1983

Toward a Criticism of Theological Reason: Time and Timelessness as Primordial Presuppositions

Fernando Luis Canale

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TOWARD A CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON:
TIME AND TIMELESSNESS AS PRIMORDIAL
PRESUPPOSITIONS

A Dissertation
Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy

by
Fernando Luis Canale
March 1983
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TIME AND TIMELESSNESS AS PRIMORDIAL 
PRESUPPOSITIONS

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in partial fulfillment of the requirements 
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by 
Fernando Luis Canale

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ABSTRACT

TOWARD A CRITICISM OF THEOLOGICAL REASON:
TIME AND TIMELESSNESS AS PRIMORDIAL
PRESUPPOSITIONS

by

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this investigation studies the possibility of developing a theological criticism of christian theological reason. the investigation proceeds by developing a phenomenological analysis of three major contexts within which reason has been interpreted and utilized by christian theology for the constitution of its exegetical and systematic formulations: the philosophical, theological, and biblical contexts.

the philosophical context shows that the structure of reason requires the interpretation of being's dimensionality which determines its basic meaning and functioning. moreover, it shows that being's dimensionality has been interpreted in two ways: as timeless and as temporal.
The theological context, through the analysis of reason's procedures as a tool for the constitution of meaning in Thomas Aquinas's and Rudolf Bultmann's systems, shows that theology has depended on philosophical criticism of reason and its classical timeless interpretation of Being's dimensionality. Thomas's system, and with him conservative theology, follows the Aristotelian interpretation of reason while Bultmann's system, and with him liberal theology, follows the Kantian interpretation.

The Biblical context, through the analysis of Exodus 3:14, the locus classicus for the discussion about Being in Scripture, shows that theological criticism of theological reason is possible and that Biblical reflection on Being interprets its dimensionality as temporal.

Moreover, considering the facts that the philosophical context uncovers the hypothetical nature of reason, and that Christian theology is rooted in the conceptuality of the Biblical reflection in which it is grounded, it is suggested that criticism of theological reason should be developed following the temporal interpretation of Being as rooted and developed in Scriptures.

On this basis it is further suggested that such a criticism should be able to provide theology with the necessary starting point for advancing beyond the alternatives provided by the Aristotelian and Kantian interpretations of reason that so far have conditioned the interpretation and actual functioning of reason as a tool for the constitution of Christian theological meanings.
Dedicated to

My wife Mirta, my son Oscar, and
my daughter Silvia
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS .......................................................... viii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ................................................................. ix
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................... 1

Chapter
I. THE ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF REASON ............ 19

An Introductory Description of the Onto-Theo-
Logical Structure of Reason ............................................ 27
The Ontological Framework: "Ontos" ................................. 34
The Epistemological Framework: "Logos" ......................... 38
The System: "Theos" .............................................................. 44
The Hypothetical Character of Reason's Structure:
Presuppositions ............................................................... 52
The Dimensionality of Reason's Structure:
The primordial presupposition ............................................ 66
Dimensionality of the Onto-Theo-Logical Structure
of Reason ........................................................................... 74
Classical Dimensionality: Timelessness ............................. 76
Primordial presupposition: Parmenides ............................. 76
Epistemological framework ............................................. 84
Plato .................................................................................. 85
Aristotle ......................................................................... 89
Kant ................................................................................. 96
Jaspers ............................................................................ 104
The "Forgotten" Dimensionality: Time ................................ 115
Primordial Presupposition: Heidegger ............................. 115
Epistemological framework ............................................. 130
Temporal objectivity ....................................................... 131
Temporal system ............................................................. 141
Summary and Conclusion .................................................... 154

II. THE ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF REASON IN
THEOLOGY .......................................................... 160

Classical Reason ................................................................. 164
Ontological Framework: Timelessness ............................. 166
Ontos .............................................................................. 167
Theos ............................................................................. 177
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>An open ontological structure</td>
<td>339</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Parallelism</td>
<td>340</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontological significance</td>
<td>341</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Summary and Partial Conclusion</td>
<td>346</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Biblical Interpretation of Being: Temporality</td>
<td>349</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ontological Framework: Being and Appearance</td>
<td>352</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Epistemological Framework: Being and Logos</td>
<td>364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Knowing &quot;Being itself&quot;</td>
<td>368</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Temporal Dimensionality of Biblical logos</td>
<td>374</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Conclusion</td>
<td>383</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>388</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

BE -- Thomas Aquinas, On Being and Essence.
EF -- Rudolf Bultmann, Existence and Faith
Essays -- Rudolf Bultmann, Essays, Philosophical and Theological
FU -- Rudolf Bultmann, Faith and Understanding
GV -- Rudolf Bultmann, Glauben und Verstehen, 4 vols.
JCM -- Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology
Jesus -- Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the World
KMII -- Rudolf Bultmann, "The Case for Demythologizing," in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate II
PE -- Rudolf Bultmann, The Presence of Eternity: History and Eschatology
SCG -- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles
ST -- Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae
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Although it is impossible to name all those who, in one way or another, have been of help and assistance throughout my doctoral studies and particularly during the writing of this dissertation, I would like to mention those who were more directly related to the gestation and bringing forth of this study.

In this context special thanks go to Doctors Gerhard Hasel and Fritz Guy, members of my advisory committee, for their scholarly advice and timely criticism, and particularly to Doctor Raoul Dederen, my major professor, who guided the entire project not only as a scholar but also as a friend.

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My wife Mirta, my son Oscar, and my daughter Silvia provided
me with daily encouragement and spiritual support that sustained me along the way. Because the loving care, understanding, and patience of my family--particularly of my wife--were essential for the completion of this intellectual enterprise, I am especially grateful to them.

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Finally, and principally, I am grateful to God from Whom every blessing and talent comes and to Whom all glory belongs.
INTRODUCTION

In our ecumenical era which strives toward Christian unity the existence of theological disagreements challenges the very foundation of Christian theology as intellectual enterprise. This challenge reaches reason itself which, as a tool for the constitution of meanings, conditions any theological disagreement or controversy.¹

As an intellectual enterprise, Christian theology may be seen as theo-logia—that is a reflection (logia) on God (theos). It is the logia of theology that makes it an intellectual enterprise. Moreover, the logia is a constitutive element of theology. In other words, without logia there is no theology. Logia as a constitutive element of theology is, in its broadest sense, what is usually known as reason. The involvement of reason in the constitution of Christian thought and teachings (exegesis, creeds, and dogmatics) was recognized early in the history of the Christian church.² Furthermore, the logia as the locus and ground for the intellective nature

¹Whoever is at least a little familiar with the wide spectrum of current and historical theological reflection needs no further evidence regarding the great variety of theological systems which often claim opposite ideas regarding the same issue. Examples of such disarray and even contradictory positions can be found in the second chapter of this dissertation where the Thomistic and Bultmannian systems are analyzed.

of Christian theology has provided the basis and viewpoint for various "critical" approaches to different aspects of Christian theology. In this context logia appears not only as the essential element for the constitution of theological meanings but also as the ground from which the Christian theos has been so far criticized. However, interestingly enough, logia itself as ground for the criticism of Christian theology has not as yet been placed under criticism.

Subtly but surely logia appears as the cognitive absolute that conditions and determines the meaning of both theological understanding and discourse. Theological truth, then, can only be perceived, recognized, and accepted within the categories and limits allowed by logia.

Within this context it should be remembered that reason, as traditionally interpreted from a philosophical perspective, has been constituted by theology as the criterion of "truth" utilized for self criticism and the constitution of meanings. In this sense reason has been used not only in natural theology but also in exegesis and dogmatics. Truth can be only that which is allowed by reason and its particular categories. It is obvious that this description, as a generalization, is not totally precise, yet it points to the basic way in which the interpretation and function of reason has been understood by most creative theologians and systems within the Christian Catholic-Protestant traditions.

Yet the current state of disarray, confusion, and lack of unity to which Christian theology has been led by this fundamental
logia suggests the necessity that logia itself, the logia as involved in theological thinking and discourse, should be placed under investigation and criticism.

This, precisely, is the approach to be followed in this investigation. The possibility that the logia of theology may be criticized by the theos instead of the theos by the logia will be carefully investigated.

The need of a criticism of theological reason seems to be clear enough. First, the already mentioned state of disagreement, and often direct contradiction which is found within the broad realm of Christian theology (creeds, exegesis, and dogmatics) seems to suggest, according to Kant's own approach (as he developed his analysis of the antinomies of pure reason), that if reason's functioning in the constitution of theological meanings leads to contradictory results, something wrong must be suspected in both the interpretation and actual functioning of reason as such contradictory results are reached.

Second, since a criticism of reason has not as yet been developed in the realm of theology it seems necessary that such an

---

1 There are some theological studies that, in one way or another, seem to address themselves to a critical approach to reason; for instance, Rudolph Gordh ("Criticism of Reason in Contemporary Theological Methodology," Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1941) approaches reason from the viewpoint and concern of the epistemological realm but in the area of methodology which assumes a previous criticism of reason. Within the area of theological methodology, Gordh focuses his study mainly on a historical analysis of the Protestant reaction at the beginning of the twentieth century, against the traditional understanding of reason as represented by Emil Brunner, the Lundensian School, and the irrationalist approach. Rousas J. Rushdoony (By What Standard? An Analysis of the Philosophy
enterprise should be undertaken especially when it is taken into account that theology as an intellective discipline stands on the basis provided by reason's functioning in the constitution of meaning.

Third, since theology has been so far developed following
the basic guidelines provided by various and well developed extra-theological theories of knowledge,¹ that is, of various interpretations of the meaning of its logia, it seems necessary that a criticism and evaluation of such a procedure and interpretation should be developed.

And fourth, the fact that in the very realm of philosophical criticism the need for a new interpretation of reason begins to be perceived and discussed² seems to suggest that also theology needs

²Brief Study of the Biblical Theory of Knowledge against a Philosophical Background," Ph.D. dissertation, Southern Baptist Theological Seminary, 1932) may be considered as representative of those which attempt to develop a Biblical epistemology or interpretation of knowledge without addressing critically the interpretation of the structure of reason. Such approaches ignore the traditional interpretation of reason that the author himself shares as he develops what is claimed to be a "Biblical" epistemology. See also Thomas F. Torrance (Theological Science [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978]) who develops with great skill and philosophical carefulness an interpretation of how traditional reason is supposed to work in a Protestant scientific tradition. Yet, a criticism of reason's structure is not intended nor developed by Torrance. He just follows the pattern of receiving philosophical criticism in order to adapt it for theological purposes. The level of the hypothetical nature of reason and its also hypothetical interpretation by philosophical traditions is a matter of either concern or investigation. Cf. Donald G. Bloesch, The Ground of Certainty: Toward an Evangelical Theology of Revelation (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1971); and Hilary Putnam, Reason, Truth, and History (London: Cambridge University Press, 1981).

²In short, as far as I can see, the criticism of theological reason has not yet been addressed by theologians even as a philosophical enterprise. Theologians seem to consider that the criticism of reason falls out of their jurisdiction.


²Giusseppe Savagneone, "La cognoscibilità del mondo della natura secondo san Tommaso," Aquinas 21 (1978):64. Regarding the different ways in which reason and rationality are interpreted within the current philosophical scene, see Michael Landmann's commentaries
to address itself directly to the same issue in order to discover and
determine the way in which its constitutive logia should be
interpreted and utilized.

By criticism of theological reason I mean two coordinated and
related senses. First, criticism of theological reason means an
investigation of reason's functioning in the constitution of meaning
within the theological realm. So far, on the contrary, the criticism
of reason has been developed within the philosophical realm as an
extra-theological enterprise. Theologians just receive the
results of this philosophical criticism of reason (whatever may have
been chosen) in a ready-to-use package which without further investi­
gation or criticism is applied to the theological enterprise. It is
ture some theologians, as for instance Thomas and Bultmann, adapt the
philosophical interpretation they choose in order to fit their own
conception of Christian theology. Yet they do not deal directly with
the criticism of reason as such but rather accept the criticism that
philosophy hands out to them.

In general terms Catholicism has been aware of reason's foun­
dational role in the constitution of theological meanings in both
natural and dogmatic theology. From its Thomistic tradition, and
even earlier, Catholicism has developed its theological reflections
within the framework provided by a Christian adaptation of the

on approaches by Max Weber (pp. 187, 188), Theodor Adorno (p. 189),
Max Horkheimer (pp. 193, 194), Herbert Marcuse (pp. 194, 195),
Jürgen Habermas (pp. 196, 197), and Ernst Bloch (p. 198). See also
Sartre's approach in his Critique de la raison dialectique: précédé
classical Platonic-Aristotelian theory of knowledge (which, by the
way, was epistemology but not yet criticism of reason, which appears
late in the history of philosophy). Thus, when criticism of reason
appears one wonders if it could be very relevant to Catholicism since
it has already carefully and dogmatically chosen its own interpreta-
tion of reason on whose basis the whole of Catholic dogmatics is con-
stituted. To criticize reason may involve changing basic dogmas and
creeds which Catholicism could not afford without serious danger of a
loss of identity.

In Protestantism the endorsement of a particular theory of
knowledge has been more difficult. Protestant Orthodoxy followed
rather closely the Thomistic interpretation of reason. Liberal Prot-
estantism has followed in different ways the basic results of Kant's
criticism of reason. Yet an actual theological (either Catholic or
Protestant) criticism of theological reason, as to the investigation
of reason's structure and functioning in the constitution of theolo-
gical meaning, has not been intended, not even in the most recent
Protestant epistemological studies.

Protestantism, as it addresses itself to the epistemological
enterprise, is not concerned with a criticism of reason but rather
with searching and finding within the philosophical criticism of
reason a model close enough to the dogmatic position the theo-
logian is trying to present, to be adapted for his particular
theological interests and tradition. Yet, what the theologian holds
as his tradition, usually in Protestantism under the name of "The
Gospel," is not under criticism even though reason itself is involved
in the constitution of whatever the theologian may be meaning with his absolute designation of "The Gospel." Thus reason's structure is not under investigation in Protestantism.

This leads me to the second sense in which I understand the criticism of theological reason. A criticism of theological reason not only includes and means a criticism of the way reason's structure constitutes meaning in theology, but it also means that such criticism is to be developed by theology within its own realm. It means to claim that theology is able to develop a criticism of its use of reason by itself outside the traditional philosophical realm. This idea entails the necessary independence of theology from philosophy that should lie at the basis of any possible discussion regarding the theology-philosophy relationship. Obviously, however, such a study could be faced only after this dissertation and a great deal of further study are successfully accomplished.

Due to the epistemological nature of this investigation, theology is approached as a cognitive enterprise which involves the constitution of meanings. Furthermore, within the cognitive realm to which theology as an intellective discipline belongs, it is necessary to determine the way in which human reason is to be interpreted before the epistemological problem regarding the origin of the content of theological statements (revelation-inspiration) may be properly addressed and interpreted. Consequently, when I say that theology stands cognitively in reason, I do not mean to deny revelation its grounding role in relation to the content of theological meanings; I am only trying to point out the intellectual realm to
which theology belongs even as it pertains to a particular revealed kind of knowledge. Since revelation-inspiration as origin of theological meanings assumes, in order to be at all, a cognitive realm, the realm of reason as a tool for the constitution of meanings (even of those originated by what theology calls "revelation-inspiration"), it seems apparent that a criticism of the realm in which revelation is given should cognitively precede the actual understanding and interpretation of "revelation-inspiration" itself. This dissertation addresses itself to this previous cognitive investigation.

If the need for a criticism of theological reason seems to be clear, its possibility is not. The criticism of reason appeared late in the history of philosophy and has been developed within the philosophical realm ever since. Moreover, since reason

1 The need comes from both the very nature of theology as grounded and constituted by its logia, and by the fact that theology has adopted, along its historical development, several different theories of knowledge without a proper critical procedure. This situation, in which different interpretations of reason are used within theology, determines the existence of different systems and contradictory theological statements.

2 Criticism of reason should be distinguished from the development of epistemological and ontological theories. Actually ontological and epistemological theories appear first in the history of philosophy, being the actual material that is addressed by the criticism of reason which comes late in the history of philosophy. Even when ontological and epistemological theories can be traced back to the Greek tradition of philosophy as early as the fifth century B.C., it is generally accepted that criticism of reason began either in 1690 with John Locke (An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, abridged ed. [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1928]; or in 1781 with Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1939]). Ever since, criticism of reason has been developed within the realm and with the procedures that belong to philosophical investigations. The criticism of reason, therefore, assumes the actual pre-existent epistemological interpretations of reason's functioning. Consequently, a criticism of theological reason, if the same pattern
seems to be one, it does not seem clear how a theological criticism of reason could be attempted or established.

Reason, as the human activity for the constitution of meaning, is one. There are not two or three different kinds of reasons within the same human being. In this sense, reason is equal to the human capability for the constitution of meanings. In this context it seems that a criticism of reason has to deal with reason as such and not with reason insofar as it produces a determinate kind of meaning, for instance, theological meanings. It is necessary, then, that the possibility of a criticism of theological reason should be established prior to its actual development in relation to reason's apparent oneness. This requires an understanding of reason's structure and its actual functioning in the constitution of meanings which is developed when the philosophical context is analyzed in chapter 1 below.

So far the logia of theology has been criticized from the viewpoint of the ontos^1 (philosophy). Could it be criticized from the viewpoint and realm of the theos (theology) within a Christian context? Theologians, in general, have accepted the criticism of reason to be a philosophical enterprise from whose ideological results they can draw but not as a task which theology itself should

|^1 I have chosen to use the genitive ontos instead of the corresponding nominative on only because of phonetic reasons. |
face and develop. Consequently, theology so far has not even asked the question about the possibility of a criticism of theological reason. In short, criticism of reason is a philosophical matter from whose results theologians may learn but in whose development theologians do not share.

In this context where the need for a criticism of theological reason is apparent but its possibility is neither clear nor has even been considered, this dissertation proposes to formulate such a question about the possibility of a criticism of theological reason and hopes to provide an answer for it. Can a criticism of reason's functioning in the constitution of Christian theological meanings be developed by theology? Or, on the contrary, should the commonly accepted procedure of criticism be confirmed and philosophy be declared responsible for the criticism of reason as it has been.

1This is a consequence of the traditional philosophical realm in which criticism of reason has been so far developed. See above, p. 3, n. 1. Theologians recognize in general that there is a critical approach to reason, but, at the same time, they dogmatically accept that this critical enterprise pertains only to philosophy. Thus the role of theology regarding the criticism of reason is not to develop the critical reflection itself but rather consists in evaluating the results of the critical philosophical enterprise so as to adapt them for theological usage. Thus, metatheology is not yet, properly speaking, a critical, cognitive enterprise.

2In this context it should be noted that the criticisms of reason have been developed by philosophy in relation to both philosophy and sciences. Yet, philosophy, as such has not addressed itself to the analysis of reason's theological activities since theologians have readily accepted for such a task the conclusions and criteria that result from the philosophical criticism of reason's activities in philosophy. Regarding the way philosophy criticizes reason's functioning in sciences (geometry, physics, biology, and history), see, for instance, Ernst Cassirer, The Problem of Knowledge: Philosophy, Science, and History Since Hegel (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1960).
developed so far? On the other hand, an actual criticism of theological reason is not intended in this study because it could be seriously considered only after the question of its possibility has been both expressed and answered.

In order that this issue may be properly addressed it is necessary to focus as precisely as possible on both the field of study and the subject-matter of this investigation. The analysis of the possibility of a theological criticism of theological reason pertains to the broad field of systematic theology. Within the field of systematic theology our study belongs to the area of theological epistemology or the philosophy of theology. In this context the subject-matter of this dissertation pertains specifically to what is known in philosophical reflection as theory of knowledge (also known in some parts of the world as "criticism" due to Kantian influence). It is within the realm of a theory of theological knowledge that the subject-matter of this dissertation is to be found, namely, reason as tool and place for the constitution of meanings, particularly Christian theological meanings. Finally, within the realm

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1It is within this area that theological methodologies are discussed, criticized, and thus shaped for theological reflection.

2As follows from the phenomenological analysis developed in chapter 2, below, what I call here theory of theological knowledge is just the theological adaptation of philosophical theories. It does not imply a critical approach to theological reason.

3It should be clear then that the logia under investigation is not logic, that is, it is not the philosophic discipline called "logic" which deals with the study of the formal and empty structure of knowledge in its various connections and relations. The logia as here understood is related to the realm of the theory of knowledge which deals with the study of the way reason proceeds in the
of reason as a tool for the constitution of meaning, this investigation is focused on the interpretation of the dimensionality of reason's structure. 1

Furthermore, due to the epistemological nature of this investigation, it should be clear that no theological, exegetical, historical, hermeneutical, or methodological study as such is intended. Besides, as the investigation of reason in its involvement in and relationship to both religion and theology has been very prolific and broad, especially in recent times, it should be noted that this study is not going to address related issues such as the truthfulness of the Christian systems of beliefs over against every other extant or possible system, 2 reason in natural theology, 3 the faith-reason constitution of meanings and reasonings with regard to its content. It could be the case that the critical analysis of the logia may suggest some changes in the way the understanding of the "logic" has been so far developed. This, however, cannot even be suggested until after the actual criticism of the theological logia is accomplished. Regarding "logic" as philosophical discipline and its field of investigation, see Clarence I. Lewis and Cooper H. Langford, Symbolic Logic (New York: Dover Publications, n.d.), pp. 3-25.

1 Within reason's structure the idea of "dimensionality" points to the foundational level in which the rational process of constitution of meanings finds its ground. For an explanation of what reason's structure is and what is meant by its dimensionality, see chapter 1 below.


3 See for instance, E. L. Miller, God and Reason: A Historical Approach to Philosophical Theology (New York: Macmillan Co., 1972); James Richmond, Theology and Metaphysics (London: SCM Press,
relationship, reason as involved in the phenomenological studies of
religion, reason and religious knowledge and experience, reason and
ermeneutics and exegesis, reason and rational justification


for beliefs, reason and apologetics, reason and theological methodology, reason and theological language, and reason and revelation.

From a cognitive perspective the subject-matter of this investigation precedes all these issues and relationships, and, at the same time, is foundational to all of them because it focuses on reason itself.

Moreover, since this investigation is not only epistemological but also follows a constructive systematic approach, some very

1See, for instance, Robert Milligan, Reason and Revelation: Or the Province of Reason in Matters Pertaining to Divine Revelation Defined and Illustrated (Cincinnati: R. W. Carrol & Co., 1871).


clear limitations of procedure need to be spelled out at the very beginning. In this kind of investigation it is impossible to attain total awareness of the whole of the philosophical and theological systems in their manifold details that could well be examined and analyzed (notably those of Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle, Kant, Jaspers, Heidegger, Thomas, Bultmann, and Moses), or with the critical ongoing discussion of them. A historical-theological follow-up of the main systems considered or of the analysis developed falls outside the purpose and limits of this constructive epistemological investigation.\(^1\) Even within the realm of theological epistemology, an actual development of a criticism of theological reason in the sense of providing a theory of theological knowledge or an interpretation of theological reason falls outside the purposes and limits of this investigation, which asks only for the possibility of such an enterprise in the theological realm.

Within this precise and reduced field and objective of investigation, and in the context of the working limitations above mentioned, the analysis of the possibility of a criticism of theological reason requires a careful examination of three basic contexts, namely, the philosophical, the theological, and the Biblical. The phenomenological analysis\(^2\) of these three contexts is intended to

\(^1\)Such a historical-theological enterprise is, obviously, highly desirable and would be very helpful for a better and clearer understanding of the current theological and religious approaches and usages of reason. However, such an attempt would be rather a critical history of theological epistemology and not an epistemological investigation into the structure and possibility of a criticism of theological reason.

\(^2\)Regarding the way in which the phenomenological approach is understood and applied in this epistemological investigation,
present a clear perspective of reason's dimensionality and the way in which it has been both interpreted and utilized in the constitution of meaning in philosophical enterprises (and, of course, in the theological as well). Such foundational information should provide enough evidence for reaching some conclusions regarding whether or not a criticism of theological reason is possible and what these conclusions would entail for the theological enterprise as a whole. At this point it should be noted that in order that the possibility of a criticism of theological reason may be affirmed it is necessary to consider the interpretation of Being's dimensionality or reason's primordial presupposition (time, timelessness).

The analysis of the philosophical context should render a clear picture of both the subject-matter of this investigation, namely reason's structure and its functioning in the constitution of meaning, and the way in which the dimensionality of reason's structure has been interpreted throughout the history of philosophy. Even within the analysis of this philosophical context, it will be interesting to notice, from a theological perspective, whether or not the philosophical interpretation of reason's dimensionality makes any room for a theological approach.

The analysis of the theological context should provide a precise and clear illustration of the way in which the structure of reason has been interpreted and utilized in the constitution of theological meanings (exegesis, creeds, and dogmatics) throughout the

clarifications and explanations are presented as needed in the development of this study as it reaches crucial points.
history of Christian thought. Furthermore, the analysis of this context should provide additional evidence regarding the necessity of a criticism of theological reason as expressed above. Yet, since Christian theological reflections have depended until now on extra-theological interpretations of reason, the possibility of a criticism of theological reason is not expected to find its ground in the analysis of this context.

The possibility of a criticism of theological reason could be established if a theological reflection on reason's and Being's dimensionality could be either found or developed. The search for such a reflection leads this investigation to the analysis of the third context, namely, the Biblical one. The analysis of the Biblical context will focus on an epistemological analysis of Exod 3:14 in order to discover whether or not an original Christian theological reflection on the interpretation of the dimensionality of reason's structure may be found at the beginning of Christian reflection. Particular care will be taken here in order to discover whether the criticism of the logia of theology should be developed from the realm and perspective of the theos (theology), or, on the contrary, should be addressed, as so far, from the realm and viewpoint of the ontos (philosophy).

With these preliminary considerations in mind, it is time now to start this investigation in search of the possibility of a criticism of theological reason by addressing the analysis of the philosophical context in which the interpretation of reason's structure appears.
CHAPTER I

THE ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF REASON

The logos involved in the word and concept of theo-logia points to the essential cognitive pre-condition of theology. To deny that logos is constitutive of the essence of theology implies the destruction of theo-logia. Where there is no logos there is no

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2 Pre-condition, epistemologically understood, means that the logos realm is required as necessary for theology to exist. Revelation, which constitutes the origin of Christian Theology, is directed to man as a being endowed with reason. Arthur F. Holmes in All Truth is God's Truth (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1977), p. 84, says in theology "we simply cannot avoid reasoning." See also L. Harold De Wolf, A Theology of the Living Church (New York: Harper and Bro., 1953), p. 33; and Luigi Bogliolo, "Theologia Ancilla Philosophiae," Aquinas 15 (1972):258. Bogliolo, from a classical viewpoint, sees God revealing Himself to human reason. Moreover, from a systematic viewpoint it should be remembered that logos in its structure is already formed before the theologians go to revelation as their source of meaning. See James L. Perotti, Heidegger on the Divine: The Thinker, the Poet, and God (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1974), p. 64. This position, however, is rejected by theological "irrationalism" which believes that "knowledge is given the thinker in 'terms' which cannot be set forth rationally, or that
theo-logia. Logos is the realm of meaning,\(^1\) which includes everything that is connected with the constitution of meaning in general.\(^2\) So far theology has mainly addressed itself to the Theos\(^3\) by means of a logos whose meaning and structure have been studied, developed, and provided by philosophy.\(^4\) Consequently, within some other way than reasoning is necessary in order that the nature of the word may be discerned" (George Rudolph Gordh, "Criticism of Reason in Contemporary Theological Methodology" [Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1941], p. 21). It is apparent, however, that "irrationalism" does recognize and accept the intellectual dimension of theology as it talks about "knowledge," "thinker," and "terms." What irrationalism rejects is a particular systematic interpretation of the logos dimension of theology and not the logos dimension itself.

\(^1\) Logos is not meant here in its christological sense as in John 1:1. It is rather to be understood as Julián Marías (History of Philosophy [New York: Dover, 1967], p. 75) puts it: "The primary meaning of logos is derived from the verb legein, 'to join together' or 'gather' and also 'to say.' Logos is 'saying,' that is, a 'meaningful word.'" For a description of the broad meaning of reason as logos see Reason and Life: The Introduction to Philosophy (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1975), pp. 157-158.

\(^2\) So logos is here used as synonymous with "reason" in its broad original sense of nous, noein ("to see," and "apprehension of reality.") (Marías, Reason and Life, pp. 164, 165). For an introductory analysis to the meaning of related concepts--from a linguistic viewpoint--such as "mens," "intellectus," and "ratio," see ibid., pp. 166-186. A restricted use of the meaning of "Reason," such as for instance the one we find in Immanuel Kant (Critique of Pure Reason [London: J. M. Dent and Sons, 1959], pp. 211-13) when he refers to reason as the connection of judgments provided by the categories of the intellect, is obviously included in the broad sense of logos and ratio.

\(^3\) Theology, understandably, has been so concerned about its own subject matter, namely God, that the logos dimension of theology has constantly fallen into oblivion. Consequently, we see contemporary Metatheology or Fundamental Theology dealing mainly with methodological issues. See K. Barth, Evangelical Theology: An Introduction (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1963), p. 16.

\(^4\) Because of many reasons whose analyses fall far beyond the limits of this investigation, theologians have always tacitly assumed
theological quarters, criticism has never reached the realm of logos, namely, the realm of reason.


On the contrary, the logos realm in its many ways and interpretations has been the main tool for the theological criticism of the idea of God, and, more recently for the theological debate on Revelation and Inspiration. For a recent study that summarizes the current discussion on the problem of the origin of theological meaning, see Paul J. Achtemeier, The Inspiration of Scripture: Problems and Proposals (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1980), pp. 21-136.

Criticism is to be understood here not only in the general sense of a careful investigation of a given subject matter but also in the particular epistemological sense introduced by Kant, that is, as being an investigation of the nature, limitations, and conditions of knowledge. In the history of philosophy this sense is obviously a recent one. According to Sebastian Samay (Reason Revisited: The Philosophy of Karl Jaspers [Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971], pp. xiv-xviii), this critical dimension is essential for philosophy.

Marvin Farber points out the epistemological predicament of reason's criticism since "in order to investigate cognition, it is necessary to make use of knowledge" ("The Ideal of a Presuppositionless Philosophy," in Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl, ed. Marvin Farber [New York: Greenwood Press, 1968], pp.
Protestantism). Within this broad context the purpose of this first chapter is twofold. First, to explain the subject matter of the investigation, namely, reason as it functions in the constitution of meaning. Second, to attempt to develop the necessary epistemological viewpoint that a criticism of reason requires. In the

Even though criticism of reason is difficult, Farber (p. 54) understands that such a situation "is unavoidable because of the essentially reflexive character of philosophical inquiry." Nicolai Hartmann in his Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntis (Berlin: W. de Gruyter, 1941), I.34.c, remarks regarding reason's predicament that to use knowledge in order to study its own conditions is something very difficult. But at the same time he adds that such an undertaking constitutes the summum of the reflexive attitude.

They are: the classical tradition which probably has its most relevant representative in Thomas Aquinas, and the scientific tradition in which Rudolf Bultmann may be considered as a relevant representative.

At this stage it may be relevant to point out that the viewpoint for criticism that we have chosen differs from the one chosen by Kant who, following the Empiricist-Rationalist controversy of his day, chose the perspective of the origin of knowledge for its criticism. We can see Kant's viewpoint for criticism in his Critique of Pure Reason (pp. 43-61) as he deals with the metaphysical and transcendental expositions of space and time. In contrast, we have chosen to develop our criticism from the perspective of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason. As we are going to see, reason's structure was described with clarity for the first time in Kant's criticism, especially in his Transcendental Dialectics.

The Kantian approach to knowledge—the result of his criticism—has been widely accepted and used in post-Kantian Protestant liberal theology. Consequently theologians believed that if they could settle the issue of the origin of theological meanings, the problem of theological meaning as a whole would also be solved as a consequence. This Kantian influence may help to explain the current interest and discussion of revelation and inspiration (see p. 21, n. 1 above) and the recent development of theological studies in epistemology—Metatheology. Metatheology is conceived to be, as foundational theological reflection, "a philosophical theology in the age of analysis" which proceeds mainly by developing "the logical
chapter I deal with the second objective in terms of the metaphysical

dimensionality of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason.

analysis of the nature of religious language" (Raeburne Heimbeck,
Theology and Meaning: A Critique of Metatheological Scepticism
For a brief account of modern Metatheological studies see ibid., pp.
19-21. Epistemological studies in theology are also called
"Fundamental Theology," whose task is to describe the nature of
revelation and to demonstrate its de facto existence by pointing to
the criteria of revelation and the signs of its credibility" (Heinrich Fries, "Fundamental Theology," Sacramentum Mundi [1968],
2:369). This kind of study is called "Formal Theology" by Emil
Brunner (Revelation and Reason: The Christian Doctrine of Faith and
these studies leave unasked the question about the logos of
theo-logia, that is, the question about the structure and functioning
of reason as a tool for theological reflection.

At first glance, to claim a "metaphysical dimensionality" as
the viewpoint for a criticism of reason may seem to be not only
unjustified but bluntly wrong. After all, was it not Kant's main
thrust that metaphysics and ontology should be put aside as reason is
investigated? Was it not Kant's conclusion that the critique of
reason does not grant any ontological or metaphysical knowledge? Is
it not true, at least to a certain extent, that Kant's approach was
followed by Edmund Husserl who believed, according to Farber (p. 55),
that "the 'formal' theory of knowledge, which explains this theory of
toories, is prior to all empirical theories; hence it is prior to
all explanatory real science, to physical science and psychology, and
also to metaphysics"? Moreover, in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries Kantian influence has caused a strong anti-metaphysical
reaction. See Julián Marias, Idea de la Metafisica, in Obras
Completas (Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1952), 6:389; and N.
Hartmann, Int. 40. In this context, and at this initial stage of our
investigation, we may reply to the above mentioned position by
pointing out that Christian theology is essentially linked to
traditional metaphysics (Perotti, p. 64) and that we cannot, as
theologians, include theology in the contemporary rejection of
metaphysics as Heidegger does in his "overcoming" of both metaphysics
and theology. Additionally, as Stanislas Breton ("Crisis de la raisin
aujourd'hui," Revue de theologie et de philosophie 22 [1972]:146,
151, 152) points out, the current crisis of philosophical reason is
essentially connected to the crisis in the understanding of the
essence of metaphysics. So, a criticism of reason neither in the
philosophical nor in the theological realm can avoid the metaphysical
dimension.

The term "dimensionality" is not used here in its common
meaning as related to breadth, length, and thickness. I use the term
In order to provide epistemological room for a criticism of theological reason I show first the independence of, and, at the same time, the essential relationship that exists between, reason as such\(^1\) and the different interpretations of it.\(^2\) I also attempt to show that reason's structure may be understood and interpreted in two different dimensionalities\(^3\) which render two widely different kinds of "dimensionality" to point out the realm of inquiry in which the primordial presupposition of Being and reason moves and receives its meaning. This "dimensionality" pertains to the structure of reason as its basic and all-pervasive nature which requires to be interpreted. In other words, "dimensionality" may be seen as the ground of Being previous to an interpretation. Both, "ground of Being," and "primordial presupposition," already include the interpretative factor. "Dimensionality" is the realm of Heideggerian "No-thing" non-entity, that pervades the whole of reality and meaning. Dimensionality then requires interpretation, it does not provide it. Cf. Paul Tillich's somewhat different usage of the term "dimension" (Systematic Theology, 3 vols. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-63], I:117, 118).

\(^1\)That is to say, reason as actual, concrete, human realm of meaning, over against the interpretations that philosophy and science may offer of such a basic cognitive activity.

\(^2\)In philosophy, science, and theology, reason, as activity responsible for the constitution of meaning, has been confused with the Platonic interpretation of it. Philosophers and theologians seem to forget that the foundational epistemological reflection that any science or methodology needs to assume is called "Theory of Knowledge." The very name suggests divergence and hypothetical results. Usually, however, these results have been considered as "facts." For a brief technical introduction to the understanding of the main Theories of Knowledge, see N. Hartmann, 2.11-22; and Thomas Whittaker, Reason: a Philosophical Essay with Historical Illustrations (New York: Greenwood Press, 1968). For a theological discussion of Theories of Knowledge, see S. Stealey, pp. 18-105.

\(^3\)I do not know any philosopher who expresses the possibility of two dimensionalities of reason. I will try to show, however, that modern epistemological criticism points in that direction and to suggest the context in which the "choice" at the level of the dimensionality of reason may be seen. Since reason cannot function in both dimensionalities at the same time, the philosophical search for truth has so far avoided this foundational and primordial choice.
of logos. In order to accomplish these objectives I undertake a phenomenological analysis of the act of knowing and analyze the actual systems of thought of the most important thinkers in the
differentiation which goes far beyond to what Derek A. Kelly calls "varieties of philosophical reason." See his article "Varieties of Philosophical Reason," Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 24 (1976):28-32. What Kelly calls "varieties of philosophical reason" is just a historical synthesis of the main currents in the theory of knowledge which are considered to be main "types" of reason, namely Perfectionism (Plato), Contextualism (Kant), Completionism (Aristotle), and Adventurism (Heraclitus). Temporality and timelessness as dimensions of reason are to be regarded as the ground and condition of theories of knowledge or "typologies" such as Kelly's.

As developed in the second part of this chapter, these two foundational kinds of logos are the classical or timeless and the temporal-historical reason. We are pointing to a foundational differentiation which goes far beyond to what Derek A. Kelly calls "varieties of philosophical reason." See his article "Varieties of Philosophical Reason," Philosophical Studies (Ireland) 24 (1976):28-32. What Kelly calls "varieties of philosophical reason" is just a historical synthesis of the main currents in the theory of knowledge which are considered to be main "types" of reason, namely Perfectionism (Plato), Contextualism (Kant), Completionism (Aristotle), and Adventurism (Heraclitus). Temporality and timelessness as dimensions of reason are to be regarded as the ground and condition of theories of knowledge or "typologies" such as Kelly's.

Farber describes the phenomenological procedure in the investigation of the act of knowledge as "the intentional analysis of the cognitive process" (p. 62). Then he evaluates it by saying that "when restricted to cognition and its correlates as such, [it] may well be the most critical possible beginning for philosophy." Additionally, Farber (p. 58) explicitly connects the phenomenological analysis to the "structure of reason" in the following way: "the phenomenological method is not only a possible method for the theory of knowledge, but it is one which necessarily must be developed and carried through consciously for the understanding of the nature and structure of knowledge." See also R. Vancourt, foreword to Les principes d'une métaphysique de la connaissance by Nicolai Hartmann (Paris: Aubier, 1945), p. 14. We are not actually planning to develop a phenomenological analysis beginning de novo. The limitations of our investigation prevent me from doing so. Additionally, the fact that there is already developed an analysis of it, and that as Farber says (p. 58), the phenomenological analysis has been used in partial form throughout the history of philosophy, encourages me to use these technical analyses and insights in the investigation here.

The analysis of reason beginning from the meaning found in an actual system of thought was successfully used by Kant. His starting point is what he calls "the fact of pure reason" (Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 35-37). This procedure has already been used in theological epistemology, even though in a somewhat different subject
history of the criticism and interpretation of reason. As I use the phenomenological approach I am aware of the major criticism¹ that has been formulated against it, namely, that it necessarily works in the realm of transcendental idealism.² This criticism, however, fails to see that phenomenology may be used outside of the idealistic fence.³

¹As a "minor" objection it could be argued that such a method is too recent to be trusted. After all, N. Hartman (1.4.b.), early in the twentieth century, recognized that he was breaking new ground with his phenomenological analysis of knowledge in a systematic way and foresaw that such a procedure would become a science by itself. Hartmann's statement may have some truth in it, but in general it is an overstatement. Reinhardt Grossmann (The Structure of Mind [Milwaukee: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1965], pp. 3-59) traces back the history of the phenomenological analysis of the structure of the mind to Brentano's idealism. Additionally, M. Farber affirms that phenomenology "has been tacitly assumed and used in part in the past" (p. 58).

²Hilary Putnam (Reason Truth and History [London: Cambridge University Press, 1981], pp. 20, 271) claims that phenomenological investigation is "fundamentally misguided." His criticism, however, is mainly due to the remaining idealism that he is able to see in phenomenology as stemming from Edmund Husserl's procedure which included as an essential feature a conscious detachment from the ontological realm. Commenting on Husserl's first Cartesian Meditation, Quentin Lauer (Phenomenology: Its Genesis and Prospect [New York: Harper and Row, 1965], p. 134) explains how for transcendental idealism the "world" is given in the "I am" of Cartesian consciousness. Farber synthesizes the idealism of Husserl's approach to phenomenology by saying that the clarification of what knowledge is "occurs within the framework of a phenomenology of knowledge which is concerned with the essential structure of the pure experiences and their meanings" (p. 55). At this point, however, we should remember that the late Husserl seems to forget this phenomenological reduction and points to the ontological foundation of meaning.

³R. Vancourt (p. 11) points out that N. Hartmann uses the phenomenological method but at the same time rejects Husserl's transcendental reduction. The same is true for Heidegger, Being and Time, Int. 2.7; Jean-Paul Sartre, Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology (New York: Philosophical Library, 1956),
It is this last way, which is open to the ontological role of reality, that I understand and use the phenomenological procedure\(^1\) in this attempt to identify the nature and structure or the subject matter of this study, namely, reason—knowledge, \textit{logos}.\(^2\)

**An Introductory Description of the Onto-theo-logical Structure of Reason**

To begin an analysis of the structure of knowledge is to leave the naïve realm in which knowledge is just a "fact" among others,\(^3\) even an unconscious one.\(^4\)

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\(^1\)This approach is the best way to accomplish the foundational task of getting acquainted with the subject matter of this study. "Before we can make any reflection on an object we must first know the object. The phenomenologists are right when they insist that the first step in philosophy is an analysis of the phenomenon, which means an accurate description of the thing as that thing swims into our awareness. This must be met face to face before anything else can be done. This is no place to give definitions, because we have no right to define until the phenomenon has been completely surveyed. To begin with definition is to expose the whole work to frustration or futility" (Gustave Weigel and Arthur G. Madden, \textit{Knowledge: Its Values and Limits} [Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961], p. 13).

\(^2\)My description of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason focuses on its main distinctive features which are directly related to the criticism of theological reason pursued in the next two chapters. For a complete and detailed analysis of the phenomenon of knowledge the best available work is still N. Hartmann's \textit{Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis}; see especially I.5. In the same tradition is Johannes Hessen's \textit{Erkenntnistheorie} (Berlin: Ferd Dümmlers, 1926). In a different tradition and with a less technical exposition is G. Weigel (pp. 29-31). A criticism of these phenomenological expositions is not intended here because of the thematic approach of this investigation.

\(^3\)Many a theological reflection has been developed on this naïve ground.

\(^4\)That is to say, naïve understanding is not even conscious of the existence of such a thing as "an act of knowledge." The naïve
Nicolai Hartmann points to the basic nature of knowledge, which is at the same time a structure, by saying that in every knowledge a "knower" and "known," a subject and an object, meet face to face. The relationship that exists between them is in itself knowledge. In different ways, and from different philosophical traditions, this foundational structure of knowledge, namely the subject-object relationship, is recognized. This is the foundational expression of reason's structure because any meaning is possible only insofar as it springs from and stands on this relationship. This relational structure is an a priori condition for knower is only conscious of the "known object" as a material content of his awareness. See N. Hartmann, 1.5.b.1. This may suggest the difficulties that lie ahead. It may require extra concentration to follow a summary description of an act whose existence has been previously unrecognized.

1N. Hartmann, 1.5.a.1; cf. 5.1.1.a. Here care must be taken not to confuse subject and object with the medieval understanding of them (objectum, subiectum—hypokeimenon) or with Kant's Gegenstand (that which exists as standing-over-against). See Heidegger, The Piety of Thinking: Essays by Martin Heidegger, edited with commentaries by James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 26. These philosophical usages and the common usages as well already include ontological connotations which at this foundational stage of the phenomenological analysis have not appeared yet. The ontological dimension appears later but only in a structural relation to the subject-object relationship in its cognitive function.

2References to it are not always direct ones nor are they expressed in an epistemological context. They are clear enough, however, as to be understood as pointing to the foundational subject-object relationship. The following references are examples. Spanish philosophers of vital reason point to this relationship from an ontological perspective through the famous sentence by Ortega y Gasset, "I am I and my circumstance" (Yo soy yo y mi circunstancia), quoted and explicated by his most brilliant disciple Julián Mariás (Idea de la Metafísica, pp. 397, 399). From a scientific viewpoint, Putnam (p. 54) points out that there is no input that is not in "some extent shaped by our concepts." From a Marxist perspective Theodor
any theory that tries to interpret the different roles of its two poles, namely, subject and object. If one pole is absent there is no knowledge, no meaning, no logos. This relationship is the center from which any meaning is constituted, from which logos opens itself up to its frameworks and dimensionality.

What is the role that each pole—subject and object—is supposed to play within the foundational expression of reason's

W. Adorno says, criticizing empiricism and rationalism, that "spirit can as little be divorced from the given ... as the latter can from it. Neither is something first. The fact that both are essentially mediated by one another makes both equally unfit to be original principles" ("Metacritique of Epistemology," Telos [1978, 79]:92). Jaspers, Philosophical Faith, understands this structure of knowledge for he states that "consciousness is the basic phenomenon of the split into subject and object," and that "whatever we speak of has come into the dichotomy as we speak of it" (p. 61). It is clear that Jaspers introduces here an ontological idea by which he sees the subject-object relationship as split in its center by a dichotomy. He considers it to be reason's responsibility through its mode of "encompassing" to bridge such a split and dichotomy in order to bring final unity. Marjorie Grene, commenting on Merleau-Ponty's approach to reason, says that "neither is pure subject, neither is pure object: it is those very categories that have so misled us and that Merleau-Ponty is attempting to transcend" ("Merleau-Ponty and the Renewal of Ontology," Review of Metaphysics 29 [1976]:619). Then she goes on characterizing the subject-object relationship as the "in-between." For an approach from a pragmatic viewpoint, see Sandra B. Rosenthal, "C. I. Lewis and the Pragmatic Rejection of Phenomenalism," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1980):209.

It pertains to the structure of knowledge, according to the phenomenological analysis, that the subject-object relationship is a "correlation" in which its poles "condition each other" (N. Hartmann, 1.5.a.2). Such a relationship takes place psychologically in consciousness and epistemologically in the "image" of the object in the subject (N. Hartmann, 1.5.b.6). So knowledge is the result of the relationship itself with the inputs that come from both its poles, namely, subject and object. This suggests that the subject-object relationship is not only determined by the object but also by the subject (ibid., 1.33.a).
structure? The object's role is basically the communication of the properties of the object into the subject. The function of the object is to be the determinative element; the subject is the determined element. On the other hand, the cognitive subject, which when considered from the object's viewpoint appears to be essentially receptive, is also, when seen from the subject's perspective, called to play a creative function in the relational structure of knowledge. The creative activity of the cognitive subject thus

At this stage it should be easier to understand why it is necessary to talk about "the structure of reason." It is because the most fundamental way in which knowledge—logos—is given is not simple but composite. It is not static but dynamic. It is not a tangible reality which could be reduced to a definite fact or meaning, but the very composite and dynamic source of meaning in action. The complexity of this structure will be apparent as I continue with its analysis.

N. Hartmann, 1.5.c.1 and 2. This may give the impression that we are facing realism. This seems in fact to be Hartmann's viewpoint as he stresses the object's role more than the subject's. However, as he develops his phenomenological analysis, a limit is set to the object's determinative powers in that the object does not determine the subject as such, not even in its purely cognitive dimension, but it only determines the image of the object in the subject (ibid., 1.5.c.4). In more precise terms one may say that what the object determines in the cognitive relationship which knowledge is, are the properties of the object that participate in the constitution of any given act of knowledge. This is always the case in independence of the kind of object involved, that is, in independence of any ontological interpretation.

N. Hartmann, 1.5.c.6. Even though at first glance the creative contribution of the cognitive subject may appear to be insignificant and easy to handle, further analysis shows its foundational importance and its complexity. The receptivity of the subject is foundational. It points to the subject's cognitive capability that makes knowledge possible. Without receptivity there would be no knowledge. Throughout the history of philosophy the concepts of "potency" and "nothingness" have been used to refer to the subject's receptivity.

This means that the subject, as knower, brings to the relationship its own inputs which shape both the form and the content
affects the relation of knowledge itself (as does the object); that is to say, it reaches forth and constitutes the image of the object, not the object itself.\(^1\) Hartmann characterizes the foundational input of the subject in any knowledge as "the spontaneity of the subject,"\(^2\) which appears mainly as the image is seen as an interpretive endeavor to grasp the object.\(^3\) This spontaneity includes all the background that the subject brings to the relation.\(^4\)

The structure of reason is to be found in the actual of the meaning that is constituted. Thus it contributes as much to the act of knowing as the object does (ibid.).

\(^1\)Ibid. This means that consciousness, namely subject as knower, participates creatively in the formation of the image, that is words of the actual meaning that springs from the relationship itself.

\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)Ibid., i.5.c.7. This points to the fact that in all knowledge an interpretative dimension is included. This interpretative dimension is provided by the subject as one of the involved poles of the relationship that knowledge is. Holmes points to this essential pole of knowledge when he says that "our reasoning interprets what is given (p. 100). John Kekes ("Feeling and Imagination in Metaphysics," Idealistic Studies 7 [1977]:76-93), even though not applying it to the structure of reason, shows that feeling and imagination are present in the construction of metaphysical theories. Since he affirms that imagination and feeling have a crucial role "within the bounds of reason," one can see in his study at least an indirect reference to the cognitive "spontaneity of the subject." At the other end of the cognitive enterprise—the origin of knowledge—the spontaneity of the subject is seen by Putnam who affirms that "even our description of sensation . . . is heavily affected . . . by a host of conceptual choices" (p. 54). Thus, we can see that at least imagination, feeling, interpretation, and conceptual choices are involved and working in what we call the "spontaneity of the subject" in the subjective pole of the relationship of knowledge.

\(^4\)The idea of "background" includes the whole of the subject's experiences and knowledge which are added to the already mentioned imagination, feeling, etc., to integrate the input the cognitive
relationship of the two poles. Poles become poles only in their relationship. These poles, in their structural relationship, constitute equiprimordially the whole of the meaning of any possible knowledge.

As the basic phenomenon of the structure of reason, the subject-object relationship appears as it functions in its natural realm, namely the cognitive one. I apply the term "epistemological framework" to the cognitive realm of the structure of reason. Even subject brings to the relationship of knowledge. The spontaneity of the subject, as the interpretative pole, must be present for the constitution of knowledge.

It has been the task of the theory of knowledge to understand and interpret this relationship. Several interpretations have been suggested, from the minimization of the subject's creative role, as in early Greek philosophy, to the maximization of it as, for instance, in George Berkeley's proposal that "to be is to be perceived" (A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge [La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1946], p. 32).  

1 Hartmann, 1.5.a.2. As the analysis shows later, however, subject and object do not exhaust themselves in their actual relationship (ibid., 1.5.e.6).

2 Knowledge and language belong together. In other words, one is never without the other. One is never the foundation of the other. One is never prior to the other. One is never condition for the other to be or to enter into the relationship. See p. 21, n. 1; and also Putnam, pp. x, xi. "The mind and the word jointly make up the world" (ibid.).

3 Hartmann, 1.5.e.

4 "Framework" is used here in its sense of "frame" within which the subject-object relationship works and to which it is essentially linked.

5 The "frameworks" of reason--both the epistemological and the ontological--are not to be considered as being "external" to the structure of reason but rather as pertaining essentially to it. As a matter of fact, the inclusion of the "frameworks" completes the phenomenological analysis of the structure of reason at its foundational level.
when both subject and object are included within the epistemological framework, it obviously leans toward the subject's side.\(^1\)

A further step in the phenomenological analysis of knowledge shows, as limiting and in a certain way embracing the epistemological framework, a complementary ontological framework.\(^4\) Now the subject-object relationship of the structure of knowledge can be seen as transcending the epistemological framework into what encompasses it, namely the ontological realm.\(^5\) The phenomenological analysis points to the ontological framework prior to and constitutive of the

\(^1\) This is apparent when Hartmann (1.5.e.1 and 6) continues his epistemological investigation by disclosing the gnosiological being-in-itself for both the subject and the object.

\(^2\) Ibid., 1.5.e.5. The phenomenological analysis reveals that the main feature of the object is its "trans-objectivity," that is, in its transcendence--independence--from the subject (ibid., 1.5.e.1). On the other hand, the main feature of the subject lies in its "potentiality" (ibid., 1.5.e.7). See p. 30, n.3 above. On this basis we see the epistemological framework mainly centered in the subject's cognitive activity. Furthermore, the gnoseological "transobjectivity" of the object points to the ontological framework of the structure of reason.

\(^3\) Ibid., 1.5.f.

\(^4\) Ibid., 1.5.i.

