὴν ἄγων τῶν ἡμαρτημένων μαστιγοῖ." *In Ieremiam* 6.2.17.

<sup>81</sup>"Καὶ γυμνάσιον μὲν φαμεν εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην σοφίαν, τέλος δὲ τὴν θεῖαν." *Contra Celsum* 6.13.11.

He writes that God provided “for each person in his soul so that it is endowed with reason, so that it can grasp knowledge and exercise its intelligence, and in the body so that it has healthy sense faculties?”<sup>82</sup> He also speaks of someone who might “instruct and enlighten our souls, teach us the way of salvation, and deliver to us the rule of life.”<sup>83</sup> This also demonstrates how easily Origen slips between the soul and the individual in his usage. First he says souls and then he switches to the pronoun *us*. Origen also writes of the “the rational soul recognizing, as it were, its relationship (to the divine), at once rejects what it for a time supposed to be gods, and resumes its natural love for its Creator.”<sup>84</sup> He notes in discussing the burial of the body that “it is not right that the dwelling-place of the rational soul should be cast aside anywhere without honor.”<sup>85</sup> He argues that the “reasonable soul” is of far more value than the body<sup>86</sup> and describes Christ as “the light of those rational souls which are in the sensible world.”<sup>87</sup>

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<sup>82</sup>“κατὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἵνα λογικὸς ᾦ, ἵνα ἐπιστήμην ἀναλαμβάνη, ἵνα γυμνάζεται τὸ συνετὸν αὐτοῦ, κατὰ τὸ σῶμα, ἵνα ἔχη ἐρρωμένα ‘τὰ αἰσθητήρια.’” *In Ieremiam* 3.2.6. See also 6.3.28 where Origen notes that the Greeks also approve of a strong, rational soul.

<sup>83</sup>“*Si quis, verbi gratia ‘laboret in Verbo’ Dei atque animas nostras instruat et illuminet, viam salutis doceat, vivendi ordinem tradat, non tibi videtur et hic ‘proximus’ quidem esse, sed multo amplius alio ‘proximo diligendus,’ qui horum nihil gerit?’*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 3.187.

<sup>84</sup>“Καὶ εὐθέως ὡσπερὶ τὸ συγγενὲς ἐπιγνοῦσα ἡ λογικὴ ψυχὴ ἀπορρίπτει μὲν ἃ τέως ἐδόξαζεν εἶναι θεοῦς φίλτρον δ’ ἀναλαμβάνει φυσικὸν τὸ πρὸς τὸν κτίσαντα.” *Contra Celsum* 3.40.15.

<sup>85</sup>“ἄξιον γὰρ τὸ τῆς λογικῆς ψυχῆς οἰκητήριον μὴ παραρριπτεῖν ἀτίμως.” *Ibid.*, 8.30.30.

<sup>86</sup>“ψυχὴν γὰρ παντὸς σώματος καὶ μάλιστα τὴν λογικὴν φαμεν εἶναι πρῶγμα τιμιώτερον.” *Contra Celsum* 8.49.24.

<sup>87</sup>“λέγω δὲ τῶν λογικῶν ψυχῶν τῶν ἐν τῷ αἰσθητικῷ κόσμῳ.” *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 1.25.161.

Virtue is important in driving sin from the soul. Origen writes, “For virtue, taking up her abode in the souls of these persons, and expelling the wickedness which had previous possession of them, produces an oblivion of the past.”<sup>88</sup> Origen does allow, though, that “although virtue does not effect an entrance, yet if a considerable progress take place in the soul, even that is sufficient.”<sup>89</sup> Similarly he writes of those who go around and speak flattery and deception and that by doing so they fail to instill virtue in souls through God’s word.<sup>90</sup>

When a person is not sincere, Origen writes of that person having an “insincere soul”<sup>91</sup> and of a “proud and stubborn and false soul.”<sup>92</sup> He also writes of a “contrite soul.”<sup>93</sup> He writes that “unless a man has first ascertained the defects of his life, and the evil nature of his sins, and made this known by confession from his own lips, he cannot be cleansed or acquitted, lest he should be ignorant that what he possesses has been bestowed on him by favor, . . . which idea undoubtedly generates arrogance of mind and

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<sup>88</sup>“Ἀμνηστίαν γὰρ τοῖς τοιοῦτοις δίδωσιν ἀρετή, ἐπιδημοῦσα αὐτῶν ταῖς ψυχαῖς καὶ ἐκβεβληκυῖα τὴν προκαταλαβοῦσαν κακίαν.” *Contra Celsum* 3.71.16.

<sup>89</sup>“Εἰ δὲ καὶ μὴ ἀρετὴ ἀξιόλογος δὲ προκοπὴ ἐγγένοιτο τῇ ψυχῇ, ἰκανὴ καὶ αὕτη κατὰ τὴν ἀναλογίαν τοῦ πῶς εἶναι προκοπῆς ἐκβαλεῖν καὶ ἐξαφανίσει τὴν τῆς κακίας χύσιν.” *Ibid.*, 3.71.18.

<sup>90</sup>“*Inde est unde nonnulli circumeunt domos loquentes ad gratiam cum omni adulatione et deceptione, non ut in verbo Dei aedificent animas ad virtutem, sed ut adulatoriis dulcibusque sermonibus permanere.*” *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 10.35.2.

<sup>91</sup>“Ὅρα οὖν τὸ νόθον αὐτοῦ τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Contra Celsum* 1.8.17.

<sup>92</sup>“*Superbam namque et contumacem animam.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 6.2.

<sup>93</sup>“*Sed in anima contribulata.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 4.5.



pride, and finally becomes the cause of the individual's ruin."<sup>94</sup> In commenting on Judas, he writes that he "neither opposed Him [Christ] with his whole soul, nor yet with his whole soul preserved the respect due by a pupil to his teacher."<sup>95</sup> He includes Celsus among the "ignorant souls."<sup>96</sup>

### **The Corporeal and the Soul**

Origen refers to the hands of the soul when he writes, "Let us stretch out our hands, alike of body and soul, to God; that the Lord . . . may by His power bestow the word also on us."<sup>97</sup> He notes that this is because one will find in Scripture that "the names of the members of the body transferred to those of the soul; or rather the faculties and powers of the soul are to be called its members."<sup>98</sup> In this context he refers to the eyes, ears, head, hand, foot, and womb of the soul. He concludes that all these references must "be referred to the parts and powers of the invisible soul."<sup>99</sup> Origen notes that by studying

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<sup>94</sup>*Ita et si qui non prius animae suae vitia et peccatorum suorum cognoverit mala ac proprii oris confessione prodiderit . . . quae res sine dubio arrogantiam rursus animae generat et elationem, et denuo ei causa fiet ruinae."* *De principiis* 3.1.12.

<sup>95</sup>ὅλη ψυχῆ γέγονε κατ' αὐτοῦ οὐδ' ὅλη ψυχῆ ἐτήρησε τὴν αἰδῶ πρὸς διδάσκαλον φοιτητοῦ." *Contra Celsum* 2.11.7.

<sup>96</sup>ἀπαίδευτοι . . . ψυχαί." *Ibid.*, 6.79.41.

<sup>97</sup>*Tam corporis quam animae nostrae palmas protendamus ad Deum, ut Dominus, . . . donet et nobis in 'virtute' sua 'verbum.'*" *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* prol.

<sup>98</sup>*Ita invenies etiam membrorum nomina corporalium transferri ad animae membra, seu potius efficientiae haec animae affectus que dicendi sunt."* *Ibid.*

<sup>99</sup>*Ex quibus evidenter ostenditur membrorum haec nomina nequaquam corpori visibili aptari posse, sed ad invisibilis animae partes virtutes que debere revocari."* *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* prol. On the eyes of the soul, see also *Contra Celsum* 6.67.15. Cf. Eph 1:18. Thus, in *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 11.8.60 he notes that Christ's followers should wash the hands of their soul (οὕτως τὰς τῶν ψυχῶν νίπτεσθαι χειρῶν).

“all the several powers of the bodily senses according to their kind and the corresponding powers of the soul” one will “clearly perceive what training should be undertaken in each case.”<sup>100</sup> Origen notes that “Christ is said to become each of these things [senses] to suit the several sense of the soul.”<sup>101</sup> He notes that “He is called the true Light, therefore, so that the soul’s eyes may have something to lighten them. He is the Word, so that her ears may have something to hear. Again, He is the Bread of life, so that the soul’s palate may have something to taste.”<sup>102</sup> To this Origen adds that Christ is a fragrance to be smelled and the flesh to be “felt and handled . . . so that the hand of the interior soul may touch concerning the Word of life.”<sup>103</sup> He writes of one who “injured the eye of the soul, that is, if he disturbed its understanding.”<sup>104</sup> He describes the disciples as having “higher organs of hearing than they who heard them [parables] without explanation, so was it altogether

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<sup>100</sup>“*Consequenter etiam de auditu et gustu et odoratu tactu que per singulas quasque sui generis virtutes sensuum corporalium referens ad animae sensus, quae in singulis adhiberi debeant exercitia quae ve emendatio parari, dilucide recognosces.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 1.105. Cf. *In Exodum homiliae* 10.2 where Origen states that the senses or functions of the soul and body have the same name; *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 9.36.3.

<sup>101</sup>“*Singulis quibusque sensibus animae singula quaeque Christus efficitur.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 2.167. Cf. 3.180.

<sup>102</sup>“*Idcirco enim et ‘verum lumen’ dicitur, ut habeant oculi animae, quo illuminentur; idcirco et ‘verbum’, ut habeant aures, quod audiant; idcirco et ‘panis vitae’, ut habeat gustus animae, quod gustet.*” *Ibid.*, 2.167. Cf. *In Leuiticum homiliae* 5.7. See also Eph 1:18.

<sup>103</sup>“*Idcirco et palpabilis ac manu contractabilis et ‘Verbum caro factum’ dicitur, ut possit interioris animae manus contingere de Verbo vitae.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 2.167.

<sup>104</sup>“*Ponat etiam ‘oculum pro oculo’: si oculus laesit animae, id est intellectum eius turbavit.*” *In Exodum homiliae* 10.4. Cf. *Contra Celsum* 4.31.20 where Origen notes that the making of idols “drags down the eyes of the soul from God to earth” (καθελκούσης ἀπὸ τοῦ θεοῦ εἰς γῆν τοὺς ὀφθαλμοὺς τῆς ψυχῆς).

the same with the eyes of their soul.”<sup>105</sup> He uses “eye of the soul” in a description of an extraordinary perceptive power when he writes, “I maintain, moreover, that even after His incarnation, He is always found by those who possess the acutest eye of the soul to be most God-like.”<sup>106</sup>

Origen also writes of one who is “an adulterer of the soul,”<sup>107</sup> demonstrating his penchant for interpreting the physical world in its relation to the spiritual world. Another example of this is his interpretation of Christ’s command not to cause a little one to stumble. Origen interprets this with a view towards little souls.<sup>108</sup> This argument is laid out in detail in *Dialogue with Heraclides*, listing each of the bodily senses, where it is used to support Origen’s argument that the soul is immaterial, arguing against the implied physical nature of the soul in Lev 17:11.<sup>109</sup> Here Origen even writes of the blood of the soul.<sup>110</sup> Origen clearly argues for a metaphorical understanding of the physical properties of the soul.

In a similar line of argument, Origen describes the Mosaic food laws as “symbols

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<sup>105</sup>“οὕτως καὶ ταῖς ὄψεσι πάντως μὲν τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Ibid.*, 2.64.26. *ibid.*, *Contra Celsum* 2.72.21.

<sup>106</sup>“Ἐγὼ δὲ φημι ὅτι καὶ μετὰ τὴν ἐνανθρώπησιν ἀεὶ εὐρίσκειται τοῖς ἔχουσιν ὀφθαλμοὺς ψυχῆς ὀξυδερεκεστάτους θεοπρεπέστατος.” *Ibid.*, 3.14.15. See also *Commentarii in epistolam ad Romanos* 8.8.6. For a more extended usage of the eye of the soul in an argument against Celsus, see *Contra Celsum* 7.39.

<sup>107</sup>“μοιχός ἐστι τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 12.4.44.

<sup>108</sup>*Ibid.*, 13.26.

<sup>109</sup>*Dialogus cum Heraclide* 16.20-24-15.

<sup>110</sup>“ὡς ἐκχεῖται τὸ αἷμα καὶ ἡ δύναμις ἡ ζωτικὴ τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Dialogus cum Heraclide* 23.1. See Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 78.

of the things which will maintain and strengthen our souls there.”<sup>111</sup> He also writes of the different foods for the different dispositions of souls.<sup>112</sup> He describes the appropriate disposition of the soul at prayer by quoting 1 Tim 2:8 that one should pray “without anger or quarreling.”<sup>113</sup> The bodily senses are also described by Origen as the means through which death can come to the soul. If the eyes of a sinner should look on a woman to lust after her; . . . then death has gained entrance to the soul.”<sup>114</sup> He notes that a similar thing can take place with the hearing.<sup>115</sup> Origen quotes 2 Cor 4:18, “For the things which are seen are temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal,” in support of his notion that the soul must seek for the unseen and invisible.<sup>116</sup> While allowing that the soul can be accessed for good or evil through the senses, he calls these things as “certain analogies and tokens and images of visible things.”<sup>117</sup> Another example of how easily Origen slips

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<sup>111</sup>“σύμβολα τῶν ἐκεῖ μελλόντων τρέφειν καὶ ἰσχυροποιεῖν ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν τυγχάνοντα, θεωρεῖν.” *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 10.15.85.

<sup>112</sup>Ibid., 13.203-217.

<sup>113</sup>*De oratione* 31.1.

<sup>114</sup>“*Si oculi peccatoris ‘videant mulierem ad concupiscendum’; et quoniam ‘qui’ ita ‘viderit mulierem, moechatus est eam in corde suo’, sic ‘mors’ ingressa est ad animam ‘per fenestras’ oculorum.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 3.219. Cf. *In Exodum homiliae* 10.4.

<sup>115</sup>“*Sed et cum recipit quis auditum vanum et praecipue falsae scientiae dogmatum perversorum, tunc ‘mors per’ aurium ‘fenestras’ intrat ad animam.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 3.219. See also *Contra Celsum* 2.48.38.

<sup>116</sup>Norris notes that thus for Origen, “the Apostle agrees with Plato in distinguishing two kinds of existence, Being and and Becoming.” Norris, 141.

<sup>117</sup>“*Sed per exempla quaedam et indicia atque imagines rerum visibilium illa, quae sunt invisibilia et incorporea, contemplatur.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 3.220. Cf. *In Exodum homiliae* 10.4; *Contra Celsum* 3.47.15. Altmann notes the Platonic notion of the sensible world being the images of the invisible forms. Alexander Altmann, “*Homo Imago Dei* in Jewish and Christian Theology,” *Journal of Religion* 48 (1968): 235-259.

back and forth between the physical and soulish sense is when he writes, “The voice of the soul is sweet when it utters the word of God, when it expounds the faith and the doctrines of the truth, when it unfolds God’s dealings and His judgments.”<sup>118</sup> Here Origen seems to mean the actual physical voice of an individual rather than a metaphorical understanding of the voice of the soul. He also writes of a sleep of the soul, referring to a lethargy of the soul in doing the things of God.<sup>119</sup>

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Origen begins his *De principiis* by giving several concepts regarding the soul that are part of the apostolic teaching of the Church. First he declares that the soul has its own substance and life. He writes, “The apostolic teaching is that the soul, having a substance and life of its own . . .”<sup>120</sup> This is followed by a statement regarding the future judgment of all souls, which suggests also the doctrine of the continued existence of the soul. He writes, “After its [soul] departure from the world, [it will] be rewarded according to its deserts.”<sup>121</sup> He adds that the soul is a free agent; “every rational soul is possessed of free-will and volition.”<sup>122</sup> He then states that the Church does not have a clear concept of the derivation of the soul. “But with respect to the soul, whether it is derived from the seed

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<sup>118</sup>“*Suavis’ autem est ‘vox’ animae, cum verbum Dei loquitur, cum de fide et dogmatibus veritatis exponit, cum dispensationes Dei et iudicia eius explanat.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 4.232.

<sup>119</sup>*Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 9.32.2.

<sup>120</sup>“*Anima substantiam vitam que habens propriam.*” *De principiis* 1.praef.5.

<sup>121</sup>“*Cum ex hoc mundo discesserit, pro suis meritis dispensabitur.*” *De principiis* 1.praef.5.

<sup>122</sup>“*Omnem animam rationabilem esse liberi arbitrii et voluntatis.*” *Ibid.* See also *In Numeros homiliae* 20.3; *In Genesim homiliae* 16.2.

by a process of traducianism, so that the reason or substance of it may be considered as placed in the seminal particles of the body themselves, or whether it has any other beginning; and this beginning, itself, whether it be by birth or not, or whether bestowed upon the body from without or not, is not distinguished with sufficient clearness in the teaching of the Church.”<sup>123</sup> He concludes by suggesting that the nature of the soul needs to be investigated similarly as the nature of God, Christ, and the Holy Spirit, in respect to their corporality or lack thereof.<sup>124</sup>

### Origins of the Soul

Origen notes that Christians “have been instructed before now that the human soul was created in the image of God.”<sup>125</sup> In his argument with Celsus, Origen asserts that that part of man which has been created after the image of God “consists in a nature which never had nor no longer has ‘the old man with his deeds.’”<sup>126</sup> Origen asserts that one

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<sup>123</sup>“*De anima vero utrum ex seminis traduce ducatur, ita ut ratio ipsius vel substantia inserta ipsis corporalibus seminibus habeatur, an vero aliud habeat initium, et hoc ipsum initium si genitum est aut non genitum, vel certe si extrinsecus corpori inditur, necne: non satis manifesta praedicatione distinguitur.*” *De principiis* 1.praef.5.

<sup>124</sup>“*Corporeus et secundum aliquem habitum deformatus.... Eadem quoque etiam de Christo et de sancto spiritu requirenda sunt, sed et de omni anima atque omni rationabili natura nihilominus requirendum est.*” *Ibid.*, 1.praef.9.

<sup>125</sup>“προκατειληφότες τὸ ‘κατ’ εἰκόνα’ γεγονέναι θεοῦ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ψυχὴν.” *Contra Celsum* 4.83.45. Cf. *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 9.4.1; *Dialogus cum Heraclide* 23.2. See also *In Ieremiam* 2.1.17 where Origen assures the reader that Gen 1:26 applies to all, not only Adam. On the soul and the image in Origen, see Altmann, 246-247; Pierre, 50-54. For a discussion on the distinction in Origen between image and likeness, see Telepneff, 183-184; R. M. Wilson, “The Early Exegesis of Gen. 1.26,” *Studia Patristica* II pt. I (1957): 436. For a helpful discussion of Origen’s understanding of the “beginning” in time of the soul, see Norris, 149-152. On the notion of humanity and the image of God in Origen, see Henri Crouzel, *Théologie de l’image de Dieu chez Origène* (Paris: Aubier, 1956).

<sup>126</sup>“ὅτι ἐν τῇ ἢ μὴ ἐσχηκίᾳ ἢ μηκέτι ἐχούσῃ ψυχῇ ‘τὸν παλαιὸν ἄνθρωπον σὺν ταῖς πράξεσιν αὐτοῦ.’” *Contra Celsum* 6.63.10.

created after the image of God receives “into his virtuous soul the traits of God’s image.”<sup>127</sup> The soul is from God, being breathed into Adam.<sup>128</sup> It is the soul which is in the image of God, not the body.<sup>129</sup> Elsewhere he writes, “For the soul that was created in the image of God is more precious than any body.”<sup>130</sup> He adds later, “We hold the resemblance to God to be preserved in the reasonable soul, which is formed to virtue.”<sup>131</sup> However the soul does not exist without the body.<sup>132</sup>

Origen argues that souls are not co-eternal with God or unbegotten.<sup>133</sup> He writes, “All souls and all rational natures, whether holy or wicked, were formed or created, and all these, according to their proper nature, are incorporeal; but although incorporeal, they were nevertheless created.”<sup>134</sup> In this context, Origen counts souls and rational creatures

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<sup>127</sup>“ἀναλαμβάνει εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ ἐνάρετον ψυχὴν τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τοῦ θεοῦ.” *Ibid.*, 6.63.32. See also 8.49.26.

<sup>128</sup>*De principiis* 2.8.1.

<sup>129</sup>See Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 78. For a discussion on the distinction between the higher soul or *nous* and the soul see Henri Crouzel, “L’image de Dieu dans la théologie d’Origène,” *Studia Patristica* 2 pt. II (1957): 198; Telepneff, 181.

<sup>130</sup>“ἡ γὰρ ‘κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ’ δεδημιουργημένη τιμιωτέρα ἐστὶ πάντων σωμαίων.” *Exhortatio ad martyrium* 12.41.

<sup>131</sup>“ὅτι τὸ ‘κατ’ εἰκόνα θεοῦ’ ἐν ψυχῇ λογικῇ, τῇ ποιᾷ κατ’ ἀρετὴν.” *Contra Celsum* 7.66.27. See also *Commentarii in epistolam ad Romanos* 9.4.1-5.1. On the relationship between the soul and God, see Daniélou, *Origen*, 296.

<sup>132</sup>Lothar Lies, “Origenes und Reinkarnation,” *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 121, no. 3 (1999): 252-255.

<sup>133</sup>“*Quae non ab eo hoc ipsum ut esset acceperit . . . de ingentis animabus.*” *De principiis* 1.3.3.

<sup>134</sup>“*Omnes animae atque omnes rationabiles naturae factae sunt vel creatae, sive sanctae illae sint, sive nequam; quae omnes secundum propriam naturam incorporeae sunt, sed et per hoc ipsum, quod incorporeae sunt, nihilominus factae sunt.*” *Ibid.*, 1.7.1. On the incorporeal nature of the soul and its relation to the corporeal body in Origen, see

as being humans and other incorporeal beings such as angels and demons and asserts that their rational nature is the same.<sup>135</sup> As Christ also had a soul, Origen writes concerning it, “In this soul the divine fire itself must be believed to have rested, from which some warmth may have passed to others.”<sup>136</sup>

### **Non-human Souls**

Here it is helpful to discuss Origen’s ideas relating to the stars and planets.<sup>137</sup> Origen asserts that they have souls.<sup>138</sup> He writes that the “soul of the sun is in a body too, as is true also of all creation.”<sup>139</sup> He notes on the basis of Job 25:5 that they are unclean, which implies that they can change from good to bad. He also quotes Isa 45:12, noting that they receive communication from God and thus must be rational. He questions “whether their souls came into existence at the same time with their bodies, or seem to be anterior to them.”<sup>140</sup> He admits that this is difficult to prove from Scripture and admits to

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David Bostock, “Quality and Corporeity in Origen,” in *Origeniana Secunda*, ed. Henri Crouzel et al. (Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1980), 323-324; Henri Crouzel, *Origen*, trans. A. S. Worrall (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1989), 94; Pierre, 44. Both Crouzel and Pierre note that, strictly speaking, only God is incorporeal and thus the soul is always in need of a body, whether ethereal or earthly.

<sup>135</sup>Cf. *De principiis* 1.8.2; 4. For the nature of Christ’s soul, see *ibid.*, 2.6.3.

<sup>136</sup>“*In hac autem anima ignis ipse divinus substantialiter requievissse credendus est, ex quo ad ceteros calor aliquis venerit.*” *Ibid.*, 2.6.6.

<sup>137</sup>For a study on the history of this notion in prior schools of thought, see Alan B. Scott, *Origen and the Life of the Stars: A History of an Idea*, Oxford Early Christian Studies, ed. Henry Chadwick et al. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1991), 3-110.

<sup>138</sup>For an example of how Origen connects this with prayer, see *De oratione* 7.1-20.

<sup>139</sup>“καὶ γὰρ ἡ ψυχὴ τοῦ ἡλίου ἐν σώματι καὶ πᾶσα ἡ κτίσις.” *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 1.17.98.5.

<sup>140</sup>“*Utrum animae ipsarum pariter cum ipsis corporibus extiterint, an anteriores*



do otherwise is mere conjecture. To attempt to provide an answer, however, Origen turns to the several verses in the Bible which speak of the infant in the womb doing something.<sup>141</sup> Thus Jacob supplanted his brother in the womb, John leapt when Elizabeth heard Mary's voice, and Jeremiah was known by God before he was created in the womb. Origen urges that because God cannot be unjust, God can only know someone before the body is formed by knowing that soul in some preexistent time. Origen thus argues that since stars are also souls, their soul must also have preexisted. As he has introduced this concept of prior existence and fall, Origen needs to make it clear that he does not support the concept of a rational soul falling so far as to be an irrational animal. He writes that one should not believe "that souls descend to such a pitch of abasement that they forget their rational nature and dignity, and sink into the condition of irrational animals."<sup>142</sup>

Another argument Origen uses is that the stars move orderly. "It manifestly follows from this, that neither can the movement of that body take place without a soul, nor can living things be at any time without motion."<sup>143</sup> He refers to Jer 7:18 where the

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*corporibus videantur.*" *De principiis* 1.7.3.

<sup>141</sup>Ibid., 1.7.4. See also *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 2.30.181 where Origen states that one "must admit that John's soul, being older than his body and subsisting prior to it" (Τῷ γὰρ τηροῦντι τὸ μηδὲν ἀδίκως μηδὲ κατὰ συντυχίαν ἢ ἀποκλήρωσιν ποιεῖν ἀναγκαῖον παραδέξασθαι πρεσβυτέραν οὔσαν τὴν Ἰωάννου ψυχὴν τοῦ σώματος). *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 2.30.181.

<sup>142</sup>"*Id est quod animae in tantum sui decessum veniant, ut naturae rationabilis ac dignitatis oblitae etiam in ordinem inrationabilium animantium vel bestiarum vel pecudum devolvantur.*" *De principiis* 1.8.4.

<sup>143</sup>"*Neque motus ullius corporis sine anima effici potest, neque quae animantia sunt, possunt aliquando esse sine motu.*" Ibid., 1.7.3.

prophet refers to the moon as the queen of heaven<sup>144</sup> as scriptural support for this idea. For additional proof, Origen notes Paul's conception of the creature and creation being made subject to vanity unwillingly and hoping for deliverance from corruption.<sup>145</sup> He writes, "Because the creature was subjected to vanity, not willingly, but because of Him who subjected the same in hope"; so that both sun, and moon, and stars, and angels might discharge their duty to the world, and to those souls which, on account of their excessive mental defects, stood in need of bodies of a grosser and more solid nature."<sup>146</sup>

Origen uses Lev 4:27-28 in support of the concept that souls exist other than those of humans on earth. He notes that it would not have read "If one soul from among the people of the land" if the corollary concept of souls not of the people of the land was also understood.<sup>147</sup>

Origen also discusses the divine soul as found in God and Christ. He quotes Lev 17:10 and Isa 1:13-14 to support the notion that God has a soul. He then adds, "It is difficult indeed both to feel and to state how that which is called in Scripture the soul of God is to be understood; for we acknowledge that nature to be simple, and without any intermixture or addition."<sup>148</sup> Elsewhere he writes in regard to the question of the soul of

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<sup>144</sup>Ibid.

<sup>145</sup>Ibid., 1.7.5.

<sup>146</sup>"*Vanitati quippe creatura subiecta est non volens, sed propter eum, qui subiecit in spe, quo vel sol vel luna vel stellae vel angeli dei explerent obsequium mundo; et his animabus, quae ob nimios defectus mentis suae crassioribus istis et solidioribus indiguere corporibus.*" Ibid., 3.5.4.

<sup>147</sup>"*Quod vero in hoc loco addidit, 'anima' dicens 'si peccaverit ex populo terrae,' non mihi videtur otiosum.*" In *Leiticum homiliae* 2.5.

<sup>148</sup>"*Dei anima' . . . enim simplicem illam naturam et absque ullius adiectionis permixtione profitemur.*" *De principiis* 2.8.2.

God, “That as with respect to everything corporeal which is spoken of God, such as fingers, or hands, or arms, or eyes, or feet, or mouth, we say that these are not to be understood as human members, but that certain of His powers are indicated by these names of members of the body; so also we are to suppose that it is something else which is pointed out by this title—soul of God.”<sup>149</sup> A further possible interpretation is that it should be understood as the incarnate Christ.<sup>150</sup> Origen does not seem to use the description of the divine soul as simple and without intermixture or addition further as he immediately goes back to the previous statement regarding “sensible and moveable” in describing the souls of angels, concerning whom he had already stated that there is no Scripture which can be used to support the notion that they “either possess souls or are called souls, and yet they are felt by very many persons to be endowed with life.”<sup>151</sup> It is possible Origen introduced the “simple” concept to avoid applying the “sensible and moveable” to God.

Origen quotes Ps 22:19-20 for support that Christ has a soul. He writes, “For as He truly possessed flesh, so also He truly possessed a soul.”<sup>152</sup> He notes elsewhere that

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<sup>149</sup>“*Quia sicut omnia, quae corporaliter de deo dicuntur . . . ita et esse aliquid aliud putandum est, quod appellatione hac, quae ‘anima dei’ dicitur, indicatur.*” Ibid., 2.8.5.

<sup>150</sup>“*Potest fortasse ‘anima dei’ intellegi unigenitus filius eius.*” Ibid. See also *In Leuiticum homiliae* 16.7.

<sup>151</sup>“*Vel animas habere vel animae dicantur; animantia tamen esse a quam plurimis sentiuntur.*” *De principiis* 2.8.1. Cf. *Contra Celsum* 3.37.33 where angels and demons are said to be souls that exist apart from the body (οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ ἐν ταῖς ἕξω σωμαίων ψυχαῖς καὶ ἀγγέλοις καὶ δαίμοσι τινες).

<sup>152</sup>“*Sicut enim vere carnem habuit, ita vere et animam habuit.*” *De principiis* 2.8.2. Cf. *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 3.8.3-7, 9 for a discussion on the relationship of the soul of Christ to the Word of God. On the difficulties of Origen’s teaching on Christ’s soul, see Alain le Boulluec, “Controverses au sujet de la doctrine d’Origène sur l’âme du Christ,” in *Origeniana Quarta*, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck:

this soul resembled “our souls indeed in nature, but in will and power resembling Himself.”<sup>153</sup> He also states that Christ’s soul went to Hades at His death.<sup>154</sup> He quotes Ps 22:9-11 for support of this idea. “Now, that He had a soul, is most clearly shown by the Savior in the Gospels, when He said, ‘No man takes my life from me, but I lay it down of myself.’”<sup>155</sup> Here he quoted John 10:18 and he also adds similar statements from Matt 26:38 and John 12:27 regarding the sorrow of soul which Christ experienced. Origen is clear that the “‘Word’ of God is not to be understood to be a ‘sorrowful and troubled’ soul” and that he does not hold “that the Son of God was in that soul [Christ’s] as he was in the soul of Paul or Peter and the other saints, in whom Christ is believed to speak.”<sup>156</sup> As further support, he alludes to Job 15:14, asserting that no one person is clean, even those only born for one day.<sup>157</sup>

Origen states that a human person cannot beget a soul. He writes, “I do not think that any man can beget a soul unless, perhaps, he be someone like” the apostle Paul.<sup>158</sup>

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Tyrolia, 1987).

<sup>153</sup>“*Sed et animam, nostrarum quidem animarum similem per naturam, proposito vero et virtute similem sibi.*” *De principiis* 4.4.4.

<sup>154</sup>“ἡ ψυχὴ ἐν ᾧδου.” *Dialogus cum Heraclide* 7.17.

<sup>155</sup>“*Quod autem habuerit animam, manifestissime in evangeliiis designat ipse salvator dicens: ‘Nemo tollit a me animam meam, sed ego pono eam abs me.’*” *De principiis* 4.4.4.

<sup>156</sup>“*Neque enim ‘tristis’ et ‘turbata’ ‘anima’ verbum dei intellegendum est . . . Nec tamen ita dicimus fuisse filium dei in illa anima, sicut fuit in anima Pauli vel Petri ceterorum que sanctorum*” *Ibid.*

<sup>157</sup>*Ibid.*

<sup>158</sup>“*Ego non puto quod quilibet hominum possit animam gignere, nisi si qui forte talis sit, qualis ille, qui dicebat: ‘nam etsi multa milia paedagogorum habeatis in Christo, sed non multos patres.’*” *In Exodum homiliae* 1.3.

To defend this notion, Origen cites 1 Cor 4:15 and Gal 4:19; in both places, Paul is describing himself in fatherly terms to those whom he brought to Christ. He also quotes Adam's words regarding Eve being bone of his bone, noting that "he does not add . . . 'and soul of my soul.'"<sup>159</sup> Elsewhere, however, Origen, in writing of Mary, the mother of Jesus, describes her as "that soul which had conceived him of the Holy Spirit."<sup>160</sup> Though Origen argues that no one can give birth to a soul, yet, on the basis of Ps 51:5, he notes that still yet, the soul is born impure, "polluted by the filth 'of iniquity and sin.'"<sup>161</sup>

### **The Human Person and the Soul**

Origen conceives of the human person being composed of body and soul.<sup>162</sup> He writes that "our one body is provided with many members, and is held together by one soul."<sup>163</sup> He also notes that "it is then clearly established, by many proofs, that . . . the soul of man exists in this body."<sup>164</sup> He also states that "every soul in this life is shadowed

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<sup>159</sup>"*Nec tamen addit: et anima de anima mea.*" Ibid.

<sup>160</sup>" τὴν συνειληφυσίαν αὐτὸν ψυχὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἁγίου πνεύματος." *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 10.8.38.

<sup>161</sup>"*Ostendens quod quaecumque anima in carne nascitur, 'iniquitatis et peccati' sorde polluitur.*" *In Leuiticum homiliae* 8.3.

<sup>162</sup>"*Nos homines animal sumus compositum ex corporis animae que concursu.*" *De principiis* 1.1.6. For a study of Origen's tripartite and dipartite anthropology, see Henri Crouzel, "L'anthropologie d'Origène dans la perspective du combat spirituel," *Revue d'ascétique et de mystique* 31 (1955): 364-385; Lawrence R. Hennessey, "Origen of Alexandria: The Fate of the Soul and the Body after Death," *Second Century* 8, no. 3 (1991): 164-173.

<sup>163</sup>"*Sed 'sicut corpus nostrum unum ex multis membris' aptum est et ab una anima continetur.*" *De principiis* 2.1.3. In this context, Origen suggests that the soul/body relationship can be used to describe God's relationship to the created world.

<sup>164</sup>"*Manifeste ergo et ex multis indiciis demonstratur quod humana anima, dum in hoc corpore est.*" *De principiis* 3.3.4.

by the covering of this gross body.”<sup>165</sup> He states that the soul “vivifies and moves the body.”<sup>166</sup> The body, he writes, was “to help and to minister to the soul.”<sup>167</sup> He does use the tripartite formulae “body, and soul, and spirit”<sup>168</sup> and is clear that the soul is distinct and different from the spirit. He also writes of “human beings, who are composed of soul and body and vital spirit.”<sup>169</sup>

Quoting 1 Thess 5:23, he writes that “the human being is a composite. For the

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<sup>165</sup>“*Omnis anima in hac vita velamento crassi huius corporis obumbratur.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 3.183.

<sup>166</sup>“ἑπέιπερ ὡσπερ ψυχὴ ζωοποιεῖ καὶ κινεῖ τὸ σῶμα.” *Contra Celsum* 6.48.17.

<sup>167</sup>“*Corpus hoc meum ‘iumentum’ est; ad adiumentum enim animae et ad ministerium datum est.*” *Homiliae in librum Iudicum* 6.5.

<sup>168</sup>“*Sicut ergo homo constare dicitur ex corpore et anima et spiritu.*” *De principiis* 4.2.4. Cf. *Contra Celsum* 2.51.40, *De principiis* 1.8.3; 2.6.5 2.8.4; 3.4.2; *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 1.5.3; 1.10.2; 1.18.5; 6.1.5; *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 32.18. See also *De oratione* 24.2.6 where Origen talks of Paul’s soul, mind, and body (οἷόν ἐστι τις ἰδίᾳ ποιότης Παύλου τοῦ ἀποστόλου, ἡ μὲν τις τῆς ψυχῆς, καθ’ ἣν τοιάδε ἐστίν, ἡ δὲ τις τοῦ νοῦ, καθ’ ἣν τοιῶνδὲ ἐστὶ θεωρητικὸς, ἡ δὲ τις τοῦ σώματος αὐτοῦ, καθ’ ἣν τοιῶνδὲ ἐστὶ). It should be noted that Origen needs the tripartite formula in this situation because he applies its three-fold structure to his hermeneutics of Scripture. On this, see Marguerite Harl, *Origène: Philocalie, 1-20: Sur Les Écritures*, Sources Chrétiennes 302 (Paris: Éditions du Cerf, 1983), 103-118; Toshio Mikoda, “Egemonikon in the Soul,” in *Origeniana Sexta*, ed. Gilles Dorival et al. (Leuven: Leuven University Press, 1995), 459; Antonia Tripolitis, *Origen: A Critical Reading* (New York: Peter Lang, 1985), 37-39. It has been described as more functional rather than purely ontological. See additionally H. Urs von Balthasar, *Origen: Spirit and Fire: A Thematic Anthology of His Writings* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1984), 46; Crouzel, “L’anthropologie d’Origène: de l’arche au telos,” in *Arché e Telos: L’antropologia di Origene e di Gregorio di Nissa: Analisi storico-religiosa* (Milano: Vita e Pensiero, 1981), 37-49; T. Heither, *Translatio Religionis: Die Paulusdeutung des Origenes in seinem Kommentar zum Römerbrief*, Bonner Beiträge zur Kirchengeschichte 16 (Cologne: Böhlau, 1990), 198; Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 84-85. On the contrast between Plato and Origen on this point, see Crouzel, *Origen*, 87-92.

<sup>169</sup>“*Id est hominibus, qui ex anima constamus et corpore ac ‘spiritu vitali.’*” *De principiis* 3.4.1.

Apostle says: May God sanctify your spirit and your soul and your body . . . and may your spirit and soul and body be kept sound and blameless.”<sup>170</sup> He writes that “he can demonstrate through countless Scriptures that the spirit is different from the soul.”<sup>171</sup> He interprets Ps 44:25, “Our soul has been brought down to the dust” as referring to the body not the soul.<sup>172</sup> This, he writes, is because “the soul was fashioned into the body of sin.”<sup>173</sup> “The soul is a mean, as it were, between the flesh and the Spirit.”<sup>174</sup> From this idea, Origen suggests that it can move either to join the flesh or it can move to join the spirit. This relates in some ways to his notion of the soul having either the devil or Christ as its master.

Origen insists that the soul has a separate existence from the body. He writes of the word of God which “cuts through, if I may speak in this way, the harmful friendship of soul and body.”<sup>175</sup> He urges the one facing martyrdom to show “they love Him with all their soul by despising so far as they are able their earthen vessel.”<sup>176</sup> In arguing with

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<sup>170</sup>“Φησὶν γὰρ ὁ ἀπόστολος· ‘Ὁ δὲ Θεὸς ἀγιάσαι ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα·’ τὸ δὲ ‘Ἀγιάσαι ὑμᾶς ὁλοτελεῖς, καὶ ὁλόκληρον ὑμῶν τὸ πνεῦμα καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ καὶ τὸ σῶμα ἀμέμπτως.’ *Dialogus cum Heraclide* 6.23

<sup>171</sup>“διὰ μυρίων δυνάμενος ἀποδεικνύει γραφῶν ἕτερον εἶναι τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 6.11.66.9.

<sup>172</sup>*Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 5.9.10.

<sup>173</sup>“*Pro hoc ipso quod in porpore peccati et corpore mortis atque humilitatis effecta sit.*” *Ibid.*, 5.9.11.

<sup>174</sup>“*Unde apparet mediam quodammodo esse animam inter carnem et spiritum.*” *Ibid.*, 6.1.5.

<sup>175</sup>“καὶ διακόπτων τὴν, ἴν’ οὕτως εἶπω, ἐπιβλαβῆ φιλίαν ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος.” *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 1.32.229.8.

<sup>176</sup>“διὰ τοῦ καταπεφρονηκεῖναι τοῦ ὀστρακίνου σκεύους ἐπιδειξαμένους τὴν ὅλην ψυχῆν πρὸς αὐτὸν ἀγάπην.” *Exhortatio ad martyrium* 2.22. See also *Exhortatio ad martyrium* 3.1.

Celsus, he speaks of “the necessary doctrine, that the soul of the dead exists in a separate state (from the body); and he who adopts such an opinion does not believe without good reason in the immortality, or at least in the continued existence, of the soul, as even Plato says.”<sup>177</sup> In discussing prayer, Origen writes that “the soul is lifted up and following the Spirit is separated from the body.”<sup>178</sup> Origen attempts to use Ps 25:1 to support this notion that “since it is by putting away its existence that the soul becomes spiritual.”<sup>179</sup>

### **Free-Will and the Soul**

Origen describes the soul as being “actuated by freedom of will, and maintaining either their advance or retrogression according to the power of their will.”<sup>180</sup> He writes, in comparing the soul of Christ to that of humans, that “the power of choosing good and evil is within the reach of all.”<sup>181</sup> This notion must be balanced with his understanding that the

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<sup>177</sup>“οὐδὲν ἦττον κατασκευαστικόν ἐστὶν ἀναγκαίου δόγματος, ὡς ἄρα ἡ ψυχὴ ὑφέστηκε τῶν ἀποθανόντων· καὶ οὐ μάλιστα πεπίστευκε περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας αὐτῆς ἢ καὶ τῆς διαμονῆς ὁ τοῦτο τὸ δόγμα ἀνειληφώς.” *Contra Celsum* 2.60.8.

<sup>178</sup>“καὶ ἡ ψυχὴ δὲ ἐπαιρομένη καὶ τῷ πνεύματι ἐπομένη τοῦ τε σώματος χωριζομένη.” *De oratione* 9.2.16.

<sup>179</sup>“πῶς οὐχὶ ἤδη ἀποτιθεμένη τὸ εἶναι ψυχὴ πνευματικὴ γίνεται.” *Ibid.*, 9.2.19.

<sup>180</sup>“*Libertate aguntur animae et vel profectus suos vel decessus pro voluntatis suae sustinent potestate.*” *De principiis* 2.3.4. Cf. *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 1.18.9; 6.9.10. This concept connects with his notion that the soul is intermediate between the spirit and the flesh and must move towards one or the other. It also explains Origen’s theodicy and the prior existence of souls. Chadwick writes, “Origen must assert the pre-existence of souls because he must explain the diversity of human fortune in this world as a consequence of choices freely made by souls before their incarnation here.” Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition: Studies in Justin, Clement, and Origen*, 115. Cf. Daniélou, *Origen*, 209-217.

<sup>181</sup>“*Boni mali que eligendi facultas omnibus praesto est.*” *De principiis* 2.6.5. Cf. *In Genesim homiliae* 1.15.



soul always has a ruler. He writes, “So then, it is impossible that a soul exists at any time without having a ruler.”<sup>182</sup> Here he relies on Rom 6:12 and Matt 11:30, asserting that one must choose either Christ or the devil. He notes that “a soul is always in possession of free-will, as well when it is in the body as when it is without it.”<sup>183</sup> Origen gives a mystical interpretation of a biblical verse for support of this concept. In commenting on Song of Solomon 2:13 he writes, “And I think it is not without reason that He says “their sweet smell,” and not a sweet smell: it was to show that there is in every soul a potential force and a freedom of the will, by means of which it has the power to all things good.”<sup>184</sup> Elsewhere he writes, “The soul in us has opportunities and the freedom of choice to be either great or small.”<sup>185</sup> In defending this notion, Origen quotes Deut 30:15, “See, I have set before you life and death,” and from Sir 15:16-17, “fire and water.”

In this context, it is sometimes difficult to determine where the power of choice lies, in the soul or elsewhere? For example, Origen writes, “There is one nature for all rational beings, the choice of each—the liberty of the impulse of each is distributed equally—when summoned by the power of choice, and by guiding the soul subjected to them either toward virtue or toward evil desire, creates the species of a good tree or an

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<sup>182</sup>“*Non ergo potest fieri ut sine rege aliquando sit anima.*” *Commentarii in epistolam ad Romanos* 5.7.8.

<sup>183</sup>“*Liberi namque arbitrii semper est anima, etiam cum in corpore hoc, etiam cum extra corpus est.*” *De principiis* 3.3.5.

<sup>184</sup>“*Et non sine causa puto quod non dixerit: odorem ‘dederunt’, sed odorem suum’, ut ostenderet inesse unicuique animae vim possibilitatis et arbitrii libertatem, qua possit agere omne quod bonum est.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 4.227.

<sup>185</sup>“*Anima vero in nobis habet causas et arbitrii libertatem, ut vel magna vel parva sit.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 12.2.

evil tree.”<sup>186</sup> Here if the soul is guided by choice, who is making the choice that guides the soul? Similarly, in this context, note how Origen interprets Luke 2:52. “Therefore, understand that “‘he was advancing in age’ of the soul and his soul became great because of the remarkable works that he was doing.”<sup>187</sup>

Origen speaks of a spiritual soul, asking “What is the place of the spiritual soul?”<sup>188</sup> Perhaps this is meant as the soul which turns after the spirit. He speaks of such a one when he writes, “It is established that it is the soul which either ‘sows in the flesh’ or ‘in the spirit’ and which can go to ruin in sin or be converted from sin.”<sup>189</sup>

Connected with the concept of free-will is the notion that the soul is influenced by both good and evil spirits. In keeping with his concern on the preexistence of the soul, Origen urges his readers to think in terms before the person is in its mother’s womb, suggesting that this is antecedent to the examples of John the Baptist leaping in Elizabeth and Jeremiah being known by God before his birth or the examples from common history where children are known to be possessed by evil spirits at their birth. He writes “that no shadow of injustice rests upon the divine government, than by holding that there were certain causes of prior existence, in consequence of which the souls, before their birth in

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<sup>186</sup>“*Ita et cum omnium rationabilium una natura sit, arbitrii proprii aequaliter libertate donata, uniuscujusque proprii motus ex arbitrii potestate prolati, vel ad virtutem, vel ad libidinem subjectam sibi animam perducentes, vel in bonae eam, vel in malae arboris speciem formant.*” *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 8.11.4.

<sup>187</sup>“*Intellige ergo quia ‘aetate’ animae ‘proficiebat’ et magna fiebat anima eius propter magna et ingentia opera, quae faciebat.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 12.2.

<sup>188</sup>“*Quis ergo est locus animae spiritalis?*” *In Numeros homiliae* 23.4.

<sup>189</sup>“*Constat animam esse, quae vel ‘in carne’ vel ‘in spiritu seminat’, et illam esse, quae vel in peccatum ruere possit vel converti a peccato.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 2.2.

the body, contracted a certain amount of guilt in their sensitive nature, or in their movements, on account of which they have been judged worthy by Divine Providence of being placed in this condition.”<sup>190</sup>

Though Origen argues strongly for the notion of the free will of the soul, yet he argues it is not capable of doing good deeds on its own. He writes, “For no noble deed has ever been performed amongst men, where the divine Word did not visit the souls of those who were capable, although for a little time, of admitting such operations of the divine Word.”

As mentioned in the previous section, Origen argues from Scripture that the acts of the body influence the soul. Citing the command in Lev 16:29 to humble one’s soul and Christ’s words in Matt 9:15, he notes that when the bridegroom is gone, they will fast; Origen argues that one humbles their soul by bodily fasting.<sup>191</sup> He cites Wis 9:15 to argue that Scripture teaches that the “corruptible body weighs down the soul, and this earthy tent depresses the thoughtful mind.”<sup>192</sup> He also discusses the connection between

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<sup>190</sup>“*Absque omni iniustitiae culpa divina providentia demonstretur, nisi priores quaedam fuisse eis causae dicantur, quibus antequam in corpore nascerentur animae aliquid culpa contraxerint in sensibus vel motibus suis, pro quibus haec merito pati a divina providentia iudicatae sint.*” *De principiis* 3.3.5. On the connection between the preexistence of the soul and the freedom of the will, see Peter Heimann, *Erwähltes Schicksal: Präexistenz der Seele und christlicher Glaube im Denkmodell des Origenes* (Tübingen: Katzmann, 1988), 197-220. See also Crouzel, “L’anthropologie d’Origène dans la perspective du combat spirituel,” 369-370.

<sup>191</sup>“*Quomodo ‘humiliat’ populus ‘animam’ suam, ipse dicit: ‘venient’ inquit ‘dies, cum auferetur ab iis sponsus, et tunc ieiunabunt in illis diebus.’*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 9.5.

<sup>192</sup>“*Ut ait Scriptura ‘Corruptibile corpus aggravat animam, et demergit terrena habitatio sensum multa cogitantem.’* *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 3.3.14. For more on this idea in Origen, see above on page 241.

the bodily sense, such as sight and smell, and the soul.<sup>193</sup> In this context he quotes 1 Tim 2:8 in regard to the disposition of the soul during prayer and 2 Cor 4:18 on the distinction between the visible and the invisible as regards the soul.

### **Death and the Soul**

Origen talks about death as the soul separating from the body.<sup>194</sup> In giving the spiritual interpretation of the departure from Egypt by the Israelites, Origen describes this as possibly referring to the soul leaving the body, obviously describing the point of death.<sup>195</sup> He also describes Jesus' raising of Lazarus in John 11 as "bring[ing] back a soul which had gone out."<sup>196</sup>

Origen quotes Gen 2:7 for support that humans have a soul. He, however, brings in his concept of the descent of souls at this point.<sup>197</sup> His first point is to conjecture that the soul is imperfect.<sup>198</sup> He discusses Paul's concept of an "animal-man" which cannot

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<sup>193</sup>See above on page 249 for a related discussion regarding the relationship between physical sense and the soul.

<sup>194</sup>See, for example, *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 13.9.6; *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 3.4.3.

<sup>195</sup>"*Cum anima de corporis huius habitatione discedit.*" *In Numeros homiliae* 27.2.

<sup>196</sup>"*ψυχὴν γὰρ ἐξεληθοῦσαν ἐπιστρέψαι.*" *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 12.2.49.

<sup>197</sup>Cf. *Contra Celsum* 4.17; 4.40.25; *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 9.1.11. See Jacques Dupuis, *L'esprit de l'homme: étude sur l'anthropologie religieuse d'Origène* (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1967), 183-192. For a helpful overview of Origen's ontological system and its relationship to the human soul, see Telepneff, 157-163. On the distinction between the creation account of Gen 1:26-27 and Gen 2:7, see Jacobsen, "The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen," 79-81.