\(^5\) The idea of "framework" could also be expressed as "order" or "level." Hartmann (ibid., 1.5.i) only provides initial insights for an analysis of the ontological framework in its relation to the epistemological. One should be careful in considering Hartmann's phenomenological analysis because at this point he introduces elements of classical ontology in its post-Kantian tradition, as for instance, when he affirms that the ontological order has to be understood as "transintelligible," namely, as that what cannot be known (ibid.; 1.5.i.8 and 11). In short, he subtly abandons the phenomenological analysis to work from the viewpoint of a particular ontological theory, while at the same time still claiming that his analysis is strictly phenomenological. At this stage of Hartmann's analysis, phenomenon and theory are mixed and confused.
structure of knowledge from the object's side. Consequently one may speak about the ontological framework of the structure of knowledge as leaning toward the object and pertaining mainly to it. As the subject-object relationship is a structural one, so the ontological and epistemological frameworks also stand in a structural relationship with each other and with the foundational subject-object relationship. Because of the importance of these two frameworks in the structure of reason I deal with them separately.

The Ontological Framework: "Ontos"

The phenomenological analysis of knowledge points to an encompassing ontological framework as a constituent of the structure.

1Ibid., 1.5.f.3 and 1.5.i.4.

2The ontological framework which proceeds mainly from the object pertains to and is constitutive of the structure of reason.

3At this point, Hartmann's analysis fails. Its failure lies in his diminishing the subject's role in the ontological framework. It is not the case that only the object is encompassed by the ontological framework. The subject is also included. According to R. Vancourt, Hartmann recognizes that "subject and object pertain to Being" (p. 20). However, in his analysis Hartmann does not explain the subject's role in the ontological order. In the analysis of the ontological order the subject seems to disappear. This oblivion of the subject prevents Hartmann from arriving at the dimensionality of ontology.

4I have chosen, however, to analyze them in the inverse order from Hartmann's. The reason for this change is that it fits better the purposes of my criticism of theological reason and contributes to its clarity.

5Vancourt says that "the phenomenological description of knowledge shows clearly that knowledge is a grasping of Being" (p. 20). Additionally, the grasping of being itself—the epistemological framework—stands itself on Being, "subject and object are of Being" (ibid.).
of reason. The ontological framework stands on the fact that "thinking" and "Being" belong together. It is important to notice that the framework of reason I am analyzing is onto-logical, that is, it is a matter of knowledge--"logical"--about Being--"onto."  

1 This means that we are still talking at the structural level revealed by the phenomenological analysis. This level is previous to conditioning, and constitutive of any possible ontological theory. Theorizing works on the basis of reason's structure.

2 The term "Being" with upper case "B" refers to the foundational realm of the "ground of Being." Being with lower case "b" refers to entities both in general and as concrete individual realities.

3 Heidegger explains that "as the situation has been presented, noein--translated for short as thinking--is thinking only to the extent to which it remains dependent and focused on the einai, Being. Noein is not "thinking" simply by virtue of occurring as a non-material activity of soul and spirit. Noein qua Noein belongs together with einai, and thus belongs to einai itself" (What Is Called Thinking [New York: Harper and Row, 1968], p. 240). This idea was expressed originally by Parmenides who said that "it is the same thing to think and to be" (The Way to Truth, frag. 3 [trans. K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, 'Fragmente der Vorsokratiker'] 42]). John Burnet translates it in a different way: "For it is the same thing that can be thought and that can be" (Early Greek Philosophy [London: Adam and Charles Black, 1948], p. 173). Cf. Theodor Gomperz, Greek Thinkers: A History of Ancient Philosophy, 4 vols. (London: John Murray, 1901-1905), 1:179; and Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), p. 95. Q. Lauer adds, "Thus in one and the same act [man's existence] what has been called subject and what has been called object are united in being" (p. 171). Cf. William E. Reiser, "An Essay on the Development of Dogma in an Heideggerian Context: A Non-theological Explanation of Theological Heresy," The Thomist 39 (1975):479. Reiser applies to dogmatic discussion the principle that "Being and truth 'are' equiprimordially" (ibid.).

4 Hartmann (1.40) points out that knowledge is that point in Being in which being itself reflects on itself and gives birth to a sphere of representations. That "sphere of representations" obviously is what we call ontology. This is a typical expression of Hartmann. In it, it appears that thinking is so encompassed by Being that it is only an activity and reflection of Being. Hence the
Reason's structure, then, implies and includes ontology\(^1\) as an understanding of Being. Ontology is thus unavoidable in an analysis and criticism of reason.\(^2\) More than that, ontology is the center of gravity of reason.\(^3\) Consequently the perspective for a criticism of reason switches from an "epistemological" approach to an ontological one.\(^4\) The phenomenological analysis of the structure of reason, spontaneity of the subject which, according to the foundational relation of knowledge, is essential and constitutive for any knowledge, is just overlooked and kind of "lost into Being." This procedure cannot be followed because it does violence to the structure of reason. See above, p. 33, n. 5.

\(^1\)See R. Vancourt, p. 21.

\(^2\)Hartmann (Int., 42) affirms that metaphysical--ontological--framework is unavoidable for any theory. Such framework for meaning appears even when theoretical thought works in unawareness of it or is trying to avoid it (ibid., Int., 32). Hartmann criticizes Kant's position by denying "gnosiology," that is theory of knowledge--which works, according to Kant, in independence from the ontological framework, the capability of deciding by itself the meaning of the essential metaphysical questions.

\(^3\)According to the phenomenological description of knowledge the center of gravity of reason does not lie between subject and object, nor beyond the subject but beyond the object, in the transobjective (Hartmann, 1.5.i.4). The idea is further expanded in order to include the ontological realm itself (ibid., 1.5.i.iii).

\(^4\)It represents, then, a return to classicism in a post-Kantian fashion, which denies the center of gravity of Kant's criticism, that is, the priority of the epistemological framework. So, for Hartmann, ontology is the primary foundational reflection on which knowledge is to be understood (ibid., Int., 39). We agree that the center of reason--and thus of meaning as a whole--is, in the final analysis, to be referred to Being as its ground for intelligibility. However, though criticism has to grasp foundational guidelines from the ontological framework, it cannot do without considering at the same time the primordial presupposition. In the overlooking of one of these two foundational frameworks of reason, Kant's and Hartmann's criticisms are to be found faulty. Perhaps the interrelationship that exists between both frameworks is adequately expressed by Hartmann (Int., 42) as he remarks that theory of knowledge supposes metaphysics as metaphysics supposes theory of
then, points to the ontological realm—understanding of Being—as being a constitutive part of reason's structure, which is called to play a decisive role in the realm of meaning. There is no meaning without an ontological framework. Every meaning, as it is constituted, stands in reference to the ontological framework.

"Onto" is included in the name of reason's structure (the "Onto-theo-logical structure of reason") because it is the phenomenological knowledge; they condition each other. He, however, does not see this relationship as applying to the structure of reason. The relationship is technically seen only at the level of theories both of knowledge and of being. The phenomenological analysis of the structure of reason, however, shows that the interrelationship between theories is grounded in a deeper level in the foundational interrelationship of reason's structure.

The understanding of Being includes in itself the epistemological framework. In other words, even though Being, as grasped in ontology, is foundational for a criticism of reason, it is not an absolute tribunal which could render a final, unchallengable, unified version of the meaning of either being itself or reason. On the contrary, as it is essentially linked to the epistemological framework, its interpretations, all of them, are provided through the "spontaneity of the subject." Otherwise they would not be cognitive. Hence the interpretative, hypothetical nature of reason cannot render a final understanding of being by itself.

That is, the Kantian way according to which ontology and metaphysics are to be left out of the analysis of reason is not granted by a careful analysis of the phenomenon of knowledge. Moreover, a careful analysis of Kant's criticism reveals that in spite of his claims of working in total independence from the ontological realm, he was in fact relying on concepts and ideas whose content was grounded on classical ontological reflections.

This ontological fact is usually unconscious. However, a technical epistemological analysis reveals, sooner or later, the...
center from which, in the final analysis, all other meaning flows.¹

The Epistemological Framework: "Logos"

The phenomenological analysis points also to an epistemological framework as a constitutive part of the structure of reason.² This framework springs from and stands on the subject's side of the subject-object relationship.³ This framework makes understanding and meaning possible. Consequently any possible meaning is grounded and happens in it.⁴ The epistemological framework is a necessary ontological basis of any given knowledge. Highly sophisticated and precise ideologies such as philosophy and theology cannot longer dare to work on an implicit unconscious ontological referent. A foundational task of reason's criticism lies in the clarification of this framework for meaning.

¹About the gnosiological priority of the ontological framework in the realm of reason, see p. 36, n. 3. Additionally, the name that we have chosen in order to identify reason's particular structure through its main nature and frameworks points to an inner dynamic that exists within the structure of knowledge itself, at least from an epistemological perspective.

²Weigel puts it in the following way: "All that the phenomenon says is that we have achieved as a content of consciousness a perception of an existing other, rendered meaningful by categories or concepts. On the examination of the phenomenon of this kind of knowledge we simply can state no more" (p. 17). What we call "epistemological framework of reason's structure" corresponds to what Weigel calls "categories or concepts."

³In other words, it is immanent to the subject as knower. So it does not form part of the known object, yet it certainly forms part of the knowledge we have of any known object (N. Hartmann, 34 c). Karl Jaspers in his Reason and Anti-Reason in Our Time ([Hamden, Connecticut: Anchor Books, 1971]), p. 58) refers to the "place" in which the epistemological framework works as a "mental space" which is provided by reason. So, the epistemological framework is that which the cognitive subject brings and introduces to the relationship of knowledge as it constitutes it.

⁴As we will see, this does not mean the denial of the ontological frameworks as a foundational part of the process of
condition for meaning in the sense that its nature and contents are prior to any given subject-object relationship. This a priori conditionality of the epistemological framework is expressed, however, in categories whose particular meanings come from the meaning. Solipsism results as a particular expression within the classical tradition of theory of knowledge but it has no place in the understanding of the structure of reason and its frameworks. What is brought into the relationship of knowledge by the cognitive subject is called, in its most general and broad sense, "categories." Kant points out that categories are "the natural property" of the understanding (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 373). "Categories are those concepts by means of which reality has to be understood if it is to be understood at all, those concepts, that is, which provide the indispensable framework within which to understand the world of our empirical experience" (Colin Gunton, "The Knowledge of God According to Two Process Theologians: A Twentieth-Century Gnosticism," Religious Studies 11 [1975]:94). Alfred N. Whitehead notes that "The novel observation which comes by chance is a rare accident, and is usually wasted. For if there be no scheme to fit into, its significance is lost" (The Function of Reason [Boston: Beacon Press, 1958], p. 73). For additional commentary on the function that categories play in constituting meaning see Putnam, p. 202.

1Hartmann (34. c) points out the role that cognitive categories play as conditions of knowledge. This a priori character of the epistemological framework must not be understood in the Kantian formal sense of absence of sensible experience from their content. A priori, as cognitive condition, is rather to be understood as "anticipation"; see Raymond F. Piper and Paul W. Ward, The Fields and Methods of Knowledge: A Textbook in Orientation and Logic (New York: F. S. Crofts and Co., 1936), p. 172. E. Husserl describes the constitutive aspect of the a priori epistemological framework by saying that we should imagine a consciousness prior to all experience which may very well have the same sensations as we have "but it will intuit no things, and no events pertaining to things, it will perceive no trees and no houses, no flight of birds nor any barking dogs. One is at once tempted to express the situation by saying that its sensations mean nothing to such a consciousness, that they do not count as signs of the properties of an object, that their combination does not count as a sign of the object itself" (Logical Investigations, 2 vols. [New York: Humanities Press, 1970], p. 309.

Categories have been understood as formal, as in Kant, or as empirical as in Ludwig Wittgenstein (On Certainty [New York: Harper and Row, 1969], 167) who points out that some particular propositions can be turned into "norms of description." This would constitute what Piper calls a "deposit" or "residuum" in terms of which "more and more
ontological framework. In other words, the epistemological framework is incorporated as part of the cognitive framework—that is, the conceptual categories—within the subject from whom any given meaning springs. It can be seen, then, that at the core of the epistemological framework and of the categories provided by it, the spontaneity of the subject is present as it provides the interpretation of Being, the ontological framework which at the same time provides the basis for the categories (the epistemological framework)

successful anticipations are possible" (p. 171). The a priori nature of the epistemological framework does not mean that we can know categories through a non-sensible knowledge or experience previous to sensible experiences. It rather means that some aspects of the cognitive object-to-be-known are already present in the cognitive subject constituting its a priori epistemological framework; cf. N. Hartmann, 34.c. It may correspond to what Husserl calls "appresentation" which is a kind of "filling-in" in the actual cognitive activity. This is what is not present—from the object's side—but is brought in—from the subject's side—as the a priori--residuum--provided by the epistemological framework. For an introductory study on Husserl's idea of "appresentation," see Edward Farley, Ecclesial Man: A Social Phenomenology of Faith and Reality (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), p. 198.

1 We see, then, how ontology determines the epistemological framework. See, for instance, Giuseppe Savagnone, "La cognoscibilita del mondo della natura secondo San Tomaso," Aquinas 21 (1978):84; Octavio N. Derisi, "El Fundamento de la Metafisica Tomista," Sapientia 35 (1980):10; and Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theoligiae, 60 vols., English trans. Michael Cardinal Browne and Aniceto Fernandez (New York: Blackfriars, 1964-75):1.2.3 (hereafter cited as ST); idem, Summa Contra Gentiles, 5 vols. trans. with an introduction and notes Vernon J. Bourke (Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1956):1.13 (hereafter cited as SCG). This seems to be in contradiction to Kant's approach according to whom the analysis of knowledge is propaedeutic for any future metaphysics. Later in this chapter we see, however, that Kant's theory of knowledge presupposes a very particular kind of ontology. See below, p. 99, n.1. Thus Kant's actual practice, if not its theory, follows the pattern established by the structure of reason.

by which meaning is both constituted and recognized. Because of their ontological origin, cognitive categories are in fact the leading element in the developing of meaning and understanding in any given scientific enterprise.

1N. Hartmann (36.a) points out the hypothetical nature of the cognitive categories. Alfred N. Whitehead sees how "the development abstract theory precedes the understanding of fact" (The Function of Reason, p. 73). Putnam (p. 202) says that our "value system" works in shaping the categories. At this point it should be remembered that both essentialism and existentialism should be avoided because they provide with unilateral emphasis what should be considered as a whole. Essentialism understands knowledge from the subject's side, from the side of essences and concepts, forgetting their ontological roots. Existentialism emphasizes concrete reality, the ontological framework, forgetting the constitutive role of the epistemological framework. As we shall see later, this does not apply to all existentialisms. For a commentary on these two ways of understanding knowledge and meaning, from a Thomistic context, see Orlando Pasquale, "Verso un Tomismo Esistenziale," Aquinas 14 (1971):381-88.

2The interpretation of cognitive categories--epistemological framework--is at least as old as Parmenides who, according to K. Jaspers (The Great Philosophers: The Original Thinkers [New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1966], p. 27), was obliged to think of the signs of Being "in forms that were later termed categories." However, the first table of categories was offered by Aristotle who saw "in categories not only logical but also ontological elements." (ibid.). Being itself may be divided in much the same fashion as his table of categories divides thought for logic. Aristotle's categories are forms of being (Metaphysics, 5.7 [trans. Hugh Tredennick, LCL, 237-39]), which follow the way of essence (ibid., 7.12-14). For further commentary on Aristotle's categories and their place in his epistemology see Julián Marías, History of Philosophy, pp. 67, 68; and Johannes Hirschberberger, The History of Philosophy, 2 vols. (Milwaukee, Wisconsin: Bruce Publishing Co., 1958), 1:142-43. Categories have been connected to the problem of the universals; see Weigel, pp. 19, 20. Kant understood categories to be a priori and independent from experience as the condition for any possible experience at all. He changed the ground for categories from the ontological Aristotelian foundation to its own epistemological transcendental foundation. For an introduction to the Kantian idea of categories, see M. Meyer, "Le Paradoxe de L'objet chez Kant," Kantstudien 68 (1977):292. Some have understood categories to be timeless, as for instance Hartmann, 34.d; and A. N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason, p. 75. Others have understood categories to be in the temporal realm of experience; see for instance, Herman.
One of the most characteristic and widely-recognized features of the epistemological framework which has received different interpretations throughout the history of philosophy is the idea of "object" and "objectivity," which in some ways seems to touch the center of rationality.\(^1\) In its technical cognitive meaning as an apriori condition of knowledge the idea of "objectivity"\(^2\) is grounded

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\(^1\) For instance, Roger Trigg claims that without a clear concept of objectivity "reason becomes impotent" (Reason and Commitment [London: Cambridge University Press, 1973], p. 168).

\(^2\) Orlando Pasquale ("L'esperienza Intellettiva tomista," Aquinas 18 [1974]:226) points out how the concept of object and objectivity according to Thomas Aquinas has its ground in the realism of Aquinas which has its center and foundation in the esse. Kant does not modify the basic meaning of objectivity and object that was produced by Aquinas' realism, but he rather gives a new philosophical interpretation of its ground. Kant's transcendentalism is apparent when he declares in Critique of Pure Reason that "Transcendental analytic showed us how the mere logical form of our cognition can contain the origin of pure conceptions a priori conceptions which represent objects antecedently to all experience, or rather, indicate the synthetical unity which alone renders possible an empirical cognition of objects" (p. 223). For a criticism of Kant's idea of objectivity and its relation to the epistemological framework, see M. Meyer, pp. 290-304. Thus, beyond the realist and transcendentalist interpretation of the ontological (or epistemological in the case of Kant) foundation for the idea of objectivity, the content of it is basically not changed. See p. 40, n. 1 above. In the context of this tradition, subjectivism and relativism are considered a denial of reason; see Putnam, p. 123 and Trigg, pp. 150 and 168. As the scientific enterprise turned into the realm of natural sciences after the empiricist and positivist traditions in philosophy, the idea of objectivity originated the ideal of "exactness." Yet, according to Wittgenstein's criticism "not a single ideal of exactness has been laid down; we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head" (Philosophical Investigations [Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
on the ontological framework. That is, the idea of "objectivity" conditions and is constitutive of the meaning of any possible knowledge, since knowledge, in order to be knowledge, needs an object. Thus the epistemological framework, as the "logos" of the Onto-theo-logical structure of reason, is to be thought of as being "a priori."  

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1958], pp. 87, 88). For further commentary on Wittgenstein's criticism of the scientific ideal of "exactness," see W. T. Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, 5 vols. 2nd ed. revised (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1969, 1970), 5:380, 381. Such criticism suggests a new concept and understanding of objectivity itself. Trigg expresses Wittgenstein's new approach, yet in a negative way by saying that for him "objectivity is in principle impossible" (p. 97). However, even though Wittgenstein departs from the traditional understanding of objectivity and exactness, according to Charles H. Cox ("Wittgenstein's Concept of Language and Its Implications for Metaphysics and Theology," Religious Humanism 9 [1975]:80), he points to objectivity under the form of "Tanguage as objective consciousness of human race." Lauer (pp. 127, 128) perceives that there is also a kind of departure from the traditional understanding of objectivity in the thinking of E. Husserl. His is a kind of objectivity that begins to grasp the essence, the 'sense' (Sinn) of the phenomenon. He believes that "what Husserl wants is not logical necessity as in logic but rather formal and material necessity." Lauer, however, is of the opinion that Husserl has failed to provide clarification for what he understands by "necessity," so this makes it "somewhat doubtful that the whole theory is genuinely rational" (p. 128). Lauer's criticism of Husserl's approach to objectivity shows how closely the idea of objectivity, which is provided through the epistemological framework, is connected to rationality itself. Finally, our incursion into the problematic of interpreting the idea of "objectivity" as a priori condition for knowledge, important as it may be, is just an example of the Logos, as epistemological framework of the Onto-theo-logical structure of reason. The epistemological framework includes every possible category, in the broadest sense of the word, that may be required for the constitution of meaning.

1This means a priori of any actual subject-object relationship. A priori, then, has not the Kantian classical meaning of "previous to sensible experience."
The System: "Theos"

The ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure in their relationship provide the basis for the unity and coherence of the cognitive enterprise as a whole. That coherence and unity of meaning is what is known as a "system" of meanings or significations. In other words, there is no isolated meaning, there are only interrelated meanings; for meaning is constituted and exists in a system. Meaning exists only in the subject-object relationship in the context of both ontological and epistemological frameworks which provide the ground for a coherent network of meaning that enables meaning to flow harmoniously among the parts of the whole and between each part and the whole.

Even though the systematic nature of reason finds its ground from the side of the ontological framework, its form and functioning

1Putnam (p. 52) notes that "objects" do not exist independently from conceptual schematization.

2L. H. De Wolf points to the systematic nature of reason's structure when he says that the examination of an idea or object in the widest possible context of thought and experience "seems the most adequate rational instrument for discerning truth" (A Theology of the Living Church, pp. 28, 29). It seems proper to remark that what De Wolf calls "thought and experience" points to the ontological structure of reason. If the systematic coherence and unity of meaning is not achieved, there is no real meaning or knowledge. Jaspers, in Reason and Anti-Reason, says that reason brings about the unity of all reality as "it wills the one, which is all" (p. 39). Such unity comes from "Being itself, the real unity" (p. 40). So that reason is "what unlocks the heart of everything" (p. 42).

3N. Hartmann indicates in his phenomenological approach to reason that reason's system comes from the "natural" structures of reality of Being (Int., 46, 47). So reason's system must not be built up but should rather be discovered. The art of ontology consists in letting the problems speak by themselves in order that they may reveal their own natural structure. At this point Hartmann is
are determined from the side of the epistemological framework. It is the "form" and "functioning" of reason that pertain to the epistemological framework which provides, through the categories, the unity and coherence that belong properly to thinking as thinking.2

referring to the source for the actual contents for reason's system as based on the ontological framework. The system itself pertains to and exists in the epistemological framework.

1The systematic nature of reason's structure as moving within the epistemological framework has been expressed with particular clarity by Kant: "It is obvious that there exists among the transcendental ideas a certain connection and unity, and that pure reason, by means of them, collects all its cognitions into one system" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 231); and: "All that we can be certain of from the above considerations is that this systematic unity is a logical principle, whose aim is to assist the understanding, where it cannot of itself attain to rules, by means of ideas, to bring all these various rules under one principle, and thus to ensure the most complete consistency and connection that can be attained" (ibid., 376). Thus, briefly, for Kant reason is what we call the "systematic nature of reason's structure." Kant says that reason "merely arranges" what it receives from the understanding and "gives to them that unity which they are capable of possessing when the sphere of their application has been extended as widely as possible" (ibid., p. 373). Then, for Kant, in a restricted sense at least, "reason" is to be seen as working in this "arranging" and "connecting" activity which he discusses and develops in his Transcendental Dialectics. We, on the other side, take reason in its wider sense which includes the whole of the processes and involved structure through which meaning is constituted. Karl Jaspers, commenting on Kant's understanding of the systematic function of reason that the transcendental ideas provide, explains that "ideas are perspectives that we apply to experience" (The Great Philosophers: The Foundations [New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, Inc., 1962], pp. 283, 284). Psychologically, "they are hidden forces in scientific inquiry. Unconsciously every individual is guided by them and evaluates . . . the importance or unimportance of a scientific work according to the ideas whose presence he feels in it" (ibid.). And, objectively, they are "consonant with nature. . . . Here we must assume the systematic unity of nature to be objectively valid and necessary" (ibid.). Kant himself (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 384) explains the "heuristic" function of the transcendental ideas in reason.

2The close connection that exists between categories and the systematic nature of reason's structure is also developed by Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 373).
At this point a foundational distinction must be made between system as a formal structure of reason's procedure in reaching meaning and the actual system or systems of meaning¹ which are built in and by the systematic nature of reason's structure. The distinction, however, is not real but pertains to the structural analysis of reason I am developing. In other words, the structure of reason is never given by itself alone—as if one could find reason's systematic "functioning" detached from all systematic "content"—but it is only co-given in any actual system of meaning. The phenomenological analysis leads behind the actual content of meaning to the cognitive dynamics which is responsible for the constitution of meaning as meaning.²

¹L. Wittgenstein refers to system in its actual concrete significations remarking that "when we first begin to believe anything, what we believe is not a single proposition, it is a whole system of propositions (Light dawns gradually over the whole)" (On Certainty, 141). He deals with systems from a more epistemological perspective, as he says that "it is not single axioms that strike me as obvious, it is a system in which consequences and premises give one another mutual support" (ibid., 142). Thus, we can speak of systems of actual significations. About the plurality of systems of meanings, see J. Marías, History of Philosophy, pp. 5, 6; c.f. Trigg, pp. 99. Regarding the experience of changing systems of thought, see Brian Knowles, "Journey into Reason," Religious Humanism 14 (1980):120.

²Even though there is a difference between the actual system of meanings and the structure of reason through which and in which meaning is constituted, the structure of reason and its systematic nature should not be thought of as being "formal" in the sense of being an empty "abstraction." The structure of reason is the actual dynamics that any meaning follows as it is constituted. In this sense, it is the basic description of reason's functioning as it constitutes meanings. The existence of actual meanings and system at the level of epistemological and ontological frameworks, is, however, also part of reason's structure. What falls out of reason's structure is only the actual significations; for instance, the meaning of "tree," "man," "the sky is blue," etc. The structure of the
It pertains to reason's systematic nature that meaning should flow from the whole to the part rather than from the part to the whole.¹ The understanding or interpretation of reality as a whole provides reason with the context or background needed for the constitution of meaning as a system. The understanding of the whole has reason is reached by analyzing the procedures followed by the human mind as it functions in constituting and discovering meanings. Then, the distinction between reason's structure and the actual content produced by it is not to be conceived as the difference that exists between what is "formal" and that which is "material," or between "abstract" and "concrete," but rather between a function and its result.

¹This flow of meaning does not mean that the part does not provide at the same time a flow of meaning coming from itself. However, the meaning of the whole is not determined by the meaning of any single part nor by the addition of all parts. The whole has a meaning of its own as whole and every part finds its own particular meaning in relation to the meaning of the whole as its cognitive-necessary background (ontological framework). Wittgenstein says that "our knowledge forms an enormous system. And only within this system has a particular bit the value we give it" (On Certainty, 410). John C. Hoffman in "On Theology's Cognitive Claims: A. J. Ayer Revisited" (Studies in Religion 6.2 [1976, 77]:125), points out that the very facts that our positivistic and scientific age considers the basis for science and knowledge have their meaning in a given system; see A. N. Whitehead, The Function of Reason, p. 80. Donald S. Lee ("Contexts," Southern Journal of Philosophy 8 [1977]:151, 57, 58) provides an analysis of the flow of meaning from the whole to the part from the perspective of an analysis of contexts. He offers an analysis of the factors involved in contexts and then comments on the role contexts play in the constitution of meanings. He remarks that he does not deny "that meanings are determinate, but," he asserts, "the determination in the end is relative to a context. The context is usually 'understood,' i.e., implicitly agreed upon by those who are grasping or attempting to grasp the meanings intended. Persons without some context in common cannot communicate successfully. . . . All meaning, in the end, is context bound, and contexts themselves are relative to further contextual considerations" (ibid., p. 158). Cf. Daniel Lerner, ed., Parts and wholes (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 157-62. Wittgenstein describes properly the role of the systematic nature of reason by saying that "the system is not so much the point of departure, as the element in which arguments have their life" (On Certainty, 105). So inextricably united is the system to meaning.
been traditionally the task of metaphysics, but it has also been designated by other terms such as a "world-view" or "Weltanschauung" and "cosmology." It is within the metaphysical realm that reason finds the end to its search for unity of meaning and so for the grounding of its systematic nature. This ground is provided by the idea of God, namely, the theos of reason's structure.

of parts that to change systems entails a change of meaning for the same involved part; cf. Hoffman, p. 125.

1 Aristotle talks about metaphysics as the understanding of the whole as he states that philosophia prima "is not the same as any of the so-called particular sciences, for none of the others contemplates Being generally qua Being" (Metaphysics, 4.1). Marías explains that "Aristotle defines 'first philosophy' as the science that considers the entity as such in an universal manner; that is the totality of things for what they are" (History of Philosophy, p. 64). Thus, in ontology we are entering into the realm that lies beyond the physical world, at least according to tradition. See Boethius, De Trinitate 2 (trans. H. F. Stewart and E. K. Rand, LCL, 9).

2 Whitehead says that the aim of speculative reason is to build a cosmology which would provide a hierarchy of meaning that would help to find the most general interpretative system for experience: "Cosmology, since it is the outcome of the highest generality of speculation, is the critic of all speculation inferior to itself in generality" (The Function of Reason, pp. 84, 85). Wittgenstein (On Certainty, 95) calls it "world-picture." Francis L. Strickland, (Foundations of Christian Belief: Studies in the Philosophy of Religion [New York: Abingdon Press, 1915], p. 46) clearly describes the role that the Weltanschauung plays in the dynamic of meaning, from the perspective of the whole or generality, as "background" or, as Wittgenstein puts it, as the "element" for the systematic nature of reason. See p. 41, n. 1 above.

3 Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 233) calls it the "Ideal of pure reason." He summarizes his position concluding that "from the totality of the conditions of thinking objects in general, in so far as they can be given, the absolute synthetical unity of all conditions of the possibility of things in general; that is, from things which I do not know in their mere transcendental conception, and of whose unconditioned necessity I can form no conception whatever. This dialectical argument I shall call the Ideal of pure reason." Of course, this "ideal" was already at work when philosophia prima was born in Aristotle's writings. Aristotle (Metaphysics,
At this point in our analysis reason's structure appears in its systematic nature as onto-theo-logical. In other words, reason's structure as onto-theo-logical finds the ultimate ground for its coherence and system in the idea of God—theos. It expresses its systematic nature through the coherent interrelation of the epistemological—logos—and ontological—ontos—frameworks. And it finds

6.1.10, 11) includes theology as a foundational part of metaphysical hierarchy—as a matter of fact as the ultimate ground and telos of metaphysics. Metaphysics, philosophia prima, has a theological foundation; cf. Joseph Owens, *The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian 'Metaphysics': a Study in the Greek Background of Medieval Thought*, 2nd ed. (Toronto, Canada: Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, 1963), p. 457. Even within the scientific tradition theos seems to be at the very foundation of rationality. See, for instance, Albert Einstein, *The World As I See It* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1949), p. 29. Martin Heidegger ("The Onto-theo-logical Constitution of Metaphysics," in *Identity and Difference*, ed. Joan Stambaugh [New York: Harper and Row, 1969], pp. 59, 60) explains how in traditional philosophy, ontology and hence reason's systematic structure finds its ground in God. He also explains that "metaphysics thinks of the Being of beings both in the ground-giving unity of what is most general, what is indifferently valid everywhere, and also in the unity of the all that accounts for the ground, that is, of the All-Highest. The Being of beings is thus thought of in advance as the grounding ground. Therefore all metaphysics is at bottom, and from the ground up, what grounds, what gives account of the ground, what is called to account by the ground, and finally what calls the ground to account" (ibid., p. 58). Theos is still considered as foundational for rationality in post-Kantian approaches; see Charles H. Cox, p. 82; and Theodor Adorno, pp. 80, 82. It is clear, then, that we use theos only in its epistemological sense of that principle of intelligibility and that any other theistic or atheistic connotations are not relevant to our analysis.

1 Heidegger in "Onto-theo-logical Constitution" (pp. 54, 60) defines metaphysics as being onto-theo-logical. In the same pages he explains the Greek foundation of the onto-theo-logical nature of metaphysics. As is clear from the preface of Being and Time, Heidegger's main concern is ontological, namely, the grasping of the meaning of the ground of Being. It is in this light that he deals with the onto-theo-logical structure. On the other hand, our main concern in dealing with the very same structure is epistemological. Since both approaches are provided from one of reason's frameworks—Heidegger ontological framework, and our study epistemological framework—they are not contradictory but complementary. It
itself built in (for any possible constitution of meaning at any level, pole, framework or dimensionality) the foundational subject-object relationship.

As the criticism of reason has been the result of a historical process led by tradition, the search for the ground of meaning and system has not dared to go beyond the ground set by tradition, namely the theos. This situation, however, has changed since Heidegger's remarks about the need to overcome metaphysics. To put it briefly, the theos cannot constitute the final state in a

should be noticed also that the coherentist versus foundationalist models for grounding meaning controversy seem to be overcome since coherence and ungrounded ultimate propositions stand together in the dynamic onto-theo-logical structure of reason. For an introduction to the foundationalist model of knowledge, see C. I. Lewis, An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court Publishing Co., 1946), p. 333. For an introduction to the coherentist model, see Roger Shiner, "Wittgenstein and the Foundations of Knowledge," Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 78 (1977, 78), pp. 104, 105.

1 About the way in which tradition leads the interpretation of the foundational structure of meaning and reason, see Wittgenstein, On Certainty, 95. Wittgenstein explains that "I did not get my picture of the world by satisfying myself of its correctness; nor do I have it because I am satisfied of its correctness. No: it is the inherited background against which I distinguish between true and false" (ibid.). See also Putnam, p. 216.

2 Such structure comes from Greek heritage and is epistemologically developed by Kant. Precisely here lies the limitation of Kant's criticism of reason. Kant develops and critically analyzes reason and its structure, yet he does not extend his criticism to the foundational ground for meaning that lies beyond the theos and the ontos themselves. In this aspect Heidegger's analysis represents a step forward.

3 Heidegger, "Onto-theo-logical Constitution," p. 72. See p. 106, nn. 2, 3; and p. 107, nn. 1, 2 below.
search for the ultimate ground of meaning, since theos in the very same onto-theo-logical structure of reason conceals a theo-logia, namely an understanding or interpretation of the theos. Additionally, it should be remembered that the theos is the ultimate expression of the ontos which also entails an onto-logy.\(^1\) It is apparent, then, that what goes beyond both theos and ontos in the onto-theo-logical structure of reason is logos itself, which is the subject matter of this investigation. It is necessary, then, to take a further step and go beyond the ontos and the theos into the realm of the ultimate cognitive reference from which the meanings of the parts of the whole—that is, of ontos, theos, and logos—equiprimordially originated. This is the realm of foundational ontology.\(^2\)

\(^1\)That is, an understanding or interpretation of the "ontos." See p. 17 n. 4, above.

\(^2\)Heidegger expresses the logos' cognitive precedence in the onto-theo-logical structure of metaphysics in the following way: "But -logy hides more than just the logical in the sense of what is consistent and generally in the nature of a statement, what structures, moves, secures, and communicates all scientific knowledge. In each case, the Logia is the totality of a nexus of grounds accounted for, within which nexus the objects of the sciences are represented in respect of their ground, that is, are conceived. Ontology, however, and theology are 'Logies' inasmuch as they provide the ground of beings as such and account for them within the whole. They account for Being as the ground of beings. They account to the Logos, and are in an essential sense in accord with the Logos, that is they are the logic of the Logos. Thus they are more precisely called onto-logic and theo-logic. More rigorously and clearly thought out, metaphysics is: onto-theo-logical" ("Onto-theo-logical Constitution," pp. 58, 59).
The Hypothetical Character
of Reason's Structure:
Presuppositions

The onto-theo-logical structure of reason points beyond the theos to the logos involved in its understanding. At this point we leave the analysis of the structure of reason as centered in its functioning\(^1\) and have to deal with the minimum basic ontological contents\(^2\) that reason's structure needs in order to function at all.\(^3\)

Nonetheless, even at this turning point from structure--as functioning--to content--as shaping the meaning of the structure--there still are some structural aspects that need clarification. That is why I analyze the actual minimum ontological content needed for reason to function in the second part of this chapter. I want now to deal with the structural aspects involved.

As knowledge stands on the foundational subject-object relationship, that which is brought to the actual relationship by

\(^1\)See p. 46, n. 2, above.

\(^2\)At this point, as the structure of reason requires an ontological--theological--content, Logos, functioning within the subject-object relationship, has as subject matter the understanding of Being which is previous to any ontological reflection. This understanding will ground, at the same time, the onto and the logos for the interpretation of both metaphysics and reason. Hence, this understanding is foundational for both epistemological and ontological frameworks. It is at this foundational level of reason's structure which we call "dimensionality of reason's structure" that the criticism of reason should be addressed and grounded.

\(^3\)We here speak of "content" only in so far as needed to develop the basic interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks. Such content is previous--a priori--to the actual system of meanings.
both the subject and the object can be said to be a priori, and to be the condition of the relationship and, consequently of meaning itself. From the subject's side the a priori feature of reason's structure appears as what the cognitive subject needs to presuppose or assume in order that a relationship—knowledge, meaning—may be produced or constituted. Kant briefly expresses this aspect of reason's structure by saying that reason has the "principle of presupposing the unconditioned for every conditioned thing." This is reason's search for unity in order to provide an

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1 It is in this sense that a priori is to be understood as being a feature in the structure of reason. Kant's idea of a priori as being previous to sensible experience is to be considered as his own particular interpretation of what the subject brings to the relation of knowledge; in other words, its own interpretation of what the a priori of reason's structure means. Kant's explanation of the a priori of reason, leaving aside its transcendentalism and idealism, is very useful and even foundational from the perspective of the epistemological framework for understanding conditionality as part of reason's structure. As we deal with reason, the analysis of what the object brings to the relation of knowledge is not addressed. Such is the task for the so-called regional ontologies. A criticism of reason must concentrate itself on the side of the subject who performs the cognitive act. And so, the a priori conditions appear from the subject side as part of the epistemological framework of reason's structure.

2 This has its foundation in the phenomenological description of knowledge as a relationship. If nothing is brought to it by the subject there is no knowledge. See p. 27, n. 3 above.

3 Critique of Practical Reason (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1956), p. 7. It is clear that Kant has given a much longer and detailed exposition of the a priori conditionality of reason which includes what he calls Transcendental Aesthetic (forms of sensitivity, space, and time) and Transcendental Analytic (forms of the understanding, categories). Because of our structural analysis, however, the a priori of reason, which Kant develops in his Transcendental Dialectics, presents the basis for an understanding of reason's hypothetical functioning.
ultim ate ground for its own system.¹ This unity, according to Kant, is to be found and grounded in the transcendental ideas from which, after they are found by reason, meaning flows to the conditioned and to the whole system of reason.² The rational knowledge that results from the application of the "heuristic principles" of reason³ to particular cases reveals the "hypothetical" character of reason's functioning.⁴ According to Kant, these principles are

¹The search for the unconditioned which conditions the whole of knowledge is grounded in the functioning of reason, hence it pertains to its structure. Kant explains this aspect in detail and remarks that the search for the a priori is developed from the side of the conditions (cognitive conditions, hence pertaining to the epistemological framework) and not from the side of the conditioned "for the possibility of the conditioned presupposes the totality of its conditions, but not of its consequences." "It is easy to perceive that the sole aim of pure reason is the absolute totality of the synthesis on the side of the conditions, and that it does not concern itself with the absolute completeness on the part of the conditioned" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 231). The search ends as it reaches the absolute unconditionality, the idea of God, the theos of reason's structure. See ibid., p. 223.

²Ibid., p. 384.

³Or transcendental ideas in which ultimate unity is expressed and conferred by the "ideal of pure reason," namely, the idea of God.

⁴"The hypothetical exercise of reason by the aid of ideas employed as problematic conceptions is properly not constitutive. That is to say, if we consider the subject strictly, the truth of the rule, which has been employed as an hypothesis, does not follow from the use that is made of it by reason" (ibid., p. 375). It is to be noticed that for Kant the hypothetical character of reason does not apply to the forms of sensibility and to the categories as the form of the understanding. Such function of reason, according to Kant, is not hypothetical but necessary, and the very foundation of science. See ibid., p. 373. Yet, even in Kant, there is a way in which the meaning that flows from the heuristic principles of reason penetrates the whole of knowledge, otherwise, there would be no unity or system, which is the task reason is supposed to achieve. Kant tells us explicitly that we have "to expect that the form of syllogisms, when applied to synthetical unity of intuitions,
complemented by the postulates of practical reason which "are not theoretical dogmas but presuppositions of necessarily practical import."\(^1\) Such presuppositions, like their correlates the "ideas," are not "knowledge"\(^2\) but they are the necessary condition of all knowledge, both theoretical and practical.\(^3\) This feature of reason's

following the rule of the categories, will contain the origin of particular a priori conceptions, which we may call pure conceptions of reason or transcendental ideas, and which will determine the use of the understanding in the totality of experience according to principles" (p. 223). Following this structural line presented by Kant, we see the hypothetical character of reason as permeating the whole of reason's activities; cf. p. 217.

\(^1\)Critique of Practical Reason, p. 132. Kant immediately adds that "while they do not extend speculative knowledge, they give objective reality to the ideas of speculative reason in general (by means of their relation to the practical sphere), and they justify it in holding to concepts even the possibility of which it could not otherwise venture to affirm."

\(^2\)They are not "knowledge" because Kant has already defined the limits of every possible knowledge as provided by intuition. If there is no intuition, according to Kant's theory you have a knowledge which is not "knowledge" but which nonetheless plays the role of ultimate foundation for meaning and knowledge. Wittgenstein, among others, follows Kant's pattern (On Certainty, 86, 116), even though within a different epistemological theory. For him, the "ground floor propositions" are not known because for "knowledge" to be--according to his theory--we must be able to verify it; cf. Shawn J. Mintek, "Rationality and Absolute Presuppositions" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Washington, 1977), p. 48; and C. G. Luckhardt, "Beyond Knowledge: Paradigms in Wittgenstein's Later Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 39 (1978):252. For Wittgenstein, "not to know 'background propositions'" or "absolute presuppositions" does not mean to "ignore" them or that they lie in the realm of unconsciousness. It rather seems to mean that they lie in a different realm of knowledge, the realm of the grounding of meaning. On the contrary, Aristotle (Analytica Posteriora 1.2, 3 [trans. G. R. G. Mure, The Work of Aristotle translated into English, 1:71\(^9\)-73\(^a\)]) and Plato (Republic 7.13 [trans. Paul Shorey, LCL, 2:203]), believe that the first ground for knowledge must be reached by knowledge, otherwise, there would be no real scientific knowledge at all.

\(^3\)Kant in Critique of Practical Reason (pp. 140, 141) explains the relationship that exists between Practical and Pure reason
structure, pointed out by Kant, extends the hypothetical character of reason to the whole of reason's system, whose ultimate meaning is not grounded in knowledge but in a "postulate," a "presupposition," or as some thinkers like to call it, "faith."¹

Even though the idea of presupposition itself has a somewhat broad and ambiguous meaning,² I use it here in its a priori sense regarding the "ideas" and "postulates." At this point, it seems clear that such "ideas" and "postulates" are at least a certain kind of knowledge. What Kant denies is the ultrasensorial, supernatural origin of knowledge, not its theoretical position in the whole of reason's structure. Reason still needs a transcendental first being—as in Aristotle and Thomas Aquinas—in order to provide the ultimate ground for meaning and system for the whole of reason's activities. What the postulates of practical reason do is to provide the "object" that corresponds to the "ideas" of pure reason. That is to say, they do not provide the meaning for the ideas. On the contrary, the meaning is provided by pure reason. We should remember at this point that for Kant existence does not add anything to the essence. See his famous criticism of the Ontological Argument of Anselm in which Kant uses the example of the 100 talers in Critique of Pure Reason, p. 350. The foundation for the transcendental ideas of reason is provided, then, not through knowledge but through moral experience and faith, while the meaning for them is still provided by pure reason as it received it from Greek platonic tradition. Kant suggests that this knowledge—that of the ideas—should not be used in a positive but rather in a negative way that would discourage an extrasensorial origin for the ideas. In this way Kant's system reaches its perfect coherence.

¹ Jaspers, commenting on Kant in The Foundations, says that "without pure rational faith, the use of reason becomes either the pretension to universal knowledge (Pansophy) or misology, the suicide of reason" (p. 312). This Kantian description of reason's structure is the basis for Dooyeweerd's criticism of reason (1:13-113).

² Farber gives an idea regarding the meaning of the term "presupposition": "literally it means 'posited as holding or as existing in advance.' Because of its many uses, the term must be interpreted in a twofold manner, having regard to existence as well as to thought. In broadest meaning it refers to any kind of supposition or assumption, such as a material or ideal domain, a realm of existence, a process of experience, or a system of knowledge. It may be also taken to refer to formal principles, either in the sense
of a condition of knowledge. In this usage the meaning of "presupposition" is still very broad, but it is no longer ambiguous since we are now applying it to a very concrete realm--namely, the realm of the cognitive activity of the subject-object relationship--and within it, more precisely, to what the subject brings to this relation from the side of the epistemological framework.

The hypothetical character of reason's structure is present in the a priori conditions or presuppositions it requires for the constitution of knowledge.\(^1\) It is possible to see, then, how the hypothetical character pertains to the whole of reason's structure.\(^2\)

At this point Husserl's idea of a presuppositionless philosophy\(^3\) seems to contradict the idea of an a priori realm of arbitrary assumptions or of necessary logical principles" (pp. 45, 46). Then, he proceeds to divide and analyze presuppositions into four basic types, namely, material, cognitive, of special systems, and principles of logic. Presuppositions have been studied in different areas: for instance, in semantics, see Deirdre Wilson, Presuppositions and Non-truth-conditional Semantics (London: Academic Press, 1975); and in linguistic analysis, see Laurie Hollings, "Presuppositions and Theories of Meaning," Mind 89 (1980):274-81. This kind of analysis falls beyond the limits of our investigation.

\(^1\)"Every knowledge has presuppositions, and what matters is what should we do with them, in other words, what role are they supposed to play in knowledge" (Marías, Idea de la Metafísica, p. 398). "Assumptions must be made in all reasoning, including reasoning in logic itself" (Farber, p. 51). De Wolf adds: "Besides needing data of experience, reason also depends upon certain assumptions or postulates which no appeal to the data can establish and which reason cannot prove without assuming them while proof is attempted" (p. 30).

\(^2\)As presuppositions are embedded in reason's structure, different presuppositions render different systems of meaning; see Farber, pp. 44, 45; and Dooyeweerd, 1:36, 37. Jaspers, commenting on Kant in The Foundations (p. 311), stresses the way in which the realm of a priori presuppositions pertains to the structure of reason.

\(^3\)Edmund Husserl puts it in the following way: "There lies embedded in its meaning as philosophy a radicalism in the matter
cognitive conditions for meaning. However, a careful study of this idea reveals that it refers rather to a procedure or methodology through which the a priori realm of presuppositions may be reached.¹

¹Farber's analysis (pp. 44-64 passim), however, goes further and sees that "in fact, the principle of presuppositionlessness has been called the greatest of presuppositions" (p. 44). It seems that Husserl, in fostering such an ideal, was thinking not along the lines of reason's structure as we do, but rather along the lines of what Putnam (p. 110) calls "criterial conception." That is, the existence of a priori institutionalized norms defining what is and is not rationally acceptable. In short, he was rejecting dogmatism in philosophical analysis as hindering the progress of it. Farber's analysis seems to confirm our evaluation as he sees Husserl referring especially to "metaphysical or existential assumptions" (Farber, p. 64). The ideal of a presuppositionless philosophy can be seen as the test for a truly critical philosophy (p. 54). This idea seems to reach its methodological expression through the époché (p. 55). However, after dogmatic assumptions are laid aside through the époché (that is to say, presuppositions in the sense of prejudices: see Rudolf Bultmann's "Is Exegesis without presuppositions possible?" in Existence and Faith, ed. Schubert M. Ogden [New York: Living Age Books, 1960], pp. 290, 291), the ideal of scientific philosophy "properly means the explicit examination and constitutive analysis of all elements of the structure of knowledge and reality" (Farber, p. 64). In this last sense, the sense pointing to reason's structure, a presuppositionless inquiry is unattainable; cf. Mintek, p. 36. Farber, on the other hand, tells us that "the phenomenological reduction makes possible the final elucidation of all elements of knowledge and experience by enabling us to get back of and to the bottom of all presuppositions" (p. 62). And so he sees that in Husserl "the radical reflection which is required examines systematically the ultimate thinkable presuppositions of knowledge" (pp. 59, 60). R. G. Collingwood expresses bluntly the need of presuppositions for the scientific inquiry: "Metaphysics, therefore,
Presuppositions are of two kinds, relative and absolute.¹

As the ultimate meaning of any relative presupposition is conditioned by the absolute one to which it is essentially ordered, we need to consider here only the realm of absolute presuppositions. A phenomenological analysis of the dynamics of meaning reveals that absolute

either has presuppositions or is no science" (Essay on Metaphysics [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1940], p. 63).

¹The relative ones, in their meaning, are sub-ordinated to the absolute ones. Three major philosophers have developed explicit studies on presuppositions, namely Collingwood, Husserl, and Wittgenstein. Lionel Rubinoff, Collingwood and the Reform of Metaphysics: A Study in the Philosophy of the Mind (Canada: University of Toronto Press, 1970), p. 218, points out that Collingwood recognizes two kinds of presuppositions, those within the body of science which can be verified, and those that pertain not to that body and which are, therefore, not verifiable. "These are the conditions sine quae non of the science in question" (ibid.). Farber says that for Husserl there are also two kinds of presuppositions, namely, the ordinary ones and that which is presupposed implicitly in all presupposing and in all questioning. This last was held to exist necessarily, and to continue to exist, and was not acknowledged to be an assumption. "It was regarded rather as the first thing to be freely and expressly posited, and that with a self-evidence which precedes all conceivable instances of self-evidence, and is contained implicitly in them all" (p. 60). W. D. Hudson ("Language-Games and Presuppositions," Philosophy 53 [1978]:96) says that for Wittgenstein there are also two kinds of presuppositions. One of them is called by him "hypotheses"; see On Certainty, 153, 163, 337, 110, where we are told that they can be true or false, be tested, be doubted, and that they need ground. The second kind is called "fundamental presuppositions"; see ibid., 403, 119, 311, 512, 12, 626, 616, 19, where we are told that they are the foundation of our language-games, they cannot be tested, they cannot be doubted, and that they cannot change. It should be noticed that the analysis of the phenomenon of knowledge and the structure of reason do not render the existence or necessity of thinking in terms of only one absolute presupposition, but rather speaks of presuppositions in general implying the plurality of them. Mintek (p. 75) explains how, according to Collingwood, many presuppositions are involved in each particular meaning; cf. Collingwood Essay on Metaphysics, p. 25. For examples of absolute presuppositions, see ibid., pp. 49, 50; cf. Mintek, pp. 71, 72. As can be appreciated from these examples, they do not reach explicitly but only implicitly the ultimate realm of the theos.
presuppositions constitute part of the structure of reason.\(^1\) The role of presuppositions within the structure of reason is, in a way, analogous to the theos of it,\(^2\) although in the deepest grounding of meaning the search for the ultimate presupposition has to go even beyond theos and ontos.\(^3\) Absolute presuppositions are the

\(^1\)Wittgenstein develops a criticism of knowledge from a linguistic viewpoint in which we are able to see presuppositions working as part of the structure of reason, since language is the expression of the act by which reason constitutes meaning. (I cannot analyze here the way in which language is also present as part of the a priori of reason as it constitutes and communicates the concrete content of the presuppositions reason needs for working.) See Hudson, pp. 94-99. On the other hand, it must be remembered that Wittgenstein's analysis, as it has been shown by Nicholas F. Gier (Wittgenstein and Phenomenology: A Comparative Study of the Later Wittgenstein, Husserl, Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty [Albany: State University of New York Press, 1981], pp. 46, 47) is, in the final analysis, also a phenomenological one. Wittgenstein sees in his analysis that the rock bottom of his convictions "are carried by the whole house" (On Certainty, 142). Consequently, Hudson points out that "Wittgenstein speaks of fundamental propositions a number of times as implicit within our experience and suggests that we explicate them subsequently through reflection upon it" (p. 95). Cf. On Certainty, 95, 152. So presuppositions are implicit in every knowledge even though the knower may not have an explicit consciousness of it. What is not explicit at first glance, though, is made explicit through the phenomenological analysis.

\(^2\)They are analogous to the theos, according to Wittgenstein, because the "systems" of meaning that he analyzes are mostly those of the common life realm, and so they can be expressed, at least in a linguistic context, as propositions that are other than God or the idea of God. By analogy, then, that presupposition plays the role of theos in reason's structure. A deeper analysis, however, asks for the meaning of this presupposition and its constitution, the thing which is not always pursued by Wittgenstein, but which is obviously hinted as he sees all systems of thought springing from the Lebenswelt. Or, as he expresses in his writings, the bottom line from which every absolute presupposition would spring is our action; see On Certainty, 204, 46, 135, 287, 559, 359; cf. Hudson, p. 99.

\(^3\)See p. 51, n. 2 above.
"groundfloor" or "source" of meaning for the whole rational system, and as such they stand beyond doubt, criticism, verification, and in this sense are neither "true" nor "false." If truth and meaning have their ultimate ground in the a priori realm of presuppositions, a criticism of reason and its structure should begin by being conscious of this realm and the content of its presuppositions.

1 According to Mintek "some beliefs are 'ground-floor' and cannot be questioned, given up, or modified rationally, because they serve as paradigms and standards of rationality. They serve as the framework of a belief-system and determine the sorts of inquiry and questioning that one can legitimately and intelligibly carry out. Even though they are not justified or known, nothing is more certain than these rock bottom beliefs according to Wittgenstein" (p. 57). Yet, philosophers in general, even those such as Husserl, Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Collingwood, etc. . . . who are involved in the study and criticism of reason, seem to forget the hypothetical nature of reason in its absolute foundation, namely, in the realm of absolute presuppositions. To accept it would imply that certainty would be challenged, at least the traditional understanding of it. A new understanding should be worked out. This is not done, not even by Wittgenstein who accepts the traditional Platonic meaning for certainty as foundational.