<sup>198</sup>"*Quod anima est, imperfecta sit.*" *De principiis* 2.8.2.

receive spiritual things. He concludes that the mind can know spiritual things, not the soul.<sup>199</sup> He also notes that Paul, in 1 Cor 14:15, prays and sings with his spirit, not his soul.<sup>200</sup> In response to the possible argument based on 1 Pet 1:9 that it is the soul which is saved, Origen proposes a unique solution, that what was once a soul, perished and was lost, and then later, “being freed from destruction, it may become a second time what it was before it perished, and be called a soul.”<sup>201</sup> This enables Origen to keep his hypothesis that the soul is imperfect and cannot comprehend the things of the Spirit and still accept any statement in Scripture which discusses the salvation of the soul. In discussing the descent, Origen seems to theorize that not all souls are the same that enter a body. For this, he comments on Ps 125:5-6, “Those who sow in tears shall reap in joy. When they went, they went and wept, bearing their seeds, but when they come, they shall come joyfully, bearing their sheaves.” He writes that it “seems to me to reveal the descent of the more noble souls that come into this life with the saving seeds.”<sup>202</sup> This can also be

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<sup>199</sup>“*Id est spiritalia, intellegere possimus, mentem magis quam animam spiritui sancto coniungit et sociat.*” Ibid. Thus Origen’s notion that soul must be joined or changed back to *nous* to receive ultimate salvation. Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition*, 85.

<sup>200</sup>“*Et non dicit quia anima orabo, sed ‘spiritu et mente’; et non dicit: anima psallam, sed ‘spiritu psallam et mente.’*” *De principiis* 2.8.2. Cf. *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 9.25.1 where Origen notes the gradations of quality pertaining to one’s spirit, soul, and body.

<sup>201</sup>“*Quae rursum ex perditione liberata potest iterum illud esse quod fuit, antequam periret et anima diceretur.*” *De principiis* 2.8.3. Cf. with Origen’s statement in *Exhortatio ad martyrium* 12.33, “If we wish to save our soul in order to get it back better than a soul, let us lose it by our martyrdom” (εἰ θέλομεν ἡμῶν σῶσαι τὴν ψυχὴν, ἵνα αὐτὴν ἀπολάβωμεν κρείττονα ψυχῆς, καὶ μαρτυρίῳ ἀπολέσωμεν αὐτήν).

<sup>202</sup>“τὸ δὲ ἀπὸ τῶν ψαλμῶν δοκεῖ μοι δηλοῦν περὶ τῆς καθόδου τῶν εὐγενεστέρων ψυχῶν παραγινομένων εἰς τὸν βίον τοῦτον μετὰ τῶν σωτηρίων σπερμάτων.” *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 13.43.293.

seen with Origen's interpretation of Luke 1:15, "He will be great in the Lord's sight," by writing that this "shows the greatness of John's soul."<sup>203</sup>

Another argument for the negative understanding of the soul which Origen uses here is based on the etymology of ψυχή.<sup>204</sup> He quotes several verses such as Deut 4:24 and Ps 104:4, which describe God as fire. He then quotes Matt 24:12, "and the love of many will grow cold," and notes that the sea in Scripture is when the Devil and Serpent rule. Thus, he suggests, maybe soul is so named "because it seems to have cooled from that natural and divine warmth, and therefore has been placed in its present position, and called by its present name."<sup>205</sup> He concludes by asking whether "you can easily find a place in holy Scripture where the soul is properly mentioned in terms of praise."<sup>206</sup> He quotes verses such as Ezek 18:4 to note that Scripture does speak against the soul but seems to fail to speak positively regarding it. He then quotes Ps 116:7, "Return, O my soul, unto thy rest," and suggests that "from all which this appears to be made out, that the understanding, falling away from its status and dignity, was made or named soul; and that, if repaired and corrected, it returns to the condition of the understanding."<sup>207</sup> This

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<sup>203</sup>"Τὸ δὲ εἰπεῖν· ἔσται μέγας· μέγεθος ἐμφαίνει τῆς Ἰωάννου ψυχῆς." *Homiliae in Lucam* 4.24.10.

<sup>204</sup>Dillon, *Origen and Plotinus*, 23; Telepneff, 172.

<sup>205</sup>"*Requirendum est ne forte et nomen animae, quod graece dicitur ψυχή, a refrigescendo de statu diviniore ac meliore dictum sit et translatum inde, quod ex calore illo naturali et divino refrixisse videatur, et ideo in hoc quo nunc est et statu et vocabulo sita sit.*" *De principiis* 2.8.3. Gross writes that "for Origen, human souls are intelligences [νόες] which were created pure by God, but which degraded due to failure and 'cooled off.'" Gross, 142. See also Chadwick, *Early Christian Thought and the Classical Tradition*, 84-85; Louth, 61.

<sup>206</sup>"*Denique proprie laudabiliter animam poni in scripturis sanctis, require si facile invenias.*" *De principiis* 2.8.3.

<sup>207</sup>"*Ex quibus omnibus illud videtur ostendi, quod mens de statu ac dignitate sua*

notion of the *nous*, or understanding, changing to soul and then back to understanding, Origen states, is not intended to be dogmatic but rather only exploratory.<sup>208</sup> In reality, though, it seems to serve a vital part in his system, though it could be argued that his whole system was rather exploratory in nature.

Origen notes that with regard to the incarnate Christ, “when it wishes to indicate any suffering or perturbation affecting Him, it indicates it under the name of soul.”<sup>209</sup> He quotes several verses from the Gospels here, such as Matt 26:38, “My soul is sorrowful, even unto death,” and notes that on the cross, Christ commends His spirit, not His soul, to the Father and states that the spirit, not the soul, is willing, and the flesh is weak.<sup>210</sup> All this is with the intent of showing a less-than-positive view of the soul.

In discussing human temptation and possible solutions that have been suggested by various authors regarding this and the human soul, Origen writes that the view which states “that the soul is tripartite [i.e., Plato], I do not observe to be greatly confirmed by

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*declinans, effecta vel nuncupata est anima; quae si reparata fuerit et correcta, redit in hoc, ut sit mens.*” Ibid. Cf. *ibid.*, 2.9.6 “*Ex istis diversis vasis vel animis vel mentibus adornaret.*” On the change from *nous* to *psyche* and back to *nous* in Origen’s thought, see Georg Bürke, “Des Origenes Lehre vom Urstand des Menschen,” *Zeitschrift für katholische Theologie* 72 (1950): 18-20.

<sup>208</sup>On the initial incorporeality of the *nous*, see Eugène de Faye, *Origène: sa vie, son oeuvre, sa pensée* (Paris: Éditions Ernest Leroux, 1923-1928), 3:73-78; Wolf-Dieter Hauschild, *Gottes Geist und er Mensch: Studien zur frühchristlichen Pneumatologie* (Munich: C. Kaiser, 1972), 90-91; Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 85. Jacobson notes that scholars are divided with some holding to its incorporeality.

<sup>209</sup>“*Nam cum passionem aliquam vel conturbationem sui vult indicare, sub nomine animae indicat.*” *De principiis* 2.8.4.

<sup>210</sup>For an argument of Origen’s against the divine nature of Christ’s soul, see *Contra Celsum* 2.9.14. For a general discussion on the spirit in contrast to the soul, see *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 13.2.

the authority of holy Scripture; while with respect to the remaining two there is found a considerable number of passages in the holy Scriptures which seem capable of application to them.”<sup>211</sup> The other two are that either there are two souls, one “more divine and heavenly and the other inferior; or whether, from the very fact that we inhere in bodily structures which according to their own proper nature are dead, and altogether devoid of life (seeing it is from us, i.e., from our souls, that the material body derives its life, it being contrary and hostile to the spirit), we are drawn on and enticed to the practice of those evils which are agreeable to the body.”<sup>212</sup> Elsewhere, Origen connects the soul with temptation when he writes, “Now the use of temptation is something like this. What our soul has received escapes everyone’s knowledge but God’s—even our own. But it becomes evident through temptations, so that we no longer escape the knowledge of what we are like.”<sup>213</sup> His point is that sin reveals the existent character of the soul. Sin is clearly attributed to the soul and thus it is in need of salvation.<sup>214</sup> Origen writes, “As much as the soul sins, that much is it wounded.”<sup>215</sup> He describes sin as

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<sup>211</sup>“*Quia tripertita sit anima, non valde confirmari ex divinae scripturae auctoritate pervide.*” *De principiis* 3.4.1.

<sup>212</sup>“*Velut duae animae in nobis dicendae sunt, una quaedam diviniore et caelestis et alia inferior, an vero ex hoc ipso, quod corporibus inhaeremus (quae corpora secundum propriam quidem naturam mortua sunt et penitus exanima, quia ex nobis, id est ex animabus corpus materiale vivificatur, quod utique contrarium est et inimicum spiritui), trahimur et provocamur ad haec mala, quae corpori grata sunt.*” Ibid. On the body being dead apart from the soul, see G. W. Butterworth, *Origen: On First Principles* (Gloucester, MA: Peter Smith, 1973), 230n5.

<sup>213</sup>“ἄπερ ἐδέξατο ἡμῶν ἡ ψυχὴ, λανθάνοντα πάντα πλην τοῦ θεοῦ ἀλλὰ καὶ ἡμᾶς αὐτοῦς, φανερὰ διὰ τῶν <πειρασμῶν> γίνεται.” *De oratione* 29.17.2.

<sup>214</sup>Cf. *Dialogus cum Heraclide* 7.4 where body, soul, and spirit separately are listed as needing salvation.

<sup>215</sup>“*Anima quotiens peccat, totiens vulneratur.*” *In Numeros homiliae* 8.1.



“malignant spears which are thrust into the soul.”<sup>216</sup>

In dealing with sin and temptation, Origen present two theories that he claims are believed by some. One is that there are two souls, one heavenly and good, while the other is earthly and bad. The latter, a carnal soul, is that one that wars against the spirit. He attributes to those who hold this notion “that there were many . . . mental perturbations which derive their origin in no respect from the flesh, and yet against which the spirit struggles, such as ambition, avarice, emulation, envy, pride, and others like these; and seeing that with these the human mind or spirit wages a kind of contest, they lay down as the cause of all these evils, nothing else than this corporal soul.”<sup>217</sup> Origen points out that those who hold the other notion, that there is only one soul which does either good or bad, make the point “that there is no other creator of soul and flesh than God.”<sup>218</sup> It seems of some interest that Origen fails to decide which of these two contradictory concepts is corrupt. He says the readers must decide for themselves.

When writing on the descent of souls into bodies based upon prior deeds, Origen writes, “Is it not more in conformity with reason, that every soul, for certain mysterious reasons (I speak now according to the opinion of Pythagoras, and Plato, and Empedocles, whom Celsus frequently names), is introduced into a body, and introduced according to

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<sup>216</sup>“*Peccata ‘maligni’ esse ‘iacula’, quae in animam diriguntur.*” Ibid.

<sup>217</sup>“*Haec illi resolvere atque inpugnare conabuntur, ostendentes quam plurimas alias passiones esse animae, quae in nullo prorsus a carne originem trahant, et tamen his spiritus adversetur, sicut est ambitio avaritia aemulatio invidia superbia et his similia; cum quibus pugnam quandam esse humanae menti vel spiritui videntes, non aliud quid causam horum omnium malorum ponent nisi hanc, de qua superius diximus, velut corporalem animam et ex seminis traduce generatam.*” *De principiis* 3.4.2.

<sup>218</sup>“*Quia alium nullum creatorem animae et carnis quam deum credendum esse defendunt.*” *De principiis* 3.4.5.

its deserts and former actions?”<sup>219</sup> Origen, himself, argues for the prior existence of the soul based on his concept of justice as well as from a teleological viewpoint. He suggests that one can look to what will happen at the end in order to determine what happened at the beginning, with respect to souls. He writes, “And if they had a beginning such as the end for which they hope, they existed undoubtedly from the very beginning in those (ages) which are not seen, and are eternal. And if this is so, then there has been a descent from a higher to a lower condition, on the part . . . of those souls who have deserved the change by the variety of their movements.”<sup>220</sup> He makes it clear by writing, “Before they should do anything good, if indeed they were born of the Holy Spirit, then they are loved.”<sup>221</sup>

Both the Holy Spirit and Christ may inhabit the soul. Origen notes that the Holy

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<sup>219</sup>“Ἡ εὐλογώτερον ἐκάστην ψυχὴν κατὰ τινὰς ἀπορρήτους λόγους — λέγω δὲ ταῦτα νῦν κατὰ Πυθαγόραν καὶ Πλάτωνα καὶ Ἐμπεδοκλέα, οὓς πολλάκις ὠνόμασεν ὁ Κέλσος —, εἰσκρινομένην σώματι κατ’ ἀξίαν εἰσκρίνεσθαι καὶ κατὰ τὰ πρότερα ἦθη.” *Contra Celsum* 1.32.34. Karpp suggests this illustrates Origen’s theology overruling his psychology. Karpp, *Probleme*, 201. On the descent and its relationship to Adam, see Bammel, “Adam in Origen,” 65-72. For a comparison here to the latter thought of Augustine, see Henry Chadwick, “Christian Platonism in Origen and Augustine,” in *Origeniana Tertia*, ed. Richard Hanson et al. (Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 222.

<sup>220</sup>“*Quod si est, de superioribus ad inferiora descensum est non solum ab his animabus, quae id motuum suorum varietate meruerunt.*” *De principiis* 3.5.4. Cf. *In Numeros homiliae* 20.2 where Origen quotes his favorite verse for the support of this theory: “Jacob I have loved but Esau I have hated.” Rom 9:11-14. On the prior existence of souls, see Gerald Bostock, “The Sources of Origen’s Doctrine of Pre-existence,” in *Origeniana Quarta*, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1987); Marguerite Harl, “La préexistence des âmes dans l’oeuvre d’Origène,” in *Origeniana Quarta*, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1987); Pierre, 56-61. It is important to note the connection between the preexistence of Christ’s soul and that of all other human souls in Origen.

<sup>221</sup>“*Istae enim tales generationes animae etiam, ‘priusquam faciant boni aliquid,’ siquidem ex sancto spiritu generatae sunt, iam diliguntur; si vero ex spiritu maligno, etiam ‘priusquam opere impleant aliquid mali.’*” *In Numeros homiliae* 20.2.

Spirit gives life to our soul.<sup>222</sup> Elsewhere he writes, “The apostles could not yet receive those things which the Savior wished to teach them until the advent of the Holy Spirit, who, pouring Himself into their souls, might enlighten them regarding the nature and faith of the Trinity.”<sup>223</sup> This indwelling of the Holy Spirit then takes on the notion of knowledge or understanding regarding the Trinity. Origen writes of a divine spirit residing “in the pure and pious soul of Moses.”<sup>224</sup> He also talks of the Holy Spirit resting on those “who have purified their souls from sin”<sup>225</sup> and notes the advantage of those who are “pure in soul and body.”<sup>226</sup> He also notes that “when the Holy Spirit is ‘mingled’ with the soul, it transfuses it with its qualities, making the recipient of salvation *pneumatikos*.”<sup>227</sup> He writes that prophets “by the contact—if I may so say—of the Holy Spirit they became clearer in mind, and their souls were filled with a brighter light.”<sup>228</sup> Elsewhere he describes those who receive the gift of prophecy “as holy and immaculate

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<sup>222</sup>“οὓς ἀπαιτούμεθα, συνόντος αὐτοῦ ἡμῖν καὶ ζωοποιούντος ἡμῶν τὴν ψυχὴν.” *De oratione* 28.3.15. See Russell, 148.

<sup>223</sup>“*Apostolos ‘non posse capere’ adhuc ea, quae volebat eos docere salvator, nisi ‘cum advenerit spiritus sanctus’, qui se eorum animabus infundens inluminare eos possit de ratione ac fide trinitatis.*” *De principiis* 2.7.3. See also 2.7.4 where the Holy Spirit “bestows consolation upon the soul to whom He openly reveals the apprehension of spiritual knowledge.”

<sup>224</sup>“ἐν καθαρᾷ καὶ εὐσεβεῖ ψυχῇ Μωϋσέως.” *Contra Celsum* 1.19.16.

<sup>225</sup>“*Requiescit’ enim ‘spiritus’ Dei in his, ‘qui mundo sunt corde’, et in his, qui purificant animas suas a peccato.*” *In Numeros homiliae* 6.3. See also *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 13.140-144 for a discussion of the Spirit of God being infused in the believer.

<sup>226</sup>“ἄλλα δὲ τὰ τοῖς καθαρῶς ψυχὴν καὶ σῶμα.” *Contra Celsum* 3.61.10.

<sup>227</sup>Russell, 148.

<sup>228</sup>“ἀφῆς τοῦ καλουμένου ἀγίου πνεύματος διορατικώτεροι τε τὸν νοῦν ἐγίνοντο καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν λαμπρότεροι.” *Contra Celsum* 7.4.7.

souls,” and he states that “after devoting themselves to God with all affection and purity, and after preserving themselves free from all contagion of evil spirits, and after being purified by lengthened abstinence, and imbued with holy and religious training, assume by this means a portion of divinity”<sup>229</sup> they receive the gift of prophecy.

Origen describes Christ as the Word of God “who stands at the door and knocks and wishes to enter their souls.”<sup>230</sup> He writes that “Jesus” as “the Word of God . . . enters the soul.”<sup>231</sup> Origen supports this last statement by an allegorical interpretation of Jesus’ entrance to Jerusalem. Elsewhere, he writes that “also in my soul I ought to have Christ within me.”<sup>232</sup> Origen also writes of souls receiving the indwelling of the word and wisdom of the Father.<sup>233</sup>

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<sup>229</sup>“*Quae hoc modo geri arbitranda sunt, quod sicut sanctae et immaculae animae, cum se omni affectu omni que puritate voverint deo et alienas se ab omni daemonum contagione servaverint et per multam abstinenciam purificaverint se et piis ac religiosis inbutae fuerint disciplinis, participium per hoc divinitatis adsumunt et prophetiae ceterorum que divinorum donorum gratiam promerentur.*” *De principiis* 3.3.3. Cf. Robert J. Hauck, *The More Divine Proof: Prophecy and Inspiration in Celsus and Origen* (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1989).

<sup>230</sup>“τὸν ἔστῶτα ἐπὶ τὴν θύραν καὶ κρούοντα καὶ εἰσελθεῖν βουλόμενον εἰς τὰς ψυχὰς λόγον θεοῦ.” *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 1.4.26.

<sup>231</sup>“Ἰησοῦς τοίνυν ἔστιν ὁ τοῦ θεοῦ λόγος, ὅστις εἰσέρχεται εἰς τὴν Ἱεροσόλυμα καλουμένην ψυχὴν.” *Ibid.*, 10.28.174.

<sup>232</sup>“ἀλλὰ καὶ ἐν τῇ ἐμῇ ψυχῇ ὀφείλω ἔχειν ἕνδον μου τὸν Χριστόν” *In Ieremiam* 5.6.11. On the notion of union of the soul with the divine, see Mark J. Edwards, “Christ of Plato? Origen on Revelation and Anthropology,” in *Christian Origins: Theology, Rhetoric and Community*, ed. Lewis Ayres et al. (London: Routledge, 1998), 18. Edwards notes that becoming one with God happens only through “mutual love and voluntary obedience.”

<sup>233</sup>“*Et eas animas, quae verbi eius ac sapientiae efficiuntur capaces.*” *De principiis* 1.1.2. Cf. *Commentarii in epistolam ad Romanos* 4.1.17. On the relationship between God, His wisdom or Logos and human souls in Origen’s thought, see Crouzel, “L’image de Dieu dans la théologie d’Origène,” 195; Daniélou, *Origen*, 255-256; Telepneff, 165, 177, 182.

In one place, Origen writes of all three members of the God-head inhabiting the soul. He writes, “Yet that the Father and the Son and the Holy Spirit are in the soul of man is said variously and diversely in the Scriptures.”<sup>234</sup>

Demons can also possess either the soul or the soul and the body. The devil himself, Origen notes, entered Judas.<sup>235</sup> He writes “that the souls of those who condemn Christians, and betray them, and rejoice in persecuting them, are filled with wicked demons.”<sup>236</sup> Origen writes that prayers are used to cast the demons out. “By the use of prayers and other means which we learn from Scripture, we drive them out of the souls of men, out of places where they have established themselves.”<sup>237</sup> Christ is described as having “cast out demons from the souls of men.”<sup>238</sup> He also writes of “the despicable weakness of demons, which, in order to be overcome and driven out of the bodies and souls of men, do not require the power and wisdom of those who are mighty in argument, and most learned in matters of faith.”<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>234</sup>“δὲ ποικίλως καὶ διαφόρως ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς λέγεται, τὸ εἶναι τὸν πατέρα καὶ τὸν υἱὸν καὶ τὸ ἅγιον πνεῦμα ἐν τῇ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου ψυχῇ.” *In Jeremiam* 8.1.31.

<sup>235</sup>“παραδεξάμενον ‘τὸ πεπτρωμένον’ περὶ τούτου ‘βέλος’ ὕστερον, αὐτὸς εἰσελθὼν εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν αὐτοῦ ἐπλήρωσεν αὐτόν.” *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 11.9.93.

<sup>236</sup>“ἀληθὲς γὰρ τὸ φαύλων δαιμόνων πληρουμένας τὰς τῶν καταδικαζόντων Χριστιανούς ψυχὰς καὶ τῶν προδιδόντων καὶ τῶν εὐδοκούντων Χριστιανοῖς προσπολεμεῖν.” *Contra Celsum* 8.43.38. Cf. *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 11.17.46.

<sup>237</sup>“Καὶ τοσοῦτόν γε ἀποδέομεν τοῦ θεραπεύειν δαίμονας, ὥστε καὶ ἀπελαύνειν αὐτοὺς εὐχαῖς καὶ τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν ἱερῶν γραμμάτων μαθήμασιν ἀπὸ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ψυχῶν.” *Contra Celsum* 7.67.13.

<sup>238</sup>“τοὺς δαίμονας αὐτὸν ἀποβεβληκέναι τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ψυχῆς.” *Ibid.*, 2.38.23.

<sup>239</sup>“τὸ τῶν δαιμονίων εὐτελὲς καὶ ἀσθενές, οὐ πάντως δεόμενον πρὸς

## Immortality of the Soul

The soul, according to Origen, is immortal.<sup>240</sup> He writes that “it is believed not only among Christians and Jews, but also by many others among the Greeks and Barbarians, that the human soul lives and subsists after its separation from the body.”<sup>241</sup> He notes that it is something uncertain for non-Christian philosophers which is resolved by the teachings of the Word of God.<sup>242</sup> For those who do not believe in the immortality of the soul, he will have to prove it as it “is to us a doctrine of pre-eminent importance.”<sup>243</sup> To those who already believe it, he still desires to prove it, not only from the Greeks but also in harmony with the Scriptures. He argues that Celsus is an Epicurean and that he should argue against the Greeks regarding the “immortality of the soul.”<sup>244</sup>

Origen writes regarding God’s long-suffering with sinners that “the soul over

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τὸ ἡττηθῆναι καὶ εἶξαν ὑπεξελεθῆναι ἀπὸ ψυχῆς ἀνθρώπου καὶ σώματος σοφοῦ τινος καὶ δυνατοῦ ἐν ταῖς λογικαῖς περὶ τῆς πίστεως ἀποδείξεσιν.” Ibid., 7.4.24. See also 8.43.34.

<sup>240</sup>Origen, in *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 2.26.167, does acknowledge that there is a sense in which “the Father ‘alone has immortality.’”

<sup>241</sup>“Ἰουδαίοις μόνοις ἀλλὰ καὶ παρ’ ἄλλοις πολλοῖς Ἑλλήνων καὶ βαρβάρων ὅτι ζῆ καὶ ὑπάρχει μετὰ τὸν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος χωρισμὸν ἢ ἀνθρωπίνη ψυχῆ.” *Contra Celsum* 7.5.4.

<sup>242</sup>“*De animae immortalitate . . . gentiles dumtaxat philosophos, incertum semper ac dubium manebat, absolvitur.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 2.119.

<sup>243</sup>“Ἐὶ μὲν οὖν οὐκ εἶναι ὑπολαμβάνετε αὐτούς, τὸν προηγούμενον ἡμῖν περὶ ψυχῆς κατασκευαστέον λόγον.” *Contra Celsum* 3.22.25.

<sup>244</sup>“ὁμολογῶν ἐπικούρειος εἶναι πρὸς τὰ παρ’ Ἑλλήσι καὶ βαρβάροις οὐκ εὐκαταφρονήτως λεγόμενα περὶ τῆς ἀθανασίας τῆς ψυχῆς.” Ibid., 3.80.17. Cf. 5.42.26 where Origen states that the Jews had the advantage of being taught from their infancy regarding the immortality of the soul (συμπληρώσει τοῦ λόγου διδάσκεσθαι αὐτοὺς τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀθανασίαν).

which He exercises this providential care is immortal.”<sup>245</sup> He adds, “For God deals with souls not merely with a view to the short space of our present life, included within sixty years or more, but with reference to a perpetual and never-ending period, exercising His providential care over souls that are immortal, even as He Himself is eternal and immortal.”<sup>246</sup> Origen then provides his rationale for this statement by adding, “For He made the rational nature, which He formed in His own image and likeness, incorruptible; and therefore the soul, which is immortal, is not excluded by the shortness of the present life from the divine remedies and cures.”<sup>247</sup> Here, the creation of the soul and its immortal nature are connected with the *imago dei*. In a related argument, Origen argues for the immortality of the soul based upon its participation in the intellectual light which is the divine nature. He writes, “If the heavenly virtues, then, partake of intellectual light, i.e., of divine nature, because they participate in wisdom and holiness, and if human souls, have partaken of the same light and wisdom, and thus are mutually of one nature

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<sup>245</sup>“*Quoniam quidem immortalis est anima.*” *De principiis* 3.1.13. See also *Contra Celsum* 8.18.24.

<sup>246</sup>“*Deus enim dispensat animas non ad istud solum vitae nostrae <breve> tempus, quod intra sexaginta fere aut si quid amplius annos concluditur, sed ad perpetuum et aeternum tempus, tamquam aeternus ipse et immortalis, immortalium quoque animarum providentiam tenens.*” *De principiis* 3.1.13.

<sup>247</sup>“*Incorruptibilem namque fecit esse rationabilem naturam, quam et ‘ad imaginem suam ac similitudinem condidit’; et ideo non excluditur brevitate temporis huius vitae nostrae a cura et remediis divinis anima, quae immortalis est.*” *Ibid.* See also *De oratione* 29.13; *In Ieremiam* 2.1.17. Cf. *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* prol. where Origen suggests the bride in Solomon’s song may be the soul made in the Word of God’s image; *In Numeros homiliae* 12.1. where by virtue of being created in the image of God, the soul in itself has great power to create what Origen symbolically describes as wells and springs and streams. For Origen, the notion of image found in Gen 1:26-27 refers to the soul, while Gen 2:7 refers to the creation of the body. Jacobsen, “The Constitution of Man according to Irenaeus and Origen,” 78-82. This distinction between the interior and exterior man is also found in *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 2.52.

and of one essence,—then, since the heavenly virtues are incorruptible and immortal, the essence of the human soul will also be immortal and incorruptible.”<sup>248</sup>

In a somewhat different interpretation of the immortality of the soul, Origen writes, “I think that by itself this human soul can be called neither mortal nor immortal. But if it should take hold of life, by partaking of life it will be immortal (for death does not fall into life); but if turning itself from life, it should draw to the participation of death it makes itself mortal.”<sup>249</sup> Elsewhere, Origen writes regarding the daily bread from the Lord’s Prayer that it is “bread for being,” and “what corresponds most closely with a rational nature and is akin to Being itself. It procures at one time health, vigor, and strength to the soul; and since the Word of God is immortal, it shares its own immortality with the one who eats it.”<sup>250</sup> These quotes seem to indicate the possibility of movement

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<sup>248</sup>“*Si ergo caelestes virtutes intellectualis lucis, id est divinae naturae, per hoc quod sapientiae et sanctificationis participant, participium sumunt, et humana anima eiusdem lucis et sapientiae participium sumit, erunt et ista unius naturae se cum invicem unius que substantiae; incorruptae autem sunt et immortales caelestes virtutes: incorrupta sine dubio et immortalis erit etiam animae humanae substantia*” *De principiis* 4.4.9. Origen also adds that as the intellectual light of the immortal Father, Son, and Spirit created all things, so also will all created things participate in this immortality. *De principiis* 4.4.9. Note Telepneff’s critique, 164-165. For an overview of the notion of participation in Origen’s thought, see David L. Balas, “The Idea of Participation in the Structure of Origen’s Thought: Christian Transposition of a Theme of the Platonic Tradition,” in *Origeniana: Premier colloque international des études origéniennes*, ed. Henri Crouzel et al. (n.p.: Universita di Bali, 1975), 257-275; Crouzel, *Théologie de l’image de Dieu chez Origène*; idem, “L’image de Dieu dans la théologie d’Origène”; idem, *Origen*, 92-98. On creation and the soul in Origen, see Peter Nemeshegyi, *La paternité de Dieu chez Origène* (Tournai: Desclée, 1960), 109-114.

<sup>249</sup>“*Unde et arbitror quod ipsa per se anima humana neque mortalis neque immortalis dici potest. Sed si contigerit vitam, ex participio vitae erit immortalis (in vitam enim non incidit mors); si vero avertens se a vita participium traxerit mortis, ipsa se facit esse mortalem.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 9.11.

<sup>250</sup>“<ἐπιούσιος> τοίνυν <ἄρτος> ὁ τῆ φύσει τῆ λογικῆ καταλληλότατος καὶ τῆ οὐσία αὐτῆ συγγενής, ὑγείαν ἅμα καὶ εὐεξίαν καὶ ἰσχὺν περιποιῶν τῆ ψυχῆ καὶ τῆς ἰδίας ἀθανασίας (ἀθάνατος γὰρ ὁ λόγος τοῦ θεοῦ) μεταδίδους τῷ ἐσθίοντι αὐτοῦ.” *De oratione* 27.9.22.



by the soul either to mortality or immortality. This is in agreement with his understanding of free will and the soul. Thus Origen notes that “the soul of the sinner is in the flesh, but of the righteous man in spirit.”<sup>251</sup> Elsewhere, he adds that the soul can “attach its love not to its lawful Bridegroom, who is the Word of God, but to some seducer or adulterer,”<sup>252</sup> adding also that “this spiritual love of the soul does flame out, as we have taught, sometimes towards certain spirits of evil, and sometimes towards the Holy Spirit and the Word of God.”<sup>253</sup> Though he does not mention in this passage the change of the nature of the soul from immortal to mortal, yet he does again reiterate the notion of the soul moving either towards the flesh or towards the Spirit. The idea that the soul moves either to a mortal or immortal state must be interpreted in light of Origen’s statements on death.

After quoting Ezek 18:4, which explicitly states that “the soul which sins will die,” Origen defines what he means by the death of the soul by adding, “We do not think that its death is to the destruction of the substance, but from the fact that the soul is alien and remote from God who is true life, we must believe that it dies.”<sup>254</sup> Origen writes similarly “because the soul is capable of sin, and the soul that sins shall die, we also will

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<sup>251</sup>“ἡ γὰρ ψυχὴ τοῦ μὲν ἀμαρτωλοῦ ἐν σαρκὶ ἐστὶ, τοῦ δὲ δικαίου ἐν πνεύματι.” *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 13.2.202. This concept of the soul either turning to the flesh or the spirit is common in Origen. See, for example, *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 1.5.2-3; 1.18.5.

<sup>252</sup>“*Interiori homini, hoc est animae, accidere potest amor non in legitimum sponsum, quem diximus esse Verbum Dei, sed in adulterum aliquem et corruptorem.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* prol.

<sup>253</sup>“*Exardescit autem etiam hic spiritalis amor animae aliquando quidem, ut edocuimus, erga aliquos spiritus nequitiae, aliquando autem erga Spiritum sanctum et Verbum Dei.*” *Ibid.*.

<sup>254</sup>“*Quamvis mortem eius non ad interitum substantiae sentiamus, sed hoc ipsum, quod aliena et extorris sit a Deo, qui vera vita est, mors ei esse credenda est.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 9.11.

say that the soul is mortal. But if [one] supposes that death means the total dissolution and destruction of the soul, we will not agree, because we cannot conceive, so far as the concept goes, of a mortal essence changing into an immortal one, and a corruptible nature changing to incorruption.”<sup>255</sup>

Origen also develops several different definitions of death found in Scripture. He writes, “Let us carefully define the word ‘death’. . . . I will attempt to present all its meanings, not according to the Greeks, but all its meanings according to holy Scripture.”<sup>256</sup> He lists “death to sin” from Rom 6:10, “The soul that sins shall die” from Ezek 18:4, and the general death of a human, which he supports by quoting Gen 5:5, “Adam lived nine hundred and thirty years and died.”<sup>257</sup> Origen argues that the soul cannot experience the ordinary natural death of humans “for if it did die, it would not be punished after death.”<sup>258</sup> Thus Origen clearly states that the nature of the soul must be

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<sup>255</sup>“Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ὅτι δεκτικὴ ἁμαρτίας, ψυχὴ δὲ ἡ ἁμαρτάνουσα αὐτὴ ἀποθανεῖται, καὶ ἡμεῖς ἐροῦμεν αὐτὴν θνητὴν.” *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 13.61.429. Cf. Origen’s interpretation of 1 Cor 15 where Paul discusses the change of the corruptible into the incorruptible below on page 286.

<sup>256</sup>*Dialogus cum Heraclide* 25.2.

<sup>257</sup>*Ibid.*, 25.12. Origen does not often refer to the “general death” as the separation of the soul from the body as is common with other Fathers. See *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 13.9.6. “Now we must think that the devil has the power of death,—not of that which is common and indifferent, in accordance with which those who are compacted of soul and body die, when their soul is separated from the body” (χωριζομένης αὐτῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος). See also *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 4.5.10; 6.6.5.

<sup>258</sup>“<Τοῦτον> τὸν θάνατον οὐδεμία ψυχὴ ἀνθρώπου ἀποθνήσκει· εἰ γὰρ ἀπέθνησκεν, οὐκ ἂν ἐκολάζετο μετὰ τὸν θάνατον.” *Dialogus cum Heraclide* 25.24. See Daley, 51-52. Daley refers to this as the notion of personal continuity. He describes Origen’s notion as an argument against those anti-Origenists who might find in his notion of the soul’s immortality something more akin to Celsus than to the Scriptures. This assumption is only one possibility however. The other is that Origen began with the notion of the necessity of the immortality of the soul because of his prior belief in the biblical mandate of a future judgment. On the possible Semitic backgrounds to the

immortal in order to guarantee the reality of a future judgment. In regard to “death to sin,” Origen concedes that the soul is mortal in this case and that it is blessed to experience this.<sup>259</sup>

Regarding the third case, “The soul that sins shall die,” Origen states that in this “we are not immortal; but it is possible for us, through vigilance, not to die this death. And perhaps what is mortal in the soul is not mortal forever. For to the extent that it allows itself to commit such a sin that it becomes a soul that sins which itself will die, the soul is mortal for a real death.”<sup>260</sup> Origen adds, however, that the soul, by possessing eternal life, can in regard to this meaning also be immortal. Origen connects this concept of death to what is said in Rom 5:12, “Therefore through one man sin entered into the world. And through sin, death.” On this he writes, “Without a doubt this is the death concerning which the prophet says ‘The soul which sins will die.’”<sup>261</sup> In commenting on Rom 5:17, “By the transgression of the one, death exercised dominion through the one,” he writes that “what seems to be made known in this is that since a soul created by God is itself free, it leads itself into slavery by means of transgression and hands over to death, so to speak the IOU of its own immortality which it had received from its own Creator. ‘For the soul that sins will die.’

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*Dialogue with Heraclides*, see Jean Daniélou and Henri I. Marrou, *The First Six Hundred Years*, trans. Vincent Cronin, vol. 1 of *The Christian Centuries* (London: Darton, Longman and Todd, 1964), 186-188; W. H. C. Frend, *The Rise of Christianity* (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1984), 384.

<sup>259</sup>“Θνητὴ ψυχὴ, καὶ μακαρία ἐὰν ἀποθάνῃ τῇ ἀμαρτίᾳ.” *Dialogus cum Heraclide* 26.10.

<sup>260</sup>“Καὶ τάχα τὸ θνητὸν τῆς ψυχῆς οὐκ αἰεὶ ἐστὶν θνητόν. . . . Θνητὴ τοῦ ὄντως θανάτου ἐστὶν ἡ ψυχὴ.” *Ibid.*, 26.21-24.

<sup>261</sup>“*Illa sine dubio mors de qua et propheta dicit, quia ‘anima quae peccat ipsa morietur.’*” *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 5.1.19.

That soul, after all, cries out through the prophet, saying, ‘You have led me down to the dust of death.’<sup>262</sup> This last notion of death is illustrated by his statement comparing this with the death of the body. He writes, “For just as a man is called a murderer who separates the body from the soul, through which it is vivified, how much more truly should he be called a murderer who separates the soul from the true life, which is God?”<sup>263</sup> Elsewhere he states that “the prophet says what is dead: The soul that sins, it shall die.”<sup>264</sup> But again, this must be interpreted by his other statements regarding the death of the soul. For support of this concept of death, Origen quotes Eph 2:5, “And when we were dead in our transgressions and sins, he raised us up together with him.” He applies this notion of death to Rom 6:23, “The wages of sin is death,” and notes that this is also the understanding of death in mind when “the Apostle was handing over the sinner for the destruction of the flesh in order that his spirit might be saved; that is to say, in order that he would die to sin and live to God,” referring evidently to 1 Cor 5:5.<sup>265</sup> Elsewhere, Origen adds another meaning of death to this list. He writes, “Moreover, the place below in the underworld,

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<sup>262</sup>“*Per quod indicari videtur, quod cum libera a Deo creata sit anima, ipsa se in servitute redigat per delictum, et velut chirographa immortalitatis suae, quae a creatore suo acceperat, morti tradat. ‘Anima enim quae peccat, ipsa morietur.’ Ipsa denique anima clamat per Prophetam dicens: ‘In pulverem mortis deduxisti me.’* Ibid., 5.3.3. Quotes from Ezek 18:4 and Ps 22:15.

<sup>263</sup>“*Sicut enim homicida dicitur ille qui corpus ab anima separat, per quam vivificatur: ita multo etiam verius ille homicida dicendus est, qui animam a vera viata separat, quae est Deus.*” Ibid., 3.4.3. Cf *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 4.5.10.

<sup>264</sup>“*Quae est mortua; propheta dicit: ‘anima quae peccat, ipsa morietur.’*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 12.3.

<sup>265</sup>“*Sic et Apostolus peccatorem tradebat in interitum carnis, ut spiritum faceret salvum, hoc est, ut moreretur peccato, et viveret Deo.*” *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 6.6.6.

where souls were being held by death, is also named death.”<sup>266</sup>

In commenting on Luke 9:24, “Whoever loses his life for my sake will save it,” Origen discusses what he understands this losing of one’s life means. He writes, “He destroys the soul, according to Christ, who curbs his desires, who resects his lusts, who castigates his luxury and weakness and in nothing forward makes his will but the will of God; and through this, the soul is said to perish.”<sup>267</sup>

Origen is very clear that the soul should not be understood as corporeal. He writes, “If there are any now who think that the mind itself and the soul is a body, I wish they would tell me by way of answer how it receives reasons and assertions on subjects of such importance—of such difficulty and such subtlety? Whence does it derive the power of memory? and whence comes the contemplation of invisible things? How does the body possess the faculty of understanding incorporeal existences?”<sup>268</sup> He asks other rhetorical questions in this defense of the incorporeality of the soul but they all hinge on

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<sup>266</sup>“*Sedet inferni locus in quo animae detinebantur a morte, etiam ipse mors appellatur.*” *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 6.6.5. See also 5.10.9.

<sup>267</sup>“*Perdit’ enim ‘animam’ secundum Christum, qui desideria eius refrenat, qui cupiditates eius resecat, qui luxuriam eius resolutionem que castigat et in nullo prorsus facit voluntatem suam, sed voluntatem Dei; et per haec perire dicitur anima.*” *In Numeros homiliae* 18.4.

<sup>268</sup>“*Si qui autem sunt qui mentem ipsam animam que corpus esse arbitrentur, velim mihi responderent, quomodo tantarum rerum, tam difficilium tam que subtilium, rationes assertiones que recipiat. Unde ei virtus memoriae, unde rerum invisibilium contemplatio, unde certe incorporalium intellectus corpori inest?*” *De principiis* 1.1.7. Cf. however, his statement in *Contra Celsum* 2.60.15 where he writes, “Now the phantoms which exist about the soul of the dead are produced by some substance, and this substance is in the soul, which exists apart in a body said to be of splendid appearance” (Τὰ μὲν οὖν γινόμενα περὶ μνημεῖα τεθνηκότων ‘φαντάσματα’ ἀπὸ τινος ὑποκειμένου γίνεται, τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ὑφεστηκυῖαν ἐν τῷ καλουμένῳ αὐγοειδεῖ σώματι ψυχῆν). He seems to further explain this when he writes in *Contra Celsum* 2.61.15 that “the body of the soul might be seen by the eye of sense” (δύναται ὀφθαλμοῖς αἰσθητοῖς φανῆναι ψυχῆς σῶμα).

the basic premise that what is corporeal cannot understand or perceive that which is incorporeal.<sup>269</sup> In his argument with Celsus, Origen asserts that Christians do not believe the soul is corporeal, similar to the Stoics, but that he wants to “demonstrate that the rational soul is superior to all ‘corporeal’ nature, and that it is an invisible substance, and incorporeal.”<sup>270</sup> Elsewhere, Origen again asserts these characteristics of the soul. He writes of the “rational being of the soul, which has a certain kinship with God. For both are intelligible and invisible and, as the prevailing argument demonstrates, incorporeal.”<sup>271</sup> It is presumably based on the relationship of the soul to the divine which provides the basis for the claim to incorporeality.

Origen acknowledges that there are scriptural passages which seem to indicate that the soul is not immaterial. He lists Lev 17:11 as the vexing passage, “The soul of all flesh is its blood.” He notes also similar ideas in Deut 12:33 and Gen 9:4. He then reiterates his hermeneutical principle which holds that incorporeal things are given corresponding names to things found in the corporeal world.<sup>272</sup> He notes several texts in

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<sup>269</sup>As this argument is couched in the discussion of the nature of God, Origen notes several texts from Scripture regarding the nature of God. He notes that in John 1:18, Jesus says that no one has seen God. This is because to see or be seen is a property of bodies and cannot be applied to God. Then, in Matt 11:27 Jesus states that no one knows the Father except the Son. This, Origen writes, is because to know or be known is the property of an intellectual being. *De principiis* 1.1.8.

<sup>270</sup>“κατὰ δὲ ἡμᾶς καὶ τὴν λογικὴν ψυχὴν πειρωμένους ἀποδεικνύναι κρείττονα πάσης σωματικῆς φύσεως καὶ οὐσίαν ἀόρατον καὶ ἀσώματον.” *Contra Celsum* 6.71.20.

<sup>271</sup>“Ἐτι δὲ καὶ φιλοζωεῖ ἄνθρωπος πείσμα λαβὼν περὶ οὐσίας λογικῆς ψυχῆς ὡς ἐχούσης τι συγγενές θεῷ. νοερὰ γὰρ ἐκάτερα καὶ ἀόρατα καὶ, ὡς ὁ ἐπικρατῶν ἀποδείκνυσι λόγος, ἀσώματα.” *Exhortatio ad martyrium* 47.2.

<sup>272</sup>*Dialogus cum Heraclide*, 11.25.

Paul, 2 Cor. 4:16 and Rom 7:22, regarding the “inner human nature”<sup>273</sup> along with Col 3:9-10<sup>274</sup> for support regarding the dual nature of humans, an inner and an outer. In this context, Origen argues that the soul of Lev 2:1 which is commanded to offer various offerings is different from the individual referenced in Lev 1:2. Based upon the different offering requirements, Origen writes, “From this, it seems to me that what is here called ‘a soul’ is to be understood as that person whom Paul calls ‘the natural person.’”<sup>275</sup> Corresponding to this, he looks to the *imago dei* concept from Gen 1:27 and argues that this is separate from the creation from the dust described in Gen 2:7, referring only to the inner incorporeal nature.<sup>276</sup> After giving a lengthy study of various passages in which physical parts of the body are used referring not to the physical organ itself but some other sense or power of the inner person, Origen writes, “Since you have all these elements of the physical body in the inner human being, you should no longer have problems about the blood, which, with the same name as physical blood, exists, just like the other members of the body, in the inner human being.”<sup>277</sup> This inner human being is the soul.<sup>278</sup>

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<sup>273</sup>Ibid., 11.29.

<sup>274</sup>Ibid., 16.10.

<sup>275</sup>“*Unde videtur mihi hic ‘anima’ quae appellata est, homo ille, quem Paulus ‘animalem hominem’ nominat.*” *In Leuiticum homiliae* 2.2.

<sup>276</sup>*Dialogus cum Heraclide* 16.1. On Origen’s notion of the image of God, see Crouzel, “L’image de Dieu dans la théologie d’Origène.” Cf. also R. Wilson, “The Early Exegesis of Gen. 1.26.” On Origen’s distinction between the creation events of Gen 1:26 and Gen 2:7, see Bürke, 28-33.

<sup>277</sup>*Dialogus cum Heraclide* 22.17.

<sup>278</sup>“*Εἰ νενόηται ἡ ψυχὴ, καὶ νενόηται κατὰ τὸν ἔσω ἄνθρωπον, καὶ νενόηται ὅτι ἐν ἐκείνῃ ἐστὶν τὸ ‘κατ’ εἰκόνα.*” Ibid., 23.2. Cf. *De principiis* 3.4.2 for a similar discussion.

In commenting on the words of Paul in 1 Cor 15, Origen writes that Paul could be understood to have written, “‘This corruptible nature of the body must receive the clothing of incorruption—a soul possessing in itself incorruptibility,’ because it has been clothed with Christ, who is the Wisdom and Word of God.”<sup>279</sup> He also adds, “Now, what else will incorruption and immortality be, save the wisdom, and the word, and the righteousness of God, which mould; and clothe, and adorn the soul?”<sup>280</sup> After the resurrection, Origen proposes that the soul will gradually lose the need of the body and ultimately the material world will cease to exist.

Origen also seems to follow others in the early Church in understanding 1 Pet 3:19-20 as referring to Christ going down to Hades. He writes, “When He became a soul, without the covering of the body, he dwelt among those souls which were without bodily covering, converting such of them as were willing to Himself.”<sup>281</sup> This is clearly shown in Origen’s homily on 1 Sam 28. In describing Saul and the Witch of Endor, Origen argues that the story should be interpreted literally, that is, that the witch actually saw and communicated with the soul of Samuel, who had been called up from Hades. In response

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<sup>279</sup>“*Necesse est corruptibile hoc induere incorruptionem, ut si diceret: necesse est naturam hanc corruptibilem corporis indumentum accipere incorruptionis, animam habentem in se incorruptionem, pro eo videlicet quod induta est Christum, qui est sapientia et verbum dei.*” *De principiis* 2.3.2.

<sup>280</sup>“*Incorruptio’ autem et ‘inmortalitas’ quid aliud erit nisi sapientia et verbum et iustitia dei, quae formant animam et induunt et exornant?*” *Ibid.*

<sup>281</sup>“*γυμνή σώματος γενόμενος ψυχῇ ταῖς γυμναῖς σωμάτων ὠμίλει ψυχαῖς.*” *Contra Celsum* 2.43.6. See also *De engastrimytho* 6. Here Origen quotes Acts 2:27-31 for its quote of Ps 15:10, “You will not leave my soul in Hades” for his defense of the concept that Christ was in Hades. Cf. *Commentarii in epistolam ad Romanos* 5.1.37 where Origen notes that a possible interpretation of Rom 5:14 is that this refers to Christ preaching to souls dead or trapped in the underworld. This point is reiterated in *Commentarii in epistolam ad Romanos* 5.10.12 where Origen combines it with the parable of Christ about the binding of the strong man in Matt 12:29.



to the question, Did a demon have “sway over the soul of the Prophet?”<sup>282</sup> Origen answers that to deny this leads to unbelief. These two incidents serve as biblical support for the notion of the continued existence of souls after the death of the body.

Origen also comments on the souls under the altar from Rev 6:9-11, writing, “So also the souls of those who have been beheaded for their witness to Jesus do not serve the heavenly altar in vain and minister forgiveness of sins to those who pray.”<sup>283</sup> He writes similarly elsewhere describing the souls of the martyrs going to the heavenly altar.<sup>284</sup> One might question if paradise is in the same place as the altar. It may be that as this is reserved only for the souls of martyrs, the rest of the souls of the saints go elsewhere to await the resurrection. Origen also writes of the prayers of the saints. Commenting on Christ’s statement regarding the joy of heaven over the one sinner who repents, he writes, “So do the souls of the saints who have already fallen asleep. All this is demonstrated by the story of Raphael’s offering a spiritual sacrifice to God for Tobit and Sarah.”<sup>285</sup> In the same context, Origen also notes the appearance of Jeremiah in 2 Macc 15.

Origen argues against those who claim that the soul is in the physical blood and

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<sup>282</sup>“ἀνήγαγεν αὐτὸν ἡ ἐγγαστρίμυθος, ἐξουσίαν ἔχει δαιμόνιον ψυχῆς προφητικῆς.” *De engastrimytho* 2.23. On Origen’s literal interpretation of this story, see Margaret M. Mitchell, “Patristic Rhetoric on Allegory: Origen and Eustathius Put 1 Kingdoms 28 on Trial,” in *The ‘Belly-Myther’ of Endor: Interpretations of 1 Kingdoms 28 in the Early Church* (Atlanta: Society of Biblical Literature, 2007), xcvi-ciii.

<sup>283</sup>“οὕτως αἱ ψυχαὶ τῶν πεπελεκισμένων ἕνεκεν τῆς μαρτυρίας Ἰησοῦ, μὴ μάτην τῷ ἐν οὐρανοῖς θυσιαστηρίῳ παρεδρεύουσιν, διακονοῦσι τοῖς εὐχομένοις ἄφεσιν ἁμαρτημάτων.” *Exhortatio ad martyrium* 30.13.

<sup>284</sup>“*Quis enim sequi possit animam martyris, quae supergrassa omnes ‘aeris potestates’ ad coeleste tendit altare?*” *Homiliae in librum Iudicum* 7.2.

<sup>285</sup>“αἱ τε τῶν προκεκοιμημένων ἁγίων ψυχαί. ἅτινα δηλοῦνται, Ραφαήλ μὲν προσφέροντος περὶ Τωβίητ καὶ Σάρρας λογικὴν ἱερουργίαν τῷ θεῷ.” *De oratione* 11.1.4. Translation Greer.

thus lies with the body in the grave after death. “But according to those of you who say that the soul lies in the tomb with the body, it did not depart from the body, it does not enjoy repose, it does not dwell in God’s paradise, it does not repose in the bosom of Abraham.”<sup>286</sup> He adds, “For if the soul is indeed blood, there is no being with Christ just as soon as the dissolution takes place.”<sup>287</sup> Here Origen clearly alludes to Luke 16 and the parable of the rich man and Lazarus as well as Christ’s words to the thief on the cross recorded in Luke 23:43.

A corresponding theory to the idea of the descent of the souls is the theory of their ascent. Here Origen sees the soul as rising to the heavens ultimately to God.<sup>288</sup> Reason itself suggests the notion that pure souls not having the “weight of sin” are able to ascend while those yet “weighed down” are seen at times around “sepulchers where they appear as apparitions of shadowy spirits, at other times among other objects on the ground.”<sup>289</sup> He finds a description of this ascent of the soul in the book of Numbers. The description of the wanderings of the children of Israel is, according to Origen, a description of the soul’s wanderings towards God. “The ascent from Egypt to the promised land is something by which, as I have said, we are taught in mysterious descriptions the ascent of the soul to heaven and the mystery of the resurrection from the dead.”<sup>290</sup> Origen talks

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<sup>286</sup>“Κατὰ δὲ ὑμᾶς τοὺς λέγοντας ὅτι ἡ ψυχὴ κεῖται ἐν τῷ μνημείῳ μετὰ τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἐξῆλθεν ἀπὸ τοῦ σώματος, οὐκ ἀναπαύεται, οὐ γέγονεν ἐν τῷ παραδείσῳ τοῦ Θεοῦ.” *Dialogus cum Heraclide* 23.9.

<sup>287</sup>“οὐ γὰρ σὺν Χριστῷ ἐστὶν ἅμα τῷ ἀναλῦσαι, εἰ ἡ ψυχὴ αἷμα.” *Ibid.*, 23.15.

<sup>288</sup>On the doctrine of apotheosis in Origen, see Russell, 140-154.

<sup>289</sup>“ἡ μὲν τις ἐπὶ ‘τὰ μνήματα’, ἔνθα καὶ ὥφθη σκιοειδῶν ψυχῶν ‘φαντάσματα’, ἡ δὲ τις ἀπαξαπλῶς περὶ τὴν γῆν.” *Contra Celsum* 7.5.11.

<sup>290</sup>“*Agitur ergo adscensio de Aegypto ad terram repromissionis, per quam*

about stages and pilgrimages leading to God. He writes regarding these pilgrimages of the soul that “we understand these pilgrimages only dully and darkly so long as the pilgrimage still lasts. But when the soul has returned to its rest, that is, to the fatherland in paradise, it will be taught more truly and will understand more truly what the meaning of its pilgrimage was.”<sup>291</sup>

Origen gives a demonstration of this interpretation by interpreting Num 33, describing how the various stages of the flight from Egypt can be understood to apply to the soul’s movement toward God. In harmony with his general theory of hermeneutics, which relies on the three-fold understanding of humanity, Origen states that beyond the historical account given, there is a two-fold understanding to the flight from Egypt which applies to the soul. The first refers to the soul’s movement before death and the second refers to what occurs after the resurrection. He writes, “Employing a double line of interpretation, we must examine the entire order of stages as it is narrated, so that our soul may make progress by both interpretations, when we learn from them either how we ought to live the life that turns from error and follows the Law of God or how great an expectation we have of the future hope that is promised on the basis of the resurrection.”<sup>292</sup>

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*mysticis, ut dixi, descriptionibus edocemur adscensum animae ad coelum et resurrectionis ex mortuis sacramentum.” In Numeros homiliae 27.4. On the challenges to the soul during the ascent, see Tripolitis, *The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen*, 124-130.*

<sup>291</sup>“*Sed hebescit harum intellectus et obscuratur, donec adhuc peregrinatur; tunc autem verius edocebitur et verius intelliget, quae fuerit ratio peregrinationis suae, cum regressa fuerit ad requiem suam, id est ad patriam suam paradisum.” In Numeros homiliae 27.4.*

<sup>292</sup>“*Duplici igitur expositione utentes omnem hunc, qui recitatus est, considerare debemus ordinem mansionum, ut ex utroque sit animae nostrae profectus, agnoscentibus ex his, vel haec vita, quae ex conversione erroris legem Dei sequitur, qualiter agi debeat,*

Origen notes that Ramses means “confused agitation” and Succoth is translated “tent.” “Thus, the first progress of the soul is to be taken away from earthly agitation and to learn that it must dwell in tents like a wanderer, so that it can be, as it were, ready for battle and meet those who lie in wait for it unhindered and free.”<sup>293</sup> In this way, Origen interprets the stages from Egypt to the Jordan River.

He supports this notion of the soul on a pilgrimage to rest with references to passages from the Psalms such as Ps 119:6 (LXX), “My soul has long been on pilgrimage,” and Ps 116:7 where the Psalmist writes, “Return, O my soul, to your rest; for the Lord has dealt bountifully with you.” These are mysteries and Origen thus asks, “Who will be found worthy and so understanding of the divine mysteries that he can describe the stages of that journey and ascent of the soul and explain either the toils or the rest of each different place?”<sup>294</sup> In the end, he writes, “When the soul has made its journey through all these virtues and has climbed to the height of perfection, it then ‘passes’ from the world and ‘separates’ from it, as it is written of Enoch, ‘And he was not found because God had taken him across.’”<sup>295</sup> Elsewhere, Origen turns to the story of

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*vel futurae spei, quae ex resurrectione promittitur, quanta sit expectatio.” In Numeros homiliae 27.6. For a similar usage, this time applying the ten plagues to the soul, see In Exodum homiliae 4.8.*

<sup>293</sup>“*Igitur primus animae profectus est, ut auferatur a commotione terrena et sciat sibi tamquam peregrinanti et iter agentis in tabernaculis habitandum, quo velut in procinctu posita adversum insidiantes expedita occurrere possit et libera.” In Numeros homiliae 27.9.*

<sup>294</sup>“*Et quis ita invenietur idoneus et divinorum conscius secretorum, qui possit itineris istius et adscensionis animae describere mansiones et uniuscuiusque loci vel labores explicare vel requies?” In Numeros homiliae 27.4.*

<sup>295</sup>“*Ubi enim per has omnes virtutes iter egerit anima et ad summam perfectionis adscenderit, transit iam de saeculo et abscedit, sicut scriptum est de Enoc: ‘et non inveniebatur, quia transtulerat illum Deus.’” Ibid., 27.12.*

Jacob's ladder for support of the following. He writes, "Celsus, too, agreeably to the opinion of Plato, asserts that souls can make their way to and from the earth through the planets."<sup>296</sup> Origen notes that the story of Jacob's ladder either hints at Plato's doctrine or at something greater, as do the visions of different gates in Ezek 48 and the various foundations and gates of the New Jerusalem in Rev 21.<sup>297</sup>

The theory of the descent and ascent of souls helps to solve Origen's concern regarding predestination and the soul's free will. He especially mentions Mal 1:2-3 as interpretive of Gen 25:25-26 regarding God's regard for Jacob over Esau. This theory of descent based on prior actions, Origen writes, will cause one to "come to the same conclusion respecting the nature of souls, and (believe) that this was the reason why Jacob was beloved before he was born into this world, and Esau hated, while he still was contained in the womb of his mother."<sup>298</sup> Noting 2 Tim 2:20, where both vessels made for honor and for dishonor are made from the same lump of clay, Origen argues that all souls have one nature.<sup>299</sup> Origen thus concludes, "Whence we are of opinion that, seeing the soul, as we have frequently said, is immortal and eternal, it is possible that, in the

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<sup>296</sup>“Καὶ τὸ ὁδὸν δὲ εἶναι ταῖς ψυχαῖς ἐς γῆν καὶ ἀπὸ γῆς Κέλσος μὲν κατὰ Πλάτωνά φησι γίνεσθαι διὰ τῶν πλανήτων.” *Contra Celsum* 6.21.6.

<sup>297</sup>Ibid., 6.23.

<sup>298</sup>“*Non videtur absurdum eodem ordine atque eadem consequentia discutientes nos antiquiores causas, eadem etiam de animarum sentire ratione, et hoc esse in causa quod Iacob dilectus est etiam antequam huic mundo nasceretur, et Esau odio habitus est, dum adhuc in ventre matris haberetur.*” *De principiis* 3.1.22. In this context, Origen is fighting the understanding of the nature of souls taught by certain of the Gnostics who suggest three types of souls that effectively determined whether one would be saved or lost.

<sup>299</sup>“*Unam etenim naturam omnium esse dicimus rationabilium animarum, sicut ‘una luti massa subiacere figulo’ designatur.*” Ibid., 3.1.21.

many and endless periods of duration in the immeasurable and different worlds, it may descend from the highest good to the lowest evil, or be restored from the lowest evil to the highest good.”<sup>300</sup>

Origen is not always clear on the distinction between understanding or *nous* and the soul, especially in the context of his theory of the ascent and descent of souls. Though he separates them clearly in his discussion of the preexistent individual’s change from understanding to the soul and then back to understanding, yet he also speaks of understanding in respect of the human person living on earth. Concerning the Christian who has a positive view of the Old Testament, he writes, “It [the Scriptures] will be the bread of life, which may nourish the soul with the food of truth and wisdom, and enlighten the mind, and cause it to drink from the cup of divine wisdom.”<sup>301</sup> Here truth and wisdom from the Scriptures are applied to the soul. He refers to Prov 9:1-5 in support of this. He also makes reference to the “natural and innate longing of the soul for the thing itself.”<sup>302</sup> He elsewhere writes of one who “would then know more clearly the reasons of all things which are done on earth, either respecting man, or the soul of man, or the mind; or regarding any other subject.”<sup>303</sup> Here it seems that Origen thinks of these

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<sup>300</sup>“*Ex quo opinamur, quoniam quidem, sicut frequentius diximus, immortalis est anima et aeterna, quod in multis et sine fine spatiis per immensa et diversa saecula possibile est, ut vel a summo bono ad infima mala descendat, vel ab ultimis malis ad summa bona reparatur.*” Ibid., 3.1.23. Here again, Rufinus seems to summarize Origen’s thought.

<sup>301</sup>“*Sed ‘panem vitae’, qui veritatis et sapientiae cibis nutriat animam et inluminet mentem et potet eam divinae ‘sapientiae’ poculis.*” *De principiis* 2.11.3.

<sup>302</sup>“*Quam naturalis sit et insita animae rei ipsius cupiditas inquiramus.*” Ibid., 2.11.4.

<sup>303</sup>“*Omniium quae geruntur in terris manifestius agnosceret rationes, id est vel de homine vel de anima hominis vel de mente, vel ex quibuscumque illis homo constat.*” Ibid., 2.11.5.

three as distinct entities. Elsewhere, he writes of the “means of which false knowledge is introduced into the minds of men, and human souls led astray.”<sup>304</sup> He also writes of “the suggestions which are made to the soul, i.e., to the faculty of human thought.”<sup>305</sup> It seems clear, then, that notwithstanding Origen’s suggestion of a change for the preexistent person from mind to soul in his theory of descent, yet the individual as soul does not lose its rational powers.

Origen further describes his understanding of the rational faculties of the soul, “just as the Church’s dowry was the volumes of the Law and the Prophets, so let us regard natural law and reason and free will as the soul’s betrothal gifts.”<sup>306</sup> He interprets this to mean that

Every soul that has been first instructed in ethics and then practiced in natural philosophy, then the Word of God is drawn by means of all those things which, as we showed just now, are taught in the aforesaid studies—namely, amendment of manners, knowledge of affairs, and uprightness of conduct. And He is willing to be drawn, and comes very gladly to instructed souls; and He accepts their drawing of Him courteously, and kindly yields thereto.<sup>307</sup>

In describing the ascending soul, Origen writes, “And thus the rational nature, growing by each individual step, not as it grew in this life in flesh, and body, and soul,

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<sup>304</sup>“*Quibus falsa scientia humanis mentibus inseritur et seducuntur animae.*” Ibid., 3.3.2.

<sup>305</sup>“*De his vero, quae a diversis spiritibus animae, id est humanis cogitationibus, suggeruntur.*” Ibid., 3.3.6.

<sup>306</sup>“*Sicut enim ecclesiae dos fuit legis et prophetarum volumina, ita huic lex naturae et rationabilis sensus ac libertas arbitrii dotalia munera deputentur.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 1.

<sup>307</sup>“*Quaecumque anima fuerit erudita primo in moralibus, secundo etiam in naturalibus exercitata, per illa omnia, quae in his disciplinis edoceri supra ostendimus, ipsa morum emendatio et eruditio rerum ac probitas disciplinae ‘trahit ad se’ Verbum Dei; et libens ‘trahitur’, gratissime enim ad eruditas animas venit et ‘trahi’ se ab his indulgenter accipit benigne que concedit.*” Ibid., 1.102.

but enlarged in understanding and in power of perception, is raised as a mind already perfect to perfect knowledge.”<sup>308</sup> Here it is clear that body and soul are tied to this earth and that understanding is the key to the future life. In his Commentary on the Song of Songs, Origen notes that love is “that which leads the soul from earth to the lofty heights of heaven.”<sup>309</sup>

Based on the appeal in Cant 1:8 to “know thyself,” Origen asserts that it is essential for the soul to know itself. He notes that it is difficult to explain what this means but he does attempt to provide a meaning. The soul should “know what she is like essentially, and what she is like according to her disposition. She should know . . . whether she is of a good disposition or not, and whether or not she is upright in intention; and, if she is in fact of an upright intention, whether, in thought as in action, she has the same zeal for all virtues, or only for necessary things and those that are easy.”<sup>310</sup> To this he adds that the soul should know “whether she does these evil deeds of hers intentionally and because she likes them; or whether it is through some weakness.”<sup>311</sup> Also, the soul should know “whether she is greatly desirous of glory, or only slightly so,

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<sup>308</sup>“*Et ita crescens per singula rationabilis natura, non sicut in carne vel corpore et anima in hac vita crescebat, sed mente ac sensu aucta ad perfectam scientiam mentis iam perfecta perducitur.*” *De principiis* 2.11.7.

<sup>309</sup>“*Ostendere non aliud esse amoris vim nisi quae animam de terris ad fastigia caeli celsa perducatur.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* prol.

<sup>310</sup>“*Videtur ergo mihi duplici modo agnitionem sui capere animam debere, quid ve sit ipsa et qualiter moveatur, id est quid in substantia et quid in affectibus habeat; ut puta ut intelligat, si boni affectus sit aut non boni, et recti propositi aut non recti; et si quidem recti sit, si erga omnes virtutes eundem tenorem habeat, tam in intelligendo quam in agendo, an erga necessaria tantum et quae in promptu sunt.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 2.143.

<sup>311</sup>“*Sed et in eo opus videtur esse animae ‘cognoscentis semet ipsam’, si haec ipsa, quae operatur mala, ex affectu ea et studio operetur an fragilitate quadam.*” *Ibid.*



or not in the least.”<sup>312</sup> Origen also notes that the soul who knows herself should perceive “whether she makes her offerings and bestows her gifts in a spirit of sharing . . . or whether she does so, as it is said, with sadness or of necessity.”<sup>313</sup> He adds that the soul should “find out whether she is easily moved by the hearing of some apparent truth and carried away by the skill and grace of its verbal presentation.”<sup>314</sup> He also asks “whether the soul puts on a body only once and, having laid it down, seeks for it no more; or whether, when it once has laid aside what it took, it takes it yet again; and, if it does so a second time, whether it keeps what it has taken always, or some day puts it off once more.”<sup>315</sup> Origen responds to this question and asserts that based upon the biblical notion of a coming judgment, it must be clear that the soul does not keep putting on and off the body but must do so only once. This is another example of his usage of the biblical teaching of a future judgment in connection with the doctrine of the soul.

Origen connects the sins of the soul with the fires of judgment. He writes, “So, when the soul has gathered together a multitude of evil works, and an abundance of sins against itself, at a suitable time all that assembly of evils boils up to punishment, and is

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<sup>312</sup>“*Adhuc et istud opus est animae ‘cognoscentis se’, si gloriae multum cupida sit aut parum aut omnino nihil.*” Ibid., 2.144.

<sup>313</sup>“*Sed et in dando et accipiendo animae ‘cognoscentis semet ipsam’ sunt quaedam indicia, si quod tribuit et praebet, utrum communicabili affectu et quasi cui aequitatem haberi inter homines placeat, an, ut ille ait, ‘ex tristitia aut necessitate’ vel certe gratiam sive ab accipientibus sive ab audientibus quaerens.*” Ibid.

<sup>314</sup>“*Utrum indifferenter habeat ea, quae accipit, an velut super aliquo bono gaudeat.*” *Commentarium in Canticum canticorum* 2.144.

<sup>315</sup>“*Sed et illud requiritur, utrum semel tantum corpore induatur et id postmodum depositum ultra non quaerat, an cum semel susceptum deposuerit, iterum assumat; et si secundo, sumptum semper habeat an aliquando iterum abiciat.*” Ibid., 2.147.

set on fire to chastisements.”<sup>316</sup> Here it is suggested that the fire of hell is actually created by the soul itself, rather than from another source.<sup>317</sup> He also describes the devil as one who “will either gain possession of us, or at least will pollute the soul, if he has not obtained the entire mastery over it.”<sup>318</sup> He adds, “From which it is understood that around the substance of the soul certain tortures are produced by the hurtful affections of sins themselves.”<sup>319</sup> As examples of this, he mentions “those passions which are wont to befall some souls, as when a soul is consumed by the fire of love, or wasted away by zeal or envy, or when the passion of anger is kindled, or one is consumed by the greatness of his madness or his sorrow.”<sup>320</sup> Though Origen notes that the resurrected body of the damned cannot be dissolved by fire,<sup>321</sup> yet he places the work of fire more directly on the soul.

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<sup>316</sup>“*Ita anima cum multitudinem malorum operum et abundantiam in se congregaverit peccatorum, competenti tempore omnis illa malorum congregatio effervescit ad supplicium atque inflammatur ad poenas.*” *De principiis* 2.10.4. See Daley, 56.

<sup>317</sup>See James W. Armantage, “Will the Body Be Raised? Origen and the Origenist Controversies” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1970), 183.

<sup>318</sup>“*Aut obtineat nos aut certe vel polluat animam, si non penitus obtinere potuerit.*” *De principiis* 3.2.4.

<sup>319</sup>“*Ex quo intellegitur quod circa ipsam animae substantiam tormenta quaedam ex ipsis peccatorum noxiis affectibus generantur.*” *De principiis* 2.10.4.

<sup>320</sup>“*Considerari possibile est ex his passionum vitiis, quae animabus accidere solent, id est cum vel flammis amoris exurit anima vel zeli aut livoris ignibus maceratur, aut cum irae agitur insania vel tristitiae immensitate consumitur.*” Ibid. See also *Contra Celsum* 8.51.22.

<sup>321</sup>*De principiis* 2.10.3.

## Hell and Paradise

Origen seems to suggest a healing purpose for the fire of hell. He speaks of God as the physician of our souls.<sup>322</sup> In this context he writes of God “desiring to remove the defects of our souls, which they had contracted from their different sins and crimes” and then he adds the “punishment of fire to those who have lost their soundness of mind.”<sup>323</sup> He adds, “If any one, then, at his leisure gather together out of the whole of Scripture all the enumerations of diseases which in the threats addressed to sinners are called by the names of bodily maladies, he will find that either the vices of souls, or their punishments, are figuratively indicated by them.”<sup>324</sup> This idea that Scripture lists the diseases of the soul is referred to when he writes, “In the Holy Scriptures the sicknesses of the soul are enumerated and the remedies described.”<sup>325</sup> Origen refers to the parable of the sower who sowed on various types of soils, including rocky soil, and describes the rocks as representing the human soul.<sup>326</sup> Elsewhere, he also references the purification purpose of

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<sup>322</sup>“*Multa sunt etiam alia quae nos latent, quae illi soli cognita sunt, qui est medicus animarum nostrarum.*” Ibid., 2.10.6. See also *In Leuiticum homiliae* 7.1. On the relationship between the illnesses of the soul and the body in earlier Greek thought, see David Bostock, “Medical Theory and Theology in Origen,” in *Origeniana Tertia*, ed. Richard Hanson et al. (Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1985), 192-193.

<sup>323</sup>“*Quanto magis intellegendum est medicum nostrum deum volentem diluere vitia animarum nostrarum, quae ex peccatorum et scelerum diversitate collegerant, uti huiuscemodi poenalibus curis, insuper etiam ignis inferre supplicium his, qui sanitatem animae perdiderunt?*” *De principiis* 2.10.6. See Daley, 57.

<sup>324</sup>“*Si qui ergo ex otio de omni scriptura congreget omnes languorum commemorationes, quae in comminatione peccatoribus velut corporearum aegritudinum appellationibus memorantur, inveniet quod animarum vel vitia vel supplicia per haec figuraliter indicentur.*” *De principiis* 2.10.6.

<sup>325</sup>“*Et ideo in divinis Scripturis aegritudines animae numerantur et remedia describuntur.*” *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 2.6.4. Latin text PG, Translation FC.

<sup>326</sup>“*Quae utique petra sine dubio pro anima posita est humana.*” *De principiis*

the fires of punishment. He writes regarding the biblical Gehenna that it was “intended for the purification of such souls as are to be purified by torments, agreeably to the saying: ‘The Lord cometh like a refiner’s fire, and like fullers’ soap: and He shall sit as a refiner and purifier of silver and of gold.’”<sup>327</sup>

The threat to destroy the world by fire is also interpreted by Origen as follows, “That, as the soul of man is immortal, the supposed threatening has for its object the conversion of the hearers.”<sup>328</sup> He further writes that “we, however, know of no incorporeal substance that is destructible by fire, nor (do we believe) that the soul of man, or the substance of ‘angels,’ or of ‘thrones,’ or dominions,’ or ‘principalities,’ or ‘powers,’ can be dissolved by fire.”<sup>329</sup> He refers to several passages in Scripture for his assertion but none of the passages demonstrate his main point, that the soul is immaterial and thus cannot be destroyed by fire.

Origen also is clear that there is a place called Hades where the souls of the wicked go.<sup>330</sup> This is where Christ went after He died on the cross, to preach to the souls of the wicked.<sup>331</sup> This is also where Samuel was when called up by the Witch of Endor at

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3.1.14.

<sup>327</sup>“τι εἰς τὸν περὶ κολάσεων τόπον, μεταλαμβανομένων εἰς τὴν μετὰ βασάνου κάθαρσιν τῶν τοιωνδὶ ψυχῶν.” *Contra Celsum* 6.25.33. See also 6.26.

<sup>328</sup>“ἀθανάτου τῆς ψυχῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων τυγχανούσης, ἢ μὲν νομιζομένη ἀπειλὴ ἐπιστρέφειν βούλεται τοὺς ἀκούοντας.” *Contra Celsum* 6.58.19.

<sup>329</sup>“Πάντα μὲν οὖν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς ἐκπυρούτωσαν, ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀσώματον οὐσίαν οὐκ ἴσμεν ἐκπυρουμένην οὐδ’ εἰς πῦρ ἀναλυομένην τὴν ἀνθρώπου ψυχὴν ἢ τὴν ἀγγέλων ἢ θρόνων ἢ κυριοτήτων ἢ ἀρχῶν ἢ ἐξουσιῶν ὑπόστασιν.” *Contra Celsum* 6.71.27

<sup>330</sup>Ibid., 2.43. Cf. *De principiis* 4.3.10.

<sup>331</sup>1 Pet 3:19-20.

Saul's request.<sup>332</sup> In concluding his homily on this story, he writes, "Therefore the souls of those who die, I may dare to say, have need of prophetic grace."<sup>333</sup> He does note that Christ threatens "that sentence that condemns body and soul to the fires of hell."<sup>334</sup>

As noted, Origen writes ambiguously regarding the actual events associated with the judgment of the soul, most especially the notion of an eternal-burning hell. In writing on the negative effects on the soul of sexual impurity, he mentions "the judgments which it will suffer, and the punishments which will be inflicted."<sup>335</sup> He adds, "See then how very bad sinning is, that they may be delivered to Satan, who holds captive the souls of those forsaken by God."<sup>336</sup>

Origen describes the resurrected soul as being "a perfect soul, and one furnished with the marks of incorruption."<sup>337</sup> He even notes that the soul can then be referred to as the clothing of the body based upon his interpretation of Rom 13:14. However, even after the resurrection, the body will still be situated according to the merits of the soul. He writes, regarding the flesh, that it "will be again raised from the earth, and shall after this,

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<sup>332</sup>See *De engastrimytho* 8.

<sup>333</sup>"τῆς οὖν χάριτος τῆς προφητικῆς αἰ ψυχῶν τῶν κοιμωμένων (<ἵνα> τολμήσω καὶ εἶπω) ἐδέοντο." *De engastrimytho* 9.26.

<sup>334</sup>"*Ista sententia quae corpus et animam gehennae ignibus damnat.*" *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 7.5.10.

<sup>335</sup>"καὶ οἷας τίσει δίκας καὶ ὡς κολασθήσεται." *Contra Celsum* 3.56.26.

<sup>336</sup>"Ὅρα οὖν πηλίκον κακόν ἐστι τὸ ἀμαρτάνειν, ἵνα 'παραδοθῶσι τῷ σατανᾷ' αἰχμαλωτίζοντι τὰς ψυχὰς τῶν ἐγκαταλειπομένων ὑπὸ θεοῦ." *In Ieremiam* 1.4.2.

<sup>337</sup>"*Perfecta anima et dogmatibus incorruptionis.*" *De principiis* 2.3.2. There is some concern as to the precise meaning of the phrase. G. W. Butterworth translates it, "instructed in the doctrines of incorruption." See also *ibid.*, 3.6.4.

according to the merits of the indwelling soul, advance to the glory of a spiritual body.”<sup>338</sup>

In regard to the various stages that he refers to in leading the ascent to God, he writes, “And in the case of each of them what purpose, what sojourn of use to the soul, or what instruction or enlightenment a person may receive is something only the Father of the age to come knows.”<sup>339</sup> He adds more regarding this advancement: “When, therefore, all rational souls shall have been restored to a condition of this kind, then the nature of this body of ours will undergo a change into the glory of a spiritual body.”<sup>340</sup> The spiritual body which Origen mentions is not to be confused with the body of flesh which humans have in this life and which they will also have following the resurrection. The ultimate goal is “when the soul, united to God, shall have been made one spirit with Him (the body even then ministering, as it were, to the spirit), attain to a spiritual condition and quality.”<sup>341</sup> Here Origen relies on verses such as 1 Cor 15:28 when God has become

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<sup>338</sup>“*Rursum resuscitetur e terra et post hoc iam, prout meritum inhabitantis animae poposcerit, in gloriam ‘corporis’ proficiat ‘spiritalis.’*” Ibid., 3.6.5. See also *In Numeros homiliae* 27.2. On the relationship of the soul and the body after death, see Armantage, 183-184; Mark J. Edwards, “Origen’s Two Resurrections,” *Journal of Theological Studies*, n.s. 46, no. 2 (1995): 502-513; Tripolitis, *The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen*, 114-116. On the connection to astral bodies, see Henri Crouzel, “La thèse platonicienne du ‘véhicule de l’âme’ chez Origène,” *Didaskalia* 7 (1977): 232; Scott, *Origen and Life*, 150-157.

<sup>339</sup>“*Quid utilitatis animae commoratio, quid ve eruditionis aut illuminationis accipiat, scit ille solus ‘futuri saeculi pater.’*” *In Numeros homiliae* 27.2. On *akoloutheo* in Origen, see Steven L. Chase, “‘What Happens Next?’ Biblical Exegesis and the Path of the Soul’s Journey in Origen and Gregory of Nyssa,” *The Patristic and Byzantine Review* 10, no. 1-2 (1991): 40-44; Dupuis, 165-175.

<sup>340</sup>“*Cum ergo restitutae fuerint omnes rationabiles animae in huiusmodi statum, tunc etiam natura huius corporis nostri in ‘spiritalis corporis’ gloriam perducetur.’* *De principiis* 3.6.6.

<sup>341</sup>“*Cum anima adiuncta deo ‘unus’ cum eo ‘spiritus’ fuerit effecta, iam tum corpus quasi spiritui ministrans in statum qualitatem que proficiat spiritalem.’* Ibid.

“all in all”<sup>342</sup> and the *imago dei* conception of humanity from Gen 1:26-28.<sup>343</sup> He adds to this the notion “we will be like Him” from 1 John 3:2 and “Father, I will that . . . as You and I are one, they also may be one in Us,” alluding to John 17:21.<sup>344</sup>

One reason for the perceived lack of emphasis on the judgment in Origen may be attributed to his theory of universal salvation. Origen asserts that “our belief is, that the Word shall prevail over the entire rational creation, and change every soul into His own perfection.”<sup>345</sup> He adds, “For stronger than all the evils in the soul is the Word, and the healing power that dwells in Him.”<sup>346</sup> In defense of this notion, Origen writes, “Many things are said obscurely in the prophecies on the total destruction of evil, and the restoration to righteousness of every soul.”<sup>347</sup> He quotes from Zeph 3:7-13 as biblical support pointing especially to statements such as “All shall call upon the name of the Lord, and serve Him with one consent; also that all contemptuous reproach shall be taken away, and there shall be no longer any injustice, or vain speech or a deceitful tongue.”<sup>348</sup>

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<sup>342</sup>Ibid., 3.6.2.

<sup>343</sup>Cf. *In Leuiticum homiliae* 4.3 where Origen writes, “God entrust ‘his own image and likeness’ to your own soul.” *Ipsi animae tuae Deus ‘imaginem suam et similitudinem’ commendavit.*

<sup>344</sup>*De principiis* 3.6.1.

<sup>345</sup>“ἡμεῖς δὲ τῆς λογικῆς φύσεώς φαμεν ὅλης κρατῆσαι ποτε τὸν λόγον καὶ μεταποιῆσαι πᾶσαν ψυχὴν εἰς τὴν ἑαυτοῦ τελειότητα.” *Contra Celsum* 8.72.13.

<sup>346</sup>“Πάντων γὰρ τῶν ἐν ψυχῇ κακῶν δυνατώτερος ὢν ὁ λόγος καὶ ἡ ἐν αὐτῷ θεραπεία προσάγει κατὰ βούλησιν θεοῦ ἐκάστῳ αὐτήν.” Ibid., 8.72.20. See Daley, 58.

<sup>347</sup>“Πολλὰ μὲν οὖν αἱ προφητεῖαι περὶ τῆς παντελοῦς ἀναιρέσεως τῶν κακῶν καὶ διορθώσεως πάσης ψυχῆς ἐν ἀπορρήτοις λέγουσιν.” *Contra Celsum* 8.72.27.

<sup>348</sup>Ibid., 8.72.

While Origen is not dogmatic on this idea, it, along with the notion of the prior existence of souls, is perhaps the most contentious teaching associated with Origen.

For Origen, the place where the saints go who depart this life is called paradise. He describes it as “some place of instruction, and, so to speak, class-room or school of souls.”<sup>349</sup> This is a good example of Origen’s conception of an ascent through understanding, which the soul embarks on once one dies. He also describes Paul, after his death, as becoming “the Apostle not only of the Gentiles but also of the Israelites and possibly of other invisible creatures in that place where the spirits and souls of the just are praising the Lord, singing a hymn to him and highly exalting him forever.”<sup>350</sup>

Origen, along with all the early Church Fathers, did not teach the transmigration of souls.<sup>351</sup> He writes that souls “are not driven on in a cycle which returns after many ages to the same round.”<sup>352</sup> There was the serious charge by his detractors that Origen taught that the human soul could be reincarnated in a beast. This has been suggested from Origen’s comments on Lev 20:16 where an animal is put to death for sodomy. Origen

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<sup>349</sup>“*Velut in quodam eruditionis loco est, ut ita dixerim, auditorio vel schola animarum.*” *De principiis* 2.11.6. Even the apostles were in need of further training after death. Cf. *In Numeros homiliae* 25.6. Daley notes that the righteous souls still play an active role in the life of the living. *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 15.35; *Commentarii in evangelium Joannis* 13.58. He also notes that the martyrs and all the righteous souls of the dead “intercede for the living and help Christ in his work of purifying.” *Exhortatio ad martyrium* 30.38; *In Numeros homiliae* 24.1; *Homiliae in Canticorum* 3; Daley, 56.

<sup>350</sup>“*Et apostolum futurum etiam post exitum suum non solum gentium, sed et Israelitarum, et aliorum fortassis invisibilium, ibi ubi benedicunt spiritus et animae iustorum Dominum, humnum dicunt, et superexaltant eum in saecula?*” *Commentarii in epistulam ad Romanos* 8.10.2.

<sup>351</sup>This did not stop others from accusing Origen of holding this doctrine.

<sup>352</sup>“*Non enim cursu aliquo in eosdem se circulos post multa saecula revolvente aguntur animae.*” *De principiis* 2.3.4. See Hoheisel, 41-42.



notes that only the human soul can be punished and held culpable for wrong deeds.<sup>353</sup>

Elsewhere, in discussing the prophecy concerning Elijah he writes, “In this place it does not appear to me that by Elijah the soul is spoken of, lest I should fall into the dogma of transmigration, which is foreign to the church of God.”<sup>354</sup>

### Summary

The soul is an invisible substance with the power of thought and movement. Though Origen does use soul for life and to refer to individuals and even races of people, he clearly intends, more often than not, that by soul he means a separated, psychological entity from the body. It is, however, affected by the actions of the body, though Origen does not spend as much time emphasizing this as Clement of Alexandria does. The soul is not good by nature. It can be overcome with emotions. Origen describes it in negative terms. It is, however, endowed with free will and a rational faculty and must choose to follow either the flesh or the Spirit. The choice to follow the Spirit is made from knowledge and by the aid of Christ’s instruction. At times, even, he can refer salvation only to the *nous* rather than the soul.

Origen allegorizes the possible physical attributes of the soul. He argues that the

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<sup>353</sup>*De principiis* 1.8.4.

<sup>354</sup>“Ἐν τούτοις Ἠλίας οὐχ ἡ ψυχὴ <Ἡλίου> δοκεῖ μοι λέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ ἐμπίπτω εἰς τὸ ἀλλότριον” *Commentarium in evangelium Matthaei* 13.1.46. See Norbert Brox, “The Early Christian Debate on the Migration of Souls,” in *Reincarnation or Resurrection*, ed. Hermann Häring et al. (London: SCM Press, 1993), 76-80; Daniélou, “Origène comme exégète de la Bible,” 249-250; Dupuis, 127-142; Mark J. Edwards, *Origen Against Plato* (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2002), 98-99; Lies, “Origenes und Reinkarnation,” no. 3, 143. On the notion of transmigration from human to angels, see Edwards, *Origen Against Plato*, 100-101. On the connection of this teaching to that of the preexistence of the soul, see Ugo Bianchi, “Origen’s Treatment of the Soul and the Debate over Metempsychosis,” in *Origeniana Quarta*, ed. Lothar Lies (Innsbruck: Tyrolia, 1987), 274-275.

hands or eyes of the soul refer to the various powers of the soul associated with the physical symbol.

One of Origen's key elements in his doctrine of the soul that has caused concern in the eyes of fellow Christians is his theory regarding the prior existence of the soul, which is combined with his theory of the soul's descent to the material world and its ascent back to God. The idea of the soul's prior existence is directly connected with his notion of free will and God's ultimate fairness in not being unjust in condemning some to death and others to life. Thus he notes Paul's assertion in Romans that before their birth, God loved Jacob and hated Esau. Origen thus concluded that this could be fair only if their souls had existed prior to their birth on this earth and had the opportunity to choose right and wrong. In defending the free will of the soul, Origen quotes a variety of verses including Rom 6:12 and Matt 11:30. He also quotes Deut 30:15 and Luke 2:52. The connection between free will and the soul's prior existence is very strong for Origen.

Based upon Gen 1:26-27, the soul is created *imago dei* but is not coeternal with God. It does, however, have certain divine qualities. This verse, however, refers to its original creation, not the physical creation of humankind described in Gen 2:7. Origen suggests that stars and other celestial bodies have souls, relying here on Job 25:5 and Isa 45:12. Quoting Lev 17:10 and Isa 1:13-14, he also argues that God has a soul. He quotes Ps 22:19-20, John 10:18; Matt 26:38, and John 12:27 to prove that Christ also has a soul. Following the tradition of earlier Fathers, Origen argues that Christ's soul went down to Hades to preach to wicked souls there at the time of His crucifixion based upon 1 Pet 3:19-20.

Origen also argues that a human person cannot beget a soul. Here he relies on 1 Cor 4:15 and Gal 4:19 in Paul's writings, as well as noting that in the creation account, Adam states only that Eve is bone of his bone, not soul of his soul. The human person, in

this life, is a composite of body and soul. He quotes here 1 Thess 5:23, referencing Paul's statement describing the trichotomy of the human individual.

To interpret several scriptural texts which suggest a material nature in the soul (Lev 17:11; Deut 12:33; Gen 9:4), Origen turns to Paul, quoting 2 Cor 4:16, Rom 7:22, and Col 3:9-10 where Paul writes of the inner and outer man. He thus argues that the soul of Lev 2:1 and that of Lev 1:2 refers differently to the inner and outer person.

Origen argues for the soul's immortality based upon several different arguments. One is its creation in the *imago dei*. He also argues that an essence which is immortal cannot be changed to one that is mortal, thus the soul does not die with the body. He also argues that the soul must be immortal and survive the death of the body in order to experience the future judgment. He uses 1 Pet 3:19-20, describing Christ's descent to Hades, along with 1 Sam 28 and Saul's meeting with Samuel through the Witch of Endor to further corroborate the notion that the soul survives the death of the body. He also begins a new trend in the use of various Scriptures by applying Luke 23:43 and Rev 6:9-11 literally and thus suggesting that the souls of the righteous do not go to Hades but immediately begin their ascent to God. The souls of the wicked are confined to Hades but the fires there are meant as cleansing rather than as destroying, thus lending credence to his proposal that, ultimately, all might be saved.

Origen notes that the Scriptures do speak of the death of the soul and he therefore gives several different usages of death that are to be found in the Scriptures. He notes that the soul can die to sin and in this sense it is mortal. However, he argues, it cannot die the natural death associated with the body and in this respect it must be immortal.

### **Gregory Thaumaturgos**

Gregory Thaumaturgos (The Wonderworker) was a student of Origen's at

Caesarea. He wrote a *Metaphrase on Ecclesiastes* along with an *Oration and Panegyric Addressed to Origen*.<sup>355</sup> He also wrote a *Canonical Letter* and an apologetic work to Theopompus. Several other works including a brief *Treatise on the Soul* are generally thought to be spurious.

### Usage of *Psyche*

Gregory describes the soul as the “ruling powers in man.”<sup>356</sup> He writes that “the soul is able to arrest the body in its disposition to intoxication and wine-bibbing, and that temperance makes lust its subject.”<sup>357</sup> Gregory writes that “the soul is free, and cannot be coerced by any means, not even though one should confine it and keep guard over it in some secret prison-house.”<sup>358</sup> He also uses the concept “know yourself.” He writes that “in this there is one virtue common to God and to man; while the soul is exercised in beholding itself as in a mirror, and reflects the divine mind in itself.”<sup>359</sup> Note Gregory’s presumed similarity between the soul and the mind of God.

Gregory states that “words are nothing else than a kind of imagery of the

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<sup>355</sup>On Gregory’s works, see John Jarick, *Gregory Thaumaturgos’ Paraphrase of Ecclesiastes* (Atlanta, GA: Scholars Press, 1990); Moreschini and Norelli, 308-312; Horst Schneider, “Gregory the Wonderworker,” *DECL*, 270.

<sup>356</sup>“αὐτὰ δὲ τὰ κυριώτατα, ψυχὴ.” *In Origenem oratio panegyrica* 6.81.

<sup>357</sup>“Λογισάμενος δὲ, ὅτι ψυχὴ δύναται στήσαι μεθύουσαν καὶ ῥέουσαν ὥσπερ οἶνον σώματος φύσιν, ἐγκράτεια δὲ δουλοῦται ἐπιθυμίαν.” *Metaphrasis in Ecclesiasten Salamonis* 992.16

<sup>358</sup>“Ψυχὴ γὰρ ἐλεύθερον καὶ οὐκ ἐγκατάκλειστον οὐδενὶ τρόπῳ, οὐδ’ ἂν ἐν οἰκίσκῳ καθείρξας τηρῆς.” *In Origenem oratio panegyrica* 6.84.

<sup>359</sup>“τὴν αὐτὴν ὄντως οὖσαν θεοῦ καὶ ἀνθρώπου ἀρετὴν, αὐτῆς τῆς ψυχῆς ἑαυτὴν ὥσπερ ἐν κατόπτρῳ ὄραν μελετώσης καὶ τὸν θεῖον νοῦν, εἰ ἀξία γένοιτο τῆς κοινωνίας τῆσδε.” *Ibid.*, 11.51.

dispositions of our soul”<sup>360</sup> and that by them “we represent the native dispositions of our soul”<sup>361</sup> and endeavor “to exhibit the impressions of the figures of our soul.”<sup>362</sup> He also writes of the “capacity of our mind which deals critically with words and reasonings, [being] educated in a rational manner; not according to the judgments of illustrious rhetoricians.”<sup>363</sup>

Gregory describes Origen, his teacher, as one who had “so deeply studied the clear and luminous oracles of God, as to be able at once to receive their meaning into his own soul, and to convey it to others.”<sup>364</sup> He also describes Origen as having been given “the gift of investigating and unfolding and explaining . . . so that, if there chanced to be any one of obtuse and incredulous soul, or one again thirsting for instruction, he might learn from this man.”<sup>365</sup>

#### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Gregory does not develop a doctrine of the soul. He does not use the Scriptures in his discussions at all.

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<sup>360</sup>“Ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐδὲν ἕτερον ἢ εἰκόνες τινές εἰσι τῶν <τῆς ψ>υχῆς ἡμῶν παθημάτων αἱ λέξεις ἡμῶν.” Ibid., 1.44.

<sup>361</sup>“τὰ πρωτότυπα τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς ἡμῶν <παθη>μάτων.” Ibid., 2.6.

<sup>362</sup>“ὑποφαίνειν τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῶν τῆς ψυχῆς τύπων.” Ibid., 2.8.

<sup>363</sup>“Οὕτως μὲν τὸ περὶ τὰς λέξεις καὶ τοὺς λόγους κριτικὸν ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς μέρος λογικῶς ἐξεπαιδεύετο· οὐ κατὰ τὰς καλῶν ῥητόρων κρίσεις.” *In Origenem oratio panegyrica* 7.86.

<sup>364</sup>“ὼν αὐτός τε ἔγνω καὶ ἑτέρων ἤκουσα περὶ τινῶν λεγόντων, μεμελετηκότες τὰ καθαρὰ τῶν λογίων φωτεινά τε παραδέχεσθαι αὐτοῦ τῆ ψυχῆ καὶ διδάσκεσθαι ἑτέρους.” Ibid., 15.18.

<sup>365</sup>“ἴν’ εἴ τις σκληρὸς τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ ἄπιστος ἢ καὶ φιλομαθῆς ὢν τύχοι, παρὰ τούτου μαθῶν.” Ibid., 15.27.

## Summary

Gregory is very reflective of the thought of his teacher, Origen. He connects the soul with the mind and learning. He teaches that the soul should know itself and that in so doing, it will be reflecting the divine mind. He also argues for the free will of the soul and notes that the soul is free and cannot be coerced by outside forces. He does not use Scripture in the development of a doctrine of the soul.

## Methodius

The only complete, extant work of Methodius is titled *The Banquet of the Ten Virgins* or the *Symposium*.<sup>366</sup> He wrote several other works which survive only in fragments of part of an eleventh-century Slavic translation including *On the Resurrection*, *On Things Created*, and *On Free Will*, though some scholars list the latter as being of doubtful authorship.<sup>367</sup> He is well noted for his anti-Origenist stance in his works.<sup>368</sup>

## Usage of *Psyche*

Methodius uses soul to refer to people. He writes in describing Ps 137:1-2, “For why do the souls declare that they were asked by those who led them captive to sing the

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<sup>366</sup>On Methodius’s works, see Moreschini and Norelli, 313-316; Lloyd G. Patterson, *Methodius of Olympus: Divine Sovereignty, Human Freedom, and Life in Christ* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1997), 1-4; Judith Pauli and Christiane Schmidt, “Methodius of Olympus,” *DECL*, 421-423. On Methodius’s use of dialogue, see M. Hoffmann, *Der Dialog bei den christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten Vier Jahrhunderte*, 67-83; Patterson, 11-13.

<sup>367</sup>Patterson, 21-34.

<sup>368</sup>*Ibid.*, 4-7; Jean Pépin, *Idées grecques sur l’homme et sur Dieu* (Paris: Les Belles Lettres, 1971), 172-175. Patterson notes that while Methodius was critical of Origen, yet he was indebted to Origen’s scriptural interpretation.

Lord's song in a strange land?"<sup>369</sup> He writes that those "souls which take care of the body, place around the outward neck of the flesh this visible ornament to deceive those who behold." He also writes, "Undoubtedly these are the souls whom the Word calls alone His chosen spouse and His sister."<sup>370</sup> Similarly, "For such fruits do the souls bring forth with whom Christ has had intercourse."<sup>371</sup>

Methodius also notes that the soul can be influenced by the deeds of the flesh. In the context of passions, Methodius writes of the sense of the soul: "For the senses of the soul, . . . when, being overcome by the excitements to passion which fall upon them from without, they receive the sudden bursts of the waves of folly which rush into them, being darkened turn aside from the divine course its whole vessel."<sup>372</sup> Here the soul is described as having the power of sense which can be overpowered by an outside influence of passions. In a similar context, he writes of a woman "decorating herself with textures of different cloths, or with stones and gold, and other decorations of the body, things which intoxicate the soul."<sup>373</sup> Elsewhere he writes of "the passions which obscure and cloud the

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<sup>369</sup>“Τί δὴ ποτε ἐπηρωτηῆσθαι πρὸς τῶν αἰχμαλωτιστῶν ὁμολογοῦσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ τὴν ᾠδὴν ἐπὶ γῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἄσαι κυρίου ἢ πάντως.” *Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum* 4.4.14.

<sup>370</sup>“Ἀμέλει ταύτας μόνον ἐκλεκτὴν νύμφην τὰς ψυχὰς καὶ γνησίαν ὁ λόγος ἑαυτοῦ καλεῖ, τὰς δὲ λοιπὰς παλλακὰς καὶ νεάνιδας καὶ θυγατέρας.” *Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum* 7.3.2.

<sup>371</sup>“Τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἀποβλαστήματα φύουσιν αἱ ψυχαὶ ἀείμνηστον φέροντα κάλλος, ὅποσαις ἂν ὁ Χριστὸς συνανακραθῇ.” *Ibid.*, 7.4.17.

<sup>372</sup>“Αἱ γὰρ αἰσθήσεις τῆς (15) ψυχῆς, ὡς οἱ τούτων ἔφασαν ἐπιστήμονες, ἐπειδὴν τῶν ἔξωθεν προσπιπτόντων παθῶν ἡσσηθεῖσαι προσδέξωνται τὰς ἐπιφορὰς τοῦ τῆς ἀνοίας ἐπικλύσαντος εἴσω κύματος.” *Ibid.*, 4.2.16.

<sup>373</sup>“Καὶ εἰ χρὴ φάναι λόγῳ πρὸς ὑμᾶς ἀληθεῖ, πᾶν τὸ μέθην φέρον καὶ ἔκστασιν τῇ ψυχῇ μετὰ τὸν οἶνον τὸν ἐξ ἀμπέλου σίκερα κυκλήσκουσιν οἱ σοφοί.” *Ibid.*, 5.6.16.

mind, which increase in us from our luxuriousness and carelessness.”<sup>374</sup> Chastity is the most useful in controlling the outside passions. Methodius writes, “Nothing can so much profit a man, O fair virgins, with respect to moral excellence, as chastity; for chastity alone accomplishes and brings it about that the soul should be governed in the noblest and best way, and should be set free, pure from the stains and pollutions of the world.”<sup>375</sup> Elsewhere, he writes, “For it speedily brings great and much-desired gifts of hope to those who strive for it, drying up the corrupting lusts and passions of the soul.”<sup>376</sup> Here Methodius notes that abstaining from a physical act will prevent passions from overcoming the soul.

Methodius argues that there is a difference between male and female souls. In describing the murder of the Jewish boys by the command of Pharaoh, he writes that Pharaoh, as a type of the devil, “took care to have the male and rational offspring of the soul carried away and destroyed by the streams of passions, but he longs for the carnal and irrational offspring to increase and multiply.”<sup>377</sup> This discussion is rare among the Fathers, having only been discussed previously by Clement of Alexandria, who uses the Bible to claim that there is no difference between male and female souls.

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<sup>374</sup>“τὰ ἐπισκοτοῦντα καὶ καλύπτοντα πάθη τὴν ψυχὴν τὰ ἀπὸ τῆς θούψεως ἡμῶν καὶ τῆς ἀμελείας πληθύνοντα.” Ibid., 9.4.12.

<sup>375</sup>“Οὐδὲν οὕτως ὀνήσαι δυνήσεται πρὸς τὸ καλὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον, ὧ καλλιπάρθενοι, ὡς ἀγνεία· τὸ γὰρ κάλλιστα καὶ ἄριστα διακυβερνηθῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν καὶ κηλίδων καὶ μiasμάτων καθαρὰν ἀπολυθῆναι τοῦ κόσμου, μόνη ποιεῖ τοῦτο καὶ ἐργάζεται ἀγνεία.” *Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum* 10.1.16.