2 According to Wittgenstein (On Certainty, 115), absolute certainty of ultimate presuppositions is the basis for doubting itself. Collingwood explains the unquestionability of absolute presuppositions in his Essay on Metaphysics, chapter 4; cf. Mintek, pp. 82, 83, 61, 62; and Adorno, p. 83. Mintek (pp. 57, 82-84, 92) criticizes Collingwood's and Wittgenstein's understanding of absolute presuppositions. Critical rationality, as Mintek sees it, must avoid such dogmatism which destroys rationality itself. According to Mintek, rationality must be open to criticism and verification at the level of its ultimate presuppositions. Yet, Mintek is not consistent with himself when he affirms that "beliefs and belief systems can be rational in spite of the fact that some beliefs must be ungrounded" (p. 105). The problem with Mintek's criticism is that he does not distinguish between absolute presuppositions as part of reason's structure and the concrete actual meaning of absolute presuppositions which stands in need of criticism. Additionally, he also disregards the hypothetical nature of reason which calls for more than one understanding for any presupposition, whether relative or absolute.

3 Luckhardt (pp. 250-52) tells how the grounds of knowledge must be known according to Aristotle, and how they are not supposed
However, the analysis is not to be developed at the concrete level of the content of the many rational systems but at the structural level in which the very epistemological framework of reason is shaped and developed in order to be used afterwards as the basic tool of systematic structural reason which any knowledge is supposed to have and follow in order to have a system of meaning at all. In such an enterprise the basic difficulty to be met lies in the possibility to be known according to Wittgenstein. Yet, in close examination these two theories are not so far apart from each other. Collingwood (Faith and Reason: Essays in Philosophy of Religion [Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1968], p. 108) explains that for Aristotle we do not have proof of them but that they are not matters of faith either. They are evident in themselves. On the other hand, for Wittgenstein, to know is to verify, at least in some sense. However, these absolute presuppositions cannot be checked out, either by experience or by argumentation; see Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, pp. 123, 194, 173; cf. Mintek, pp. 67, 74. Then, it seems clear why they are not "knowledge" in Wittgenstein's theory. However, they are knowledge in the sense that they have a meaning of their own that can be expressed in propositions. Hence they have the foundational meaning for the entire structure of reason; cf. Farber, pp. 59-62 passim; p. 55, n. 2 above; Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, p. 43.

1This is, for instance, the kind of criticism that Wittgenstein's and Collingwood's analyses represent; see Mintek, pp. 71-87 passim. Collingwood (Essay on Metaphysics, p. 48) expresses his historicist criticism of absolute presuppositions. He further develops its position; see pp. 72, 73, 254. Collingwood believes that absolute presuppositions may be compared to others, may be historically investigated in their process of change, yet they must be accepted by faith. I agree that history plays a foundational role in the transmission of absolute presuppositions from one historical situation to another, yet disagree with the historicist reduction of metaphysics and the meaning of absolute presuppositions by the historical conditioned situation in which men live and think. This position is unaware of the epistemological framework and of the historical logos. It just criticizes traditional trends but does not provide a new interpretation for reason's structure to function.
As we look for the ultimate presupposition in the structure of reason we have to recall that its epistemological framework presupposes as its foundation the ontological framework. The theos

1The basic difficulty we find in Wittgenstein's and Collingwood's approaches lies in the tension they posit between the theos of reason's structure—which represents the traditional concept and dimension of the ONE—and the affirmation of a plurality of ultimate principles. The problem lies in the fact that neither of them pursue his analysis until its final consequences, into the realm and dimension of the ONE. This is the step I try to take. See pp. 48, n. 3; and 59, n. 1 above.

2See p. 40, n. 1 and p. 41, n. 1 above. R. Vancourt (p. 22) speaks of "mutual conditionality" which considers the critique of knowledge to be the necessary introduction for metaphysics; and, at the same time, considers metaphysics to be the indispensable presupposition of every theory of knowledge. Hartmann (Int., 42) considers metaphysics to be the indispensable presupposition of every theory of knowledge following the traditional idea of philosophia prima. Heidegger remarks that "the question of Being aims therefore at ascertaining the a priori conditions not only for the possibility of the sciences which examine entities as entities of such and such type, and, in so doing, already operate with an understanding of Being, but also for the possibility of those ontologies themselves which are prior to the ontical sciences and which provide their foundations" (Being and Time, Int., 3). Heidegger stresses the point that "original ontological concepts must . . . be obtained prior to any scientific definition of 'basic concepts'" (The Essence of Reasons [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1969], p. 25). T. Langan affirms that "these notions about the ultimate constitution of Being and about the nature of the founding entity influence the critical attitude of the thinker as he plays off the different sources of evidence one against the other. At work whether he sees it clearly or not is a conception of truth and a notion of what Being is basically like that guides his judgment as to what will be accepted as evidence and what will not, what will be evaluated and what devaluated" ("Historicity and Metaphysics," American Catholic Philosophical Association 48 [1974]:5). Not only epistemology is seen as conditioned by ontology but also logic itself. Farber remarks: "It is becoming increasingly clear that logic requires the preparatory analysis of meaning and the concept of reality" (p. 52). See also Jacques Maritain, The Range of Reason (London: Geoffrey Bles, 1953), p. 6; Putnam, p. 215; Andrés Ortis-Oses, "Comunicación e Interpretación: Crítica de la Razón Hermenéutica," Pensamiento 30 (1974):420.
of reason's structure also presupposes the ontological framework.\(^1\)

Thus, in the onto-theo-logical structure of reason the logos is in a sense subordinated to the theos, and the theos is subordinated to the ontos.\(^2\) In short, the flow of meaning in the structure of reason goes from the ontos through the theos to the logos.\(^3\) It would seem, however, that the hypothetical nature of reason remains at

\(^1\)Martin Heidegger says: "Only from the truth of Being can the essence of the holy be thought. Only from the essence of the holy can the essence of the divinity be thought. Only in the light of the essence of divinity can it be thought and said what the word 'God' is to signify" ("Letter on Humanism," in Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Anthology, eds. W. Barret and H. D. Aiken, 4 voIs. [New York: Random House, 1962], 3:294). He further adds: "All theological concepts necessarily contain that understanding of Being which is constitutive of human Dasein, insofar as it exists at all" ("Phenomenology and Theology" in The Piety of Thinking, eds. J. G. Hart and J. C. Maraldo [Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1976], p. 18). Cf. Nicholas A. Patricca, "Martin Heidegger's Understanding of Theology," Listening 10 (1975):60, 61. Rousas J. Rushdoony points out that in theology the philosophical bias "re-orders their whole judgment and determines what shall be and what shall not be a fact" (By What Standard? An Analysis of the Philosophy of Cornelius Van Til [Philadelphia: Pennsylvania: The Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1959], p. 13). John Macquarrie explains that "every inquiry has its presuppositions, and that is true of theological inquiry as of any other. These presuppositions delimit the field of the inquiry, determine its basic concepts, and give it direction. In some way they already determine the result of the inquiry—not the content of the result, but the kind of result that will be obtained. These presuppositions are ontological, that is to say, they consist in a preliminary understanding of the being of the entities into which the enquiry is being made" (An Existentialist Theology: A Comparison of Heidegger and Bultmann [New York: Macmillan, 1955], pp. 6, 7).

\(^2\)See p. 48, n. 3; p. 51, n. 2; and p. 52, n. 2 above. Thus, the onto-theo-logical order expresses the flow of meaning.

\(^3\)This flow is to be seen as complementary to the flow from the whole to the part; see p.41, n.1 above. Ontos and theos provide the ground and framework for the understanding of the whole which is afterward kept as categories in the epistemological framework. It should be remembered that Logos is equiprimordial to ontos and theos as logos is present providing the understanding of both ontos and Logos.
the theos level\(^1\) and does not reach the ontos level (at least not the level of foundational ontology). Thus the ontos level would appear to be the non-hypothetical ground for the hypothetical character of the structure of reason.\(^2\) Our analysis, however, gets more complex, and at the same time opens itself up, when it is realized that since ontology already includes a logos, which renders a meaning that may be expressed in a propositional way, foundational ontology must also function within the structure of reason at the level of the subject-object relationship. This requires that the spontaneity of the subject\(^3\) should be present in the ontological realm. Consequently the ontological realm itself, inasmuch as a logos (and hence a cognitive subject with its necessary spontaneity) is involved, is to be considered as pertaining to the hypothetical character of reason's structure.\(^4\)

\(^1\)See p. 54, nn. 3 and 4 above.

\(^2\)This is the case when the metaphysical and ontological realms are seen as the realm of absolute presuppositions. The absolute presupposition is then to be understood as an ontological one and so ontology itself has to follow the ungrounded—presuppositionless—nature of absolute presuppositions; see Hoffman, p. 121; and Mintek, p. 82. There are also those who accept the hypothetical nature of reason in metaphysics but only in relation to its unavoidable, various, and contradictory theories. See, for instance, N. Hartmann, Int., 36, a, and 41; cf. Karl Jaspers, Philosophical Faith, pp. 200, 201.

\(^3\)See p. 31, n. 2 above.

\(^4\)This fact is being increasingly recognized by contemporary philosophers. For instance, J. Marias (Idea de la Metafísica, pp. 26, 393, 394) says that "adamism" is impossible, that is to say, a presuppositionless metaphysics is impossible; moreover, "Being is an interpretation of reality." Alan Richardson says that "it is becoming clearer nowadays that, without the instruction of a 'faith-principle,' no metaphysical system and no Weltanschauung can
We can see now that reason functions, in all the levels of its structure, in a hypothetical way. Additionally, since the hypothetical character of reason is provided by its a priori realm of presuppositions, a criticism of reason has to begin not with a detailed analysis of the structure itself but rather with a consideration of the actual minimum meaning that the structure of reason requires for developing the content of the a priori presuppositions it needs to constitute particular meanings arising in a subject-object relationship.

Thus it can be seen, through the phenomenological analysis, that the structure of reason is discovered from its actual functioning and, at the same time, that an awareness of the main features of this structure allows us to proceed further in the actual criticism of reason.

The Dimensionality of Reason's Structure: The Primordial Presupposition

At this point, the aim of our analysis is to disclose the epistemological realm in which the source of meaning for both

ontological and epistemological frameworks, and from them as a priori conditions of knowledge for any given system of meaning in its actuality, is given. We call this epistemological realm the primordial presupposition\(^1\) of reason or its "dimensionality."\(^2\) This is the realm in which Being, the "ultimate" presupposition of every meaning, has its own basic meaning\(^3\) which is present in every

\(^1\)"Primordial presupposition" expresses in a nutshell the idea of ultimate source in the sense of "grounding realm." M. Heidegger, in An Introduction to Metaphysics (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959), pp. 3, 6, speaks about the ultimate ground from the perspective and concern of ontology. He believes that "the ground [of metaphysics] in question must account for the being of the essent as such. This question 'why' does not move on the same level as the essent itself. This 'why' does not move on any one plane but penetrates to the 'underlying' ('zu-grunde' liegend) realms and indeed to the very last of them, to the limit; turning away from the surface, from all shallowness, it strives toward the depths; this broadest of all questions is also the deepest." He calls this ontological search the opening of the "Ur-sprung" that is the original source or origin. Our search, even though involved in the ontological realm, approaches it from the epistemological perspective of the ontological framework, and so it entails other concerns than Heidegger's ontological ones. Primordial presupposition leads then to the ultimate ground of meaning, to the primordial source of meaning. The analysis at this level provides the necessary viewpoint for developing our criticism of theological reason.

\(^2\)Heidegger speaks of it as a realm always present and which he calls the "area of thinking's abode" ("The Onto-theo-logical Constitution," p. 50), and "the way in which logos essentially occurs" (Early Greek Thinking [New York: Harper & Row, 1975], p. 70). Perotti, commenting on Heidegger's ontological purpose, says: "He is attempting to establish an ontological dimensions which would be the ground for the ontic" (p. 19). Cf. Collingwood, Essay on Metaphysics, p. 30; and Mintek, p. 77.

\(^3\)The grasp of the meaning of Being is difficult because it implies grasping the whole (Jaspers, The Foundations, p. 290) and because it is seen sometimes as a search into an insight for understanding reality (Hoffman, pp. 124, 125). Yet an additional problem arises: if we have to grasp the meaning of Being, and Being is to be seen as the whole of reality, what can be presupposed that is not already to be considered as a part of the whole? Jaspers says that we cannot reach it "by our knowledge of something, but solely
meaning, furnishing the ground for meaning, coherence, and unity for the whole of reason's structure. In understanding this realm, Heidegger's reflections are particularly helpful.

The analysis of the meaning of Being shows that it functions as an a priori presupposition for understanding the meaning of entities. In this context, the analysis of the meaning of Being by the course we take within it [the world], by the experience of the ideas in systematic knowledge, by the play of all our cognitive faculties in the intuition of the beautiful, and truly and decisively, through our freedom in ethical action" (p. 290). This, however, besides following the Kantian pattern, is not helpful because it tries to search for the ultimate meaning in some part of the whole namely, ethics or esthetics. Dorothy M. Emmet is not helpful either when she suggests that such foundational meaning is obtained through "a peculiarly vivid kind of awareness and responsiveness to reality beyond ourselves" (The Nature of Metaphysical Thinking [London: Macmillan, 1961], pp. 61, 65). This last approach is not useful because it is too broad, and in its broadness it does not provide any clue as to the actual meaning for the primordial presupposition. Moreover, it seems to suggest a sort of individual illumination or revelation. Cf. W. H. Walsh, Metaphysics (London: Hutchinson University Library, 1963), p. 81.

Jaspers (Philosophical Faith, p. 198) speaks about these basic presuppositions as providing the guidance that our vision needs to see the onta. That is why the basic meaning of Being is present in each being or entity providing the ground for its meaning. Consequently, Jaspers says that "the most abstract question about being becomes the most powerful" (The Original Thinkers, p. 32).

Heidegger in the preface to Being and Time gears its whole enterprise into the task of understanding the meaning of Being: "So it is fitting that we should raise anew the question of the meaning of Being." Cf. 2.6.83. We should bear in mind that in the meaning of Being both epistemological and ontological frameworks find their source. Being and logos are equiprimordial. No one is previous to the other.

Heidegger, in Being and Time, says that "this 'presupposing' of Being has rather the character of taking a look at it beforehand, so that in the light of it the entities presented to us get provisionally articulated in the Being. This guiding activity of taking a look at Being arises from the average understanding of Being in which we always operate and which in the end belongs to the essential
leads us beyond metaphysics to its ground. That is to say, we have to go beyond the level of beings as entities, which are dealt with by metaphysics, to the level of Being as Nothing, which is the ground constitution of Dasein itself. Such 'presupposing' has nothing to do with laying down an action from which a sequence of propositions is deductively derived" (Int., 1.2). It is in this last sense of a presupposition as an axiom that grounds deduction that Heidegger denies his search is a search to discover "a hitherto overlooked presupposition of philosophy, and thereby to show that philosophy does not yet stand on an unshakable foundation and therefore cannot yet be the absolute science" ("The Way Back into the Ground of Metaphysics," in Philosophy in the Twentieth Century: An Anthology, ed. S. W. Barret and H. D. Aiken, 4 vols. [New York: Random House, 1962], 3:209). It should be remarked here that according to Heidegger there is a foundational difference between beings (entities) and the ground of Being (Being itself); see Heidegger, "The Principle of Identity," in Identity and Difference, ed. J. Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 51. However, he is looking for the ground of Being which is the source of all presupposition.

Heidegger comments: "Metaphysics, insofar as it always represents only beings as beings, does not recall Being itself. Philosophy does not concentrate on its ground. It always leaves its ground--leaves it by means of metaphysics. And yet it never escapes its ground. Insofar as a thinker sets out to experience the ground of metaphysics, insofar as he attempts to recall the truth of Being itself instead of merely representing beings as beings, his thinking has in a sense left metaphysics. From the point of view of metaphysics, such thinking goes back into the ground of metaphysics. . . . Metaphysics remains the basis of philosophy. The basis of thinking, however, it does not reach. When we think of the truth of Being, metaphysics is overcome" ("The Way Back," p. 208). The ground for the meaning of Being stands upon the difference that exists between Being and beings; see "The Onto-theo-logical Constitution," p. 51. According to Heidegger, philosophical traditions have forgotten the realm of the ground of Being and so the truth of Being "has remained concealed from metaphysics during its long history from Anaximander to Nietzsche" ("The Way Back, p. 210). Besides, the going back to the forgotten ground of metaphysics may bring about a "transformation of metaphysics" (pp. 209-13 passim). This "transformation" or "restoration" of metaphysics was already pointed at in Being and Time, Int. 2.7, as "destruction." Later, in The Question of Being (New York: Twayne, 1958), p. 91, Heidegger calls it "overcoming" (Überwindung); cf. Perotti, pp. 57-59.
for both Being and meaning.¹ Nothing as no-thing² is the realm of meaning which we call primordial presupposition or, more precisely, dimensionality.³ That dimensionality is the realm of no-thing as

¹In "The Way Back" (pp. 216-18), Heidegger shows how the thinking for the ground of Being moves to the Nothing and then it tries to think the nature of metaphysics. Heidegger suggests (p. 218) that Leibniz's famous question "Pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien?" should be understood not regarding metaphysics. In other words the question should be thought of as regarding the ground of Being, hence, as not looking for the ground in an entity. The question would be looking rather for the ground of all entities. Thus, the question should be, "How did it come about that beings take precedence everywhere and lay claim to every 'is' while that which is not a being is understood as Nothing, though it is Being itself, and remains forgotten?" (ibid.). Breton considers that in searching for its ground "la métaphysique se dépasse d'elle-même vers quelque chose dont elle ne nous dit rien" (p. 149).

²Heidegger explains his position by saying that "Nothing is neither an object nor anything that 'is' at all. Nothing occurs neither by itself nor 'apart from' what-is, as a sort of adjunct. Nothing is that which makes the revelation of what-is as such possible for our human existence. Nothing not merely provides the conceptual opposite of what-is but also an original part of essence (Wesen). It is in the Being (Sein) of what-is that the nihilation of Nothing (das Nichten des Nichts) occurs" ("What Is Metaphysics," in Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock [Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1949], p. 340). In Being and Time (Int. 1.2), he says that "the Being of entities 'is' not itself an entity." Cf. idem, The Question of Being, p. 97. Perotti explains this rather difficult Heideggerian concept saying that "the 'nothing' here is first intended in the sense of that which is other than beings, that which is not a being" (pp. 19, 20). Cf. Jaspers, Reason and Anti-Reason, p. 54.

³We here make a distinction that appears only implicitly in Heidegger. The "nothing" of Heidegger includes two different elements. First, the realm of the inquiry or reflection, which we have already pointed out; and the actual understanding of such a realm. By the use of the term "dimensionality" we mean the realm of inquiry in which the primordial presupposition of Being and reason moves and receives its meaning. By the use of the term primordial presupposition, we mean the actual interpretation of the dimensionality of reason and Being.
non-entity entails that the primordial presupposition does not simply appear but rather co-appears with every entity.\textsuperscript{1} So, even though the primordial presupposition is not "knowledge" in the usual sense (that is to say, knowledge in the realm of entities), it is nonetheless "knowledge" insofar as there is a subject-object relationship that always appears with it.\textsuperscript{2} And, since the ground of Being as

\textsuperscript{1}Perhaps the shorter way of expressing the foundational way in which dimensionality—ground—of Being and Reason—is to be understood is given by Heidegger himself in "What Is Metaphysics?" when he affirms that "nothing occurs neither by itself nor 'apart from' what-is, as a sort of adjunct" (p. 340). See p. 52, n. 2 above. In Being and Time Heidegger explains that "it is something that proximally and for the most part does not show itself at all: it is something that lies hidden, in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground" (Int., 2.7.c). That is why he believes that "Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to be the theme of ontology. . . . Only as Phenomenology is ontology possible" (ibid.). A quick glance at the whole section shows that Heidegger's Phenomenology has rejected Husserl's transcendental idealism. In it Heidegger explains how the ground of Being, the dimensionality of Being and reason, is "co-given" or "co-appears" with every entity, not as an entity but as their ground and always present source of meaning, coherence, and unity. Moreover, it is known that Heidegger considers Dasein as the place in which the "co-appearance" of Being can be better and more clearly grasped; see Being and Time, Int. 2.5; and "What Is Metaphysics?" pp. 347, 348.

\textsuperscript{2}Heidegger expresses the core of the difficulty by saying that "thinking, which is essentially always thinking about something, would, in thinking of Nothing, be forced to act against its own nature" ("What is Metaphysics?" p. 330). This last statement about the "nature" of thinking must not be interpreted as meaning that beyond representational knowledge there is no knowledge, but rather pointing beyond representational knowledge to a different kind of knowledge. See "The Way Back" pp. 211, 217 where Heidegger remarks that "the thinking which is posited by beings as such, and therefore representational and illuminating in that way, must be supplanted by a different kind of thinking which is brought to pass by Being itself and, therefore, responsive to Being" (p. 211). He also speaks of a transition from representational thinking to "thinking that recalls" (p. 217). An additional difficulty lies in the fact that as we try to express this different kind of knowledge we are bound to the language of tradition; see Heidegger, "The Onto-theo-logical
primordial presupposition can only be reached in the realm of knowledge, it cannot happen in disregard of the hypothetical character of reason's structure either. In other words, reason needs to have an a priori understanding of the ground of Being and meaning in order to be able to grasp the meaning of beings as entities. This

Constitution," p. 50. Obviously, however, even when we are bound to use the language of tradition we are also bound to provide a new meaning for it in order to express the new kind of knowledge.

1 J. Maritain may be considered as representative of classical philosophy which does not accept the hypothetical nature of reason at its foundational level. In The Range of Reason, Maritain says that "in its rational development as in its primal intuitions metaphysics is purely objective" (p. 28). Heidegger may be considered as representative of the "new way of ontology and thinking." He says in "The Way Back" that the "new kind of thinking is brought to pass by Being itself and, therefore, responsive to Being" (p. 211). So we just grasp the meaning of Being which is given—as it is--by Being itself. The spontaneity of the subject is in other places recognized by Heidegger (for instance, Being and Time, prologue, and Int., 2.6) but is not considered actually when Heidegger speaks of the meaning of the ground of Being. This situation may be understood if we realize that to recognize the hypothetical character of reason at the level of the ground of Being—primordial presupposition—would entail extending the hypothetical character to every meaning and to truth itself. As Heidegger sees it clearly (Being and Time, Int., 7.c), beyond the ground of Being stands neither entities nor Nothing. Hence, reason would have no reference to decide between alternatives should they be recognized at this foundational level. The inability--impossibility?--for providing a rational answer to this foundational choice should be considered the main reason for Heidegger's interpretation of traditional thinking as not in opposition but in complementation to his own "destroying and "overcoming" of it.

2 It should be clear that I use the term "ground of Being" in a different way than the one Paul Tillich does in his theology. In his Systematic Theology Tillich makes clear that "the ground of Being" is God (1:156), interpreted after it has been understood that God is not an entity (1: 237; cf. 1:235). God as "creative ground of Being" keeps the traditional ideas of causality and substance as it transcends them by applying them to the reality of God as a non-entity (1:274). As Tillich does this interpretation of God as the "creative ground of Being." the meaning of the primordial presupposition has been accepted in the Parmenidean tradition of timelessness (1:188, 189). We see, then, that in Tillich, "the ground of
a priori is a foundational grasp of reason's dimensionality, namely a primordial presupposition, which is the minimum knowledge that reason needs as it (first) develops an interpretation of the ontological framework—e.g., traditional metaphysics—and then (second) on this basis, proceeds to develop the epistemological framework—its procedures, functions, and categories—which were born as they were already used in the interpretation of the ontological framework.

Moreover, the foundational subject-object relationship is involved in the interpretation of the primordial presupposition that leads beyond the structure of reason to its first basic content which determines the form and meaning that the structure itself assumes in its actual functioning. Consequently, the spontaneity of the subject is to be seen as active in the constitution of the primordial presupposition.

"Being" designates ontologically the divine being. The realm of Being as No-thing, prior to any interpretation of it either as timelessness or temporality (dimensionality), is not included in Tillich's idea of "the ground of Being."

We do not need to get involved in the obvious complexity of this subject. We should bear in mind, however, that the epistemological framework relates to an ontological structure—or the traditional metaphysics that deals with beings as beings—and so it is not the case that we should have first an epistemological framework and then an ontological one. Yet in the actual historical development of ideas, both frameworks are thought of together. The epistemological analysis, however, shows a cognitive precedence of the ontological framework in that it provides the ground for the developing of the epistemological framework.

See p. 52, n. 2 above. Object here does not mean "object"—neither in its Kantian sense nor in any way that relates it with ontological entities. Object here expresses the necessary role that the structure of knowledge requires for the constitution of any meaning whatsoever.

At this point we part company with the majority of philosophers. See p. 72, n. 1 above.
In this context reason can be expected to have than one possible primordial presupposition. So far there are two basic understandings of reason's dimensionality. That is to say, reason has developed its own actual structure—with emphasis on the epistemological structure—on the basis of two widely different primordial presuppositions, namely timelessness and temporality. In the second part of this chapter, which deals with the structure of reason from the viewpoint of the minimum content its dimensionality needs to be interpreted, I will analyze these two primordial presuppositions as they have been understood and developed in the history of philosophy. In particular, I am interested in the ways in which they have influenced the actual form and meaning of two different interpretations of the functioning and structure of reason.

Dimensionality of the Onto-Theo-Logical Structure of Reason

The phenomenological analysis of reason's structure must now be focused on the actual interpretations that this structure

1. We cannot see any particular reason why there should be only two. Perhaps, from an epistemological viewpoint, it is possible to grasp more than two primordial presuppositions. This is irrelevant, however, for our criticism of theological reason, since in the theological realm timelessness and temporality are enough to satisfy the needs of both criticism and constitution of meanings.

2. As primordial presupposition is, in its basic meaning, the ground for the meaning of the whole, it necessarily determines and constitutes both the ontological and epistemological frameworks. Yet, if the basic foundational interpretation for each framework is worked out from assuming a different primordial presupposition, the traditional ground for unity and coherence, the One, would have been destroyed by changing it into "two." In this case the ultimate ground for coherence and system would be inexistent, and so coherence, system, and truth would no longer exist. We should recall,
has received throughout the history of philosophy. Because a complete and detailed analysis falls out of the limits of our epistemological constructive investigation,¹ I deal only with those thinkers who because of the nature and relevance of their suggestions are indispensable for an understanding of the dimensionality of reason in its timeless and temporal interpretations. For the sake of clarity I follow a historical order,² and deal first with timelessness and then with temporality. In each case I have selected a philosopher who is generally recognized as providing the foundational insight into the nature of Being (or its primordial presupposition).³ Then I show, in an abridged way of course, how the

however, that the structure of reason itself qua functioning is not modified by the particular content chosen in the primordial presupposition.

¹A detailed analysis would belong in an historical analysis. Such an analysis would be very enlightening as a complement to the present systematic analysis. On the other hand, we agree with José Ortega y Gasset who believes that only a few thinkers have dealt with Being and that for this reason it is wise not to multiply the analysis "filling philosophy with brown cats" (no vale la pena llenar la filosofía de gatos pardos) (La idea de Principio en Leibniz y la Evolución de la Teoría Deductiva in Obras Completas [Madrid: Revista de Occidente, 1961-1989], 8:271).

²The historical order is useful for our criticism, not because we agree with historicism, as, for instance, Collingwood in An Essay on Metaphysics (pp. 47-50), but rather because the actual shaping of reason has been achieved throughout a long period of time in which several contributions, additions, and modifications have been introduced by germinal thinkers. The critic of reason in theology must be aware not only of the structure of reason--as functioning--but also of its origin and development throughout the history of philosophy. In the timeless primordial presupposition I follow the chronological order with no modification. In the case of the temporal historical primordial presupposition I modify the chronological order in order to maintain the systematic order of our investigation.

³We have selected Parmenides for the timeless primordial presupposition and Heidegger for the temporal. The analysis
ontological and epistemological frameworks have been shaped and interpreted according to the primordial presupposition.

Classical Dimensionality: Timelessness

Primordial Presupposition: Parmenides

Parmenides\(^1\) not only seems to have been the first philosopher to give expression to the foundational relationship that exists between epistemological and ontological frameworks\(^2\) but he also seems to have been the first to go beyond the \textit{arché} of the earliest philosophers,\(^3\) that is, to enter into the realm of the nature of reveals that they provide philosophy with the most explicit and influential expression of each primordial presupposition.

\(^1\)See W. C. K. Guthrie, \textit{A History of Greek Philosophy}, 4 vols. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962-1975), 2:1-80 for an introduction to Parmenides' biographical data and to his philosophy as a whole. Parmenides was born c. 515 B.C. He was probably a younger contemporary of Heraclitus and an older contemporary of Zeno and Socrates.

\(^2\)Parmenides, frag. 3. Theodor Gomperz explains the meaning of Parmenides' frag. 3: "For it is the same thing to think and to be." By saying that, "they mean nothing more than that the genuine thing that is is the only object of thought, and that thinking can never be diverted to the thing that-is-not" (\textit{A History of Ancient Philosophy}, 4 vols. [London: John Murray, 1901-1905], 1:179). The "understanding in depth" of what Parmenides meant is, however, still a cause of controversies; see, for instance, Francis McDonald Conford, \textit{Plato and Parmenides: Parmenides' "Way of Truth" and Plato's "Parmenides"}, trans. with an introduction and running commentary (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1939), p. 80; and Heidegger, \textit{Early Greek Thinking}, pp. 74, 84, 86.

\(^3\)Jaspers states: "Parmenides wished by thought to gain a foothold beyond the origin of the world, which, under the name of \textit{arché} (origin, principle), had already been conceived in a number of ways. However, his thought was interpreted as a new approach to this very same \textit{arché}" (\textit{The Original Thinkers}, p. 31). Yet, since the idea of \textit{arché} had a temporal sense in the first philosophers (Dietrich Müller, \"Beginning, Origin, Rule, Ruler, Originator," \textit{NIODNT}, 1:164), it seems that Parmenides did not give a new interpretation to the very same idea of \textit{arché} but that he rather replaced...
Being, the realm of reason's dimensionality or primordial presuppositions in order to provide the first interpretation of it.

it by the expression, at the same time, of both the dimension of reason and its timeless primordial presupposition which afterwards becomes classical for both philosophy and theology. As Parmenides moves in the cognitive realm it is clear that it is different from the cosmological arché of the first philosophers.

Regarding the realm of dimensionality in Parmenides' thought, Jaspers remarks in The Original Thinkers that "measured by the logical richness of the differentiated categories or the perceptual richness of the world, Parmenides' being is so poor that it vanishes. For his boldly transcending thinking of this being is directed toward an imageless pre-categorial, or trans-categorial realm, yet transcendence in Parmenides is not somewhere else, it is wholly present. But this presence does not lie in the plenitude of the sensuous, temporal world" (pp. 27, 28). Perotti points out the fact that Parmenides and Heraclitus, whom Heidegger called "greater" philosophers (What Is Philosophy [New York: Twayne, 1958], p. 53), "did not seek to answer the to on, and thus they were not ontological; they did not affirm a first divine ground for all beings and thus were not theological; finally since they were poets and mythologists, they were neither logicians nor did they think representationally" (p. 68). José Lorite ("Preliminares al Estudio Científico de la Suma Teológica," Pensamiento 30 [1974]:295-97) notes the well-known fact that Parmenides' and Heraclitus' thoughts are opposite. Nonetheless, we are not going to analyze Heraclitus' views since he was not followed as understanding of being until late in the history of philosophy. Since we are following a somehow historical analysis of the primordial presupposition of reason, we deal with the opposite to Parmenides' interpretation in Heidegger's late development of it. Yet, we should bear in mind that the duality of interpretation in the realm of dimensionality may be traced back in Western philosophy as early as 500 B.C.

This is the realm which Heidegger calls "No-thing" (see p. 52, n. 1 above). Gomperz expresses the idea that Parmenides, after having assayed "a flight on the wings of Icarus above the region of experience into the ethereal domains of pure being, . . . sank, and fell to the familiar plains of corporeal existence" (1:170). This interpretation is unaware that Parmenides is working in the realm of reason's dimensionality. Consequently, Gomperz sees Parmenides working with entities; for instance, when Parmenides talks of Being as "the mass of a well-rounded sphere" (frags., 7, 8). However, already Aristotle sees that "the contention that all existence is one and rigidly unchanging . . . does not really concern the student of nature" (Physics 1.185a [trans. Ph. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, LCL, 1:14, 15]). Cornford (p. 45) remarks that
Even though Parmenides did not speak explicitly about the ground of Being or about timelessness, he makes it apparent that his "way of truth" was grounded in the meaning of Being and that his understanding of Being was grounded in timelessness. Parmenides was aware that the knowledge of Truth requires a foundational decision, a decision that he, consequently, made at the very

Parameides' Being is the object of thought but not of sense perception; and M. L. West thinks that Parmenides' Being "is not derived from cold deduction but from a direct perception, a mystical experience" (Early Greek Philosophy and the Orient [Oxford: Clarendon, 1971], p. 222). Etienne Gilson, L'Être et l'Essence, 2nd ed. (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1972), p. 26, believes that to speak of "abstraction" in Parmenides' understanding of Being is an anachronism. At the same time Gilson considers Parmenides as the founder of ontology (ibid.). Cornford (p. 29) sees that Parmenides' thought is not a mere abstraction as far as it speaks of reality or ousia. Kathleen Freeman argues regarding Parmenides' extra-logical meaning concerning Being because back in Parmenides' time thinkers "would not have found his results absurd if he had kept them to the realm of logic and had not insisted that they must be accepted against all the evidence of the senses" (The Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Companion to Diels, "Fragmente der Vorsokratiker" [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1959], p. 145). Obviously, beyond arguments on minute details, Parmenides' thought on Being is recognized as dealing with the foundational understanding of Being, the understanding of the ground of Being. Jaspers explains the dimensionality of Parmenides' thinking on Being by stating that "it is a thinking action which was possible in the naïveté (not primitivism) of creative beginning, it is still possible, though we cannot recapture the old candor. Logic and being merged, and both were unfolded in thought. Logic was not yet empty because it was not yet intended as logic. Accordingly, the vision is not a metaphor, but a necessary part of the thought. . . . The Inexplicable is explained; the form is that of prophetic vision" (The Original Thinkers, p. 26, 27). Cf. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, p. 98.

The meaning of timelessness cannot be understood in a single concept or proposition. That is why Parmenides uses several sémata in order to convey the basic meaning of Being's dimensionality. Timelessness is expressed by the overall meaning presented by the sémata. In short, timelessness appears couched in Being. That being-couched-in-Being of timelessness is what we call the "co-appearance" of the dimensionality of reason, see p. 72, n. 1 above.
beginning of his poem. He described the ground of Being—primordial presupposition—which he called "the way" by means of several "signs" (sēmata): the "not coming-into-being" (ἀγεννητόν).

1 Parmenides expresses his decision in the following sentence: "Thou shalt inquire into everything: both the motionless (ἄτρομος) unmoved heart (μὴ τι τω) of well-rounded truth, and also the opinions of mortals, in which there is no true reliability (πιστικός θλησθής)" (frag. I). Here we can see that a foundational choice has been made. No reason is given for it. Obviously it points to the hypothetical character of reason's structure. Parmenides expresses this hypothetical character of "Truth"—reason—by remarking that in the way of doxa there is no "love reliability" or "true faith." See the translation by Burnet (p. 172). Parmenides connects "The Way of Truth" to Being: "The ways of inquiry which alone are to be thought: the one that IT IS (ἐστίν), and it is not possible for IT NOT TO BE (μὴ τι τω), is the way of credibility, (πιστοθύμος) for it follows truth (ἐλασθητί γὰρ σωφρείς)" (frag. 2). (πιστοθύμος) can also be understood as "persuasion." See Burnet, p. 173; and "Πειθήμων," A Greek-English Lexicon (1968), pp. 1353, 54. If πιστοθύμος is translated as "persuasion" The Way would be of persuasion, which could point to the fact of an already-taken choice, or to the certainty that it provides to the one who is searching in the way of truth.

2 "There is only one other description of the way remaining, (namely) that (What Is) IS. To this way there are very many signposts (ἀνωτάτω): that Being has no coming-into-being and no destruction, for it is whole of limb, without motion, and without end. And it never Was, nor Will Be, because it Is now, a Whole all together, One, continuous; for what creation of it will you look for? How, whence (could it have) sprung?" (Parmenides, frags. 7, 8).

3 With this word the via negativa begins. Its starting point is the world of sensory perception. On this, Parmenides says: "You must debar your thought from this way of search, nor let ordinary experience in its variety force you along this way" (frags. 7, 8). In other words, Being and its meaning are to be reached as we get rid of the Lebenswelt by denying that which pertains to the senses. Here ἀγεννητόν denies that Being—reality—has any origin or cause. Being stands beyond causality and development. Becoming is not part of Being, since becoming is part of the world of doxa. Cf. Felix Cleve, The Giants of Pre-sophistic Greek Philosophy: An Attempt to Reconstruct Their Thoughts, 2 vols. (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1965), 2:530, 531.
"indestructibility" ( anvalephrou ), 1 "completeness" ( oulolemec ), 2 "motionlessness" ( axiwnou ), 3 and "endlessness" ( atelestou ). 4

1 This completes the axiwnou idea. Being has no cause. Hence it has no development. Then it has no perishing nor fading away.

2 I think that Burnet (p. 174) renders a better translation of Parmenides oulolemec. He translates oulolemec "complete," instead of "whole of limb." We find here also a negative meaning in that wholeness is reached by the denial of parts. The negative meaning reappears later when Parmenides (frags. 7, 8) affirms that Being is "an inviolate whole" [ ean xoxon ]. For a commentary regarding the relation extant between oulolemec and mouvece, see Burnet, p. 174, n. 4.

3 This leads nearer to the foundation of Parmenides' understanding of Being. Due to its relevance it was already mentioned in frag. 1 as being the "heart of well-rounded Truth." In frag. 1, Parmenides uses the word doxece. Here, as he develops the semata he uses axiwnou, which becomes the classical word for changelessness. According to W. K. C. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy, 1:381, 82, before Parmenides kinec had only the popular sense of local motion or disturbance. The negation of local motion would have been the meaning the word has in Xenophanes, frag. 26 (trans. K. Freeman, Ancilla to the Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 23). However, in Parmenides, according to Guthrie, axiwnou means "complete immobility of the real, the impossibility of kiv in any sense of the word" (2:36). This absolute negation, obviously, already includes time, since time is what always co-appears when something is moving in any way, as Aristotle points out later in On the Heavens 279, a.15 (trans. W. K. C. Guthrie, LCL, 90, 91) and Metaphysics, 72.1.5, that time is the measure of motion. The absence of motion, then, entails the absence of time and vice versa. Being, then, belongs to that region beyond time, namely, timelessness. However, as the idea of timelessness stands by negating time, and, since the idea of time is not clear for Parmenides or Greek philosophy—which understands it only in relation to movement—the idea of timelessness in its positive content is to be grasped in relation to the meaning of the semata as a whole.

4 Is Parmenides denying the idea of achievement and, hence, of progress in Being, or is he speaking about the everlasting duration of something that is present? The word "atelestitou" seems to fit both meanings; see Gerhard Delling, "Telos," TDNT, 8:49-87. Its meaning in this text must be decided by the context provided by the nature of Being whose semata Parmenides is developing. So it must be related to the previous axiwnou. At this point we should disregard Freeman's translation which disconnects
Finally, reaching the very core of this *via negativa*\(^1\) Parmenides expressed the timelessness of "the way of truth" by saying that "it never was nor will be, because it is now" (*οὐδὲ νότ' ἐν οὐδέ ἔσται ἐπὶ νῦν ἔστιν*).\(^2\) It seems clear, however, that the result of this *via negativa* was not something negative itself and therefore meaningless or with no content at all; on the contrary, it was a basic foundational, positive meaning that provided the ground for meaning.

\(^1\)As can be easily observed, Parmenides reaches the core of Being's dimensionality by denying what is given to him through sensory perception. We can see here the cradle of the theological *via negativa* followed in the pursuing the knowledge of God, and of the Platonic *chorismos*, which expresses it in the gap which separates the two worlds--sensible and intelligible. M. Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics*, p. 106, uses *chorismos* in this sense.

\(^2\)Here duration is denied as pertaining to Being, and so timelessness reaches its deepest expression. If Being should be understood as endless duration in time, it certainly should have had a past (unchangeable as it may be), and surely it should have a future, because duration flows in time. Yet, Parmenides' Being has neither past nor future. So the "now" does not point to the present or temporality, rather it points to the "instant" which is beyond the flux of time, and so beyond time as dimensionality of Being. Timelessness, then, is understood by Parmenides as Being's dimensionality. For those who may still think--following Heidegger--that the "now" as "instant" gives access to the present and is grounded in time, at least in one of its ecstasies, we have to point out that we have access to the present through appearances, and that what appears is given to us through sensory perception, the way which is expressly rejected by Parmenides as pertaining to the truth of Being. See frags. 1, 7, 8; cf. Cleve, 2:538. It seems to be the case that Parmenides is not only denying (forgetting in Heidegger's expression) the movement of flux (change) implicit in time and making Being something "static" (beyond any flux) in time but also is denying duration, since duration needs, in order to be, both past and future.
and unity to the whole of reason's system. And the basic idea Parmenides was expressing through his via negativa was his primordial presupposition for the dimensionality of Being, namely timelessness.

and Being has neither one. Therefore, the \( \nu \nu \ \xi \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) stands outside both, the flux as measure of essential change and, also outside of the very dimension of duration, outside time as the realm of appearances. Thus, the \( \nu \nu \ \xi \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) is expressing timelessness and not indefinite duration in time of what is beyond essential change. What is beyond essential change is, then, completely beyond time. The \( \nu \nu \ \xi \sigma \tau \iota \nu \) expresses what lies beyond time, namely, timelessness. The origin of the idea of timelessness seems to have been very early in the realm of heathen religions. See Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, pp. 28, 29. Xenophanes of Colophon (c. 530 B.C.) seems to be an early antecedent for some of Parmenides' ideas (see frags. 23-26). After Parmenides, Melissus of Samos (c. 440 B.C.) seems to deal with timelessness, yet he reaches only the idea of infinite duration, for he says in frag. 1 of his Poem (trans. K. Freeman, Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophers, 48) that "that which was, was always and always will be." It seems that he misses the deeper thought of his predecessor. Yet, he follows Parmenides in rejecting sensory perception as belonging to Being. See frag. 8:2, 3, 5 where the discontinuity of Being from sensory perception is apparent. We see, then, that Parmenides' thought on the ground of Being stands alone as the beginning of Greek traditional philosophy.

This is apparent when Parmenides, in his treatment of the signs of Being, changes from the via negativa into positive statements on Being. See, for instance, frags. 7, 8 where Parmenides says that Being is "a Whole all together" \( \sigma \mu \mu \delta \ \pi \alpha \gamma \nu \), "One" \( \xi \nu \), and "continuous" \( \xi \nu \eta \varepsilon \varepsilon \zeta \). These and other expressions have to be understood, however, on the basis of the via negativa, namely on timelessness. In short, this "positive" way of talking about Being is not literal but rather "analogical."

Freeman in The Pre-Socratic Philosophers comments: "Therefore Becoming and Destruction (and with them time itself) are done away with ('quenched')" (p. 147). Gomperz adds: "May, one of Parmenides' expressions even seems to cast doubt on the passage of time itself; and, seeing that nothing happened in time, that reality was denied to each and every temporal process, there was actually nothing left for the time-conception to denote" (1:172). Bertrand Russell writes: "The doctrine of the perpetual flux as taught by Heraclitus is painful, and science, as we have seen, can do nothing to refute it. One of the main ambitions of Philosophers has been to revive hopes that science seemed to have killed. Philosophers, accordingly, have sought, with great persistence, for something not subject to the empire of time. This search begins with Parmenides"
From this viewpoint, time—temporal reality—was understood and appraised in an initial negative way. And because timelessness was the first basic understanding of Being's and reason's dimensionality, the whole range of philosophical thinking—ontology, (A History of Western Philosophy: and Its Connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present [New York: Simon and Schuster, 1945], p. 47). For additional commentary on Parmenides' semata see Jaspers, The Original Thinkers, pp. 26, 27.

1 It seems that Parmenides' basic choice was between timelessness and temporality; see Jaspers, The Original Thinkers, p. 29. The way of "seeming" is what the Goddess is fighting against from the beginning. The way of "not-being" is just impossible (frag. 2) because "it is just the same thing to think and to be" (frag. 3). But, how to choose between the way of "being" and the way of "seeming"? At this point the very same language shows that Parmenides and, after him, Western philosophy as a whole have identified Being with timelessness. Yet, there is nothing that assures the absolute certainty of the choice made. After this identification is done, the rejection of the "seeming" way is just a logical consequence. So Parmenides (frag. 6) may say that those who follow the "seeming way" are two-headed [δικράνοι] because "for them to Be and Not to Be [τὰ πέλειν τὲ καὶ οὐκ εἶναι] are regarded as the same and not the same [ταῦτον νενομίσται καὶ ταῦτον]" (frag. 6). According to Burnet (p. 174, n. 2), "there is no difference between πέλειν and εἶναι except in rhythmical value." In short, the "way of seeming" is not to be chosen because it couches within itself the unthinkable "not-Being." Hence, appearance and sense perception are not part of the way of Truth; see Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, p. 29; and Gomperz, 1:181. So "plurality, becoming, change, motion, are in some sense unreal" (Cornford, p. 28). Gilson L'Étre, p. 27) expresses Parmenides' interpretation of temporal being in a clearer way when he says that Parmenides' sensible world as a whole, with the eternal changes proper of it, "must be excluded from the order of Being and seen as appearance." We see then that in this primordial presupposition "there is no possible transition from the One Being to the manifold and changing world which our senses seem to reveal" (Cornford, pp. 29, 51).

2 Parmenides' thinking is the beginning of "ontology" (Jaspers, The Original Thinkers, p. 33; Cleve, 2:543). The starting point is also what conditions classical metaphysics and epistemology as a whole, even the discussion about the possibility of metaphysics. See Marias, Idea de la Metafisica, p. 381; Jaspers, The Original Thinkers, p. 32. For a very good presentation on the origin and
Epistemological Framework

After Parmenides' pioneer thinking on the fundamental nature of Being, philosophy proceeded to develop its tools. The next step of development of the idea of Being from Parmenides to Thomas Aquinas, see Gilson, L'Être, pp. 24-123.

It is perhaps at this level that Parmenides' thinking on Being is to play the most influential role in the history of Western philosophy and Christian theology. His thinking on the ground of Being, after a long process of development determines the epistemological framework—logos—of Western civilization. Adorno remarks that in Parmenides the understanding of Truth, Being and Unity "are also direction how to think" (p. 83). Even though some may consider Parmenides' reflection as pure emptiness and nonsense (for instance, Cleve, 2:541), Jaspers explains in a very clear way how the paramount influence of Parmenides in Greek and Western thinking is to be seen in the epistemological framework: "Parmenides' influence has been enormous. This may seem surprising in view of the predominantly logical character of his thinking. But for Parmenides the seeming emptiness of his statement was supreme fullness, and for all who came after him it represented a challenge to fill his molds of thought, which, once communicated, become purely formal. But there are other reasons for his historical influence. The methods of thought he developed came to be utilized independently, while their original meaning was overshadowed or lost" (The Original Thinkers, p. 31). Perhaps the deepest mold of thought that Parmenides imposed on Western thinking was the "gap" or chôrismos between the sensible world (Lebenswelt) and the world of Truth and Reason. See Cornford, pp. 34, 35; Cleve, 2:546; and Raschke, p. 384.

Jaspers, The Original Thinkers, 31.

"Parmenides does not call Being God. But what he conceived as the signs of being, became a field of categories which were subsequently transferred to God when theologians sought to define His attributes. From Parmenides came the motifs appropriate to a thought structure embracing the imageless God, to the apprehending of transcendence by pure thought. His 'ontology' provided 'theology' with its tools" (ibid., p. 33). What Jaspers here calls "tools" is what we call "epistemological framework" of reason's structure. We see in a more detailed analysis how correct is Jaspers' statement in our second chapter.

After Parmenides' expression of the timeless primordial presupposition, there was no other reflection on the subject matter of the ground of Being as "No-thing" until Heidegger. Heidegger

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to be taken was the interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks on the basis provided by Parmenides' presupposition of timelessness.

Plato. Parmenides' two ways—way of Truth and way of doxa—were developed by Plato into a worldview in which the unbridgeable gap that Parmenides maintained between Truth and doxa began to blur. However, the gap only blurred; it did not disappear. Rather it came to form an essential and constitutive part of Plato's understanding of the whole of reality. This came about in what is known as Plato's theory of the two worlds, a dualism which Plato expressed in terms himself recognizes that Parmenides saw the connection of Being and beings and so Being as "No-thing"; see Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, pp. 98, 99. Yet, even though he recognizes that Greek philosophy made at least "initial contributions towards an Interpretation of the ground of Being," he rather sees him interpreting being from "what is present without considering presencing," which implies that he interpreted Being from the viewpoint of beings and this from the mere "present" of being, disregarding the deeper level of their "presencing." See Early Greek Thinking, pp. 35, 98, 99.

The interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks is what we find in the history of philosophy as ontological and epistemological theories. Obviously, after Parmenides the whole of such interpretations was developed on the timeless dimensionality of Being and reason. This interpretation of the ontological and epistemological framework on the timeless ground of Being was confused with reason itself.


Cornford, Plato and Parmenides, pp. 29, 51; and Gilson, L'Être, p. 27. See also p. 83, n. 1 and p. 84, n. 2 above.
of dimensionality by saying that "time imitates eternity." 1 In this way Plato gave birth, on the background of Parmenides' primordial presupposition, to the ontological theory of the tāa αἰώνα.

1 Plato Timaeus 37.d-38.c (trans. R. G. Bury, LCL, 7:74-79). Here Eternal Being [εὐεργετὴν σωτὴριον], even when it may refer to everlasting duration; see Aristotle On the Heavens 284a.5-20 (trans. W. K. C. Guthrie, LCL, 132, 133). It is clearly understood by Plato as timelessness: "Time, then, came into existence along with the Heaven, to the end that having been generated together they might also be dissolved together, if ever a dissolution of them should take place; and it was made after the pattern of the Eternal Nature [διανεμείσθαι τὸ αἰώνιον], to the end that it might be as like thereto as possible; for whereas the pattern is existent through all eternity [πάντα αἰώνα], the copy, on the other hand, is through all time, continually having existed, existing, and being about to exist [γέγονε φυσικὸν καὶ ἄνω καὶ ἐσόμενον]" (ibid.). So time came into being at the same time as the heavens. This leaves the realm of timelessness for Eternal Being, since duration itself belongs to the realm of time (of the copy which imitates eternity). Plato (Parmenides 151e-153b [trans. H. N. Fowler, LCL, 282-89]) remarks on the contradictions that arise when the One is supposed to be in time. On Plato's timeless understanding of beings and reality, see Eduard Zeller, Plato and the Older Academy (New York: Russel and Russel, 1962), pp. 366-82; and John F. Cailhahan, Four Views of Time in Ancient Philosophy, rev. ed. (Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood, 1979), pp. 3-27. Jaspers remarks on Plato's dependence on Parmenides regarding the central Platonic motif of the "theory of the two worlds": "The distinction between truth and opinion, between the being of being and the illusion of the world, was later fixated in the so-called theory of the two worlds. This became possible once a certain independent reality was imputed to nature, i.e., the world of illusion, once illusion became a natural phenomenon, i.e., an appearance, while being became a transcendent realm, another being, a second world, a 'world behind the world.' With this the Parmenidean unity of being and knowledge was transformed into a dualism which, in a variety of forms, has run through all Western history" (The Original Thinkers, p. 33). We should not be confused by the term "dualism." There are not two principles for the understanding and interpretation of the world, according to Plato; there is just one, namely, timelessness. Dualism here refers to the incorporation of the sensory world into the realm of philosophy as it is considered to "imitate" the realm of timeless being. The duality is then rooted in the unity of being and meaning. Duality is recognized as appearance turns to be an imitation of timeless being. Timelessness is the sole source of both being and meaning.
That is to say, it was a theory not of timelessness as merely an empty dimension, but rather a theory of timeless beings. In Plato's theory, these timeless beings were considered to be the source of Truth. Obviously, then, Plato's ontological theory demanded a particular way in which knowledge was supposed to function in order to achieve timeless truth.

Western philosophy adopted the main lines of Plato's worldview, in which timelessness and temporality were no longer opposites. On the contrary, temporality was, by imitation, ordered and conditioned by timelessness, which was regarded as the source of both Being and knowledge not only for timeless beings but also for temporal ones. With Plato philosophy became the philosophy of timeless essences—ideas—which belonged to the ideal world in relation to which our sensible world is considered a temporal imitation.

1Heidegger is correct; Plato does not address himself to the study of the ground of Being. Yet he knows it very well and uses it in a masterful way as he approaches the interpretation of reality as a whole. So, as he refers to "eternity," he is speaking of τὸν κόσμον τῆς δινής (Timaeus, 38a). This could not have been accomplished were not Being already understood as pertaining to the dimensionality of timelessness.

2As beings are understood and interpreted as pertaining or being essentially related—temporal entities—to timelessness, the ontological framework which is required by the structure of reason begins to take the shape that determines the meaning of the logos for Western thought.

3Perotti (p. 7) points out that since Plato, metaphysics has been a study of essences. According to Plato, beings are intelligible because they have intelligible natures—ideas, essences. The intelligible nature of the essence gives birth to what Kant later called thing-in-itself. But, what determines the intelligibility of the thing? This main issue has been already settled by Parmenides when he chose the ground of Being to be timelessness. "Transitoriness of appearance has been attributed to the realm of doxa, to illusion, and essence has been reserved for eternity" (Adorno, p. 87).
Consequently, Plato's epistemological framework had provisions for reaching the timeless essence which the sensible world either participates in or imitates.\(^1\) True knowledge, then, was that kind of knowledge which was able to grasp timeless ideas, eliminating those features of an object that pertained to the temporal, sensory world.\(^2\)

Plato's interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks has been so influential in Western civilization that it is no overstatement to say that the whole of philosophy has been a series of footnotes to Plato.\(^3\) Plato's astonishing influence lies mainly in the fact that he was the first philosopher to develop in a technical way the ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason, and so he was the one who provided the structure of reason with the basic contents and categories which it needs to function. Thus reason (as a technical tool for thought, namely *logos*) was born at the same time that it became timeless. Reason and timelessness belonged together in Plato's interpretation, and, through Plato,


in the generally held interpretation of Western scientific and philosophical thinking. With Plato reason as *logos* became timeless. Plato's influence has been so strong that the timeless interpretation of reason's structure came to be considered as pertaining to the structure of reason itself. The hypothetical character of reason was overlooked, even denied.

**Aristotle.** Like Plato, Aristotle did not think it was necessary to address himself to the interpretation of the ground of Being.\(^1\) Parmenides' insight was enough.\(^2\) Perhaps the most relevant contribution of Aristotle to philosophy was his denial of the two-world theory and his understanding of being as pertaining to or expressed in sensible entities.\(^3\) His interpretation of the ontological framework developed the Platonic *eidos* into the

\(^1\) "Aristotle is well aware of the presence of such a concept. He expressly teaches that it is not Entity. Entity--Being qua Being--, however, is what the Primary Philosophy treats. The concept 'being', therefore, cannot be its object" (Owens, p. 471).

\(^2\) "And just as the Platonic Ideas, or Ontos Onta, so is their Aristotelian counterpart, those innumerable unchangeable and eternal forms, or Kinds of Being. . . . Supported by the authority of Plato and Aristotle, the Einai has become an integral ingredient of Western philosophy" (Cleve, 2:558).

\(^3\) "Being for Aristotle, accordingly, retains the fundamental connotations derived from Parmenides and Plato. 'To be' means to endure. It denotes 'not to change.' As for Plato, it continues to mean form and difference. . . . The new conception removes the sharp antithesis between the changing and unchangeable, the sensible and the knowable. Final causality accomplishes what participation or any other Platonic explanation was unable to do. The sensible thing, in striving after the permanence of separate Entity, imitates and expresses the permanence, the Being of separate Entities themselves. That is the Being which is derived to sensible things. That is the Being which they express, and which is expressed even by 'becoming' and 'not-being'" (Owens, p. 464).
metaphysical principle of (morphé).\(^1\) In this way, being as a whole--as a system which interprets reality as a hierarchy that includes also sensible concrete individuals--was still understood from the perspective of timelessness.\(^2\) Now, however, the timeless Platonic "idea," having become the Aristotelic "form," was in the world, in

\(^{1}\) Hirschberger (1:191) gives his interpretation of how the Platonic eidos becomes the Aristotelic morphé, and Owens (p. 461) explains how form is ordered to the eternal and the divine, that is to say, to permanence or timelessness. It must not be overlooked, however, that even though Aristotle understood being--entities--from the viewpoint of timelessness and permanence, this is not synonymous with "static." His understanding of being is timeless but active. This is apparent when we realize that being is to be understood not only as "form" but also as "act." Aristotle considers being as energeia ón (Metaphysics, 4.1003a). For a commentary on this dynamic aspect of Aristotle's timeless being, see Ortega y Gasset, La idea de Principio en Leibniz, p. 278. Owens (pp. 466, 467) further points out that Aristotle's dynamic understanding of being would leave out the issue of existence. However, he also remarks that such deficiency appears only when Aristotle's thought is considered in the light of later reflections. As we will see in our second chapter, Thomism claims originality for developing in the idea of esse something which is not present in classical philosophy. It seems, however, that from the Aristotelian idea of being as energeia ón, the Thomistic reflection on esse also has its starting point in Aristotle. For a summary of Aristotle's classical metaphysics, see Marias, Idea de la Metafisica, pp. 380-84.

\(^{2}\) "Form" or essence is called by Aristotle the "second ousia." The "first ousia" is the hylé-morphe synolon, that is to say, the real, actual, concrete entity. Yet the synolon receives its meaning from the realm of the second ousia or essence; see Hirschberger, 1:167. And for Aristotle essence is timeless. This is apparent in the way Aristotle names the essence through a strange expression τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι which has been translated into Latin as quod erat esse, that is "what being was." See Marias, History of Philosophy, p. 74; and Aristotle Metaphysics, 7.4.3-6. This expression shows timelessness in that it entails that which the entity is before it. In more concrete terms, the second ousia is ontologically and epistemologically prior to the first ousia. But the first ousia is in time, hence the second ousia is not in time and determines what appears in time. Hirschberger (1:167) identifies the Aristotelian "form" as a metaphysical principle with the Platonic idea which is timeless. See p. 87, n. 3 above.
Nonetheless, Aristotle was not expressing a temporal primordial presupposition. On the contrary, time was simply recognized and included in his synthesis. Meaning and Being did not pertain to time but to timelessness, to the form. The particular

For Aristotle "the world is no longer in the idea, but the idea is now in the world. The form no longer appears in its universality, but in its concrete and particular realization. For Aristotle only the first substance, not the second as was the case with Plato, moves about in the world. And if the form becomes operative, this is due to its actuality both in space and in time" (Hirschberger, 1:167).

Time for Aristotle is "the measure of movement" Metaphysics, 12.2.5,1069b.10-15; and 12.7,1072b.14,15; Physics, 4.11,220a). Hirschberger remarks that for Aristotle "time remains, nevertheless, inherently bound up with the material world. Outside our world there is consequently no time, just as there can be no waste time. The unit of measurement in time is the 'now,' the present moment" (1:190, 191). "Time is the number of motion, and without natural body there cannot be motion. It is obvious then that there is neither place nor void nor time outside the heaven, since it has been demonstrated that there neither is nor can be body there" (Aristotle, On the Heavens, 279.a.15). Cf. Cornford, p. 185. It follows that where no "natural body" exists, there is no time, hence there is timelessness or Being itself. Callahan synthesizes Aristotle's timelessness by saying that "things that are not moved or are not at rest are therefore not in time" (p. 69). Cf. Hirschberger, 1:190. The very Aristotelian interpretation of time itself which is done from the viewpoint of the "now" is not temporal. "The 'now,' therefore, as a limit is not time, but is incidental to time" (Aristotle Physics, 4.9.220a.20). For further commentary, see Callahan, pp. 38-87.

"In Aristotle the proper reality of sensible things was divine. The restless seeking of the divine, the imitation of the divine, was the way of final causality that brought Being into the sensible world. But that causality was of an extrinsic type. It effected no intrinsic change whatsoever in either the natures of sensible things or in the natures of separate Entities. Neither the changeless permanence of the divine nor the intrinsic reality of sensible things had in any way to be sacrificed to the interests of their common unity in the one and the same universe. Against this background, Aristotle's doctrine of Being may be summed up in a few words. Being is a group of equivocals, of which the primary instance is form in the sense of act. Form includes all the intelligible content in a thing. It cannot be 'empty.' Form means difference" (Owens, pp. 469, 470). Cf. Hirschberger, 1:165.
individual was to be understood in the light of the timeless universal.

So the ontological framework in Aristotle was interpreted and developed along the lines provided by the Parmenidean primordial presupposition. Aristotle's ontological framework proposed a close, yet extrinsic, relation between timelessness and temporality. The realm of intelligibility was timelessness, because timelessness was considered to be the dimension of Being itself. And Being is the source of knowledge. This ontological framework provided the basis for Aristotle's understanding of the theos which was only the ground, foundation, and foremost expression of ontology itself. Obviously, then, theos is understood to be timeless being in its maximum and most perfect expression.

1"The universal is actually more important than the particular; for the particular is now understood only by means of the universal" (Hirschberger, 1:165). And the universal is what belongs to the essence, that is, what is timeless. So reality, temporal reality, is understood from the Parmenidean perspective of timelessness. Thus we note that "the form has appeared as the ultimate basis of all universal scientific knowledge, just as it has emerged as the ultimate foundation of Being" (Owens, p. 457).

2Obviously, we cannot follow here the very detailed and complex way in which Aristotle develops the meaning of the ontological framework. For an introduction to Aristotle's Ontological Theory, see Marías, Idea de la Metafísica, pp. 380-84.

3God is understood in the maximum category of Being, and so he is actus purus (Metaphysics, 12.8.18, 1074a.35). He is pure form or essence, "το τι ἐστιν κόσμιον," and as such is the maximum expression of timelessness. The idea of God as being the first mover is Platonic in spirit; see Hirschberger, 1:194, 195). For a treatment of Aristotle's idea of the first mover and the difficulties of its interpretation, see Jaeger, Aristotle, pp. 342-67. Aristotle seems to regard the timelessness--immutability--of God as pertaining to the common traditional domain (see On the Heavens, 279a. 31). Aristotle also speaks of God, however, as a "living God" (Metaphysics, 12.7.8-12). Life, of course, is to be understood in reference...
In the context of this ontological framework, which included as its maximum expression the timeless theos, Aristotle grounded and developed his epistemological framework on the presupposition of timelessness.  

Aristotle's epistemological framework was decisive for classical reason because in it Aristotle developed an understanding of cognitive activity as a process of abstraction, following his understanding of reality as "essence" (and of course following the Platonic tradition). By means of abstraction one could reach the timeless reality of being which was present and involved in the concrete temporal entity. The temporal entity was considered only to provide the starting point for reason's abstractive activity. In short, abstraction was the activity of logos understood as the grasping of the timeless truth present in the ontological essence of the

1Marias in Idea de la Metafísica (p. 395) remarks that logos as a tool of knowledge is traditionally identified with the attributes of Being; and in his History of Philosophy he explains, commenting on Aristotle, that "Logos tells us what things are, and is

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thing by the dismissal of whatever temporal, sensible element may be involved in the process—whether from the object's side or the subject's side. In this way, the epistemological framework as a whole was developed in the timeless dimensionality of Being, becoming consequently the a priori condition for any knowledge that claimed to be "scientific," that is, "true knowledge." With Aristotle closely related to being. The principles of logic—for example, the principles of identity or contradiction—are ontological principles that refer to the behavior of entities. I cannot say or think that A is and at the same time is not B, because A cannot be and not be B. Logic is nothing but metaphysics (p. 75).

Hirschberger remarks that "in Aristotelian abstraction, however, it is precisely the ideal structure of being that is recognized, eidos (species) and morphé (form). . . . His abstraction is the intuition of the essence, an abstraction that is gained and performed intuitively. To him sense knowledge is as little an efficient cause as it was with Plato. It is only a material cause and consequently cannot actuate Nous" (1:156, 157). See also ibid., p. 141.

"The Nous which forms these non-sensible notions is consequently a creative principle which of itself develops the notional essence, but not under the determining influence of the phantasm which are only material; for it is 'separable, impassible, unmixed . . . in its essential nature activity.' This active intellect is, as consequence, something eternal and something immortal" (Hirschberger, 1:155). Cf. Aristotle On the Soul 3.5 (trans. W. S. Hett, LCL, 171). N. Hartmann (41.a) in his post-Kantian analysis considers the active intellect as not required by reason's system. Epistemological framework functions independently from the ontological framework. Yet, for Aristotle there must be an ontological foundation for timelessness, both from the object's side: the essence of the thing to be known, and from the subject's side: the active intellect which is the timeless substance or nature of man—something divine in him—which has the power to produce the intellectual act that is called "abstraction" and on which the whole of reason's activity is grounded.

That is, it is not mere doxa which here is rejected as much as it was in Parmenides. Hirschberger explains that "according to Aristotle two things are characteristic of the essence of science: it is knowledge based on reason, and its propositions are concerned with circumstances and facts which are strictly necessary and hence
"true knowledge" was knowledge of the movable, changeable temporal reality as it moves. But the knowledge that was to be reached was knowledge not simply of this reality as movable but rather in so far as it expressed that timeless dimension that was the foundation of its being.

With Aristotle's interpretation of the epistemological framework reason reached its classical expression. Classical logos was an interpretation of reason's functioning closely tied to the ontological framework from whose interpretation it sprang. Its epistemological framework developed the a priori conditions of coherence and meaning on the basis of the interpretation it itself already gave of reality in the ontological framework. According to it, time (the individual, history, the world of concrete sensory perception, the Lebenswelt), though included in the whole, did not furnish the ground for the meaning of reality, either as individual entities or as a whole. Meaning and reality came from their only possible source, the timeless realm.  

cannot be other than they are (Post, An., I,2). . . . The foundation and starting point of strict science is accordingly always a knowledge of essences. And in this knowledge we have knowledge based on reason. . . . Because of this the knowledge of essence far surpasses the knowledge of bare facts" (1:151).

1Not as in Plato where scientific knowledge was of the separated ideas in the topos ouranos and had no direct relation to the illusory world of sensible appearances. In Aristotle the Platonic world is kind of "incarnated" in the sensory appearances. So, scientific knowledge must reach the "incarnated" essence. This is achieved through abstraction. See p. 94, n. 1 above.
Kant. With Kant, Aristotle's ontological grounding for both the ontological and epistemological frameworks was rejected as impossible. Yet, in spite of his rejection of the classical ground of meaning, Kant still gave expression to the classical epistemological framework, which now was supposed to ground itself independently of the traditional ontological ground. Briefly, Kant turned the classical understanding of reason from an ontological grounding to an epistemological transcendental one. ¹ This interpretation of knowledge as centered and grounded in the cognitive subject may be seen as beginning with the cogito ergo sum of Descartes.²

¹ That is, in Kant's terminology, transcendental. This is also the main trend in neo-Kantism. See R. Vancourt, pp. 18-20.

² "The seemingly new beginning which Descartes proposed for philosophizing has revealed itself as the implantation of a baleful prejudice, which has kept later generations from making any thematic ontological analytic of the 'mind' ['Genus'] such as would take the question of Being as a clue and would at the same time come to grips critically with the traditional ancient ontology" (Heidegger, Being and Time, Int.2.6). Thus we see in Descartes a critical viewpoint which only provides a new foundation in the mental realm, for the same Platonic-Aristotelian interpretation in its Thomistic expression. Heidegger continues, saying that "everyone who is acquainted with the Middle Ages sees that Descartes is 'dependent' upon medieval scholasticism and employs its terminology. But with this 'discovery' nothing is achieved philosophically as long as it remains obscure to what a profound extent the medieval ontology has influenced the way in which posterity has determined or failed to determine the ontological character of the res cogitans" (ibid.). See Edmund Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960), p. 24. Through this historic process Aristotelian tradition was developed and constituted the ground of Western mentality. What we call "Western mind" is "Aristotelian mind." At least this is true regarding the basic lines of reason's structure. Aristotle's influence, since it shapes the structure of reason, does not reach only philosophy and theology but also natural sciences in general. Edmund Husserl points out that "very significant metaphysical presuppositions" underlie "at least all those sciences that are concerned with actual reality." After an enumeration of presuppositions as for instance "that all
Kant denied the ontological foundation of knowledge by stating that knowledge does not reach the thing-in-itself but only the phenomenon.¹ This basic Kantian idea seems to place Kant’s theory beyond the influence of traditional Aristotelian ontology and even epistemology.² However, what Kant actually accomplished in the process is subject to the causal principle,” he affirms that “these presuppositions, all to be found in the framework of Aristotle’s First Philosophy, are at present ranked under the quite unsuitable rubric of ‘epistemology’” (Logical Investigations, p. 59). Since Aristotle’s influence is so obvious even after Kant, I skip the pre-Kantian developments because they do not render any substantial new insight regarding the structure of reason.

¹ Kant in Critique of Pure Reason (p. 54) sums up his position on the phenomenical nature of knowledge.

² What Kant actually rejects is the traditional ontological foundation of knowledge on reality itself. The existence of the so-called thing-in-itself is not denied though. Kant only claims that it is not knowable (ibid., p. 46). In Kant’s understanding of the thing-in-itself can still be seen a Platonic influence. The thing-in-itself lies beyond time for both Plato and Kant; hence it is, following Parmenides, timeless. The difference between them is that for Plato the thing-in-itself is not only “knowable” but the ground of true knowledge itself, while for Kant it is “unknowable.” So Kant put asunder what since Parmenides was considered as belonging together, namely thinking and being (see p. 35, n. 3 above). The transcendence and timelessness of being are accepted by Kant he just provides a new immanent foundation for knowledge in independence from ontology. With Kant again, as it was originally with Parmenides, there is no way for crossing the gap between being and doxa. Kant’s position, however, is much more complex since for him the sensible world is no longer the world of opinion but rather the world of true knowledge, scientifically necessary knowledge, after the Platonic-Aristotelian interpretation of it. Thus timelessness is also present in Kant’s epistemological theory and not only in his ontological reflection. Kant, then, suggests a “disconnection” between the ontological and epistemological realms that goes against not only traditional philosophy but also against the structure of reason itself. The disconnection is expressed in technical language as being between the noumen (thing-in-itself) and the phainos noumen (appearance). The severing is caused by the acceptance of the Platonic chōrismos, which is the expression of Parmenides’ via negativa for the understanding of the ground of Being. After Parmenides, however, tradition crossed the gap through
epistemological realm was to deny knowledge of any suprasensible origin. But as already noted, a suprasensible origin was at the basis of Aristotle's interpretation of the epistemological framework of reason's structure.

In place of the traditional ontological foundation Kant provided a transcendental foundation for knowledge. That is to say, he explained the ground of scientific knowledge from the perspective of the cognitive structures of the subject. The transcendent ontological foundation proposed by Aristotle was replaced by an immanent cognitive foundation. Yet, Kant developed his own interpretation of the meaning of the epistemological framework on the ground of analogy and abstraction. This was possible because of the ontological Aristotelian theory of analogia entis according to which, to put it in a nutshell, noumen and phainos noumen were complementary. This complementary connection disappears in Kant's theory. Then, what appears is no longer connected to the appearance. So a problem is posited; namely, how to interpret the nature of phenomenal knowledge in the context of disconnection proposed by Kant. Two main answers have been provided so far, namely, Jaspers' and Heidegger's.

1Kant's denial of the suprasensible does not only include the knowledge of God but also, in a deeper way, includes the interpretation of the cognitive act that requires an "eternal and immortal" intellect, see p. 94, n. 1 above. However, Kant believed in the immortality of the soul (Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 132, 133). His epistemological stance is the consequence of his theory of the thing-in-itself.

2Immanence here is to be understood over against the traditional understanding of transcendence as linked and grounded on the timeless theos. For Kant, knowledge is immanent not because it pertains to the sensible world but because it pertains to the phenomenal world, in which, according to Kant, not only sensory but also extra-sensory elements are involved. These extra-sensory elements are the a priori forms the subject provides. So they are extrasensory but pertain to the world. Thus in Kant, "immanence" means the denial of supernatural origins for knowledge. It does not mean the acceptance of the Parmenidean world of doxa as realm for knowledge. In the "natural" world of Kant, traditional, timeless-
of Aristotelian ontology. He interpreted the phenomenon (the basic original cognitive unit) by means of Aristotelian ontological categories of matter and form\(^1\)—matter corresponding to sensation (time) categories, in the way of "forms," "categories," and "transcendental ideas," still are the basic source for scientific—"true"—knowledge. See Critique of Pure Reason, p. 25; and Critique of Practical Reason, pp. 132, 133.

\(^1\)At this point we should bear in mind that the Aristotelian matter and form are not only ontological but also epistemological principles. Kant in Critique of Pure Reason explains the structure of the phenomenon in a very clear and foundational statement: "The undetermined object of an empirical intuition is called phenomenon. That which in the phenomenon corresponds to the sensation, I term its matter; but that which affects the content of the phenomenon that can be arranged under certain relations, I call its form. But that in which our sensations are merely arranged, and by which they are susceptible of assuming a certain form, cannot be itself sensation. It is, then, the matter of all phenomena that is given to us a posteriori; the form must lie ready a priori for them in the mind, and consequently can be regarded separately from all sensation" (p. 41). The phenomenon, then, is constituted by matter—sensation—and form—that does not come from sensory experience. Additionally, form is said to be a priori. That is to say, it has its ground not in sensation (ibid., p. 26). It has its ground in an intuition as that of the active intellect in Aristotle which reached the thing-in-itself. Now, according to Kant's "Copernican Revolution," it has its ground in the pure intuition of the forms of sensibility and in the transcendental deduction of categories. All this is an intra-mental activity. Kant, as he describes the a priori cognitions (ibid.), makes it clear that he is talking about the same universal, necessary, kind of knowledge as in traditional philosophy. It can be seen how the two ways of Parmenides, or the Platonic theory of the two worlds, are present at the core of Kant's system. The world of the senses is present within the phenomenon as its matter, which provides the access to the individual and contingent. The world of necessary, absolute, and universal truths is present in the form of the phenomenon, which through tradition has a timeless grounding for its meanings. The actual grounding, however, is seen as happening in the epistemological realm in disconnection from the ontological one. Adorno (pp. 96, 97) sees Kant as "an apologist for prima philosophy" as "he continued to defend the primacy of form." And Jaspers (The Foundations, p. 309) sees that Kant's knowledge since it has to follow the "form" cannot grasp the actual individual in its concrete dimension. Cf. Dooyeweerd, 1:50, where Kant is seen understanding reality in a dualistic pattern.
and form to science (timelessness).  

The picture gets more complex, however, in the light of Kant's claim that time is one of the forms of the phenomena. Yet it must be remembered that Kant's positing of time as the "formal condition a priori of all phenomena whatsoever" did not deal with time in the realm of reason's dimensionality. Hence, time is not to be understood, in Kant's interpretation of the epistemological framework, as replacing the Parmenidean timelessness as the primordial presupposition.

Leaving aside Kant's understanding of the ontological realm

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1That the form is the foundation of science is clear since Kant (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 52) says that time and space, which are "the two pure forms of sensuous intuition" are also "two sources of knowledge, from which, a priori, various synthetical cognitions can be drawn. Of this we find a striking example in the cognitions of space and its relations, which form the foundation of pure mathematics" (ibid., 42).

2Ibid., p. 50.

3As Aristotle interprets time from the perspective of a timeless understanding of Being--from the viewpoint of the static "now" as "measure of movement," this can be seen as he includes time as one of Being's categories (Metaphysics, 5.7.4); see also p. 91, n. 2 above. Kant also interprets time from the viewpoint of timelessness, as a formal dimension for all possible phenomena. Obviously time does not affect being (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 52). Time in itself does not belong to the ontological framework (ibid., p. 49), but to the epistemological framework (ibid., pp. 49, 50). And in the epistemological framework it is interpreted as being a priori, that is to say, understood to be in disconnection with the sensible world, the world of doxa. Time, thus, pertains to the timeless world of tradition. However, in an indirect way, as he introduces time in the epistemological framework, Kant is paving the way for the introduction of time in the ontological framework. This task is done, notably, by Heidegger. Heidegger, in Being and Time (Int. 2.6), points out that Kant's failure may be seen in his neglecting the problem of Being, his accepting quite dogmatically Descartes' position, and following the traditional understanding of time.
from the perspective of the thing-in-itself, one can say that from the perspective of reason's structure Kant conceived the epistemological framework of reason as working in a timeless dimension, while that which would correspond in his theory to the ontological framework at least implied a temporal dimension. In this way, Kant's theory involved a disruption of the basic correspondence and unity that reason's structure requires between its ontological and epistemological framework.

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1 See p. 97, nn. 1, 2 above.

2 This can be seen not only in his interpretation of sensibility, but also in his interpretation of intellect and reason (see p. 99, n. 1 and p. 100, n. 1). Gier clearly affirms that "Kant models his transcendental logic on Aristotelic logic" (p. 46). Cf. Mayer, pp. 293, 296. We see, then, that the meaning of "object" and "objectivity" in Kant is the same as the classical one, namely, objectivity calls for necessity, universality, and exactness. Besides, Kant in Critique of Practical Reason (p. 123) affirms that God is timeless; obviously, then, also the ideas of reason should be understood as working in a timeless dimension. Jaspers (The Foundations, p. 284) expresses it clearly: [in Kant] "the ideas are the breach through which the supersensible enters into knowledge."

3 Sensible intuition, considered as the limit for the possibility of knowing particular concrete individuals, seems to point dimly to a temporal primordial presupposition. Dimly, we say, because Kant's understanding of the phenomena is expressly disconnected from the realm of being. Yet, since sensations are originated neither in the mind nor in the thing-in-itself, the door is slightly opened for someone to investigate the origin of the phenomena.

4 In Kant's theory there is unity of meaning. It is traditional unity. It is provided by the realm of forms, categories, and transcendental ideas. However, since in Kant the epistemological framework works in a clear, timeless primordial presupposition, and, at the same time, the origin of sensible knowledge, in its particularity, seems to point to the possibility of a temporal primordial presupposition, the complete coherence and unity of meaning are threatened. In Aristotelian traditional reason, as both epistemological and ontological frameworks worked in the timeless dimension, coherence was complete. The temporal aspects of reality were incorporated as categories of Being which is said in many ways; see
With Kant, then, traditional ontological reflection lost its grounding role\(^1\) while at the same time its basic content provided the meaning of the a priori conditions of reason, namely of the interpretation of the epistemological framework. In the final analysis, traditional ontology was not denied but rather smuggled in through the actual interpretation of the concrete meanings of the a priori conditions of knowledge. In this way, the tradition originated by Parmenides' reflection on Being as timeless no-thing reached its most developed and sophisticated philosophical expression as an epistemological framework. Classical timeless Being had given place to classical timeless logos.\(^2\)

Aristotle Metaphysics, 4.2.4: "τὸ δὲ λέγεται πολλοῖς." Reason cannot work assuming different primordial presuppositions for the epistemological and ontological frameworks. The primordial presupposition is the ultimate ground for meaning, coherence, and unity which has to condition both frameworks. In Kant, the working primordial presupposition is the classical, timeless one. As the part that sensible knowledge—of the concrete individual—plays in "scientific" knowledge is minimal, the disruption that his system entails is also minimal—even imperceptible. We mention it because later on this disruption becomes more visible, thus playing an important role, especially in the theological realm.

\(^1\)"Taking Plato's line as heuristic, it can be said that Kant denies not the power of noesis, but the objective structure which is its aim to know" (Derek Kelly, p. 29). See W. H. Walsh, "Kant and Metaphysics," Kantstudien 67 (1976):383. This lacking of ontological ground for knowledge is perhaps the most relevant way in which Kant influences theological thinking which was used through Thomism and orthodox Protestantism to the absolute coherence provided by the timeless ontological foundation of classicism.

\(^2\)Adorno, speaking about Kant, remarks that he "liquidated the question of Being and yet taught prima philosophia, 'foundation' (Grundlegung), on any account" (p. 90). Henri Bergson says it clearly: "The whole Critique of Pure Reason ends in establishing that Platonism, illegitimate if Ideas are things, becomes legitimate if Ideas are relations, and that the ready-made idea, once brought down in this way from heaven to earth, is in fact, as Plato held,
Kant's theory shaped the structure of reason into the form which in its broad lines is followed by modern science. The epistemological framework is still understood and developed in terms of timelessness, following the Aristotelian idea of "form" as the general pattern for intelligibility. This provides a grounding for the ideals of exactness and necessity--objectivity--that contemporary natural science seeks in its investigation of nature (Physis).

At the same time the object to be known is considered to be spatio-temporal, yet with no particular ontological implications. The result of this pattern or model of knowledge (logos) is that objectivity in particular and knowledge as a whole are understood as pertaining only to the spatio-temporal reality. But the "scientific knowledge" to be reached in regard to these spatio-temporal realities is at the same time supposed--as a priori condition for it--to be "objective," that is to say, it is supposed to follow the patterns proposed by classical timeless reason, namely, necessity, universality, and exactness.

the common basis alike of thought and of nature" (An Introduction to Metaphysics [London: Macmillan, 1913], pp. 72, 73).

1Jaspers remarks on this feature of scientific knowledge by saying that "as we came to know an unfathomable remote reality accessible only to measurement, the world began at the same time in a mysterious way to take on the character of 'appearance' for us. In the end we were able to take this appearance for full reality once more, but in such a way that now 'true' reality is nowhere. Every thing is only a perspective" (Philosophy of Existence [Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1971], pp. 66, 67).

2For the way in which philosophy lost the primacy as grounding science and natural sciences took over, see ibid., pp. 5-9. This basically happened because after Kant the Platonic ideal of
Yet, Kant's immanentism, which called for sensations as the indispensable origin for knowledge of reality, implied at least the possibility of a different interpretation for the dimensionality of reason and Being.¹

Jaspers. In Jaspers may be seen a representative of classical logos in the post-Kantian era. For Jaspers scientific and philosophical knowledge are two different kinds of knowledge.² Following Kant, he held that objectivity belongs only to the first,³

knowledge was considered to be possible only in the realm of temporal nature which is the realm of natural science. In other words, through the epistemological framework in which the idea of "objectivity" is a true a priori of reason's structure the ontological tradition of Plato and Aristotle is kept as determinative as it provides the ground for the understanding of the a priori of "objectivity" as meaning "universality," "necessity," and "exactness." (See p. 39, n. 1 above.) Thus, what does not fit the a priori condition of the timeless interpretation of objectivity is just not knowledge. It belongs to the individual.

¹Ibid., p. 94.

²"For philosophy cannot arise from scientific ways of thinking and scientific knowledge alone. Philosophy demands a different thinking" (ibid., p. 12). Yet, we should remember that for Jaspers, scientific knowledge is at the very ground of the understanding of the whole, since he sees the flux of meaning going from the part to the whole, reversing in that way the ordo of reason's structure which goes from the whole to the part; see p. 47, n. 1 above. Jaspers says that "the sequence of the three—phenomena, signs, ciphers—makes the understanding of each subsequent one dependent on the one before. In speaking, therefore, we must use the guidelines without which no cipher language becomes real: phenomena for signs and ciphers, and the signs which illumine Existenz for our relations to Transcendence" (Philosophical Faith, p. 95). This flux may be better understood if one remembers that for Jaspers "phenomena" stand for a scientific, conceptual, objective kind of knowledge; and that "signs" and "transcendence" stand for the "different" kind of knowledge that philosophy requires.

³Objectivity, for Jaspers, means what has been explained above; see p. 103, n. 2. Additionally, it means the absence of
while Knowledge of being corresponds only to the latter.\footnote{Jaspers' threelfold division of reason's activity (also following a Kantian pattern) considered reason as working through "concepts," "signs," and "ciphers."} Science, which produces and works with concepts, provides an exact, necessary, and universal knowledge of what is not being but just appearances. Knowledge of being is (following "subjectivity" (Philosophy of Existence, p. 9): "Science has integrity as value-free science." That is why scientific experiences have demonstrated the possibility of possessing a wholly determined and concrete knowledge at any given time" (ibid.).

Scientific cognition of things is not cognition of being. Scientific cognition is particularly concerned with determinate objects, not with being itself" (ibid., p. 10). We can see how, via Kant, the realm of concrete, individual reality is not the realm of science. Science, according to Jaspers, holds the same Platonic ideal of knowledge. Science is to provide "exact," "necessary," "universal" knowledge of concrete temporal reality. Here the disruption between the ontological and epistemological frameworks that Kant's theory entails reaches its full expression: temporal, concrete, individual reality is understood in an objective timeless way (see p. 101, nn. 3, 4). An ontological framework--at least implicit--is faced in order to produce meaning, in the subject-object-relationship which is knowledge, by a timeless epistemological framework.

Appearance is described and thought in concepts. Signs convey what I am and can be as myself. Transcendent reality, to be experienced by Existenz alone, is manifested in ciphers" (Jaspers, The Philosophical Faith, p. 95). So, concepts correspond to Kantian concepts within their phenomenal spatio-temporal limit; that is to say, they refer to "appearances." Moreover, to talk about "appearances" already indicates that "appearance" is not being. Being is beyond appearances. This is another way in which the Platonic timeless interpretation of reality appears. Things, which are studied by science in an objective, exact way, belong not to the realm of being but to the realm of doxa (appearance). "Signs" belong to the new kind of knowledge that Jaspers suggests for the interpretation of man's being. It, then, corresponds to the Kantian idea of soul. "Ciphers" is the new kind of knowledge that Jaspers suggests for the understanding of that Being which is beyond man, that is for the "understanding" of "transcendence." "Transcendence" corresponds to the Kantian idea of God.
Kant again) knowledge of what lies beyond appearances.\(^1\) That is, it is knowledge of the thing-in-itself. In this context, Jaspers' concern was to provide a way in which knowledge could reach the ontological realm in order to provide meaning for the ideas of man and God.

The basic problem in dealing with the ideas of man and God in the classical structure of reason accepted by Jaspers is that this structure places them in the realm beyond knowledge. They had been declared, by Kant's interpretation of the epistemological framework, to be "unknowable." However, as both Existence\(^2\) and

\(^1\)Here the meaning of "appearance" is the old Platonic one which points to doxa as that which is not being. Cf. Jaspers, Philosophy of Existence, pp. 10, 66.

\(^2\)Jaspers describes man's access to ontology as a crossing from existence into Existenz. "Existenz" is the term he has chosen to express "the self-being that relates to itself and thereby also to transcendence from which it knows that it has been given to itself and upon which it is grounded" (ibid., p. 21). And this is a crossing into timelessness: "It is the leap from everything that can be experienced in time and can be known timelessly (and therefore always remains mere appearance) to real and eternal being itself (which therefore is not knowable in temporal existence even though it comes to expression for us only in temporal existence)" (ibid., p. 25). This last statement is most interesting for in it Jaspers himself expresses that what we know in the world of appearances is temporal-ontological framework--and the way of knowing it, as being timeless-epistemological framework; see above, p. 105, n. 1. On the other hand and at the same time, he considers that man's real being is "eternal" and unknowable in the realm of appearances (temporality). If Existenz is not accessible in the realm of time, it obviously belongs to what is not temporal, that is to say, to timelessness. Consequently, Jaspers adds that Existenz is beyond conceptuality; see ibid., p. 22. Conceptuality cannot reach being, we are told, because "it lacks universal validity" (ibid., p. 27). "Man is real only as historic," we are told. Yet this does not mean that we should understand man's being historically--as, for instance, in Heidegger--because "the historical and visible objectivity of particular individuals is not the historicity of Existenz. To identify historicity in the form of the historical plurality is to
Transcendence were seen by Jaspers as belonging not only to the realm beyond "appearances" but also to a clearly timeless realm, cause transcendence to disappear into mere willfulness" (ibid.). It is clear then, that according to Jaspers, timeless understanding of Existenz, even the meaning of historicity, must not be understood in a temporal historical way when referred to being.

Jaspers clearly considers transcendence to be timeless: "This transcendence is to Existenz intrinsic being, the cause of its own being. It is the Now that has no Before and no After, the Now that includes its own past and future and is real despite of them, the Now that must not be conceived as timeless, therefore, but as temporal at the same time. The presence of this transcendence is not the end of time. It was not in the past, and it will not be only in the future. It is now, the Now without anything else to come, because nothing is in the flux any more and everything is eternal" (Philosophy, 3 vols. [Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1971], 3:51). The Parmenidean pattern is apparent. However, some expressions like for instance that the "Now" must be conceived as being timeless and temporal at the same time seem awkward and deserve some explanation. The fact is that here Jaspers refers to time and timelessness as categories in the Kantian sense. As categories, time and timelessness can refer only to objects, but not to that which lies beyond objects, namely, being. See above, p. 106, n. 2. In order to refer to Being, time and timelessness must be transformed into "ciphers" through dialectics. So transcendence is beyond natural reality. Time and timelessness belong to natural reality as categories for it. Hence, Transcendence lies beyond time and timelessness, considered as categories. But when time and timelessness are considered as "ciphers," then they "become identical as eternity" (ibid., pp. 51, 52). It is not certain what this "identity" may mean. It is not our point either. What is important to notice is that Jaspers is not talking through these expressions regarding Being dimensionality as if the Being and doxa of Parmenides were mixed beyond recognition. What Jaspers is really doing when he goes beyond time and timelessness as categories is leaving the realm of temporal, objective reality to which categories apply and entering into the realm of timelessness as dimensionality, which he calls "eternity" and to which, according to the Kantian pattern, no objective knowledge can apply. The rest of the statement is, however, clear enough as pointing to the Parmenidean timeless dimensionality for transcendence. Cf. ibid., 3:21, where Jaspers comments that "the paradox of transcendence lies in the fact that we can grasp it only historically but cannot adequately conceive it as being historic itself." What he clearly rejects is not the beyond nor the timeless dimensionality for it, but rather the Platonic dualistic ontic objective interpretation of it. "The beyond as just another reality is an untenable illusion" (ibid., 3:10). He further explains
the Parmenidean timeless primordial presupposition appears to have conditioned his epistemological framework.\(^1\)

Since Jaspers worked within the Kantian framework he rejected the classical procedure for reaching the knowledge of what was supposed to be timeless, namely, abstraction and analogy. In this context, Jaspers tried the difficult task of overcoming the *via negativa* in search for a positive knowledge\(^2\) of transcendence by replacing the classical, analogical procedure\(^3\) with a dialectical one.\(^4\)

That "reason would certainly like to be able to grasp intellectually what this is which is before all phenomena, before all time, before all worlds, and which is equally after all phenomena, and all time and all worlds--yet which is really neither before nor after, but something in phenomena, in time, in the world, namely, real, unhistorical Being itself. It is that which does not become, it is that which is. But reason cannot think it; it can only keep it undefiled by the false thinking that would strive to enclose it in categories, images and verbal structures" (Reason and Anti-Reason, p. 47). Cf. ibid., pp. 43, 44. A. Lichtigfeld, "Jaspers in English: A Failure Not of Communication but Rather of Interpretation," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 41 (1980), p. 222, also sees that the real dimension of Jasperian inquiry is "what is timeless throughout time."

\(^1\)That is to say, Jaspers adopts the epistemological framework in its Kantian interpretation. This determines Jaspers' understanding of the ontological framework. See Philosophical Faith, pp. 94-102.

\(^2\)The analogical way is clearly rejected by Jaspers. See, for instance, ibid., p. 258; cf. pp. 136, 137.

\(^3\)Since analogy is ruled out and equivocal refers only to concrete individual realities, the only way left to overcome the *via negativa* (Platonic chôrismos) is to use the *via negativa* as the negation in a dialectic method that should lead to a new "meaning" in what is left when the contraries are brought together. For an example of this procedure at work, see above, p. 107, n. 1.

\(^4\)Jaspers expressly declares that he follows Anselm's tradition in believing that the gulf (Platonic chôrismos) that lies between man and transcendence can be bridged in cogitative forms (ibid., p. 256). Of course, such a task calls for a different kind of thinking; see Philosophy of Existence, p. 12.
On one side Jaspers affirmed that knowledge of transcendence is not possible and so pertains to the realm of "silence"¹ and the "unthinkable."² On the other side, he said that Existenz alone³ has the necessary "sensitivity" to hear transcendence or to be in touch with it. What is supposed to happen on this level is a "metaphysical experience," "a real personal involvement," which "makes being transparent in existence." It is not "thoughtless"; on the contrary, the experience of being includes "thought." Yet, since what happens at this level "implies a translation of being from mere existence into eternity, which is beyond knowing,"⁴ what is actually reached is not an understanding. Yet it is the basis of all understanding.⁵

¹Jaspers, Philosophical Faith, p. 125.
²"Unable, in my thinking, to hold fast to a thought of transcendence, I must, in the same thinking, void the things I have thought. This is what happens in transcending from the thinkable to the unthinkable" (Jaspers, Philosophy, 3:34).
³Existenz is understood not as pertaining to the dimension of temporality but to timelessness; see p. 106, n. 2 above. Existenz, is in the same dimension as transcendence and so it is possible for it to get in touch with transcendence at least in some way, since transcendence is wholly other than Existenz. Cf. Oswald O. Schrag, Existence, Existenz, and Transcendence: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Karl Jaspers (Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: Duquesne University Press, 1971), p. 8; Jaspers, Philosophy, 3:113; Philosophical Faith, p. 125.
⁴Jaspers, Philosophy, 3:114.
⁵Since Jaspers himself is here trying to express in objective thinking—which is the only level in which knowledge is possible at all (Philosophical Faith, p. 92)—what is unthinkable, the analysis, and especially the explanation of the realm of transcendence becomes very complex. Jaspers explains what "happens" in the "metaphysical experience" as follows: "If a not-knowing was the negative limit of my experience of a mundane thing, of life and thought as
After the "metaphysical experience" has occurred, man wants to convey the content of that "fulfilling."¹ This has to be done in knowledge, the only realm in which communication is possible; hence it has to be done through objectifications of that original "fulfillment."² This is done as the philosopher "reads the original cipher script by writing a new one"³ through analogy. Yet, because after Kant analogy was no longer possible, Jaspers believed that the only way of being "more accurate" in our meanings as we talk of "unthinkable transcendence" was to press the negative way a little further than traditional metaphysics did. Now the via negativa was conceived as applicable to the very idea of entity or objectivity, but not to its timeless reality.⁴ This gives place to what Jaspers called the "turnabout"⁵ in philosophical thinking, expressed in the

such, this becomes now a fulfilled not-knowing as I return to present sensory reality" (Philosophy, 3:114). So, from a cognitive viewpoint, what happens in the encounter is to be seen as a "fulfilling" of "not-knowledge." That is to say, after the encounter with transcendence or more properly with the "language of transcendence" (ibid., p. 113), we still have no knowledge; however, we have something "new" coming from it, namely, "fulfilling."

¹See above.

²This happens in manifold ways. Some objectifications are "concrete" or "empirical," as, for instance, in mythology, and some are "abstract," as in traditional ontology. See ibid., 3:115-119; cf. Schrag, pp. 228-30.

³Ibid., 3:117.

⁴This shows that Jaspers denies Plato's interpretation of timelessness as imitatio of temporal entities. See above, p. 107, n. 1. Jaspers' denial is to be considered as a step back into Parmenides' interpretation of timelessness. Jaspers' approach may be considered a more detailed expression of what a timeless being is.

⁵Jaspers, Philosophical Faith, p. 77. This is basically the new perspective that Jaspers suggests for philosophical thought.
transformation of ontological concepts into "ciphers of transcendence."¹

This "turnabout," which Jaspers' acceptance of the tradition via Kant demanded in order for traditional philosophical understanding of reason to survive in a post-Kantian era, implied a reinterpretation of ontology and metaphysics.² It was claimed that there is a ground for them in the "metaphysical experience" or "fulfillment."³ However, knowledge, even though still having an "ontological ground" as traditional philosophy required but which Kant ignored, had lost the basis for its objectivity as philosophical thinking.⁴ Hence, philosophical thinking in its new mode of "ciphers" was supposed to work in the hypothetical realm and under the changeable influence of the historic situation from which existence goes to transcendence.

It is not a denial of traditional abstraction; on the contrary, it is rather its further expression because in it the via negativa requires not only that what is concrete, temporal, and individual be excluded from knowledge, but the idea of entity or objectivity itself is to be excluded too. This radical timeless abstraction is the "basic operation" which "would tempt us with statements of a knowledge if its underlying sense of non-objectiveness did not constantly control our speech and thinking" (ibid.).

¹"The great step in which man transforms himself occurs when the supposed corporeality of Transcendence is given up as deceptive and the ambiguous cipher language is heard instead—when the contents that have been conceived and visualized are stripped of objective reality. Instead of tangibles there remain ciphers open to infinitely varied interpretation" (ibid., p. 92).

²Ibid., p. 201.

³See above, p. 109, n. 5.

⁴Objectivity still exists in its traditional Greek-Kantian way applying to the realm of temporal empirical realities.
for its "fulfillment" and to which it returns to express it.¹

The logos—the epistemological framework—was still the same traditional timeless one. It determined what scientific "objective" knowledge was supposed to be, and it also determined what ontological knowledge could be. Objective spatio-temporal knowledge was interpreted by applying the Aristotelian "form" to the interpretation of the epistemological framework for scientific meanings. This provided the ground for the interpretation of "objectivity" itself and conferred the characteristics of universality and necessity to objective scientific knowledge. At the same time, however, scientific knowledge was considered as happening in the realm of Parmenidean doxa, since objectivity dealt with temporal appearances and not with Being itself.

Ontological knowledge was also timeless. But now the

¹In traditional philosophy, for instance, in Thomas Aquinas, man is considered to have the power of "going out" of nature—time—and reaching transcendence. Transcendence is thought, additionally, to be in the realm of being, that is, in the realm of entities which are the ground of objectivity. And, as knowledge pertains precisely to this realm of timeless objectivities, when man comes back from his cognitive encounter with transcendence, he is able to express the concepts and meanings reached in propositions which have objective and certain value as knowledge because they have ground in the knowledge of reality itself, namely, timeless being as entity. On the contrary, for Jaspers, man just does not "go out of" nature. Transcendence is present in time. So the encounter, even though happening in a timeless dimension, is not a contact with the supernatural. Additionally, transcendence which is present as timelessness in time is not an entity. Consequently, it does not render knowledge but rather "non-cognitive fulfillment." When man wants to express such a fulfillment he has to do it in knowledge. There is no other realm for expressing and communicating it. As no knowledge is brought from the encounter with transcendence, the cognitive expression is, in its content, not originated in transcendence or the encounter but completely in the historical situation from which the subject "goes out to" and "comes back from" transcendence.
The concrete result of this interpretation of the epistemological framework was, then, that objective knowledge pertained only to the realm of the sciences, while philosophical knowledge was to play in the realm of meaning a relative, indirect, changeable, subjective function as a "pointer" to transcendence.

Consequently, while both ontological and religious knowledge move in the realm of what Jaspers called the "subject-object split" (the level of objectivity), their contents cannot have an "objective"
ground. The ground for their contents, then, is shifted from the object—which is unreachable just because it is no-object—to the subject. This entails a reinterpretation of both traditional ontological and theological contents.

Jaspers rejects the charge that his position entails subjectivism; see ibid., pp. 80, 81. He affirms that "faith" is not just a subjective filling with no referent or ground at all. The referent is transcendence with which Existenz does get in touch, in a non-cognitive metaphysical experience though. We can see that his position is not "subjectivism" in the sense of not being "groundless," as if transcendence were nothing. The "fulfillment" reached in the "encounter" is the "certain" ground of faith. Yet it is a non-cognitive ground, and we are concerned with knowledge. Knowledge, according to Jaspers, refers always to objects. It is impossible for it to reach transcendence. Thus, as man refers to transcendence in knowledge as "ciphers of transcendence," the meaning of them springs from their objective referents which exist in time. The selection of knowledge, then, is determined neither by non-cognitive transcendence nor by objective entities. It is determined by the subject, who selects the "more appropriate" meanings at his disposal and then provides them with the function of pointers. What is important is not the actual meaning of ciphers, but rather their function as pointers. The meaning is irrelevant, since it never reaches transcendence. The meaning of ciphers is then subjective. Different subjects may choose different expressions which may appear, from a cognitive point of view, contradictory. This just shows, in Jaspers' understanding, that beyond them, as they suppress each other in their meaning, lies unreachable and unknowable transcendence. As ciphers lose their meaning in the dialectical procedure, they reach their "pointer" function which is the only possible language we can reach of transcendence.

Ibid., p. 201.

"Children will receive ciphers with deep feeling, like fairy tales where the question of reality or unreality does not yet clearly arise, and their impact on the adult is not lost even when they unequivocally cease to be realities for him. Tales of an act of God, of divine event, of a man who is more than human, endure as ciphers. Their reality is voided, and yet as ciphers they retain a voice. . . . Do such concepts mean a weakening of revelation? They certainly change its meaning; as a cipher it is no longer what the believer in revelation meant it to be. In any case, the theologian would be distinguished from the philosopher by the potency of his unfolding of the cipher. . . . The paradox seems inescapable: the contents of revelations would become more pure, more true, if
The "Forgotten" Dimensionality: Time

Primordial Presupposition: Heidegger

The reflection on time in general and as a primordial presupposition in particular appeared rather late in the history of philosophy. Kant seems to have set the stage, so to speak, for this appearance. Kant's system provided the ground not only for continuity with traditional epistemology in the scientific era but also for discontinuity from and criticism of traditional

their reality were discarded. The reality as such would turn into a cipher of the presence of God, lending an extraordinary weight to the contents" (ibid., p. 340). Jaspers then goes on remarking that faith would "undergo a metamorphosis" which "under the conditions of our time, of its new knowledge and its new world situation ... would occur in line with the nature of things. Not the substance, but the appearance in consciousness would change. Philosophy and theology would be on the road to reunification" (ibid.). In our second chapter we come back to this structure of reason and the way it is considered to work in theology.

Our particular task is to show time as a working primordial presupposition in philosophy. We have no time to deal with the related issue of time's meaning. Yet, as we deal with time as primordial presupposition the search for time's meaning is enlightened. A basic knowledge of the history of the interpretation of the meaning of time is, however, indispensable for an accurate understanding of the role time is supposed to play as primordial presupposition. A very clear analysis of the main interpretations that the idea of time has received throughout the history of philosophy may be found in Fritz Guy's "Man and His Time: Three Contemporary Theological Interpretations" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Chicago, 1971), pp. 6-108.

Time is central for Kant's theory on the schematism of concepts. Heidegger in Being and Time points out that Kant is "the first and only person who has gone any stretch of the way towards investigating the dimension of temporality or has even let himself be drawn hither by the coercion of the phenomena themselves" (Int. 2.6). See p. 100, n. 3.
timelessness. From the viewpoint of the history of philosophy, epistemological criticism preceded and paved the way for reflection on the dimensionality of Being and reason.

Because of his insightful epistemological analysis and his direct influence on contemporary philosophical criticism, Edmund Husserl may be regarded as the one who introduced time into epistemological reflection, and through epistemology into ontology.

1 A classical expression of this criticism is provided by F. Nietzsche who renders a summary of his criticism in four propositions. "First proposition. The reasons for which 'this' world has been characterized as 'apparent' are the very reasons which indicate its reality; any other kind of reality is absolutely indemonstrable. Second proposition. The criteria which have been bestowed on the 'true being' of things are criteria of not-being, of naught; the 'true world' has been constructed out of contradiction to the actual world: indeed an apparent world insofar as it is merely a moral-optical illusion. Third proposition. To invent fables about a world 'other' than this one has no meaning at all, unless an instinct of slander, detraction, and suspicion against life has gained the upper hand in us: in that case we avenge ourselves against life with a phantasmagoria of 'another,' a 'better' life. Fourth proposition. Any distinction between 'true' and an 'apparent' world—whether in the Christian manner or in the manner of Kant (in the end, an underhanded Christian)—is only a suggestion of decadence, a symptom of the decline of life. That the artist esteems appearance higher than reality is no objection to this proposition. For 'appearance' in this case means reality once more, only by way of selection, reinforcement, and correction" ("Twilight of the Idols," in The Portable Nietzsche, ed. Walter Kaufmann [New York: The Viking Press, 1954], p. 484). Cf. ibid., pp. 479-81; Adorno, pp. 87, 88; Perotti, pp. 37-41, comments on Nietzsche's criticism and its influence on Heidegger. On the criticism of traditional timelessness, see among others, Kenneth Chandler, "Dewey's Phenomenology of Knowledge," Philosophy Today 21 (1977):43-53 passim; Gier, p. 47; Adorno, pp. 77-103; Rosenthal, p. 214; Carl Raschke, "The New Cosmology and the Overcoming of Metaphysics," Philosophy Today 24 (1980):379; and Perotti, p. 39.

2 Jean Paul Sartre sat in his classes during a year, and Heidegger was his personal assistant at Freiburg during several years; see Lauer, p. 163, n. 1. Obviously reflection on time along Husserl's line has its antecedents; among them we must remember Franz
Husserl's thought is widely known as a transcendental idealism\(^1\) which at first glance seems to lead to solipsism.\(^2\) Upon further reflection, however, Husserl's epistemological criticism seems to point rather toward the ontological realm\(^3\) and to a temporal historical understanding of its dimensionality.\(^4\) According to Husserl, the

Brentano, Henry Bergson, W. Dilthey, and Collingwood. Regarding Husserl's paramount place in contemporary philosophy see Lauer, p. 163.