<sup>376</sup>“τὰ λυμαντήρια τῆς ψυχῆς ἀπομαραίνουσα πάθη καὶ ὑπεκκαύματα.” Ibid., 5.3.23.

<sup>377</sup>“τὰ μὲν ἄρρενα καὶ νοητὰ τῆς ψυχῆς ἔκγονα ὑπὸ τῶν ῥευστῶν παραφέρεσθαι καὶ ἀναιρεῖσθαι παθῶν σπουδῆν ἔσχε, τὰ δὲ σαρκικὰ καὶ αἰσθητὰ αὐξάνεσθαι τε καὶ πληθύνεσθαι γλίχεται.” Ibid., 4.2.36.



Methodius has a two-fold understanding of the senses of the body as they are described in Scripture, similar to that of Origen. He writes in commenting on Song of Solomon 4:9-12, “For it is clear to every one that there is a twofold power of sight, the one of the soul, and the other of the body.”<sup>378</sup> This dual application of the sense is reminiscent of Origen’s interpretation.

Methodius mentions the eye of the soul, writing, “And He says that they shall look upon God with confidence, because they bring in nothing that darkens or confuses the eye of the soul for the beholding of God.”<sup>379</sup>

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

In discussing the creation, Methodius writes of “the sending down of our souls from heaven, and their descent into the bodies.”<sup>380</sup> In this context, he does not, however, intend a kind of preexistence for the soul along the lines suggested by Origen but rather suggests this as its origin.

Methodius uses the *imago dei* concept from Gen 1:27. He writes that “the souls of men do then most accurately resemble Him who begat and formed them, when, reflecting the unsullied representation of His likeness, and the features of that countenance, to which God looking formed them to have an immortal and indestructible shape, they

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<sup>378</sup>“Δισσὴν γὰρ ὄψεως δύναμιν εἶναι παντί που καταφανές, μίαν μὲν ψυχῆς, θατέραν δὲ σώματος.” *Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum* 7.2.6.

<sup>379</sup>“μετὰ παρρησίας ἀποφθέγγεται ‘τὸν Θεόν’, ὅτι μηδὲν ἐπισκοτοῦν ἢ συνταράσσον τὸν ὀφθαλμὸν τῆς ψυχῆς πρὸς τὴν θείαν ἐπιφέρονται θεωρίαν.” *Ibid.*, Epiloge.1.60.

<sup>380</sup>“τὴν δὲ προσκειμένην εἴσοδον τοῖς ὄρεσι τῇ ἀπὸ τῶν οὐρανῶν εἰς τὰ σώματα καταβάσει καὶ παραπομπῇ τῶν ψυχῶν.” *Ibid.*, 2.5.6. See Patterson, 136-137.

remain such.”<sup>381</sup> Elsewhere he writes that God “creating and arranging, made the soul after the image of His image. Therefore, also, it is reasonable and immortal.”<sup>382</sup>

Methodius writes of the body as the garment of the soul.<sup>383</sup> He suggests, on the basis of Gen 2:7, that while one might argue that the creation of the body happens apart from the command of God, yet the soul is not fashioned in this way. In this context, Methodius notes that the soul is the “undying and undecaying part” and “the invisible and indestructible.”<sup>384</sup> This is in line with his notion of the soul’s immortal nature.

Methodius writes of “accomplishing in the receptacle of the soul, as in a womb, the blameless will of the Word.”<sup>385</sup> This demonstrates that for Methodius, the soul is where the decisions made by an individual take place. Methodius also argues for the freedom of the soul. He writes, in describing Paul’s call to virginity, “that none of those things which conduce to sanctification should be of necessity and by compulsion, but according to the free purpose of the soul, for this is acceptable to God.”<sup>386</sup>

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<sup>381</sup>“Ἀπὸ κτίσεως αἰ ψυχῶν τῶν γεννησάντων τότε μάλιστα καὶ πλασαμένων, ὅποτε τὴν ‘καθ’ ὁμοίωσιν’ ἰδέαν ἀχραντὸν ἐκλάμπουσαι καὶ τοὺς χαρακτῆρας τῆς ὄψεως ἐκεῖ.” Ibid., 6.1.15.

<sup>382</sup>“καὶ κτίζον καὶ μετασκευάζον ἐτεκτήνατο ‘κατ’ εἰκόνα’ τῆς εἰκόνης ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν. Διὸ καὶ λογικὴ καὶ ἀθάνατός ἐστι.” *Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum* 7.2.6., 6.1.25.

<sup>383</sup>“τὸν χιτῶνα τῆς ψυχῆς τὸν σάρκινον τοῦτον.” Ibid., 2.7.2.

<sup>384</sup>“Τὸ γὰρ ἀθάνατον καὶ ἀγήρων μόνος ὁ παντοκράτωρ ἐμφυσᾷ, ἣ καὶ μόνος τῶν ἀοράτων ἐστὶ καὶ ἀνωλέθρων ποιητής.” Ibid., 2.7.6.

<sup>385</sup>“ἀνατροφὴν μήτρας δίκην ἐν τῷ δοχείῳ τῆς ψυχῆς τὸ θέλημα τελεσφορήσαντες ἀλώβητον τοῦ λόγου.” Ibid., 3.8.64.

<sup>386</sup>“ὅπως δὲ μηδὲν τῶν εἰς ἀγιασμὸν ἀναφερομένων κατ’ ἀνάγκην γένοιτο καὶ βίαν, ἀλλὰ κατὰ πρόθεσιν αὐτεξούσιον ψυχῆς — τοῦτο γὰρ πρόσφορον θεῷ.” Ibid., 3.13.17.

Methodius argues that Paul’s call to virginity is placed only to those endowed with such a gift. And to the others he “advise[d] them to marry, lest in their time of manly strength, the flesh stirring up the desires and passions, they should be goaded on to defile the soul.”<sup>387</sup> Chastity, Methodius argues, is most helpful in controlling the passions. He gives as support of this notion an allegorical interpretation of Judg 9:8-15, Jotham’s poem after the lords of Shechem made Abimelech king over them. This, Methodius interprets to be about souls, not trees. The olive is compared to the compassion and mercy of God, the fig is the command given in Eden to Adam, and the vine is the command given to Noah after the flood. The bramble, however, represents the law given to the Apostles.<sup>388</sup> These are given other interpretations as well<sup>389</sup> but all rely on this allegorical interpretation of Scripture. He also refers to Zech 4:1-3 as support of the notion that the olive represents the law of Moses.<sup>390</sup>

Methodius writes of sin as passions of the soul. In arguing against the notion of destiny, he writes that “either education and habit are the cause of sins, or the passions of the soul, and those desires which arise through the body.”<sup>391</sup> In this context he writes of two kinds of desire. “There are two motions in us, the lust of the flesh and that of the soul, differing from each other, whence they have received two names, that of virtue and

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<sup>387</sup>“ἵνα μὴ καιρῶ τῆς ἀκμῆς σφυγμοὺς καὶ φλεγμονὰς παρεχούσης αὐτοῖς τῆς σαρκὸς ἀσχημονῶσιν οἰστορηλατούμενοι τὴν ψυχὴν.” *Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum* 3.14.6.

<sup>388</sup>Ibid., 10.2.

<sup>389</sup>See *ibid.*, 10.3-4.

<sup>390</sup>Ibid., 10.6.

<sup>391</sup>“Ἦτοι ἀνατροφαὶ καὶ τὰ ἔθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων εἰσὶν αἴτια, ἢ τὰ πάθη τῆς ψυχῆς καὶ αἱ διὰ σώματος ἐπιθυμίαι.” *Ibid.*, 8.16.100.

that of vice.”<sup>392</sup> He also argues that the continent, concupiscent soul is better than the chaste soul which has not had to fight against lust. As support for this, he refers to Jesus’ parable about the house built on the rock which was able to withstand the storm, as well as several other arguments from common life.

Methodius writes of death as the soul putting off the body.<sup>393</sup> In commenting on 1 Thess 4:17 he notes that those who are alive and remain are the souls<sup>394</sup> which before had put off their bodies at death. He adds, “For we truly who are alive are the souls which, with the bodies, having put them on again, shall go to meet Him in the clouds.”<sup>395</sup> In describing the death of virgins, he writes, “For, as soon as their souls have left the world, it is said that the angels meet them with much rejoicing, and conduct them to the very pastures already spoken of.”<sup>396</sup>

Methodius mentions the salvation of the soul from the wrath of a future judgment. He writes of the Jews in the following manner: “Nor do they understand that by it also the death of Christ is personified, by whose blood souls made safe and sealed shall be preserved from wrath.”<sup>397</sup> In discussing the resurrection, when the soul will put on an

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<sup>392</sup>“Δύο γὰρ κινήσσει ἐν ἡμῖν ἔστων· ἐπιθυμία πεφυκότε σαρκὸς καὶ ψυχῆς, διαφέρετον ἀλλήλοιν.” *Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum* 8.17.8.

<sup>393</sup>“ἐνεκρώθησαν γὰρ ἀπαμφιασθέντα τῶν ψυχῶν.” *Ibid.*, 6.4.42.

<sup>394</sup>“ἡμεῖς γὰρ κυρίως οἱ ζῶντές ἐσμεν αἱ ψυχαί.” *Ibid.*, 6.4.44.

<sup>395</sup>“γὰρ κυρίως οἱ ζῶντές ἐσμεν αἱ ψυχαί, αἵτινες μετὰ τῶν σωμάτων, ἀπειληφυῖαι ταῦτα.” *Ibid.*, 6.4.45.

<sup>396</sup>“Ἄμα γὰρ τῷ καταλεῖψαι τὸν κόσμον τὰς ψυχὰς λόγος ταῖς παρθένοις ὑπαντῶντας ἀγγέλους μετὰ πολλῆς εὐφημίας εἰς τοὺς προειρημένους παραπέμπειν λειμῶνας αὐτάς.” *Ibid.*, 8.2.26.

<sup>397</sup>“Οὐκέτι δὲ καὶ τῆς σφαγῆς τύπον ἠγήσαντο τοῦτο προδηλωτικὸν γεγονέναι Χριστοῦ, οὗ αἱ κατησφαλισμέναι τῷ αἵματι καὶ σφραγισθεῖσαι ψυχαί.” *Ibid.*, 9.1.85.

immortal body, Methodius writes that God put an end to sin by means of death when the “soul was separated from the flesh, that sin might perish by death, not being able to live longer in one dead.”<sup>398</sup> Thus the separation of the soul from the body was the means by which sin is eradicated from the individual.

Methodius, in discussing chastity and the power necessary to attain it, writes of one “direct[ing] the chariot of the soul upwards from the earth” in view of reaching the heavens and viewing God.”<sup>399</sup> This has hints of the ascent theory described by Origen.

### Summary

Methodius uses soul generally to refer to a separate psychological entity from the body. He argues that the deeds of the body impact the soul. He notes a distinction between the male and female souls. When interpreting the Scriptures, he attributes sense to the soul as well as to the body.

Methodius uses both Gen 1:27 and Gen 2:7 in discussing the creation of souls. From the *imago dei* concept, he argues for the immortal nature of the soul. He mentions the soul’s descent into the body and argues for it being the part of humanity which was created in the image of God. He describes the body as the garment of the soul and argues for the soul’s freedom. He uses Judg 9:8-15 to allegorically describe chastity in the soul. Chastity is what is necessary to instill virtue in the soul. It is the means by which soul is directed to the heavens, finally attaining a view of God.

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<sup>398</sup>“Καὶ διὰ τοῦτο καὶ τέθνηκεν οὐ γενόμενος θνητὸς ἢ φθαρτὸς καὶ διεκρίθη τῆς σαρκὸς ἢ ψυχῆ ἵνα νεκρωθῆ διὰ τοῦ θανάτου τὸ παράπτωμα μηκέτι δυνάμενον ζῆν ἐν τῷ τεθνηκότι.” *Symposium sive Convivium decem virginum* 9.2.28.

<sup>399</sup>“αἴτινες ἀθρόως τὸ ῥεῦμα μετοχετεύσασαι τῆς ἡδυπαθείας ἄνω μετέωρον ἀπευθύνουσι τὸ ὄχημα τῆς ψυχῆς.” *Ibid.*, 1.1.15.

Death is described as the soul putting off the body. He interprets 1 Thess 4:17 as referring to the souls which had put off the body. After death, the souls of the righteous go to a place prepared separately for them to enjoy before the resurrection.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has studied both the general usage of the soul in Origen, Gregory Thaumaturgos, and Methodius as well as the use of Scripture in its doctrinal development. It is dominated by Origen's work. While in other areas, Gregory and Methodius primarily react—the former positively and the other negatively—to Origen's work, in regard to the concept of the soul, they both more often agree with Origen, offering very little that is new and original.

Origen describes the soul as the principle of life and movement. He mentions Job 25:5 as biblical support for this idea. Both he and Methodius view the soul in a dichotomous relationship with the body. For Origen, the soul is described as incorporeal and invisible.

The soul is clearly the seat of mental activity. Both Origen and Methodius discuss or at least mention the Greek philosophical phrase “eye of the soul.” With Origen, the education and development of the soul is also important. In this context, free will is closely associated with the soul. It is also the seat of emotions. For Gregory and Methodius, the soul is described as the ruling power of the individual. Gregory also writes of it as divine, which is fairly unusual.

Origen sees a connection between the actions of the body and the health or state of the soul. On a related point, Methodius is unique in arguing for a difference between male and female souls. Most authors in the Ante-Nicene period who mention the topic argue that there is no difference between the male and female soul. As earlier authors

have done, Origen describes the soul as connected to the body through the blood, based upon Lev 17:14. The soul is thought to be spread throughout the body, giving life to it.

Methodius is the only author in this chapter to describe the soul as entombed in the body. For both Origen and Methodius, though, the soul is explicitly said to survive the death of the body, with death being defined as the separation of the soul from the body. Origen notes, however, that death has several different usages in the Scriptures and these must be understood in order to correctly understand the soul and its relationship to death. Methodius writes of the soul rejoining the body to face the judgment. Origen almost grudgingly allows for this but prefers to keep all discussion regarding the afterlife on the spiritual plane with little mention of the body at all.

For Origen and Methodius, Gen 1:27 is the source of the *imago dei* concept. Though the verse does not mention the soul, yet for them, it describes the soul as the locus of rational activity and the more important part of humanity and, assuming this is a key element also of divinity, use this passage to connect the soul with the divine. From this, Origen argues for the immortal nature of the soul. He also finds a special significance for the soul in the idea of the “breath of God” from Gen 2:7. He suggests there is evidence here for his idea of the descent of the soul.

Origen also argues that the idea of an immortal soul is required because of the biblical description of a future judgment. The argument is that the soul must be immortal in order to face the judgment at a future time. Origen does not quote a specific passage, as Clement did earlier, but does state that the soul must be immortal to endure a future judgment.

Origen uses 1 Sam 28:12-13 (Saul, Samuel, and the Witch of Endor) and 1 Pet 3:19-20 to support the notion of Hades and a continued existence for the soul. He also uses Luke 16:19-31 (Rich Man and Lazarus) and Luke 23:43 (Jesus words to the Thief on

the Cross) to suggest that the soul goes straight to paradise after death. The use of Luke 23 in this context is unique in the Ante-Nicene era. He is explicit that this happens to the martyrs, alluding directly to the “souls under the altar” of Rev 6:5.

Origen offers several ideas that are new in the development of the concept of the soul. He argues both for a spiritual salvation and a spiritual fire of punishment. This is related to his proposed idea that ultimately all will be saved by the power of God’s love. Along with Origen’s idea of the descent of the soul, he also proposes the ascent of the soul upon death. Thus, Hades plays a much smaller role for him. The soul begins this ascent upon the death of the body. While this idea does not seem to catch on quickly with other later authors, over time and with a few slight modifications, it becomes mainstream teaching.



## CHAPTER VII

### THE LATIN FATHERS

As the Church gravitated to the west of the empire, it was perhaps natural that Latin, the language of the West, would become prominent among the Church Fathers. This chapter looks at the Latin word for soul, *anima*. Among Latin writers, another word, *animus*, is sometimes used where one might expect *anima*. Generally *animus* relates to the mind. While there is a certain amount of cross-over between these two terms, yet there is still enough of a distinction between them that this study looks chiefly at the word *anima*.

#### **Tertullian**

Tertullian was a very prolific writer, leaving many extant works. His writings generally fall into three categories: apologetic works, anti-heretical or controversial works, and works relating to moral discipline in which he began to show his Montanist leanings.<sup>1</sup> Because of his later move towards Montanism, there has been much scholarly

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<sup>1</sup>See Cross, *The Early Christian Fathers*, 137-145; Ernest Evans, *Tertullian's Treatise Against Praxeas* (London: SPCK, 1948), 1-6; Quasten, 251-317; Eva Schulz-Flügel, "Tertullian," *DECL*, 554-555. On his Montanism and the impact on his works, see Geoffrey D. Dunn, *Tertullian* (London: Routledge, 2004), 4-9; Schulz-Flügel, 555. On the chronology of his writings, see Timothy D. Barnes, *Tertullian: A Historical and Literary Study* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971), 30-56. Tertullian wrote the first Christian document specifically on the soul, his *De anima*, which was itself an anti-heretical work. Jan H. Waszink, *Tertullian: De anima; Edited with Introduction and Commentary* (Amsterdam: J. M. Meulenhoff, 1947), 7\*.

debate as to which of his writings predate his Montanist tendencies and which were written during the latter Montanist period of his life. However, these arguments are not of great concern to this study.

### Usage of *Anima*

#### **General Usage**

Tertullian uses soul for human life. He talks of rulers who urge Christians “to deny, say, ‘Save your life;’ and, ‘Do not lose your life.’”<sup>2</sup> He writes of murder as not “only in the shedding forth of blood, and in the actual taking away of life.”<sup>3</sup> In arguing against the charge that Christians murder their children in secret rites, Tertullian describes his view on abortion. He declares that it is wrong and states, “To hinder a birth is merely a speedier man-killing; nor does it matter whether you take away a life that is born, or destroy one that is coming to the birth.”<sup>4</sup> Elsewhere, in arguing for religious tolerance, he urges that a person should be allowed to “consecrate his own life to his God”<sup>5</sup> or to that of a goat. He also writes, “They know from whom they have obtained their power; they know, as they are men, from whom they have received life itself.”<sup>6</sup> He

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<sup>2</sup>“*Ipsi denique praesides cum cohortantur negationi, serua animam tuam! dicunt, et, noli animam tuam perdere!*” *Scorpiace* 11.

<sup>3</sup>“*Homicidium in sola sanguinis profusione et in animae ereptione reputandum.*” *De idololatria* 2.

<sup>4</sup>“*Homicidii festinatio est prohibere nasci, nec refert, natam quis eripiat animam an nascentem disturbet.*” *Apologeticum* 9.33.

<sup>5</sup>“*Alius suam animam deo suo uoueat.*” *Ibid.*, 24.23.

<sup>6</sup>“*Sciunt quis illis dederit imperium; sciunt, qua homines, quis et animam; sentiunt eum esse deum solum.*” *Ibid.*, 30.3.

also speaks of those who do not redeem their life by the denial of their faith.<sup>7</sup> He notes that “one will not be permitted to love even life more than God.”<sup>8</sup> He presents Moses as offering his life for the people of Israel when God intended to destroy them.<sup>9</sup> He also writes how Marcion “destroy[s] the origin of flesh and life”<sup>10</sup> by denying the nativity of Christ and how he and his fellow Montanists, as ones persecuted for their faith, are “as men whose very lives are not their own.”<sup>11</sup> We are also told to do as Christ did. “That is, for as Christ laid down His life for us, so, too, we should do for Him.”<sup>12</sup> Tertullian writes elsewhere of Christ, “He has both suffered the penalty in our presence, and surrendered His life, laying it down for our sakes.”<sup>13</sup> Later he adds that Christ “saved the lives of the three brethren, who had agreed to lose them for God’s sake”<sup>14</sup> and insists that “whosoever loses his life for God saves it, so that you may here again recognize the Judge who recompenses the evil gain of life with its destruction, and the good loss

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<sup>7</sup>“*Animam negatione lucraris.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 1.27. See also *De exhortatione castitatis* 13.33 and *Scorpiace* 12 where the expression is “*animam ponas*”.

<sup>8</sup>“*Ceterum super deum diligere nec animam licebit.*” *Scorpiace* 14.

<sup>9</sup>“*In persona moysi figuratum, patris deprecatores et oblatores animae suae pro populi salute.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 2.27.

<sup>10</sup>“*Carnis atque animae originem destrue.*” *Ibid.*, 3.11.

<sup>11</sup>“*Ut etiam animas nostras exauctorati.*” *Ad scapulam* 1.2.

<sup>12</sup>“*Oportet enim, quomodo christus animam suam posuit pro nobis, ita fieri pro eo et a nobis.*” *De fuga in persecutione* 12.76. This usage seems heavily influenced by Christ’s statement that the good shepherd lays down his life for his sheep and John’s statement that greater love has no one than to lay down his life for his friend.

<sup>13</sup>“*Nam et sancitur penes nos et animam suam circumscribit, propter non eam ponens.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.14.

<sup>14</sup>“*Saluas facit animas trium fratrum, qui eas pro deo perdere conspirauerant.*” *Ibid.*, 4.21.

thereof with its salvation.”<sup>15</sup> Tertullian compares the god of Marcion with Pharaoh when he writes, “For while he destroyed lives, our heretic’s god refuses to give them.”<sup>16</sup> While discussing the command to march around Jericho for seven days, he notes that this would have presumably included a Sabbath. Commenting he writes, “For that was really God’s work, which He commanded Himself, and which He had ordered for the sake of the souls of His servants when exposed to the perils of war.”<sup>17</sup> As is evident, Tertullian most often used soul for life in the context of death, or the loss of life.

Tertullian occasionally uses soul to refer to animals and people in discussing the Sabbath laws. In a commentary on Luke 13:15, he states, “When, therefore, He did a work according to the condition prescribed by the law, He affirmed, instead of breaking, the law, which commanded that no work should be done, except what might be done for any living being; and if for any one, then how much more for a human life?”<sup>18</sup> Here *anima* is used in reference to any living animal. Tertullian uses soul for living thing.<sup>19</sup> This is very common when referring to the creation narrative in Gen 1, 2. In this, he is

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<sup>15</sup>“*Qui animam suam propter deum perdit seruat illam. Vt et hic tamen iudicem adgnoscas, qui malum animae lucrum perditione eius et bonum animae detrimentum salute eius remuneraturus sit.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.21.

<sup>16</sup>“*Nam ille animas adimit, hic non dat.*” *Ibid.*, 1.29.

<sup>17</sup>“*Nam et illud opus dei erat, quod ipse praeceperat et quod propter animas disposuerat hominum suorum in discrimine belli constitutas.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.12.

<sup>18</sup>“*Ergo secundum condicionem legis operatus legem confirmauit, non dissoluit, iubentem nullum opus fieri, nisi quod fieret omni animae, quanto potius humanae?*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.30.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. “*Ut ex aquis natatiles et uolatiles animae.*” *Aduersus Hermogenem* 32. This is in place of the more common *animalia*. See for example *Aduersus Hermogenem* 36 where Tertullian writes, “All things, indeed, have motion—either of themselves as animals (*animalia*), or of others as inanimate things.”

similar to Origen who also saw the creation story account as indicating that animals have souls as well.

Tertullian also notes that the soul is often called the breath.<sup>20</sup> In this context, it is difficult to determine if Tertullian is referring to an interpretation of Gen 2:7 or of some other source. Tertullian also uses soul for life as found in the plant world. In writing about trees and whether there is a time when their soul is without an intellect, Tertullian writes, “For it is an undoubted fact, that when trees are yet but twigs and sprouts, and before they even reach the sapling stage, there is in them their own proper faculty of life, as soon as they spring out of their native beds.”<sup>21</sup> He uses the expression “water of life”<sup>22</sup> and elsewhere writes, “Surely if killing means taking away life from the flesh, and its opposite, reviving, amounts to restoring life to the flesh, it must needs be that the flesh rise again, to which the life, which has been taken away by killing, has to be restored by vivification.”<sup>23</sup>

In a different usage, Tertullian writes of man-made objects as having a soul. In reference to idols he writes, “I take it that that trade which pertains to the very soul and spirit of idols.”<sup>24</sup> Here his usage may be of a more allegorical rather than literal usage of the term.

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<sup>20</sup>“*Ipsum quod anima uocitatus est flatus.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 2.9.

<sup>21</sup>“*Illis necdum arbusculis, sed stipitibus adhuc et surculis etiamnunc, simul de scrobibus oriuntur, inest propria uis animae.*” *De anima* 19.11.

<sup>22</sup>“*Unum animae.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 26.38.

<sup>23</sup>“*Certe si occidere carni animam eripere est, uiuificare, contrarium eius, carni animam referre est, caro resurgat necesse est, cui anima per occisionem erepta referenda est per uiuificationem.*” *Ibid.*, 28.25.

<sup>24</sup>“*Quae ad ipsam idolorum animam et spiritum pertinet.*” *De idololatria* 11.

In some places it can be difficult to determine if Tertullian intends by *anima* a separated, sentient soul or rather life itself. He describes the Apostle Paul as “desiring souls to keep a fast from the legitimate fruit of nature—the apple, I mean, of marriage.”<sup>25</sup> He also adds, “Thus Christ did not at all rescind the Sabbath: He kept the law thereof, and both in the former case did a work which was beneficial to the life of His disciples.”<sup>26</sup> In describing the work which Christ did on the Sabbath, Tertullian notes that this was done “for a soul.”<sup>27</sup> This seems to be based upon Luke 6:9, “to save life or to destroy it?” He also writes, “One soul cannot be due to two masters—God and Caesar.”<sup>28</sup> In these last examples, it is possible to interpret them as referring to a separate entity from the body rather than referring directly to an individual. He also refers to the tongue as the “very organ of the soul.”<sup>29</sup> This also seems as if it is best interpreted as referring to the soul in distinction to the body as no one would question that the tongue is an organ of the body.

Tertullian writes of “a divorced woman, who has been separated (from her husband) in soul as well as body, through discord, anger, hatred, and the causes of these.”<sup>30</sup> In a commentary on Luke 11:41, Tertullian inserts into Jesus’ statement

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<sup>25</sup>“*Aspice illum a iusta fruge naturae, a matrimonii dico pomo, animas ieiunare cupientem.*” *De pudicitia* 16.45. Here one might argue that Tertullian uses soul to refer to the separated soul which should be kept from desires of the flesh or to refer to the individual as a whole and the call to a chaste life.

<sup>26</sup>“*Ita nec christus omnino sabbatum rescindit, cuius legem tenuit, et supra in causa discipulorum pro anima operatus.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.12.

<sup>27</sup>“*Pro anima facturus esset.*” *Ibid.*

<sup>28</sup>“*Non potest una anima duobus deberi, deo et caesari.*” *De idololatria* 19.

<sup>29</sup>“*Ipsius animae organo.*” *Ad nationes* 1.8.22.

<sup>30</sup>“*Et anima et corpore separata est.*” *De monogamia* 10.7.

regarding the inside of a person that this refers to one's soul.<sup>31</sup> These examples seem clearly to indicate a reference to a separated entity, distinct from the body.

Tertullian uses soul when writing of the mental capabilities of a person, as when he refers to some people as "simple souls."<sup>32</sup> He similarly writes of these "common people" being susceptible to novel ideas.<sup>33</sup> This usage seems to highlight the mental capabilities of the soul rather than indicating directly a separate entity from the body.

### **The Corporeal and the Soul**

Tertullian writes of the acts of the body affecting the soul. This concept becomes key in his discussion on the corporeality of the soul.<sup>34</sup> He argues that *exomologesis*, or the act of making one's body penitent through actions such as living in sackcloth and ashes and "to know no food and drink but such as is plain," is done "not for the stomach's sake, to wit, but the soul's."<sup>35</sup> Tertullian accuses charioteers of "disquiet[ing] so many souls."<sup>36</sup> He also argues against the notion that "comeliness" is "a kind of goodly garment of the

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<sup>31</sup>"*Interiora autem uestra non emundastis, id est animam, adiciens: nonne qui exteriora fecit, id est carnem, et interiora fecit, id est animam?*" *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.27.

<sup>32</sup>"*Simplices animae.*" *Scorpiace* 1; 15.

<sup>33</sup>"*Sed ipsam nouitatem cognitionis percutientem rudes animas ipsam que naturalem nouitatis gratiositatem uolui repercutere, et hinc iam de ignoto deo prouocare.*" *Aduersus Marcionem* 1.9.

<sup>34</sup>Marsha L. Colish, *Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century*, vol. 2 in *The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages* (Leiden: Brill, 1985), 24.

<sup>35</sup>"*Ceterum pastum et potum pura nosse, non uentris scilicet sed animae causa.*" *De paenitentia* 9.8.

<sup>36</sup>"*An deo placebit auriga ille tot animarum inquietator.*" *De spectaculis* 23.5.

soul”<sup>37</sup> urging rather that it should be feared. These seem to admit of some connection between the outward body and the inward soul.<sup>38</sup>

Tertullian describes a connection between food and the soul. He writes, “Are there not some who prohibit to themselves (the use of) the very ‘creature of God,’ abstaining from wine and animal food, the enjoyments of which border upon no peril or solicitude; but they sacrifice to God the humility of their soul even in the chastened use of food?”<sup>39</sup> Elsewhere, also in a discussion on fasting, Tertullian speaks of the connection between food and the soul and how fasting must be practiced before an individual is arrested and sent to prison where food will be in short supply. He describes such a person who had prepared for martyrdom as follows, “The succulence of his blood already sent on (heavenward) before him, the baggage as it were of his soul,—the soul herself withal now hastening (after it), having already, by frequent fasting, gained a most intimate knowledge of death!”<sup>40</sup>

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<sup>37</sup>“*Nam etsi accusandus decor non est, ut felicitas corporis, ut diuinæ plasticæ accessio, ut animæ aliqua uestis bona.*” *De cultu feminarum* 2.2.42.

<sup>38</sup>This connection is not always clear. Elsewhere he presents opinions regarding the connection between the seasons of the year and the soul and also between the way one lies to sleep at night and their mind (*De anima* 47.1-6) and then proceeds to chalk it up to mere conjecture, even though it is that of Plato.

<sup>39</sup>“*Numquid non aliqui ipsam dei creaturam sibi interdicunt, abstinentes uino et animalibus esculentis, quorum fructus nulli periculo aut sollicitudini adiacent, sed humilitatem animæ suæ in uictus quoque castigatione deo immolant?*” *De cultu feminarum* 2.9.36.

<sup>40</sup>“*Cum sola et arida sit cute loricatus, et contra ungulas corneus, praemisso iam sanguinis suco tamquam animæ impedimentis, properante iam et ipsa, quæ iam saepe ieiunans mortem de proximo norit.*” *De ieiunio aduersus psychicos* 290.13. See Wiebke Bähnk, *Von der Notwendigkeit des Leidens: Die Theologie des Martyriums bei Tertullian*, *Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte* 78, ed. Adolf M. Ritter et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, 2001), 193-232.



## Powers and Divisions of the Soul

Tertullian argues for a unity of substance for the soul among all humans. He attributes the differences among people to the varying circumstances and influences upon them.<sup>41</sup> This concept proves useful in his argument against the Gnostics who proposed a tripartite division of souls into three separate categories.<sup>42</sup>

Tertullian lists the faculties of the soul as follows. “The soul, then, we define to be sprung from the breath of God, immortal, possessing body, having form, simple in its substance, intelligent in its own nature, developing its power in various ways, free in its determinations, subject to the changes of accident, in its faculties mutable, rational, supreme, endued with an instinct of presentiment, evolved out of one (archetypal soul).”<sup>43</sup> Elsewhere, he reviews his view on the soul, writing that he

Reckon[s] the soul as very far below God: for we suppose it to be born, and hereby to possess something of a diluted divinity and an attenuated felicity, as the breath (of God), though not His spirit; and although immortal, as this is an attribute of divinity, yet for all that passable, since this is an incident of a born condition, and consequently from the first capable of deviation from perfection and right, and by consequence susceptible of a failure in memory.”<sup>44</sup>

Tertullian allows for the ability of the soul to occasionally know something

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<sup>41</sup>*De anima* 20.

<sup>42</sup>*De anima* 21.1.

<sup>43</sup>“*Definimus animam dei flatu natam, immortalem, corporalem, effigiatam, substantia simplicem, de suo sapientem, uarie procedentem, liberam arbitrii, accidentis obnoxiam, per ingenia mutabilem, rationalem, dominatricem, diuinatricem, ex una redundantem.*” *De anima* 22.8.

<sup>44</sup>“*Nos autem, qui nihil deo adpendimus, hoc ipso animam longe infra deum expendimus, quod natam eam agnoscimus ac per hoc dilutioris diuinitatis et exilioris felicitatis, ut latum, non ut spiritum; et si immortalem, ut hoc sit diuinitatis, tamen passibilem, ut hoc sit natiuitatis, ideo que et a primordio exorbitationis capacem et inde etiam obliuionis affinem.*” *De anima* 24.8.

regarding the future apart from the gift of prophecy. This he refers to as divination. He writes, “But there is not a man living, who does not himself feel his soul possessed with a presage and augury of some omen, danger, or joy.”<sup>45</sup>

Tertullian notes that many philosophers have divided the soul variously but that these “ought not to be regarded so much as parts of the soul, as powers, or faculties, or operations thereof, even as Aristotle himself has regarded some of them as being.”<sup>46</sup>

Tertullian does not give a definitive list as to his powers of the soul. He, instead, writes of “motion, of action, of thought, and whatsoever others they divide in this manner; such, likewise, as the five senses themselves, so well known to all—seeing, hearing, tasting, touching, smelling.”<sup>47</sup> For this concept, Tertullian looks for support from several philosophers and from the example of air being blown through an organ and yet it is not divided in its substance.<sup>48</sup> He adds, “Nothing, therefore, pertaining to the soul is unconnected with sense, nothing pertaining to sense is unconnected with the soul.”<sup>49</sup> He goes even further, adding, “Sense is the soul’s very soul.”<sup>50</sup> He also writes, “Accordingly,

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<sup>45</sup>“*Sed nec quisquam hominum non et ipse aliquando praesagam animam suam sentit, aut ominis aut periculi aut gaudii augurem.*” *De anima* 24.78.

<sup>46</sup>“*Huiusmodi autem non tam partes animae habebuntur quam uires et efficaciae et operae, sicut de quibusdam et aristoteles iudicauit.*” *De anima* 14.13.

<sup>47</sup>“*Non enim membra sunt substantiae animalis, sed ingenia, ut motorium, ut actorium, ut cogitatorium, et si qua in hunc modum distinguunt, ut et ipsi illi quinque notissimi sensus, uisus auditus gustus tactus odoratus.*” *Ibid.*, 14.16. Note here that Tertullian uses *animalis* rather than *animae*. The connection between this line of thinking with the Stoic eight-part division of the soul seems clear. Cf. *De corona* 5.10.

<sup>48</sup>*De anima* 14.23-36.

<sup>49</sup>“*Adeo nihil animale sine sensu, nihil sensuale sine anima.*” *De carne Christi* 12.9.

<sup>50</sup>“*Animae anima sensus est.*” *Ibid.*, 12.10.

sensation comes from the soul, and opinion from sensation; and the whole is the soul.”<sup>51</sup> Tertullian locates the senses in the soul. Here he fights the Platonists, who impugn the accuracy of the senses, and the Epicureans, who accept the accuracy of the senses but separate them from opinions regarding them. Tertullian, however, disagrees with both. He states, “Again, whence arises sensation if not from the soul? For if the soul had no body, it would have no sensation.”<sup>52</sup> It is not clear here if Tertullian is referring to the body of the soul or the visible body. Tertullian’s argument does not appear to depend on it. He argues that the problem is with the medium through which the senses perceive an object that causes the confusion, not the ability of the soul to sense accurately.

In arguing against the physical philosopher Varro, who claimed that the stars were gods and animated, Tertullian writes, “But if this be the case, they must needs be also mortal, according to the condition of animated nature; for although the soul is evidently immortal, this attribute is limited to it alone: it is not extended to that with which it is associated, that is, the body.”<sup>53</sup> Here Tertullian makes use of what he appears to be the accepted fact that the soul is immortal.

Tertullian distinguishes between the soul and the spirit of a person. After quoting Paul’s prayer which includes the tripartite formula of body, soul, and spirit, Tertullian writes, “For although the soul has a kind of body of a quality of its own, just as the spirit has, yet as the soul and the body are distinctly named, the soul has its own peculiar

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<sup>51</sup>“*Ita et sensus ex anima est et opinio ex sensu et anima totum.*” *De anima* 17.30.

<sup>52</sup>“*Et unde sensus, si non ab anima? denique carens anima corpus carebit et sensu.*” *De anima* 17.26.

<sup>53</sup>“*Nam etsi immortalem constat animam, ipsi hoc soli lic<ebit>, non etiam illi cui adnectatur, id est corpori.*” *Ad nationes* 2.3.45.

appellation, not requiring the common designation of body.”<sup>54</sup> Here it seems that he lends some concept of physicality to the term *soul*. Elsewhere, in comparing the offerings of Christians to those of believers of other religions, he describes them as “that costly and noble sacrifice of prayer dispatched from the chaste body, an unstained soul, [and] a sanctified spirit.”<sup>55</sup>

Elsewhere, however, Tertullian connects the soul with the idea of spirit and breathing. He writes, “We, however, claim this (operation) for the soul, which we acknowledge to be an indivisible simple substance, and therefore we must call it spirit in a definitive sense—not because of its condition, but of its action; not in respect of its nature, but of its operation; because it respire.”<sup>56</sup> Thus he sees the spirit as a function of the soul, that is breathing, rather than part of the nature of the soul or something separate from the soul. “Some maintain that there is within the soul a natural substance—the spirit—which is different from it: as if to have life—the function of the soul—were one thing; and to emit breath—the alleged function of the spirit—were another thing.”<sup>57</sup> He

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<sup>54</sup>“*Licet enim et anima [et] corpus sit aliquod suae qualitatis, sicut et spiritus, cum tamen et corpus et anima distincte nominantur, habet <autem> anima suum uocabulum proprium.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.15. See *De resurrectione mortuorum* 47.71 where he also quotes the tripartite formula for the human person from 1 Thess 5:23. Cf. *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.10.

<sup>55</sup>“*Orationem de carne pudica, de anima innocenti, de spiritu sancto profectam.*” *Apologeticum* 30.23.

<sup>56</sup>“*Hoc dum animae uindicamus, quam uniformem et simplicem agnoscimus, spiritum necesse est certa condicione dicamus, non status nomine, sed actus, nec substantiae titulo, sed operae, quia spirat, non quia spiritus proprie est.*” *De anima* 11.3. See also *ibid.*, 18. See Jean-Claude Fredouille, “Observations sur la terminologie anthropologique de Tertullien: constantes et variations,” in *Les Pères de l’Église face à la science médicale de leur temps* (Paris: Beauchesne, 2005), 325; Jean Steinmann, *Tertullien* (Paris: Éditions du Chalet, 1967), 194.

<sup>57</sup>“*Quidam enim uolunt aliam illi substantiam naturalem inesse spiritum, quasi aliud sit uiuere, quod uenit ab anima, aliud spirare, quod fiat a spiritu.*” *De anima* 10.4.

argues from nature, drawing on the anatomy and physiology of certain small insects to point out that life and breath are not two different things. To those who argue this point, he asks, “If indeed the soul and the spirit are two, they may be divided; and thus, by the separation of the one which departs from the one which remains, there would accrue the union and meeting together of life and of death.”<sup>58</sup> He concludes that “therefore this entire process, both of breathing and living, belongs to that to which living belongs—that is, to the soul.”<sup>59</sup>

In another context, Tertullian calls the soul spirit in respect of its action of breathing. The reason he gives for this is to counter the claim of Hermogenes’ writing, “Moreover, we properly and especially insist on calling it [the soul] breath (or spirit), in opposition to Hermogenes, who derives the soul from matter instead of from the afflatus or breath of God.”<sup>60</sup> He, however, admits regret in applying it in this “lower” sense, rather than the Scripture sense of the Spirit of God. To prove this dual notion of spirit (physiological and spiritual), he quotes from Isa 57:16, “My Spirit went forth from me, and I made the breath of earth. And the breath of my Spirit became soul,” and Isa 42:5, “He gives breath unto the people that are on the earth and Spirit to them that walk

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On the relationship of soul and spirit and Tertullian, see Jérôme Alexandre, *Une chair pour la gloire: l’anthropologie réaliste et mystique de Tertullien*, *Théologie Historique* 115 (Paris: Beauchesne, 2001), 257-263.

<sup>58</sup>“*Si enim duo sunt anima et spiritus, diuidi possunt, ut diuisione eorum alterius discedentis, alterius inmanentis, mortis et uitae concursus eueniat.*” *De anima* 10.61. Fischer notes the Stoic teaching here which Tertullian follows. Fischer, 29.

<sup>59</sup>“*Ergo totum hoc et spirare et uiuere eius et cuius et uiuere, id est animae.*” *De anima* 10.56.

<sup>60</sup>“*Ita et animam, quam flatum ex proprietate defendimus, spiritum nunc ex necessitate pronuntiamus, ceterum aduersus hermogenen, qui eam ex materia, non ex dei flatu contendit, flatum proprie tuemu.*” *De anima* 11.7. See Fredouille, 323, 327-329.

thereon.”<sup>61</sup> He concludes that the natural soul comes first, or the breath, and then later the Spirit of God comes to the believer.<sup>62</sup> He adds that the Spirit did not turn Saul into a different man by causing him to prophecy (1 Sam 10:6-12) any more than the wicked Spirit later turned him into an evil man or the spirit of Satan (1 Sam 28:12-13). Elsewhere he demonstrates this distinction by writing, “Men of soul and flesh alone as you are, justly do you reject things spiritual.”<sup>63</sup>

Similarly, Tertullian seeks to define the relationship between the soul and the mind. He writes, “As the spirit or breath is the faculty of the soul to respire, so *animus* is the inherent faculty to act, learn and move.”<sup>64</sup> He does not want to end up with two separate entities, as Aristotle argues for, or with one, as Democritus asserts. In asserting this he states, “The question will arise how two can be one—whether by the confusion of two substances, or by the disposition of one? We, however, affirm that the mind coalesces with the soul,—not indeed as being distinct from it in substance, but as being its natural function and agent.” This solution is similar to his description of soul and spirit. *Animus* is a function of *anima*. He then makes it clear that the soul is the superior substance. He first notes that in common speech, people use soul to refer to a person, such as a pilot of ship questioning how many souls were lost in a storm, not mind. He

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<sup>61</sup>See Adhémar d’Alès, *La théologie de Tertullien* (Paris: Beauchesne, 1905), 119.

<sup>62</sup>In arguing that the Spirit of God or the spirit of Satan is not present naturally at birth, Tertullian mentions the Spirit’s influence on Adam (Gen 2:24-25) and on Saul (1 Sam 10:6-12) along with Satan’s later influence over Judas (John 13:27).

<sup>63</sup>“*Merito homines solius animae et carnis spiritualia recusatis.*” *De ieiunio aduersus psychicos* 17.

<sup>64</sup>“*Quo agit, quo sapit, quem se cum habens ex semetipsa se cum moueat in semetipsa.*” *De anima* 12.1.

then notes how Christ also did the same thing, noting that Christ spoke of destroying the soul in hell, of the Good Shepherd laying down his life for his sheep.<sup>65</sup> He then describes the mind as the “instrument, not the ruling power” of the soul.<sup>66</sup>

Tertullian’s understanding of the soul in relation to the mind and the spirit is summarized well when he writes “that the mind is nothing else than an apparatus or instrument of the soul, and that the spirit is no other faculty, separate from the soul, but is the soul itself exercised in respiration; although that influence which either God on the one hand, or the devil on the other, has breathed upon it, must be regarded in the light of an additional element.”<sup>67</sup> Then, regarding the soul’s relation to the material and spiritual world, he writes, “Both the one and the other must be regarded as inherent in the soul, and as obedient to it, seeing that it embraces bodily objects by means of the body, in exactly the same way that it conceives incorporeal objects by help of the mind, except that it is even exercising sensation when it is employing the intellect.”<sup>68</sup> In summarizing his position on the development of the soul and its constituent parts, Tertullian writes, “And here, therefore, we draw our conclusion, that all the natural properties of the soul

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<sup>65</sup>*De anima* 13.6-18.

<sup>66</sup>“*Habes animae principalitatem, habes in illa et substantiae unionem, cuius intellegas instrumentum esse animum, non patrocinium.*” *De anima* 13.18.

<sup>67</sup>“*Ob haec ergo praestruximus neque animum aliud quid esse quam animae suggestum et structum, neque spiritum extraneum quid quam quod et ipsa per flatum, ceterum accessioni deputandum quod aut deus postea aut diabolus adspiraret.*” *De anima* 18.46. Note that Tertullian also identifies the “carnal mind” of Rom 8:6-7 as the soul because he points out that the flesh does not have any sense without the soul and thus it cannot be the flesh. *De resurrectione mortuorum* 46.52.

<sup>68</sup>“*Apud animam tamen et istis et illis obsequio deputatis, quae perinde per corpus corporalia sentiat, quemadmodum per animum incorporalia intellegat, saluo eo, ut etiam sentiat, dum intellegit.*” *De anima* 18.46.

are inherent in it as parts of its substance; and that they grow and develop along with it, from the very moment of its own origin at birth.”<sup>69</sup>

Tertullian has another argument in the mind/body debate. It follows his understanding that at death, the soul separates from the body.<sup>70</sup> At this time of separation, Tertullian argues that the mind also follows and is not left behind.<sup>71</sup> From this, Tertullian infers that the soul and the mind are “indissolubly attached.”<sup>72</sup> He also makes it clear that the soul must always have a mind. After pointing to the natural world as seen in the development of trees, Tertullian argues that “even the infancy of a log, then, may have an intellect (suitable to it): how much more may that of a human being, whose soul (which may be compared with the nascent sprout of a tree) has been derived from Adam as its root, and has been propagated amongst his posterity by means of woman, to whom it has been entrusted for transmission, and thus has sprouted into life with all its natural apparatus, both of intellect and of sense!”<sup>73</sup>

Of the various powers of the soul, key among them is “the ruling power of the

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<sup>69</sup>“*Et hic itaque concludimus omnia naturalia animae ut substantia eius ipsi inesse et cum ipsa procedere atque proficere, ex quo ipsa censetur.*” Ibid., 20.1.

<sup>70</sup>See Fredouille, 323.

<sup>71</sup>“*Quod anima digressa nec animus in homine inueniatur; ita illam ubique sequitur, a qua nec in fine subremanet.*” *De anima* 18.78. See Salvador Vicastillo, *Un cuerpo destinado a la muerte: su significado en la antropología de Tertuliano* (Madrid: Biblioteca de Autores Cristianos, 2006), 77.

<sup>72</sup>“*Sequitur et addicitur.*” *De anima* 18.80.

<sup>73</sup>“*Viuant ut philosophi uolunt, sapiant ut philosophi nolunt, intellegat et infantia ligni, quo magis hominis, cuius anima uelut surculus quidam ex matrice adam in propaginem deducta et genitalibus feminae foueis commendata cum omni sua paratura pullulauit tam intellectu quam et sensu.*” Ibid., 19.36.



soul” or *hegemonikon* as the philosophers called it.<sup>74</sup> Without this, Tertullian writes, the soul itself is jeopardized. He refers to it as “some supreme principle of vitality and intelligence.”<sup>75</sup> From his argumentation, it seems clear that he sees himself countering those philosophers who contend that there is no such thing as a soul. He lists several philosophers who belong to this category and then counters with a list of biblical texts which he cites as proof that God teaches that there is a ruling faculty of the soul.<sup>76</sup> What is unique about this list is that they all refer to the heart. He then concludes “that there is a directing faculty of the soul, with which the purpose of God may agree; in other words, a supreme principle of intelligence and vitality,” and that it resides in the heart.<sup>77</sup> After listing the philosophers who disagree, he points out that this agrees with the Egyptians and several other philosophers.<sup>78</sup>

Tertullian allows for Plato’s distinction between the rational and the irrational elements of the soul.<sup>79</sup> He, however, makes it clear that the irrational part is not by nature

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<sup>74</sup>Ibid., 15.1. See Fredouille, 327; Marsha L. Colish *Stoicism in Christian Latin Thought through the Sixth Century*, 21.

<sup>75</sup>“*Aliqui summus in anima gradus uitalis et sapientialis.*” *De anima* 15.1.

<sup>76</sup>Tertullian quotes from Wis 1:6, Prov 24:12, Ps 134:23; Matt 9:4; Ps 51:12; Rom 10:10; 1 John 3:20; Matt 5:28. See d’Alès, 120. Cf. *De resurrectione mortuorum* 15.16 where this ruling faculty of the soul is said to be located in the flesh, i.e., the brain.

<sup>77</sup>“*Et esse principale in anima, quod intentio diuina conueniat, id est uim sapientialem atque uitalem (quod enim sapit, uiuidum est), et in eo thesauro corporis haberi.*” *De anima* 15.25.

<sup>78</sup>On the connection between blood and soul, cf. *De anima* 25.36. On the Egyptian reference, cf. Rosalie David, *Religion and Magic in Ancient Egypt* (London: Penguin Books, 2002), 158. This describes the notion of the heart being weighed in the judgement after one’s death to determine one’s worthiness for immortality.

<sup>79</sup>*De anima* 16.1. On this, see Timothy, *The Early Christian Apologists*, 52-53.

part of the soul. Only the rational part of the soul has this distinction. The reason for this is that God is seen as the origin and author of the soul from his own breath. He asks, “For how should that be other than rational, which God produced on His own prompting; nay more, which He expressly sent forth by His own *afflatus* or breath?”<sup>80</sup> As for the irrational part, Tertullian does not wish to assign its origin to God’s nature so he argues that it comes from Satan.<sup>81</sup> However, he points out that all three were operative in Christ, the irascible and concupiscible in subjection to reason. Thus he notes, “In our own cases, accordingly, the irascible and the concupiscible elements of our soul must not invariably be put to the account of the irrational (nature), since we are sure that in our Lord these elements operated in entire accordance with reason.”<sup>82</sup> Thus Tertullian is forced to recognize two separate irascible and concupiscible parts of the soul:<sup>83</sup> that which is in accordance with reason, which God even has, and that which is irrational and thus originating with the devil.