\(^1\)Husserl's transcendental idealism is expressed at the very beginning of his Ideas: "Posited as real (wirklich), I am now no longer a human Ego in the universal, existentially posited world, but exclusively a subject for which this world has being, and purely, indeed, as that which appears to me, is presented to me, and of which I am conscious in some way or other, so that the real being of the world thereby remains unconsidered, unquestioned, and its validity left out of account" (p. 14). It seems clear that in this initial stage Husserl pays respects to Kant. Knowledge deals with phenomena. The realm of Being is to be seen, according to Husserl, as "bracketed." James J. Valone, "Conflicts in the Later Husserl's Ontology and Theory of Knowledge," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 51 (1977):21b, criticizes Husserl's procedure because it severs Logic from Being.

\(^2\)Lauer explains that Husserl's phenomenological reduction has three main steps. First, it reduces all beings to a correlate of consciousness. Second, it reduces phenomenal being to the state of being given-in-itself. And third, it reduces all knowledge to a systematized whole. We should bear in mind, however, that Husserl, at this point, is not developing an ontological analysis as Descartes did. Husserl (Cartesian Meditations, 2.18) points out rather that knowledge stands by itself. Knowledge is not in need of assuming something from "outside" its realm as Kant's thing-in-itself seemed to suggest: "The 'object' of consciousness, the object as having identity 'with itself' during the flowing subjective process, does not come into the process from outside; on the contrary, it is included as a sense in the subjective process itself" (ibid.). Lauer (p. 145) additionally notes the fact that Husserl belongs to the empiricist tradition of philosophy.

\(^3\)See Lauer, pp. 147, 170; and Adorno, p. 101.

\(^4\)Against traditional interpretation Being is seen as belonging to the realm of appearances, namely, to Parmenidean doxa. Husserl puts it in the following way: "On broad lines we can always
temporal historical world of Parmenidean doxa, the Lebenswelt, "provides the materials with which consciousness deals."\(^1\)

What was implicit and undeveloped in Husserl's approach was brought into sharp focus and carefully analyzed by Martin Heidegger, notably in *Being and Time*. Heidegger consciously addressed the realm of the primordial presupposition,\(^2\) and he provided, over against the Parmenidean tradition, a temporal understanding and interpretation of it.\(^3\) Heidegger conceived and expressed the foundations of

see that transcendent Being in general, whatever its genus may be, when understood as Being for an Ego, can become a datum only in a way analogous to that in which a thing is given, thus only through appearances. Otherwise it would really be a Being which could also become immanent; whereas what is immanently perceivable is this and nothing more. Only when we fall into the confusions we have indicated above, and have now cleared up, can we hold it possible that one and the same could at one time be given through appearance, in the form of transcendent perception, and at another through immanent perception" (*Ideas*, p. 138). Cf. *Cartesian Meditations*, 2.17, and 18. However, it seems that Husserl's burden was on the epistemological side of reason's structure, hence he did not take full advantage of his discovery of the Lebenswelt. See Valone, pp. 212-18, who further explains how Husserl's thinking moved from transcendentalism toward time and history.


\(^2\)See p. 68, nn. 2, 3 above; and p. 69, nn. 1; p. 70, nn. 1, 2; p. 71, nn. 1, 2 above.

\(^3\)"Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the interpretation of time as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being" (*Being and Time*, prologue).
temporal understanding of the dimensionality of Being—and reason.\textsuperscript{1}

\textsuperscript{1}In order to make his point of view clear regarding his ontological stance in Being and Time, Heidegger explains himself in the following way: "For this reason the treatise which sought to point the way back into the ground of metaphysics did not bear the title 'Existence and Time,' nor 'Consciousness and Time,' but Being and Time. Nor can this title be understood as if it were parallel to the customary juxtapositions of Being and Becoming, Being and Seem ing, Being and Thinking, or Being and Ought. For in all these cases Being is limited, as if Becoming, Seeming, Thinking, and Ought did not belong to Being, although it is obvious that they are not nothing and thus belong to Being. In Being and Time, Being is not something other than Time: 'Time' is called the first name of the truth of Being, and this truth is the presence of Being and thus Being itself" ("The Way Back," pp. 213, 214). Heidegger was already expressing the temporality of Being for he declared that "the fundamental ontological task of interpreting Being as such includes working out the Temporality of Being. In the exposition of the problematic of temporality the question of the meaning of Being will first be concretely answered" (Int. 2.5). Hence, his much referred to analysis of Dasein as "Care Structure" (Being and Time, 1.6.41; and 2.5.74) is to be understood both as standing on, as an expression of temporal Being; cf. "Letter on Humanism," p. 281, regarding the way temporal understanding of Being determines the meaning of philosophical terms, even of the famous Sartrian phrase on the superiority of existentia over essentia (ibid., p. 280). This position is not changed in what is known as the "later Heidegger" or Heidegger after Being and Time. Heidegger comments on his work after Being and Time, particularly regarding his little book On Time and Being (New York: Harper & Row, 1972), whose title seems to suggest a reversal from his earlier work. He clearly points out that "this reversal is not a change from the standpoint of Sein und Zeit, but in it the intended thought for the first time attains the place of the dimension from which 'Being and Time' is experienced; and, indeed, experienced from the basic experience of Being" ("Letter on Humanism," p. 280). Cf. Heidegger, Foreword to Heidegger: through Phenomenology to Thought by William J. Richardson (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), p. 20; W. J. Richardson, Heidegger: through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 639; and Perotti, p. 76. We see, yet, that Heidegger's proposal regarding Being as pertaining to Parmenidean doxa is so revolutionary that often philosophers are unable to follow him, and, consequently, interpret his thought as a "new" approach which moves along the line of Parmenidean primum presupposition. These may be challenged. See, for instance, J. Maritain, The Range of Reason, p. 9; Pasquale Orlando, "L'esperienza Intellettiva tomista," p. 237; Cornelius Ernst, "Metaphor and Ontology in 'Sacra Doctrina'," Thomist 38 (1974):424; Anthony M. Camele, "Time in Merleau-Ponty and
What this new temporality means may be seen from several angles in Heidegger's prolific work. Because of space limitations, I deal here with only two of them which are in my opinion foundational, namely phenomenology and historicality (Geschichtlichkeit). A temporal primordial presupposition is already at work as Heidegger expresses his understanding of phenomenology as the method for his ontological investigation. Through the understanding and application of this method, Heidegger's interpretation of Being's dimensionality determines the meaning of his philosophy as a whole. Since Being is temporal, there is no Platonic-Kantian thing-in-itself beyond the phenomena. The realm of beings and Being is the realm of appearances. The realm of Parmenidean doxa is the realm of Being. The analysis of logos, then, as a whole (including its dimensionality as well as its ontological and epistemological frameworks) is an enterprise to be developed within the temporal dimensionality.¹

¹Heidegger's concern is clearly ontological; see The Essence of Reasons, p. 45. Yet, as "thinking" and "Being" belong together (see p. 35, n. 3) both are seen as pertaining to the temporal dimensionality. Additionally, the center of meaning proceeds from the ontological framework; see p. 36, nn. 1-4; p. 37, nn. 1-3. In other words, even though Heidegger's concern is not directly as epistemological as ours, his reflections on time and Being have a foundational bearing for the realm of reason's primordial presupposition.

²Heidegger goes beyond Husserl's idealism and transforms phenomenology into the tool for ontology itself; see Heidegger, Foreword to Heidegger: through Phenomenology to Thought, p. xiv. In Being and Time Heidegger explains his ontological understanding of phenomenology: "Phenomenology is our way of access to what is to
Furthermore, the ideas of time and temporality themselves are understood by Heidegger in a different way, namely a temporal...
way. Time is no longer interpreted from the viewpoint of timelessness—as traditionally since Aristotle—but rather from its very flux, which is disclosed in an ontological analysis of Dasein\(^1\) (the ontological framework in its flux).\(^2\) The interpretation of Dasein in the flux of time eventually leads one to grasp Being as historicality. In historicality the depth and breadth of the temporal primordial presupposition is expressed.\(^3\)

\(^1\)"Dasein" (being-there) is a technical term that Heidegger uses to refer to the entity that man is. "Dasein" expresses the concrete, factual, individual reality of man as existent.

\(^2\)Obviously it is impossible for us to provide even an abridged introduction to Heidegger's interpretation of Dasein's structure as it is given to us in the flux of time. Temporality as dimensionality requires that the interpretation of Dasein should follow the "being-in-the-world" structure (Being and Time, 1.2.12, 13), which is to be complemented and completed by the structure of Care: "The formally existential totality of Dasein's ontological structural whole must therefore be grasped in the following structure: the Being of Dasein means ahead-of-itself-Being-already-in-(the-world) as Being-alongside (entities encountered within-the-world). This Being fills in the significance of the term 'care' [Sorge], which is used in a purely ontologico-existential manner" (\textit{ibid.}, 1.6.41). This quotation represents the summary of Heidegger's long analysis which precedes it. This is one of the most carefully developed treatments of the temporal ontological framework so far.

\(^3\)Heidegger arrives at historicality toward the end of \textit{Being and Time}. Historicality is basically a property of Dasein (\textit{ibid.},
This temporality implies a very particular relation to traditional philosophy. Briefly, it entails the "destruction" and "overcoming" of metaphysics. (And because of the onto-theological)

2.5.73). He clearly states that "the interpretation of Dasein's historicality will prove to be, at bottom, just a more concrete working out of temporality" (ibid., 2.5.74). And as Heidegger unfolds his interpretation we can see how Dasein is in a structure from which meaning flows to him. This structure springs from temporality and stands on it. Heidegger's interpretation may be appreciated at least in a nutshell, when he links historicality with Destiny [Geschick]: "If fateful Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, exists essentially in Being-with-others, its historizing is co-historizing and is determinative for it as destiny [Geschick]. This is how we designate the historizing of the community, of a people. Destiny is not something that puts itself together out of individual fates, any more than Being-with-one-another can be conceived as the occurring together of several Subjects. Our fates have already been guided in advance, in our Being with one another in the same world and in our resoluteness for definite possibilities. Only in communicating and in struggling does the power of destiny become free. Dasein's fateful destiny in and with its 'generation' goes to make up the full authentic historizing of Dasein" (ibid.). In short, temporality receives its more comprehensive and deep meaning in historicality; cf. Heidegger, The Question of Being, p. 87; Perotti, pp. 13, 35; and Reiser, p. 475.

It seems that Heidegger considers that neither existentialism (Sartre) nor phenomenology (Husserl) are able to reach the level where temporality becomes historicality see "Letter on Humanism," pp. 281, 287. This evaluation, in our understanding, seems to fit Jaspers existentialism. It is difficult to see, however, how it may apply to Sartre's existentialism which turns toward Marxism. Perhaps Sartre and Merleau-Ponty express historicality in a different way from the one chosen by Heidegger.

1For Heidegger, metaphysics, which needs to be overcome, is that philosophical reflection that talks of beings as beings from the viewpoint of what he calls "unconcealedness." That is of the isolated static Present dimension of time. The grounding flux is forgotten (concealedness). This fateful situation determines the history of the oblivion of Being which runs from Plato to Nietzsche, according to Heidegger's interpretation; see "The Way Back," p. 210; and Perotti, p. 12.

2For Heidegger's claim of destruction, see Being and Time, Int. 2.6; cf. "Letter on Humanism," p. 281; and Perotti, 11.

3"Metaphysics remains the basis of philosophy. The basis of thinking, however, it does not reach. When we think of the truth
structure of metaphysics. At the same time, however, Heidegger interprets Greek philosophy as not having reached the realm of primordial presuppositions. The reflection on the "ground of Being" has been forgotten throughout the history of metaphysics. Consequently Heidegger claims to be the first in dealing with and expressing "something that has not been thought." Since, according to Heidegger, there is really only one understanding of the ground of Being, namely, temporality, Greek philosophy is interpreted as stemming from the Present of Being, metaphysics is overcome." ("The Way Back," p. 208). And, of course, this going beyond metaphysics into the ground of metaphysics entails a change in human nature, accompanied by a transformation of metaphysics (ibid., p. 209). This stance, obviously, goes beyond Jaspers' humble project of "reinterpreting" metaphysics from the viewpoint provided by non-objective transcendence; see p. 124, nn. 2, 3. In its being overcome, metaphysics is expected to be rather "re-shaped" from the new depth of perspective provided by the now known "truth of Being," namely, temporality (ibid., p. 214). Old traditional metaphysics, then, is introduced as a necessary step in Being's history or fate. At this point, it should be noticed, Heidegger lapses into a timeless epistemological framework from which he interprets the historical process. If temporality and historicality were applied by Heidegger consistently all the way into the ground of Being, the "necessity" of traditional philosophy as a part of "Being history" disappears. See additionally ibid., p. 218; Perotti, pp. 57, 58; and Raschke, p. 384.

1See above, p. 50, n. 2.

2This happens because theology utilizes the ontological categories of traditional metaphysics. See "The onto-theo-logical Constitution," pp. 55-60; and Perotti, pp. 12, 39. For an introduction about Heidegger's interpretation of Christianity as a whole, see Vycinas, pp. 312-21.

Presence, a mode which pertains to time but which misses its true dimensionality as the ground of Being. This historical happening constitutes what Heidegger calls the "necessary," "unexplainable" "fate" of metaphysics, in short, the destiny of Being.

I cannot agree, however, with Heidegger's understanding of a groundless traditional metaphysics. Traditional metaphysics was

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1Ibid., p. 214. "Entities are grasped in their Being as 'presence' [Anwesenheit']; this means that they are understood with regard to a definite mode of time--the 'Present' [Gegenwart']" (Being and Time, Int. 2.6). And this is due, among other reasons, to the fact that in Heidegger's system "the problematic of Greek Ontology, like that of any other, must take its clues from Dasein itself" (ibid.).

2"A concealed hint of Time speaks not only out of the earliest metaphysical names of Being but also out of its last name, which is 'the eternal recurrence of the same events.' Through the entire epoch of metaphysics, Time is decisively present in the History of Being, without being recognized or thought about" ("The Way Back," p. 214).

3That is to say, it is neither aware of the realm of the ground of Being beyond entities--No-thing--nor of its temporal nature.

4This is what Heidegger sees as necessary "two-foldedness" of metaphysics, which is grounded in the fact of the "ontological difference" between Being and beings. Heidegger, then, believes that man was bound to grasp first the realm of beings which is clearer in its appearance, and only afterwards he was thought to be able to reach the ground of Being (ibid., p. 216). Even though we agree on the nature of the ontological difference as such, we do not see that Heidegger's historical interpretation follows from the nature of such structure.

5Heidegger does not see Parmenides reaching a timeless interpretation of the ground of Being as we have suggested; see above, pp. 75-87. In Being and Time Heidegger interprets Parmenides' key role in the history of metaphysics as follows; "Legein itself--or rather noein, that simple awareness of something present-at-hand in its sheer presence-at-hand--which Parmenides had already taken to guide him in his own interpretation of Being--has the temporal structure of a pure 'making-present' of something. Those entities which show themselves in this and for it, and which are understood
developed on the background of a very precise understanding of the
ground of Being in Parmenides' timeless presupposition. Thus, in
a sense, what is brought up by Heidegger's interpretation of the
ground of Being as temporality in its opposition to traditional meta-
physics may be explained as "necessary" and as being the "fate" of
Being, but not in the Heideggerian sense. Heidegger's opposition

as entities in the most authentic sense, thus get interpreted with
regard to the Present; that is they are conceived as presence
(ousia)" (Int. 2.6). José Ortega y Gasset, who can be considered
among those who studied the temporal primordial presupposition some-
time before Heidegger's publication of Being and Time (1926)--see
Philip W. Silver, Ortega as Phenomenologist: The Genesis of Medita-
tions on Quixote (New York: Columbia University Press, 1978), p. 89,
who traces Ortega's foundational understanding of man as "yo y mis
circunstancias" back to 1914--properly criticizes Heidegger's inter-
pretation by pointing out that "Heidegger adopts the usual opinion
that Greek philosophers only understood Being as 'what there is' ['lo
que hay'], as what man finds before him. We think this is neither
correct nor accurate because the movement that Greek philosophers
invented and that we call 'to do philosophy' consisted in rejecting
Being [Ente] as meaning simply 'what there is' by denying the
Being-of-what-there-is and requiring behind it what it truly is--the
ōν--ontos on. What is unusual regarding what truly is is
that it is not plainly given [es que no lo hay sin más]. It is
rather necessary to discover it behind what there is. . . . It is,
then, a limine, an error to affirm that for the Greeks, and through
their influence, for all their successors until Kant, the Being of
entities [el Ser del Ente] consists only in that it--entities--is
what there is there ['lo hay ahí)--Vorhandenheit" (La Idea de
Principio, pp. 277, 278). Obviously, for Heidegger, timelessness is
unthinkable. So tradition is to be grounded in a distorted
understanding of the unique ground, namely, time. We can agree with
Heidegger in understanding traditional philosophy deriving its
meaning from the present cf. Marias, Reason and Life, p. 388. Yet
we must agree with Ortega y Gasset when he explains that what has its
starting point as content in the "Present" of the temporal realm is
then to be changed by negation into timeless significations.
Additionally, to claim a groundless traditional metaphysics would
mean to overlook the claims of classical philosophers who express Being
at the level of the ground of Being; see, for instance, S. Breton, p.
151: "Il me semble au contraire que cette différence ontologique,
loin d'avoir été oubliée, a toujours été ressentie à l'intérieur des
grandes métaphysiques."

1See pp. 84-114 above.
to the tradition is to be understood as "necessary" and as the "fate" of Being only inasmuch as it reveals the hypothetical structure of reason which is involved in the understanding of the meaning of the ground of metaphysics.¹ What is unavoidable is the hypothetical character of the understanding of the ground of Being itself, and so of the structure of reason itself.

Even though Heidegger is the philosopher who has addressed himself to thinking through and explicitly expressing the meaning of the ground of Being and reason,² he does not stand alone. Ortega y Gasset³ and his disciple Julián Marias⁴ also deal with a temporal

¹See pp. 50-74 above.

²Besides this important feature of Heidegger's thought we have chosen him because he both springs from a theological background (see Hans Küng, Does God Exist?" An Answer for Today [New York: Vintage Books, 1980], p. 492) and goes on to influence theological reflection, especially in Protestantism. See J. M. Robinson and John B. Cobb, eds., The Latter Heidegger and Theology (New York: Harper and Row, 1963); cf. Küng, p. 497.

³Ortega y Gasset explains the meaning of his basic expression "I am I and my circumstances" (see p. 126, n. 1) by saying that "in order to speak, then, of man's being we must first elaborate a non-Euclidian concept of Being, as others have elaborated a non-Euclidean geometry. The time has come for the seed sown by Heraclitus to bring forth its mighty harvest" (History As a System and Other Essays toward a Philosophy of History [Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1961], p. 203). Then he goes on to say that "man, in a word, has no nature; what he has is his to ry" (ibid., p. 217), and that history is a system "of human experiences linked in a single, inexorable chain. Hence nothing can be truly clear in history until everything is clear" (ibid., p. 221). For an introduction to Ortega y Gasset's work, see the analysis by Philip Silver, Ortega as Phenomenologist and Ciriaco Morón Arroyo, El Sistema de Ortega y Gasset (Madrid: Ediciones Alcalá, 1968).

⁴Marias follows his teacher Ortega y Gasset as he affirms in Idea de la Metafísica (p. 412) that "the theory of human life (concrete in all its complexities and broadness) is Metaphysics." He adds that "we go from Being to life, from Being as an interpretation of reality to reality beyond any interpretation" (ibid., p. 397). Cf. idem, Reason and Life, p. 193.
understanding of the dimensionality of reason. The same may be said of Jean-Paul Sartre. The same approach but from a more epistemological viewpoint, is used not only by Husserl, but it is also used by Ludwig Wittgenstein, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and

Sartre's Being and Nothingness addresses itself to the ontological investigation in the realm of the phenomena and its temporal understanding; see p. 120, n. 2 above.

See p. 117, nn. 3 and 4 above. As Husserl approaches the investigation of the Lebenswelt, his reflection is bound to point to a different understanding of reality other than timelessness. For a comparison among Husserl's, Kant's, and Heidegger's understandings of time, see R. P. Morrison, "Kant, Husserl, and Heidegger on Time and the Unity of 'Consciousness,'" Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 34 (1978):182-87.

Gier (pp. 47, 48) points out that Wittgenstein, due to his understanding of the origin of every system of meaning in the "fullness and richness of lived experience," may be considered as pertaining to phenomenology in that broad sense of a return to the Lebenswelt as ground for meaning. As we have seen above, the turning of epistemological reflection to the Lebenswelt entails a temporal primordial presupposition. See Shiner, p. 119; Charles H. Cox, p. 80; and Earl Taylor, p. 197.

Merleau-Ponty begins in his foundational analysis of Phenomenology of Perception with an epistemological study which works on the assumption of a temporal dimensionality of Being. Merleau-Ponty understands both the subject and object of the cognitive relationship as pertaining and working in the temporal dimension. He says that "past therefore, is not past, nor the future future. It exists only when a subjectivity is there to disrupt the plenitude of being in itself, to adumbrate a perspective, and introduce non-being into it. A past and a future springs forth when I reach out toward them" (ibid., p. 421). Cf. Heidegger's historicality of the subject (p. 122, n. 3). See additionally, Phenomenology of Perception, pp. 416, 417, 428. According to Merleau-Ponty the subject is also to be considered as being-in-the-world (ibid., p. 430). He plainly declares that "it is through time that being is conceived, because it is through the relations of time-subject and time-object that we are able to understand those obtaining between subject and the world" (ibid., pp. 430, 431). Regarding the cognitive object he declares that "objective being has its roots in the ambiguities of time" (ibid., p. 333), and that it would be "more accurate to say that nothing exists and that everything is 'temporalized'" (ibid., p. 332). This clear, temporal dimensionality which is apparent in Merleau-Ponty's epistemological framework is the starting point for
Ernst Bloch.\(^1\) In general terms, however, not one of these philosophers actually proceeds into the analysis of the hypothetical character of reason's structure which they imply and which they reveal through their writings (in contrast to traditional metaphysics).\(^2\) Nonetheless, Hartmann is right when he evaluates the new trends in ontology and sees them pointing toward temporality.

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\(^1\) Ernst Bloch is a Marxist revisionist. Heidegger already saw Marxism reaching historicality (see p. 122, n. 3). Bloch expresses his "universal formula that applies at the beginning of philosophy: S is not yet P, no subject already has its adequate predicate" (Man on His Own: Essays in the Philosophy of Religion [New York: Herder and Herder, 1970], p. 90). This entails a temporal ontological framework. He interprets the tension of historicality from the viewpoint of the future (not-yet): "The genuine reference-and-return is towards what is still in the future, and therefore what has not come to be in the past; ultimately it is a return to the still underived derivation of all that happens" (ibid., p. 83). This represents a basic modification from Heidegger's interpretation of the flow of meaning springing "equiprimordially" in tension both from future and past (Being and Time, 2.5.74). Cf. Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 417. As the "not-yet" is "unreachable," and at the same time is determinative of meaning, it could be seen as a reflection of the Platonic Chorismos--vis epistemological framework--embedded in the interpretation of the ontological framework. William A. Johnson, (The Search for Transcendence: A Theological Analysis of Nontheological Attempts to Define Transcendence [New York: Harper and Row, 1974], pp. 92, 93) points out Bloch's awareness regarding the Biblical understanding of reality and his influence on Jürgen Moltman (ibid., pp. 79-80).

\(^2\) It is very important to bear this in mind. We do not claim that the philosophers we are quoting as pointing to a temporal primordial presupposition interpret it, in the final analysis, as standing in opposition to traditional timelessness as primordial presupposition, as we do. No matter how radical they may sound, at some point of other in their analysis they fall short of applying historicality and temporality all the way so as to reach a hypothetical understanding of the ground of Being.
as a dimension for Being and reason.¹

Epistemological Framework

The temporal presupposition in its very appearing provided a new form and interpretation for the ontological framework which is now centered in the interpretation of Dasein as the ecstatic structure of Care developing out of the fact of Being-in-the-world.² Since Being and Thinking belong together,³ the changes of meaning in the primordial presupposition and ontological framework brought along a change in the epistemological framework too.⁴

In comparison to timeless logos, temporal logos can be seen as a newcomer to philosophy. Yet, some of its basic features are already clear enough to be recognized as foundational cognitive directions,⁵ which the epistemological framework assumes as it is


²Perhaps the most detailed study of this structure is presented by Heidegger in Being and Time, "Preparatory Analysis of Dasein." This same approach is followed in broad lines and with obvious modifications by Jean-Paul Sartre in Being and Nothingness and Maurice Merleau-Ponty in Phenomenology of Perception. See p. 122, n. 2 above.


⁴That the temporal primordial presupposition and the temporal ontological framework call for a "new understanding of the meaning of logos" is conceived in an epistemological realm. From a chronological perspective it seems that the epistemological reflexion precedes the ontological. Perhaps the way into a temporal understanding of Being and logos began with the empiricist claim that experience is the source for our knowledge; see John Locke, An Essay Concerning Human Understanding, abridged ed. (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1928), pp. 9-52.

⁵We are concerned here, as earlier when we dealt with the classical logos, with broad ideas and guidelines and not with
interpreted in the temporal dimensionality of Being. It is therefore possible to point out briefly how logos, when temporally understood, is supposed to function at the levels of objectivity and system.¹

Temporal Objectivity. When the subject-object relationship is understood as working in the temporal dimensionality of knowledge, the interpretation of what essence and objectivity mean in themselves is bound to differ from the classical timeless interpretation of them. Even though no single author may be identified as providing a final description of the new temporal interpretation of objectivity,² several authors have contributed, namely Husserl,³ detailed interpretations of either the ontological or the epistemological frameworks. Such a detailed treatment does not belong to our phenomenological study of the structure of reason but rather to the realm of ontological theories and theories of knowledge.

¹As we follow this order from objectivity to metaphysics, our purpose is one of achieving clarity. We are not following the Kantian pattern.

²This may be due to the early stages of development in which this kind of reflection finds itself.

³It is very difficult, and not really our task, to determine whether Husserl actually came to the understanding of temporal categories for reason and objectivity. His philosophy presents motives that link him with classical timeless categories, as, for instance, his transcendental reduction; see Cartesian Meditations, ¹; Lauer, pp. 130, 134; and Adorno, pp. 100, 101. There are in his writings, however, other motives that, like the very idea of phenomenon, ground his thinking in temporal experience and time-consciousness. Lauer (pp. 119, 122) grasps this ambivalency. Perhaps this is unavoidable when the process of thinking is moving from one dimension of intelligibility to another. As we use Husserl's insights about essence and objectivity, we interpret them as related to temporal, concrete, ontological entities in the Lebenswelt. His phenomenological reduction is, then, interpreted as being just a temporary methodological step which, following Heidegger's interpretation, is later to be removed.
Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and Wittgenstein, who all provide basic insights we need to be aware of in our criticism of theological reason.

The "newness" of temporal logos is understood as it is compared to the interpretation that traditional logos renders of

1It is true that Heidegger accepts the traditional objectivity for the scientific enterprise; see Heidegger, "The Theological Discussion of 'The Problem of a Non-Objectifying Thinking and Speaking in Today's Theology'--Some Pointers to Its Major Aspects," in The Piety of Thinking, eds. James G. Hart and John C. Maraldo (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 1976), p. 28. Raschke (p. 380) explains that Heidegger still understands science in its positivistic interpretation. Yet, as Heidegger develops his ontological thinking in a temporal primordial presupposition we find relevant insights which point to a different kind of objectivity.

2Merleau-Ponty in his Phenomenology of Perception may be one of the authors that deals more directly and extensively with the new kind of temporal objectivity. His insights, however, should not be taken as final on the subject, but rather as pointers for further analysis. For an introduction to Merleau-Ponty's epistemological thinking, see Thomas Langan, Merleau-Ponty's Critique of Reason (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966); Remy C. Kwant, From Phenomenology to Metaphysics: An Inquiry into the Last Period of Merleau-Ponty's Philosophical Life (Pittsburgh, Philadelphia: Duquesne University Press, 1966); and Gary Bient Madison, La Phénoménologie Merleau-Ponty: une recherche des limites de la conscience (Paris: Editions Klincksieck, 1973).

3L. Wittgenstein's analysis is useful in a more indirect way since it is expressed from a linguistic perspective. Additionally, due to the non-systematic style of his writings, we find in him a rather germinal thinker who provides insights which stand in need of further development.

4This situation may result in either an advantage or a disadvantage for theology. It will depend on the results of our entire investigation. If our study points to some form of classical reason as the one suitable for theological enterprises, the germinal, undeveloped stage in which temporal reason finds itself is irrelevant. But, if our investigation should point to historical logos it would be a disadvantage. However, if our investigation should point additionally to the theological realm--over against the traditional philosophical one--as the responsible agent for providing the interpretation of reason as a tool for theology, this germinal stage will
objectivity. Temporal logos, however, does not entail merely a "reinterpretation" of the old traditional epistemological framework—as, for instance, in Jaspers. It rather requires the development of a new epistemological framework. This "newness" is required when logos sees itself working in the flux of time, consciousness, and Lebenswelt.

In terms of temporal dimensionality, meaning is first formed, constituted, grasped, and only then is it expressed. Thus, meaning is formed in a pre-theoretical, pre-predicative, or pre-linguistic level of knowledge. This is the level of the real, concrete, prove to be an advantage because theologians will not be tempted to rely on a "ready to use" philosophical interpretation.

The limits of our investigation prevent us from dealing with this comparison. For an introduction to classical objectivity as "representational thinking" (vorstellendes Denken), see Perotti, pp. 29-31. The basic features of traditional objectivity we need to remember as we proceed in our analysis are "universality" and "necessity." When they are achieved they produce "certainty" in the cognitive subject. These two features of objectivity are required by the timeless primordial presupposition. In modern positivistic sciences they shaped the idea and meaning of "exactness," which is rather an ideal. Yet, Wittgenstein confesses that "we do not know what we should be supposed to imagine under this head" (Philosophical Investigations, p. 88).

Husserl (Cartesian Meditations, pp. 2, 20) realizes that he is dealing with "Heraclitean flux" and that in that realm to proceed with the standards valid for traditional sciences would indeed be foolish. He needs a new approach and understanding of objectivity. See Valone, p. 216; and Lauer, p. 139.


6This is not a non-cognitive realm as the relation between Existenz and transcendence is according to Jaspers' theory (see above, p. 104, nn. 1, 2, 3). This pre-theoretical area points rather
wholistic, complex, dynamic, temporal, historical life world (Lebenswelt).\(^1\) As in classical logos, even though knowledge is present at this level\(^2\) as the starting point, it is not reduced or confined to it.\(^3\) Logos proceeds into the theoretical realm through abstraction (from the object's side) and categories (from the subject's side).

Abstraction (this paramount cognitive activity) and its outcome (the knowledge of the essence, of the object) are to be understood now in an entirely different way. In timeless logos abstraction stands basically in discontinuity to the Lebenswelt,\(^4\) while to the area where meaning is constituted, that is to the area where the subject-object relationship actually functions. We should not conceive this level as working necessarily without words, predicates, or theories, otherwise we would be creating a new kind of "Platonic worlds" in time. In the constitution of meaning at this level many factors are involved both from the subject's and the object's sides. The area where meaning is constituted is obviously previous to the expression of the constituted meaning. This level, however, cannot explain the whole of the cognitive activities. It should be considered, though, to be at the very basis of any meaning whatsoever.

\(^1\)This is the world of Parmenidean doxa.

\(^2\)The Lebenswelt cannot simply be denied. It is there. From Plato onwards it is interpreted and provided a place in the cognitive process. For instance, in Plato's theory the Lebenswelt is considered to provide the "stimulus" that causes "reminiscence," "remembrance" to get started.

\(^3\)In temporal logos meaning also starts at the level of the Lebenswelt. However, it develops the cognitive functions of reason as a whole within this, the only available world, namely the Lebenswelt. See above, p. 135, n. 6 above.

\(^4\)This discontinuity is grounded in the via negativa which Parmenidean primordial presupposition requires. This primordial presupposition entails a negative evaluation of the Lebenswelt as not-being; see pp. 75-87 above. See Adorno, p. 85.
in the temporal *logos* it stands in continuity with it.\(^1\) Abstraction entails a reduction regarding the *Lebenswelt* in both timeless and temporal *logos*. Yet, in each case the reduction is achieved in a different way and implies a different meaning for the essence and objectivity reached through it. In timeless *logos* the reduction is achieved by a negation of the *Lebenswelt*. The abstraction means more than the *Lebenswelt*.\(^2\) In temporal *logos* the reduction is due to the fact that the nature and richness of the *Lebenswelt* cannot be expressed in a final absolute form by any single predicate or judgment. Here the abstraction is less than the *Lebenswelt*.\(^3\)

\(^1\) This is required by the temporal primordial presupposition, which entails a positive evaluation of the *Lebenswelt* as the realm of Being, and consequently of beings as beings; see pp. 113-30 above. This continuity is expressed by Merleau-Ponty's analysis which is abridged in an insightful statement by Grene: "There is no turning from the so-called phenomenal to an intelligible world. It is true that the intelligible is invisible, but it is the invisibility of the visible, not some other which we saw when, following the chariots of the gods, we lifted up our heads into the outer heavens. Nor, of course, on the other hand, is Merleau-Ponty suggesting for a moment an irrationalism: an attempt to philosophize through the reduction of meaning (of sens) to mere sensations. Seeing is not intellection; it is not the Thought of seeing, Merleau-Ponty keeps insisting; yet neither is it a dumb show. It is the coming into being of meanings, of beings with meaning, at the pre-conceptual, pre-theetic level which has to support all conceptualization" (p. 618). Cf. Lauer, p. 110; Faber, p. 61; and Valone, p. 214.

\(^2\) Through the via negativa on which abstraction is grounded, the *Lebenswelt* is to be denied as a whole in order for the intellect to be able to grasp its true object; cf. p. 133, n. 1, above, on "representational thinking" ("vorstellendes Denken"). Consequently, abstraction produces a reduction of the *Lebenswelt* into a timeless expression of it, which entails a projection out of it and so it means "more" than the *Lebenswelt*. At this point Heidegger fails in his interpretation of classical *logos*. He sees classical abstraction as just reducing the temporal *flux* from a static present, but he does not follow tradition in its abstractive process *via* *analogia* which points beyond the *Lebenswelt*.

\(^3\) This richness is due to the fact that in a temporal dimension for Being and Knowledge both, subject and object, stand in the
This difference in the understanding of abstraction calls for a difference in the interpretation of "objectivity" and "exactitude" in each logos.\(^1\) Timeless logos understands the nature of the knowledge of essences or "objectivity" as being "necessary," "universal," and "exact."\(^2\) Temporal logos understands the knowledge of flux of time, and so they are in change and movement. Consequently, abstraction and essences have to be understood in this new setting. Lauer remarks that "because an object is always more than what is actually present to consciousness, the essence of an object cannot be constituted except in a successive actualization of aspects—to which must be added the sum total of the horizons constituted by the whole of experience" (p. 139). This "more than" is due to the historical dimensionality recognized by historical logos. This "more than" is in continuity with what is "actually present to consciousness." Therefore the "reduction" is due to the fact that man can only grasp its object as it and he himself flow and change in the flux of time; cf. Marias, Reason and Life, p. 190; and Lauer, p. 138.

\(^1\)Classical timeless epistemological framework is unable to grasp a temporal reality temporally and historically. The only way it can function is by freezing both subject and object in a static relationship which is conceived to be "ideal" or "true." Objectivity and exactness find their meaning in the context of this freezing of the flux of time into a static relationship. Temporal epistemological framework considers subject and object in movement and change and develops structures and procedures to grasp the meaning as it develops and changes. In this context, the very meaning of objectivity and exactness is different.

\(^2\)"Necessity," "universality," and "exactness" have here a special meaning. They express a knowledge that is this way, cannot be any other way, and for which it is impossible not to be as they are. Of course, there is a margin for error or lack of exactitude, which is due to remnants of temporality in the cognitive process. The basic concepts of necessity, universality, and exactness are not eliminated from the concepts of historical temporal logos, they, however, receive a different interpretation, hence they have a different meaning, that affect the scientific enterprise as a whole. When these old traditional words are used in their new temporal historical meaning, they are bound to be misinterpreted by both philosophers and theologians who are not yet aware of the change of meaning required by the newly-adopted primordial presupposition. See Adorno, p. 86; and Marias, Reason and Life, p. 96.
essences or "objectivity" as "determinable indeterminacy";¹ that is to say, as historical residuum of historical thickness. Finally, abstraction appears and is corrected as it gets in touch with the realm of Being, that is, with timeless essences for timeless logos.²

¹Husserl describes in detail the meaning of "objectivity," that is, of the nature that the knowledge of essences is supposed to have in a temporal logos, as follows: "And the meaning of this indeterminacy is once again foreshadowed by the general meaning of the thing perceived as such, or by the general and essential nature of this type of perception which we call thing-perception. The indeterminacy necessarily means the determinability of a rigorously prescribed mode (Stils). It points forward to possible patterns of perception, which, continually passing off into one another, coalesce in the unity of a single perception in which the continuously enduring thing in ever new series of perspectives reveals ever again new 'aspects' (or retraces the old). Meanwhile, the subsidiary co-apprehended phases of the thing come gradually into the focus of real presentation as real data, the indeterminacies define themselves more clearly to turn at length into clear data themselves; contrariwise, what is clear passes back into the unclear, the presented into the non-presented, and so forth. To remain for ever incomplete after this fashion is an ineradicable essential of the correlation Thing and Thing-perception. If the meaning of Thing gets determined through what is given in Thing-perception (and what else could determine the meaning?), it must require such incompleteness, and we are referred of necessity to unified and continuous series of possible perceptions which, developed from any one of these, stretch out in an infinite number of directions in systematic strictly ordered ways, in each direction endlessly, and always dominated throughout by some unity of meaning. In principle a margin of determinable indeterminacy always remains over, however far we go along our empirical way, and however extended the continua of actual perceptions of the same thing which we may have treasured. No God can alter this in any way any more than He can the equation 1 + 2 = 3, or the stability of any other essential truth" (Ideas, pp. 137, 138). Lauer, commenting on Merleau-Ponty, remarks that "the world in its history does not follow a preconceived model; rather it takes on sense through its history, which is truly a history only in and through a subject-object dialectic" (p. 184). Cf. Raschke, pp. 377, 378; and Putnam, pp. 31, 41.

²See above, p. 87, n. 3; p. 90, n. 1; p. 91, n. 3; p. 92, n. 1; p. 99, n.1; and p. 100, n. 1.
and the Lebenswelt for temporal logos.¹

In historical temporal reason as in classical timeless reason, the "categories" are that which is brought a priori to the subject-object relationship by the cognitive subject.² However, in temporal reason they obviously do not come from timelessness but rather from the past into the present and future. This movement, by the way, corresponds to the flow of meaning in temporal reason.³

¹ Marías puts it in the following way: "This obliges us to study the reality in question in its concreteness, and therefore circumstantially. That reality must be brought back, actually or imaginatively, to my life, the only 'place' in which it is authentically real, and thereby seen within the set of activities of mine which are related to it: i.e., see happening" (Reason and Life, p. 189). Yet, this coming back to the ground of meaning is not a simple task. The further back we need to go the more difficult the enterprise becomes. This is particularly true in metaphysics where we need to grasp the meaning of the present from the perspective of the past history as a whole; see Heidegger, Being and Time, 2.5.72.

² So, categories in their broadest meaning include the epistemological framework as a whole.

³ Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, p. 433, calls it "thickness." Heidegger remarks that "when historicality is authentic, it understands history as the 'recurrence' of the possible, and knows that a possibility will recur only if existence is open for it fatefuly, in a moment of vision, in resolute repetition" (Being and Time, 2.5.75). He adds that "Dasein temporalizes itself in the way the future and having been are united in the Present" (ibid., 2.5.76). Cf. Reiser, p. 475. Heidegger remarks that the flux may be misunderstood as being determined by the past or when the past is interpreted in terms of the present (ibid., 2.5.73). The procedure of interpreting the past in terms of the present is at the core of the Historical Critical Method in exegesis; see Ernst Troeltsch, Gesammelte Schriften, vol. 2: Zur religiösen Lage, Religionphilosophie und Ethik (Tübingen: Scientia Verlag Aalen, 1922), pp. 729-53; Gerhard von Rad, Old Testament Theology, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 1:107, n. 3; and Gerhard Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, rev. ed. (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1972), p. 135, n. 16. See also Marías, Reason and Life, p. 369.
This epistemological flow is complemented by the ontological flow of time, which goes from the future to the present and into the past. But it is the epistemological flow that provides the unity and coherence of meaning through the flow and changes of reality. Otherwise meaning would be given in isolated "epochs" with no connection among each other. Also the subject-object relationship is understood in a very different way which affects the very constitution of meaning. In temporal logos the subject-object relationship is conceived as a wholistic enterprise in which no gap is really present.

Once knowledge happens or is constituted, it is expressed in language, and language, in order to communicate meaning and participate in the further constitution of meaning, needs to be interpreted. Interpretation follows the primordial presupposition and epistemological framework that the interpreter brings with himself as he comes to language as the place for meaning. Yet, on the other side of language there is always the cognitive subject who spoke as a result of his own cognitive activity (both theoretical and pre-theoretical). For language to fulfill its purpose of communication.

1."The primary phenomenon of primordial and authentic temporality is the future" (Heidegger, Being and Time, 2.3.65). See also Merleau-Ponty, Phenomenology of Perception, chapter on "Temporality."

2. This happens always when the meaning of what develops in the flux of time is understood from a timeless epistemological framework.

3. In classical reason the subject-object relationship is not denied. It is rather interpreted as a unity of two things that by nature are severed from each other. Hence, it constitutes a dichotomy; see Jaspers, Philosophical Faith, p. 79; and Heidegger,
the hearer, receiver, interpreter of language stands in need of grasping first the dimensionality and epistemological framework from which the language has been uttered. Otherwise there is no communication and so, in the final analysis, no language.¹ Even when it is built into the very process of constituting meaning, however, language as the expression of reason is not able to go beyond its function as sign of meaning.² Only as sign, may language—that is, word—be considered as logos.³

The Question of Being, p. 77. In the realm of a temporal primordial presupposition the subject-object relationship receives also a new interpretation that Heidegger calls "transcendence." See Heidegger, The Essence of Reason, pp. 37, 39.

¹Reiser remarks that "language guarantees that objective expression can survive from one generation to the next and thus gives rise to tradition. It encapsulates the world-view of a people non-thematically in its structure, grammar, syntax, origins; it is also historical" (p. 481). However, language is used not only "non-thematically" but also "thematically," i.e., "theoretically." In both cases language is a sign and plays the essential role in communicating.

²"We are to conclude, therefore, that language discloses the gathering of all things into nearness. Language is a sign of our own being drawn into the unifying sweep in which the regions of the world come face to face. But saying is likewise a showing. That is why the word, Logos, is so rich; it contained philosophy's originative insight into the manifestness of what is in the all-embracing nearness of things" (ibid., p. 485).

³In the context of the history of philosophy the philosophical analysis of language is rather recent. Its insights will surely be very useful in future philosophical analysis. Moreover, a criticism of reason deals with the constitution of meaning—not directly with its expression or communication. A phenomenological analysis of language may point toward some features of reason but will be unable to provide final answers or go further into the realm of the theory of knowledge. A sample of this may be seen in the work of Wittgenstein taken as a whole. For further comments on the relationship of reason and language, see M. Heidegger, Poetry, Language, Thought (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); idem, On the Way to Language (New York: Harper & Row, 1971); and Maurice Merleau-Ponty,
Temporal System. So far it is clear that the primordial presupposition of temporality has developed new patterns for the understanding of "objectivity." The analysis, however, becomes more complex and difficult as we look for the systematic realm of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason. As noted earlier, this realm is centered in the theos which provides for coherence and unity of meaning beginning with an interpretation of the ontological framework. The theos, then, appears as the ultimate foundation for the coherence and system of reason's structure.


1 That is to say, temporal logos brings a new way of understanding the same temporally limited reality that Kant, in the Aristotelian tradition, interpreted by applying the same classical epistemological framework in a transcendental interpretation; see pp. 99-103 above.

2 At this point, we must remember that the classical epistemological framework has developed throughout a more than twenty-five-century span. We have been able to point at its most relevant moments. However, we cannot do the same regarding temporal logos. This "newness" of the subject matter adds to its thematic difficulty.

3 See pp. 34-51 above.

4 We see, then, that Aristotle's approach to reality as a whole is the basic task to be accomplished by metaphysics. Metaphysics may still have the traditional meaning of dealing with what is beyond the physical realm, but only in the sense of what is beyond the objectives of natural sciences, and no longer in the traditional sense of what is beyond this historical temporal world. It is proper to remember that reason needs, as part of its structure, to have an interpretation of reality as a whole, ontological framework, in order to provide unity and coherence to its procedures. Therefore, in temporal logos the Aristotelian ontological framework—metaphysical hierarchy—is to be replaced by a new one. This task also involves the interpretation of God. Here, in an indirect way, we reach the realm of our criticism of theological reason. The basic issue that is to be reinterpreted regarding the theos is the idea of its ontological transcendence.
The anti-metaphysical trend of post-Kantian philosophy\(^1\) leads to a new kind of metaphysics, a metaphysics that is supposed to develop in the temporal dimensionality of beings and knowledge.\(^2\) The whole is now seen in movement—in the flux of time—and the meaning of it is to be reached as the whole and the cognitive subject move in relation to each other. It is precisely the complexity that represents not only the whole but also the whole in movement that constitutes the main difficulty for rendering a systematic interpretation of metaphysics.\(^3\) As metaphysics is needed for reason to

\(^1\)Breton (p. 148) shows how today's scientific reason is considered to be the mental structure that remains after its ontological foundation has been denied by the anti-metaphysical trend of our times; cf. Perotti, p. 59.

\(^2\)M. Faber, commenting on Husserl, remarks that "acts of thought may refer to transcendent or even to non-existent and impossible objects. But the meaning of such experiences is clarified purely on the basis of experience" (p. 54). This basic principle of temporal logos does not entail the denial of transcendence. It rather points to the cognitive realm and its primordial presupposition where any interpretation of transcendence is to be understood.

\(^3\)Grene, commenting on Merleau-Ponty, describes the real complexity of the subject matter of metaphysics in a temporal dimensionality which seems to be a rather impossible task: "What one has to try to do, in radical reflection, is to catch the Being of some being from within our experience as experienced. But there are indefinitely many such centers of Being and we are, never in all of them, but, in the chiasm, entangled, in many dimensions, in many at once. True, we glimpse their universal interrelatedness, but only as, and through, the very intertwining that we are. An overview would be, for us, or so far as we can tell, for any being, on principle impossible. Logos, the ultimate coherence in and behind language, possesses us, but never definitively, once for all, any more than, definitively we can master it" (p. 623). J. Ortega y Gasset, in *The Dehumanization of Art, and Other Writings on Art and Culture* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1956), p. 114, explains with an example the complexity of the real world of time and history which as a whole is the subject matter of temporal metaphysics. He shows how the very same event, the death of a person, means different things to four different observers. The fact is
function in its complete capacity for coherence and meaning, temporal reason stands in need either of developing a new metaphysics or of using the structure of the old one as part of its epistemological framework.

Since philosophical thinking is just beginning to deal with the whole in its temporal flux, there is no "final" approach that may be singled out as the most relevant and influential one. Nonetheless, reflection in this area has developed far enough to allow an identification of three interpretations which are already influential and which surely provide the germinal insights for further developments: evolutionism (as developed by Teilhard de Chardin), Marxism, and Heideggerian temporal "metaphysics."

The evolutionist interpretation of temporal reality provided by Teilhard de Chardin works on the basis of a timeless presupposition,¹ to which the entire process of temporal reality is oriented.² The ultimate meaning comes from outside time, that is from the theos (the Omega point), which is timeless.³ Teilhard de Chardin's that the actual meaning of this historical event is the whole of what the four grasped individually. Cf. Maria's, *Reason and Life*, p. 188.

¹This appears clearly at the very beginning of Teilhard de Chardin's *The Phenomenon of Man* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 29, when he remarks that his analysis "deals with man solely as a phenomenon." And then he adds that he has "not tried to discover a system of ontological and causal relations between the elements of the universe" (ibid.).

²Teilhard, pp. 254-72.

³Teilhard, referring to the transcendence of the Omega point, says that "Omega must be independent of the collapse of the forces with which evolution is woven" (p. 270). And he adds that
interpretation of temporal reality follows the scientific rationality which represents the final expression of classical logos. Nonetheless Teilhard's synthesis provides a coherent understanding of temporal reality from an evolutionistic viewpoint in which both Marxist and Christian motives are included. Teilhard may be seen as providing the most coherent interpretation of temporal reality thus far developed using classical scientific logos. Yet, since if by its very nature it does not escape from the time and space which it gathers together, it would not be Omega" (ibid.). See also ibid., p. 273.


2 That is to say on the basic motif of biological evolution, Teilhard develops evolutionism as a tool or foundational category for the understanding of concrete temporal reality as it moves. Evolution is the viewpoint that supposedly reaches the center of the movement of reality as it progresses, and so it is able to render it intelligible. It is at this point where Teilhard's analysis, even though developed from a traditional ontological and epistemological perspective, could provide categories for a temporal ontological framework. Teilhard's approach, in order to be able to do that should consider the phenomenon to correspond to the order of Being. His phenomenological theory should be declared to be, as it is, ontological. This, however, he expressly rejects.

3 Teilhard, pp. 256, 257. It must be pointed out that Teilhard is not a Marxist, yet his synthesis is broad enough to be able to include Marxism as a part of it.

4 Teilhard, pp. 264-67, incorporates in his synthesis the idea of "Love" and "Great Presence."

5 N. A. Whitehead's interpretation of temporal reality as process is also worked out from the epistemological structure of classical reason. His system, however, is not as comprehensive as Teilhard's. On the other hand, according to Whitehead, the final foundation for his classical system challenges the traditional understanding of the theos as it becomes "dipolar" in order to include both time and timelessness; see Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1957),
his approach assumes ontological and epistemological frameworks that are already developed, his interpretation of temporal reality does not ground a "new" interpretation of Being. On the contrary, it relies on the traditional interpretation of Being in order to ground its own coherence.

Marxism also works within the temporal dimensionality of reality,¹ but approaches it following the dialectical method developed by Hegel.² We can say, then, that in Marxism metaphysics is replaced by a particular philosophy of history--dialectical

¹Within the same classical understanding of reason and its ontological framework can be seen, for instance, Whitehead, who in his The Function of Reason considers that "the Greeks produced the final instrument for discipline of speculation" (p. 41). Whitehead, however, considers that Greek reason is not final in scientific endeavors. Cf. A. Robert Caponigri, A History of Western Philosophy, vol. 4: Philosophy from the Age of Positivism to the Age of Analysis (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1971), p. 97.

²It is widely known that in order to grasp the movement of history and its meaning, Marx adopted the Hegelian dialectics and applied them to the study of "matter," that is to history as "praxis." See Etienne Gilson, gen. ed., A History of Philosophy, 4 vols. (New York: Random House, 1966), vol. 4: Recent Philosophy: Hegel to the Present, by Étienne Gilson, Thomas Langan, and Armand A. Mauer, p. 45. Hegelian dialectics grasp the meaning of what moves (temporal ontological framework) from a classical epistemological framework. Traditional objectivity is assumed--idea of essence--in order for negation to be. In order to understand two realities or events as contradictory to each other--as thesis and antithesis of the dialectic method--their meaning or essence is to be considered...
materialism. Consequently it is this philosophy of history which provides the interpretation of the ontological framework of reason. In its interpretation of concrete historical reality Marxism provides a new "temporal hierarchy" which is to shape its epistemological framework.

as "closed," that is as "frozen." And this can be done only in a timeless primordial presupposition which requires the object to be "static." Should temporal epistemological framework be applied—temporal objectivity—no contradiction arises—only the richness and manifoldness of the Lebenswelt in its many complementary meanings and forms. Hegel's and Marx's dialectics are interesting and surely represent a step forward in the concern and investigation of the temporal ontological reality. For an introduction to Hegel's idea of dialectics, see W. T. Jones, 4:125.

1 It is not conscious, however, of the ground or dimensional- ity of Being and Reason. It works in the level of beings as beings. Its perspective, however, assumes a temporal primordial presupposition. See Heidegger, "Letter on Humanism," p. 287. This feature of Marxism is apparent already in Karl Marx and Frederick Engels as they affirm that "Communism abolishes eternal truths, it abolishes all religion, and all morality, instead of constituting them on a new basis; it therefore acts in contradiction to all past historical experience" ("Manifesto of the Communist Party," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels on Religion, ed. R. Niebuhr [New York: Schocken Books, 1964], p. 89). We find here a more radical dismissal of past philosophy than in Heidegger.


3 Shaw remarks that "Marx's model ranks the spheres of social life in a hierarchy. This allows him methodologically to put aside certain realms of social existence in his investigation of more funda- mental relations; but it also assumes, I would contend, that the derivative character of secondary and tertiary social realms is system-atic. Accordingly, the nature of the derivation would be suscepti- ble to scientific analysis and formulation" (p. 68).