Tertullian writes of “concupiscence” as one who has “stirred his soul with immodest commotion.”<sup>84</sup> He speaks of Christ in Gethsemane as being “in the trouble of His soul.”<sup>85</sup> He also refers to the knowledge which those who kill the Christians use,

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<sup>80</sup>*De anima* 16.6. See d’Alès, 113.

<sup>81</sup>“*Acciderit ex serpentis instinctu, ipsum illud transgressionis admissum, atque exinde inoluerit et coadoleuerit in anima ad instar iam naturalitatis.*” *De anima* 16.7.

<sup>82</sup>*Ibid.*, 16.30.

<sup>83</sup>In support of this distinction, Tertullian quotes from or alludes directly to Luke 22:15; 1 Tim 3:1; Gal 5:12; Eph 2:3; Matt 6:24; John 8:44; Matt 13:25. See d’Alès, 120-121.

<sup>84</sup>“*In concupiscentia designat, . . . et animam commouerit impudice.*” *De idololatria* 2.

<sup>85</sup>“*Sed et in conturbatione animae.*” *Aduersus Praxean* 23.7. This references John

knowing that “they [Christians] are never to be approached more than when fear has opened the entrances to the soul, especially when some display of ferocity has already arrayed with a crown the faith of martyrs.”<sup>86</sup> This type of usage shows a connection between the emotions and the soul.

## Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

### Origin of the Soul

Tertullian argues that humans have a soul. In this he sees himself writing against the philosophers of old who taught that people had no souls.<sup>87</sup> To establish this, he turns to the creation narrative. “Goodness,” writes Tertullian, “breathed into [Adam] a soul, not dead but living.”<sup>88</sup> This notion of a *breathed* soul is very important to Tertullian.<sup>89</sup> This defines for him where the soul comes from, that is the breath of God.<sup>90</sup> He refers to it as the “shadow of His own soul, the breath of his own Spirit, the operation of his own

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12:27.

<sup>86</sup>“*Nam quod sciant multos simplices ac rudes tum infirmos, plerosque uero in uentum et si placuerit christianos, numquam magis adeundos sapiunt, quam cum aditus animae formido laxauit, praesertim cum aliqua iam atrocitas fidem martyrum coronauit.*” *Scorpiace* 1.

<sup>87</sup>“*Quibus animas aut nullas aut non in pristina corpora redituras adfirmabant?*” *De spectaculis* 30.14.

<sup>88</sup>“*Bonitas inflauit in animam, non mortuam, sed uiuam.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 2.4.

<sup>89</sup>When writing *De anima*, Tertullian notes that he has demonstrated this point in his treatise *Against Hermogenes*. In the argument against Hermogenes, the key point was that the soul was formed from nothing and not from a previous material existence. See *De anima* 3.24.

<sup>90</sup>See for example, *Aduersus Marcionem* 2.8; 5.6; *De anima* 11:7; 27.42; *De resurrectione mortuorum* 7.28. Cf. Fredouille, 327-329; Karpp, *Probleme*, 41.

mouth.”<sup>91</sup> He writes in an argument against Marcion’s creator, who was different from the Supreme God, regarding the effect of baptism, “If the bestowal of the Holy Ghost, how will he bestow the Spirit, who did not at first impart the soul?”<sup>92</sup> Thus Tertullian clearly understood the soul as being given by God. Tertullian then states that man is like God, “the very image and likeness of Himself, and, by the origin of his soul, His own substance too.”<sup>93</sup> Thus the origin of the human soul is connected also to its substance.

Tertullian, in countering Plato, insists that if it is accepted “that the soul originates in the breath of God, it follows that we attribute a beginning to it.”<sup>94</sup> In fact, Tertullian states that “we ascribe both birth and creation to it.”<sup>95</sup> Tertullian argues against Plato’s concept of the origins of the soul along with his notion that the souls on earth have forgotten what they once knew and then later remember it. He does so only based upon logical arguments regarding memory and how it is impossible for a memory that existed from eternity could be snuffed out by the body.

In this same context, Tertullian argues against those who “begin by maintaining that the soul is not conceived in the womb, nor is formed and produced at the time that

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<sup>91</sup>“*Uero animae suae umbram, spiritus sui auram, oris sui operam.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 7.30.

<sup>92</sup>“*Si consecutio est spiritus sancti, quomodo spiritum adtribuet qui animam non prius contulit?*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 1.28.

<sup>93</sup>“*Hominem, et quidem imaginem et similitudinem suam, immo et substantiam suam, per animae scilicet censum.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 2.5. On the notion of image in Tertullian, see Alexandre, 157-165; Leal, 95-106; Stephan Otto, “Der Mensch als Bild Gottes bei Tertullian,” *Münchener Theologische Zeitschrift* 10 (1959): 276-282.

<sup>94</sup>“*Consequens enim est, ut ex dei flatu animam professi initium ei deputaremus.*” *De anima* 4.2. On the origins of the soul in Tertullian, see Alexandre, 229-241.

<sup>95</sup>“*Et natam autem docemus et factam ex initii constitutione.*” *De anima* 4.4.

the flesh is molded, but is impressed from without upon the infant before his complete vitality, but after the process of parturition.”<sup>96</sup> To counter this, Tertullian goes into a discussion relating more to the obstetrics knowledge of his age than anything else. The point he makes is that infants before birth have life and vitality. As biblical support, he notes the stories regarding the seven demons in Mary Magdalene and the legion in the Gadarenes man.<sup>97</sup> He uses these to assert that multiple souls can exist in one body, which counters what Plato states that only one soul can exist in a body, therefore the soul must enter at the infant’s first breath because the mother’s body can contain only one soul, her own, not her baby’s also.<sup>98</sup>

Tertullian uses another quote from Plato to support the claim that the soul is passed through the seed implanted in the womb.<sup>99</sup> To this, Tertullian adds a proof from nature in that children resemble their parents and an additional argument relying on the ancient practice of astrologers using the time of conception rather than the time of birth in their predictions of the future.<sup>100</sup>

Tertullian provides several scriptural examples to support the notion of the soul

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<sup>96</sup>“*Qui praesumunt non in utero concipi animam nec cum carnis figulatione compingi atque produci, sed et effuso iam partu nondum uiuo infanti extrinsecus inprimi.*” *De anima* 25.5.

<sup>97</sup>Mark 16:9; 5:1-9.

<sup>98</sup>*De anima* 25.82.

<sup>99</sup>“*Ostendit enim animam de semine induci, quod curari monet, non de prima aspiratione nascentis.*” *De anima* 25.85. Karpp refers to this as the “traduzianische Anschauung Tertullians von der Entstehung der einzelnen Seelen.” Karpp, *Probleme*, 59. See also I. L. S. Balfour, “The Fate of the Soul in Induced Abortion in the Writings of Tertullian,” *Studia Patristica* 16, no. 2 (1985): 128-129; Steinmann, 194-195.

<sup>100</sup>*De anima* 25.27-29.

existing in the fetus before its birth.<sup>101</sup> These are the biblical narratives where children *in utero* are spoken of. He mentions Rebecca's twins fighting in her and John leaping in Elizabeth's womb at the voice of Mary. He also mentions God's statement in Jer 1:5, "Before I formed thee in the womb, I knew thee. And before you came forth out of the womb, I sanctified thee."

Tertullian goes beyond the concept that the soul is formed before birth. He asserts that its substance is formed at conception, together with the body.<sup>102</sup> He states that the body was "conceived, formed, and generated along with the soul from its earliest existence in the womb."<sup>103</sup> He allows for two kinds of seed, that of the body and that of the soul.<sup>104</sup> This is defended first by noting that the sexual act itself is a combination of the desire of the soul and the action of the flesh.<sup>105</sup> He adds to this a defense from the creation narrative, noting that God made Adam of clay and added to this his own breath<sup>106</sup> and then gave the command to "be fruitful and multiply."<sup>107</sup> To this concept, Tertullian adds the notion that the sex of the infant is not determined either by the soul or

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<sup>101</sup>Ibid., 26.

<sup>102</sup>*De anima* 27.1. See also *De resurrectione mortuorum* 45.16.

<sup>103</sup>"*Caro autem, ab exordio uteri consata conformata congenita animae.*" *De resurrectione mortuorum* 16.38.

<sup>104</sup>"*Nam etsi duas species confitebimur seminis, corporalem et animalem, indiscretas tamen uindicamus et hoc modo contemporales eiusdem que momenti.*" *De anima* 27.19.

<sup>105</sup>"*In hoc itaque sollemni sexuum officio, quod marem ac feminam miscet, in concubitu dico communi, scimus et animam et carnem simul fungi, animam concupiscentia, carnem opera, animam instinctu, carnem actu.*" *De anima* 27.27.

<sup>106</sup>Ibid., 27.42.

<sup>107</sup>Gen 1:28.

the body alone. “The soul, being sown in the womb at the same time as the body, receives likewise along with it its sex; and this indeed so simultaneously, that neither of the two substances can be alone regarded as the cause of the sex.”<sup>108</sup>

### **The Human Person and the Soul**

For Tertullian, it is quite clear that the human person consists of two substances.<sup>109</sup> One argument he uses for this is based on the words of Christ in Matt 10:28 regarding fear for the one who was able to destroy both body and soul. Tertullian remarks, “For since both substances are set before us (in this passage, which affirms) that ‘body and soul’ are destroyed in hell, a distinction is obviously made between the two.”<sup>110</sup> In arguing against the heretics regarding Christ’s flesh, Tertullian writes, “Whatever is the condition of our soul in its secret nature, it is certainly not one of flesh.”<sup>111</sup>

In commenting on the words of Jesus, “For the Son of man is come to seek and to save that which was lost” (Luke 19:10), Tertullian writes, “Now, since he consists of two

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<sup>108</sup>“*Anima in utero seminata pariter cum carne pariter cum ipsa sortitur et sexum, ita pariter, ut in causa sexus neutra substantia teneatur.*” *De anima* 36.7. Tertullian even attempts an explanation for the origin of Eve’s soul as being in Adam before being taken out with the flesh from the side from which she was formed. *De anima* 36.25.

<sup>109</sup>See, for instance, *De resurrectione mortuorum* 14.30; 32.11; 34.45; 40.9; 43.22; 49.37. Cf. *Adversus Praxean* 30.7; *De pudicitia* 20.51, 64. On the relationship of the soul and the body in Tertullian, see Alexandre, 279-328; Leal, 57-61. See also Fredouille, 322-323; Paulo Siniscalco, *Ricerche sul De resurrectione di Tertulliano* (Rome: Editrice Studium, 1966), 115-117.

<sup>110</sup>“*Cum enim utrumque proponitur, corpus atque animam, occidi in gehennam, distinguitur corpus ab anima.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 35.16.

<sup>111</sup>“*Cuiuscumque <autem> formae est in occulto anima nostra, non tamen carnae.*” *De carne Christi* 10.18.

parts, body and soul, the point to be inquired into is, in which of these two man would seem to have been lost?”<sup>112</sup> Tertullian, in an interesting argument, urges that if only the soul is lost, then the body is not lost and salvation belongs only to the soul. After allowing for the opposite to this (body is lost and soul is safe), Tertullian mentions a third option, which he seems to favor. This is that the whole person is lost and in need of salvation, both soul and body. The soul then, whatever substance it is allowed to be, must be presumed to be lost and in need of salvation.<sup>113</sup> As scriptural support for this notion, Tertullian points to the parable of the lost sheep, which was lost both in body and soul and thus was saved in both body and soul.<sup>114</sup>

In seeking to defend the importance of the body to the human person, Tertullian points out that Adam was first clay, that is body, and only later became man.<sup>115</sup> He notes that man “became a living soul by the inbreathing of God—by the breath indeed which was capable of hardening clay into another substance.”<sup>116</sup> He also writes, “Yes; and so intimate is the union, that it may be deemed to be uncertain whether the flesh bears about the soul, or the soul the flesh; or whether the flesh acts as *apparitor* to the soul, or the

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<sup>112</sup>“*Hic cum ex duabus substantiis constet, ex corpore et anima, quaerendum est, ex qua substantiae specie perisse uideatur.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.37.

<sup>113</sup>See also *De resurrectione mortuorum* 34.3.

<sup>114</sup>*Ibid.*, 34.9.

<sup>115</sup>*Ibid.*, 5.38-44. See also *De resurrectione mortuorum* 40.9. That is, God created man from the dust of the ground and, only afterwards, breathed into him the breath of life, or his soul. See Fernández Ardanaz, *El Mito del “hombre Nuevo” en el Siglo II: El Dialogo Cristianismo-Helenismo*, 61-62.

<sup>116</sup>“*Factus est homo in animam uiuam de dei flatu, uaporeo scilicet et idoneo torrere quodammodo limum in aliam qualitatem, quasi in testam, ita et in carnem.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 7.13.



soul to the flesh.”<sup>117</sup> He does acknowledge that the soul is served by the body, but even this he interprets as increasing the body’s glory.<sup>118</sup> He also writes regarding the soul that the body “is mixed up with it likewise in all its operations.”<sup>119</sup>

Though Tertullian is quite emphatic as to the importance of the body to the human person, yet he can also express the opposite opinion at times. In discussing the flesh of Christ, he writes that one of his opponent’s arguments “implies that we are ourselves separate from our soul, when all that we are is soul.”<sup>120</sup> He adds, “Indeed, without the soul we are nothing; there is not even the name of a human being, only that of a carcass.”<sup>121</sup> Elsewhere, he adds, that it was not by the physical makeup of the human body that showed a likeness to God, “but he showed his stamp in that essence which he derived from God Himself (that is, the spiritual, which answered to the form of God), and in the freedom and power of his will.”<sup>122</sup> Tertullian connects the concept of free will elsewhere with the soul. He writes that it is through free will that sin entered the human

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<sup>117</sup>“*Tanta quidem concretione, ut incertum haberi possit, utrumne caro animam an carnem anima circumferat, utrumne animae caro an anima adpareat carni.*” Ibid., 7.40.

<sup>118</sup>“*Sed etsi magis animam inuehi atque dominari credendum est, ut magis deo proximam, hoc quoque ad gloriam carnis exuberat, quod proximam deo et continet et ipsius dominationis compotem praestat.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 7.43.

<sup>119</sup>“*Etiam in omni operatione miscetur illi.*” Ibid., 16.38.

<sup>120</sup> “*Quasi nos seorsum ab anima simus, cum totum quod sumus anima sit.*” *De carne Christi* 12.3. Cf. *De resurrectione mortuorum* 32.36.

<sup>121</sup>“*Denique sine anima nihil sumus, neque hominis quidem, sed cadaueris nomen.*” *De carne Christi* 12.5.

<sup>122</sup>“*Sed in ea substantia, quam ab ipso deo traxit, id est anima, ad formam dei, spondentis et arbitrii sui libertatem et potestatem, signatus est.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 2.5.

race.<sup>123</sup>

Tertullian argues for a close connection between the soul and the body. He writes, “The soul is never without the flesh, as long as it is in the flesh.”<sup>124</sup> In discussing the divine commands regarding eating in Gen 2-3, he writes that God “has regard rather to the body than to the soul, although it be in the interest of the soul also.”<sup>125</sup> Thus food is important for the soul as well as the body. He quickly notes, though, that it is not necessary for the life of the soul as the soul is not mortal.<sup>126</sup> Elsewhere he writes, “The flesh, indeed, is washed, in order that the soul may be cleansed; the flesh is anointed, that the soul may be consecrated; the flesh is signed (with the cross), that the soul too may be fortified; the flesh is shadowed with the imposition of hands, that the soul also may be illuminated by the Spirit; the flesh feeds on the body and blood of Christ, that the soul likewise may fatten on its God.”<sup>127</sup> He also points to other things such as “fastings,

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<sup>123</sup>“*Itaque non per illud iam uideri potest anima deliquisse, quod illi cum deo adfines est, id est per adflatum, sed per illud, quod substantiae accessit, id est per liberum arbitrium, a deo quidem rationaliter adtributum, ab homine uero qua uoluit agitatam.*” Ibid., 2.9.

<sup>124</sup>“*Numquam anima sine carne est, quamdiu in carne est.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 15.19.

<sup>125</sup>“*Prospectam non tam animae quam carni, etsi propter animam.*” *De anima* 38.20.

<sup>126</sup>“*Auferenda est enim argumentatoris occasio, qui quod anima desiderare uideatur alimenta, hinc quoque mortalem eam intellegi cupit, quae cibis sustineatur, denique derogatis eis euigescat, postremo subtractis intercidat.*” Ibid., 38.26. The only reason the soul desires meat and drink is for the body which it inhabits. *De anima* 38.34-35.

<sup>127</sup>“*Sed et caro abluitur, ut anima emaculetur; caro ungitur, ut anima consecretur; caro signatur, ut [et] anima muniatur; caro manus impositione adumbratur, ut [et] anima spiritu inluminetur; caro corpore et sanguine christi uescitur, ut et anima de deo saginetur.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 8.8. Cf. Prigent, *Justin et l’Ancien Testament*, 61-62.

abstinences, and . . . humiliations” along with “virginity and widowhood, and the modest restraint in secret on the marriage-bed” are all carried out in the flesh but described as “conflicts of the soul.”<sup>128</sup> This is a strong statement regarding the connection between what is done in the body and the result to the soul.

As the body develops, so does the soul for Tertullian. He writes that the soul grows “in intelligence” and “in sensibility. . . . Its inherent power, in which are contained all its natural peculiarities, as originally implanted in its being, is gradually developed along with the flesh, without impairing the germinal basis of the substance, which it received when breathed at first into man.”<sup>129</sup> Tertullian is quite cautious on this point however. He writes, “We are, however, forbidden to suppose that the soul increases in substance, lest it should be said also to be capable of diminution in substance, and so its extinction even should be believed to be possible.”<sup>130</sup> He clarifies this by adding that “the growth and developments of the soul are to be estimated, not as enlarging its substance, but as calling forth its powers.”<sup>131</sup> He argues that the soul reaches its maturity at the same time as puberty is reached for the body. Though he acknowledges that this is believed by

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<sup>128</sup>“*Nam et sacrificia deo grata, conflictationes dico [carnis] animae, ieiunia et seras et aridas escas et adpendices huius officii sordes, caro de proprio suo incommodo instaurat. Virginitas quoque et uiduitas et modesta in occulta matrimonii dissimulatio et una notitia eius de bonis carnis deo adulantur.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 8.14.

<sup>129</sup>“*Caro modulo, anima ingenio, caro habitu, anima sensu . . . sed uis eius, in qua naturalia peculia consita retinentur, saluo substantiae modulo, quo a primordio inflata est, paulatim cum carne producitur.*” *De anima* 37.27-33.

<sup>130</sup>“*Ceterum animam substantia crescere negandum est, ne etiam decrescere substantia dicatur atque ita et defectura credatur.*” *Ibid.*, 37.32. See Salvador Vicastillo, *Tertuliano y la muerte del hombre* (Madrid: Dundacion Universitaria Española, 1980), 67.

<sup>131</sup>“*Ita et animae crementa reputanda, non substantiua, sed prouocatiua.*” *De anima* 37.48.

others, he draws his support from the account of the entrance of sin in Gen 3. Here, Adam and Eve became ashamed of their nakedness only after they had obtained the knowledge of good and evil. Thus also, humans have shame regarding sexual matters at the onset of puberty, this taking place, Tertullian argues, when they have come to a knowledge of good and evil.<sup>132</sup>

Tertullian writes that the soul has a corporeal nature.<sup>133</sup> He refers to arguments from both Zeno, who argues that the body dies when the soul departs, and Cleanthes, who argues that characteristics of the soul pass along familial lines, to set up his argument that the soul is corporeal. Tertullian writes, “But the soul certainly sympathizes with the body, and shares in its pain, whenever it is injured by bruises, and wounds, and sores: the body, too, suffers with the soul, and is united with it (whenever it is afflicted with anxiety, distress, or love) in the loss of vigor which its companion sustains, whose shame and fear it testifies by its own blushes and paleness.”<sup>134</sup> Tertullian later calls on Soranus who states “that the soul is even nourished by corporeal aliments; that in fact it is, when failing and weak, actually refreshed oftentimes by food.”<sup>135</sup>

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<sup>132</sup>*De anima* 38.12.

<sup>133</sup>See *De resurrectione mortuorum* 17.4. For a discussion on the importance of this in Tertullian’s thought, see Alexandre, 241-256; Dunn, 37; Karpp, *Probleme*, 46-59. Dunn argues that when Tertullian understood the soul to be corporeal, he meant it was real though spiritual.

<sup>134</sup>“*Porro et animam compati corpori, cui laeso ictibus uulneribus ulceribus condolescit, et corpus animae, cui afflictæ cura angore amore coaegrescit per detrimentum socii uigoris, cuius pudorem et pauorem rubore atque pallore testetur.*” *De anima* 5.22.

<sup>135</sup>“*Animam corporalibus quoque ali, denique deficientem a cibo plerumque fulciri.*” *Ibid.*, 6.44. On the use of Soranus by Tertullian in *De anima*, see Heinrich Karpp, “Soranus vier Bücher *Peri psyches* und Tertullians Schrift *De anima*,” *ZNW* 33 (1934): 31-47.

Because of this shared commonality of the soul with the body, Tertullian argues that the soul must be corporeal in nature. He concludes by referring to two more writers, Chrysippus and Lucretius. “The soul, therefore, is endued with a body; for if it were not corporeal, it could not desert the body.”<sup>136</sup> Here the notion of the soul escaping from the body at death is used to support the notion that the soul then must be corporeal.<sup>137</sup>

Though the soul is corporeal, yet Tertullian insists it not be referred to as an animate body, “inasmuch as it is the soul itself which makes the body either animate, if it be present to it, or else inanimate, if it be absent from it.”<sup>138</sup> However, he argues, it is the soul which moves the body.<sup>139</sup> He then asks rhetorically, “Whence could accrue such power to the soul, if it were incorporeal? How could an unsubstantial thing propel solid objects?”<sup>140</sup>

Tertullian argues against the idea that the soul is not perceived by bodily organs but only by the intellectual capabilities. If this were true then he understands that the soul must be incorporeal.<sup>141</sup> He attempts to disprove this argument by noting that sound, color,

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<sup>136</sup>“*Igitur corpus anima, quae nisi corporalis corpus non derelinquet.*” *De anima* 5.33.

<sup>137</sup>“*Derelicto autem corpore ab anima affici morte.*” *Ibid.*, 5.28. Cf. *ibid.*, 27.5 where the same assumption is made without being defended.

<sup>138</sup>“*Non enim potest anima animale corpus dici aut inanimale cum ipsa sit quae aut faciat corpus animale, si adsit, aut inanimale, si absit ab illo*” *De anima* 6.8. See also *De resurrectione mortuorum* 53.30.

<sup>139</sup>“*Anima autem mouet corpus, et conatus eius extrinsecus foris parent.*” *De anima* 6.22.

<sup>140</sup>“*Vnde haec uis incorporalis animae? vnde uacuae rei solida propellere?*” *Ibid.*, 6.26. Based on *De carne Christi* 11.4, Leal argues that for Tertullian, even God is corporeal. Leal, 40-41. For an overview of scholarly attempts at explaining Tertullian’s concept of a corporeal soul, see Leal, 43-46.

<sup>141</sup>“*Itaque incorporalem esse animam constat cuius qualitates non corporalibus,*

and smell are incorporeal and yet are perceived by the corporeal faculties of the body.<sup>142</sup> He concludes, “Inasmuch, then, as it is evident that even incorporeal objects are embraced and comprehended by corporeal ones, why should not the soul, which is corporeal, be equally comprehended and understood by incorporeal faculties?”<sup>143</sup> As further proof, Tertullian notes that barbarians unlearned in philosophy live quite well. “For it is not the soul’s actual substance which is benefited by the aliment of learned study, but only its conduct and discipline.”<sup>144</sup>

Tertullian also quotes Soranus to counter the argument that if the soul were corporeal, then after death, the body should be lighter, but it is in fact heavier.<sup>145</sup> He also points to the eagle’s ability to look at the sun as proof that some things appear to be invisible but in reality it is only a difference in ability to see. So, Tertullian suggests, perhaps the soul’s corporeality is “invisible to the flesh, but perfectly visible to the spirit.”<sup>146</sup> This, Tertullian says, may be how John in Rev 6:9 was able to see the souls of martyrs noting that “thus John, being ‘in the Spirit of God,’ beheld plainly the souls of the martyrs.”<sup>147</sup> Tertullian adds another proof, which he attempts to present as a biblical

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*sed intellectualibus sensibus comprehendantur.” De anima 6.31.*

<sup>142</sup>*De anima 6.34.*

<sup>143</sup>“*Igitur si constat incorporalia quoque a corporalibus comprehendendi, cur non et anima, quae corporalis, ab incorporalibus renuntietur?*” *De anima 6.38.*

<sup>144</sup>“*Non enim substantiae ipsi alimenta proficiunt studiorum, sed disciplinae*” *De anima 6.61.*

<sup>145</sup>*De anima 8.19.*

<sup>146</sup>“*Tantundem et animae corpus inuisibile carni, si forte, spiritui uero uisibile est.*” *De anima 8.30.* He notes that John saw the souls under the altar in Rev 6:9-11 by the power of God as they are not naturally visible.

<sup>147</sup>“*Sic iohannes in spiritu dei factus animas martyrum conspicit.*” *De anima 8:31.*

defense. This is the statements of a woman in his church who had received visions and, in them, claimed to have seen souls.<sup>148</sup>

After discussing the arguments of the philosophers for a corporeal soul, Tertullian turns to the Scriptures. He finds the clearest example of this in Luke 16:23-24. “In hell the soul of a certain man is in torment, punished in flames, suffering excruciating thirst, and imploring from the finger of a happier soul, for his tongue, the solace of a drop of water.”<sup>149</sup> He adds, “For unless the soul possessed corporeality, the image of a soul could not possibly contain a finger of a bodily substance.”<sup>150</sup> Therefore, Tertullian concludes that it is the souls that reside in Hades waiting judgment.<sup>151</sup> It is of note here that Tertullian adds the above statement parenthetically. The text of Luke does not state that the souls of the rich man, Lazarus or Abraham, were there. So Tertullian believes that it is the souls of the dead who are in Hades awaiting judgment, though he does not attempt to prove this point. But based upon that assumption, he assumes the corporeality of the soul as “whatever is incorporeal is incapable of being kept and guarded in any way; it is also exempt from either punishment or refreshment.”<sup>152</sup> The conclusion of this argument

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<sup>148</sup>On the role of this story in Tertullian’s argument against Hermogenes, see T. Barnes, 124.

<sup>149</sup>“*Dolet apud inferos anima cuiusdam et punitur in flamma et cruciatur in lingua et de digito animae felicioris implorat solacium roris.*” *De anima* 7.3. See d’Alès, 116-117.

<sup>150</sup>“*Si enim non haberet anima corpus, non caperet imago animae imaginem corporis, nec mentiretur de corporalibus membris scriptura, si non erant.*” *De anima* 7.8.

<sup>151</sup>“*Quid est autem illud quod ad inferna transfertur post diuortium corporis, quod detinetur illic, quod in diem iudicii reseruatur.*” *Ibid.*, 7.11.

<sup>152</sup>“*Incorporalitas enim ab omni genere custodiae libera est, immunis et a poena et a fouella.*” *Ibid.*, 7.15.

is that only corporeal things are capable of suffering. Elsewhere he does allow for a suffering soul.<sup>153</sup>

Having proved the corporeal nature of the soul, Tertullian also insists that it is not inconsistent to “declare that the more usual characteristics of a body, such as invariably accrue to the corporeal condition, belong also to the soul—such as form and limitation; and that triad of dimensions—I mean length, and breadth and height—by which philosophers gauge all bodies.”<sup>154</sup> In order to prove this statement, Tertullian cites a witness from his church (Montanist) who claims to have had visions in which she states that it “has been shown to me a soul in bodily shape, and a spirit has been in the habit of appearing to me; not, however, a void and empty illusion, but such as would offer itself to be even grasped by the hand, soft and transparent and of an ethereal color, and in form resembling that of a human being in every respect.”<sup>155</sup> Tertullian argues that the “ethereal transparent” color is what should be expected as whatever “is very attenuated and transparent bears a strong resemblance to the air” which is “the case with the soul, since in its material nature it is wind and breath (or spirit.)”<sup>156</sup> The shape of the soul, according

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<sup>153</sup>Cf. *De resurrectione mortuorum* 18. See also *Apologeticum* 48 and *De testimonio animae* 6. where he argues contrary to this, asserting that only by being connected with the body can one soul feel good or bad. In this context though, the soul is not specifically named, leaving it to be assumed that this is what cannot feel suffering without the body.

<sup>154</sup>“*Omnimodo debita corpulentiae adesse animae quoque, ut habitum, ut terminum, ut illud trifariam distantium, longitudinem dico et latitudinem et sublimitatem, quibus metantur corpora philosophi.*” *De anima* 9.6.

<sup>155</sup>“*Ostensa est mihi anima corporaliter, et spiritus uidebatur, sed non inanis et uacuae qualitatis, immo quae etiam teneri repromitteret, tenera et lucida et aerii coloris, et forma per omnia humana.*” *Ibid.*, 9.32.

<sup>156</sup>“*Sed quoniam omne tenue atque perlucidum aeris aemulum est, hoc erit anima, qua flatus et spiritus tradux, siquidem prae ipsa tenuitatis subtilitate de fide corporalitatis periclitatur.*” *Ibid.*, 9.44. Cf. *De monogamia* 16.8 where Tertullian seems



to Tertullian, is the same as the shape of the body. He draws on the creation account of God breathing His breath into Adam, on Paul being able to see the Lord on the road to Damascus (Acts 9:1-8), on the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16) and on John seeing the souls under the altar (Rev 6:9).<sup>157</sup> Adam's soul, then, also became the seed for all future souls. "The soul indeed which in the beginning was associated with Adam's body, which grew with its growth and was molded after its form proved to be the germ both of the entire substance (of the human soul) and of that (part of) creation."<sup>158</sup>

In discussing sin, Tertullian notes that the soul is the real culprit rather than the body. He writes, "How then is it, that the soul, which is the real author of the works of the flesh, shall attain to the kingdom of God, after the deeds done in the body have been stoned for, whilst the body, which was nothing but (the soul's) ministering agent, must remain in condemnation?"<sup>159</sup> Elsewhere, he divides blame between the flesh and soul based on any effects which come of the sin. "The emotions of sin, indeed, when not resulting in effects, are usually imputed to the soul."<sup>160</sup> For the righteous, the reward also

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to argue that the soul is immaterial.

<sup>157</sup>*De anima* 9.57-69. On the function of the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus and the descent of Christ in Tertullian's eschatology, see Heinz Finé, *Die Terminologie der Jenseitsvorstellungen bei Tertullian: Ein semasiologischer Beitrag zur Dogmengeschichte des Zwischenzustandes* (Bonn: P. Hanstein, 1958), 236; Leal, 179-180. Cf. Stuiber, 43.

<sup>158</sup>"*A primordio enim in adam concreta et configurata corpori anima, ut totius substantiae, ita et condicionis istius semen effecit.*" *De anima* 9.70.

<sup>159</sup>"*Quale est autem ut, si anima, auctrix operum carnis, merebitur dei regnum per expiationem eorum, quae in corpore admisit, corpus, ministrum solummodo, in damnatione permaneat?*" *Adversus Marcionem* 5.10.

<sup>160</sup>"*Denique sensus delictorum etiam sine effectibus imputari solent animae.*" *De anima* 40.20. When it results in some effect, then it is usually blamed on the flesh.

goes both to the soul and the body.<sup>161</sup>

The soul also suffered a change in its nature because of evil. He writes, “There is, then, besides the evil which supervenes on the soul from the intervention of the evil spirit, an antecedent, and in a certain sense natural, evil which arises from its corrupt origin.”<sup>162</sup> This is in contrast to his statement elsewhere that the irrational part of the soul is not part of the soul by nature, as God is its originator and He cannot create anything evil by nature.<sup>163</sup> He attempts to balance this view with the concept that the soul still has in part a good nature. “Still there is a portion of good in the soul, of that original, divine, and genuine good, which is its proper nature.”<sup>164</sup> Just what he means when he says divine good is not clear. From other statements, it does not seem that this should be interpreted to mean that the soul originally had a divine nature.

Though he clearly connects the soul with sin, Tertullian also makes the argument that the soul is by nature Christian.<sup>165</sup> He states, “Though under the oppressive bondage of the body, though led astray by depraving customs, though enervated by lusts and passions, though in slavery to false gods; yet, whenever the soul comes to itself, as out of a surfeit, or a sleep, or a sickness, and attains something of its natural soundness, it

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<sup>161</sup>*De resurrectione mortuorum* 33.34.

<sup>162</sup>“*Malum igitur animae, praeter quod ex obuentu spiritus nequam superstruitur, ex originis uitio antecedit, naturale quodammodo.*” *De anima* 41.1.

<sup>163</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 16.

<sup>164</sup>“*Tamen insit et bonum animae, illud principale, illud diuinum atque germanum et proprie naturale.*” *Ibid.*, 41.3.

<sup>165</sup>On this idea in Tertullian, see G. Quispel, “Anima naturaliter christiana,” *Eranos-Jahrbuch* 18 (1950): 173-182; Carlo Tibiletti, “Postilla sul tema dell’anima Cristiana per natura,” *Augustinianum* 34, no. 2 (1994): 447-454.

speaks of God; using no other word, because this is the peculiar name of the true God.” He then notes how often is used expressions such as “God is great and good” and “I commend myself to God” and concludes with the statement, “O noble testimony of the soul by nature Christian.”<sup>166</sup>

The concept of the soul being Christian means to Tertullian that it knows its creator. Thus, based upon people fearing God and invoking his name in various ways in common speech, Tertullian makes the argument that the soul is made by God or is divine itself or both.<sup>167</sup> To those who argue that the soul only learned to say such things from the writings of others, Tertullian counters by stating, “Unquestionably the soul existed before letters, and speech before books, and ideas before the writing of them, and man himself before the poet and philosopher.”<sup>168</sup> Then, as if to allow for the possibility that the soul might have learned something from the things which had been written down, he argues that the Scriptures clearly predate secular writings and thus if the soul learned anything from written materials, it must have learned from the writings of Scripture since they

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<sup>166</sup>“*O testimonium animae naturaliter christianae!*” *Apologeticum* 17.27. Cf. *De testimonio animae* 1-2 where he seems to argue precisely the opposite, that the soul becomes a Christian, though he uses the same argument of habit of souls (or people) using God in various statements such as “If God so will” and “May God repay” as a witness for the Christians from among demons. See also *Aduersus Marcionem* 1.10; *De anima* 39.19-28; 40.1. See T. Barnes, 113. Barnes suggests that, for Tertullian, the soul is not Christian itself but “bears witness to Christianity.” The solution seems to be in his statement: “Thus the divinity of the soul bursts forth in prophetic forecasts in consequence of its primeval good; and being conscious of its origin, it bears testimony to God (its author) in exclamations such as: Good God! God knows! and Good-bye!” *De anima* 41.17.

<sup>167</sup>“*Si enim anima aut diuina aut a deo data est, sine dubio datorem suum nouit, et si nouit, utique et timet et tantum postremo ad auctorem.*” *De testimonio animae* 2.31. See also *ibid.*, 5.18.

<sup>168</sup>“*Certe prior anima quam littera, et prior sermo quam liber, et prior sensus quam stilus et prior homo ipse quam philosophus et poeta.*” *Ibid.*, 5.22.

were first.<sup>169</sup> But even having said this, Tertullian elsewhere asserts that “the soul was before prophecy. From the beginning the knowledge of God is the dowry of the soul, one and the same amongst the Egyptians, and the Syrians, and the tribes of Pontus. For their souls call the God of the Jews their God.”<sup>170</sup> Tertullian supports this notion by asking an apparent rhetorical question, “Whence, then, the soul’s natural fear of God, if God cannot be angry?”<sup>171</sup>

Tertullian asserts that the soul, as the breath of God, is not weak in terms of will power and the strength to follow God’s law.<sup>172</sup> Here the soul should not be identified with the Spirit of God. Tertullian maintains a distinction between breath, or *afflatus*, and Spirit.<sup>173</sup> The latter causes the former and is the image of it, but it is not identical with it. Tertullian uses the example of one who plays a flute. “And in an act of your own, such as blowing into a flute, you would not thereby make the flute human, although it was your own human breath which you breathed into it, precisely as God breathed of His own Spirit.”<sup>174</sup> Tertullian here argues against a divine nature of the soul. He does, however,

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<sup>169</sup>*De testimonio animae* 5.37. *De testimonio animae* 6 provides a summary of this argumentation with a call to listen to either God, nature, or the soul itself on this matter.

<sup>170</sup>“*Ante anima quam prophetia. Animae enim a primordio conscientia dei dos est; eadem nec alia et in aegyptiis et in syris et in ponticis. [Iudaeorum enim deum dicunt animae deum].*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 1.10.

<sup>171</sup>“*Unde igitur naturalis timor animae in deum, si deus non nouit irasci?*” *De testimonio animae* 2.35. This whole argument occurs in the context of a discussion upon the essence of God.

<sup>172</sup>*Aduersus Marcionem* 2.8; 5.6.

<sup>173</sup>See *ibid.*, 4.9 where Tertullian admits that many wise men claim the soul has a divine nature.

<sup>174</sup>“*Nec tu enim, si in tibiam flaueris, hominem tibiam feceris, quamquam de anima tua flaueris, sicut et deus de spiritu suo.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 2.9.

argue in this context for the immortality of the soul, stating that although the breath is not the same as the spirit, yet there are several clear similarities.<sup>175</sup>

### **Death, Immortality, and the Soul**

Tertullian argues for a simple soul. He writes, “It is essential to a firm faith to declare with Plato that the soul is simple; in other words uniform and uncompounded; simple that is to say in respect of its substance.”<sup>176</sup> He describes it as being “single, simple, and entire in itself, it is as incapable of being composed and put together from external constituents, as it is of being divided in and of itself, inasmuch as it is indissoluble.”<sup>177</sup> He clearly states the key reason why he argues this way. “For if it had been possible to construct it and to destroy it, it would no longer be immortal. Since, however, it is not mortal, it is also incapable of dissolution and division.”<sup>178</sup> It is very clear that Tertullian seeks to protect the soul from even the possibility of death.<sup>179</sup> He even goes so far as to write that he is “forbidden” from supposing “that the soul increases

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<sup>175</sup>“*In hoc erit imago minor ueritate et adflatus spiritu inferior, habens illas utique lineas dei, qua immortalis, [anima] qua libera et sui arbitrii, qua praescia plerumque, qua rationalis, capax intellectus et scientiae.*” Ibid.

<sup>176</sup>“*Pertinet ad statum fidei simplicem animam determinare secundum platonem, id est uniformem, dumtaxat substantiae nomine.*” *De anima* 10.1.

<sup>177</sup>“*Singularis alioquin et simplex et de suo tota est, non magis structilis aliunde quam divisibilis ex se, quia nec dissolubilis.*” Ibid., 14.1. See Steinmann, 194. On the concern by Tertullian to explain the human soul in mind of Christ’s soul and the comparison to Plato’s tripartite soul, see Waszink, *Tertullian*, 229-230. Both authors note that for Tertullian, the irrational part of the soul comes as a result of the fall and is thus not part of its nature. It is introduced through the work of Satan.

<sup>178</sup>“*Si enim structilis et dissolubilis, iam non immortalis. Itaque quia non mortalis, neque dissolubilis neque diuisibilis.*” *De anima* 14.3. See also 51.29.

<sup>179</sup>See Vicastillo, *Un cuerpo destinado a la muerte: su significado en la antropología de Tertuliano*, 35-56.

in substance, lest it should be said also to be capable of diminution of substance.”<sup>180</sup>

Elsewhere he adds, “The truth is, the soul is indivisible, because it is immortal; (and this fact) compels us to believe that death itself is an indivisible process, accruing indivisibly to the soul, not indeed because it is immortal, but because it is indivisible.”<sup>181</sup> The immortality of the soul is assumed and from this is proved by the soul’s simpleness.

Tertullian notes that the immortality of the soul is generally a universal principle among all people.<sup>182</sup> He writes, “There is no need, I suppose, to treat of the soul’s safety; for nearly all the heretics, in whatever way they conceive of it, certainly refrain from denying that.”<sup>183</sup> Elsewhere he argues that the soul “has no trace of a fall in its designation, as indeed there is no mortality in its condition.”<sup>184</sup> As proof here he notes that “that cannot fall which by its entrance raises; nor can that droop which by its

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<sup>180</sup>“*Ceterum animam substantia crescere negandum est, ne etiam decrescere substantia dicatur atque ita et defectura credatur.*” *De anima* 37.32.

<sup>181</sup>“*Ceterum anima indiuisibilis, ut immortalis, etiam mortem indiuisibilem exigit credi, non quasi immortalis, sed quasi indiuisibili animae indiuisibiliter accidentem.*” *Ibid.*, 51.26.

<sup>182</sup>See *De resurrectione mortuorum* 1.14 where he compares his views to those of Pythagoras and Plato. See, also, his statement in *De praescriptione haereticorum* 7.10 against the Epicureans who hold that the soul dies. Wolfson argues that Tertullian does not hold to a natural immortality of the soul but rather holds a view similar to others that the existence of the soul is by virtue of God’s will rather than natural to it. Wolfson also argues that “natural immortality” means that God could not destroy the soul if He wanted to. Wolfson, 305-306. This does not seem a helpful argument as no author in this study has been found to offer such an idea. He is correct in judging that most of the early Church Fathers’ beliefs on the immortality of the soul were the same.

<sup>183</sup>“*Animae autem salutem credo retractatu carere <posse>.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 2.61. Cf. 34.22.

<sup>184</sup>“*Atque adeo caro est, quae morte subruitur, ut exinde a cadendo cadauer enuntietur; anima porro nec uocabulo cadit.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 18.34.

departure causes ruin.”<sup>185</sup> In commenting on the death of Christ in this context, he notes that Jesus said, “Destroy this temple, and in three days I will raise it up again” (John 2:19), in reference to His body (John 2:21), not His soul. He notes that the Scriptures state that His “soul was trembling even unto death” (Matt 26:38) but does not state that His soul died. Tertullian also argues based on Matt 10:28 where Christ said, “‘He is rather to be feared, who is able to destroy both body and soul in hell,’ that is, the Lord alone; ‘not those which kill the body, but are not able to hurt the soul,’ that is to say, all bureau powers.”<sup>186</sup> He interprets this as follows: “Here, then, we have a recognition of the natural immortality of the soul, which cannot be killed by men; and of the mortality of the body, which may be killed.”<sup>187</sup>

Another argument Tertullian uses is constructed around the definition of the word *dead*. He writes, “The word *dead* expresses simply what has lost the vital principle, by means of which it used to live. Now the body is that which loses life, and as the result of losing it becomes dead. To the body, therefore, the term dead is only suitable.”<sup>188</sup> He also

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<sup>185</sup>“*Non potest cadere quae suscitauit ingressa; non potest ruere quae elidit egressa.*” Ibid., 18.34.

<sup>186</sup>“*Sed et praecipit eum potius timendum, qui et corpus et animam occidat in gehennam, id est dominum solum, non qui corpus occidant, animae autem nihil nocere possint, id est humanas potestates.*” Ibid., 35.1.

<sup>187</sup>“*Adeo hic et anima immortalis natura recognoscitur, quae non possit occidi ab hominibus, et carnis esse mortalitatem, cuius sit occisio.*” Ibid., 35.4.

<sup>188</sup>“*[Ita] mortuum [uocabulum] non est nisi quod amisit animam, de cuius facultate uiuebat; corpus est quod amittit animam et amittendo fit mortuum: ita mortui uocabulum corpori competit.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 5.9. He also uses this argument against those who argue that the natural body of 1 Cor 15 which is sown and raised again is the soul only and not the flesh. He thus argues that the soul is not “sown” and thus it cannot be identified with the natural body. *De resurrectione mortuorum* 53.4. The body itself is the natural body and at the resurrection, the soul is rejoined with it to become a spiritual body. *De resurrectione mortuorum* 53.27. See Fernández Ardanaz, *El Mito*, 60.

argues based upon the word resurrection, which, he notes, must refer to the body as that is the only thing that has fallen.<sup>189</sup> For this, he refers to Gen 3:19 where Adam, who is man and/or clay and not soul, is told “Dust you are, and unto dust shall you return.” He also uses the story of Abraham requesting a place to bury Sarah in Gen 23:4 where he says, “Give me the possession of a burying place with you that I may bury my dead.” Tertullian interprets this as “meaning, of course, her flesh; for he could not have desired a place to bury her soul in, even if the soul is to be deemed mortal, and even if it could bear to be described by the word *dead*.”<sup>190</sup> Thus the soul cannot die and the resurrection does not apply to it.<sup>191</sup>

Tertullian uses several non-biblical arguments to support the notion of the continued existence of souls after death. One is from the general habits of people. He notes that most people are very concerned about their “posthumous fame.” “How is it the nature of the soul to have these posthumous ambitions and with such amazing effort to prepare the things it can only use after decease? It would care nothing about the future, if the future were quite unknown to it.”<sup>192</sup> He then proceeds to add to this argument for a post-mortem sentient soul the doctrine of a future resurrection. In support of this, he uses

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<sup>189</sup>This entire argument is very similar to the one given in *De resurrectione mortuorum* 18.17-33. On Tertullian’s motive for his doctrine of the resurrection, see Siniscalco, *Ricerche*, 148-153.

<sup>190</sup>“*Neque enim animae humanae spatium desiderasset, et si anima mortalis crederetur, et si mortuus dici mereretur.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 18.56.

<sup>191</sup>Tertullian uses this as a key argument for the resurrection of the body, which, in general, is a more important theme than the nature of the soul for him. Cf. *Adversus Marcionem* 5.10.

<sup>192</sup>“*Unde animae hodie affectare aliquid quod velit post mortem et tantopere praeparare quae sit usura post obitum?*” *De testimonio animae* 4.56.



a similar style of argumentation, the habits of people. He notes that when someone has died, it is often said that “‘He has gone.’” The obvious conclusion being that “‘He is expected to return, then.’”<sup>193</sup> Clearly in this section, Tertullian is relying on a natural argument. He adds, “‘These testimonies of the soul are simple as true, commonplace as simple, universal as commonplace, natural as universal, divine as natural.’”<sup>194</sup> He adds to this the following: “‘And what the soul may know from the teachings of its chief instructor, you can judge from that which is within thee.’”<sup>195</sup> From this argumentation based upon non-scriptural teaching by unbelievers, Tertullian argues that it is possible for one to be a witness to truth using only one’s natural powers, without the aid of divine revelation. “‘For some things are known even by nature: the immortality of the soul, for instance, is held by many. . . . I may use, therefore, the opinion of a Plato, when he declares, ‘Every soul is immortal.’”<sup>196</sup>

Tertullian goes so far as to say that “‘he who destroys the very soul, (as Epicurus does), cannot help destroying death also.’”<sup>197</sup> This is made in the context of Epicurus’s statement that death does not pertain to humans as we are dissolved at death and thus have no sense. Tertullian provides no argument other than to point out that if the deprivation of our sensation be nothing to us, neither can the acquisition of sensation

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<sup>193</sup>Ibid., 4.61.

<sup>194</sup>Ibid., 5.1.

<sup>195</sup>“*Quid anima possit de principali institutore praesumere, in te est aestimare de ea quae in te est.*” Ibid.

<sup>196</sup>“*Quaedam enim et naturaliter nota sunt, ut immortalitas animae penes plures, . . . Vtar ergo et sententia platonis alicuius pronuntiantis: omnis anima immortalis.*” *De anima* 3.4-5.

<sup>197</sup>“*Sed mortem quoque interimat qui et animam.*” Ibid., 42.16.

have anything to do with us. It seems possible to here infer that Tertullian is wanting to maintain the importance of the notion of death as this is also understood to be the penalty of sin. He does not clearly develop the point here, however.

At this point, it is necessary to address Jan Waszink's claim that the immortality of the soul is not discussed in *De anima* but rather in Tertullian's lost *De censu animae*. Waszink writes, "To understand *De anima*, fully we ought to have access to *De censu animae*, not only because this work induced Tert. [*sic*] to occupy himself with psychological problems, but also because he continually assumes that the readers of *De anima* are acquainted with it. . . . Thus, for instance, we do not know the grounds on which Tert. [*sic*] defended the immortality of the soul."<sup>198</sup> However, Tertullian, in condemning Lucan, states that in his "book on the entire condition of the soul" (presumably *De anima* rather than *De censu animae*),<sup>199</sup> he gives an explanation regarding the immortality of soul.<sup>200</sup> This would seem to counter Waszink's claim that we do not know how Tertullian defends the notion of the immortality of the soul.

Waszink also claims that a correct interpretation of *De anima* 22.1 demonstrates that the immortality of the soul is one of the natural faculties of the soul and is discussed in Tertullian's treatise on the soul written against Hermogenes (presumably *De censu animae*). However, this does not appear to be proven.<sup>201</sup> While Tertullian does argue for

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<sup>198</sup>Waszink, *Tertullian*, 7. Cf. d'Alès, 112.

<sup>199</sup>See *De anima* 58.52 where Tertullian states that he has in the *De anima* "encountered every human opinion concerning the soul, and tried its character by the teaching of (our holy faith)."

<sup>200</sup>"*Habet et iste a nobis plenissimum de omni statu animae stilum.*" *De resurrectione mortuorum* 2.67.

<sup>201</sup>Cf. A. Cleveland Coxe, *ANF* 3:202 n9.

the natural immortality of the soul, yet Waszink offers no evidence that Tertullian has written of this elsewhere and, thus, in the current debate, does not offer the argument again. If this were the case, it would seem that Tertullian himself would in some way refer to it.

In *De anima* 24.2, Tertullian mentions the immortality of the soul in connection with his argument against Hermogenes (presumably *De censu animae*). Waszink asserts that its usage there is proof that Tertullian's understanding of the immortality of the soul is found there, not in *De anima*. However, the point under discussion in *De anima* 24.2 is not primarily the immortality of the soul but rather the soul's relationship to God; Tertullian's point being that the human soul is not divine. It is immortal, yes, which is akin to divinity but it is born, and most importantly, it is also passable.<sup>202</sup> The conclusion then is that it can be subject to a failure of memory. This argument is to counter the claim made by Plato that the soul is unborn and yet suffers from a loss of memory of its prior state. It does not seem sufficient evidence to have Tertullian discuss the loss of memory in the soul and correspondingly state that this point is discussed in his document against Hermogenes and to then make the claim that, in that document, Tertullian gives his fullest discussion on the immortality of the soul.

For Tertullian, a corollary concept derived from the notion of the soul's immortality pertains to motion and, through this, to sleep. This argument reasons that the soul is "always in motion, and always active, [it] never succumbs to rest,—a condition which is alien to immortality: for nothing immortal admits any end to its operation."<sup>203</sup>

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<sup>202</sup>*De anima* 24.2.

<sup>203</sup>"*Animam enim ut semper mobilem et semper exercitam numquam succidere quieti, alienae scilicet a statu immortalitatis; nihil enim immortale finem operis sui admittit, somnus autem finis est operis.*" *De anima* 43.26. See also 45.1; *De resurrectione*

He writes, “In like manner, the immortality of the soul precludes belief in the theory that sleep is an intermission of the animal spirit, or an indigence of the spirit, or a separation of the (soul’s) connatural spirit.”<sup>204</sup> As in his argument regarding the growth of the soul, Tertullian also asserts that during sleep, the soul does not undergo “diminution or intermission,” for to do so would mean that the soul would perish.<sup>205</sup> He is left with the opinion of the Stoics who hold that sleep is the “temporary suspension of the activity of the senses, procuring rest for the body only, not for the soul also.”<sup>206</sup>

In commenting on the creation narrative, Tertullian sees a typological example connecting the soul, sleep, and death. He points to the fact that Adam slept while Eve was created. This is a type of Christ and an example of how the body is during death, waiting for the soul that has recently left.<sup>207</sup> Of significant interest to Tertullian in regard to human sleep is the dreams that are then experienced.

Tertullian refers to dreams as “no slight or trifling excitements of the soul.”<sup>208</sup> He seems to even indicate that they demonstrate the continual movement of the soul, which,

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*mortuorum* 18.39.

<sup>204</sup>“*Perinde deminutionem animalis spiritus aut indigentiam spiritus aut segregationem consati spiritus immortalitas animae non sinit credi.*” *De anima* 43.21.

<sup>205</sup>“*Perit anima, si minoratur.*” *Ibid.*, 43.23.

<sup>206</sup>“*Superest, si forte, cum stoicis resolutionem sensualis uigoris somnum determinemus, quia corporis solius quietem procuret, non et animae.*” *Ibid.*, 43.24. On Stoic influence on Tertullian’s thought, see d’Alès, 137-138.

<sup>207</sup>*De anima* 43.61-89.

<sup>208</sup>“*Non modicis iactationibus animae.*” *De anima* 45.2. On dreams in the ancient world, see John S. Hanson, “Dreams and Visions in the Graeco-Roman World and Early Christianity,” in *ANRW*, ed. Wolfgang Haase et al. (Berlin: Walter de Gruyter, 1980), 23.2:1421-1425.

he declares, “is a proof and evidence of its divine quality and immortality.”<sup>209</sup> He attributes the smiles and movements of the body in sleep as evidence of the “emotions of their soul as it dreams.”<sup>210</sup> Tertullian argues that part of the nature of the soul is to dream. He writes strongly against a report by Aristotle concerning the people of Atlantes, a nation in Africa, that Aristotle alleged did not dream during their sleep. “Could it then be that rumor deceived Aristotle, or is this caprice still the way of demons? (Let us take any view of the case), only do not let it be imagined that any soul is by its natural constitution exempt from dreams.”<sup>211</sup>

Tertullian teaches that the soul leaves the body at death. He writes, “But the operation of death is plain and obvious: it is the separation of body and soul.”<sup>212</sup> He supports this notion by alleging that this is the common opinion.<sup>213</sup> This separation of the soul from the body, Tertullian refers to as the “work of death.”<sup>214</sup> Against those who suggest that occasionally the soul might stay with the body, at least for a period of time, Tertullian adds, “But not a particle of the soul can possibly remain in the body, which is itself destined to disappear when time shall have abolished the entire scene on which the body has played its part.”<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>209</sup>“*Quod diuinitatis et immortalitatis est ratio.*” *De anima* 45.4.

<sup>210</sup>“*Ex re comprehendant motus animae somniantis.*” *Ibid.*, 49.1.

<sup>211</sup>“*Dum ne animae aliqua natura credatur immunis somniorum.*” *Ibid.*, 49.18.

<sup>212</sup>“*Opus autem mortis in medio est, discretio corporis animaeque.*” *Ibid.*, 51.1.

<sup>213</sup>*De resurrectione mortuorum* 19.9.

<sup>214</sup>“*Hoc igitur opus mortis: separatio carnis atque animae.*” *De anima* 52.1.

<sup>215</sup>“*Sed nec modicum quid animae subsidere in corpore est decessurum quandoque et ipsum, cum totam corporis scenam tempus aboleuerit.*” *De anima* 51.19.

Elsewhere, in a gruesome description of the charge made against Christians of sacrificing infants during their rites, Tertullian writes, “Come, plunge your knife into the babe, . . . await the departure of the lately given soul.”<sup>216</sup> In another place he exhorts those leaders persecuting the Christians in the following manner. “Let this, good rulers, be your work: wring from us the soul, beseeching God on the emperor’s behalf.”<sup>217</sup> Here the poetic description seems to be of the soul leaving the body at death which was brought on by the persecutions they were enduring. In commenting on Jesus’ parable of the rich man and Lazarus,<sup>218</sup> Tertullian, after making reference to the “Elysian fields,” states “that there is some determinate place called Abraham’s bosom, and that it is designed for the reception of the souls of Abraham’s children.”<sup>219</sup> This location is higher than hell but lower than heaven. Tertullian also uses “those stories toward heaven” (Amos 9:6) and “Who shall declare unto you the eternal place” (Isa 33:15-16) in support of his notion of a “temporary receptacle of faithful souls.”<sup>220</sup>

Death is always violent, in that it is not by nature part of the human person.<sup>221</sup> It is owed to “a fault or defect which is not itself natural.”<sup>222</sup> It expels the soul from the

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<sup>216</sup>“*Fugientem animam nouam exspecta.*” *Apologeticum* 8.5.

<sup>217</sup>“*Hoc agite, boni praesides, extorquete animam deo supplicantem pro imperatore!*” *Apologeticum* 30.38.

<sup>218</sup>Luke 16:19-31.

<sup>219</sup>“*Vnde apparet sapienti cuique, qui aliquando elysios audierit, esse aliquam localem determinationem, quae simus dicta sit abrahamae, ad recipiendas animas filiorum eius.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.34.

<sup>220</sup>“*Temporale aliquod animarum fidelium receptaculum.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 4.34.

<sup>221</sup>See Vicastillo, *Tertuliano y la muerte del hombre*, 186-194.

<sup>222</sup>“*Ex culpa, ne ipsa quidem naturali.*” *De anima* 52.6.

body.<sup>223</sup> It is forced slowly from the body as injury occurs to the body. “It must needs come to pass, amidst the gradual decay of its instruments, domiciles, and spaces, that the soul also itself, being driven to abandon each successive part, assumes the appearance of being lessened to nothing.”<sup>224</sup> Here Tertullian does not present death as an aid to the soul. On the contrary, it forces itself on the soul.<sup>225</sup> Death is also understood as being simple in nature. He writes, “Death, however, would have to be divided in its operation, if the soul were divisible into particles, any one of which has to be reserved for a later stage of death.”<sup>226</sup> The purpose of this argument is not entirely clear.

Tertullian mentions the Platonic concept of the body being the prison for the soul.<sup>227</sup> He himself also refers to the body as the “temporary lodging” of the soul<sup>228</sup> and states that “the flesh is the clothing of the soul.”<sup>229</sup> He points out that for Christians, it is the temple of God. He, however, notes that he must admit that “by reason of its enclosure it obstructs and obscures the soul.”<sup>230</sup> He here draws more on Platonic thought than any

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<sup>223</sup>“*Quae animam per commoda expellit.*” Ibid., 52.22.

<sup>224</sup>“*Finium, situum officiorum, necessario et anima dilabentibus paulatim instrumentis et domiciliis et spatiis suis paulatim et ipsa migrare compulsa deducitur in deminutionis effigiem.*” Ibid., 53.16.

<sup>225</sup>This is similar to the language of Melito of Sardis.

<sup>226</sup>“*Diuidetur autem et mors, si et anima, superfluo scilicet animae quandoque morituro; ita portio mortis cum animae portione remanebit.*” *De anima* 51.29. On the notion of death in Tertullian, see Vicastillo, *Tertuliano y la muerte del hombre*.

<sup>227</sup>*De anima* 53.45.

<sup>228</sup>*De resurrectione mortuorum* 46.54.

<sup>229</sup>“*Vestitus enim animae caro.*” *Scorpiace* 12.

<sup>230</sup>“*Sed interim animam consepito suo obstruit et obscurat et concretionem carnis infaecat.*” *De anima* 53.47.

biblical concept. He writes, “Undoubtedly, when the soul, by the power of death, is released from its concretion with the flesh, it is by the very release cleansed and purified: it is, moreover, certain that it escapes from the veil of the flesh into open space, to its clear, and pure, and intrinsic light; and then finds itself enjoying its enfranchisement from matter, and by virtue of its liberty it recovers its divinity, as one who awakes out of sleep passes from images to verities.”<sup>231</sup>

Though Tertullian argues for the continuance of the soul after death, he is clear to note that the souls of the dead generally cannot interfere in the lives of the living, though the demons attempt this. He points out that some people cooperate with demons and thus have the ability to “make what seem the souls of the dead to appear.”<sup>232</sup> Elsewhere, however, Tertullian writes of those souls occupied by demons during life continuing to cooperate with demons even after their death.<sup>233</sup> He even speaks of those souls coming back to inhabit others. He supports this concept by discussing cases of exorcism when the evil spirit “affirms himself sometimes to be one of the relatives of the person possessed by him, sometimes a gladiator or a bestiarius, and sometimes even a god.”<sup>234</sup> Tertullian notes that whenever this happens, it is the purpose of the demons to attack the truth that

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<sup>231</sup>“*Procul dubio cum ui mortis exprimitur de concretione carnis et ipsa expressione colatur, certe de oppanso corporis erumpit in apertum ad meram et puram et suam lucem, statim semetipsam in expeditione substantiae recognoscit et in diuinitatem ipsa libertate resipiscit, ut de somnio emergens ab imaginibus ad ueritates.*” Ibid., 53.50.

<sup>232</sup>“*Porro si et magi phantasmata edunt et iam defunctorum infamant animas.*” *Apologeticum* 23.1.

<sup>233</sup>*De anima* 57.16.

<sup>234</sup>“*Nisi fallor, etiam rebus probamus, cum in exorcismis interdum aliquem se ex parentibus hominis sui affirmat, interdum gladiatorem uel bestiarium, sicut et alibi deum.*” Ibid., 57.26.



all the souls of the dead go to Hades and that there awaits a resurrection and judgment.<sup>235</sup> Tertullian notes that even the spirit which Saul thought was the dead prophet Samuel (1 Sam 28:12-13) was only a trick of the demons.<sup>236</sup> For supporting this concept, Tertullian points out that “‘Satan himself is transformed into an angel of light’—much more into a man of light—and that at last he will ‘show himself to be even God,’ and will exhibit ‘great signs and wonders, insomuch that, if it were possible, he shall deceive the very elect.’”<sup>237</sup> As final support for the idea that no dead person can return from Hades, Tertullian turns to the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus from Luke 16:26. He writes, “The fact that Hades is not in any case opened for (the escape of) any soul, has been firmly established by the Lord in the person of Abraham, in His representation of the poor man at rest and the rich man in torment.”<sup>238</sup> Tertullian notes that it is possible for God alone to recall a soul from Hades. “But yet in all cases of a true resurrection, when the power of God recalls souls to their bodies, either by the agency of prophets, or of Christ, or of apostles, a complete presumption is afforded us, by the solid, palpable, and ascertained reality (of the revived body), that its true form must be such as to compel one’s belief of the fraudulence of every incorporeal apparition of dead persons.”<sup>239</sup>

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<sup>235</sup>“*Nihil magis curans quam hoc ipsum excludere quod praedicamus, ne facile credamus animas uniuersas ad inferos redigi, ut et iudicii et resurrectionis fidem turbent.*” Ibid., 57.30. This is a very indirect support of the notion that souls continue to exist after the death of the body because of the reality of a future judgment.

<sup>236</sup>“*Et credo, quia mendacio possunt; nec enim pythonico tunc spiritui minus licuit animam samuelis effingere post deum mortuos consulente saule.*” Ibid., 54.47.

<sup>237</sup>Ibid., 57.52.

<sup>238</sup>“*Nulli autem animae omnino inferos patere satis dominus in argumento illo pauperis requiescentis et diuitis ingemiscantis ex persona abrahamae sanxit.*” *De anima* 57.71.

<sup>239</sup>“*Atquin in resurrectionis exemplis, cum dei uirtus siue per prophetas siue per*

## Hell and Paradise

In the context of judgment, Tertullian discusses Christ's words in Matt 10:28 regarding the destruction of both body and soul in Gehenna. He writes,

If, therefore, any one shall violently suppose that the destruction of the soul and the flesh in hell amounts to a final annihilation of the two substances, and not to their penal treatment (as if they were to be consumed, not punished), let him recollect that the fire of hell is eternal—expressly announced as an everlasting penalty; and let him then admit that it is from this circumstance that this never-ending “killing” is more formidable than a merely human murder, which is only temporal.<sup>240</sup>

Tertullian does note that for the sinner, “the body after the resurrection has to be killed by God in hell along with the soul.”<sup>241</sup> This killing, though, must be understood to be eternal or without end.

Tertullian seems to support the popular notion that the souls of the dead could be prayed for and redeemed. He writes, “And so it knows nothing save how to recall the souls of the departed from the very path of death.”<sup>242</sup> Elsewhere, in discussing the remarriage of a widow, he writes, “Indeed, she prays for his soul, and requests refreshment for him meanwhile, and fellowship (with him) in the first resurrection; and

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*christum siue per apostolos in corpora animas repraesentat, solida et contrectabili et satiata ueritate praeiudicatum est hanc esse formam ueritatis, ut omnem mortuorum exhibitionem incorporalem praestrigias iudices.” Ibid., 57.79.*

<sup>240</sup>“*Proinde si quis occisionem carnis atque animae in gehennam ad interitum et finem utriusque substantiae adripiet et non ad supplicium, quasi consumendarum, non quasi puniendarum, recordetur ignem gehennae aeternum praedicari in poenam aeternam, et inde aeternitatem occisionis agnoscat, propterea humanae ut temporali praetimendam.” De resurrectione mortuorum 35.23. See also Scorpiace 12.*

<sup>241</sup>“*Certe cum post resurrectionem corpus cum anima occidi habeat a deo in gehennam.” De resurrectione mortuorum 35.30.*

<sup>242</sup>“*Itaque nihil nouit nisi defunctorum animas de ipso mortis itinere reuocare.” De oratione 29.18.*

she offers (her sacrifice) on the anniversaries of his falling asleep.”<sup>243</sup> Though he does not mention it specifically, it must be assumed that he has Paul’s words in mind, though he does address that statement elsewhere.

Tertullian places the location of Hades, where souls are kept until the judgment, in the “interior of the earth.”<sup>244</sup> He relies on Matt 12:40 for this. He places all souls in Hades until the Day of Judgment.<sup>245</sup> He writes, “You must suppose Hades to be a subterranean region, and keep at arm’s length those who are too proud to believe that the souls of the faithful deserve a place in the lower regions.”<sup>246</sup> Tertullian quotes 1 Thess 4:16 as support against those who place the Christian dead in heaven already. “How, indeed, shall the soul mount up to heaven, where Christ is already sitting at the Father’s right hand, when as yet the archangel’s trumpet has not been heard by the command of God?”<sup>247</sup> He does note in commenting on Rev 6:9 that only the souls of the martyrs are

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<sup>243</sup>“*Enimvero et pro anima eius orat, et refrigerium interim adpostulat ei, et in prima resurrectione consortium, et offert annuis diebus dormitionis eius.*” *De monogamia* 10.23.

<sup>244</sup>On the underworld in Tertullian, see Finé, 79-112.

<sup>245</sup>“*Habes etiam de paradiso a nobis libellum, quo constituimus omnem animam apud inferos sequestrari in diem domini.*” *De anima* 55.40. The martyrs have a special place and are said to go straight to paradise. See Daley, 36. Daley writes that “Tertullian elaborates more clearly than any Christian writer before him a theory of an ‘interim state’ in which the souls of the dead await and even anticipate their final punishment or reward.” On the notion of judgment, see Finé, 63-79.

<sup>246</sup>“*Habes et regionem inferum subterraneam credere et illos cubito pellere qui satis superbe non putent animas fidelium inferis dignas.*” *De anima* 55.8.

<sup>247</sup>“*Quo ergo animam exhalabis in caelum christo illic adhuc sedente ad dexteram patris, nondum dei iussu per tubam archangeli audito, nondum illis quos domini aduentus in saeculo inuenerit, obuiam ei ereptis in aerem, cum his qui mortui in christo primi resurgent?*” *De anima* 55.19. On what happens to the soul after death in Tertullian and how this compares to other ancient authors, see Finé, 54-63.

presented as under the altar.<sup>248</sup> These are the only group of souls that go heavenward at death rather than down to Hades. Elsewhere while describing a martyr's death, he writes of the martyr's soul going up to heaven.<sup>249</sup>

Though the souls of the saints do go to Hades, Tertullian is clear that there are two separate regions there, one for the good and the other for the bad.<sup>250</sup> He concludes his *De anima* with a chapter discussing the need of Hades as an active place. He notes that some ask why the soul should undergo punishment or consolation in Hades before the judgment at the resurrection.<sup>251</sup> He gives several reasons as to why this might not be the case. "Because in the judgment of God its matter ought to be sure and safe, nor should there be any inkling beforehand of the award of His sentence; and also because (the soul) ought to be covered first by its vestment of the restored flesh, which, as the partner of its actions, should be also a sharer in its recompense."<sup>252</sup> Tertullian's reply to this is quite telling as to his thought. He asks, "What, then, is to take place in that interval? Shall we sleep? But souls do not sleep even when men are alive: it is indeed the business of bodies to sleep, to which also belongs death itself, no less than its mirror and counterfeit

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<sup>248</sup>*De anima* 55.29; *Scorpiace* 12. See Dunn, 37-38.

<sup>249</sup>"*Cum sola et arida sit cute loricatus, et contra ungulas corneus, praemisso iam sanguinis suco tamquam animae impedimentis, properante iam et ipsa, quae iam saepe ieiunans mortem de proximo norit.*" *De ieiunio aduersus psychicos* 290.13.

<sup>250</sup>*De anima* 56.61.

<sup>251</sup>"*Cur enim non putes animam et puniri et foueri in inferis interim sub expectatione utriusque iudicii in quadam usurpatione et candida eius?*" *Ibid.*, 58.4. Cf. *De resurrectione mortuorum* 17.7.

<sup>252</sup>"*Quia saluum debet esse, inquis, in iudicio diuino negotium suum sine ulla praelibatione sententiae; tum quia et carnis opperienda est restitutio ut consortis operarum atque mercedum.*" *De anima* 58.8.

sleep.”<sup>253</sup> Thus, because he has already proved the point that souls do not sleep, then they must do something in Hades.

Tertullian further defends this concept. First, he notes that it would be unjust for the guilty to have rest that they do not deserve and the righteous to not yet have the reward that they do deserve.<sup>254</sup> He then asks, “Must the soul always tarry for the body, in order to experience sorrow or joy?”<sup>255</sup> He notes examples of where this is not the case in common literature and that in fact the soul can experience both pain and suffering without involving the body. He then notes that Christ stated that anyone who looked at a woman lustfully had committed adultery with her in his heart. He concludes from this statement that “it is most fitting that the soul, without at all waiting for the flesh, should be punished for what it has done without the partnership of the flesh.”<sup>256</sup> He then notes that the same must be true of the righteous also.

Tertullian believes in the soul returning to the body at the resurrection and judgment.<sup>257</sup> He points out that this is a much better opinion to hold than that of some non-Christians. He writes, “If there is any ground for the moving to and fro of human souls into different bodies, why may they not return into the very substance they have

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<sup>253</sup>“*Quid ergo fiet in tempore isto? dormiemus? at enim animae nec in uiuentibus dormiunt; corporum enim est somnus, quorum et ipsa mors cum speculo suo somno.*” Ibid., 58.9.

<sup>254</sup>Ibid., 58.14.

<sup>255</sup>“*Semper autem expectat anima corpus, ut doleat aut gaudeat?*” Ibid., 58.19. Cf. *De resurrectione mortuorum* 17.

<sup>256</sup>“*Ergo uel propter haec congruentissimum est animam, licet non expectata carne, puniri, quod non sociata carne commisit.*” *De anima* 58.36.

<sup>257</sup>On the resurrection of the body in Tertullian, see Francine J. Cardman, “Tertullian on the Resurrection” (Ph.D. diss., Yale University, 1974), 112-140.

left, seeing this is to be restored, to be that which had been?”<sup>258</sup> He adds, “But how much more worthy of acceptance is our belief which maintains that they will return to the same bodies! And how much more ridiculous is your inherited conceit, that the human spirit is to reappear in a dog, or a mule, or a peacock!”<sup>259</sup> Elsewhere he writes, “Get the demons if you can to join you in your mocking; let them deny that Christ is coming to judge every human soul which has existed from the world’s beginning, clothing it again with the body it laid aside at death.”<sup>260</sup>

Tertullian also seems to suggest a change for the soul at the resurrection also, in a similar way that the body is changed, though this point is not entirely clear. He writes, “But if the soul is not to be changed also, then there is no resurrection of the soul; nor will it be believed to have itself risen, unless it has risen some different thing.”<sup>261</sup> Elsewhere, Tertullian is clear that the soul does not undergo change from the point of death until the resurrection. He writes, “We therefore maintain that every soul, whatever

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<sup>258</sup>“*Quasi non, quaecumque ratio praeest animarum humanarum in corpora reciprocandarum, ipsa exigit illas in eadem corpora reuocari, quia hoc sit reuocari, id est: esse quod fuerant!*” *Apologeticum* 48.11.

<sup>259</sup>“*Quae similiter asseuerant animas in corpora redituras. Attamen quanto acceptabilior nostra praesumptio est, quae in eadem corpora redituras defendit; uobis autem quanto uanius traditum est, hominis spiritum in cane uel mulo aut pauo moraturum!*” *Ad nationes* 1.19.3. See also *Apologeticum* 48.11. It is assumed that Tertullian is employing a parallel usage between *anima* and *spiritus* rather than stating that the Christian belief is that the *spiritus* would return to the same human body and that the non-Christian belief was that the *anima* would return to a body of some other animal. Earlier in the passage, Tertullian also uses *mens* in an apparent parallel style. In arguing against Marcion (*Aduersus Marcionem* 1.24), Tertullian calls the salvation of only the soul a half salvation.

<sup>260</sup>“*Quodcumque ridetis, rideant et illi uobis cum: negent christum omnem ab aeuo animam restituto corpore iudicaturum.*” *Apologeticum* 23.68.

<sup>261</sup>“*Quodsi non et anima mutabitur, iam nec animae resurrectio est; nec ipsa enim surrexisset credetur, si non alia surrexerit.*” *De resurrectione mortuorum* 56.19.

be its age on quitting the body, remains unchanged in the same, until the time shall come when the promised perfection shall be realized.”<sup>262</sup> Elsewhere he adds, “A man will come back from a man—any given person from any given person, still retaining his humanity; so that the soul, with its qualities unchanged, may be restored to the same condition, though not to the same outward framework.”<sup>263</sup>

As previously noted, a major theme when Tertullian discusses the soul is actually his defense of the notion of the resurrection of the body. He presents several arguments in this discussion. He asserts against Marcion that the soul is the one which leads a person to sin first. Thus if the soul is not reunited to the body at the resurrection, then the result is only a half salvation. “Although sins are attributed to the body, yet they are preceded by the guilty concupiscence of the soul; nay, the first motion of sin must be ascribed to the soul, to which the flesh acts in the capacity of a servant.”<sup>264</sup> Additionally he adds that “when freed from the soul, the flesh sins no more.”<sup>265</sup> As another proof, Tertullian, again going to the creation narrative, asserts that the essential nature of humans is material rather than spiritual, quoting Gen 2:7, “And the Lord God made man of the dust of the

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<sup>262</sup>“*Ita dicimus omnem animam quaqua aetate decesserit, in ea stare ad eum diem usque, quo perfectum illud repromittitur.*” *De anima* 56.54. See Vicastillo, *Tertuliano y la muerte del hombre*, 65. Vicastillo argues here and based upon *De anima* 42.1; 67, that though the soul continues for Tertullian, yet it has also reached the end of life: “The separation is, for the soul, a death.”

<sup>263</sup>“*Hominem ex homine rediturum, quemlibet pro quolibet, dum hominem: ut eadem qualitas animae in eandem restauretur, etsi non effigiem, certe condicionem.*” *Apologeticum* 48.29.

<sup>264</sup>“*Sed et si carni delicta reputantur, praecedit animae reatus et culpa principatus animae potius adscribendus, cui caro ministri nomine occurrit.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 1.24.

<sup>265</sup>“*Carens denique anima caro hactenus peccat.*” *Ibid.*, 1.24.

ground, . . . and man became a living soul.”<sup>266</sup> Thus, humans are essentially flesh and not soul, at least in this argument.<sup>267</sup>

Tertullian argues that the resurrection of the body and soul is to ensure the reality of the judgment. “Assuredly, as the reason why restoration takes place at all is the appointed judgment, every man must needs come forth the very same who had once existed, that he may receive at God’s hands a judgment, whether of good desert or the opposite. And therefore the body too will appear; for the soul is not capable of suffering without the solid substance (that is, the flesh; and for this reason, also) that it is not right that souls should have all the wrath of God to bear: they did not sin without the body, within which all was done by them.”<sup>268</sup>

Tertullian argues against the notion of the reincarnation of souls.<sup>269</sup> He does not use any biblical support for this though. He also argues against the reincarnation of human souls from animals. He writes, “Now our position is this: that the human soul

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<sup>266</sup>“*Et fecit hominem deus, inquit, limum de terra, non animam; anima enim de afflatu: et factus est homo in animam uiuam.*” Ibid., 1.24. On Tertullian’s use of Gen 2:7, see G. T. Armstrong, *Die Genesis in der Alten Kirche: Die drei Kirchenväter*, 112-117; Franz Seyr, “Die Seelen- und Erkenntnislehre Tertullians und die Stoa,” *Commentationes Vindobonenses* 3 (1937): 53-54.

<sup>267</sup>Cf. “*quod finxit, non quod flauit; qui caro nunc, non qui anima.*” *Aduersus Marcionem* 1.24. However, Tertullian also writes that the Christian view regarding the soul after death is better than the Pythagorean, “as it does not transfer thee into beasts.” *De testimonia animae* 4. This seems to imply that the identity of a person is located in the soul, rather than the flesh. This is continually a challenge with Tertullian, as it is with all who propose different parts to the human person.

<sup>268</sup>“*Ideo que repraesentabuntur et corpora, quia neque pati quicquam potest anima sola sine materia stabili, id est carne, et quod omnino de iudicio dei pati debent animae, non sine carne meruerunt, intra quam omnia egerunt.*” *Apologeticum* 48.35. See also *De anima* 33.81.

<sup>269</sup>*De anima* 28-31. See Cardman, 118-120.



cannot by any means at all be transferred to beasts, even when they are supposed to originate, according to the philosophers, out of the substances of the elements.”<sup>270</sup>

Tertullian offers several arguments, only one of which he bases on a biblical text.

Quoting Ps 49:20 he writes, “Man is like the beasts that perish” and “the very fact of your judging that a man resembles a beast, you confess that their soul is not identical; for you say that they resemble each other, not that they are the same.”<sup>271</sup> Tertullian argues against those, such as Carpocrates, who use the question asked of John the Baptist concerning whether he was Elijah. Tertullian notes that the Bible clearly states, “And he shall go before the people . . . in the spirit and power of Elias”—not (observe) in his soul and his body.”<sup>272</sup>

### Summary

Tertullian often uses soul for human life. In this context, he also refers to the soul or life of an aborted fetus. He also uses soul to refer to people and to animals and living things in general. He even refers to the souls of idols.

For Tertullian, the soul is simple, endowed with the power of intelligence and yet changeable in regard to its faculties and in no way possessing anything divine. In discussing the different parts of the soul, Tertullian writes of these as different faculties rather than different parts of the soul. He attributes motion, thought, and also the five

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<sup>270</sup>“*Dicimus animam humanam nullo modo in bestias posse transferri, etiamsi secundum philosophos ex elementiciis substantiis censetur.*” *De anima* 32.11.

<sup>271</sup>“*Ipsam enim quod hominem similem bestiae iudicas, confiteris animam non eandem, similem dicendo, non ipsam.*” *Ibid.*, 32.89.

<sup>272</sup>“*Sed quomodo helias johannes? habes angeli uocem: et ipse, inquit, praecedet coram populo in uirtute et in spiritu heliae, non in anima eius nec in carne.*” *Ibid.*, 35.57.

senses to the soul. When discussing Plato's rational and irrational parts of the soul, Tertullian suggests that the irrational element in the soul is not by nature part of the soul. Tertullian notes that the acts of the body affect the soul both positively and negatively. Breathing is a key function of the soul and thus Tertullian connects the soul and spirit. Against those who argue against the soul, he notes that God discusses the ruling faculty of the soul in the Scriptures. Against the Gnostics, Tertullian argues that there is a unity of substance among all human souls. He does allow for, though, a difference in the development of the souls of different individuals.

Genesis 2:7 is very important in the development of Tertullian's doctrine of the soul. He focuses on the notion of breath. Though the soul is not divine, yet it comes from God. This means that the soul has a beginning. Tertullian argues that the soul is not breathed into the infant at birth but is present before this. He cites biblical examples of infants being spoken of while *in utero*, mentioning Esau and Jacob, John the Baptist, and Jeremiah.

The human person is a composite of soul and body. He mentions here Matt 10:28 and the creation narrative regarding Adam's creation first as body/dust and then soul. Tertullian, however, can also write that the human person is nothing but a soul, arguing that the *imago dei* is not found in the physical constitution of the individual but in the power of freedom of one's will which is a power of the soul. He argues that the soul develops its powers but its substance does not increase. He draws on Gen 3 and the entrance of sin to argue that the soul reaches maturity along with the body at puberty.

The soul is of a corporeal nature. Christ's parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16) has a prominent role in providing a scriptural argument for this idea. The souls under the altar (Rev 6:9-11) also contribute to his argument. He also mentions Paul's vision of Christ (Acts 9:1-8) and God's breathing into Adam (Gen 2:7) as support for this

idea.

Tertullian connects the soul directly to the sin of the individual, both from a partial evil nature and through the influence of demons on it. He also argues, though, that the soul is inherently Christian and does not lack the power to obey God's law. This element in Tertullian results in a tension which he does not resolve. For him, the soul has both good and evil in it.

Tertullian argues for a simple soul, agreeing in this with Plato, so as to protect the soul from destruction. That is, the soul must survive the death of the body in order to receive the punishment or reward that awaits at the judgment. Writing on the reunion of the soul with the body at a time subsequent to death, he states, "The reason why restoration takes place at all is the appointed judgment."<sup>273</sup> While he does not argue that the soul is immortal so as to experience the judgment, yet he is explicit that the resurrection and recombining of soul and body is necessary because of the resurrection.

Tertullian uses Christ's parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus (Luke 16) to support the notion that the soul survives the death of the body. He also argues from statements made concerning Christ's death (John 2:19-21; Matt 26:38) that Christ's body went into the grave but not His soul. He also argues from Christ's words in Matt 10:28 that only he who can kill both body and soul in hell is to be feared.

Though the soul survives the death of the body, it does not have the ability to interfere in the lives of the living. The demons use illusions to give this appearance. This is how he explains 1 Sam 28 and Saul's desire to see Samuel called up by the Witch of Endor. The souls are confined to Hades, which is in the inside of the earth until the

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<sup>273</sup>*Apologeticum* 48.35.

resurrection. He uses Matt 12:40 and 1 Thess 4:16 as support for the notion that the souls of all, even of the righteous, are not in heaven until after the resurrection. This does not include the special group of martyrs who, based upon Rev 6:9-11, are already in heaven. Key for Tertullian in this discussion is the reality of the resurrection of the body to be joined together with the same soul to face the judgment.

Tertullian uses the Scriptures heavily in defending his doctrine of the soul. He does, however, perhaps more than any other previous author, include many arguments explicitly quoting the ideas of other philosophers in defending his doctrine.

### **Minucius Felix**

Minucius's sole work is a dialogue titled the *Octavius*.<sup>274</sup> It exhibits many connections with some of Tertullian's works. The dialogue is between two of Minucius's friends, Caecilius, a pagan, and Octavius, a fellow Christian along with Minucius.<sup>275</sup> In this section, what Octavius is represented as saying will be taken for the belief of Minucius himself as he everywhere presents himself as agreeing with Octavius's position.

### Usage of *Anima*

Minucius Felix does not use *anima* sufficiently enough to allow for a detailed study. He does ask rhetorically, "Do you wish to see God with your carnal eyes, when you are neither able to behold nor to grasp your own soul itself, by which you are enlivened and

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<sup>274</sup>On this, see Bettina Windau, "Minucius Felix," *DECL*, 423-424. On the use of the dialogue in comparison with other writers of the time period, see M. Hoffmann, *Der Dialog bei den christlichen Schriftstellern der ersten Vier Jahrhunderte*, 28-39; Windau, 424.

<sup>275</sup>Windau notes that the persons in the dialog are probably historical. Windau, 423.

speak?”<sup>276</sup> There seems here to be a hint of a connection between God and the soul; as one cannot be seen, even more so can the other not be seen. From this statement, it can also be deduced that Minucius understood the soul to be invisible and the principle of life.

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

When Minucius asks, “Do you wish to see God with your carnal eyes, when you are neither able to behold nor to grasp your own soul itself, by which you are enlivened and speak?”<sup>277</sup> he clearly has in mind a composite understanding of the human individual. This is referred to by the mentioning of the carnal eyes and the soul which gives life.

Minucius notes that the doctrine of the resurrection as presented by others such as Pythagoras and Plato represents some degree of similarity with the Christian teaching. In this context, he begins an argument that may lead some to conclude that Minucius supported the notion of the dissolution of the soul after the death of the body. In the dialog, Octavius argues that if God originally created humans out of nothing, then it is not difficult to conceive of Him having the ability to recreate them. He writes of the individual “that he is nothing after death, and that he was nothing before he began to exist; and as from nothing it was possible for him to be born, so from nothing it may be possible for him to be restored.”<sup>278</sup> It is then noted that the decomposed bodies are not lost to God and, thus, Christians do not fear burial in the earth but rather await the springtime restoration of the body.

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<sup>276</sup>“*Deum oculis carnalibus vis videre, cum ipsam animam tuam, qua vivificaris et loqueris, nec aspicere possis nec tenere?*” *Octavius* 32.6.31.5.

<sup>277</sup>Ibid.

<sup>278</sup>*Octavius* 34.10.

It seems more likely in this argument that what is at issue pertains only to the body. This is suggested in the introduction to the argument where Minucius notes that the Pythagorean/Platonic notion of the resurrection is corrupt as they argue that the body is dissolved and the soul alone endures, often with a return to the body of another animal. Minucius also argues that it is not foolish to believe that as God formed humans originally from nothing, so he can re-form them from nothing. Here still the emphasis seems to be on the physical forming of the human body rather than the soul. He then discusses the cyclical nature of bodies in the birth/death/rebirth cycle and argues that when something is withdrawn from our eyes, it has not died to God. Here he specifically mentions the body but leaves out the soul. This further suggests that Minucius was focused on the physical reality of the body that is seen and then is seen no more, yet is still known to God. This seems more likely when compared with his previously discussed notion of an invisible soul.

Minucius mentions those who hope “that they shall be nothing after death; for they would prefer to be altogether extinguished, rather than to be restored for the purpose of punishment.”<sup>279</sup> Here he seems to describe those who hope for death to be the destruction of the entire being, body and soul, leaving no possibility for a judgment. It does not seem apparent, though, that from this can be implied that Minucius was advocating the death being the dissolution of both body and soul. First of all, he is speaking about what others are hoping for. Secondly, he is talking more about the absence of a future judgment than about the state of the human soul after death. This is not even mentioned in the discussion.

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<sup>279</sup>Ibid., 34.

Minucius writes against the reincarnation of the soul into other bodies declaring, “Thus also the most illustrious of the wise men, Pythagoras first, and Plato chiefly, have delivered the doctrine of resurrection with a corrupt and divided faith; for they will have it, that the bodies being dissolved, the souls alone both abide for ever, and very often pass into other new bodies.”<sup>280</sup> He then notes also the belief in the return of the souls into the bodies of other animals.

### Summary

Minucius describes a composite individual composed of body and soul. The soul is described as invisible. He also calls it the principle of life.

While Minucius makes it clear that God can recreate a dead person out of nothing just the same as He created them before their birth, yet it is not clear that Minucius intends that this argument pertains to the soul also. Rather, it seems more likely that this argument was construed to be used against those who were discussing the body and its destruction at death and its future resurrection at the judgment. He does not use any Scripture in this discussion, but clearly holds that the reality of the future judgment should assure all that they will exist again after the resurrection.

### Cyprian

Cyprian was a major figure in the Church during a crucial period in the middle of the third century. He wrote many letters and treatises.<sup>281</sup> Some of his more prominent are

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<sup>280</sup>“*Sic etiam condicionem renascendi sapientium clariores, Pythagoras primus et praecipuus Plato, corrupta et dimidiata fide tradiderunt; nam corporibus dissolutis solas animas volunt et perpetuo manere et in alia nova corpora saepius commeari.*” Octavius 34.6.

<sup>281</sup>Maurice Bévenot, “Cyprian von Karthago,” *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (1981); Ronald E. Heine, “Cyprian and Novation,” in *The Cambridge History of Early*

his letters *To Donatus* and *To Fortunatus* and his treatises *On the Unity of the Catholic Church*, and *On the Lapsed*. His letters number eighty-one but several are not his. In his writings, he was not as much occupied by theological matters as he is with the practical exigencies of Church life amidst fierce external persecution and internal strife.<sup>282</sup>

#### Usage of *Anima*

Cyprian uses soul to refer to life. He writes regarding martyrs who have separated from the Church, “Although they burn, given up to flames and fires, or lay down their souls, thrown to the wild beasts, that will not be the crown of faith, but the punishment of perfidy.”<sup>283</sup> In describing the conditions of humanity, Cyprian writes that we “bear chains, spend our souls, endure the sword, the wild beasts, fires, crucifixions.”<sup>284</sup> He writes regarding martyrdom that “they readily deliver up both their souls and their blood.”<sup>285</sup>

Cyprian uses soul where he is referring to people, though this often has to do with their abilities. He writes concerning the temptations of the Devil that “from the very beginning of the world he deceived; and flattering with lying words, he misled inexperienced souls by an incautious credulity.”<sup>286</sup> Elsewhere he uses a similar

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*Christian Literature*, ed. Frances Young et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 152-157; Andreas Hoffmann, “Cyprian of Carthage,” *DECL*, 148-153.

<sup>282</sup>A. Hoffmann, “Cyprian of Carthage,” 151; Quasten, 344.

<sup>283</sup>“*Ardeant licet flammis, et ignibus traditi uel obiecti bestiis animas suas ponant, non erit illa fidei corona sed poena perfidiae.*” *De ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 14.359.

<sup>284</sup>“*Portandae catenae, animae impendendae, gladius, bestiae, ignes, cruces.*” *De bono patientiae* 12.226.

<sup>285</sup>“*Sed prompte et animas et sanguinem tradere.*” *Epistulae* 60.2.3.41.

<sup>286</sup>“*Ab initio statim mundi fefellit, et uerbis mendacibus blandiens rudes animas*



expression, “By a natural foresight, the untrained soul laments the anxieties and labors of the mortal life.”<sup>287</sup>

Cyprian uses soul to refer to a separated entity in distinction to the body. In describing the pains of a martyr, he writes, “My mind stood firm, and my faith was strong, and my soul struggled long.”<sup>288</sup> Here mind and soul seem to be somewhat distinct, though related. In a similar usage, he describes those facing death as being of “a steadfast mind and a firm faith, and a devoted soul.”<sup>289</sup> In describing a girl who had been exposed to the pagan sacrifices and later suffered from this, Cyprian writes that “as if by the compulsion of a torturer the soul of that still tender child confessed a consciousness of the fact with such signs as it could.”<sup>290</sup>

Cyprian uses soul sometimes where it is difficult to determine if he is referring to an individual or to a separated soul distinct from the body. He writes, “When the soul, in its gaze into heaven, has recognized its Author, it rises higher than the sun, and far transcends all this earthly power, and begins to be that which it believes itself to be.”<sup>291</sup>

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*incauta credulitate decepit.” De ecclesiae catholicae unitate 1.14.*

<sup>287</sup>“*Providentia naturali lamentatur uitae mortalis anxietates, et labores et procellas mundi, quas ingreditur in exordio, statim suo ploratu et gemitu rudis anima testatur.” De bono patientiae 12.223.*

<sup>288</sup>“*Stetit mens stabilis et fides fortis, et cum torquentibus poenis immobilis diu anima luctata est.” De lapsis 13.251.*

<sup>289</sup>“*Mens solida est et fides firma et anima deuota.” De mortalitate 1.1.*

<sup>290</sup>“*Velut tortore cogente quibus poterat indiciis conscientiam facti in simplicibus adhuc annis rudis anima fatebatur.” De lapsis 25.484.*

<sup>291</sup>“*Postquam auctorem suum caelum intuens anima cognouit, sole altior et hac omni terrena potestate sublimior id esse incipit, quod esse se credit.” Ad Donatum 14.299.*

Elsewhere he writes in a discussion about heresy that by it, “before the day of judgment, the souls of the righteous and of the unrighteous are already divided, and the chaff is separated from the wheat.”<sup>292</sup> He also describes his attitude in the face of persecution as one whose “mind [soul] is always secure of its God.”<sup>293</sup>

Cyprian also speaks of losing one’s soul. He writes, “Miserable creature, you have lost your soul; spiritually dead . . .”<sup>294</sup> Elsewhere he writes of those who hold onto their wealth, “that you are a lover of mammon more than of your own soul.”<sup>295</sup> In describing one who needs to do good works because he has many children, Cyprian writes, “The sins of many have to be redeemed, the consciences of many to be cleansed, the souls of many to be liberated.”<sup>296</sup> He also writes concerning the lapsed and those who cause schism in the church, “In the former, it is the loss of one soul; in the latter, the risk of many.”<sup>297</sup> In describing a lapsed individual who protected those who were fleeing persecution, Cyprian writes that he was “showing and offering to the Lord many souls living and safe to entreat for a single wounded one.”<sup>298</sup> He writes concerning those who

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<sup>292</sup>“*Sic et ante iudicii diem hic quoque iam iustorum adque iniustorum animae diuiduntur, et a frumento paleae separantur.*” *De ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 10.248.

<sup>293</sup>“*De deo suo semper anima securo.*” *Ad Demetrianum* 20.380.

<sup>294</sup>“*Animam tuam, misera, perdidisti; spiritualiter mortua.*” *De lapsis* 30.603.

<sup>295</sup>“*Ipse minuaris amator magis mammonae quam animae tuae.*” *De opere et eleemosynis* 10.202.

<sup>296</sup>“*Multorum purgandae conscientiae, multorum animae liberandae.*” *Ibid.*, 18.357.

<sup>297</sup>“*Hic animae unius est damnum, illic periculum plurimorum.*” *De ecclesiae catholicae unitate* 19.465. In this case, it could be argued that Cyprian has in mind the soul of an individual rather than one’s life.

<sup>298</sup>“*Offerens domino multas uiuentes et incolumes animas quae pro una saucia deprecentur.*” *Epistulae* 55.13.2.214.

have led others astray from the Church that those “souls in the day of judgment shall be required at the hands of those who have stood forth as the authors and leaders of their ruin.”<sup>299</sup> This usage seems to be a way of speaking in reference to one’s eternal salvation as he elsewhere argues that it is not only the soul but the body that is lost.

Cyprian describes the human person as flesh and spirit and then writes that when God’s will is done in both of them, then “the soul which is new-born by Him may be preserved.”<sup>300</sup> Elsewhere he also exhibits this similarity of understanding between spirit and soul when he writes of Celerinus and his sufferings that “although his body was laid in chains, his spirit remained free and at liberty. His flesh wasted away by the long endurance of hunger and thirst; but God fed his soul, that lived in faith and virtue, with spiritual nourishments.”<sup>301</sup> It is not clear here what distinction Cyprian is making between the soul and spirit.

Cyprian hints at the idea of only one kind of soul for humans. He writes to Fortunatus that he has a “like bodily substance and a common order of souls.”<sup>302</sup> This is similar to Tertullian.

Cyprian locates some elements of mental anxiety in the soul. He describes one who had partaken unworthily of the Eucharist, how she “began presently to be tormented

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<sup>299</sup>“*Quorum animae in die iudicii de ipsorum manibus expetentur qui perditionis auctores et duces extiterunt.*” *Epistulae* 72.2.3.58.

<sup>300</sup>“*Quae per eum renata est anima seruetur.*” *De dominica oratione* 16.291.

<sup>301</sup>“*Sed posito in uinculis corpore solutus ac liber spiritus mansit. Caro famis ac sitis diuturnitate contabuit, sed animam fide et uirtute uiuentem nutrimentis spiritalibus deus pauit.*” *Epistulae* 39.2.2.27.

<sup>302</sup>“*Corporum materia consimilis, animarum ratio communis.*” *Ad Demetrianum* 8.141.

in soul, and to become stiffened with frenzy.”<sup>303</sup> He also writes to one stating that “the gloom of barrenness has besieged your soul.”<sup>304</sup> Other mental states or actions are also used. He describes jealousy as “a gnawing worm of the soul.”<sup>305</sup> In describing an attitude of humility before God, Cyprian writes, “Let our soul lie low before Him.”<sup>306</sup>

Cyprian notes a connection between the material world and the soul. In his argument for the use of inebriating wine at the Eucharist, he writes that by drinking “common wine the mind is dissolved, and the soul relaxed, and all sadness is laid aside.”<sup>307</sup> Cyprian advises the penitent to practice almsgiving “by which souls are freed from death.”<sup>308</sup> Cyprian describes the fight of patience against “the deeds of the flesh and the body, wherewith the soul is assaulted and taken.”<sup>309</sup> The enemy, he writes, in order “to take captive the soul by money, . . . heaps together mischievous hoards.”<sup>310</sup> He also writes regarding the effects of a blind love for property by which “the spirit [is] bound,

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<sup>303</sup>“*Angi et anima exaestuante concludi postmodum coepit.*” *De lapsis* 26.500.

<sup>304</sup>“*Obsederunt animum tuum sterilitatis tenebrae.*” *De opere et eleemosynis* 13.252.

<sup>305</sup>“*Qualis uero est animae tinea, quae cogitationum tabes, pectoris quanta rubigo zelare in altero.*” *De zelo et liuore* 7.118.

<sup>306</sup>“*Illi se anima prosternat.*” *De lapsis* 29.576.

<sup>307</sup>“*Quemadmodum uino isto communi mens soluitur et anima relaxatur et tristitia omnis exponitur.*” *Epistulae* 63.11.3.198.

<sup>308</sup>“*Eleemosynis frequenter insistere quibus a morte animae liberantur.*” *De lapsis* 35.679.

<sup>309</sup>“*Contra facta carnis et corporis quibus anima expugnatur et capitur uirtutum suarum propugnaculo reluctatur.*” *De bono patientiae* 14.272.

<sup>310</sup>“*Ut animam pecunia capiat ingerit pernicioosa compendia.*” *De zelo et liuore* 2.27.

and the soul hindered.”<sup>311</sup> To one who gives liberally he writes that “the soul according to the spirit is preserved.”<sup>312</sup> Cyprian also writes describing the soul that “is at once instructed by what we hear, and nourished by what we see.”<sup>313</sup>

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Cyprian mentions the soul when he writes of the penalty which the souls and bodies of the unrighteous will suffer. “Souls with their bodies will be reserved in infinite tortures for suffering.”<sup>314</sup> He quotes Isa 66:24 as proof of this concept and also from Wis 5:1-9.

“Souls are delivered from death by almsgiving.”<sup>315</sup> Cyprian bases this on Tob 12:8-9. He then adds “that souls are delivered by almsgiving not only from the second, but from the first death,”<sup>316</sup> noting that Tabitha was raised from the dead by Peter after he had been summoned and shown all the works of charity that she had performed. It is clear here that Cyprian means by the second death the punishment of everlasting torture, not the cessation of existence.

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<sup>311</sup>“*Et mens uincta et anima praeclusa.*” *De lapsis* 11.207.

<sup>312</sup>“*Spiritualiter anima seruetur.*” *De opere et eleemosynis* 17.334.

<sup>313</sup>“*Animam simul et auditus instruit et pascit obtutus.*” *Ad Donatum* 1.13.

<sup>314</sup>“*Seruantur cum corporibus suis animae infinitis cruciatibus ad dolorem.*” *Ad Demetrianum* 24:468. See Daley, 42; Machael A. Fahey, *Cyprian and the Bible: A Study in Third-Century Exegesis*, Beiträge zur Geschichte der biblischen Hermeneutik 9, ed. Oscar Cullmann et al. (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 1971), 216-217.

<sup>315</sup>“*Eleemosynis a morte animas liberari.*” *De opere et eleemosynis* 5.106. See a similar statement in *De lapsis* 35.679.

<sup>316</sup>“*Quod eleemosynis non tantum a secunda sed et a prima morte animae liberentur.*” *De opere et eleemosynis* 6:111.

## Summary

Cyprian uses soul to refer to life, to people and to the separated soul. He locates mental anxiety in the soul and notes that there is one kind of soul for all humans. The soul is influenced by the actions done in the physical realm. Cyprian uses soul and spirit together at times, not making a clear attempt to differentiate between them.

Cyprian uses Isa 66:24 and Wis 5:1-9 to argue that souls are punished along with their bodies in never-ending fire. He also quotes Tob 12:8-9 to argue that the soul is saved from death by almsgiving. Noting Peter's raising of Tabitha (Acts 9:36-43), Cyprian argues that this refers both to the first and second death.

Cyprian does not use any of the traditional verses used in describing the soul. He instead refers to the Isaiah passage to argue for the eternal burning of the wicked souls. Here he is consistent with prior interpretations that both the soul and the body would burn.