4 This happens in all revisionisms of Marxism and in all those who use the Marxist method. See, for instance, Jean-Paul Sartre who confesses to be a "Marxist" (Critique de la raison dialectique, précédé de Question de Méthode [Paris: Gallimard, 1960]) but who,
Marxist interpretation of historic reality is not done, however, using the temporal epistemological framework\(^1\) (which was still undeveloped in Marx's day);\(^2\) rather it uses the classical, timeless one.\(^3\) The use of classical logos in Marxism may be seen in the according to Wilfrid Desan's evaluation, "does not claim to introduce an interpretation of history that is counter to the Marxist view, that is to dialectical materialism, but he wants merely to become aware of the dialectic, and through this awareness, to show its rationality (when well-understood) and necessity" [The Marxism of Jean-Paul Sartre [Gloucester, Massachusetts: Peter Smith, 1974], p. 74]. Cf. Jean-Paul Sartre, Between Existentialism and Marxism (New York: Morrow Quill, 1974), pp. 33-64. This procedure has also been introduced into theology as a method; see José Miguez Bonino, Doing Theology in a Revolutionary Situation (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), pp. 96-98.

\(^1\) That is to say, Marxist logos in its epistemological framework follows the classical pattern of reasoning in its modern scientific expression. It follows neither the "temporal objectivity" nor the temporal abstraction in continuity to the flow of concrete individual reality in the equiprimordiality of past and future from whose tension springs, in the "moment of vision," from the Present, the true meaning of the whole; see Heidegger, Being and Time, 2.5.74.

\(^2\) It is true that Hegel's synthesis includes aspects that rightly may be considered as antecedents of historical logos; see W. T. Jones, 4:110. However, the understanding of temporal objectivity and abstraction may be considered to begin with Edmund Husserl, and so, to be a twentieth-century happening. Marx's ideas were, however, settled--in their broad lines--by 1848. See Marx and Engels, "Manifesto of the Communist Party," pp. 89, 90. Marx's analysis does not follow the epistemological realm which could have led him to develop Hegel's insights on temporal logos.

\(^3\) As Marx works in a very high level of abstraction he is able to interpret hierarchically historical reality on the basis that the force that moves history is economic, and within the economic realm, the class struggle constitutes the process and the meaning of history. See Shaw, pp. 68-75. Reality is not grasped and interpreted historically. A classical procedure follows: First reality is evaluated and a decision is taken regarding the nature of its "true" source or power; its pertaining to the economic realm. In this step reality is not denied nor reduced to only economic expression (see Shaw, pp. 66, 67), but its meaning is seen in a hierarchy, from whose top, the class struggle, meaning flows to the whole. In a second intellecitive movement, Marx reaches, by
procedure followed to reach the foundational principle for the intelligibility of the system, namely the productive forces. Marx does not reach this principle by reasoning historically, that is to say, from the past and future considered equiprimordially, but rather by addressing the present after having abstracted it from both past and future. That is, once installed in the present, he abstracts, from the manifold richness of the Lebenswelt, one particular aspect and declares it to be the first principle of intelligibility. Only after this classical rational procedure is complete is reason, equipped with a new non-Aristotelian first principle, to be applied to history in order to interpret it. This obviously renders a non-historical understanding of history by imposing present categories abstracting from his present economic situation, the foundational idea of class struggle, which is, in a third step, elevated to play the role of cognitive first reached through a process of abstraction as it is made to play the "first mover" role of the traditional theos in the epistemological realm of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason. See ibid., p. 163. "The two German iconoclasts [Marx and Engels] only tender an alternative world-view, which--despite its attraction--is more speculative and quite a bit less empirical than they imagined" (ibid.). The traditional timeless epistemological framework is not only to be seen in Marx's approach to the "core" of reality but also in the way he understood its movement, namely, in dialectics.

1See Shaw, pp. 59-66.
2Ibid., p. 73.
3The obvious "choice" dimension of Marx's system is pointed out indirectly by Shaw as he comments that Marx's idea that "the 'real premise' of human existence, that men must eat, have shelter before they can pursue politics and philosophy, hardly shows the explanatory primacy of that realm" (p. 59). Additionally, it should be noted that Marx's choice regarding his "first principle" is not a choice of primordial presupposition, but rather a "new" one within the traditional timeless primordial presupposition.
on the past. Through this procedure the meaning of the past is bound to be lost.\footnote{See above, p. 138, n. 3. Additionally, the timeless epistemological framework in Marx's approach to history may be seen in the class struggle principle itself. See p. 147, n. 3 above. Yet, as Marxism deals with history, it is bound to express historical insights that recapture part of the past; see, for instance, Friederich Engels, "Engels to Bloch," in Karl Marx and Friederich Engels on Religion, ed. R. Niebuhr (New York: Schocken Books, 1964), p. 276.}

In Marx's system the theos as transcendence disappears, as reality is conceived on the basis of a temporal presupposition.\footnote{"The atheistic character of Marxism is not questioned by any serious scholar" (Giulio Girardi Marxism and Christianity [New York: Macmillan, 1968], p. 19). Ernst Bloch, the Marxist revisionist who is closer to Christian sensibility, expresses clearly how in Marxist epistemology the theos--Kantian idea of God--has been given not only a "new content," but also a "new dimension," that is, temporality: "God appears therefore as the hypostatized ideal of the as yet truly undeveloped essence of man; he appears as Utopian entelechy. So the banner should cry not 'Demythologize!'--without distinguishing Prometheus or Baal from the 'Kerygma'--but 'De-theocratize!'" (Atheism in Christianity, The Religion of the Exodus and the Kingdom [New York: Herder & Herder, 1972], p. 82). In short, "The forward-look has replaced the up-ward-look" (ibid., p. 265); see also idem, Man on His Own, pp. 208-216.}

Theos still appears, however, in its formal cognitive function of "first principle" of the epistemological framework, namely, as the productive forces and the class struggle they originate.\footnote{E. Bloch expresses Marxism in terms of temporal ontology, the "ontology of Not-yet-being" (Atheism in Christianity, p. 66). Yet, the meaning of history does not come from the future. The not-yet-being points to the ontological temporal dimension which provides openness for the process. But history as process receives its meaning from the analysis of what is present. Bloch carefully avoids the charge of determinism usually made against Marxism (Shaw, pp. 66, 67) as he sees the content of the concrete utopia springing from the humanum which is constituted by a pluralism of actual cultures in their projection into the future (A Philosophy of the Future [New York: Herder and Herder, 1970], pp. 144, 111). This future utopia as Utopian Omega takes the place that God has in traditional}
In summary, Marxism works in a temporal ontological dimensionality but it pursues the understanding of it from a timeless epistemological framework. This approach allows Marxism to render a "coherent" interpretation of historical reality. However, as this "coherence" is developed by its timeless epistemological framework, the interpretation of the historical whole is bound to be reduced to those aspects of it which may fit the chosen framework for intelligibility.  

In his later works Heidegger expresses, perhaps in a manner more clear than any other contemporary thinker, the radical difficulty of developing a temporal interpretation of reality as a whole.  

metaphysics and religion; see Atheism in Christianity, p. 265. Bloch's understanding of theos as Utopian Omega develops in a timeless cognitive dimensionality, not only because it springs from the present but because the understanding of the various present cultures geared toward the not-yet-being is developed not with the historical logos but from the Marxist timeless logos whose "first mover"—theos—is the abstract "class struggle." See ibid., pp. 267-73.  

We are aware that Marxism, as Engels says ("Engels to Bloch," p. 274), sees history determined "ultimately" and not "solely" by productive forces. This remark, however, does not change the situation in which economy determines the meaning of the whole. It is just the same epistemological framework as the one used by Aristotle. The Aristotelian "first mover" is certainly not the "only" factor in the constitution of meaning, but receives its meaning and unity from it. Marxism, and any Marxist revisionism, is bound to accept and work with this "first principle." To reject it would amount to rejecting Marxism.  

Heidegger (Being and Time, 2.5.74) expresses two aspects that point to the utter complexity of metaphysics conceived as a temporal enterprise. On the one hand, he says that Dasein as Being-in-the-world is in its historicality a being-with-one-another. This points to a plurality of Daseins. On the other hand, he clarifies that his analysis of historicality in Being and Time is ontological and not ontic; that is to say, it deals with Dasein in general but it does not deal with the plurality of its concrete factual
when reason has decided to follow historicality all the way and not to force upon it any pattern which does not follow its flux. Thus historical logos rejects the selection of a new content for a "first principle" because it is seen as an imposition of the meaning of a part on the whole, and so as inverting the normal flow of meaning from the whole to the part.¹

The later Heidegger thinks that logos as it approaches the understanding of the whole is to assume a poetic expression.² In this connection he is only able to provide guidelines for approaching the whole which are expressed poetically as the "foursome" (Geviert) which "is the interplay of earth, sky, gods, and men as mortals."³

expressions. Yet, the ontological investigation points to the whole as constituted by the totality of factual Daseins as they move in the ontic realm; that is, the subject matter of temporal metaphysics. Additionally, Heidegger recognizes, as he works in a temporal logos, the fact that there is not any particular privileged viewpoint from which the whole and its meaning may be reached and surveyed--as Marxism in its classical logos does.

¹See above, p. 47, n. 1.

²See Heidegger, "Holderlin and the Essence of Poetry," in Existence and Being, ed. Werner Brock (Chicago, Illinois: Henry Regnery, 1967), pp. 281-84. "The poet names the gods and names all things in that which they are. This naming does not consist merely in something already known being supplied with a name, it is rather that when the poet speaks the essential word, the existent is by this meaning nominated as what it is. So it becomes known as existent. Poetry is the establishing of being by means of the word" (ibid., p. 281).

³See Vycinas, pp. 224-237; and Perotti, pp. 84-93. This approach is harshly criticized by Bloch in Atheism in Christianity, as he says that "Heidegger really trivializes metaphysics, making of it the old, untenable theory of mere remembering--of the eternal return" (pp. 67, 68). This is, however, as far as Heidegger could go in developing an interpretation of metaphysics as historical reality which at the same time would be faithful to temporal logos and that would not force meaning upon the natural spontaneity of historicality.
Through these poetic expressions Heidegger describes the basic realms that the whole includes in its development. As man is part of the process, and as there is no particular "viewpoint" for surveying the whole that may provide unity of meaning, man as metaphysician, as interpreter of the meaning of the whole, is considered to be the guard of the truth of Being\(^1\) as it appears to him.

For Heidegger the radical acceptance of temporality as dimensionality not only of Being but also of the \textit{logos} it generates entails the total exclusion of the \textit{theos} pole of reason's structure. In Marxism, \textit{theos} was denied as transcendence, but not in its cognitive function in the structure of reason.\(^2\) Heidegger's radical acceptance of historicality leaves \textit{theos} out even of the cognitive picture.\(^3\) Yet he does not deny the realm of divinity as possible

\(^{1}\)As reality is perceived in its total complexity and richness, Heidegger is aware that man has no possibility of grasping the meaning of what is present to him as a whole. Man's knowledge of the whole is impossible because the whole surpasses man absolutely not only in its future and past dimensions which man cannot control nor encompass, but in the very same present dimension which in its richness and manifoldness surpasses any intent of understanding. Heidegger remarks that "man is rather cast by Being itself into the truth of Being; in order that he, ex-sisting thus, may guard the truth of Being; in order that in the light of Being, beings as beings may appear as what it is. Whether and how it appears, whether and how God and the gods, history and nature, enter, presenting and absenting themselves in the clearing of Being, is not determined by man. The advent of being rests in the destiny of Being" ("Letter on Humanism," p. 281). Cf. ibid., p. 271; and Perotti, pp. 78, 79.

\(^{2}\)See p. 149, nn. 2, 3 above.

\(^{3}\)Consequently, reason in Heidegger works in an onto-logical structure. The \textit{theos} is denied because it entails a \textit{logos}--\textit{theo-logia}--which brings with itself traditional ontology to the realm of meaning from the perspective of the epistemological framework. Heidegger sees this process centered in the theological claim of God as being \textit{causa sui}; see "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution,"
for Dasein. Nonetheless, when God—who now is conceived as a "silent" God—decides to come out of his silence, theology is supposed to render a quite different expression of Him from the one provided by traditional Christian theology.\(^2\)

Temporal logos for a temporal metaphysics has to be, according to Heidegger, godless, that is onto-logical, and no longer onto-theo-logical (ibid.). We should notice that it is precisely the lack of the theos dimension of reason—which is present in Marxism—that determines the absence of unity in Heidegger's approach to the whole, and the role of the philosopher as "guardian of Being" as well. Yet, from the viewpoint of a temporal primordial presupposition Heidegger is correct in leaving it outside of his system. God cannot be introduced in the system as Marxism does, because this implies the timeless logos which Heidegger is replacing with a temporal one. The only way of including the theos again in the structure of reason would be through a reshaping of the very idea of transcendence where the via negativa of Parmenidean timeless primordial presupposition is still firmly couched determining the meaning of both philosophical and theological inquiries. This could not be done until the philosopher, and the theologian, were able to have at least a basic introduction to a temporal logos, functioning at least at the level of objectivity. This is what Heidegger and others attempted to do—to develop an onto-logical structure of reason that is godless but not atheistic. God is in silence. Once man has access to the temporal onto-logical structure of reason he has also an ear to hear God's voice, if God decides to come out of his silence. However, in this pattern, God no longer forms part of reason's structure as it did in traditional reason. Onto-theological reason, according to Heidegger, becomes onto-logical. This, however, entails a foundational lack which, in the final analysis, destroys the very source of meaning and coherence, which is what reason is all about.

\(^1\)"The god-less thinking which must abandon the god of philosophy, god as causa sui, is thus perhaps closest to the divine God. Here this means only: god-less thinking is more open to Him than onto-theo-logic would like to admit" (ibid.).

\(^2\)This would happen, of course, only in the case that theology should decide to follow the temporal onto-logical understanding of logos that Heidegger suggests.

\(^3\)Heidegger considers that the three past manifestations of the divine--Greek, Jewish, and Christian—are no longer meaningful to us; see Perotti, p. 95. So it seems that he placed divinity not in the temporal realm (Being and Time, 2.5.74) in which past and
Summary and Conclusion

The first step of this investigation toward a criticism of theological reason is completed. It has uncovered the onto-theological structure of reason at its two foundational levels. In the first level reason's structure was seen from the viewpoint of its functioning. Its complex functioning is grounded in the subject-object relationship which is the place where meaning is constituted. This original relationship then expanded to include, from the object's side, the ontological framework, and, from the subject's side, the epistemological framework, both related to each other in a coherence that is provided by the theos as ground for the system of reason.

The onto-theological structure of reason also appeared, functioning in a hypothetical way which reached all its levels. The ground for reason's hypothetical nature was provided by the future are equiprimordial, but rather in the not-yet-being of Bloch. In Heidegger, however, the content of the theos comes not from the present as in Bloch, but rather from the future itself. We see, then, that in this foundational enterprise, namely, the theological one, Heidegger is not faithful to his understanding of Being as historicity. He is not able to hear the theos equiprimordially, from past and future, but rather from the future, which as it comes will be the traditional approach from the present. This is forgottenness of Being. Let us, however, say in Heidegger's behalf, that the task of dealing with God pertains to theology and not to philosophy. So, in his philosophical approach Heidegger is not in the correct perspective to deal with God, at least with the Christian God. It is interesting that Heidegger does not apply the viewpoint of historical continuity, basic for a temporal logos, that he does apply for the understanding of Being, to the understanding of the theos. Perhaps the criticism of theological reason should search for the understanding of the theos in the history of the theos' temporal manifestations. However, the first step, still ahead of us, consists of deciding under which primordial presupposition reason is to work in theological enterprises.
spontaneity of the cognitive subject. This basic character of reason is, then, grounded at the very core of the "place" where every meaning whatsoever is constituted, namely, at the core of the subject-object relationship. Finally, reason's structure pointed to the realm of the ground of Being, the realm of primordial presupposition as the ultimate ground of meaning, coherence, and system. This realm appeared as essentially involving a choice regarding the dimensionality in which the whole of reason's structure is supposed to function.

The second level of the investigation has disclosed that "reason" is not merely an abstract description of its functioning alone but rather a particular interpretation of the epistemological framework which incorporates a particular interpretation of the ontological framework as a priori categories for understanding. Besides, the ontological framework is grounded on the interpretation of the ground of Being or primordial presupposition. The flow of meaning appears to go from the dimensionality through the ontological framework into the epistemological framework which conditions a priori the meaning of every particular meaning both in its individuality and in its systematic relation to every other meaning.

The discovery of this "flow" of meaning points to a new perspective for developing a criticism of reason. Throughout the history of philosophy, the criticism of reason has been usually directed toward the problem of the origin of knowledge. It was felt that the problem of meaning could be solved if criticism could decide what kind of "object" the primary source for meaning was. This
tradition of criticism was unaware that in the final analysis meaning as a whole is not determined by the object alone, but also by the a priori epistemological structure which reason needs in order to function and which is always present, from the subject's side, in any knowledge of objects. Kant, with his transcendental criticism of reason, was the first to point toward the new and decisive viewpoint for criticism. This new perspective, then, involves reason's dimensionality and structure as the realm for a criticism of reason in general, and of theological reason in particular.

Consequently, the analysis of the onto-theological structure of reason was directed to its ground or dimensionality. That involved leaving the area of a formal description of reason's functioning and entering the area of a concrete description of reason's actual functioning as it interprets its own structure. Here the history of philosophy discloses that the ground of Being has been interpreted following two opposite ways.

The first way, the interpretation of the ground of Being as timeless, was originated at the very birth of Greek philosophy itself through Parmenides' foundational insight. Reason as we know it—in its broad lines and foundational aspects—even as it is used by contemporary science, is the product of a long series of interpretations and revisions of the ontological and epistemological frameworks on the assumption that dimensionality of Being is timeless.

The second way, the interpretation of the ground of Being and reason as temporal, appears rather late in the history of philosophy. Its systematic development, even if seen germinally in
Hegel, is a twentieth-century happening. Its youth shows up. Its ontological framework has been developed only at the level of human being in order to provide the foundation for a new understanding of reason's structure at the level of objectivity. The theological and metaphysical aspects of reason (that is, the system and the ground for unity and system) in its temporal dimensionality are still in their initial stage of reflection. Through different approaches, Evolutionism and Marxism try to grasp the temporal historical meaning of the whole by using a timeless epistemological framework. Even though these approaches provide coherent interpretations for the whole, they lose its historicality. Heidegger, on the other hand, represents in a notable way those who are sensitive to the necessary correspondence that must exist between Being and Knowledge; in other words, to the need that reason's structure has of functioning within the same dimensionality. Yet he is unable to provide an interpretation for the ontological framework at its metaphysical level—system—mainly because in his thinking the theos aspect of reason is to be put aside. He does not suggest atheism, as does Marxism which nevertheless keeps the theos as cognitive function, but rather a godless structure for reason and philosophy. In short, Heidegger replaces the onto-theo-logical structure of reason with an ontological one.

Thus the phenomenological analysis of reason's structure shows not only that reason as we generally use it is the product of a long series of interpretations but also that reason itself, from the core of its very structure, provides the ground on which
the interpretations develop. This hypothetical nature of reason, however, does not mean that reason is able to work in such different ways as to lose all its relevance and authority as the ground of meaning and communication. In short, the hypothetical nature of reason does not sink reason into conceptual relativism. Reason's actual dynamics, however, show that it can function in two different ways of constituting meaning. So reason is still the proper tool for meaning and communication. But reason does not appear to be either the final source of truth or its judge. In other words, once reason is working within a particular dimensionality it may lead us to truth. Yet reason by itself is unable to decide which dimensionality leads to truth because its own structure and nature include dimensionality and hypothetical procedures.

Reason cannot go beyond its structure and dimensionality to reach a further reference which may allow it to decide. This limitation both reveals reason's unfitness as final judge of truth and opens up anew Parmenides' choice by asking for the foundation of the choices made by philosophers (either Parmenides' or Heidegger's). So we reach here the ultimate question to which the criticism of reason leads and whose answer would provide the foundation and beginning of criticism. The answer to this question, however, does not determine the structure of reason's functioning but rather the way this functioning must go in order to be a tool for truth. It seems, then, that in order to answer this foundational question we need to meet ultimate truth at least in a partial and germinal way.
At this point two paths are possible in the task of seeking this initial germinal contact with truth, namely, the philosophical and theological. This investigation is going to try the theological way in search for a perspective that in touch with theological truth may help us both to decide the proper dimensionality of reason as a theological tool of meaning and to indicate, from the viewpoint of the chosen dimensionality, the initial steps toward a criticism of theological reason at all its structural levels.

The next step in this investigation is to observe how reason has been actually used throughout the history of theology in order to discover its dimensionality and structure in the development of systems of doctrines and the overall meaning of Christianity.
CHAPTER II

THE ONTO-THEO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF

REASON IN THEOLOGY

The analysis developed in chapter I regarding the onto-theological structure of reason as place and ground for the constitution of meaning makes it possible for our investigation to enter into its second step, namely, the analysis of the way in which reason actually works in theological discourse. Logos in theologia, as place and ground for the constitution of meaning, works in and through the onto-theo-logical structure already analyzed. Both the material and the object of our phenomenological analysis are to be found in the actual systems of theological thought which offer for investigation already constituted meanings which point to reason and its structure as their basis. This is what, with Kant, we could call the "fact" of theological reason.¹

Among the great variety of theological systems available for investigation, we have chosen, as the place for our phenomenological analysis, the systems of Thomas Aquinas and Rudolf

¹This procedure is followed by Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 33, 34. Kant's limitation, though, which has brought criticism to his system as a whole, lies in that he identified a part of reason's activity with the whole. In other words, he saw Newtonian physics as physics itself.
Bultmann. Within the broad and extensive material that both systems provide our inquiry will be directed to the realm of the primordial presupposition and a priori conditions for the constitution of meaning in order to discover in which dimensionality and structure reason was actually used as Christian theology was developed in two of its major traditions.²

¹My choice of the theological systems of Thomas Aquinas and Rudolf Bultmann as representatives of classical and scientific theology is based on the following reasons. Representatives are needed, because to analyze "schools of thought" or "theological tendencies" would entail the prior and very difficult task of defining what is meant by "school" and "tendency." Yet, performing such a task would be useless because it would represent one's own rational structure or at least include it, confusing the whole investigation. In short, the "fact" of theological reason to be investigated would be lost. On the other hand, it is materially impossible to come up with an epistemological analysis of each important theologian. Thus representatives are needed so that in a way the summary of theological approaches may be presented by the history of theology itself. It is perhaps too soon to speak of "history of theology" in the case of Bultmann, but since a choice had to be made, Bultmann's theology has at least as much relevance as any other modern scientific Protestant theology. Moreover, there is little doubt that both Thomas Aquinas and Rudolf Bultmann are highly influential theologians whose particular understanding of reason is still followed today by the great majority of Christian theologians. In their systems, some rational choices have been made and coherently developed to their final consequences and implications. As representatives of classicism and scientism, and of Catholicism and Protestantism, they in a way comprise the whole of the history of Christian theology. Care should be taken not to identify either Thomas's or Bultmann's systems with theology itself. They represent only a part of the broad spectrum of theological "fact." Yet, as the whole of theological "fact" is impossible to analyze at this point, we choose to analyze theological reason in its Thomistic and Bultmannian expressions. On the other hand, we should remember that the structure of reason's functioning is not given by itself but rather co-given in the system it produces. See pp. 44-50 above.

²Consequently, the purpose of this chapter is not to develop a "new understanding" of Thomas Aquinas or Rudolf Bultmann. Such is not the purpose of this investigation. The whole of their theological projects and their manifold implications also fall outside of the epistemological limits of this analysis. I will not deal...
A preliminary glance at both systems reveals the fact that neither Thomas Aquinas nor Rudolf Bultmann has addressed himself either to the realm or to the interpretation of the meaning of reason's (or Being's) dimensionality. Consequently, our investigation has to be developed in the realms pertaining to the ontological and epistemological frameworks in which Thomas and Bultmann actually used reason as an indispensable theological tool. From the starting point provided by these frameworks we focus mainly on the primordial presupposition they entail. At the same time our analysis makes us aware, in a structural way, of the way reason functions in each theological system. Our analysis is developed following a historical approach with their theologic: exegetical procedures as such, or explicate their understanding of such related issues as revelation or mythology. Similarly a detailed analysis and criticism of their epistemological-philosophical writings or of the ongoing discussion and criticism that they have aroused in the theological community are not intended here. I will deal with their philosophy and theology only insofar as the use and interpretation of the structure of reason in their system requires.

1 Ortega y Gasset in La Idea de Principio, p. 271, explains that Being has not been asked about its meaning since 480 years before Christ. He also points out that Scholasticism in particular did not ask for the meaning of Being but rather for Aristotle's understanding of Being.

2 A detailed study of Thomas's and Bultmann's use and interpretation of reason's role in theology is not possible in our study, which searches for the a priori conditions utilized by reason rather than for a description of reason's manifold procedures and features. It should be clear at this point that reason's actual procedures in the constitution of meaning is determined by the a priori conditions, presuppositions (ontological and epistemological), and primordial presupposition chosen for reason's functioning. A detailed and complete study should go beyond our structural determination of reason's dimensionality and basic procedures at the framework level, to both a detailed analysis of reason's functioning as it constitutes different kinds of theological meaning and to show the way in which the actual result, that is the theological idea within
Consequently we deal first with classical reason and then, in the second part of this chapter, with scientific reason.

While we search in each theological system for reason's dimensionality as the ultimate a priori ground for meaning, we should remember that according to the analysis developed in chapter I, two possible primordial presuppositions have been recognized by philosophical reflection, namely, timelessness and temporality. In this context we ask which one is at work in each theological system.

As the primordial presupposition determines the very functioning of reason through the interpretation of its framework, the first and foundational decision that any system, philosophical or theological, should consciously make is the decision regarding the primordial presupposition to be used. Such is also the first step to be taken in the area of the criticism of reason. Only on the given system, depends for its meaning and intelligibility upon a particular understanding of reason's role that each theologian chose to follow.

The historical order is used for the same reason presented in the case of the analysis of reason's dimensionality in its philosophical development. See above, p. 75, n. 2.

The name is chosen only for the practical purposes of quick identification. We are aware that both classical theology and its structure of reason are also "scientific," at least from Thomas' classic claim onwards: "Dicendum sacram doctrinam scientiam esse," ST, I. 1, 2 (in specialized literature quotes from Thomas follow several styles, of which I have chosen one). However, since the scientific model has changed substantially since Thomas's times, we use the term "scientific" in the sense of a careful procedure of investigation that searches for truth in the natural realm. It should be added that the term "scientific" is used in its Newtonian positivist sense and not in its rather recent and yet unexplored meaning brought about by modern physical discoveries. See Werner Heisenberg, Across the Frontiers (New York: Harper & Row, 1975), pp. 154-65; and idem, Physics and Philosophy: The Revolution in Modern Science (New York: Harper & Row, 1958), pp. 187-206.
this basis may both the ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure be developed.

In chapter I our analysis provided the philosophical and epistemological contexts that the decision regarding the theological primordial presupposition requires. The main purpose of this second chapter is to provide the theological context from the realm of the history of theology. Our third chapter completes the necessary theological context from the realm of Sacred Scripture. Only then can a critical choice regarding both reason and its primordial presupposition be possible.

**Classical Reason**

As we consider classical reason in the way it is represented by Thomas Aquinas, we should bear in mind that Thomas's interpretation of reason's structure is generally accepted and utilized for the constitution of theological meanings not only by Roman Catholic theology\(^1\) but it is also accepted by conservative Protestant

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Consequently, our analysis attempts to uncover the structure of theological reason as it has been utilized by both traditions.

In order to show both the way in which reason actually functioned and the dimensionality which reason, in its classical expression, chose for its functioning, we search Thomas's interpretation. This is a common denominator that we can find, for instance, in theologians such as Karl Rahner (Robert Moloney, "Seeing and Knowing: Some Reflections on Karl Rahner's Theory of Knowledge," Heythrop Journal 18 [1977]:412), Hans Küng (Does God Exist?, pp. 62T, 22, 56; cf. Catherine Mowry Lacugna, The Theological Methodology of Hans Küng [Chico, California: Scholars Press, 1982], pp. 8-55), Teilhard de Chardin (The Phenomenon of Man, p. 29), and Gustavo Gutiérrez (Theology of Liberation: History, Politics and Salvation [New York: Orbis Books, 1973], pp. 56, 57, 69-72).


Focused mainly on Summa Theologiae and Summa Contra Gentiles.

At least in some degree, modern liberal Protestant theology departs from this pattern. We address this departure in the second part of this chapter.
interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks.¹

**Ontological Framework:**

**Timelessness**

The center of gravity of Thomas Aquinas's system may be found in the understanding of being, namely, in his metaphysics.² Thomas's metaphysics is developed after the pattern and model provided by Aristotle's metaphysics.³ This fact⁴ already points to a timeless

¹As we talk about "framework" the reader should bear in mind two things. First, that what we call "framework" is what Thomas Aquinas or any other author calls "theory" both of ontology (ontological framework) and of knowledge (epistemological framework). We call them "framework" because our epistemological analysis has shown that reason needs such interpretations in order to function. However, it should be remembered that since the content and meaning of any framework is produced by reason itself, it stands in the level and character of "theory," hence, it is a hypothetical following of the character of reason as a whole. See pp. 32-52 above.


³Thomas Aquinas was not the first to use Aristotle for theological purposes, see Yves M. J. Congar, A History of Theology (Garden City, New York: Doubleday, 1968), p. 85. A swift glance into Summa Theologiae shows that Thomas made use not only of Aristotle but also of many other thinkers, such as Augustin of Hippo, Pseudo-Dionysious, and Maimonides; see E. Gilson, The Philosophy of St. Thomas Aquinas (Cambridge: W. Heffer & Sons, 1924), pp. 12-15. Though Aristotle provides the framework for Thomas Aquinas's system, the neo-Platonic heritage of Thomas's metaphysics must not be forgotten. See G. M. Pizzuti, "Per una interpretazione storico-cizzata de Tomaso D'Aquino: Senso e limiti di una prospettiva," Sapienza 29 (1976):460. For additional commentary on the Aristotelism of Aquinas, see, for instance, Loritz, pp. 291-94.

⁴Even though the Aristotelism of Aquinas may be interpreted in different ways and with different emphases, the basic fact that
primordial presupposition standing at the very basis of Thomas's system.\(^1\) In this context, Thomas's contribution to both philosophy and theology may be seen in his Christian interpretation of the Aristotelian pattern for both being and knowledge.\(^2\)

**Ontos**

After Thomas Aquinas's death his ontology has been interpreted in various ways.\(^3\) Among them it is possible to distinguish two major traditions, namely, essentialism and existentialism as either essentia (form) or esse (existence), both being aspects of the pattern of thought followed by Aquinas is confessedly Aristotelian.

\(^1\) As we have already pointed out (see above, pp. 88-96), Aristotle's system assumed and worked in a timeless primordial presupposition both in the ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure.

\(^2\) Thomas saw that Aristotle's metaphysics was able to provide the basic framework for intelligibility needed for approaching the study of theology as a whole in a scientific way. Etienne Gilson in History of Christian Philosophy in the Middle Ages (New York: Random House, 1958), pp. 364, 365, remarks that Thomas's approach to theology from the viewpoint of the Aristotelic framework produced a revolution both in theology and philosophy. However, we should remember that Thomas interpreted the first principles of Aristotelic metaphysics and theory of knowledge from a Christian viewpoint (ibid.). The purpose of Thomas' philosophical reflection was to provide theology with a necessary background for intelligibility. Hence, in his thinking philosophy and theology stand together in an unbreakable relationship. See Josef Peiper, Introduction to Thomas Aquinas (London: Faber & Faber, 1962), pp. 152-53. Thomas's metaphysics provides theology with a "rational bridge" which helps him to bring the supernatural content of revelation into man's normal realm of knowledge (Congar, p. 113). Finally, Thomas's metaphysical pattern as ontological framework of the structure of reason affects not only the form but the very content of theological meanings. See ibid., p. 86.

\(^3\) We are not concerned here with Thomism as a school of thought. For a brief historical introduction to the main trends in Thomism, see Küng, Does God Exist? pp. 22-26.
Thomas's ontology are emphasized.\textsuperscript{1} Neo-Thomist approaches seem to be more comfortable with the existentialist interpretation.\textsuperscript{2} An analysis of Thomas's writings, however, shows that both \textit{esse} and \textit{essentia} are foundational for his ontological framework.

According to Aquinas, \textit{esse} is the act of existence\textsuperscript{3} which is found at the root of reality and which is ontologically prior to everything else including \textit{essentia}.\textsuperscript{4} \textit{Esse} is "the most perfect thing of all," which is the condition even for the foundational metaphysic concepts of matter and form; potency and act.\textsuperscript{5} Existential

\textsuperscript{1}Gilson, \textit{Thomisme}, pp. 49, 138.

\textsuperscript{2}For instance, see Jacques Maritain, \textit{Existence and the Existent} (Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1964); Savagnone, pp. 73-76; Pasquale Orlando, "Verso un Tomismo Esistenziale," pp. 382-410; Gilson, \textit{L'Etre}, p. 301, and \textit{Thomisme}, pp. 49, 138. It should be noticed that, as Maritain, \textit{Existence and the Existent}, p. 1, says, Thomas's is a "different kind" of existentialism which must not be confused with the contemporary one (as in Sartre and Merleau-Ponty, for instance). Thomas's existentialism, of course, is for Thomists the "only authentic existentialism" (ibid.). This already suggests that a particular interpretation or understanding of the \textit{esse} is involved.

\textsuperscript{3}Thomas uses the word \textit{ens} to refer to an entity and the word \textit{esse} to refer to the act of existence of an entity or substance. See Gilson, \textit{Thomisme}, p. 44. ST, I. 5, 1 ad 1, explains that being (\textit{ens}) properly signifies: something-existing-in-act (\textit{esse in actu}).

\textsuperscript{4}SCG, 2. 54, 50, 51. So the \textit{essentia} as we find it presupposes the \textit{esse} as its ontological ground. See SCG, 2.52; and BE, chapter 5; cf. Octavio Derisi, "El fundamento de la Metafisica Tomista. El \textit{esse} e intelligere divino, fundamento y causa de todo ser y entender participados," \textit{Sapiencia} 35 (1980):15, 16. "The most perfect thing of all is to exist \textit{[ipsam esse]}, for everything else is potential compared to existence" (ST, I. 4. 1 ad 3).

\textsuperscript{5}"Nothing achieves actuality except it exists, and the act of existing is therefore the ultimate actuality of everything, and even of every form" (ST, I. 4. 1 ad 3). So \textit{esse} is the ground of every form of being, be it natural (ST, I. 3. 4) or supernatural (separate substances, BE, p. 44; cf. \textit{SCG}, 2. 54. 10). Cf. Maritain, \textit{Existence}, p. 37.
Thomism likes to remark that in the idea of esse, Thomas was facing (and solving) a problem unnoticed by Aristotle, namely, the problem that appears when being as being is related to nothing. In a sense Thomas may be considered as an existentialist philosopher since esse precisely points to "being there" (Dasein) as the basic precondition for any meaning at all. However, the similitude between Thomas's existentialism and modern existentialism, in general, ends right here, namely, where it begins.

In Thomas's thinking the concept of esse neither exhausts the ontological realm nor provides the ground for the interpretation of either the epistemological and ontological frameworks. The concept

1For instance, Gilson, Thomisme, p. 49. This nothing refers to the not-being as in Parmenides. Thus it is the question for the explanation of the existence of being, and not for its meaning as, for instance, Heidegger's analysis suggests. See "The Way Back," pp. 216-218. As we will see, the question of the meaning of Being in Aquinas has been, basically, answered by Parmenides; hence, such a question does not need to be posited. For Heidegger, on the contrary, the question for existence as such, in disconnection from the question for meaning, has neither relevance nor meaning, since reflection begins because of it as what is there (Dasein). For Heidegger, in his historical context, what is important is the question for the meaning of what is there. On the other hand, in Thomas, the idea of creatio is applied to esse, but not as the ground for the meaning of being as Heidegger claims (An Introduction to Metaphysics, pp. 7, 8). Heidegger claims that Christian thinkers cannot formulate the ultimate question for the meaning of Being because they have the answer in the idea of creation. This Heideggerian idea misunderstands the purpose and place of the idea of creation in Christian theology. Creation points to the esse, yet it does not ground, neither in the Bible nor in Thomas, the meaning or ground of Being; cf. "The Way Back," pp. 216-18. It is proper, however, to say in Heidegger's behalf, that in classical theology the idea of the meaning of Being is so hidden that at first glance it seems to be reduced to the question for existence in the creatio answer. Further analysis, however, reveals that the meaning of Being, both in creation and in the creator himself, has another ground and follows a different level of inquiry. See the analysis of the meaning of Being according to Moses in the third chapter.
of **esse** rather expresses the independence of the ontological realm from the cognitive realm and provides the ground for the possibility of both the ontological and epistemological frameworks.¹

Meaning, in Thomas's system, appears when **esse** is seen in its unbreakable relation to **essentia**.² Meaning happens in the level or realm of **essentia** as **essentia** is considered to be "that through

¹ST, I. 44, 1 ad 1. Since the cause does not enter into the definition of an ens which is caused, esse as the ontological "cause," or at least as the precondition for meaning of ens, is not related or included in its actual meaning; cf. BE, p. 46. The non-conceptualization of the act of esse as basic ontological ground or realm is explained by Gilson as he says that truth consists in "the operation of an intellect that going beyond the simple grasping of quiddity of Being reaches the act that causes it" (L'Etre, p. 123). As we can see "quiddity" is the cognitive term that refers to knowledge as existing in the epistemological framework, corresponding to the essence in the ontological framework. Hence, beyond meaning we can see the ontological cause or act that originated meaning, namely, esse. But this esse, as such, has no meaning of its own independent of essentia. Hence esse is not really grasped but rather co-grasped with the essentia with which it co-appears. Maritain (Existence, pp. 34, 35) calls esse, as ontological ground, the "super-intelligible" ground for intelligibility, that is, he sees esse as transcending the realm of mind and knowledge. He also further explains that "to say that which exists is to join an intelligible to a super intelligible" (ibid.). Kant works precisely on this understanding of Thomas regarding existence as esse, when he affirms, as he criticizes the Ontological Argument for the existence of God, "If I take the subject (God) with all its predicates (omnipotence being one), and say: God is, or There is a God, I add no new predicate to the conception of God, I merely posit or affirm the existence of the subject with all its predicates—I posit the object in relation to my conception. The content of both is the same; and there is no addition made to the conception" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 350).

²The real distinction between esse and essentia is at the core of Thomas's ontological framework. "From this is clear that the act of existing is other than essence or quiddity" (BE, p. 46). See also ST, I. 3. 4. This distinction is not present in the case of God's being because "sua igitur essentia est suum esse" (ibid.).
which and in which a being has its act of existing [esse]."¹ As essentia is understood, following Aristotle, as "quod quid erat esse,"² the Parmenidean timeless primordial presupposition³ shows up as its precondition. Timelessness can additionally be seen as essentia follows form. It is clear that essentia, in Thomas, refers to the nature of both composite and separate substances.⁴ It is

¹BE, p. 28. Essentia according to Thomas is meaning as considered in its ontological ground in union with esse. Quiddity is the epistemological correlate to essentia in the mind of the cognitive subject (ibid.). We should notice at this point that the real distinction between essentia and esse means that essentia by itself is not the ultimate ground for reality and meaning. In this sense the essentialism of Plato and the formalism of Aristotle are overcome by Thomas. See, for instance, Savagnone, pp. 73-75. However, when there is esse there is always essentia. That is, essentia always entails as its ontological support an existence, an esse as actu. ST, I. 3, 4 ad 2, expresses that esse insofar as it is said means actum essendi, that is, the ontological realm is in close relationship with essentia and compositionem propositionis. That is, esse points to the epistemological realm.

²BE, p. 27. Armand Mauer comments on the meaning of essence as "what a thing was to be," pointing out that "the past tense of the verb (was) does not express past time. It expresses absolutely the direction of the tendency of a being's nature" (ibid., n. 6). So, it seems that the etymological meaning of essentia already points to the dimensionality where a "being's nature" is given according to Thomas Aquinas's thinking, that is to say, it points to timelessness.


⁴SCG, 2. 54. 10. Composite substances are formed by matter and form [BE, pp. 30-32], and essentia embraces both. Separate substances are composed of potency and act (this also applies to composite substances, SCG, 2. 54. 10). See ST, I. 75, 5 ad 4; and BE, p. 45. Essentia, then, refers in material being, to the composite substance (matter and form), and in the separate substances to form and its entailed potency, namely, to its participated esse.
clear also that the *essentia* of these two main kinds of ontological substances is expressed through the ontological concepts of form and potency-matter. Now, according to Thomas, form as the principle of Being, has primacy over matter. And since matter points to the temporal dimension of reality while form points to timelessness (after the Platonic-Aristotelian tradition), it follows that in

1. Since a separate substance does not have matter (BE, pp. 43, 44) and is, therefore, a form, the potentiality that belongs to matter (namely, the changeability of temporality) does not apply to it. However, the potency of its esse as participated in relation to God's does apply to separate substance; God does not participate in esse because he is ipsum esse. "There is in them a composition of form and act of existing [esse]" (BE, p. 44).

2. The principle of knowledge is form (ST, I. 12, 1 ad 2). In the case of the natural composite substances, Thomas explains that "we find the relation of matter and form such that form makes matter exist. It is thus impossible that matter exists without some form" (BE, p. 30). He further adds: "On this account, the essence by reason of which a thing is called a being, cannot be either form alone or matter alone, but is the two together, even though the form alone in its own way is the cause of such an act of existing" (ibid., p. 31). Thomas explains that "if we find some forms which can exist only in matter, this happens to them because they are far removed from the first Principle, which is primary pure act" (ibid., p. 44); cf. Gilson, Thomisme, p. 48, as he comments that according to Thomas, form determines matter and gives intelligibility to it; and SCG, 2. 54. The primacy of form is obvious in separate substances (immaterial entities) as angels who have no matter. See, for instance, ST, I. 50. 2. This should not be confused with essentialism. Essentialism suggests the primacy of essence by disregarding the idea of esse.

3. Matter, in Thomas's system, points to the temporal dimension only as materia signata (BE, p. 32). "Only corporeal matter stands in the way of intelligibility" (BE, p. 44). Yet undesignated matter is included in the essence of composite substances (BE, pp. 30-32). In general, matter points to change (SCG, I. 17. 2 and 5). Potency also entails change (SCG, I. 16). We see, then, how time is certainly included in Thomas's ontological framework. However, matter (time) is not the principle of knowledge, hence it is not the principle of Being either. Matter with no form is unknowable (ignotum) (ST, I. 12, 1 ad 2).

4. Thomas does not use explicitly the idea of timelessness to refer to or describe "form." However, it is clear that he uses
Thomas's interpretation of the ontological framework timelessness has primacy over temporality. Moreover, regarding the dimensionality of Being and knowledge, it is apparent that only timelessness is possible. This ontological pattern and its determinative timelessness may be seen in Thomas's interpretation of man's being which plays a central role in his interpretation of reason's structure.

Man is a natural composite substance. As such man is composed of matter and form which correspond to body and soul. Hence, the idea of "form" in its Aristotelic meaning (BE, pp. 37, 38) as pointing to universality, necessity, intelligibility, and abstraction. All these foundational ideas, in different ways, assume a timeless ground for their understanding. See above, p. 90, nn. 1 and 2.

1"Materiae non perfectae per formam ignotum es" (matter not perfected by form is, as such, unknowable)" (ST, I. 12, 1 ad 2). And "formae non limitatae per materiam est secundum se maxime notum" (form not confined by matter is in itself supremely knowable). That matter in itself, as changeable and temporal, cannot be the principle of knowledge, entails that it does not belong to Being, "for it is the same thing to think and to be"; see p. 35, n. 3. Hence matter, even though recognized and included as part of reality as a mode of it, is not to be considered at the level of Being's dimensionality. On the contrary, since form is the principle of knowledge, timelessness appears as Thomas's implicit primordial presupposition.

2The interpretation of man is central for any philosophy, obviously because it deals with man's being, and so it conditions the interpretation of the cognitive subject and its capabilities (potentialities in Thomas's language). The interpretation of man is central for theology too, besides the already-mentioned reasons for the case of philosophy, because in theology man is also the center and place for the constitution of meaning. Hence, the particular interpretation of man's being that any system adopts determines the broad lines which the constitution of meaning follows in it.

3BE, pp. 32, 34, 38. We cannot enter into the clarification of the distinction that Thomas makes between materia signata as principle of individuation and designated matter as constitutive of the definition (concept, essentia, quiddity) of man; see ibid., p. 32.

4ST, I. 75. 4.
according to the primacy of form, the soul as intellectual nature is not absorbed by corporeal matter but is considered to be man's specific nature. Soul, as form, reveals that man's being is also conceived as pertaining to timelessness. As we have already seen, the idea that in Thomas Aquinas more clearly points to temporality as Parmenidean doxa (Lebenswelt) is to be found in the concept of matter. Since matter does not pertain to the nature of the

\[1\] ST, I. 76, 2 ad 2. See also I. 79.

\[2\] ST, I. 76, 1 ad 4.

\[3\] SCG 2. 60. See Ricardo Marimón Batlló, "Orden Natural y Orden Sobrenatural en Santo Tomás de Aquino," Sapientia 33 (1978):22. Of course the soul is not the man, but the form of the human body (ST, I. 97. 6; SCG, 2. 68. 70. 71 57; ST, I. 75. 4). Man is the composite of body and soul. Soul, through its function as "form" leads in the realm of being and meaning.

\[4\] That is to say, potentiality for not-being. The idea of matter entails essential change and corruption as it may be found in contingent temporal realities. "To be subject to change or to undergo it belongs to materiality by virtue of its potentiality" (ST, I. 75, 5 ad 2). Not all potentiality, however, points to temporality. For instance, the separate substances also have potentiality in two ways which do not entail temporality as in the Parmenidean doxa dimensionality. One is the potentiality of the form of the separate substance in relation to its esse (ST, I. 75, 6 ad 4; SCG 2. 54). The other is the movement (non-essential change) that the intellect undergoes from "ignorance to knowledge" (ST, I. 75, 5 ad 2). The soul, at least in via, is potential in the last two senses (BE, p. 44; ST, I. 79). How timelessness is implied by matter and corruptibility may be seen as Thomas remarks that "in every thing which is corrupted there must be potentiality to non-being. Hence, if there be a thing in which there is no potentiality to non-being, such a thing cannot be corruptible. Now, in the intellectual substance there is no potentiality to non-being. . . . Hence, neither in the case of the corruptible substances is there potentiality to non-being in the complete substance itself, except by reason of the matter. But there is no matter in intellectual substances, for they are themselves complete, simple substances. Consequently, there is no potentiality to non-being in them. Therefore, they are incorruptible" (SCG 2. 55. 5). I would add: therefore they are timeless. Due to lack of space I cannot comment here.
soul, it follows that the soul is timeless. In via, yet, man is not timeless in the way the separate substances are. Notwithstanding, man is to be interpreted in his specific and determinative nature as timeless.

In patria man will be transformed after the likeness of his soul's timeless nature. In patria man is certainly going to have a body, but it will be an incorruptible body whose "matter" will be in complete subjection to the human soul. Man's body will be raised, ontologically to a level of reality "up above every body on how the above-mentioned potentialities regarding the incorruptible, simple, immaterial intellectual entities may be seen as an analogical remnant of time in the way timeless being is interpreted within a hierarchical order which reaches its climax in God who alone is absolute being ipsum esse, and to whom, therefore, pertains timelessness in its absolute mode. Cf. Marimón Batlló, "Orden Natural," p. 22.

1 "Hence there is in no way a composition of matter and form in a soul or an intelligence so that matter may be thought to exist in them as it does in corporeal substances" (BE, p. 44).

2 SCG, 2. 60.

3 "The body, then, will be commonly disposed in all men in harmony with the soul, with this result: The incorruptible form bestows an incorruptible being on the body in spite of its composition from contraries, because in respect to corruption the matter of the human body will be entirely subject to the human soul. But the glory and power of the soul elevated to the divine vision will add something more ample to the body united to itself. For this body will be entirely subject to the soul—the divine power will achieve this—not only in regard to its being, but also in regard to action, passion, movements, and bodily qualities" (SCG, 4. 86. 1). So, the body is not annihilated as if man should become as the angelic separate substances. Yet matter, as far as corruptibility is concerned, is to be eliminated through its absolute submission to the soul, whose timelessness, so to speak, will absorb the body and those aspects which are incompatible with man's new ontological state in patria. See, for instance, SCG, 4. 87. 2, regarding the "new" way in which the senses are supposed to function. Thomas does not explain, however, what would be in patria the object of the "new"
whatever\textsuperscript{1} as it is transformed according to the characteristics of the heavenly bodies.\textsuperscript{2} This picture is completed when we are told that in patria "time shall be no longer,"\textsuperscript{3} and that all animals and plants "will be no more."\textsuperscript{4} It is now possible to see, then, how the timeless dimensionality of reason entails or

senses, since all material realities as we know them today will disappear. See also SCG, 4. 97. 5.

\textsuperscript{1}SCG, 4. 87. 2.

\textsuperscript{2}SCG, 4. 87. 1. Now, heavenly bodies are the most unchanging of all. They certainly do not change essentially or substantially. Hence, they are incorruptible (ST, I. 115. 3), they only change place. It is apparent, then, that the result of the subjection of the matter by the soul entails a change in the very nature of our body from corruptible (temporal) to incorruptible (timeless). Additionally, it should be noticed that the cognitive potentiality of the soul will disappear in the state of bliss in patria as every desire is put to rest in the visio Dei (SCG, 1. 63). The only potentiality that, according to Aquinas, will remain in man will be that of his participated esse in relation to God's ipsum esse.

\textsuperscript{3}"Now, generation and corruption in inferior bodies are caused by the movement of the heavens. Therefore, that generation and corruption may come to a stop in the inferior bodies, the movement of the heavens must also come to a stop. And on this account the Apocalypse (10:6) says 'that time shall be no longer'" (SCG, 4. 2). As we can see, according to Thomas, the movement of corruption and generation not only will come to a stop in the inferior bodies but they will disappear altogether (see note below).

\textsuperscript{4}"But the other animals, the plants, and the mixed bodies, those entirely corruptible both wholly and in part, will not remain at all in that state of incorruption" (SCG, 4. 97. 5). This will be effected by the final fire (SCG, 4. 95. 6). The Lebenswelt is destroyed and overcome as consequence of the overall timeless interpretation of Being that Thomas utilizes as background of intelligibility for the understanding of the being of man both in via and in patria. This shows the Parmenidean timeless primordial presupposition as being the one Thomas chose for both his philosophy and his theology. Obviously, such timelessness is embedded in the structure of reason itself, as the interpretation of the meaning of the concepts of essence, existence, entity, truth, goodness, being, etc. . . . and the hierarchical order in which they are conceived.
includes a timeless dimensionality for man's being.

Theos

The theos idea provides, within the general structure of reason, the ground for unity, coherence, and system. Thomas

It is necessary to remark that perhaps, from a historical viewpoint, the timelessness of man's being may be seen as the first ground that timelessness had in the philosophical realm. It seems to be clear that Plato's understanding of an immortal soul (timeless) has its origin in Oriental Orphic religious thought. See Wilhelm Windelband, A History of Philosophy, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1958); J. R. Zurcher, The Nature and Destiny of Man: Essay on the Problem of the Union of the Soul and the Body in Relation to the Christian Views of Man (New York: Philosophical Library, 1969), pp. 15-17; Carsten Johnsen, Man the Indivisible: Totality versus Disruption in the History of Western Thought (Oslo: Universitetforlaget, 1971), pp. 83-85. When timelessness came to determine the philosophical primordial presupposition, it could not but render a timeless interpretation of man's being.


Without this idea reason just cannot function. It pertains to reason's structure, not only to the interpretation of it. As reason constitutes meaning theos is always present, either consciously or unconsciously guiding the process. We should be aware that the theos aspect of reason structure may be expressed in different ways by different systems. For instance, theos itself, the expression we have chosen for our analysis, has obvious theological connotations. In philosophy the ONE plays the role of theos in both the structure of reason and in the system itself. Thomas explicitly explains that in his system theos plays the role of the Platonic ONE (ST, I. 44. 1). In Marxism the "class struggle" concept plays
interprets theos within the context of his ontological categories as the being (ens) whose essentia est suum esse. God, conceived as act of existence (esse), is the foundation of Thomas's system.

Thus the criticism that Thomas' ipsum esse is an empty concept is the role of theos. See p. 144, n. 3 above. For the role of theos as structural ground for meaning and system, see pp. 41-51.

This is apparent, as soon as we get into Thomas's first articles of ST. The ontological interpretation that he developed in his early years and which is expressed in an abridged form in BE is presupposed as basic condition for intelligibility in ST. It is also apparent that Aquinas follows the onto-theo-logical ordo of the flux of meaning within the structure of reason. See p. 64, n. 3 above.