## Commodianus

Commodianus was not a prolific writer, though he is considered the first Christian poet of the Latin period.<sup>317</sup> His main treatise is titled *The Instructions*. Another work, *Apologetic Poem*, is extant though lacks a modern translation.

## Usage of *Anima*

Commodianus uses *soul* sparingly. He uses it in describing the state of happiness of the individual. He writes, "If you wish to be refreshed (soul to be cooled), give help and encouragement to the martyr."<sup>318</sup> He also elsewhere notes that the soul can be made

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<sup>317</sup>Siegmar Döpp, "Commodian," *DECL*, 139-140.

<sup>318</sup>"*Si refrigerare cupis animam.*" *Instructionum libri ii* 2.13.19.

happy.<sup>319</sup> Here he continues the idea which Cyprian taught that good works are good for the salvation of the soul.

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Commodianus seems to suggest that the eternal punishment of hell is a spiritual one. He writes, “But since you seek to wander, you disbelieve all things, and therefore you will go into hell. By and by you give up your life (soul); you shall be taken where it grieves you to be: there the spiritual punishment, which is eternal, is undergone; there are always wailings: nor do you absolutely die therein—there at length too late proclaiming the omnipotent God.”<sup>320</sup> Here, though Commodianus is not precise in stating that it is the soul which goes to hell, he is clear that the unbeliever is taken there to undergo eternal, spiritual punishment. That he means the soul may be understood from another statement where he writes, “The souls of those that are lost deservedly of themselves separate themselves . . . and there the eternal flame will torment on the day decreed.”<sup>321</sup> Thus it seems likely that for Commodianus, the soul suffers punishment without the body being restored to it. Commodianus does not use any direct, biblical citations to support his idea.

### Summary

Commodianus has a similar usage to Cyprian regarding good works and the soul,

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<sup>319</sup>“*Exhilaratur enim ex anima regibus aptis.*” Ibid., 2.24.8.

<sup>320</sup>“*Lex docet ipsius, sed quia uagari tu quaeris, omnia discredis et inde in tartara ibis: mox animam reddis, duceris quo te paenitet esse. At luitur ibi poena spiritalis aeterna; lugia sunt semper, nec permoreris in illa omnipotentem deum iam tunc ibi sero proclamans.*” Ibid., 1.29.14.

<sup>321</sup>“*Damnatorum animae merito se ipsae secernunt; ex hoc protegenti iterum ad sua recurrunt.*” *Instructionum libri ii* 2.9.1.

arguing that they provide for its happiness. In a new development, he also argues that the unbelieving soul will receive spiritual punishment for eternity. Though fire is also used by Commodianus as the means of punishment, yet the introduction of the notion of a spiritual punishment hints at the direction that church thought seems to be moving, namely, away from the insistence on the physical resurrection and ultimate salvation of the body, replacing this with the spiritual superiority of the soul, both for salvation and damnation. This is in stark contrast to earlier writers who, save for Origen's proposals, were united in their insistence on the resurrection of the body to be rejoined to the soul for the reception of real rewards and real, literal punishments.

### **Novation**

Novation has several extant works including *On the Trinity* and *On the Jewish Foods*. *On the Trinity* was found among the works of Tertullian. Two letters, *On the Goodness of Chastity* and *On the Spectacles*, were included among the works of Cyprian but are believed to have been written by Novation.<sup>322</sup>

### Usage of *Anima*

Novation uses soul to refer to life. In commenting on Jesus' own words, Novation writes, "Now who is it who says that He can lay down His life, or can Himself recover His life again, because He has received it of His Father?"<sup>323</sup>

Novation locates the purity of an individual in their soul, writing, "The meat, I

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<sup>322</sup>On the works of Novation, see Heine, "Cyprian and Novation"; Moreschini and Norelli, 1:378-380.

<sup>323</sup>"*Quis est enim qui dicit animam suam se posse ponere aut animam suam posse se rursus recuperare, quia hoc mandatum acceperit a patre.*" *De trinitate* 21.12.



say, true, and holy, and pure, is a true faith, an unspotted conscience, and an innocent soul.”<sup>324</sup>

Novation writes of the soul being killed. “It must be said, moreover, that adultery is not pleasure, but mutual contempt; nor can it delight, because it kills both the soul and modesty.”<sup>325</sup> He also writes, “If Christ is only man, why may not Christ be denied without destruction of the soul, when it is said that a sin committed against man may be forgiven?”<sup>326</sup> Both of these *usages* may refer to the death of the soul in the sense of the loss of eternal salvation.

### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

Novation describes humans as “flesh and soul.”<sup>327</sup> He describes the soul as created by Christ. In the context of defending against those who claimed that Christ’s divinity had been put to death on the cross, Novation writes of “the soul itself, which was made by the Word of God.”<sup>328</sup>

For Novation, the soul does not die at death. In comparing Christ’s death to that of others he writes, “When in other men also, who are not flesh only, but flesh and soul, the flesh indeed alone suffers the inroads of wasting and death, while the soul is seen to

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<sup>324</sup>“*Cibus, inquam, uerus et sanctus et mundus est fides recta, immaculata conscientia, et innocens anima.*” *De cibis iudaicis* 5.30.

<sup>325</sup>“*Dicendum etiam quod adulterium uoluptas non est, sed mutua contumelia nec delectare potest quod et animam interficiat et pudorem.*” *De bono pudicitiae* 14.1.

<sup>326</sup>“*si homo tantummodo christus, cur non licet christum sine exitio animae negari, cum in hominem commissum delictum referatur posse dimitti?*” *De trinitate* 14.26.

<sup>327</sup>“*Qui non sunt caro tantummodo, sed caro et anima.*” *Ibid.*, 25.24.

<sup>328</sup>“*Nam cum ipsa anima, quae per dei uerbum facta est.*” *De trinitate* 25.42.

be uncorrupted, and beyond the laws of destruction and death.”<sup>329</sup> For support of this idea, Novation quotes Matt 10:28 about the destruction of soul and body. In this context, Novation refers to the soul as immortal and thus analogous to the divine in Christ which did not die when Christ was crucified.<sup>330</sup> Presumably he has here in mind 1 Pet 3:19-20. As additional scriptural support for this notion of an immortal soul, Novation argues that when the Scripture in Luke 20:37-38 says referring to Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob, that they “live unto God,” this means that their souls did not die, only their bodies were dissolved at death.<sup>331</sup>

Novation argues for a location where the souls of the just and the unjust are taken after the death of the body. He writes,

And truly, what lies beneath the earth is not itself void of distributed and arranged powers. For there is a place whither the souls of the just and the unjust are taken, conscious of the anticipated dooms of fixture judgment; so that we might behold the overflowing greatness of God’s works in all directions, not shut up within the bosom of this world, however capacious as we have said, but might also be able to conceive of them beneath both the abysses and the depths of the world itself.<sup>332</sup>

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<sup>329</sup>“*Quando et in ceteris hominibus, qui non sunt caro tantummodo, sed caro et anima, caro quidem sola incursum interitus mortis que patitur, extra leges autem interitus et mortis anima incorrupta cernatur?*” Ibid., 25.24.

<sup>330</sup>“*Quodsi anima immortalis occidi aut interfici non potest in quouis alio.*” Ibid., 25.32. See also 25.36, 39.

<sup>331</sup>“*Nam si abraham et isaac et iacob, quos homines tantummodo constat fuisse, manifestum est uiuere—omnes enim, inquit, illi uiuunt deo nec mors in illis animam perimit, quae corpora ipsa dissoluit; ius enim suum exercere potuit in corpora, in animas exercere non ualuit, aliud enim in illis mortale et ideo mortuum, aliud in illis immortale et ideo intellegitur non exstinctum.*” Ibid., 25.50.

<sup>332</sup>“*Nam neque quae infra terram iacent, neque ipsa sunt digestis et ordinatis potestatibus uacua—locus enim est quo piorum animae impiorum que ducuntur futuri iudicii praeiudicia sentientes—ut operum ipsius in omnibus partibus redundantes magnitudines non intra mundi huius capacissimos licet, ut diximus, sinus conclusas uideremus, sed etiam infra ipsius mundi et profunda et altitudines cogitare possemus et sic considerata operum magnitudine tantae molis digne mirari possemus artificem.*” *De trinitate* 1.62.

Novation, in describing things which the Christian will see, writes, “He will look also upon souls brought back even from death. Moreover, he will consider the marvelous souls brought back to the life of bodies which themselves were already consumed.”<sup>333</sup> The second sentence seems clearly to refer to the resurrection, while the first is not so clear. In this context, Novation moves from scenes which the Christian will see while on earth, to those which will be observed after the resurrection. This sentence lies at the dividing point, and it is not certain as to what it should refer to. The document *On the Trinity* clearly argues that the soul does not cease to exist at the death of the body. This statement here, if it were to refer to a time after the death of the body, would seem to indicate a time when the soul was dead.

### Summary

Novation uses soul for life. When he writes of its death, it seems to be in the context of the loss of salvation. Novation also has a composite or dipartite view of the human person, consisting of both soul and body. The body is corruptible and dies at death, while the soul is immortal, likened to the indestructibility of Christ’s divinity. Novation argues for this concept by referring to Christ’s words in Matt 10:28 and in Luke 20:37-38. He also uses the notion of Christ’s descent from 1 Pet 3:19-20. Novation argues that all souls, both of the just and the unjust, are held in the inner part of the earth until the resurrection.

While Novation continues the use of Matt 10:28 to argue for the continued nature of the soul, he also introduces a new verse to the argument. This is Luke 20:37-38. Here

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<sup>333</sup>“*Intuebitur et animas ab ipsa iam morte reuocatas, considerabit etiam de sepulcris admirabiles ipsorum consummatorum iam uitas corporum redactas.*” *De spectaculis* 10.11.

God is described as the God of the living, of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob.

### Arnobius

Arnobius wrote only one document which is known and extant, *Against the Heathen*.<sup>334</sup> The work is divided into seven books and is an apologetic against the pagan religions of the early fourth century. He is noted for suggesting several ideas at variance with other early Church Fathers on the topic of the soul.

### Usage of *Anima*

Arnobius uses soul for life. He writes, “The serpent by his bite takes away life.”<sup>335</sup> He also describes the sacrifice of animals as “the life fleeing away with the blood.”<sup>336</sup> In noting the power which Christ showed, he asked, “Was He one of us, who ordered the breath that had departed to return to the body.”<sup>337</sup> Here he connects soul with breath, though he does not connect it to the creation narrative. In the same vein he writes, “And to restore feeling and life to bodies long cold in death.”<sup>338</sup> Here Arnobius connects the soul with feeling or sense in the body.

Arnobius also identifies the soul as referring to oneself. He writes, “Beyond a

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<sup>334</sup>See Rainer Jakobi, “Arnobius the Elder (of Sicca),” *DECL*, 50; Oliver Nicholson, “Arnobius and Lactantius,” in *The Cambridge History of Early Christian Literature*, ed. Frances Young et al. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004), 259-261.

<sup>335</sup>“*Morsu animam serpens tollit.*” *Aduersus nationes* 1.11.12.3.

<sup>336</sup>“*Animas cum cruore fugientes.*” *Ibid.*, 7.4.346.17.

<sup>337</sup>“*Vnus fuit e nobis qui redire in corpore iam dudum animas praecipiebat efflatus.*” *Aduersus nationes* 1.46.40.15.

<sup>338</sup>“*Et in frigentia olim membra sensus animas que redducere.*” *Ibid.*, 1.52.48.1.

doubt the soul is a precious thing, and nothing can be found dearer to a man than himself.”<sup>339</sup> Elsewhere he writes, “Do you dare to laugh at us because we see to the salvation of our souls?—that is, ourselves care for ourselves.”<sup>340</sup> While surely other authors intended this usage, Arnobius is the first to explicitly identify the soul with oneself.

Arnobius describes congenital defects of character as the “inborn depravities of the soul.”<sup>341</sup> This notion becomes important in his argument against the divine or immortal nature of the soul. In this, he clearly locates moral and ethical failings in the soul itself.

#### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

In discussing the origins of the soul, Arnobius describes of it as “being either sent forth from Him, or having fallen from Him”<sup>342</sup> and as being confined in the body. However, he also urges that the soul is not a child of God. He writes “that souls are not the children of the Supreme Ruler, and did not begin to be self-conscious, and to be spoken of in their own special character after being created by Him; but that some other is their parent, far enough removed from the chief in rank and power, of His court, however, and distinguished by His high and exalted birthright.”<sup>343</sup> He argues that “if

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<sup>339</sup>“*Si quidem res anima pretiosa est, nec ipso se homini quicquam potest carius inveniri.*” Ibid., 1.53.48.22.

<sup>340</sup>“*Audetis ridere nos, quod animarum nostrarum provideamus saluti id est ipsi nobis?*” Ibid., 2.13.81.3.

<sup>341</sup>“*Qui ergo luctatur animarum ingenitas corrigere pravitates.*” Ibid., 2.50.124.2.

<sup>342</sup>“*Quod ab eo vel missae <animae> vel lapsae caecitate huius in corporis continemur?*” *Aduersus nationes* 1.29.25.6. Note that *anima* is supplied.

<sup>343</sup>“*Non esse animas regis maximi filias . . . , sed alterum quempiam genitorem his*

souls were, as is said, the Lord's children, and begotten by the Supreme Power, nothing would have been wanting to make them perfect, as they would have been born with the most perfect excellence."<sup>344</sup> He concludes, "But let this monstrous and impious fancy be put far from us, that Almighty God, the creator and framer, the author of things great and invisible, should be believed to have begotten souls so fickle, with no seriousness, firmness, and steadiness, prone to vice."<sup>345</sup> As to the question of who did create human souls, Arnobius states that he does know.<sup>346</sup> He writes that as Plato uses the Demiurge, "we do nothing out of place or foolish in believing that the souls of men are of a neutral character, inasmuch as they have been produced by secondary beings, made subject to the law of death, and are of little strength, and that are perishable."<sup>347</sup>

In an argument concerning Christ and His similarity to other humans, Arnobius writes, "But in the meantime let us grant, in submission to your ideas, that Christ was one of us—similar in mind, soul, body, weakness, and condition."<sup>348</sup> Here Arnobius gives a

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*esse, dignitatis et potentiae gradibus satis plurimis ab imperatore diiunctum, eius tamen ex aula et eminentium nobilem sublimitate natalium.*" Ibid., 2.36.108.13.

<sup>344</sup>*Quodsi essent ut fama est dominicae prolis et potestatis animae generatio principalis, nihil eis ad perfectionem / defuisset virtute perfectissima procreatis.*" Ibid., 2.37.109.1.

<sup>345</sup>*Sed procul haec abeat sceleratae opinionis immanitas, ut deus credatur omnipotens, magnarum et invisibilium rerum sator et conditor, procreator, tam mobiles animas genuisse, gravitatis ac ponderis constantiae que nullius, in vitia labiles.*" Ibid., 2.45.118.5.

<sup>346</sup>Ibid., 2.47.

<sup>347</sup>*Ergo cum haec ita sint, non absone neque inaniter credimus, mediae qualitatis esse animas hominum utpote ab rebus non principalibus editas, iuri subiectas mortis, parvarum et labilium virium.*" *Aduersus nationes* 2.53.126.23.

<sup>348</sup>*Sed concedamus, interdum manum vestris opinationibus dantes, unum Christum fuisse de nobis, mentis animae corporis fragilitatis et condicionis unius.*" Ibid., 1.38.32.11.

three-fold description of a human person. He more often writes of the soul and body in a dichotomous understanding.<sup>349</sup> He writes explicitly, “For what are we men, but souls shut up in bodies?”<sup>350</sup> He also writes of souls “clothed with the garment of the human body”<sup>351</sup> and “confined in the darkness of this body.”<sup>352</sup>

Arnobius does speak of death as the separation of the soul from the body. He writes, “For that which is seen by the eyes is only a separation of soul from body, not the last end.”<sup>353</sup> He also refers to this “fear of death, that is, the ruin of our souls”<sup>354</sup> and admonishes that “unless you give yourselves to seek to know the Supreme God, a cruel death awaits you when freed from the bonds of body.”<sup>355</sup>

Arnobius argues that the soul is not immortal. He writes that the people should not think that “souls are immortal, next in point of rank to the god and ruler of the world.” He notes that “if the soul had in itself the knowledge which it is fitting that a race should have indeed which is divine and immortal, all men would from the first know everything; nor would there be an age unacquainted with any art, or not furnished with

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<sup>349</sup>See for example *ibid.*, 2.14.82.15.

<sup>350</sup>“*Quid enim sumus homines nisi animae corporibus clausae?*” *Ibid.*, 2.13.81.5.

<sup>351</sup>“*Humani corporis circumiectione vestiri?*” *Ibid.*, 2.43.116.10.

<sup>352</sup>“*Caecitate huius in corporis continemur.*” *Ibid.*, 1.29.25.6.

<sup>353</sup>“*Nam illa quae sub oculis cernitur animarum est a corporibus diiugatio, non finis abolitionis extremus.*” *Ibid.*, 2.14.82.15.

<sup>354</sup>“*Mortis nobis cum proponatur metus id est animarum interitus, quid?*” *Ibid.*, 2.33.104.19.

<sup>355</sup>“*Nisi vos adplicatis dei principis notioni, a corporalibus vinculis exsolutos expectat mors saeva.*” *Aduersus nationes* 2.61.137.18.

practical knowledge.”<sup>356</sup> “For we do not see what is so wonderful in these arts, that because of their discovery the soul should be believed to be above the sun.”<sup>357</sup> Arnobius notes that people do not have the same abilities, which they should if they were divine, and they do not have any ability to gain wisdom outside of space and time, which they would not need if they were descended from the divine. He argues that if the soul is incorporeal, it would not lose its memory by being in a body<sup>358</sup> and wonders how it could be that it loses its memory from being joined to the body and yet, once this happens, it has no trouble remember things for many years.<sup>359</sup> He also notes that no one has ever seen the soul descending from the Supreme Ruler to earth to enter a human body.<sup>360</sup>

Arnobius argues that just as other beings have immortality as given by God, not from nature, so in the same way “will He deign to confer eternal life upon souls also, although hell death seems able to cut them off and blot them out of existence in utter annihilation.”<sup>361</sup> He also writes that souls “are gifted with immortality, if they rest their hope of so great a gift on God Supreme, who alone has power to grant such blessings, by

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<sup>356</sup>“*Quodsi haberent scientias animae, quas genus et habere divinum atque immortale condignum est, ab initio homines cuncti omnia scirent nec saeculum esset ullum, quod artis esset ignarum alicuius aut rerum experientia non paratum.*” Ibid., 2.18.87.3.

<sup>357</sup>“*In quibus artificiis quidnam insit admirabile non videmus, ut ex eorum inventione credatur esse animas potiores et sole et sideribus cunctis.*” Ibid., 2.19.87.21.

<sup>358</sup>Ibid., 2.26.

<sup>359</sup>*Aduersus nationes* 2.28.

<sup>360</sup>*Aduersus nationes* 2.51.

<sup>361</sup>“*Quo igitur pacto immortalitatis largitus est donum dis <die> certa prolatis, et animas hoc pacto dignabitur immortalitate donare, quamvis eas mors saeva posse videatur extinguere et ad nihilum / redactas inremeabili abolitione delere.*” Ibid., 2.36.107.18.



putting away corruption.”<sup>362</sup> Arnobius may be drawing on 1 Tim 6:16 when in this context of discussing the soul’s neutral nature between life and death he writes that God alone is immortal.<sup>363</sup> Here, also, Arnobius notes that it is based upon God’s word that he believes that that which is not immortal by nature (i.e., the soul) can be changed to become immortal. In the argument, Arnobius relies on the idea that God alone is immortal and thus the soul is obviously not immortal and anything that is or becomes immortal is so only by virtue of God’s will. In this context, Arnobius also argues that Plato lends some support to this notion by suggesting in the *Timaeus* that the various deities are corrupt by nature and only by the will of God are they kept from death.

Arnobius writes of “hell, and fires which cannot be quenched, into which we have learned that souls are cast by their foes and enemies.”<sup>364</sup> In countering Plato, he writes, “While he says that the soul is immortal, everlasting, and without bodily substance, he yet says that they are punished, and makes them suffer pain.”<sup>365</sup> Arnobius then argues that this cannot be. What is immortal cannot suffer pain and, conversely, what suffers pain is not immortal. He rather argues that the damned are annihilated and go to everlasting destruction.<sup>366</sup> This, he writes, “is man’s real death . . . annihilation: this, I say

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<sup>362</sup>“*Perpetuitate donari, <si> spem muneris tanti deum ad principem conferant, cui soli potestas est talia corruptione exclusa largiri.*” Ibid., 2.53.126.23. As Arnobius is clear that God alone can preserve the soul and give it immortality, one must question what place the lower, creator God had in the economy of God.

<sup>363</sup>Ibid., 2.35.

<sup>364</sup>“*Audetis ridere nos, cum gehennas dicimus et inextinguibiles quosdam ignes, in quos animas deici ab earum hostibus inimicis que cognovimus?*” *Aduersus nationes* 2.14.81.14.

<sup>365</sup>“*Ut cum animas dicat immortales perpetuas et ex corporali soliditate privatas, puniri eas dicat tamen et doloris adficiat sensu.*” Ibid., 2.14.81.20.

<sup>366</sup>“*Iaciuntur enim et ad nihilum redactae interitionis perpetuae frustratione*

is man's real death, when souls which know not God shall be consumed in long-protracted torment with raging fire."<sup>367</sup> Of interest here is the continual loss of importance for the body. Only the soul is regarded to have experienced any suffering. This is a newer development that is found in the later Latin authors.

Arnobius, in describing the things that Christ has taught the Christians, lists "what the soul, and whether it flew to us of its own accord, or whether it was generated and brought into existence with our bodies themselves; whether it sojourns with us, partaking of death, or whether it is gifted with an endless immortality; what condition awaits us when we shall have separated from our bodies relaxed in death; whether we shall retain our perceptions, or have no recollection of our former sensations or of past memories."<sup>368</sup> Arnobius gives no indication here of scriptural citations where Christ answered these questions or even what answer Christ gave to them. Arnobius is clear, however, that he understands these issues to have been addressed biblically by Christ Himself.

### Summary

Arnobius only rarely uses soul for life. He introduces the notion of the soul as the self. He also locates sin in the soul.

Arnobius has, in general, a dichotomous view of the human person, soul, and

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*vanescunt.*" Ibid., 2.14.82.6.

<sup>367</sup>"*Haec est hominis mors vera, haec nihil residuum faciens . . . non finis abolitionis extremus—haec inquam est hominis mors vera, cum animae nescientes deum per longissimi temporis cruciatum consumentur igni fero.*" Ibid., 2.14.82.15.

<sup>368</sup>"*Quid anima, advolarit ne ad nos sponte an cum ipsis sata sit et procreata visceribus, mortis particeps degat an immortalitatis perpetuitate donata sit, qui status nos maneat, cum dissolutis abierimus a membris, visuri ne nos sumus an memoriam nullam nostri sensus et recordationem habituri.*" *Aduersus nationes* 1.38.32.15.

body. He does once use the trichotomous expression body, soul, and mind. He is quite clear that the body is viewed as that which restrains the individual and from which death brings release.

For Arnobius, the soul is mortal because it was created by one lower than the Supreme God, who because he was a lesser god, he did not have the power to give immortality. This is evident in that all souls are different and all are sinful. God alone can give immortality. In this argument, Arnobius possibly alludes to 1 Tim 6:16. Thus if the soul becomes immortal, it is by virtue of God's will, not of any natural characteristic. Arnobius argues that souls are subject to fires which will burn to the point of annihilation. Thus Arnobius introduces a new concept, that of a limited punishment for the wicked—limited, that is, in time.<sup>369</sup> However, while he does not deny the soul's being rejoined to the body, yet he also specifically mentions only the soul in describing the suffering of hell fire.

Arnobius repeatedly notes that the Scriptures and Christ's words are the source for his teachings. He does not specifically point to any passage in his argumentation. Thus the reader is left somewhat unsure of what Scriptures motivated his thinking, especially on the several important ideas where his thought differed from earlier writers. In this, it should be noted that Arnobius generally refrains from mentioning prior Christian teaching, choosing rather to argue against Plato and other pagan writers.

### **Lactantius**

Lactantius, one of the more erudite of Latin Christian writers, is reported to have

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<sup>369</sup>While some have argued that this is also true with both Justin and Irenaeus, Arnobius is the first to clearly advocate this notion.

been the student of Arnobius. He has left several important documents.<sup>370</sup> These include the *Divine Institutes*, the *Creation of God*,<sup>371</sup> *Epitome of the Divine Institutes*, *Wrath of God*, and the *Death of the Persecutors*. He also wrote a poem on the *Phoenix*. The soul appears prominent in both the *Divine Institutes* and the *Creation of God*.

It has been noted that “Lactantius is very sparing in his use of Christian sources.”<sup>372</sup> It should be observed, however, that he does indicate several times that the doctrine of the soul has been given from God and thus is not subject to the errors that are found in the writings of the philosophers.

### Usage of *Anima*

#### General Usage

Lactantius uses soul for life. In describing the killing of children, he writes, “They destroyed tender and innocent lives.”<sup>373</sup> He describes those “who, though they eagerly seek their souls, and property, and children by sword and fire, yet are spared when conquered,”<sup>374</sup> and writes of those “who do not even spare their own life, but sell their

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<sup>370</sup>On the works of Lactantius, see Karl-Heinz Schwarte, “Lactantius,” *DECL*, 366-367; Antonie Wlosok, “Lactantius,” *Theologische Realenzyklopädie* (1990), 371-374. For an overview of his life, see Mary F. McDonald, *Lactantius, The Divine Institutes* (Washington, DC: The Catholic University of America Press, 1964), ix-xxv.

<sup>371</sup>See Eberhard Heck, “Bemerkungen zum text von Lactanz, *De opificio Dei*,” *Vigiliae Christianae* 23 (1969): 273-292; Michel Perrin, “Le *De opificio Dei* de Lactance. Bilan d’une édition trente ans après: *Retratatio* et perspectives de recherche,” in *Le De opificio Dei: Regards croisés sur l’anthropologie de Lactance*, ed. Béatrice Bakhouché et al. (Saint-Étienne: Université de Saint-Étienne, 2007).

<sup>372</sup>McDonald, xviii.

<sup>373</sup>“*Cum teneras atque innocentes animas.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 1.21.10. Cf. *De mortibus persecutorum* 1.5; 17.9.

<sup>374</sup>“*Quibus utique, cum animas eorum et opes et liberos ferro et igni adpetant, tamen parcitur uictis.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 5.9.3. See also *Epitome diuinarum*

souls to be taken away in public.”<sup>375</sup> He elsewhere writes to Christians that “where life is endangered, to be more careful of the soul of another than of one’s own.”<sup>376</sup> Here *anima* is used in parallel with *vita*. He urges that all cherish “and support with kindness, the soul of men, that they may not be extinguished.”<sup>377</sup> He writes of those who “destroy the lives of men.”<sup>378</sup> He has an interesting usage when he writes, “Therefore let no one imagine that even this is allowed, to strangle newly-born children, which is the greatest impiety; for God breathes into their souls for life, and not for death.”<sup>379</sup> Here life and soul are connected to God’s breath. And Lactantius specifically describes God as breathing into their souls to give them life rather than breathing a soul into them to give them life. Later, he will change course and write of God breathing a soul into the body. He also writes, “For if there is no existence after death, it is plain that he acts foolishly who spares the life of another to his own loss, or who consults the gain of another more than his own.”<sup>380</sup>

Lactantius also uses soul for person. He writes, “We must endure it with

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*institutionum* 49.5.

<sup>375</sup>“*Qui ne uitae quidem suae parcant, sed extinguendas publice animas suas uendant.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 5.9.15.

<sup>376</sup>“*Tam ineptum uidetur quam in periculo uitae alterius animam magis curare quam suam.*” *Ibid.*, 5.18.12.

<sup>377</sup>“*Foue quantum in te est et animas hominum ne extinguantur humanitate sustenta.*” *Ibid.*, 6.11.19.

<sup>378</sup>“*Ut cum animas hominum interficiant, ludere se opinentur.*” *Ibid.*, 6.20.11.

<sup>379</sup>“*Ergo ne illud quidem concedi aliquis existimet, ut recens natos liceat oblidere, quae uel maxima est impietas: ad uitam enim deus inspirat animas, non ad mortem.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 6.20.18.

<sup>380</sup>“*Si enim post mortem nihil est, utique stulte facit qui alterius animae parcat cum dispendio suae aut qui alterius lucro magis quam suo consulit.*” *Epitome diuinarum institutionum* 52.7.

equanimity, since the death of an innocent person cannot be unavenged, and since we have a great Judge who alone always has the power of taking vengeance in His hands.”<sup>381</sup> He writes, “Those ravenous and voracious wolves who have tormented just and innocent souls, without the commission of any crimes, will surely meet with their reward.”<sup>382</sup>

Lactantius speaks of oneself and one’s soul in a way that might suggest a distinction. He writes, “Worship a living being, that you may live; for he must necessarily die who has subjected himself and his soul to the dead.”<sup>383</sup> However, he also writes of one bowing down before idols as “prostrat[ing] his soul.”<sup>384</sup> Here soul may possibly be seen as identifying the individual as a whole.

Lactantius also describes the soul as a separate entity from the person. He writes, “Therefore, let those who destroy their own souls and the souls of others learn what an inexpressible crime they commit.”<sup>385</sup> The context here suggests that this is not referring to life. He also writes of those who “place their own souls to be burned with the very incense on detestable altars.”<sup>386</sup> He also describes spirits who “as long as there is peace

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<sup>381</sup>“*Et si uis aliqua inferatur, aequa mente patiendum, cum extincta innocentis anima inulta esse non possit habeamus que iudicem magnum.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 3.18.7.

<sup>382</sup>“*Ueniet rabiosis ac uoracibus lupis merces sua, qui iustas et simplices animas nullis facinoribus admissis excruciauerunt.*” *Ibid.*, 5.23.4.

<sup>383</sup>“*Uiuum colite, ut uiuatis: moriatur enim necesse est qui se suam que animam mortuis adiudicauit.*” *Ibid.*, 2.2.24.

<sup>384</sup>“*Ut quisquis animam suam, cuius origo de caelo est, ad inferna et ima prostrauerit.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 2.18.5.

<sup>385</sup>“*Discant igitur et suarum et alienarum interfectores animarum quam inexpressibile facinus admittant.*” *Ibid.*, 5.19.1.

<sup>386</sup>“*Adorant itaque hostes suos, latrones et interfectores suos uictimis placant et animas suas cum ture ipso cremandas aris detestabilibus inponunt.*” *Ibid.*, 5.20.1.

among the people of God, flee from the righteous, and fear them; and when they seize upon the bodies of men, and harass their souls, they are adjured by them, and at the name of the true God are put to flight.”<sup>387</sup> He writes of the persecutors of Christians, “Therefore let not the souls of the sacrilegious expect that those whom they thus trample upon will be despised and unavenged.”<sup>388</sup> He adds, “But we do not refer the chief good to the body, but we measure every duty by the preservation of the soul only.”<sup>389</sup>

Lactantius suggests that both virtue and vice impact the soul with vices being the more powerful.<sup>390</sup> He writes of those who “would not subject their souls to the influence of earth-born fictions, nor would they seek the deadly fascinations of their lusts.”<sup>391</sup> He writes of the commands of restraint “which restrain [sinners] from their pleasures, to which they have given up their soul, together with their body.”<sup>392</sup> He notes that there are “three passions, or, so to speak, three furies, which excite such great perturbations in the souls of men,” these being anger, love of gain, and lust.<sup>393</sup>

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<sup>387</sup>“*Hi enim, quamdiu pax est in populo dei, fugitant iustos et pauent, et cum corpora hominum occupant animas que diuexant, adiurantur ab iis et nomine dei ueri fugantur.*” Ibid., 5.21.4.

<sup>388</sup>“*Quapropter non sperent sacrilegae animae contemptos et inultos fore quos sic obterunt.*” Ibid., 5.23.4.

<sup>389</sup>“*Nos autem summum bonum non referimus ad corpus, sed omne officium solius animae conseruatione metimur.*” Ibid., 6.17.15.

<sup>390</sup>“*Non uides fore ut inrumpant uitia cum uirtutibus, quia mala bonis adhaerent et in animis hominum potentiora sunt?*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 1.20.17.

<sup>391</sup>“*Terrenis figmentis animas suas non substernerent, mortiferas libidinum suauitates non adpeterent.*” Ibid., 2.1.4.

<sup>392</sup>“*Quia uulnerant aures eorum praecepta continentiae, quae illos uoluptatibus suis prohibent quibus animam suam cum corpore adiudicauerunt.*” Ibid., 7.1.14.

<sup>393</sup>“*Tres adfectus uel ut ita dicam tres Furiae sunt, quae in animis hominum tantas perturbaciones cient et interdum cogunt ita delinquere, . . . ira, . . . auaritia, quae*

## The Corporeal and the Soul

Lactantius notes the ancient connection between heat and moisture with soul and body.<sup>394</sup> He also writes that the soul is “that with which we breathe.”<sup>395</sup> He suggests that the lungs are where the soul resides; or at least, that is where they are nourished.<sup>396</sup> In further discussing the connections between the physical body and the soul, he writes, “But I think that all things which relate to the motions of the mind and soul, are of so obscure and profound a nature, that it is beyond the power of man to see through them clearly.”<sup>397</sup>

Lactantius also connects the soul with the power of breath.<sup>398</sup> Elsewhere he describes “the nature of the soul, which is so subtle that it escapes the eyes of the human mind.”<sup>399</sup> He notes that “the soul appears to be like light, since it is not itself blood, but is

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*desiderat opes, libido, quae adpetit uoluptates.” Epitome diuinarum institutionum 55.5.*

<sup>394</sup>“*Cum enim constet omne animal ex anima et corpore, materia corporis in umore est, animae in calore: quod ex auium fetibus datur scire, quos crassi umoris plenos nisi opifex calor fouerit, nec umor potest corporari nec corpus animari.” Diuinae Institutiones 2.9.22.*

<sup>395</sup>“*Ipse animam qua spiramus infudit.” Ibid., 2.11.19.*

<sup>396</sup>“*Sed cum homo constet ex corpore atque anima, illud quod supra dixi receptaculum soli corpori praestat alimentum, animae uero aliam sedem dedit.” De opificio Dei 11.3. Cf. 11.5.*

<sup>397</sup>“*Sed omnia quae ad motus animi animae que pertineant, tam obscurae altae que rationis esse arbitror, ut supra hominem sit ea liquido peruidere.” De opificio Dei 14.8.*

<sup>398</sup>*Diuinae Institutiones 7.12.10.*

<sup>399</sup>“*Sed quia non peruidebant animae rationem, quae tam suptilis est, ut oculos humanae mentis effugiat, interire dixerunt.” Ibid., 7.13.8. Cf. De ira Dei 15.3.15. On the “eyes of the mind,” see Eph 1:18.*



nourished by the moisture of the blood, as light is by oil.”<sup>400</sup>

Lactantius argues that the soul is not necessarily connected to the blood in the body. He writes, “For if the soul appears to be extinguished when the blood is poured forth through a wound, or is exhausted by the heat of fevers, it does not therefore follow that the system of the soul is to be placed in the material of the blood.”<sup>401</sup>

### **The Powers of the Soul**

The soul is distinct from the mind, “for it is one thing that we live, another that we reflect.”<sup>402</sup> He notes that it is the mind which is at rest when a person sleeps, not the soul. In this context, he also points out that people may lose their mind but still retain their soul. He adds that the mind increases and decreases with age, but the “soul is always in its own condition; and from the time when it receives the power of breathing, it remains the same even to the end.”<sup>403</sup> Motion also defines the soul. He describes it as “in motion

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<sup>400</sup>“*Uidetur ergo anima similis esse lumini, quae non ipsa sit sanguis, sed umore sanguinis alatur ut lumen oleo.*” *De opificio Dei* 17.3. See Michel Perrin, *L’homme antique et chrétien: l’anthropologie de Lactance* 250-325, *Théologie Historique* 59 (Paris: Beauchesne, 1981), 278.

<sup>401</sup>“*Non enim si anima sanguine aut per uulnus effuso aut febrium calore consumpto uidetur extingui, continuo in materia sanguinis animae ratio ponenda est, ueluti si ueniat in quaestionem lumen quo utimur, quid sit, et respondeatur oleum esse, quoniam consumpto illo lumen extinguitur, cum sint utique diuersa, sed alterum sit alterius alimentum.*” *De opificio Dei* 17.3.

<sup>402</sup>“*Nam dormientium mens, non anima sopitur, et in furiosis mens extinguitur, anima manet, et ideo non exanimis, sed dementes appellantur.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.12.9. On this and the connections with Tertullian and other philosophers, see Perrin, *L’homme antique et chrétien*, 288-293.

<sup>403</sup>“*Anima in statu suo semper est, et ex quo tempore spirandi accipit facultatem, eadem usque ad ultimum durat, donec emissa corporis claustrum ad sedem suam reuolet.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.12.10.

by itself at all times.”<sup>404</sup> He also writes, “But I think that all things which relate to the motions of the mind and soul, are of so obscure and profound a nature, that it is beyond the power of man to see through them clearly.”<sup>405</sup>

After having made this distinction between the mind and the soul, Lactantius seems to reverse course and writes, “In the next place, the soul, although inspired by God, yet, because it is shut up in a dark abode of earthly flesh, does not possess knowledge, which belongs to divinity.”<sup>406</sup> He adds that it gains wisdom by learning and hearing. Wisdom is of noted importance for the soul. This is evident when Lactantius writes, “But as these things are the nourishment of the body, so wisdom is of the soul.”<sup>407</sup> Wisdom thus seems vital in giving strength and health to the soul.

## Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

### Origins of the Soul

In describing creation, Lactantius writes, “And thus, when all things had been settled with a wonderful arrangement, He determined to prepare for Himself an eternal kingdom, and to create innumerable souls, on whom He might bestow immortality.”<sup>408</sup>

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<sup>404</sup>“*Nec ideo tamen immortalem esse animam non intellegimus, quoniam quidquid uiget mouetur que per se semper nec uideri aut tangi potest, aeternum sit necesse est.*” *De opificio Dei* 17.1. See Perrin, *L’homme antique et chrétien*, 280-281.

<sup>405</sup>“*Sed omnia quae ad motus animi animae que pertineant, tam obscurae altae que rationis esse arbitror, ut supra hominem sit ea liquido peruidere.*” *De opificio Dei* 14.8.

<sup>406</sup>“*Deinde, quod anima quamuis a deo sit inspirata, tamen quia tenebroso domicilio terrenae carnis inclusa est, scientiam non habet, quae est diuinitatis.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.12.11.

<sup>407</sup>“*Ut illa corporis alimenta sunt, sic animae sapientia.*” *Ibid.*, 7.12.11.

<sup>408</sup>“*Ita rebus omnibus mirabili discriptione compositis regnum sibi aeternum parare constituit et innumerabiles animas procreare, quibus immortalitatem daret.*” *Ibid.*,

Here, Lactantius locates the creation of souls after the creation of the rest of the animal world. In this initial description, immortality is to be conferred on them. He describes God as after “having made the body, He breathed into it a soul from the vital source of His own Spirit, which is everlasting, that it might bear the similitude of the world itself, which is composed of opposing elements.”<sup>409</sup> He alone is the “giver of life” and can “impart the breath of life.”<sup>410</sup> These are clear allusions to Gen 2:7.

Lactantius argues that the soul is not given at birth but at conception.<sup>411</sup> He further notes that this is done by God, not by anything from the father or mother. He writes, “For a body may be produced from a body, since something is contributed from both; but a soul cannot be produced from souls, because nothing can depart from a slight and incomprehensible subject.”<sup>412</sup> He continues, “For nothing but what is mortal can be generated from mortals.”<sup>413</sup> As further argument against the soul’s originating from the father he writes, “Nor ought he to be deemed a father who in no way perceives that he

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2.10.2.

<sup>409</sup>“*Ficto enim corpore, inspiravit ei animam de vitali fonte spiritus sui qui est perennis, ut ipsius mundi ex contrariis constantis elementis similitudinem gereret.*” Ibid., 2.12.3.

<sup>410</sup>“*Quod uitae sit dator et animantibus inspiret animas, quae uirtus solius dei est—quam enim possit inspirare animam qui ipse accepit aliunde?*” Ibid., 1.11.16.

<sup>411</sup>*De opificio Dei* 17.7. Cf. Perrin, *L’homme antique et chrétien*, 266; Aline Rousselle, “L’embryologie dans le *De opificio Dei* de Lactance,” in *Le De opificio Dei: Regards croisés sur l’anthropologie de Lactance*, ed. Béatrice Bakhouché et al. (Saint-Étienne: Université de Saint-Étienne, 2007).

<sup>412</sup>“*Corpus enim ex corporibus nasci potest, quoniam confertur aliquid ex utroque, de animis anima non potest, quia ex re tenui et incomprehensibili nihil potest decedere.*” *De opificio Dei* 19.2.

<sup>413</sup>“*Nam de mortalibus non potest quicquam nisi mortale generari.*” Ibid.

has transmitted or breathed a soul from his own.”<sup>414</sup> Elsewhere he notes that “nothing can depart from a slight and incomprehensible subject. Therefore the manner of the production of souls belongs entirely to God alone.”<sup>415</sup>

### **The Human Person and the Soul**

Lactantius has a clear dichotomous view of the human individual. He writes that “man is composed of body and soul.”<sup>416</sup> He describes man as being made of “soul and body, that is, as it were, of heaven and earth: since the soul by which we live, has its origin, as it were, out of heaven from God, the body out of the earth, of the dust of which we have said that it was formed.”<sup>417</sup> He adds, “For as much as the soul excels the body, so much does God excel the world, for God made and governs the world.”<sup>418</sup> This is a clear conflict between the soul and the body.<sup>419</sup> He writes, “Because God has set forth virtue before man, although the soul and the body are connected together, yet they are

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<sup>414</sup>“*Nec putari pater debet qui transfudisse <se> aut inspirasse animam de sua nullo modo sentit, nec si sentiat, quando tamen aut quomodo id fiat habet animo comprehensum.*” Ibid., 19.3.

<sup>415</sup>“*Ex re tenui et inconprehensibili nihil potest decedere. itaque serendarum animarum ratio uni ac soli deo subiacet.*” Ibid., 19.2-3. See Karpp, *Probleme*, 143.

<sup>416</sup>“*Sed cum homo constet ex corpore atque anima.*” *De opificio Dei* 11.3.

<sup>417</sup>“*Constat enim ex anima et corpore id est quasi ex caelo et terra, quandoquidem anima qua uiuimus uelut e caelo oritur a deo, corpus e terra, cuius e limo diximus esse formatum.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 2.12.3. See also 7.4.12; 7.5.16; 7.5.23; *De ira Dei* 15.3. Cf. 19.1-2.

<sup>418</sup>“*Quia quanto pluris est anima quam corpus, tanto pluris est deus quam mundus, quia mundum deus et fecit et regit.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 3.9.16.

<sup>419</sup>See Blandine Colot, “Le corps, du *De opificio Dei* aux *Diuinae institutiones*: martyre, philosophie chrétienne et religion chez Lactance,” in *Le De opificio Dei: Regards croisés sur l’anthropologie de Lactance*, ed. Béatrice Bakhouché et al. (Saint-Étienne: Université de Saint-Étienne, 2007), 77.

contrary, and oppose one another.”<sup>420</sup>

The soul also functions as the principle of life for the body. He writes that “a body abandoned by the soul wastes away.”<sup>421</sup> This strong connection between the soul and the divine in contrast to the connection between the body and the earth is key to understanding Lactantius’s position on the nature of the soul. Though Lactantius has a generally dichotomous understanding of the human person, he does write that, “then, the soul being freed from intercourse with the body, he lives in the spirit only.”<sup>422</sup>

Lactantius writes that one “cannot maintain the character of a man who is ignorant of God, the parent of his soul.”<sup>423</sup> As God is the parent of the soul, Lactantius can write regarding the commonality of humanity, “and, indeed, the more closely united, because we are united in soul rather than in body.” Here Lactantius notes that all humanity is united in soul because all humanity derives its origin from God.

The two separate substances, body and soul, which comprise the human individual wage war to determine the eternal destiny of the individual. Lactantius writes, “If the soul, which has its origin from God, gains the mastery, it is immortal, and lives in perpetual light; if, on the other hand, the body shall overpower the soul, and subject it to

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<sup>420</sup>“*Ergo quia uirtutem proposuit homini deus, licet anima et corpus consociata sint, tamen contraria sunt et inpugnant inuicem.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.5.23. On Lactantius’s explanation for the organs of the body and their relation to the soul, see *De officio Dei* 14.

<sup>421</sup>“*Corpus relictum ab anima diffluit.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 3.20.14.

<sup>422</sup>“*Sed tunc, cum anima societate corporis liberata in solo spiritu uiuit.*” *Ibid.*, 3.12.34.

<sup>423</sup>“*Non potest enim rationem hominis obtinere qui parentem animae suae deum nescit.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 6.9.1. Lactantius writes that God is capable of creating innumerable souls. See, for example, *ibid.*, 7.5.9.

its dominion, it is in everlasting darkness and death.”<sup>424</sup> He also writes that “those things which belong to God occupy the higher part, namely the soul, which has dominion over the body; but those which belong to the devil occupy the lower part, manifestly the body: for this, being earthly, ought to be subject to the soul, as the earth is to heaven.”<sup>425</sup>

Lactantius does not explain why people sin or if the soul is the master over the body by nature. He adds, “For we have one great and principal struggle to maintain with the flesh, the boundless desire; of which press upon the soul, nor allow it to retain dominion, but make it the slave of pleasures and sweet allurements, and visit it with everlasting death.”<sup>426</sup> Here it seems that the flesh is described as having power of the soul which requires a struggle to overcome.

### **Immortality and the Soul**

Lactantius defends the doctrine of the immortality of the soul by several arguments. He connects the immortality of the soul with virtue and the return to the soul’s creator. He writes, “Those who discuss the immortality of the soul ought to have understood that virtue is set before us on this account, that, lusts having been subdued, and the desire of earthly things overcome, our souls, pure and victorious, may return to

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<sup>424</sup>“*Si anima superauerit quae oritur ex deo, sit immortalis et in perpetua luce uersetur, si autem corpus uicerit animam ditioni quae subiecerit, sit in tenebris sempiternis et in morte.*” Ibid., 2.12.7.

<sup>425</sup>“*Superiorem partem tenent ea quae sunt dei, anima scilicet quae dominium corporis habet, inferiorem autem ea quae sunt diaboli, corpus utique, quod quia terrenum est, animae debet esse subiectum sicut terra caelo.*” Ibid., 2.12.10. See also 7.5.24.

<sup>426</sup>“*Una enim nobis et magna et praecipua cum carne luctatio est, cuius infinitae cupiditates premunt animam nec dominium retinere patiuntur, sed eam uoluptatibus et inlecebris suauibus mancipatam morte adficiunt sempiterna.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 4.25.9.

God, that is, to their original source.”<sup>427</sup> He describes virtue as “the natural goodness and honor of which may teach us that the soul is not mortal, and that a divine reward is appointed for it by God.”<sup>428</sup> He adds, “The gift of virtue also to man alone is a great proof that souls are immortal.”<sup>429</sup>

Lactantius also argues that virtue demonstrates the immortality of the soul, as it is not good for the present life if there is not reward or punishment to follow. He argues, “For in defense of faith and justice, virtue neither fears want, nor is alarmed at exile, nor dreads imprisonment, nor shrinks from pain, nor refuses death; and because these things are contrary to nature, either virtue is foolishness, . . . or if it is not foolishness, then the soul is immortal, and despises present goods, because other things are preferable which it attains after the dissolution of the body.”<sup>430</sup>

In comparing his notion of the immortality of the soul with that of Plato, Lactantius writes, “For although he perceived the truth respecting the immortality of the soul, yet he did not speak respecting it as though it were the chief good.”<sup>431</sup> This he

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<sup>427</sup>“*Illi tamen qui de immortalitate animae disputant intellegere debuerunt ideo propositam nobis esse uirtutem, ut perdomitis libidinibus rerum que terrestrium cupiditate superata purae ac uictrices animae ad deum id est ad originem suam reuertantur.*” *Ibid.*, 3.12.25. Cf. *Epitome diuinarum institutionum* 52.7.

<sup>428</sup>“*Cuius naturalis bonitas et honestas docere nos potest animam non esse mortalem diuinum que illi a deo praemium constitutum.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 5.18.10.

<sup>429</sup>“*Uirtus quoque soli homini data magno argumento est immortales animas esse.*” *Ibid.*, 7.9.15.

<sup>430</sup>“*Uirtus enim pro fide, pro iustitia nec egestatem timet nec exilium metuit nec carcerem perhorrescit nec dolorem reformidat nec mortem recusat: quae quia naturae contraria sunt, aut stultitia est uirtus, si et commoda impedit et uitae nocet, aut si stultitia non est, ergo anima immortalis est et ideo praesentia bona contemnit, | quia sunt alia potiora quae post dissolutionem corporis sui adsequatur.*” *Epitome diuinarum institutionum* 65.3.

<sup>431</sup>“*Nam licet uerum de animae immortalitate sentiret, tamen non ita de illa*

explains by writing, “But these men, because they were ignorant or in doubt that the souls of men are immortal, estimated both virtues and vices by earthly honors or punishments.”<sup>432</sup> Lactantius is clear to argue that virtue must always be kept in the context of immortality which God gives to those who practice virtue. Regarding this he writes, “For if our souls are mortal, if virtue is about to have no existence after the dissolution of the body, why do we avoid the goods assigned to us, as though we were ungrateful or unworthy of enjoying the divine gifts?”<sup>433</sup> From this, Lactantius connects virtue to vice or pleasure. He adds, “Pleasure is common to all animals, virtue belongs only to man; the former is vicious, . . . the latter is opposed to nature, unless the soul is immortal.”<sup>434</sup> Elsewhere he also writes, “But if the virtue of the soul shall have resisted the desires, and suppressed them, he will be truly like to God. From which it is evident that the soul of man, which is capable of divine virtue, is not mortal.”<sup>435</sup>

Lactantius argues that the philosophers who agreed with the idea of the immortality of the soul did so accidentally,<sup>436</sup> not relying on Scripture, which was opened

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*tamquam de summo bono disserebat.” Diuinae Institutiones 7.8.2.*

<sup>432</sup>“*Hi uero quia ignorabant aut dubitabant animas hominum inmortales esse, et uirtutes et uitia terrenis honoribus aut poenis aestimauerunt.*” *Ibid.*, 6.3.5.

<sup>433</sup>“*Si enim mortales sunt animae, si uirtus dissoluto corpore nihil futura est, quid fugimus adtributa nobis bona quasi aut ingrati aut indigni qui diuinis muneribus perfruamur?*” *Ibid.*, 6.9.20.

<sup>434</sup>“*Uoluptas omnibus est communis animalibus, uirtus solius est hominis: illa uitiosa est, haec honesta, illa secundum naturam, haec aduersa naturae, nisi anima immortalis est.*” *Epitome diuinarum institutionum* 65.2.

<sup>435</sup>“*Vnde apparet animam hominis, quae uirtutem diuinam capit, non esse mortalem.*” *De ira Dei* 19.2.8. See also 24.13.51.

<sup>436</sup>*Diuinae Institutiones* 3.18. Lactantius, in *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.13.9, does mention Aristoxenus who he says denied that there was a soul at all. Lactantius notes that there can be nothing more senseless than this.



to the Christians by divinity.<sup>437</sup> In arguing against Cicero's notion that death is not to be feared because if the soul survives, it is divine, and if it does not, then there is no evil, Lactantius writes that "each conclusion is false. For the sacred writings teach that the soul is not annihilated; but that it is either rewarded according to its righteousness, or eternally punished according to its crimes."<sup>438</sup> Here Lactantius connects the immortality of the soul with the reality of a future judgment. In arguing against Epicurus, he notes that the idea that one does not need to fear a future punishment because the soul dies is more fitting of a leader of a band of robbers than a rational person.<sup>439</sup> Here Lactantius makes a clear connection between the reality of a future judgment and the continued state of existence of the soul.<sup>440</sup>

Lactantius notes that some philosophers understood in part the doctrine of the soul.<sup>441</sup> He, however, states that there were often errors in understanding or in reasons or causes which they were describing. He argues that God has proclaimed the truth in this regard and thus he can explain it correctly.<sup>442</sup> He asks, "But why do we infer from arguments that souls are eternal, when we have divine testimonies?"<sup>443</sup> This point is

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<sup>437</sup>Cf. *ibid.*, 7.13.2.

<sup>438</sup>"*Docent enim diuinae litterae non extingui animas, sed aut pro iustitia praemio adfici aut poena pro sceleribus sempiterna.*" *Ibid.*, 3.19.3.

<sup>439</sup>*Ibid.*, 3.17.42.

<sup>440</sup>See also Perrin, *L'homme antique et chrétien*, 369-370.

<sup>441</sup>See, for example, *Epitome diuinarum institutionum* 63.8.

<sup>442</sup>See, for example, *ibid.*, 62.7; 65.1.

<sup>443</sup>"*Sed quid argumentis colligimus aeternas esse animas, cum habeamus testimonia diuina?*" *Ibid.*, 65.6.

reiterated. The immortal nature of the soul is taught in the Scriptures. Of note here is that Lactantius refers to the Scriptures as support for the idea of the immortal nature of the soul though he does not in general make any direct citations.

The idea that God is incorporeal, invisible, and eternal also influences Lactantius's thinking. From this, he argues "that the soul, since it is not seen, does not perish after its departure from the body."<sup>444</sup> Similarly he notes that "the soul is both endowed with perception and cannot be seen, and does not burn. From which it is evident that the soul is something like God."<sup>445</sup> He also argues that the soul will be able to sense without the members of the body just as God also senses without a body. He notes that even Cicero agrees that the immortal nature of the soul can be understood from the fact that humans are the only animal which has knowledge of God.<sup>446</sup> He also refutes the argument of Lucretius that since the soul is created with the body, it also dissolves with the body. He notes that the soul does not perish with the body for when the soul departs (that is, at death), the body still remains undissolved for some time. Lactantius writes, "For the soul cannot entirely perish, since it received its origin from the Spirit of God, which is eternal."<sup>447</sup>

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<sup>444</sup>"*Quodsi est deus et incorporalis et inuisibilis et aeternus, ergo non idcirco interire animam credibile est, quia non uidetur, postquam recessit a corpore, quoniam constat esse aliquid sentiens ac uigens quod non ueniat sub aspectum.*" Ibid., 7.9.7. See also Perrin, *L'homme antique et chrétien*, 348-349.

<sup>445</sup>"*Sed ignis et sensu indiget et uidetur et tactu conburit, anima uero et sensu aucta est et uideri non potest et non adurit. unde apparet animam nescio quid esse deo simile.*" *De opificio Dei* 17.4. See Perrin, *L'homme antique et chrétien*, 273-274.

<sup>446</sup>*Diuinae Institutiones* 7.9.12. Cf. Cicero *De legibus* 1.8.

<sup>447</sup>"*Nam interire prorsus anima non potest, quoniam ex dei spiritu qui aeternus est originem cepit.*" *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.12.16.

Lactantius argues that humans are made of two elements, one heavenly, the other earthly, one fire, the other water. He writes that Adam consisted of “soul and body, that is, as it were, of heaven and earth: since the soul by which we live, has its origin, as it were, out of heaven from God, the body out of the earth, of the dust of which we have said that it was formed.”<sup>448</sup> He notes that the body is solid and can be sensed with the senses, while the soul can neither be seen nor touched.<sup>449</sup> Elsewhere, he writes, “Nor, therefore, do we fail to understand that the soul is immortal, since whatever is vigorous and is in motion by itself at all times, and cannot be seen or touched, must be eternal.”<sup>450</sup> He does admit, however, that “what the soul is, is not yet agreed upon by philosophers, and perhaps will never be agreed upon.”<sup>451</sup>

### **Death and the Soul**

Death, for Lactantius, is “the separation of body and soul.”<sup>452</sup> Death, however, is not destruction. He notes that death does not “altogether annihilate the souls of the unrighteous, but subjects them to everlasting punishment.”<sup>453</sup> He adds a further

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<sup>448</sup>“*Constat enim ex anima et corpore id est quasi ex caelo et terra, quandoquidem anima qua uiuimus uelut e caelo oritur a deo, corpus e terra, cuius e limo diximus esse formatum.*” Ibid., 2.12.3. See also 2.12.7; 2.12.10; 2.12.14

<sup>449</sup>Ibid., 7.9-11.

<sup>450</sup>“*Nec ideo tamen inmortalem esse animam non intellegimus, quoniam quidquid uiget mouetur que per se semper nec uideri aut tangi potest, aeternum sit necesse est.*” *De opificio Dei* 17.1.

<sup>451</sup>“*Quid autem sit anima nondum inter philosophos conuenit nec umquam fortasse conueniet.*” *De opificio Dei* 17.2.

<sup>452</sup>“*Mors est corporis animae que seductio.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 2.12.9. Cf. 3.20.14. See Perrin, *L’homme antique et chrétien*, 496-502. Perrin notes the connection with the Platonic and Stoic definition.

<sup>453</sup>“*Cuius non ea uis est ut iniustas animas extinguat omnino, sed ut puniat in*

definition: “Death is the condemnation of souls for their deserts to eternal punishments.”<sup>454</sup> It is clear that the multiple definitions of death are key in this interpretation. Lactantius also points out that the souls of the dumb animals do not suffer this fate, noting rather that their “souls, not being composed of God, but of the common air, are dissolved by death.”<sup>455</sup> Here it is clear that the immortal nature of the soul is derived from the breath of the Creator. He also writes, “For it is not the soul that becomes senseless when the body fails, but it is the body which becomes senseless when the soul takes its departure, because it draws all sensibility with it.”<sup>456</sup> He then adds, “But since the soul by its presence gives sensibility to the body, and causes it to live, it is impossible that it should not live and perceive by itself, since it is in itself both consciousness and life.”<sup>457</sup>

In reading Lactantius, it is necessary to keep in mind his definitions of death and immortality. Immortality is the gift of God to the righteous.<sup>458</sup> Death is the punishment of God to the wicked. Lactantius can write that the soul is immortal and that the wicked will suffer death.<sup>459</sup> However, these need to be interpreted in light of the previous definitions.

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*aeternum.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 2.12.8.

<sup>454</sup>“*Mors est animarum pro meritis ad aeterna supplicia damnatio.*” *Ibid.*, 2.12.9.

<sup>455</sup>“*Haec mutas pecudes non adtingit, quarum animae non ex deo constantes, sed ex communi aere morte soluuntur.*” *Ibid.*, 2.12.9.

<sup>456</sup>“*Non enim anima corpore deficiente, sed corpus anima decedente brutescit, quia sensum omnem trahit se cum.*” *Ibid.*, 7.12.24.

<sup>457</sup>“*Cum autem praesens anima sensum tribuat corpori et uiuere id efficiat, fieri non potest ut non ipsa per se et uiuat et sentiat, quoniam ipsa est et sensus et uita.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.12.25.

<sup>458</sup>Cf. *Epitome diuinarum institutionum* 62.4.

<sup>459</sup>See, for example, *Diuinae Institutiones* 6.3; 7.5. Wolfson fails to make this

This is clearly demonstrated in the following. “Again, as the life of the soul is everlasting, in which it receives the divine and unspeakable fruits of its immortality; also its death must be eternal, in which it suffers perpetual punishments and infinite torments for its faults.”<sup>460</sup>

## **Hell and Paradise**

The dead are not judged immediately, according to Lactantius. He writes, “Nor, however, let anyone imagine that souls are immediately judged after death. For all are detained in one and a common place of confinement, until the arrival of the time in which the great Judge shall make an investigation of their deserts.”<sup>461</sup> After this is the resurrection when their bodies are joined back to their souls.

Fire figures in the future of all humans. The wicked are described as suffering eternal torment by fire, their souls being immortal.<sup>462</sup> Lactantius also argues that the righteous will be tried by fire, which is repelled by those full of justice and virtue but bringing to light the sins of others.

Lactantius writes that “the sacred writings teach that the soul is not

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distinction and thus claims that Lactantius does not believe that the soul is immortal by nature. Wolfson, 305.

<sup>460</sup>“*Rursus sicut uita animi sempiterna est, in qua diuinos et ineloquibiles immortalitatis suae fructus capit, ita et mors eius perpetua sit necesse est, in qua perennes poenas et infinita tormenta pro peccatis suis pendit.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.11.1. In this quote, Lactantius uses *animus* rather than *anima*. However, he can be casual about the interchange between these two words and he uses *anima* in the previous sentence and thus it seems warranted to include here. See also *ibid.*, 7.12.15; 7.14.

<sup>461</sup>“*Nec tamen quisquam putet animas post mortem protinus iudicari: omnes in una communi que custodia detinentur, donec tempus adueniat quo maximus iudex meritorum faciat examen.*” *Diuinae Institutiones* 7.21.7.

<sup>462</sup>See *ibid.*, 7.14.

annihilated.”<sup>463</sup> He adds later, “The souls of the righteous being recalled to a happy life, a quiet, tranquil, peaceful, in short, golden age, as the poets call it, should flourish, under the rule of God Himself.”<sup>464</sup> He writes that “God will come, that, having cleansed the world from all defilement, He may restore the souls of the righteous to their renewed bodies, and raise them to everlasting blessedness.”<sup>465</sup>

### Summary

Lactantius often uses soul for life, especially in the sense of giving one’s life or dying. He also uses it to refer to a person.

Virtue and vice are directly related to the soul. Sin happens in the soul. The soul is to rule over the body, yet it can easily be overcome by the desires of the body. The body functions as the enclosure of the soul. It is darkened by the body and kept from the full knowledge it ought to have, being akin to the divine. The soul is also the principle of life and movement for the body. Here, Lactantius makes a distinction not found with other writers. He argues that since the soul is the principle of life, then it is not the same thing as the mind. They are in fact distinct from each other.

The soul was created by God. This was breathed into the body of Adam at creation. It is not given to humans at birth but rather at conception. As with the creation of Adam’s soul, Lactantius also argues that every soul is created by God, not passed on from father or mother. He argues this point based upon the immortal nature of the soul,

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<sup>463</sup>“*Docent enim diuinae litterae non extingui animas.*” Ibid., 3.19.3.

<sup>464</sup>“*Piorum animis ad beatam uitam reuocatis quietum tranquillum pacificum, aureum denique ut poetae uocant saeculum deo ipso regnante florescat.*” Ibid., 7.2.1.

<sup>465</sup>“*Deus enim ueniet, ut orbe hoc ab omni labe purgato rediuiuas iustorum animas corporibus innouatis ad sempiternam beatitudinem suscitet.*” Ibid., 7.22.8.

suggesting that that which is mortal cannot be responsible for that which is immortal.

The human person is a dichotomy of soul and body, though the soul, as the immortal part of humans, is clearly to be preferred. Lactantius continues the general denigration of the soul. With Lactantius, the body wars against the soul. Earlier writers wrote instead of the passions of the soul rather than the passions of the body. Death is the separation of the soul from the body. This does not mean the destruction of the individual. The soul is immortal and thus continues to exist.

Lactantius connects the soul's immortal nature to its creation by God. Based on this, God sets virtue before humans. This call to the virtuous life also hints at the immortal nature of the soul. Religion is what separates humans from other animals, as does knowledge. These all indicate the immortal nature of the soul. The believer who follows after virtue in this life is seen as one seeking immortality. Lactantius also connects the immortal nature of the soul to the notion of self-movement. Against Cicero, who says that death is not to be feared, Lactantius argues that the soul does survive to face a future judgment, arguing similarly against the ideas of Epicurus. Further proof of the soul's immortal nature is when a believer intentionally deprives oneself of pleasure in the present for a future blessing. Lactantius reiterates the connection between the soul's creation by God and its immortal nature. As God is incorporeal and eternal, so is the soul that is breathed by Him. Here there seems to be a clear allusion to Gen 2:7. As the soul is unseen, so also is it immortal, being in nature like fire or light.

The souls of both the wicked and the righteous are kept in a subterranean location after death to await the judgment. The souls of the righteous are tested by fire but not punished by it. After the judgment, the soul and body are rejoined together to receive either eternal punishment by fire or eternal rewards.

Though Lactantius does not quote or direct the reader to the Scriptures, yet he

draws on biblical themes like earlier apologists. He emphasizes the breath of God, which is clearly a direct allusion to Gen 2:7. He also is clear that the soul must be immortal and survive the death of the body because there is a future judgment with rewards and punishments, which is a biblical theme emphasized in various biblical texts.

### **Conclusion**

This chapter has studied both the general usage of the soul in the Latin Fathers in the second, third, and early fourth centuries as well as studying the use of Scripture in the development of this doctrine. While this chapter contains fewer authors than the Greek Ante-Nicene period, yet several new ideas have been proposed. This era also witnessed the first treatise written specifically on the soul, a practice that would be continued by many later authors in the Church. While the later Greek Fathers discussed ideas such as rational activity and education, along with the emotions and feelings and their impact on the soul, in the Latin Fathers, this is much less prominent. With the Latin Fathers, there is more emphasis on what happens to the soul after death.

The soul repeatedly carries the notion of natural life, often in the context of death and dying. It is connected with rational thinking in several authors along with ideas such as motion, being the principle of life, and its simple nature. In general, these ideas are more often mentioned in passing rather than appearing in a focused debate or discussion.

An important development with the later Latin Fathers is that of the denigration of the body in relation to the soul. This is seen in several ways. First of all, the soul by itself is the entity that will receive both rewards or punishment. The body is no longer spoken of as reuniting with the soul. The soul also is more often seen in an entirely positive note, with evil coming from the influence of the body rather than passions existing in the soul as was common with the Greek Fathers.



For most authors, mental anxieties and other vices of the mind appear in the soul. The issue of the goodness of the soul is also discussed by Tertullian. He notes that sin takes place in the soul and yet he also calls the soul Christian by nature. Commodianus describes happiness in the soul.

The usage of Scripture to support the doctrine of the soul is most prominent in Tertullian, though Novation also uses Scripture. The remaining authors devote comparatively little space to scriptural support of the doctrine. The works of Arnobius and Lactantius are apologetic in genre and thus do not refer to the Bible directly with citations. These authors do, however, claim that their ideas are those taught by the Scriptures. They claim authority for their doctrine based upon its scriptural origin, refraining, however, from quoting them directly.

The Latin authors, as with their Greek counterparts, generally describe the human person as a composite of body and soul. For Arnobius and Lactantius, the body shelters, even restricts, the soul. Most authors write of the acts of the body also impacting the soul. This is in line with the general teaching of the Greek Fathers. Tertullian goes to great detail in establishing the birth and origin of the soul as well as arguing for its corporeal nature. Lactantius also describes the origins of the soul as well as noting its location in the physical body. He also follows earlier Greek authors in describing the fight between the body and the soul for mastery of the individual. Several authors also discuss death and the soul, following the later Greek Fathers in describing various ways in which the soul dies.

Tertullian and Lactantius draw on the breath of God imagery of Gen 2:7. For Tertullian, this means that it had a beginning and that its origin was from God. He states that the *imago dei* refers only to the soul, not the body.

Tertullian and Novation use Matt 10:28 to support the notion of the continued

existence of the soul after death. Novation himself also uses Luke 20:37-38 while Tertullian uses Luke 16. They both also argue that Christ's soul did not enter the grave. Novation argues this on the basis of 1 Pet 3:19-20, while Tertullian uses John 2:19-21 and Matt 26:38.

Though the soul does continue after death, it cannot interfere in the lives of the living. Tertullian argues this fact based upon Matt 12:40 and 1 Thess 4:16. This also means that all souls, save for the martyrs (Rev 6:9-11), are confined to Hades until the judgment. Novation and Lactantius also argue for the confinement of all souls in Hades until the resurrection. After the resurrection and judgment, the souls of the wicked are punished by fire forever. Cyprian argues this based on Isa 66:24 and Wis 5:1-9. Though Tertullian acknowledges that Matt 10:28 writes of the death or destruction of the soul, yet he notes that this must be understood in the sense of lasting forever, not its actual annihilation. Lactantius defines death similarly.

Lactantius connects the idea of a future judgment with an immortal soul, while Tertullian connects the judgment with the restoration of the soul to the body.

Several ideas, some of them novel, are proposed in this period. Tertullian argues for a corporeal soul (Luke 16, Rev 6:9-11, Acts 9:1-8, Gen 2:7). Arnobius argues that the soul is not immortal because it was not created by the Supreme God but a lower demiurge. He also argues for a limit to the time of burning in hell, writing of the final annihilation of the wicked after a long period of time. Consistent with his beginning supposition that the soul is not immortal, he argues that only God is immortal (cf. 1 Tim 6:16) and thus the immortality of the righteous is a gift of God rather than a natural state. It is possible that Minucius Felix also seems to have believed in the ultimate annihilation of the souls of the wicked. This is difficult to prove with certainty however.

Commodianus suggests a spiritual, rather than physical punishment in hell, apparently

intending the soul only to be that which undergoes torment.

The several new and distinct ideas introduced by the Latin Fathers in this period are truly unique. It is not clear what caused this phenomenon after what seemed to be more of an established view on the soul during the Greek period.

## CHAPTER VIII

### SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study has looked at the concept of the soul in the early Church Fathers and the development that took place during the Ante-Nicene era. It has analyzed the role of Scripture in this process and has identified various Scripture passages and themes that provide pivotal support for this developing doctrine during the Ante-Nicene era. While at first glance, the many various and sometimes contradictory ideas discussed regarding the soul give the impression of little in the way of coherence, yet this study demonstrates that recognizable themes and patterns emerge during this era, which have stayed with Christian theology to the present day. It has also identified several challenges that the early Church Fathers struggled with when seeking to articulate a biblical concept of the soul in the context of the first three centuries CE.

In the summary that follows, the general practice of dividing the results into the two separate categories of general usage and doctrinal development is again followed. In the *Usage* section, the attributes and powers of the soul are discussed. This section gives an overview of the semantic range which the early Church Fathers traversed when using the word *soul*. In the *Doctrinal Teaching* section, themes such as the origin of the soul, the death of the soul, and the soul in the afterlife are reviewed. In general, the first section does not find much in the way of scriptural support for the ideas on the soul that the Church Fathers were teaching, while in the latter, it is quite common. Often, the arguments used in describing the powers and attributes of the soul are openly taken from

various philosophical teachings. The purpose of including this first section on the semantic range of usage of soul, which does not deal with scriptural usage to a great degree, has been to provide a general context within which to frame the more detailed analysis of the early Church Fathers' development of the concept of the soul.

## Summary

### Usage of *Psyche* and *Anima*

As one looks at the semantic range of the soul words, *psyche* and *anima*, in the Ante-Nicene period, multiple points of emphasis are apparent. The early Apostolic Fathers begin the general practice of using soul for life. This is by far the most consistent way to use the term, being used by the Greek Apologists and later Greek authors along with the later Latin Fathers. The one author who stands out is Origen. He only rarely uses it in this sense. He does use it to refer to an individual. Other authors also use it to refer to an individual or to one's self, though this is a less common practice. It begins with the *Shepherd of Hermas* and continues with a small sampling of authors throughout the entire era.

Beyond using soul for life and an individual, the Apostolic Fathers are also consistent in noting that both good and evil exist in the soul as well as faith and unbelief. However in this early period, there is no clear conception of a dichotomy between body and soul which will appear only with the *Epistle to Diognetus*.<sup>1</sup> Both *Barnabas* and the *Shepherd of Hermas* write of the death or destruction of the soul. However, as just mentioned, since there is no clear conception of a dichotomy between body and soul at

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<sup>1</sup>In this way and in several others, the *Epistle to Diognetus* is more closely connected with the soul concepts of the Apologists than with the Apostolic Fathers.

this point, it would seem to be out of sequence to therefore conclude that this death refers to a separate entity from the body but rather is to be understood as referring to life in general.

Several authors also argue for the soul as the principle of life. This idea is first mentioned by the *Epistle to Diognetus*. While it is not as prevalent, it has a related corollary which is talked of much more often. This is the understanding that the soul is the principle of movement. Authors from the Greek Apologists, the later Greek Fathers, and the Latin Fathers all mention this idea. With this borrowing from philosophy, that it is the soul which animates, or makes alive, and it is only living things that have in them the principle of self-movement, Origen moves to argue even that stars, having orderly motion, possess souls. He argues for this, suggesting that Job 25:5 notes that the stars are not pure in the eyes of God thus giving further evidence to support the idea of stars possessing a soul. This idea of the soul being the principle of life will become important in the discussion regarding the soul's immortality or continued existence after the death of the body. In a related line of thinking, animals are sometimes thought of as having a soul. Origen and Tertullian note that the creation story in Gen 1 indicates that both land and sea animals are referred to as souls.

Beginning with the *Epistle to Diognetus*, the practice of describing the soul as a separate, ontological entity from the body develops. What prompts this transition, if it may even be called a transition, is not entirely clear. It may be related to the fact that no earlier author addresses the concept of the soul in any detail. That is, there may have been no transition at all, only a vacuum of knowledge resulting from the paucity of theological writings in this period. While the soul is, from this point forward, always described as being separate from the body, nevertheless, it is generally thought to be in close connection with it. This is especially true for the next century or so. This connection

between soul and body is commonly made with blood. Irenaeus is the first to make this point. Origen argues for this based upon Lev 17:14. In this context, the soul is often described as being dispersed throughout the body. Lactantius is alone, at the end of the era, in arguing against the notion of the soul being in the blood, preferring rather the lungs, presumably because of his connection of breath and soul.

Beginning with the Apologists, authors begin to make a connection between the soul and breath or the action of breathing. This idea is addressed below in the analysis regarding the immortality of the soul in relation to Gen 2:7. There God is described as breathing the breath of life into Adam, and Adam became a living soul. What is important here is to see that once the connection was made between breath and soul, several other attributes were added as well. Irenaeus, based upon Gen 2:7, argues that since the breath is incorporeal and invisible, the soul is also incorporeal and invisible. The *Epistle to Diognetus*, though, generally accepted to be written before the Apologists, also attributes invisibility to the soul. It seems likely that this was done based on his prior understanding rather than a connection between soul and breath based upon Gen 2:7. This practice happens at other times as well. There is a belief supported in the literature before an actual biblical defense is given. Thus, it seems that while the Hellenistic thesis of Harnack, while clearly overly simplistic in attributing much of early Church thought on the soul and other doctrines to Greek influence, should not be completely set aside as having no relevance.

Two authors fall out of the mainstream on the notion of an incorporeal soul. Irenaeus and Tertullian argue, based upon Luke 16:19-31 and Rev 6:9, that souls are corporeal. While this thought has connections to the corporeal soul argued for by earlier Epicureans and Stoics, it seems clearly to be a result of the two Scripture passages mentioned that convinces these two authors to move outside the mainstream of Christian

thought. For though they argue for its corporeal nature, they also argue for its immortal nature. This put them at odds with the philosophical ideas of neo-Platonism and with later Church thinking as well.

As a rule, the early Church Fathers argue that the actions of the body influence the soul. This is hinted at first with the *Shepherd of Hermas*, though with him, it seems too early to argue that this is resulting from a clear dichotomy. The idea is discussed the most in the extensive writings of Clement of Alexandria on the soul. Of note is the absence in the Greek Apologists of this idea. One of the most common ideas expressed in this context is advocating for bodily fasting as a means of improving the health of the soul. Out of line with the general tenor of the early Church Fathers on this topic is Athenagoras, who argues that there is no connection between the needs and actions of the body with the soul because the soul needs nothing from the body because of its “peculiar,” passionless nature. This perhaps illustrates the tension that is observable between describing the soul as immaterial and yet arguing for a connection between this immaterial soul and the material body. While most authors recognize that the actions we do affect our souls, Athenagoras pushes the notion of incorporeality to its logical conclusion. While he presents his argument based on the impassability of the soul, yet it seems probable that this was also motivated by his philosophical belief that the material and immaterial have no connection.

Justin Martyr is the first author to argue for the rational capacity of the soul. Later Irenaeus and the rest of the later Greek Fathers use the same concept, as well as Tertullian from among the Latin Fathers. One notable exception to this understanding is Lactantius, who at times argues that reason is found in the soul and at other times argues that reason is too divine to be found in the “lowly” soul.

The idea of a rational soul means that the soul is the ruler of the body. Most



authors who comment on this describe the soul as the place where the individual makes choices. The idea of a free soul endowed with the power to make choices for good or evil is an idea that germinates with Irenaeus and then becomes vital to the understanding of the powers of the soul in both Clement of Alexandria and Origen and even Origen's followers. Tertullian also makes good use of it. Lactantius argues that if the soul gains mastery over the body, then it receives immortality, but that if the body gains mastery over the soul, then it receives eternal punishment.

Connected to this idea of a soul endowed with free will, though somewhat in tension with it, is the notion that the soul must make choices between the irascible desires of the body and the pure virtues of the soul. Accepting this idea implies that evil may exist in the soul, which most authors don't quarrel with. This difficulty is recognized by Tertullian and Origen. The latter offers creative options, including the option of two souls, while the former proposes no solution. In general, however, most authors will accept that evil can exist in the soul and leave unresolved this tension of divine and evil elements in the soul. This seems to be the result of a clear distinction between divine attributes that the soul has because of its origin from God and real divinity, which is attributed exclusively to God.

Most authors describe the soul in very positive terms, though this is a notion that develops after the Apostolic era as that early period did not exhibit any trend regarding this idea. Irenaeus is representative when he describes it as the better part of man. In contrast to this majority view, Origen and Arnobius stand apart. They view the soul in terms that are more negative. Origen favors a positive view of the spirit and argues that the Bible does not speak positively regarding the soul, even suggesting that the soul will ultimately change to spirit. Origen goes so far as to posit a dual soul, one that is holy and good and the other that is evil. Arnobius argues that the soul is so bad that this is proof

that it is not divine or immortal. His reasoning is that nothing so bad could have been created by God. This further represents, for Origen, a trend towards making his understanding of the soul as logically consistent as possible while at the same time taking various biblical statements regarding the soul into account. While he recognized the challenge to Church teaching, his proposal was never repeated and surely was an example of the type of theology that resulted in his being posthumously anathematized. With the majority of the early Church Fathers, however, this tension is left unresolved.

When one analyzes this section, *Usage of Psyche and Anima*, in the discussion of the various authors of this study, the role of Scripture is minimal. This seems primarily because the discussion of the attributes and powers of the soul is generally based on common belief and secular authors rather than on scriptural authority. The Bible is more likely to be quoted in this context if an author believes contrary to common knowledge. This is seen when Irenaeus and Tertullian argue for the corporeal nature of the soul. The commonly accepted opinion of people was that the soul was incorporeal, in agreement with the basic platonic framework. Because these two argue that Scripture teaches that the soul is corporeal, they quote the story of the Rich Man and Lazarus in support of this. More often, the beliefs of the early Church Fathers are in harmony with the commonly accepted opinions of others and thus no biblical defense is deemed necessary.

#### Doctrinal Teaching and Usage of Scriptural Sources

One of the most important questions for the early Christian Fathers to discuss was the origin of the soul. The early Apostolic Fathers do not discuss this but the question arises in the subsequent era of the Apologists. In this context, one verse is used more than any other. Genesis 2:7, with its description of God breathing into Adam the breath of life, becomes the undisputed biblical proof for arguing both for the reality of the human soul

and for the soul's origin from God. It is first proposed by Theophilus of Antioch and is voiced by all the major writers after him in both the later Greek writers and the Latin Fathers as well. This idea of the soul originating from the breath of God was used by various authors as a reason to assign various divine attributes to it. Theophilus is again the first to note this in writing that many consider the soul to be immortal based on its connection to the divine *afflatus*. Irenaeus and Tertullian also cite this verse in connection with the soul's immortality. Lactantius's exclamation that the soul cannot die because its origin is from God is typical of this argument. Tatian argues that the soul originates from below. And Arnobius claims that the soul is not created by God but rather by another, lower being that possesses creative powers. This notion is reminiscent of some of the earlier Gnostic teachers whom Irenaeus wrote against in the second century. Arnobius is driven by the obvious evil present in the soul to argue that a good God would not create something as "fickle and prone to evil" as the soul.

The idea of creation in *imago dei* in Gen 1:27 functions similarly to the breath of God concept, though it is not quoted by as many authors. Irenaeus and Origen use it to argue for the incorporeal nature of the human soul, while Origen and Methodius use it to attribute immortality to the soul. Tertullian uses it to argue for the free will of the soul in choosing its own path.

The usage of this verse to argue that various attributes of divinity are to be found in the soul demonstrates two interpretative practices used by the early Church Fathers when using the Scriptures to defend the doctrine of the soul. The first practice is when examining a verse that says something regarding human beings, the author may assume that what is spoken of actually refers only to the soul rather than the entire person or just the body, even though the verse(s) under consideration does not mention the soul at all. Thus, authors quoting Gen 1:27 may declare that the soul alone is made in the *imago dei*,

even though no mention of the soul is made in Gen 1:27. Conversely, though no mention is made of the body or soul in this verse, nevertheless the early Church Fathers consistently refer the *imago dei* to the soul and deny it any reference to the body, save for Irenaeus who refers it to the whole person.

Once this previous step is allowed, then assigning to the soul various attributes and powers that are divine follows naturally. This second step is to ascribe various attributes of divinity to the soul even though they are not mentioned in the text. So the attributes of incorporeality, immortality, and freedom of the will are all argued to be attributes and powers of the soul based on Gen 1:27, even though no mention is made of those attributes and powers in the verse itself. But since they are attributes of divinity, they can be assigned to the soul.

An important observation is that, in general, no attempt is made by the early Church Fathers to prove that humans have an ontologically separate soul. Origen's statements in *De principiis* to this effect are perhaps most revealing and indicative of this point. When he begins to discuss the soul in detail, Origen asserts that no one will argue that all living things have souls. Having admitted that this point is accepted on popular belief, he proceeds to offer Scripture citations to make it clear that this belief is accepted by the Christian because of its appearance in the Bible. He then quotes several statements from the creation account of Gen 1-2. He notes that both land animals and sea animals are referred to as souls. He then quotes Gen 2:7 to indicate that humans also have a soul. What is of note here is that none of the texts that Origen uses state that humans have a soul. Rather, they seem to indicate that humans, and animals for that matter, are a soul. This is the extent to which any of the early Church Fathers go to demonstrate from the Scriptures the idea that humans have a soul rather than are a soul.

Thus all authors, save the early Apostolic Fathers who were writing within a very

limited doctrinal agenda, view the human person in a dichotomous relationship of body and soul. The body was physically visible to all and biblically necessary for the doctrine of the resurrection. So long as the resurrection was an important theological topic, the body had a corresponding importance. In addition, as the soul is mentioned throughout the Scriptures and the understanding of it was well accepted in the culture of the times, no writer seeks to deny the notion that every person has a soul. The *Epistle to Diognetus*, being the earliest to develop any doctrinal understanding of the soul, is also the first to argue for the dichotomy between body and soul. Though the dichotomy of body and soul is one of the most pervasive teachings on the soul in this era, nevertheless, only Tertullian offers a biblical defense of this idea. He argues from Christ's words in Matt 10:28, "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul," that this demonstrates a dichotomy of body and soul.

Another doctrinal concept which develops in the midst of the era of the Apologists, directly related to the dichotomous vision of the human person, is the definition of death as the separation of the soul from the body. The soul, being often understood as the life principle, is what gives life to the body. And death occurs when this ontologically separate entity is separated from the body to which it has given life. Beginning with Athenagoras and Melito of Sardis, this idea becomes the de facto interpretation. Death is almost always described as a good thing, freeing the soul from the confines of the body. Tertullian, perhaps because of his consistent emphasis on seeing the human person as a combination of body and soul, describes death as something violent, not according to nature. Clement of Alexandria is alone in seeking biblical support for this view of death as separation of the soul from the body. He finds allegorical references for this in Matt 6:25, "Take no thought for your life, what ye shall eat?" He adds Matt 10:39, "He that findeth his life shall lose it: and he that loseth his life for my sake shall

find it.” In addition, he notes Christ’s words in Matt 16:26, “For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?” These references, while specifically used for the call to the Gnostic life of knowledge and separation from the cares of the body, are also metaphorical for death as the separation of the soul from the body. It is of note that while the *Epistle to Diognetus* is the first to define death in this way, it is not until the writings of Clement of Alexandria that any writer offers a biblical defense of the idea.

Clement’s usage of these last two Matthean verses highlights another interpretative challenge that the early Church Fathers faced in developing the doctrine of the soul. That is, they were faced with the semantic range for the word soul that the corresponding Greek and Hebrew terms comprised. The word in both verses that Clement of Alexandria cites is *psyche*, which can mean both life and soul. In both cases, Clement understands it to refer to soul, as in an ontologically separate entity, rather than to life. Clement’s usage highlights the challenge of bringing to the text an understanding of an ontologically separated soul which then guides in whether the semantic meaning of the word is interpreted to read soul or life.

Developing alongside this understanding of the relationship between the soul and the body, the church begins to articulate an understanding of what happens to the soul at death. A group of three prominent texts is used by the early Church Fathers to demonstrate that the soul is alive after the death of the body. The first of these is found in the story of Israel’s king Saul going to the medium at Endor to consult the departed spirit of Samuel (1 Sam 28:12-13). This text is first used by Justin Martyr to highlight the notion that the soul is sentient after death. Justin even claims that this demonstrates that demonic forces have power over the soul of a dead believer, while Tertullian argues that demons are masquerading as Saul. Origen says the apparition of Samuel’s soul should be

understood literally, with all three authors agreeing that it demonstrates that souls are in Hades after death and are sentient. In this context, two additional points may be made. First, Tertullian quotes Ps 20 and Luke 23:46 as further support for his idea of demons having power over the departed-yet-alive soul. Secondly, it may be noted that Origen allowed for Samuel himself to be called up from Hades. This is important because when discussing Christ's parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, another important text in this discussion, Origen argues that the souls of the righteous begin their ascent to God immediately at death rather than spending time in the underworld. He supports this with Jesus' words to the thief on the cross, "Today you shall be with me in paradise" (Luke 23:43). This is a new development and the only time that it appears in the Ante-Nicene era. It appears as a forerunner to the current belief of many Christians, who see the souls of the righteous going immediately to heaven. Other authors who discuss the abode of the soul after death and before the resurrection do so in the context of a subterranean Hades that acts as a place of repose for both the wicked and the righteous.

The second pivotal text used by the early Church Fathers in support of the continued existence of the soul after the death of the body was found in the pericope of the Rich Man and Lazarus in Luke 16:19-27. Irenaeus, Origen, and Tertullian use this pericope to argue that the souls of the righteous go to a different and better place than the souls of the wicked at death. Irenaeus and Tertullian also argue from this passage that souls have a corporeal nature. Even though Origen interprets the parable literally, as he does with the story of Samuel and the Witch of Endor, he does not allow that the soul has a corporeal nature, even though it is able to do all of the things that the body does even though it is separated from it at death. This slight ambiguity is found also in how these two Fathers use Rev 6:9-11. Tertullian argues for the corporeal nature of the soul from this, while Origen simply uses it as further corroboration that the soul is sentient after

death.

The description of the separate death of the soul and body in Matt 10:28 is noted by several authors. Justin uses it to argue for the reconnection of the soul with the body for judgment, while Tertullian and Novation argue that this also demonstrates the immortal nature of the soul. In looking at this text, Tertullian acknowledges that it discusses the destruction of the soul in hell. His solution is one that is used elsewhere by other authors for similar purposes. That is, he defines what destruction is. Here he suggests that it simply refers to the eternal reality of the punishment. This redefining will take place with respect to the notion of death in other authors as well.

The descent of Christ into Hades upon His death on the cross is the third main text used by early Church Fathers as support of the continued existence of the soul after death. Irenaeus, in characteristic fashion, supports this idea with a variety of Scriptures. Hippolytus, Clement of Alexandria, and Origen all specifically use 1 Pet 3:19-20 as biblical support for this idea that Christ's soul did not die on the cross but, instead, His soul descended to Hades to preach to the souls held there.

These three texts, the story of Saul and the Witch of Endor, Jesus's story of the Rich Man and Lazarus, and the interpretation of Peter's description of Christ's descent into hell after His death on the cross, along with the more limited usage of Matt 10:28, all prove pivotal in forming the defense for the idea that the Scriptures teach that the soul continues to exist after the death of the body. It is helpful to note that, as mentioned, the first two of these did not find a consistent interpretative model among those who argued from them. In addition, none of these three texts mentions the word soul, and thus any statement regarding the soul that is argued from these verses is ultimately based upon a prior understanding that can then be read into these verses. Any desire to find fault with the early Church Fathers' understanding of the existence of the soul after the death of the



body being taught in Scripture must begin here. Tatian is the only author who allows that the soul is dissolved after death and reconstituted before the resurrection, thus denying any intermediate place of repose for it. He also, though, attributes immortality to it, either of rewards or of punishment.

As mentioned previously when discussing Matt 10:28, multiple authors recognize that the biblical text attributes death and destruction to the soul in several places. In addition to the Matthaen text just mentioned, Ezek 18:4 and Matt 10:39 are also discussed. The solution to this dilemma of believing in an immortal soul on the one hand and yet have several biblical texts which speak of the death or losing of the soul is to argue that there are several different meanings of death used in the Bible. Clement of Alexandria is the first to recognize this problem and he suggests, based on an allusion to Rom 6:20-23, that death is “the fellowship of the soul in a state of sin with the body,” while Origen interprets Matt 10:39 as an exhortation to lose one’s “sinning soul.” Ephesians 2:5 talks about death to sin and was used to argue for this other notion of death. Cyprian refers to losing one’s soul as being spiritually dead or living in a sinful state. Lactantius states that death is simply the condemnation of the wicked to their eternal punishment, while Origen, in interpreting Ezek 18:4, writes that the death described here is the separation of the soul from God. This need to provide an interpretation beyond that of the natural reading of the texts involved highlights a tendency by some to adjust the meaning of certain texts in order to make them fit established teaching.

Another important theme that directly influenced the doctrine of the soul was the Church’s teaching of an eternally burning hell. While this specific doctrine was not the focus of this study and thus was not analyzed in depth, yet nevertheless, it does show up in various places where authors write about the end of the soul. The early Apologists,

Justin and Tatian, describe the souls and bodies of the wicked being punished by eternal fire. In addition, almost all of the Latin Fathers describe this as the fate of the wicked souls. Cyprian is the only author to cite a biblical reference in support of this teaching, quoting from Isa 66:24, though surely references to “eternal fire” and other similar references in the NT lie behind this idea. Against this notion of an eternal burning hell, Arnobius clearly argues that the souls of the wicked receive a limited punishment rather than an eternal one. On this point, Justin, Irenaeus, and Minucius Felix hint at a limited punishment, but the evidence is not strong enough to make a definitive judgment on their position. No Scripture is used to support their points, however. It is not possible to make a clear case for whether the early Church Fathers’ doctrine of an eternally burning hell demanded a soul that was immortal or whether this was simply a corollary point. At this point, it seems most plausible that they simply went hand and hand as the Church’s teaching.

Besides the penal aspect of the burning fires of hell that is experienced by the soul, several other options are proposed. Origen suggests that the fires have a purification function, in addition to punishment. This is perhaps in line with his proposal of an ultimately universal salvation. Commodianus, almost certainly following Origen, writes of a spiritual burning of the soul in hell. No one else picks up on this idea in the Ante-Nicene era.

The reality of a future resurrection proves to be a vital topic when the early Church Fathers write on the soul. They argue that this teaching demands that the immortal soul be reunited with the previously dead body. Where this becomes important in this present study is how the reality of the future resurrection, whose purpose was to enable all to participate in judgment and subsequent rewards and retribution, was connected to the need to argue for the immortal nature of the soul. The Church Fathers,

beginning with Justin Martyr, repeatedly point to this biblical idea of a future judgment when arguing for the necessity of the doctrine of the immortality of the soul. In general, this idea has not been noticed by recent scholarship. Daley mentions it in connection with Origen's teaching on salvation,<sup>2</sup> and Norris hints at it when he writes, "Christian writers had gladly adopted the idea that the soul is called to participate in a divine mode of existence. It appealed to them as a convenient way of interpreting one aspect of the Christian eschatological hope."<sup>3</sup>

Justin Martyr notes that if there were no sensation after death, "this would be a godsend to the wicked." This is an early presentation of the argument for the soul's immortality based on the biblical doctrine of a future resurrection. Theophilus notes how a change in thought came about in the Greek authors to bring them in line with the Hebrew prophets' teaching on a future judgment and the souls of the dead being kept in Hades. Athenagoras also argues that if the soul is extinguished at death, then there can be no resurrection and evil will abound. The notion of the soul being the principle of life is exhibited here. If it is destroyed, life is gone forever. Irenaeus vaguely alludes to this idea in *Against Heresies* 2.29.2. Clement of Alexandria argues that because the soul can be tortured, then it must be accepted that the soul is immortal, even though this also implies that the soul suffers. Origen argues the same as Athenagoras, that if the soul died, then it could not be punished. Tertullian, in arguing against Epicurus, makes the connection by arguing that if you allow the soul to be destroyed, as Epicurus does, then you in effect have actually destroyed the real power of death, which surely is the judgment of the

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<sup>2</sup>Daley, 51-52.

<sup>3</sup>Norris, 142.

wicked. Lactantius also makes this argument against Epicurus that the soul is not annihilated but is either rewarded or punished according to its deeds.

What is clear is that the reality of a future judgment is an overarching theme that demanded a soul that was not dissolved at death. In combination with the notions of eternal punishment and eternal life, this dictated that the soul be immortal. Again, here it should be noted that this understanding of immortality was one that recognized no end but yet insisted on a beginning. Thus, the early Church Fathers also argued that, along with 1 Tim 6:16, only God was immortal. While the early Church Fathers do make the argument for immortality based upon other more philosophical notions, such as its simpleness or incorporeal nature, yet they nevertheless argued that the biblical teaching of a future judgment demanded that the soul be immortal. The essence of their understanding may be summed up by the idea that if you deny the immortality of the soul, you deny the Christian doctrine of the resurrection, for if the soul is allowed to cease to exist, life itself has been extinguished and the Christian faith is denied.

### **Conclusions**

This study has sought to delve into the early Church Fathers' usage of Scripture as a source for their doctrine of the soul. In so doing, it has uncovered the importance of several biblical citations and ideas that were vitally important for any statement made regarding the human soul. The Church Fathers, contrary to the notion suggested by Pelikan noted at the beginning of this study that the Bible does not contain a doctrine of the soul, believed that the Bible was an authoritative source for the doctrine of the soul. Thus, any argument that one may have with their teaching must take place at the interpretive level of Scripture.

One can clearly see, at the end of the Ante-Nicene era, a fairly unified

understanding of the soul and one that was defended upon biblical testimony. The soul has its origin in the breath of God, breathing into Adam's lifeless body the breath of life. The soul is thus seen to be distinct and in a dichotomous relationship with the body. At death, the soul is released from the body, residing in a place termed Hades to await the resurrection. At the resurrection, the soul, being reunited with the body, faces the judgment with its resultant reward or punishment. The reward and punishment received by the soul reunited with the body are both eternal and everlasting in nature.

Several ideas are proposed during this era that are out of harmony with the general concept of the time. Tatian's idea regarding a dissolved soul at death and Arnobius's suggestion that the soul is created by a lower demiurge as well as his argument for a limited punishment for the damned all generally find themselves outside of the mainstream teaching. Origen's idea of an immediate ascent of the soul and being with Christ upon the death of the body, though finding no other supporters in the Ante-Nicene era, ultimately becomes standard Christian teaching.

It should also be noted that those who argue for a teaching of conditional immortality in the writings of the early Church Fathers do so on very thin grounds. There is no direct statement to this effect that this study has discovered. While the Apostolic Fathers write of the death and destruction of the wicked, which has been used to argue that they were conditionalists, so also do the writings of later authors, all of whom clearly argue for the immortal nature of the soul. One could easily argue that the earlier period had not yet developed the sophistication applied by later authors such as Origen, who argued that, as mentioned above, the Bible does mention the death of the soul but this must be interpreted to mean something other than the cessation of its existence.

One can clearly see the effect of *sitz in Leben* on the writings of the early Church Fathers. They found themselves in a world that basically offered two options: some form

of neo-Platonism on the one hand or Epicurean and Stoic naturalism on the other. The Platonists argued for the reality of the non-material world that saw true human existence in the spirit world, while Epicurean thought insisted that the natural, visible world was the sum total of existence and once one died, there was no more to life. Presented with these two options, it is easy to see how the early Church Fathers, citing Pauline phrases to the effect that what is seen is passing away and what is unseen is reality, tended toward the Platonic notion of the soul, all the while arguing against the limitations of Platonic philosophy. At times, an idea was promulgated before any biblical defense was offered for it. This is seen with Tertullian's late defense for the dichotomous soul/body understanding of the human person along with Clement of Alexandria's late biblical defense of the definition of death as the separation of the soul from the body. It may be argued that these are examples of where an idea was taught based upon a source other than the Bible and then later authors realized that a biblical defense of the idea was lacking and thus they provided one.

Several interpretative challenges were faced by the early Church Fathers in explaining their doctrine of the soul. The stated acceptance of the fact that all humans have a soul that is an ontologically separate entity was clearly an example of bringing one's own *a priori* assumptions to bear and reading this into the text. Little effort at all was made to support this scripturally. The use of exegetical standards regarding determining the appropriate translation for *soul* from among the word's semantic range of meaning was also a step that was not often followed and surely impacted their study. As well, the tendency to read a verse as referring only to a separated soul when in fact the text referred in a non-partisan manner to the human person in general led them to assign one text as referring to the soul alone and another as referring only to the body. This was especially helpful in promoting the dichotomous view of humans and assigning various

attributes and powers to either the body or the soul, when no such distinction was present in the text.

While several interpretive challenges were faced by the early Church Fathers in their use of Scripture in explaining their doctrine of the soul, an important element that this study has brought to bear when analyzing this usage is the importance of allowing the early Church Fathers to speak something new rather than simply passing on the teaching of previous generations. Much good work has been produced in the field of historical theology on the Greco-Roman world and its impact on the thought patterns of the early Church Fathers, especially as it relates to the doctrine of the soul. However, what can happen when the early Church Fathers are read only through the lens of the influence of the earlier and contemporary Greco-Roman authors, at the expense of allowing the Fathers to reinterpret and modify the thought patterns of the day, is that one loses much of the scriptural insights they brought to bear in their doctrinal discussions. Students of the era may simply assume that they are so heavily influenced by their cultural milieu that they produced little that may be of importance to the Church today.

The benefit of studying the early Church Fathers' concept of the soul from the vantage point of their usage of Scripture is that one quickly begins to realize the important role Scripture played in the development of this doctrine.<sup>4</sup> While not denying the impact of prior thought on their thinking, this study has demonstrated that the early Church Fathers were well versed in the biblical statements regarding the soul and intended to incorporate these into their teaching. Once this fact is recognized, it then suggests that still, today, a doctrine of the soul may be searched for in the Scriptures.

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<sup>4</sup>Cf. Hamman, *L'homme, image de Dieu: essai d'une anthropologie chrétienne dans l'Église des cinq premiers siècles*, 9.

While it may not agree with that which was constructed in the early Church period, yet it will continue in the tradition of the early Church of searching the Scriptures for a doctrine of the soul.

### **Areas for Further Research**

While this study has produced information that will aid in understanding the early Church's usage of Scripture in developing various doctrines, it has also been able to suggest more areas of study that should prove useful in further understanding this era. Research can be done, for example, in comparing *anima* and *animus* as well as looking at expressions such as *πνοη ζωης* and other related expressions in the early Church Fathers that should further clarify their understanding of the soul. Study of later Latin authors, beginning with Lactantius, should produce important information for an analysis of their use of *animus*. Key topics should also be studied, including creation, immortality, judgment, and hell with specific focus given to the role that Scripture played in their development.

This study has shown that the early Church Fathers understood their belief in the reality of a future judgment demanded a corresponding belief in an immortal soul. This discovery suggests that other areas of belief are similarly related that should be explored. For instance, does one's belief in a resurrection of the body play a role in one's understanding of the immortal nature of the soul? Is there a connection between the ability of the soul to sin and other characteristics of the soul's nature? Does a positive view of the body result in a belief in the resurrection, and is a positive view of the body influenced by one's view, positive or negative, of the soul? These are other areas of related research that should prove useful in further understanding the interrelatedness of various aspects of doctrine.



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