3ST, I. 3. 4; BE, p. 50.

Maritain explains the centrality of God as ipsum esse in the following statement: "The act of existing insofar as it grounds and centers the intelligible structure of reality, as it expands into activity in every being, and as, in its supreme, uncreated plenitude, it activates and attracts to itself the entire dynamism of nature. At their ontological peak, in the transcendence of the Pure Act and the Absolute, Being and Reason are one and the same reality" (The Range of Reason, p. 87). See also Pasquale Orlando, "Verso un Tomismo esistenziale," p. 389.

This idea is broadly held by Protestant interpreters and theologians; for instance, Paul Tillich in his Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-1963), 1:247. Tillich sees in this Thomistic formula a negation of the idea of life: "Potenti ality and actuality appear in classical theology in the famous formula that God is actus purus, the pure form in which everything potential is actual. . . . In this formula the dynamic side in the dynamics-form polarity is swallowed by the form side. Pure actuality, that is, actuality free from any element of potentiality, is a fixed result; it is not alive" (ibid., p. 246). It seems that Tillich approaches the interpretation of Thomas's thought from an essentialist perspective which disregards the basic idea of esse. It is interesting to notice that Tillich's proposal regarding the "power of being" has many similarities with the idea of esse. For an analysis and comparison between Thomas's esse and Tillich's "power of being," see Lewis S. Ford, "Tillich and Thomas: The Analogy of Being," The Journal of Religion 46 (1966):239-45. According to Pizzuti ("Teologia e Metafisica," p. 585) the same seems to be the case, for instance, in Kari Barth's interpretation of the
incorrect since it ignores the foundational idea of esse. At the same time, however, we should notice that the "essentialist" interpretation of Thomas’s idea of God is not denied but rather included in the proper understanding of God as ipsum esse. That is apparent classical position. In short, this situation is due to an essentialist interpretation of Thomas Aquinas’s idea of God according to which God is reduced to a general and empty concept in which the living, dynamic God of the Bible is lost.

1Gilson (Thomisme, p. 52) affirms that to interpret Thomas's God as an abstract being is to commit treason against Thomas. Regarding the idea of esse and its meaning in Thomas Aquinas, see pp. 61, 62. Gilson, (Thomisme, pp. 126, 127) points out that Thomas overcame the Augustinian essentialism through his proofs of God's existence (esse). See ST, I. 2. 3; cf. Derisi, "El Fundamento," p. 12.

2Essentialism refers to the understanding of God as an abstraction which follows the ontological idea of form in the matter-form pattern of Aristotelian philosophy. It follows the path of the Platonic idea. And this is an essentialist interpretation of the Platonic Idea, because the Platonic Idea may also be understood as referring to or representing actual existing Being, only in another dimension (namely, what is called Platonic "realism").

3This is apparent, for instance, in ST, I. 3. 2, where Thomas affirms that God "is essentially form." In other words, esse points to the existence and life in God. See ST, I. 3. 3, where Thomas connects the ideas of God's esse and essentia to the idea of life. So, according to Thomas Aquinas, God is a living God. The idea of life is grounded on the idea of esse. Yet at the same time God's esse is his essentia. Thus, the idea of God understood from the viewpoint of the Aristotelian form is kept as part of the idea of God. The basis for the analogia entis is provided by the esse. The idea of essentia provides the ground for a human understanding and interpretation of God's esse. In other words, the understanding of God as esse is reached in the grasping of his essence. The esse itself is never grasped, not even in the visio Dei in patria. The visio Dei is a grasping of God's essentia but not of his esse. The esse cannot be grasped. It just rather co-appears with the essentia. So the esse dimension of God's being keeps the mystery of God's life alive in the Thomistic and Catholic system. In short, neither Thomism nor Catholicism can be criticized on account of an abstract, empty interpretation of God. The interpretation of God as form does not exhaust God's reality into an empty idea. What still can be analyzed, however, is whether Thomas's interpretation of a living God from the viewpoint of a timeless dimensionality for Being is compatible with the Biblical interpretation of a living God.
when we are told that since the idea of esse points to God as act, namely, as a living reality which is his essentia, the idea of God must include every possible perfection. Thus, the ipsum esse is the ens perfectissimum whose perfection follows the ontological pattern of form and actuality at their maximum expression. That entails that God's being, as esse-essentia (maximum reality) be understood as timeless, since it excludes absolutely both matter and potentiality.

1 "God possesses all perfections in His very act of existing" (BE, p. 51). "Unde primum principium activum oportet maxime esse in actu, et per consequens maxime perfectum" (ST, I. 4. 2). See also SCG, 2. 52. 4; 3. 1; Orlando, "Verso un Tomismo," p. 389; Derisf, "El Fundamento," pp. 25, 26; and Gilson, Thomisme, p. 51. That in God esse and essentia come together as complementary ideas or approaches for the interpretation of reality as a whole, and particularly for the interpretation of the maximum reality, namely God, is clearly expressed by Thomas as he not only refers to God as the being "whose essence is His very act of existing" (BE, p. 50); but also asserts that "God is His essence" (SCG, 1. 217) and "that in God Being and essence are the same" (SCG, T. 22). Thomas clearly explains that "although God is simply the act of existing, it is not necessary that He lack the other perfections or excellences" (BE, p. 51). So "God possesses all perfections in His very act of existing" (ibid.). Bloch points out that the "equation between being and perfection" in scholastic theology has its source in "Plato rather than Christ" (Man on His Own, p. 209).

2 "God then is essentially form, and not composed of matter and form" (ST, I. 3. 2). He cannot partake of matter because it would imply potentiality (ibid.).

3 Ibid. God "contains no potentiality, but sheer actuality." God "is pure act" (SCG, 1. 17. 7).

4 SCG, 1. 17. 1-5.

5 SCG, 1. 16. 1-7. Both matter and potentiality refer to timelessness as negation of the Parmenidean doxa. The realm of matter in Thomas is the realm of Parmenidean doxa. Potentiality is, in Thomas's hierarchical understanding of Being, what remains of time (analogically) in timeless substances, that is, in substances which do not belong to the realm of Parmenidean doxa.
In Thomas Aquinas, the idea of God's timelessness (eternal) is based on the idea of immutability of Being.\(^1\) And the idea of immutability is grounded on Parmenides' timeless primordial presupposition.\(^2\) Additionally, God's timelessness can be seen as Thomas affirms that "eternity and God are the same thing."\(^3\)

\(^1\)"Eternity, in the true a. proper sense, belongs to God alone, for eternity, we said, follows upon unchangeableness (immutabilitatem)" (ST, I. 10. 3). And as we will see, eternity is timeless.

\(^2\)This, of course, is not directly expressed by Thomas anywhere. However, when we consider his arguments to prove his basic idea of the immutabilitas Dei (ST, I. 9. 1), we realize that his arguments do not prove it except on the assumption of the Aristotelian ontological concepts of potentiality and actuality, in which potentiality and change do not belong to being. Both this description of the ontological framework and the interpretation of it stand only on the assumption of a timeless dimension for Being, namely, on the Parmenidean primordial presupposition. That immutability entails that timelessness is apparent as Thomas says "that the notion of eternity derives from unchangeableness in the same way that the notion of time derives from change" (ST, I. 10. 2).

\(^3\)"Those beings alone are measured by time that are moved. For time, as is made clear in Physics IV, is 'the number of motion.' But God, as has been proved, is absolutely without motion, and is consequently not measured by time. There is, therefore, no before and after in Him: He does not have being after non-being, nor non-being after being, nor can any succession be found in His being. For none of these characteristics can be understood without time. God, therefore, is without beginning and end, having His whole being at once. In this consists the nature of eternity" (SCG, I. 15. 3). "Time and eternity clearly differ" (ST, I. 10. 2 ad 3). The basic difference is to be seen in the fact that "eternity exists as an instantaneous whole, whereas time does not" (ST, I. 10. 4). Now, eternity (God) as instantaneous whole does not pertain to the "now" of time (ST, I. 10. 4 ad 2). This is so because time measures "not only movement but also rest, the state of the movable when not moving" (ST, I. 10. 4 ad 3). So eternity is a different dimension of reality which belongs properly only to God (ST, I. 10. 3). The idea of eternity is further clarified as Thomas explains that "anything existing in eternity is unending (interminable), that is to say, lacks both beginning and end" (ST, I. 10. 7). Additionally, as instantaneous whole, eternity also lacks successiveness (ibid.). This position which clearly excludes time even in its dimension of present from the ideas of eternity, God, and Being, clearly
God is, in Thomas Aquinas, the center of the theological and philosophical system. The ordo ad Deum, as it pertains to the
contradicts Heidegger's interpretation of traditional Being as springing from and referring to temporal Present as presence; see p. 125, n. 5 above. Moreover, in Thomas' hierarchical understanding of being as whole, the dimension of eternity or timelessness belongs absolutely only to God. The rest of being pertains either to time or to the intermediate state which "is neither time nor eternity," namely to the "aeon" (ST, I. 10. 5). Briefly, as in time there are present (leading in the understanding of temporal beings) timeless aspects which flow from God's being, as, for instance, form, essentia, esse, and act, in the intermediate state of aeon, the time­less dimensionality finds within itself temporal elements such as potentiality and the movement from ignorance to knowledge. Additionally, as God's eternity "comprehends (includit) all phases of time" (ST, I. 10. 2 ad 4). Thomas interprets God as being in relation to all beings both in the aeon and in time. It should be remembered that this is the timelessness of the ipsum esse and so it refers in no way to an empty abstract concept according to the essentialist tradition of interpretation. Timelessness rather points to the very dimension in which God, as ipsum esse, as living being, lives and acts. We see, then, that God, and with him the very idea of transcen­dence, is developed by Thomas Aquinas following the Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelian pattern of ontology. See Orlando, "Verso un Tomismo," p. 401; Joseph de Finance, "Eternity," "Sacramentum Mundi": An Encyclopedia of Theology (1968), 2:250, 251; Gilson, L'Etre, p. 82; Marias, History of Philosophy, p. 193; Maritain, Existence, p. 43; Ernst, p. 408; cf. ST, I. 12. 3; I. 13. 7; SCG, 3. 62.

1ST, 1. prologue to question 2: "The fundamental aim of holy teaching is to make God known, not only as he is in himself, but as the beginning and end of all things and of reasoning creatures specially." See also ST, I. 1. 3 ad 1; Ernst, p. 423. Wheeler, p. 49, points out the necessity of the ordo ad Deum, and the futility of the Protestant ordo ad Christum because "one cannot have an explanation of anything except in terms of principles, and ultimately of the First Principle of the being and operation of every object of our thought." What Wheeler does not realize is that in Protestant­ism the ordo ad Christum replaces the ordo ad Deum as first principle of intelligibility. This change was effectuated by Luther in the context of Nominalism. After Thomas a Nominalist current was developed in Scholastic philosophy. A complex ontological-epistemological controversy was centered on the kind of reality that belongs to "universal" concepts, that is to say, what ontological foundation is to be supposed for true knowledge (true knowledge is universal knowledge). Nominalism denied any "ontologi­cal reality" to the universal concepts. Roscelin's extreme position

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onto-theo-logical structure of reason, provides the basis for the

considered them to be mere flatus vocis (Windelband, 1:296). Occam's
nominalism, which through Gabriel Biel directly influenced Martin
Luther (Seeberg, 2:185, 86), "strikes these species intelligibles as
useless doubling of external reality" (Windelband, 1:325). For
Nominalism, then, the individual concrete reality is the only exist-
ent reality; the species intelligibles (universal concepts) do not
exist at all, hence they have no meaning at all. The problem that
Nominalism was yet unable to solve was that of providing new cate-
gories that could be used for the understanding of the individual
concrete reality. For Nominalism, reality was individual, but the
cognitive categories were still claiming a universal (timeless) know-
ledge. In this context, knowledge, at the most, was to be considered
as being only a "sign" with no exact correspondence in reality
(Windelband, 1:326). In this intellectual context arose Luther's
Protestantism. Luther's theologia crucis (William M. Landeen, Martin
Luther's Religious Thought [Mountain View, California: Pacific
Press, 1971], p. 45) placed the center of intelligibility of Protes-
tantism outside the realm of the species intelligibles (timelessness)
into the very flow of individual, concrete, sensible, historical
reality, that is to say, in the Parmenidean doxa. Yet there
were no cognitive categories to work with such a realm of reality
in the intellectual realm. Protestantism placed itself before cogni-
tive crossroads: whether it had to create a new set of cognitive
categories that could match the nature of reality it had chosen or
it just had to accept the classical timeless structure of in-te-
elligibility of classic theology. Historical Protestantism changed the
ordo ad Deum and its Aristotelian-Thomistic meaning for the ordo
ad Christum in a Lutheran interpretation of the doctrine of justifi-
cation by faith in Paul. In other words, in Protestantism the theos
of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason is not denied but it
is rather provided with a different interpretation. The ontological
framework, then, points to temporality, but the epistemological
framework still, through the accepted traditional framework for
intelligibility, points to timelessness. Hence, the intellectual
enterprise that is theology develops in the realm of timelessness.
The ordo ad Christum, then, which replaces the ordo ad Deum is reached
through a traditional process of abstraction, as in the case of the
class struggle of Marxism (see p. 147, nn. 1-3, and p. 148, nn.
1-3). Thus the Protestant ordo ad Christum is timeless in both the
idea of ordo which relates to Christum not in a temporal historical
way for understanding, but rather in the timeless classical way of
reasoning, deduction, and conclusion; and the idea of Christus which
also is not the product of a temporal historical reasoning or consti-
tution of meaning, but rather is the result of an abstractive cogni-
tive procedure applied to the Biblical text. It is apparent that
Wheeler's criticism of Protestant ordo ad Christum had a point insofar
as the ordo ad Christum is still constructed on the assumption of
the ordo ad Deum as ontological framework. It is also apparent that
ordo disciplinae.¹ This ordo ad Deum is embedded in the Aristotelian hierarchy of being which provides the metaphysical background for reason's coherence and intelligibility.² In this hierarchical interpretation of being, timelessness and time are conceived as

the ontological and epistemological frameworks determine the meaning of theology and system even when in some way the thinker may be reacting against them. In short, as the ordo ad Christo of Protestantism does not challenge the ontological and epistemological frameworks of classical reason, it is developed in and through them so that it just represents a different mode within the same dimensionality and interpretation of the structure of reason. The difference is a difference of intellectual system within a same dimensionality for reason, as, for instance, are Rationalism and Empiricism as philosophical systems.

¹The ordo disciplinae of Thomas' Summa Theologiae has been interpreted in different ways. For instance, M. D. Chenu (Toward Understanding Saint Thomas [Chicago: Henry Regnery, 1964], pp. 298-318) suggests that the pattern followed by Thomas in his Commentary on the Sentences, which is Neo-Platonic in origin, also provides a key for understanding the ordo disciplinae of Summa Theologiae. However, according to Per Erik Persson ("Sacra Doctrinae: Reason and Revelation in Aquinas [Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970], pp. 251, 252), A. Hayen denies a Neo-Platonic pattern and suggests that Thomas's system is based upon the idea of causality. Persson (pp. 258-62) proposes that the ordo disciplinae in Thomas Aquinas is grounded on the ordo ad Deum. Wheeler (pp. 48, 49) additionally points out that in Thomas the ordo disciplinae is based on Aristotelian-Thomistic theories of Being and Knowledge. Thus Persson's and Wheeler's positions complement each other in that Persson's points to the structural movement of thought as it pertains to the structure of reason, while Wheeler's points to the actual interpretation of such structure according to the Aristotelian traditional pattern.

²For a brief summary on the hierarchy of being, see BE, chap. 5. The hierarchy, obviously, is determined by the ontological categories of matter and form; potency and act. Pure act and form (essentia) are given only in God. Then, through the ordo ad Deum, the whole of reality participates of Being (act and form). This participation is given in degrees, notably, separate substances, man, and composite substances. Man and composite substances are in time. Separate substances are not in time, but in the aeon. The ordo ad Deum determines that intelligibility and meaning have to follow the principles of being and knowledge which are essentia and form, namely timelessness. Matter, namely temporality
integrating the whole picture. Meaning and being, however, pertain to the timeless dimensionality which, through the ordo disciplinae, (Lebenswelt), is the very opposite to God and timelessness (SCG, 1.17.6). Additionally, form is the principle of intelligibility (ST, 1.12, 1 ad 2). For further commentary, see Anderson, pp. 29, 32; and Wheeler, pp. 26, 27, 33. This hierarchical order in which the whole of being is conceived furnishes the framework of reference for reason to constitute its meanings, judgments, and reasonings.

1The hierarchy of Being is given in degrees. It, therefore, entails degrees in which timelessness and temporality are given and co-given in the constitution of several entities (substances) within the hierarchy. Temporality is given in the composite substances (matter and form). We should remember, however, that composite substances, as far as they "are," partake of eternity in a temporal mode. They both are and may be known insofar as they as form are related to timelessness (being). Separate substances which have no matter are neither temporal nor timeless, but pertain to the aeon (ST, 1.10.5). They partake of timelessness, however, in that being essences they do not change. Yet they partake of temporality in that a cognitive change from ignorance into knowledge is possible in them, and in that they are not esse but receive their esse from the creative act of God who alone is esse, and, therefore, who alone is timeless. Thomas explains the criterion that he used to determine the hierarchy: "The further a thing falls short of abiding existence, the further it falls short of eternity" (ST, 1.10.5). It is clear, then, that timelessness is the criterion that determines the hierarchy of being and, hence, the constitution of meaning in its systematic dimension. See also Anderson, p. 35; Gilson, L'Être, p. 99. The way in which temporality is included harmoniously within the framework of timeless being may be additionally seen, from another angle, in Thomas’s central idea about the naturale desiderium (ST, 1.12, 8 ad 4), which applies to reality as a whole. "Created things are made like unto God by the fact that they attain to divine goodness. If then, all things tend toward God as an ultimate end, so that they may attain His goodness, it follows that the ultimate end of things is to become like God" (SCG, 3.19.1). See also I-IIae. 3.8. So, movement, that is to say, time is conceived and explained within the framework of timelessness after, again, an Aristotelian pattern. In short, all movement, as desire, is explained as movement toward God, namely, toward timelessness. And, since happiness is the fulfillment of the naturale desiderium (SCG, 3.63.9) in the visio Dei, it follows that temporality, as involved in ethics, reaches its end as it leads to timelessness (eternity). This principle, (the naturale desiderium) is a general principle through which Thomas is able to include time as movement within a timeless structure. Consequently, the principle of naturale desiderium applies to all beings according to each one's nature.
namely the ordo ad Deum, penetrates the whole scope of reality, determining the meaning and interpretation of both ontology and theory of knowledge.¹

Moreover, the hierarchical systematic ordo of being provides, as the structure of reason, the foundation on which Thomas builds up his understanding about the harmonious relationship that is supposed to exist between both philosophy and theology,² and the natural and supernatural orders.³ This harmonious understanding of reality as...

It applies to material things (SCG, 3. 21. 3. 6; 3. 24. 6; ST, I-IIae. 1. 11. 2; I. 80. 1.), to animatis (SCG, 3. 24. 7), and in a special way to man. In the case of man, Thomas further includes the temporal mode of being within his timeless ontological structure as he distinguishes the natural desiderium to see God in man as following man's historical movement in three stages, namely, (1) in the originalis justiae state (ST, I. 100. 1 ad 2; I. 95. 1; I. 94. 1; I. 95. 4 ad 1; SCG, 3. 62; ST, I-IIae. 3. 8); (2) in via (ST, I-IIae. 1. 4); and (3) in patria when de visio Dei is achieved (SCG, 3. 62. 5). The basic temporal structure of naturale desiderium also applies to the angels (who live in the aeon) (ST, I. 59. 1; I. 62. 5; SCG, I. 19. 1 ad 2). Neither Aquinas's ordo disciplinae nor his interpretation of reason's structure can be properly understood if the naturale desiderium is forgotten. This makes apparent the flexibility and broadness of Thomas' interpretation of the structure of reason, which is able to include time as it interprets it from the viewpoint of timelessness. In short, it is clear that, even when both time and history have a harmonious place in Thomas's system, meaning is constituted from the viewpoint and assumption of timelessness. Temporal being is not understood qua temporal but qua timeless. See Derisi, "El Fundamento," p. 13. For a commentary on the relevant role that history plays in Aquinas's synthesis, see Gilson, L'Étre, p. 99; and M. Froidure, "La Théologie Protestante de la Loi Nouvelle peut-elle se réclamer de Saint Thomas?" Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 51 (1967):58, 59.

¹See for instance, Wheeler, pp. 47-49.

²For an introduction to this aspect of Thomas's system, see Gilson, Thomisme, pp. 9-41; and ST, I. 1; and SCG, I. 1-8.

³For an introduction to the study of the Thomistic interpretation of the natural and supernatural orders in their interrelationship and complementarity as grounded in the ontological framework,
a whole, which is expressed in a nutshell in Thomas's famous statement that "grace does not scrap nature but brings it to perfection," is a product of Thomas's ontological framework which reason uses in the constitution of theological meaning in all its forms.

It is apparent, then, that Thomas's interpretation of the ontological framework provides the necessary framework for intelligibility that theology as a science needs for the constitution of meaning. Moreover, it is also apparent, from the analysis already done, that such a foundational interpretation assumes a timeless understanding of Being's dimensionality. In other words, it assumes a timeless primordial presupposition in the Parmenidean-Platonic tradition of Greek philosophy.

Epistemological Framework:

Timelessness

The analysis of the structure of reason in classical theology needs to be completed by an investigation into the particular way in which the epistemological framework was interpreted and utilized.

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1ST, I. 1 8 ad 2. As we will see later, this principle plays an important role in his theology and even in his theory of theological knowledge namely, in the understanding of the cognitive as visio fidei, visio prophetiae, and visio Dei). At this point, however, it is important to realize that such a principle, namely, that "gratia supponit naturam" does not stand by itself. On the contrary, it stands only on the ground of Thomas's understanding of Being as a hierarchy which is ordered in degrees centered in its climax which is provided by the timeless theos. Gratia supponit naturam, therefore, is neither the ground nor the foundation of
in the constitution of theological meaning. As in the case of the ontological framework, Thomas Aquinas developed his epistemological framework following the Aristotelian pattern. Following the basic agreement between Being and Knowledge, Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of the epistemological framework develops assuming also a timeless primordial presupposition.

Our purpose here is not to enter into a detailed account of Thomas Aquinas's theory of knowledge but rather to present it as activity which, from the subject's side, develops in the assumption of a timeless dimensionality both for being and for the Thomas's system. It is rather a way of expressing in simple terms what is the result of his interpretation of the ontological framework of reason's structure.

Thomas Aquinas follows the basic pattern provided by the Aristotelian scientific model or Theory of Knowledge. See Pasquale Orlando, "L'Esperienza," p. 228; Lorite, "Preliminares," p. 299; Ortiz-Osés, "Comunicación E Interpretación," p. 434; cf. Wheeler, p. 85; and Edwin Hatch, Influence of Greek Ideas and Usages upon the Christian Church, 2nd ed., ed. A. M. Fairbairn (Covent Garden, London: Williams & Norgate, 1891), pp. 116-138. It is on this basis that Aquinas made the revolutionary statement that "sacram doctrinam unam scientiam esse" (ST, I. 1. 3). Even though Aristotle's model was already linked to theological investigations, as, for instance, in Philip Chancellier (1236) and William Auxerre (1231) (M. D. Chenu, La Theologie comme science au XIIIe siècle, 3rd ed. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 1969), p. 67), Thomas's interpretation became the classical one. The basic motifs that Thomas takes from Aristotle's scientific model are the following: that science is knowledge of the essence that science is knowledge by the cause, that science is knowledge of what is necessary, and that science uses the argumentative and demonstrative method. See Tharcisse Tshibangu, Théologie positive et théologie spéculative: position traditionnelle et nouvelle problématique (Louvain: Publications de l'Université de Louvain, 1965), pp. 1-168.

See p. 35, n. 3 above.

This is apparent from Thomas's choice of the Aristotelian pattern for both ontology and epistemology which run in the timeless...
cognitive activity itself. This analysis allows us to see how theological meanings are constituted, and how the timeless primordial presupposition plays the central and determinative role in both the form in which such activity or constitution is achieved and the content or final result, namely, the constituted theological meaning itself.

**Lumen rationis**

Thomas's interpretation of human knowledge develops within the framework of his hierarchical interpretation of being as a whole within a timeless primordial presupposition. Within this context we approach the understanding of Thomas's interpretation of the epistemological framework of reason's structure from the perspective of what he calls *lumen rationis*, that is, of man as composite substance, knowing what is naturally available to him, namely, other composite substances.

The proper object of man's knowledge is the nature or dimensionality. See p. 91, n. 3 above. "Santo Tomás descubrió el alcance a-temporal, a-histórico, de la obra del Nous griego en su dimensión radical" (Lorite, p. 294).

Aquinas's theory of knowledge may be approached from several angles. We are concerned here with a basic awareness of his understanding of the cognitive activity in a general sense, that is to say, with what Thomas calls "lumen naturalis rationis" (ST, II-IIae. 1. 2; he also calls it "lumen intellectuale," [ST, I. 79. 4]). As we will see, this provides the basis for the complementary analysis of human knowledge as lumen fidei, lumen prophetiae, and lumen gloriae. It also provides the basis for the analysis and interpretation of the cognitive activity of the separate substances (angels) and the cognitive activity of the ipsum esse himself, namely God. Yet, as theology is developed by man, and not by either angels or God, we will not touch Thomas's interpretation in those areas.

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quiddity\(^1\) that is to be found in matter.\(^2\) Then, according to the ontological framework already analyzed, knowledge has for object the timeless being that is in time as a form of matter in the constitution of a composite substance.\(^3\) In short, the object of knowledge is the form of a thing, not its matter.\(^4\) However, since in our present state in via man cannot have access to forms except

\(^1\)"Quiddity" refers to the epistemological framework while "essence" refers to the same reality of a thing, from an ontological framework (BE, pp. 26-28).

\(^2\)ST, I. 84. 7; I. 85. 1.

\(^3\)In ST, I. 84. 1, Aquinas explains how the basic thread of his theory of knowledge, which follows the Aristotelian "form" over against "matter" (as changeable and hence temporal), derives from Plato's search for cognitive certainty. The basic difference between Aquinas and Plato does not refer to the nature or dimension in which the form is supposed to pertain, nor in the fact that knowledge refers to the form, but it rather has to do with the way in which the form is given to man. In Plato forms are given through "reminiscence" (see p. 88, nn. 1, 2 above), while in Thomas they are given only through the senses. This makes clear that knowledge has for object what is timeless in time, and not time, matter, or change. Precisely what hindered certainty, and thus knowledge, was the continual flux of time. In order to avoid this uncertainty, Plato, says Thomas, suggested another class of beings separated from matter and change, that is, a new class of timeless beings. Aquinas rejects that such beings may exist as Plato claimed, that is, as immaterial forms. The same timeless dimension for knowledge, however, is accepted by Thomas, as he interprets the cognitive object as timeless forms in time (see p. 174, n. 4). The timelessness of knowledge may also be seen from the viewpoint of immateriality. Gilson explains that according to Thomas, "immateriality is as such and by its nature, intelligible" (Thomisme, p. 161). See also ibid., p. 160.

\(^4\)BE, p. 45. Additionally, the intellect, insofar as it knows the individual, knows "matter," but after the mode of the intellect, which, as we will later see, is also timeless. So Thomas explains that "the intellect receives material and changeable species of material things in an immaterial and unchanging way, in accord with its nature" (ST, I. 84. 1). See also ST, I. 86. 1 ad 3.
through sense images,¹ the cognitive process has to develop as a departure from matter. This departure from matter (and time) is what is called abstraction,² which renders intellectual knowledge, that is, objective knowledge.³

¹ "It is impossible for our intellect, in its present state of being joined to a body capable of receiving impressions, actually to understand anything without turning to sense images" (ST, I. 84. 7).

² "Now to know something which in fact exists in individual matter, but not as existing in such or such matter is to abstract a form from individual matter, represented by sense images. Thus, we have to say that our intellect understands material things by abstraction from sense images" (ST, I. 85. 1). It should be noticed that in ST, I. 85. 1 ad 2, Thomas presents degrees of abstraction. In this graduation of abstraction it is clear that abstraction at least entails a denial of and hence a discontinuity from matter as "individual sensible matter." However, matter may be included in the quiddity of a thing as common matter, or intelligible matter. In short, abstraction provides the elimination of the movable temporal sensible reality of the Lebenswelt as such. Abstraction needs the senses just to get started. The mode in which composite substances are given is certainly temporal, but the mode of both being and man's knowledge is certainly timeless. Even though abstraction eliminates matter as sensible change, some quiddities require that temporal (material) connotations should be included in them, as, for instance, bones and flesh in man. But they are included not as actual concrete bones and flesh, but rather as part of the timeless essence of man. In other words, matter is included insofar as, as a general principle, it constitutes a part of the essence of a composite substance. In order for matter to get into the realm of knowledge, it has to be abstracted from its sensible, changeable features (as materia signata), and thus it has to be made another feature of the timeless form of a sensible, natural, composite substance. This aspect of Thomas's thought shows the very complex and detailed ways in which Thomas Aquinas understood the integration of time in the realm of being and knowledge. Yet, at the same time, it also shows the primacy of the form, hence the primacy of timelessness as basic category for knowledge.

³ Intellecutive knowledge, the knowledge of the quiddity of a thing, is real knowledge, certain knowledge. It is true knowledge in its basic features of universality and necessity, since true knowledge is supposed to express the unmoving, changeless essence of a thing. Changelessness and immutability are the very nature of the form and are inherited from the Parmenidean-Platonic
Besides, as knowledge follows the ancient principle that "like is known by like"\(^1\) and as the mode of understanding depends on the nature of the knower,\(^2\) abstraction requires a particular interpretation of the cognitive potentialities of the subject who realizes the process of abstraction\(^3\) and determines the mode of knowledge. This is what Thomas, following Aristotle, addresses as the active or agent intellect.\(^4\)

The active intellect is a power of the soul,\(^5\) which as principle of the act of understanding is "some kind of incorporeal and subsistent principle."\(^6\) Yet the immateriality of the soul as passive tradition. This knowledge, then, is true "objective" knowledge since it is able to reproduce perfectly its timeless object, namely, the essence or quiddity of the thing. Thus we can see how, even in theology, objectivity is linked to timeless, necessity, and universality.

\(^1\)ST, I. 84. 2. This principle expresses the already mentioned correspondence between subject and object and the dimensionality in which both of them are given.

\(^2\)ST, I. 84. 1.


\(^4\)The need for a particular understanding of the cognitive subject is made clear as Thomas declares "that forms are not actually intelligible unless they are separated from matter and material conditions; nor are they rendered actually intelligible except through the power of an intelligent substance which receives them within itself and produces them" (BE, p. 43). It is clear, then, that the ontological framework determines knowledge not only from the side of the object but also from the side of the subject in the subject-object relationship, as it determines the timeless dimensionality for both.

\(^5\)ST, I. 79. 1.  
\(^6\)ST, I. 75. 2.
potentiality for abstractive knowledge is not enough for producing the actual abstract knowledge. There must be an intellectual agency, namely the active intellect, in order for abstraction to be possible.\(^1\) Thus, "the abstractive intellect creates the concept in its universality by abstracting it from materiality."\(^2\) In this process\(^3\) time has priority in the order of discovery (origin), while timelessness (eternity) has priority in the cognitive order.\(^4\) This shows

\(^1\)ST, I. 79, 3 ad 3. "An intellectual soul is indeed actually non-material, but it is a state of potentiality as regards grasping the natures of things. Images, on the contrary, actually are likenesses of certain things grasped, but are only potentially non-material. Nothing can stop the one same soul from having, because of its actual non-materiality, a power enabling it to dematerialize things by abstracting them from the conditions of material individuality" (ST, I. 79. 4 ad 4).

\(^2\)ST, I. 79, 5 ad 2. The activity that pertains to the active intellect is not of the kind of "self-movement apparent in animal locomotion, certainly not a self-movement within the potency of the soul" (William E. Murnion, "St. Thomas Aquinas's Theory of the Act of Understanding," Thomist 37 [1973]:118). According to Umberto Degl' Innocenti ("L'etimo dell'intelletto agente," Aquinas 13 [1970]:40) "The active intellect is a kind of intuition that in the way of an habit goes always with our soul."

\(^3\)To explain the process according to which the universal and necessary essence can be reached from the starting point of the sensible temporal reality, Thomas suggests that human intellect works in a twofold manner, namely, in an active and passive way, following the ontological Aristotelic pattern of matter and form (ST, I. 79. 4). The active intellect does not work directly on the sensory, temporal reality but rather on the "phantasmata" (ST, I. 85. 1. 2)--a kind of image--which is provided by sensory knowledge to the active intellect. It is on this basis that the active intellect is able to draw from temporal sensory reality the timeless essence (quiddity) (Adorno, Storia della Filosofia, p. 474). From this, it is clear that in Thomas's epistemological framework only what is immaterial (timeless) may be scientifically knowable (Peifer, p. 52). The timeless nature of scientific knowledge may be also seen when Thomas explains that intelligibility is incompatible with the singular, not as such, but as material (ST, I. 86, 1 ad 3).

\(^4\)ST, I. 79. 9.
clearly the timeless dimensionality in which knowledge as such is
supposed to function in order to be knowledge at all.\textsuperscript{1} The relevance
and priority of timelessness in the cognitive order is apparent as the active intellect is considered to be both place and source of the constitution of meaning.\textsuperscript{2}

According to the ontological framework, the whole of being
includes more than composite substances, namely, separate substances
and God, who is the subject matter of theology. Regarding them, the epistemological framework allows only, as \textit{lumen rationis}, the
analogical and negative procedures.\textsuperscript{3} However, since being and knowledge pertain to the timeless dimension (immateriality), other forms of knowledge are also possible \textit{in via}, namely, those produced by

\textsuperscript{1}See \textit{ST}, I. 86, \textit{1 ad 3}.
\textsuperscript{2}As is seen in the second part of this chapter, the main
difference between the classical and scientific interpretations of reasons regarding their structures lies in this point: Thomas's ontological framework allows the proposal of an active (cognitive) timeless intellect, while the ontological framework of modern reason, even though allowing a timeless dimension for being, does not allow the cognition of it. Hence, there cannot be anything like an active intellect. It is precisely on this point that Cartechini (p. 407) criticizes Heidegger on account of closing the entrance to metaphysics by understanding the thinking of Being with a finite intellect, after the Kantian pattern, Thomas's proposal regarding the active intellect was interpreted in various ways. See Moloney, p. 401.

\textsuperscript{3}"We know incorporeal realities, which have no sense images, by analogy with sensible bodies, which do have images, just as we understand truth in the abstract by a consideration of things in which we see truth. . . . Furthermore, we cannot, in our present state, know other incorporeal realities" (\textit{ST}, I. 84, \textit{7 ad 3}). This is due to the fact that in \textit{via} man's knowledge is tied up, for its starting point, to sensible temporal data (\textit{ST}, I. 84. 7). So, the sensible temporal aspect of knowledge is the starting point of real knowledge. In Kant, on the contrary, temporal knowledge becomes the limit of all possible knowledge. See p. 97, n. 1.
the lumen prophetiae and the lumen fidei. As we will see, however, because of the ontological-epistemological frameworks already developed, the new forms do not scrap the lumen rationis pattern but rather perfect it.\footnote{ST, I. 8 ad 2.}

Lumen prophetiae

The lumen prophetiae refers to the problem of the origin of theological knowledge which in its interpretation assumes the structure of reason in both its ontological and epistemological frameworks (lumen rationis). Prophecy,\footnote{For an introduction to Aquinas's idea of inspiration and revelation under the prophetic motif, see Persson, pp. 19-40. "We search in the writings of Thomas in vain for the kind of discussion of revelation which characterizes more recent works of doctrine. But we must not conclude from this that revelation has no decisive part to play in his theology. A closer investigation will soon disclose that on the contrary revelation is the basic presupposition of all his writings" (ibid., p. 19).} according to Thomas Aquinas, "primo et principaliter consistit in cognitione,\footnote{Aquinas considers revelation not 'as a spoken or written word' but regards it primarily as an event which takes place in the depths of the soul" (Persson, p. 49). See also, ibid., pp. 20, 21. The encounter, therefore, happens in timelessness. From a Catholic perspective René Latourelle concludes his analysis of Thomas's understanding of revelation pointing out also that "Saint Thomas is primarily interested in immediate revelation, and principally prophetic revelation. He speaks of this essentially as a cognitive act" (Theology of Revelation [Staten Island, New York: Alba House, 1966], p. 171). The divine-human encounter, therefore, happens in timelessness. For further commentary see Latourelle, pp. 159-172.} and only secondarily refers to "utterance or speech (locutione).\footnote{ST, II-IIae. 171. 1.} Prophecy may refer to temporal or timeless realities,\footnote{ST, II-IIae. 171. 3.} but we are interested...
mostly in prophecy as a source of knowledge regarding supernatural realities, that is to say, intellectual, spiritual, and divine realities. In order for this kind of knowledge to be possible the subject has to have access to its new supernatural object. This requires God's special assistance both from the object's and from the subject's side. The divine assistance from the object's side is called revelation. Divine assistance from the subject's side is called inspiration. Because of the cognitive pattern in which

1Ibid.

According to Thomas, truth, in prophetic knowledge, may be conveyed through sensu exterius (externally by means of the sense), per formas imaginarias (by forms of the imagination), and by species intelligibles, directly infused into the soul without passing through sense perception (ST, II-IIae. 173. 2; SCG, 3. 154; Persson, p. 23). Of course, truth abides in the realm of the species intelligibles (ST, II-IIae. 174. 2). Hence, a process of abstraction is also assumed in the very heart of revelation: "Intellectual vision is not affected by bodily and individual images, but by an intellectual image. . . . Such an intellectual image in prophetic revelation is sometimes immediately impressed by God; sometimes it derives from imaginative forms with the help of prophetic light, because from these same imaginative forms a more delicate truth becomes apparent in the radiance of a higher light" (ST, II-IIae. 173, 2 ad 2). So this new 'abstraction' is developed by the lumen prophetiae. For the discussion about the different "degrees" in prophecy see ST, II-IIae. 174. 3.

2ST, II-IIae. 171, 1 ad 4. "Prophecy calls for a light which surpasses the light of natural reason" (ST, II-IIae. 171. 2). Yet, since the light of natural reason (in the active intellect) is considered to be a participation in the light by which God sees and knows everything (ST, I. 1, 8 ad 3; I-IIae. 92. 2), the lumen prophetiae (inspiration) is just additional power infused in the active intellect. Thus, between lumen rationis and lumen prophetiae there is a quantitative difference and not a qualitative one. Prophecy is reason (timeless) perfected so as to be able to get in touch with non-sensible realities in via. In short, inspiration for Thomas does not refer to the inscripturation of revelation (ST, IIIae. 68. 1; Persson, p. 38), but rather to the elevation of man's reason (active intellect) by an act of God's grace (Persson, p. 39).
prophecy is to be understood, the assistance of God from the subject's side plays the foundational role.¹

Revelation, however, properly occurs when the cognitive act happens.² Revelation, as source of theological meaning, is to be found in the Bible. Yet the Bible as such is not revelation but

¹ST, II-IIae. 171, 2 ad 2; 173, 2 ad 3. If the gift of grace were not conceded to humans, there would be no prophetic knowledge. In this regard it must be noted that for Aquinas neither prophecy nor revelation can be regarded as a habitus but only as a passio vel impressio transiens (ST, II-IIae. 171. 2; II-IIae. 176. 2 ad 3; Persson, p. 27).

²ST, II-IIae. 173. 4; II-IIae. 171. 1; cf. SCG, 3. 154. 1-9. "Di si rivelava per venire incontro alla ragione" (Bogliolo, p. 258). See also Persson, pp. 24, 25. It is apparent, then, that revelation according to Thomas "cannot consist, for example, in events recorded in the Gospels— the birth, death or resurrection of Christ, and the like. We may not even regard the incarnation as a divine revelation. Only knowledge of the incarnation can be revelation, and this is always something internal to man" (Persson, p. 25). Thomas's position is remarkably similar to Bultmann's (KM., p. 42), for whom what is important is not the historical fact of resurrection (historie), but its meaning as produced through the apostolic faith and preaching. Moreover, for Thomas the content of prophecy is not the vision of God himself. The visio Dei is supposed to be the eschatological result of a further gift of grace (lumen gloriae) which the saints will receive in patria (ST, I. 12. 1-10; I-IIae. 3. 1-8; SCG, 3. 51-63; Persson, p. 25; Gilson, Thomisme, p. 150). Prophecy "is not a vision of the divine essence itself. When the prophets see what they do see, it is not in the divine essence but in certain similitudes lighted up by a God-given light" (ST, II-IIae. 173. 1. See Persson, p. 29). The idea that revelation is cognitio and not its expression (locutio), along with the idea that the prophet's cognitio does not grasp "all that the Holy Spirit intends in visions, words, and even deeds" (ST, II-IIae. 173. 4), provides the basis for the interpretation of the so-called "fuller sense" (sensus plenior) of the Scriptures and the exegetical procedure to reach it. Regarding the methodological aspects that sensus plenior entails in its contemporary Catholic interpretation, see Raymond E. Brown, The "Sensus Plenior" of Sacred Scripture (Baltimore, Maryland: J. H. Furst, 1955); idem, "The History and Development of the Theory of a Sensus Plenior," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 15 (1953):141-62; and idem, "The Sensus Plenior in the Last Ten Years," Catholic Biblical Quarterly 25 (1963):262-85.
contains and communicates it.\footnote{See p. 195, n. 3 above. The Bible plays a foundational role in Aquinas's theology (Persson, pp. 49-56). This position is, yet, very similar to the basic idea of Neo-Orthodoxy and Encounter Theology in modern times. See William Hordern, "The Nature of Revelation," in The Living God, ed. Williard J. Erikson (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker, 1976), pp. 177-196. The difference, however, between Thomism and Encounter Theology lies mostly in the fact that for Thomas the encounter is essentially cognitive and objective while for Encounter Theology it is non-cognitive. This basic difference is required by the epistemological framework of reason's structure that each theological system adopts as its own. Thomas's structure of reason requires an active intellect able to know timelessness, while Encounter Theology's does not allow such active intellect at all (see p. 194, n. 2 above). That is why the "encounter" happens in a non-cognitive area of being according to the Kantian-Jasperian pattern (see pp. 104-13) above. It should be noted, however, that Thomas's cognitive revelation is not to be confused with "propositional revelation" as it is understood in the contemporary inerrancy controversy. See Achtemeier, p. 39; Kenneth S. Kantzer, "Revelation and Inspiration in Neo-Orthodox Theology," Bibliotheca Sacra 115 (1958): 121; Dewey M. Beegle, Scripture, Tradition, and Infallibility (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1973), p. 199; A. A. Hodge and A. A. Warfield, "Inspiration," The Presbyterian Review 2 (1881):225-60; and Lindsell, The Battle for the Bible (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan, 1976). Those who favor "inerrancy" do link revelation as knowledge with its propositional expression in the Bible.} From a cognitive viewpoint (which is the viewpoint of truth and revelation), the historic dimension\footnote{Aquinas recognizes this dimension as he considers, in the realm of exegesis, that the basic sense of Scriptures is the historical literal one (ST, I. 1. 10). M. D. Chenu remarks that "l'Ecriture traite d'un bout à l'autre de faits singuliers" (La théologie comme science, p. 68). In other words, Scriptures move, from beginning to end, in a temporal, concrete, historical dimension. It should be noticed, however, that Thomas's valorization of the literal historical sense of Scripture as the one on which Dogmatics should be built is to be understood in the context of reason's structure, which from its epistemological framework requires, in via, a sensible historical beginning.} in which Sacred Scripture contains and communicates the truth of revelation is considered as having been properly chosen by God since in via man's cognitive faculties require a sensible origin.\footnote{ST, I. 84; I. 1. 9.} Yet,
since the truth that the Bible contains and exemplifies is understood to be timeless, its historical dimension does not constitute part of theological truth but rather constitutes only a pedagogical device in order that timeless truth may be properly conveyed to

Theology, for Thomas Aquinas, is ordered from and toward God as veritas prima. Yet God is to be understood as ipsum esse as the most perfect timeless being. See Ernst, p. 405. In this context Thomas assumes that, since Truth is One, the truth of the Bible must function in the same dimension that is proper to all truth and mainly to metaphysical truth. See Thomas R. Potvin, "Exigences de l'Intellectus Fidel," Eglise et Théologie 8 (1977):386. So the veritas prima is the source of all truth. Then, all truth, qua truth, is timeless, notably theological truth which because of its nature stands closer, in the hierarchical ontological framework of Aquinas, to God.

As revelation is an intellectual act, there is no room for the historical dimension of Scripture in the realm of the essence of truth. "Aristotle's science had no room for historical fact and the Bible was history" (Gerald A. McCool, "Scientific Theology: Bonaventure and Thomas Revisited," Thought 44 [1974]:382, 83). "St. Thomas chooses to follow, not the historical pattern, but a pattern of intelligible priorities..." (Thomas C. O'Brien, "Sacra Doctrina Revisited," The Thomist 41 [1977]:500). "In his Summa Thomas followed a strictly logical and scientific order, inherited from Aristotle's Posterior Analytics. Each question has its logical place in the whole, and each article has its proper place in the question; even the objections are posed in a logical order" (James A. Weisheipl, "The Meaning of Sacra Doctrina in Summa Theologiae I.q.1," The Thomist 38 [1974]:53).

ST, I. 1. 9. Weisheipl explains that Sacred Scripture uses parables, poetry, and metaphors "both out of necessity and out of convenience. The text of Scripture is the Word of God in the words of men, for God speaks to man in terms easier for him to understand; the sublimity of this doctrine requires that wisdom clothe herself in metaphors and symbolic language for three reasons; (1) lest there be error in our conception of the divine, the language most remote from the reality should be used; (2) 'understatement is more to the point with our present knowledge of God,' lest we think that our speech and thought really represent him; and (3) 'divine matters are more effectively screened against those unworthy of them.' In Sacred Scripture God takes into account man's nature, which is to arrive at intellectual and spiritual truths through the sense and bodily images. In other words, metaphorical language is most accessible to most people, and at the same time
and grasped by all people, even those who are not capable of profound intellectual thinking.¹

It is clear, then, that the structure of classical reason in its ontological and epistemological frameworks determines the basic interpretation of the origin of theological meaning (the idea there is less danger of confusing symbol with reality" (p. 77). See also SCG, I. 6. The metaphoric aspects of Scriptures may be seen, for instance, when as in James 4:8 God is conceived of as in the realm of change (time). See St, I. 9, 1 ad 1; cf. Ernst, p. 423.

¹Since Scripture works in the temporal pedagogic dimension, its truth is to be reached through the cognitive powers of abstraction which lead the exegete and theologian to intellectual knowledge that is at the origin of the Biblical, temporal, metaphoric utterances. Thus, the structure of reason, according to Thomas's timeless interpretation of it, when applied to the Bible, requires, in order that truth may be reached, the development of an intellectual procedure which is aimed at the elimination of the temporal-historical clothing in which God had to convey timeless intellectual truth. This procedure is in general similar to Bultmannian demythologization. "What is certainly true is that St. Thomas stands for a demythologization of the word" (Ernst, p. 418). Of course, as we have already pointed out, the actual outcome of demythologization is different in both Thomas and Bultmann just because they work within a different structure for reason's functioning. See p. 196, n. 1 above. Additionally, the historical critical method, as a scientific advancement, can be applied to the exegetical enterprise in the context of Thomas's system. Such exegetical procedure does not affect the dogmatic enterprise since it deals with the historical, temporal, pedagogic clothing of the Bible and not with its intellectual timeless truth. As we can see, this also is the position of Bultmann. Regarding the historical critical method, as accepted within the Thomistic structure for reason and theology. See Potvin, p. 373. The independence of the historical vehicle that is used by the Bible to convey truth, from the intellectual truth actually conveyed, may be seen in the following way: "The philosophical soundness of the Summa Theologiae is not impaired by its use of authority, since wherever the data are amenable to reason, the dicta of authority on the subject are scrutinized scientifically before either acceptance or rejection" (Wheeler, p. 55).
of revelation), and also the nature of both theological truth and its written expression.¹

*Lumen rationis* is the realm of philosophy and the sciences. *Lumen prophetiae* refers to the particular realm of knowledge (revelation) that applies to a reduced number of persons, namely, the prophets. *Lumen gloriae* refers to the eschatological destiny of reason which will be transformed not to depend on the senses any more. As is apparent, none of these are the realm of theology or, as Thomas calls it, *Sacra Doctrina*.² The realm of *Sacra Doctrina* is the realm of *lumen fidei*.

*Lumen fidei*

*Lumen fidei* is grounded on the *lumen rationis* which receives additional power from the infusion of God's grace into it.³ *Lumen fidei* is a kind of knowledge insofar as it is not a direct knowledge as in vision (intellectual or sensory), but it is a knowledge as it accepts what somebody else sees.⁴ That is why Thomas considers

¹This also makes clear that a criticism of reason in theology cannot begin with the problem of the origin of theological meaning. The origin of theological meaning is bound to be interpreted through the categories that the epistemological framework of reason's structure is supposed to provide.

²ST, I. 1. 2. 3. 7; see also Persson, pp. 12-19; Weisheipl, pp. 49-80; Wheeler, pp. 34-36.

³ST, II-IIae. 6. 1; I-IIae. 109. 1; cf. I. 54, 4 ad 2; I. 79, 3 ad 2; I-IIae. 110. 1; Potvin, pp. 371-96 passim; Terence Penelhum, "The Analysis of Faith in St. Thomas Aquinas," Religious Studies 13 (1977):137-38. Again, the principle that grace does not scrap nature but rather perfects it is at work.

⁴Faith, according to Aquinas, is "a kind of knowledge" because from the subject's side, it exists in act as an act of the intellect. Thomas's definition of faith (which he sees based upon
theology to be a "subalternated science." The object of faith as cognitive act is to be seen in the articles of faith, which at the

Paul's definition in Heb 11:1) says that "belief is immediately an act of intellect because its object is truth, which is the proper concern of intellect" (ST, II-IIae. 4. 2). Yet, at the same time, from the object's side, faith fails its object (it does not reach it). In other words, faith does not make contact with its object as in vision. "Now things are said to be seen when they themselves cause the mind or the sense to know them. Clearly, then, no belief or opinion can have as object things seen, whether by sense or by intellect" (ST, II-IIae. 1. 4). That is why "faith is a sort of knowledge in that it makes the mind assent to something. The assent is not due to what is seen by the believer but to what is seen by him who is believed. In that it lacks the element of seeing, faith fails to be genuine knowledge, for such knowledge causes the mind to assent through what is seen and through an understanding of first principles" (ST, I. 12, 13 ad 3). This determines that theology is a subalternated science in Thomas's system of thought. In other words, we believe (sort of indirect knowledge) what the angels and the blessed in patria. See ST, II-IIae. 1. 5).

1 This means that theology as a science is grounded in what other beings see (ibid.). That is why faith is knowledge understood and accepted on the basis of the testimony of somebody else who sees. This contact is made through revelation and the lumen prophetiae. The principle of the subalternation of the theological science is presented by Thomas in ST, I. 1. 2. See also ST, II-IIae. 2. 3; II-IIae. 1. 4; Persson, p. 28; Congar, A History of Theology, p. 95.

2 The object of faith is not the Biblical content, not even its literal sense, since as knowledge, faith relates to what is intellectual, that is to say, to which is abstract and timeless. Thomas explains how it was necessary to draw the principles of theology from the Bible: "The truth of faith is contained in sacred Scripture, but diffusely, in divers ways, and, sometimes, darkly. The result is that to draw out the truth of faith from Scripture requires a prolonged study and a practice not within the capacities of all those who need to know the truths of faith; many of them, taken up with other cares, cannot find leisure for study. That is why there was a need to draw succinctly together out of the Scriptural teaching some clear statement to be set before all for their belief. The symbol is not added to Scripture, but drawn from Scripture" (ST, II-IIae. 1, 9 ad 1). It is clear, then, how the first principles of theological science are to be found within the Biblical material through abstraction of its historical dimension. It is
same time are the first principles of theological science.\(^1\) Such principles, as scientific principles, are timeless.\(^2\) From them, also apparent how the first principles of theology are determined in their meaning through reason's structure and the presupposition that it includes in order that reason may function. Additionally, it should be noted that the ultimate object of faith, for Thomas, is not doctrine or the Articles of Faith, but rather God. The Articles of Faith just allow for us in via to reach our object from afar off.

\(^1\) The Articles of Faith are at the core of Aquinas's System of theology (Congar, A History of Theology, p. 95). "The articles of faith are to the teaching of faith what the first principles are to a discipline evolved by natural reason" (ST, I-IIae. 1. 2; Persson, p. 74). They are not self-evident principles as the philosophical principia per se nota, and for that reason they would seem to be of a lower kind than the philosophical principles. However, Thomas provides the following explanation regarding the certainty of the principles of theology. He says that the theological principles are more certain regarding the object, namely, God and the science of the blessed. The doubt and uncertainty is due to disability of our minds to grasp their object. "Doubt about the articles of faith which falls to the lot of some is not because the reality is at all uncertain but because the human understanding is feeble" (ST, I. 1. 5). We see here how the ontological framework is utilized to explain a particular epistemological issue within the Thomistic system. What Thomas calls "articles of faith," explains Congar, is "the Symbol of the Apostles or Creed of the Apostles" (A History of Theology, p. 95). Cf. ST, II-IIae. 1. 9. As principles of theological science the articles of faith contain all the main aspects of faith in an intelligible abstract way as expected from the first principles of any science. "In principiis scientiae virtualiter tota scientia continentur" (ST, I-IIae. 3. 6; cf. I. 1. 7).

\(^2\)ST, II-IIae. 1. 7. The timelessness of the articles of faith or first principles of theological science is apparent as Thomas explains that the articles "are implicit in certain primary ones, namely that God exists and that he has providence over man's salvation. For the truth that God is includes everything that we believe to exist eternally in God and that will comprise our beatitude" (ST, II-IIae. 1. 7). So, the articles of faith are an explication, in via, in propositions (whose origin is the visio prophetiae of what in reality is something non-composite) of God as Veritas Prima (II-IIae. 1. 2.). Thomas, dealing with the question of whether or not the articles of faith have changed through history, clearly expresses their unchangeableness as he says: "the things to be hoped for were the same at all times for everyone" (ST, II-IIae. 1. 7 ad 1). Obviously, then, theology as intellectual science is a timeless
in a deductive procedure, the whole of theology is developed. In via, then, theology renders provisional, imperfect knowledge. Theology is fides quaerens intellectum. Its search, however, is not science. It could not be otherwise since theology is to constitute its meanings with a reason which is interpreted as functioning though a timeless structure.

"On the basis of such principles some point stands proved for believers in a way similar to that whereby for all men something stands proved on the basis of principles known connaturally" (ST, II-IIae. 1, 5 ad 2). See also ST, I. 1, 5 ad 2; I. 1. 8, and ad 2; Persson, pp. 78, 79. For an analysis not only of the deductive procedures of reason in theology but also of its demonstrative, apologetic, and explicative roles, see Congar, History of Theology, pp. 92-100. Reason, as lumen rationis, is therefore in via the tool for theological knowledge. Wheeler explains that what is truth "can be explained in understandable terms by sound philosophical methods" (p. 80). So, through the deductive method of reason in its Aristotelian pattern, the ontological framework, which already determined the epistemological framework, the idea and meaning of revelation, and the nature of the articles of faith as timeless cognitive first principles of theological science, passes to determine also the very way in which reason is supposed to constitute theological meaning in both exegesis and dogmatics. See how Wheeler shows the influence of reason's structure and presuppositions in the dogmatic construction regarding the doctrines of transubstantiation, Trinity, grace, incarnation, and sacraments in Thomas's system (pp. 79-97). See also in this respect Chenu, Toward an Understanding, pp. 304-318. Moreover, it should be remembered that the formulation of a symbol of faith (articles of faith) belongs to the Supreme Pontiff, according to Thomas (ST, II-IIae. I. 10). In this way, then, the hierarchical structure of being is also determinative of the hierarchical understanding of the Church in Catholicism.

Fides quaerens intellectum may have two applications within Thomas's system of thought. First, since divine revelation includes truths that may be reached through reason (SCG, I. 4), Fides quaerens intellectum may refer to the search of intellectual truths that the lumen rationis can reach by itself and that for practical reasons have been included by the lumen prophetiae in the revelation of God. However, revelation properly refers to that which we in via cannot reach, that is of what we cannot have cognitive contact or vision. This aspect of revelation refers properly only to the articles of faith which are the principles of theological science. In a second sense, then, fides quaerens intellectum is to be understood within the context of the hierarchical ontological framework of Thomas, as a cognitive movement of ascent from a lesser to a higher degree or mode.
completed in via. It can only be achieved by God’s special gift of grace that in patria enables man to understand (by direct vision) what now can only be grasped through the kind of knowledge that is faith. Theology, then, as fides quaerens intellectum, is to be developed in the realm and with the powers of lumen rationis. Consequently, theology as cognitive enterprise is bound to deal with theological realities (the understanding of the Articles of Faith and God himself) in the indirect way of which human reason is capable, namely, via negativa and via analogica. Such procedure assures timelessness, and so an essential discontinuity of meaning between what is given to the understanding in via through the senses (Lebenswelt) and the actual intellectual true meaning is to be observed at the basis of the constitution of theological meaning.

Summary and Partial Conclusion

The brief analysis of Thomas Aquinas's interpretation of both ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure of knowledge. In via this movement is to work through analogy and demonstrative procedures which, however, as it is of the highest reality causes "the greatest joy" (SCG, I. 8. 2). In patria the fides quaerens intellectum reaches its goal, and, therefore comes to an end when through grace the lumen gloriae is conferred upon the blessed ones so that it is possible to see God (SCG, 3. 51-63; cf. Lorite, p. 16).

1See p. 194, n. 3. "There is no reason, however, why man cannot by analogy strive to penetrate the meaning of the truths revealed and thus give fuller meaning and greater force to facts which, in the very nature of things, are accepted on faith" (Wheeler, p. 80).

2See p. 134, n. 4.
shows that it has been developed on the assumption of a timeless primordial presupposition in the Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelian tradition of philosophy. Thomas himself does not deal with the problem of the ground of Being and reason. He just develops in detail the consequences that the timeless primordial presupposition has for reason's structure in general and for theological reason in particular. As both subject (lumen) and object (essentia, form, quiddity) are conceived as pertaining to a timeless dimensionality, structure allows for perfect systematic coherence.

Moreover, since time is not excluded from being but is rather included as a mode of it (not as dimensionality) at the level of composite substances within the hierarchical metaphysical context, Thomas's interpretation of reason's structure makes reason a perfect instrument to deal with the whole of reality. This allows classical reason to provide room for natural sciences. This explains why Thomas's system has been able to subsist and be meaningful even after the scientific revolutions of the past two centuries.

Objectivity, in classical reason, is shaped in its meaning as objectivity by the features provided by the timeless knowledge of timeless essences. Temporal realities are included only insofar as they include being within their composite reality, namely, insofar as they include timelessness.

Transcendence is also interpreted in terms of timelessness. Consequently the knowledge of both timelessness and transcendence is possible only because of man's timeless cognitive potencies (lumen).
As there is no temporal being, there is no temporal understanding (there is only a temporal mode of timeless being and knowledge). The classical interpretation of being and theory of knowledge (as structure of reason) determines the answers that theology provides for the problem of the origin of theological meaning (revelation, Bible) and to the problem of the intellectual background of reference for intelligibility (metaphysics, ordo disciplinae).

In Thomas's system the Bible represents the place where theological reflection is supposed to begin, since it contains the record of prophetic revelations. Yet, as the Bible has been given to mankind for practical purposes, it is mainly concerned with pedagogical temporal exemplifications of timeless truth. Thus, as revelation, the Bible is reduced, through the activity of the lumen rationis, to a few first timeless scientific principles of theology as science. This makes apparent that the "facts" or "phenomena" of theology, namely, what theology has as its object, are not just something "objectively given" with no preconditions brought into the "facts" or "phenomena" from the subject's side. The very "facts" or "phenomena" of theology appear as they are interpreted ontologically and epistemologically through the categories provided by the structure of reason.

Our analysis also makes apparent that Thomas's theological system, through the structure of reason, assumes that there is only one possible understanding of being, namely the timeless one. Hence, it is understood also that the Bible has been thought and written on this universal timeless assumption of truth.
Finally, we should notice that classical reason functions regarding the flow of meaning, in the onto-theo-logical direction. In other words, the Parmenidean interpretation of the ground of being as timeless provides the first necessary precondition for the intelligibility of reality, namely the ontos. The ontos additionally requires, for the completion of its structure, the inclusion and interpretation of theos. It is in this context that logos (epistemo-logical framework) is interpreted in order to provide an adequate cognitive procedure to grasp the knowledge of being in its hierarchi-cal timeless complexity.

Our analysis must now begin to consider the way in which modern liberal Protestant theology has utilized reason for the constitution of theological meaning. We turn, then, to the analysis of "scientific theological reason."

Scientific Reason

As we focus our attention on the scientific interpretation of reason's structure as it is represented by Rudolf Bultmann's theology, it should be remembered that Bultmann's understanding of reason's structure\(^1\) is rather "like a paradigm for much of modern

\(^1\)From the very beginning it should be noticed that Bultmann is not a philosopher like Aquinas. Bultmann does deal with foundational philosophical matters but he does not develop them in the systematic and profound style of the Aquinate. Consequently, a systematic development of either ontology or epistemology is not found in Bultmann's writings. However, ontological and epistemological reflections do spread throughout his writings. This fact determines that the phenomenological analysis in search of the structure of reason and its dimensionality should proceed more slowly and with greater difficulty in Bultmann's theology than in Thomas's theology. Jaspers appreciates Bultmann more as a historian and exegete than
theology,"\(^1\) which is shared by related but independent thinkers such as Tillich\(^2\) and Jaspers.\(^3\)

Bultmann's programmatic influence on modern theology is due mostly to his concern about the nature of theological "understanding" (Verstehen)\(^4\) and to his coherent interpretation of the ontological


\(^2\)Even though Tillich's theology is worked out within the same Kantian framework for the interpretation of reason's structure (Systematic Theology), 1:82), the way in which it is developed shows a closer relation to classical theology and philosophy than Bultmann's. Additionally, tillich develops in greater detail, and with greater clarity and philosophical expertise, issues and motives that Bultmann's analysis only suggests or implies, for instance, the cognitive use of analogy for the knowledge of God.

\(^3\)As their dialogue in the debate on demythologization shows (KMII, pp. 133-94) both work within the same basic interpretation of the Kantian framework and share the same approach regarding the intelligibility and meaning of theological statements. In the final analysis, they differ not regarding the procedure reason is supposed to follow in the process of demythologization, but rather regarding the extent to which such procedure should be applied. In broad lines Bultmann stands closer to Jaspers than to Tillich. It seems clear that Jaspers and Bultmann (as well as Tillich) have developed their systems independent from each other's influence. In other words, both have faced the challenge of performing the theological task within the pattern for intelligibility proposed by Kantian thought. Surprisingly enough they reach similar conclusions, agreeing in the foundational approach and disagreeing only in matters of detail.

\(^4\)Roberts, p. 10.
and epistemological frameworks of theological reason.¹

As Aquinas developed his interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks for theological reason following the Aristotelian pattern, Bultmann developed his following the Kantian pattern.² Yet since Bultmann not only does not refer explicitly to Kant but, on the contrary, recognizes explicitly the value that Heidegger's existential analysis has for the understanding of faith,³ most theological writers have interpreted Bultmann's thought as grounded in a Heideggerian pattern.⁴ Recent studies, however,

¹Ibid., pp. 9, 211. See also Ogden, Foreword to Existence and Faith, p. 11.

²In Kantian thinking reality is divided into phenomena, to which knowledge properly pertains (the realm of Parmenidean doxa), and noumena, to which pertains the thing itself which is unknowable (the realm of Parmenidean Being). See in chapter I the section on Kant for further commentary on the Kantian pattern. I am aware of Jaspers' rather harsh evaluation of Bultmann's philosophical abilities ("Myth and Religion," p. 138). Jaspers considers that Bultmann is "untouched by the least breath of Kantian or Platonic thinking" (ibid.). This, however, does not mean that Bultmann is not following the Kantian pattern. What it means is that Bultmann is not a creative philosopher. In that evaluation Jaspers is correct. Bultmann just accepts the Kantian pattern without criticism. He is more critical of Heideggerian thoughts than he is of epistemological issues in general.

³Bultmann recognizes the importance of the existential analysis of Heidegger, Jaspers, and Gogarten for theology (FU, p. 327, EF, p. 102). According to Ogden (Christ without Myth: A Study Based on the Theology of Rudolf Bultmann [New York: Harper and Bros., 1961], p. 45, n. 73), Bultmann's most explicit statement regarding his appropriation of Heideggerian categories is found in Existence and Faith (pp. 92-110).


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uncover^—although still in a very superficial way—the fact that
Bultmann's thought, and consequently his interpretation of reason's

Studies 7 (1980):54, and Reiser, p. 473. Bultmann is not alone in
using Heidegger's analysis for theological purposes. Heinrich Ott,
Ernst Fuchs, Eberhard Jüngel, and Helmut Franz have also used
Heideggerian insights in theology (Perotti, p. 12).

^Roberts points out the Kantian framework of Bultmann's
thought by saying that for him "modern man is a Kantian, for whom
'nature' and 'spirit' never overlap" (p. 152). Thiselton's study
devels some background on the Neo-Kantian influence on Bultmann's
thought (pp. 226, 284). Cohen and Natrop are specially influential
in Bultmann's understanding of knowledge as objectification in
accordance to the principle of law (pp. 209, 210). In his conclusion
regarding neo-Kantian influence in Bultmann's thought, Thiselton
remarks that "Bultmann has tried to respond to the epistemology of
Marburg Neo-Kantism, but in so doing has arrived at a dualism which
in one respect reverses the concern of the Neo-Kantian philosopher,
and brings him nearer to Kant himself. Kant, we may say, was more
dualistic than the Neo-Kantians. The phenomenological realm was not
coterminal with reality" (p. 285). The Kantian pattern in
Bultmann's thought is merged with nineteen-century Lutheranism
(pp. 211, 213). Arno Anzenbacher remarks that the difference between
the so-called "Encounter theologians" and Bultmann is that the latter
develops the Kantian pattern of rationality to its final conse­
cquences. Anzenbacher explains that "thematically, the I-Thou philosophy
originates in transcendental philosophy and can be understood only in
relation to it. The dichotomy of existence and objectivity as
carried out by Marcel, of existence and Dasein by Jaspers, of person
and proper nature by Buber, etc., are intelligible only on the basis
of these historical conditions" ("Thomism and the I-Thou Philosophy," Philosophy Today 11 [1967]:240). Additionally, Thiselton (p. 217)
points out that Bultmann's perspective on objectivity and law was
settled before 1923. Ogden (Foreword to Existence and Faith, p. 11)
remarks that Bultmann's basic pattern of thought was already at work
in 1926 when Heidegger's Being and Time was published for the first
time. Bultmann and Heidegger began their dialogue at Marburg at that
time (EF, p. 286), when both had already developed the basic features
of their thinking. Consequently, Heideggerian influence on Bultmann
has to be seen as applying not to the basis of his system but rather
to the philosophical expression of it. Even though Bultmann does not
speak directly about following the Kantian pattern for ontology and
epistemology, such a pattern can be seen at work in his thinking, for
instance, in issues such as the interpretation of God's act (KM, p.
197), the idea of miracle as wonder (FU, pp. 247-61; Giovanni Miege,
Gospel and Myth in the Thought of Rudo TF Bultmann [Richmond, Virginia:
John Knox Press, 1960], p. 80), the basic cognitive assumption of
the "closed continuum" (EF, p. 291; JCM, p. 15; H. A. Nielsen,
structure, is developed after the Kantian pattern for both ontology and epistemology. There is no doubt that Heideggerian categories still play an important role in Bultmann's thought, but, they do not furnish the pattern for reason's structure. On the contrary, "Bultmann's Philosophical Troubles," Dialogue 8 [1970]:688, 689), and in his search for the object of theology in basic agreement with the History of Religion school (Robert W. Funk, Foreword to Faith and Understanding, by Rudolf Bultmann [New York: Harper & Row, 1969], pp. 15-18). It is apparent that Bultmann applies the critical epoché only to theological theories but not to philosophical ones which he accepts quite uncritically as the a priori condition for the intelligibility of theological meanings. Ogden explains that Bultmann sets aside all "previous theological formulation of faith, including even, those of the canonical theologians themselves" (Foreword to Existence and Faith, p. 18). On the Kantian pattern analyzed from a philosophical perspective, see Walsh, "Kant and Metaphysics," p. 383.

1 The question regarding whether Bultmann understood correctly Heidegger's philosophy arises in this context. The question is not regarding Bultmann's own awareness of Heidegger's philosophy but rather regarding his actual use of it. It has been suggested that a proper answer to this question seems to be that Bultmann's thought has a superficial resemblance to Heidegger's (George D. Chryssides, "Concepts of Freedom in Bultmann and Heidegger," Sophia 17 [1978]: 20). John Macquarrie (The Scope of Demythologizing: Bultmann and His Critics [London: SCM Press, 1960], p. 20) believes that Bultmann makes a correct use of Heidegger's writings which is grounded also in a correct interpretation of them. However, Macquarrie also remarks that there are, so to speak, two dimensions in Heidegger as a philosopher, namely, the ontologist and the existentialist. In this context Macquarrie correctly interprets that "Bultmann's concern is with Heidegger the existentialist" (Existentialist Theology, p. 74). At this point a very particular switch takes place. Bultmann understands Heidegger's existential analysis in isolation from his ontology. Bultmann himself declares that "we do not necessarily subscribe to Heidegger's philosophical theories when we learn something from his existential analysis" (KMI, p. 182). The switch includes not only the interpretation of the Heideggerian analysis of existence in isolation from Heidegger's ontology but also the replacement of it by the Kantian pattern for ontology and epistemology. Thus the Heideggerian existential analysis takes over a very different non-Heideggerian meaning, namely, a Bultmannian meaning. In this context Jaspers remarks that Bultmann uses Heidegger as "a discovery of 'scientific philosophy'" ("Myth and Religion," p. 138). Bultmann has done what, according to Perotti,
in Bultmann's system, Heidegger's existential analytic functions within the framework provided by the Kantian pattern.

As we search for Bultmann's interpretation of the primordial presupposition of reason and being through a phenomenological investigation of his interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure, the Kantian pattern appears more clearly.

**Ontological Framework**

Bultmann is particularly aware of the determinative role that ontology plays in the constitution of meaning in general and of theological meaning in particular. His emphasis, however, lies on developing the ontological categories of man as existent. The analysis of Dasein's structure, however, is just the starting point for Bultmann's ontology. It is there that Heidegger's existential cannot be done, namely, forced Heideggerian thinking into traditional categories (p. 4).

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1 See Ogden, Christ without Myth, pp. 69, 70, and Kraft, pp. 54-59. Bultmann himself comments on the value of existential analysis for theology in the following terms: "It is therefore evident that it is possible to speak of existence per se, and that the structural elements of existence which philosophy presents are also valid for existence in faith" (FU, p. 327). Existential philosophy, then, helps theology by providing it with "the most adequate perspective and conceptions for understanding human existence" and so "to find the right concepts for speaking of God non-mythologically" (JCM, pp. 55; Ogden, Foreword to Existence and Faith, p. 19). It is here, where the existential analysis is connected with the traditional dimension of transcendence, that Bultmann's departure from the Heideggerian pattern appears more clearly. See Miegge, p. 75.

2 Bultmann, writing to Barth in 1952, explains that "I think I always saw one thing clearly, namely, that the decisive thing is to make it clear with what concept of reality, of being and events, we really operate in theology, and how this relates to the concepts
analysis plays its normative role by providing the access to a "correct" understanding of man's being.

Yet, the ontological framework cannot be reduced to the analysis of a particular region of being. The interpretation of any particular region of being is to be developed in the context provided by the understanding of Being as a whole, namely, of Being as primordial presupposition. Since Bultmann does not address himself to the interpretation of the primordial presupposition as such, we have to address our phenomenological analysis to the aspect of his system in which the primordial presupposition is bound to appear, namely the theos of the onto-theo-logical structure of reason. In Bultmann's case, since he is a Christian theologian, the theos is to be found in his reflection about God's being. The analysis of Bultmann's idea of God's being uncovers his understanding regarding the primordial presupposition for being and reason, and, at the same time, provides the ground for the unity and coherence that reason's structure needs for its functioning.

In order to get acquainted with Bultmann's understanding of the ontological framework I will analyze first God's being, and secondly, man's being.¹ As we proceed it should be remembered that the ontological framework shows and describes the essential nature in which not only other people think and speak of reality, being, and events, but in which we theologians also think and speak in our everyday lives" (Letters, p. 87).

¹Bultmann does not follow this order when he presents his ontological analysis which seems to be centered exclusively in man. The order I have chosen to follow, however, will help to disclose Bultmann's primordial presupposition as it conditions his interpretation of man's being.
of the object reason is supposed to reach. The way reason follows in order to reach its object is furnished by the interpretation of the epistemological framework, which, obviously, has to be adapted to the essential nature of the object to be reached.

Theos: Timelessness

God's being appears as timeless in Bultmann's basic insight that "God is wholly 'Beyond' (Gott ist der schlechthin Jenseitige)." In other words, God is wholly beyond the world and, consequently, beyond time as dimensionality.

Bultmann applies the traditional interpretation of God's transcendence in an absolute, radical way. The "wholly other" prevents God from any dealings with the temporal dimension in which man finds himself. Thus, the understanding of God's being is

1 FU, p. 41, cf. pp. 49, 50. Thiselton points out that Bultmann's understanding of the "wholly other" is more radical than R. Otto's (p. 229, n. 7).

2 EF, p. 167, Essays, pp. 93, 94. "The eternal God is beyond the world that confronts me at any given time, and beyond myself" (Essays, p. 93). "God is other than the world, he is beyond the world and that . . . means the complete abrogation of the whole man, of his whole history" (FU, p. 40). Ogden further explains that the idea of "wholly beyond" entails that God is even beyond "the eternal principles of things as these may be hypostatized in a cosmic 'Spirit' or eternal 'Idea of the Good'" (Foreword to Existence and Faith p. 16).

3 God's timelessness appears also as Bultmann subscribes to the classical concept of the invisibilita Dei. "The action of God is hidden from every eye except the eye of faith" (JCM, p. 62). "The invisibility of God excludes every myth which tries to make God and His action visible; God withholds Himself from view and observation" (JCM, pp. 83, 84). "His being is not manifest in nature to the observing eye of the reason or of the aesthetic perception, but precisely in the enigma, the incomprehensible, the wonderful" (Essays, p. 116). Cf. EF, pp. 27, 30; FU, pp. 38, 39. This clearly
developed by Bultmann in the timeless dimensionality that follows the Parmenidean interpretation of the ground of Being and reason. Yet God is understood as being in relation to time and history, not in the sense of suggesting a "temporal" aspect of God's being, points to the fact that God's being pertains to the realm or dimension of the noumenon (timelessness). Here the core of Bultmann's approach to reason and meaning may be found. The invisibilitas Dei, the transcendence of God, with its classical timelessness are accepted by Bultmann in the Parmenidean tradition. Yet, at the same time, they are conceived to belong to the Kantian realm of the noumena. What is noumenon cannot become phenomenon. The Parmenidean gap between timelessness and temporality, which Greek tradition as a whole tried to overcome in different ways (notably Plato and Aristotle), is at the center of Bultmannian reason. God in his being, is what is not temporal, hence he cannot relate nor even reveal himself in the temporal historical dimension. He is the absolute. Time and history are the realm of relativity (FU, pp. 30, 31).

1Again Bultmann is just following the tradition which recognizes God's dealings with man, and so his relation to time, which must not be confused with Temporality. The timeless God, the invisible God, relates to temporal, visible, historical concrete man. That is the problem theology is bound to face, and which determines its meaning as a whole. Bultmann expresses his conviction that God relates to time in the following way: "God is the enigmatic power beyond time, yet master of the temporal; beyond being, yet working in it" (Essays, p. 5).

2The temporality of God's being is not even present in Process theology. In Process theology the dimensionality of Being is not in discussion. What is being challenged is the understanding of that timeless dimension which tradition developed from a "static" "timeless" viewpoint. Process theology does not reject the classical approach. It only holds that the classical approach is basically correct, but yet that it stands in need of some improvement in order that its onesideness may be avoided. That is why Process theologians like Schubert Ogden are comfortable with the "Neo-Classicism" label. It is not possible for me to discuss in detail the timeless dimensionality in which Process theology utilizes reason. It can be, however, briefly pointed out that according to Ogden ("What Sense Does It Make to Say 'God Acts in History'?" The Journal of Religion 43 [1963]:12, 13), God is to be reached through analogy, an idea which assumes the interpretation of God's being and his transcendence within the Parmenidean tradition of via negativa. The via analogica can only be developed after the via negativa has been applied. What
which would be both absurd and contradictory, but insofar as God in His act comes in contact with (encounters) men.

The fact that Bultmann thinks of God's transcendent Being not only as timeless but also within the Kantian pattern may be

Ogden, following Process theology, suggests is a more thorough application of analogy from the perspective of the human person (p. 9). In this way what Ogden calls "eminent historicity" (p. 13) could be applied analogically to the idea of God. Such "historicity" of God, however, must not be confused with the temporal dimensionality of Being and reason since it is reached after the timeless via negativa has provided the ground for the analogical procedure. See Charles Hartshorne, Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method (London: SCM Press, 1970), pp. 227-44.

This aspect is clarified later on as we deal with the divine-human encounter and the understanding of divine revelation in Bultmann's system. Some Bultmannian declarations could be confusing if the reader does not place them in their proper context. For instance, it could be interpreted that Bultmann is suggesting a temporal dimensionality for God's being when he declares that "transcendence does not mean the sphere of the mind over against matter and what is sensorily perceptible—of what is timeless and eternal over against what develops and declines: God's transcendence is rather his constant futurity, his absolute freedom" (Essays, p. 271; cf. Roberts, p. 58). This is not to be interpreted as a direct speech on God's being (as only the via negativa is able to offer), but is rather an analogical statement pronounced after the encounter with God. Man's expression is bound to be historical and temporal. So God's transcendence is grasped and expressed by Bultmann in terms of the analysis of human existence as "constant futurity." But this "constant futurity" is not a temporal dimension in God's being but rather the position from which temporal man is bound to reach ever anew his encounter with timeless God. In fact, the via negativa provides what is usually called "the natural knowledge of God" (Essays, pp. 96-98). Bultmann believes that Christian faith does not provide a different knowledge of God from the one available through the via negativa. Faith "has simply to confirm this knowledge" (ibid., p. 98). Cf. FU, p. 53. Yet, as we see later, after this initial procedure through the via negativa is performed, an analogical procedure is recognized as possible by Bultmann.

seen as he declares that God "is not an objective entity."¹ This
idea results from a radical application of the via negativa which
is necessary in order to preserve God's absolute transcendence.²
This usage of the via negativa is required by the Kantian pattern
of reason according to which entities as objects are cognitively
constituted by the a priori concepts of the understanding.³ And,
since these concepts apply only to what is given to the understanding
through the forms of sensibility⁴ (phenomena), it follows that
entities can only pertain to the phenomenal world of the Parmenidean
doxa.

¹So the understanding of God as non-entity is not demanded
by the existence-world dichotomy as Roberts (pp. 259, 260) suggests,
but it is rather the result of Bultmann's application of the Kantian
pattern for intelligibility. The existence-world dichotomy that
Roberts stresses in his analysis is also an expression of the same
Kantian pattern.

²"Man, in speaking of God's eternity and transcendence, is
as yet not really speaking of God at all, and . . . he as yet has
not understood all the logical implications of man's finitude, in
seeing through the transient and symbolic nature of everything
belonging to the here and now. On the one hand this is his asser­
tion: all talk of the transcendent God becomes illusory when it
is an attempt to be more than a mere negation, that is, more than
the admission that the actual reality of man is devoid of God. To
imagine God's transcendence behind this life as the sphere into which
man can take flight from the things of this world, in theoretical
contemplation, asceticism and mysticism, is wishful thinking"
(Essays, p. 106). This amounts to a denial of Platonism in relation
to God. The via negativa must deny everything to God, even His being
an entity.

³Kant, Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 110, 111; cf. pp. 72,
73, 77.

⁴Ibid., p. 62; cf. pp. 186, 187. Here the timelessness of
the noumena (their non-sensory nature) and the absolute gap that
separates them from the phenomena is expressed in an abridged way.
In this context, it is obvious that God, in his timeless transcendence, cannot belong to the phenomenal world. Therefore, God cannot be an entity, since entities are only temporal. Consequently, within the Kantian pattern for intelligibility, the via negativa is to be applied consistently even to the idea of entity which is to be denied as pertaining to God's being.\(^1\) In this way Bultmann expresses, briefly and clearly, the timeless dimensionality of God's being over against the temporality of secular reality.\(^2\)

\(^1\) Kant himself (Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 371, 372) expresses the conviction that speculative reason "is of the highest utility in correcting our conception" of God's being. And this "correction" is obviously provided by the consistent application of the via negativa in order "to eliminate all phenomenal elements" (p. 371) from the idea of God. Kant does not apply the via negativa to the entity of God as Bultmann, who says that God "is not an entity." This same conclusion is also reached by Tillich: "God is being-itself, not a being" (Systematic Theology, 1:237); and "being-itself" referred to God is what Tillich calls "the ground of being" (ibid., p. 235). Bultmann also reaches the conclusion that since the God of religion is "beyond knowledge" he cannot be the principle of the unity of knowledge (FU, p. 60). Bultmann is here speaking of the God of religion, the Living God, the God of the noumen. This, however, does not deny the theos function of the idea of God in Kantian tradition (Essays, p. 98). What Bultmann wants to express is that God has to be conceived, through via negativa, even beyond the theos epistemological function. To identify God with the epistemological theos would amount to forgetting the real God by replacing Him by an idol (theos) of human invention.

\(^2\) Temporality and timelessness as dimensionality must not be confused with the usual way in which time and timeless are conceived, that is as pertaining to the categories of the understanding in the Kantian pattern. It is in this last sense that, for instance, Tillich sees God as an "all-temporality" very similar in his content to the Thomistic "totum simul" (Systematic Theology 1:274, 275). Jaspers also deals with time and timelessness as categories of thought which must be denied before they may be applied to "Transcendence." In such dialectical negation both time and timelessness are kept in an analogical relation to transcendence. See p. 107, n. 1 above.
In relation to Bultmann's timeless understanding of God's being, one should notice that he is unaware of the philosophical origin and the hypothetical nature of the dimensionality he is uncritically applying to God's being, and through God as theos to the whole of reason's structure. Bultmann sincerely believes that in his direct talk about the nature of God's being as timeless he is only being influenced by the Jewish idea of creation. Yet, what he is actually doing is applying the Parmenidean primordial presupposition to the being of God. It is in Bultmann's understanding of the dimensionality of God's being as timeless that his radical

^1 It is seen later that theological meanings are possible only indirectly through the self-understanding of faith and analogy. Yet the analogical interpretation of both God and man is understood as "true," objective, direct talk which "sets" the realm in which theological meaning is possible.

^2 Bultmann clearly expresses his opinion that the "idea of transcendence is a legacy of Jewish tradition, and symptomatic of this is the idea of creation, the creatio ex nihilo" (Essays, pp. 271, 272). Thiselton explains how "it is precisely because God is 'wholly other' and outside the whole system of human knowledge that Bultmann believes himself to be secure against the possibility of compromising the truth of revelation by drawing on concepts borrowed from philosophy" (p. 228). It would seem that Bultmann is talking about the Protestant dream of changing the onto-theo-logical ordo of reason's structure into a theo-onto-logical one which would express the Reformers' principle of sola Scriptura, in the sense of solo Deo. God in his revelation is the one who determines the dimensionality of reason and its primordial presupposition. The suggestion is good and correct. (I am going to work on it in the last chapter.) Yet Bultmann is actually following the Parmenidean primordial presupposition and so the onto-theo-logical traditional ordo of reason's structure.

^3 Roberts (p. 168) believes that Bultmann's position which makes impossible a direct knowledge of God is determined by his a priori existentialist metaphysics. Roberts is correct in seeing Bultmann's understanding of God as conditioned by philosophical presuppositions. Yet he is not totally accurate when he speaks of Bultmann's existential metaphysics, if such a declaration is to be
difference and departure from Heideggerian thought can be more clearly appreciated as Thiselton underlines.¹

Bultmann's understanding of God's being in terms and within the dimensionality of timelessness is accepted without further comment by all the theologians involved in the "demythologization debate," whether liberal or conservative, and this fact shows that the Parmenidean primordial presupposition is still at the basis of the way reason is utilized for the constitution of theological meaning in the post-Kantian scientific era.²

Bultmann's radical understanding of the Being of God as timeless transcendence entails a foundational change in the functioning of reason's structure within the bosom of Protestantism. Protestantism changed the Thomistic ordo ad deum into the Lutheran ordo ad

understood independently of the Kantian framework within which Bultmann develops his metaphysical insights.

¹"At this point it may well seem that we have travelled furthest away from any point of contact between Bultmann and Heidegger" (Thiselton, p. 224).

²For instance, Tillich declares at the very beginning of his Systematic Theology that "theology moves back and forth between two poles, the eternal truth of its foundation and the temporal situation in which the eternal truth must be received. Not many theological systems have been able to balance these two demands perfectly" (1:3). Barth also explains regarding the framework of his thinking that "if I have a system, it is limited to a recognition of what Kierkegaard called the 'infinite qualitative distinction' between time and eternity, and to my regarding this as possessing negative as well as positive significance: 'God is in heaven, and thou art on earth'" (Epistle to the Romans, p. 10). See also P. Gisel, Vérité et histoire, pp. 518, 519. For an introduction to the ontological and epistemological frameworks as understood by Karl Barth, see "The Epistemology of Karl Barth," Heythrop Journal 18 (1977):383-398. Regarding timelessness as determining that neither Barth nor Bultmann treated seriously the problem of history, see Normann H. G. Robinson, "Barth or Bultmann," Religious Studies 14 (1978):281.
Traditional Protestant Orthodoxy and even Protestant Liberalism attempted to develop theological meanings following the ordo ad Christum. Yet, since the crux included in the Christus entailed temporality and since reason had not as yet developed categories to deal with the temporal, sensible, contingent realities of the Lebenswelt, such attempts were bound from the beginning to end in failure and in the sacrificium intellectus. In order to avoid these results, Bultmann connected the timeless transcendence of God and the Lutheran dogma of justification by faith. Thus, Bultmann is able to salvage the salvific element of the Christus through the abstract idea of justification, which results from the elimination

1See p. 182, n. 1 above.
3Bultmann develops a consistent criticism of Protestant Liberal theology on account of its ordo ad Christum approach (FU, pp. 28-52).
4FU, p. 47.
5Funk holds that Bultmann's "programme may be said to aim at the radicalization of Luther's doctrine of Justification" (Foreword to Faith and Understanding, p. 14). Cf. FU, p. 46.
6I am aware that for Bultmann justification by faith is not abstract, that is, equal to unreal, but a very real ontological experience. I say that Bultmann applies the "abstract" concept of justification in the sense that for him the correct understanding of justification must include the elimination of the historical temporal elements (myths) that the doctrine of justification includes even in Paul and Luther. In this sense Bultmann reaches through his abstractive procedure of demythologization the "correct" interpretation of justification, which in its isolation from temporal and historical elements pertains most properly to the transcendent timelessness of God who according to Bultmann is not an entity.
Commenting on Bultmann's Christology, Barth remarks that Bultmann's approach consists in "a principally timeless Christ idea which is embodied in this Jesus but can also be abstracted from him" (Letters, p. 144). Bultmann clearly states that "'Christ after the flesh' is no concern of ours" (FU, p. 132). He further explains why it is so by suggesting that "The event of Jesus Christ is the end of the aeon; he is the final word which God has spoken and is speaking. The history of the proclamation of the Word is not a segment of world history but is consummated outside that history or above it" (FU, p. 311). Bultmann faces great difficulties when he tries to express his timeless understanding of Being in temporal concepts. In such an attempt Bultmann's timeless primordial presupposition is apparent. Also apparent is his explicit departure from Heidegger's temporal interpretation of Being which he calls "temporality of nature" over against what he calls "human temporality." Yet, Heidegger's analysis of Dasein's nature precisely uncovers "human temporality." The context reveals that what Bultmann calls "human temporality" is a very confusing way of talking about what is timeless, that is, of what does not pertain to the temporal continuum. Bultmann explains himself in the following way: "The future of Christ, instead of being a yet unknown segment of time due to appear, which will at some time become present and then past, is the future which marks an absolute limit and is 'always the opposite of every conceivable present.' Clearly the 'future of Christ' means—or at least needs to mean—nothing more than futurity per se, which is always the opposite of every conceivable present. Here, therefore, we have expressed—although admittedly less clearly—an understanding of human temporality in contrast to the temporality of nature, such as we find in Heidegger" (FU, p. 324). In the above statement timelessness appears clearly when "the future of Christ" is reduced to "future per se" and "future per se" is understood in opposition to "every conceivable present." At this point the entire line of time is envisioned in the idea of "every conceivable present." So whatever is left after the entire line of time has been considered and denied is "non-temporal," that is, timeless. Such is the "absolute limit" of which Bultmann speaks above. Such limit is the Parmenidean chorismos. Thus, Christ's resurrection is reduced to an article of faith (KM, p. 41) which has its historical temporal counterpart in the act of preaching of the Church (p. 42). See also KM, pp. 43, 44, and EF, p. 33. Yet the preaching of the church "happens" not only in history and time but is linked as to its content to the cross as history. Bultmann explicitly declares that "the cross of Christ is no mere mythical event, but a historic (geschichtlich) fact originating in the historical (historisch) event which is the crucifixion of Jesus" (KM, p. 37). Here appears what has been called the "inconsistency" of Bultmann's system which in synthesis consists in tying
This foundational perspective represents a step back closer to Aquinas's *ordo ad deum*, but with the advantage that it denies what has been always annoying to Protestantism, namely Aquinas's hierarchical interpretation of ontology.¹

**Man: Potential Timelessness**

Bultmann interprets man's being in order to provide, within the Kantian pattern, the necessary ontological room for the divine-human encounter which plays a central role in his theology.

²This denial of Thomas' ontology is established through Kantism and is developed through the ontological categories of Heidegger's existential analysis. The ontological timeless framework is accepted. At this point both Catholic and Protestant traditions agree. Yet Bultmann in a Kantian tradition denies the hierarchical ontology of the Aristotelic-Thomistic tradition. In the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition timeless being and its temporal...
Consequently, Bultmann's interpretation of man's being, insofar as man is essentially related to God in the encounter, is conditioned by his timeless interpretation of God's being.

Bultmann rejects both the Idealist and the Materialist traditions that consider man to be a substance or object among objects. He understands man as event, act, or will. Yet he also rejects the idea that man should be considered as an "eternal self," that is, as a timeless substance. Consequently, man as entity is considered to be absolutely temporal and historical, that is, as belonging to the dimensionality of the Parmenidean doxa. The historical expression are developed together in a harmonious hierarchical order. In Bultmannian thought, both levels or dimension, as constitutive of reality as entity or substance, do not mix. Yet, as appreciated later, in the "encounter" time and timelessness, it can relate in a very particular non-cognitive way.

1 JCM, pp. 46, 47; and FU, p. 58.

2 "But though human will is in general not without reason, the will is to be esteemed as the determining factor, if it is correct that human life is lived through decisions" (PE, p. 142). See Roberts, pp. 37-38. In EF Bultmann expresses his understanding of man as centered in the act of decision, namely, in resolve (pp. 106-109). "He is simply identical with his act, taken independent of any effect or product or actuality which might ensue from it; he is identical with pure act thought of as the moment of acting, the moment of decision" (p. 33). Cf. FU, p. 187.

3 Essays, pp. 80, 271. Bultmann denies the Greek Platonic-Aristotelian tradition of ontology.

4 As man is obviously perceivable, he belongs to the realm of phenomena. Thus he belongs to the closed historical continuum (Roberts, p. 127). No interpretation of man's being can think of man outside this realm. Bultmann explicitly says that "what to the Greek counts as the appearance of reality is actually the true reality of life" (Essays, p. 83). He connects this idea of historicity with his interpretation of existence: "Only men can have 'existence' because they are historical beings" (JCM, p. 56). This is to say
nature of man is understood as "potentially to be,"¹ which provides the basic category according to which man's being as act or event is understood. As temporal, man pertains to the three ec-stasies of time (past, present, and future).²

As Bultmann approaches the interpretation of man's being from the temporal dimensionality, he does make a distinction between existentiell and existential,³ according to which existentiell points to man as a concrete individual in his unique particular existence, and existential points to the interpretation or that Bultmann sees the "self" as belonging to the "flow" of time and decisions (PE, p. 145). See additionally PE, p. 146; FU, p. 139; Essays, p. 9; and Roberts, pp. 31, 93.

¹"We believe that we understand the being of man more truly when we designate it as historical. And we understand by the historical nature of man's being that his being is a potentiality to be. That is to say, the being of man is removed from his own control, it is risked continually in the concrete situations of life and goes through decisions in which man does not choose something for himself, but chooses himself as his possibility" (FU, p. 149). See FU, p. 187 and Roberts, p. 31. It is clear that "potentiality to be" is linked to the Lutheran idea of justification and hence to the timeless God who acts. For those readers who are familiar with Heidegger, it will be easy to see that Heidegger's interpretation of man's being as potentiality does not entail the "removal of man's being" from his control. On the contrary, the "authentic" man, according to Heidegger, is the man who is in control. For Bultmann to be "in control" is sin.

²As historical being man is "what he was and what he will be" (FU, p. 200). It should be remembered that man's historical nature is understood in Bultmann along the lines provided by nineteenth-century Historicism (Friedrich Gogarten, Demythologizing and History [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1955], p. 57; and PE, pp. 110-137). In short, Bultmann does not follow Heidegger's interpretation of time and man as temporal being in the three extasies and flux of time.

³See also Gogarten, pp. 50-56; Ogden, Foreword to Existence and Faith, p. 7; and idem, Christ without Myth, p. 47. Man, in his...
understanding of what existence means in general. This distinction is not only present in Heidegger's thought in regarding what is ontical and ontological, but goes all the way back to Thomas' foundational ideas of esse and essentia; for esse corresponds to Bultmann's existentiell, and essentia to Bultmann's existential. The real difference between Thomas' and Bultmann's ontological approaches is not in the ways they understand the structure of reality as such, but in the interpretation of existence they develop. Thomas interprets existence with the categories of Aristotelian metaphysics. Bultmann interprets existence with the categories provided by Heidegger's analysis of existence.

I think that Bultmann has an adequate understanding of the role that the ontological framework plays in theology. He realizes that it is just not possible for theology to do without an ontological interpretation. In the ontological realm Bultmann believes that Heidegger's interpretation is the correct one because it is, in a nutshell, the interpretation of the New Testament, and because, as existentiell concrete dimension cannot be reduced to knowledge—in Bultmann's terms, to objectivity (FU, p. 175; Roberts, pp. 26, 33, 44). The same is true in Thomas's system where the esse cannot be reduced to essentia. See p. 170, n. 1 above.

1 See Being and Time, p. 31, n. 3 for the basic meaning of ontisch (ontical) and ontologisch (ontological).

2 See p. 168, nn. 4, 5; p. 169, n. 1; p. 170, n. 1 above.

3 EF, p. 96.

4 "In fact there is no reason why we should not admit that what we are concerned with is the 'right' philosophy" (KM, p. 193). Ogden (Christ without Myth, p. 45) explains that Bultmann considers that science of man has been achieved successfully by Heidegger's phenomenological analysis in Sein und Zeit.

5 "Of course it may still be necessary to eliminate mythology here and there. But the criterion adopted must be taken not from
it is developed through the phenomenological method, it does not understand man in an "objectifying" way\(^1\) (that is to say, in analogy to natural things) but tries to grasp man's being in his historicity.

Yet, as Bultmann replaces the classical ontological categories with Heidegger's \textit{existentialia} applied in the traditional way, Jaspers' criticism regarding Bultmann's objective application of the \textit{existentialia} arises suggesting the questionability of Bultmann's existentialism.\(^2\) Be that as it may, it is at this point that

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\item At this point, objectivity is used by Bultmann in two different senses which vary according to the context. First, Bultmann rejects "objectifying" knowledge of man in the sense that man is understood as if he were another natural entity, that is, a "thing." It is in this context that Bultmann sees Heidegger as providing a "non-objectifying" interpretation of man. That is why Bultmann considers that Heidegger provides the "right" ontological approach to man's being. Heidegger develops "a precise conceptuality in which the phenomena of human existence may be appropriately described in a non-mythological way" (Ogden, \textit{Christ without Myth}, p. 56). See also \textit{EF}, pp. 92-110. Regarding the second sense for "objectivity" see n. 2 below.

\item Here the second sense in which "objectivity" is used by Bultmann appears. "Objectivity" also means knowledge as such insofar as any knowledge has an object in space and time. In this context "object" is taken in its broadest sense. Ogden explains that Bultmann allows the existential analysis to have "objective" character, in the sense of being expressed in temporal "objective" propositions (\textit{Christ without Myth}, p. 45, n. 2, and p. 66). Jaspers in criticizing Bultmann points out his usage of Heideggerian \textit{existentialia} as objective scientific truth ("Myth and Religion," p. 139). To say that Heideggerian categories are found in the New Testament or that they are the result of a phenomenological analysis is not enough to justify their application in an absolute, necessary way. Thomas Aquinas's categories also fill those requirements. Yet Aquinas's categories are shaped within a timeless dimensionality
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Bultmann departs the most from tradition, although not so far as to follow Heidegger in his "overcoming of metaphysics."¹

Even though Bultmann accepts Heidegger's existential analysis and uses it to provide his ontological categories he considers that it is not adequate to express the theological understanding of man. Heidegger's analysis does not recognize the coram deo which in Bultmann's thought is essential for theology.² Thus, from Bultmann's

while Heidegger's are shaped within a temporal one. Bultmann takes Heidegger's temporal categories and applies them in the context of a timeless interpretation of being and knowledge. The Heideggerian existentialia become "timeless truths" (Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 66; FU, p. 330). Thus, man as a temporal reality is interpreted not in the context of the flux of time but in the context of timelessness. It should be remembered that Bultmann works within a Kantian framework for intelligibility and that Kantian objectivity is developed on the basis of the Aristotelic categories of matter and form. See p. 99, n. 1, p. 100, n. 1 above. It is clear, then, that Bultmann does not follow Heidegger's new temporal interpretation of knowledge and "objectivity" according to which objectivity is to be found in the continuity both of the subject-object relationship (with no primordial or initial gap assumed) and of the three extasis of the flux of time (past, present, and future). See pp. 130-40 above.

¹Bultmann still uses the traditional interpretation of the ontological framework for his understanding of the structure of reason. His heavy reliance on Heideggerian insights appears to be a device to replace the Aristotelic-Thomistic categories with Heideggerian existential ones which are more suitable for expressing the foundational doctrine of justification in its Lutheran sense. Aristotelic categories are not suitable because they are grounded on the description of "things." Existentialia, as categories can reach man because they are grounded on the phenomenological description of man as existentiell, and thus they will not "objectify" (reduce to the level of "thing") man's proper historical being.

theological viewpoint Heidegger's analysis is not "wrong" but rather "incomplete," inasmuch as it interprets man from the perspective of an "external" phenomenon, namely, "death," and forgets the "inner" phenomenon of "love." In short, the theological analysis of man

1 Bultmann explicitly denies that the theological analysis of existence in faith is in any kind of "competition" with philosophical ontology (EF, p. 108). He affirms the scientific task of theology as he remarks emphatically that he cannot concede "that the theological explication of existence in faith may not fall back on the philosophical analysis of man. On the contrary, I affirm that this is precisely what theology must do if it at all wants to clarify the existence in faith in a conceptual way, i.e., if it wants to be a science and not merely a sermon" (ET, p. 97). Yet, Heidegger's analysis is considered as introductory to faith as it reveals "from the outset an ontological possibility of human existence of which man dimly knows. Faith is from the outset an ontological possibility of man that appears in the resolve of despair. It is this that makes it possible for man to understand when he is encountered by the kerygma" (EF, p. 108).

Macquarrie (Existentialist Theology, pp. 67-76) searches for a point of contact between Heidegger's existentialist analysis and Bultmann's analysis of the man in faith, and believes that it could be found in Heidegger's concept of Angst. Yet, an analysis of Heidegger's concept of Angst (Being and Time, I.6.40) reveals that Angst belongs to being-in-the-world since "being-in-the-world itself is that in the face of which anxiety is anxious" (ibid.). Consequently, Angst cannot result from confronting "something standing apart from the world" (Macquarrie, Existentialist Theology, p. 70). Perhaps the best way of understanding the relation between Heidegger's analysis of natural man from the viewpoint of death and anxiety and Bultmann's complementary analysis of the man of faith, is to follow Bultmann's own analogical approach (EF, p. 110). For further commentary on the Heideggerian concept of Angst as belonging to and being determined by the world within a temporal dimensionality see Being and Time, I.6.41; II.1.53.

2 Love, according to Bultmann, belongs to the ontic level. "Love is not (like historicity) a characteristic of man as such (what Heidegger speaks of as 'existential'), but rather is an ontic determination of resolve" (EF, p. 106). And the ontic phenomenon of love reveals the existence of faith (p. 107) which constitutes the subject matter of theology as a science. "Theology can have its basis only in the man of faith. Only faith can motivate applying oneself to a science that undertakes a conceptual interpretation of existence in faith, and so theology, can only be a movement of faith itself" (p. 97). The subject matter of theology, then, is not love.
finds in the ontic realm a phenomenon which has been disregarded by philosophical analysis and which allows the theological "completion" of ontology. ¹

Bultmann's theological analysis of man's being sees man as determined by God, ² whose act of encounter requires of man a "radical openness for the power speaking to him from the sphere of the transcendent." ³ The theological dimension, the coram deo, determines man's being both as possibility and as existentiell. Since God's being is timeless, the occurrence of a real ontological relation requires either that God should become in some way temporal or that man should become in some way timeless. Bultmann's approach follows the latter. Man's being as revealed by the act of faith entails a

Love is just the phenomenon which corresponds and reveals the act of faith (EF, pp. 95-97). Yet love may also refer to the act of faith in itself, and so it is not a phenomenon but an invisible reality. See KM, p. 200; Roberts, p. 167.

¹"Completion" gives the idea that what is "completed" remains untouched in its meaning. That is not the case in Bultmann's completion of Heideggerian categories. What Bultmann introduces in theology is not revealed, nor can it be revealed through the existential analysis because it does not belong to this world, but to the realm of timelessness. This is the point where the timeless primordial presupposition appears conditioning the meaning of man's being, and through man, the meaning of theological propositions as a whole. In the context provided by the timeless primordial presupposition accepted by Bultmann, the existential categories bear quite different meaning from the one they have in the temporal context in which Heidegger places them. Thus, it can be seen that Bultmann develops his own dualistic philosophy of man's being in which some Heideggerian motifs are included.

²"God is the reality that determines our existence" (FU, pp. 56, 57).

³Essays, p. 322. See Roberts, p. 53.
passive potentiality for timelessness as a constitutive and determinative element of it. “What we never are here and now—precisely that is our true being.” Man’s being as timeless is to be seen when Bultmann categorically denies that it belongs to the Lebenswelt, that is to say, the world of Parmenidean doxa. Yet the discovery

1 “Man in his finite ‘historicity’ transcends the whole sphere of the subject-object correlation, so also does God as infinite Thou or ‘Existent’ transcend all that falls within the macrocosmic counterpart of this same sphere” (Ogden, Foreword to Existence and Faith, p. 16). “For one who has this belief . . . whatever one has it will be as if one did not in fact have it . . . longing loses its torture, for in the very longing, man frees himself from the illusion that the here and now could ever bring fulfilment, and longing is seen to go beyond time and into eternity” (Essays, p. 6). Man’s “real nature is to be found in what he is not in the sense of being in the world—it is in what he is only with God; his existence as existence is eschatological and transcendent” (Essays, p. 111). Consequently, the believer keeps “the gift of grace, of his justification and his real nature from again becoming a phenomenon of the world” (ibid.). “For the self of man, his inner life, his personal existence is also beyond the visible world and beyond rational thinking” (JCM, p. 40). Our essential being is different from “the working of the laws governing the world” (FU, p. 59). See also Gogarten, Demythologizing, p. 51, and Roberts, p. 53.


3 “In the eyes of the Christian faith the world is the extraneous element, which even the dominion of mind cannot turn into a home. . . . For—the Christian faith feels obliged to say this—man’s real life is not his mind, but an inner self which is at an even profounder level. . . . Man does not simply become aware of God in striving for the true, the good and the beautiful, but only when he can free himself from the world and soar up to the eternal as his home” (Essays, p. 153). Regarding the world (Lebenswelt) as not pertaining to the real authentic being of man, see also FU, pp. 60, 257; KM, p. 18; GVIV, p. 128; EF, p. 107; Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 61; and Roberts, p. 89. Roberts (pp. 29-59) and points out that what is controllable, what is physical in nature, what is in the “past,” and what constitutes our personality is to be denied as belonging to man’s being. Ogden (Foreword to Existence and Faith, pp. 15, 16) points out the qualitative difference that exists, according to Bultmann, between the world and the inner self of man’s being. Yet, according to Roberts’ criticism, such a gulf or dichotomy not only does not pertain to New Testament conceptuality
of man's timeless ontological dimensionality does not mean that man should be considered as a timeless substance or reality. On the contrary, the paradoxical nature of man consists in that he is at the same time both temporal and timeless. His timelessness is in time, in the continuum of time, yet it is not to be identified or confused with the temporal historical continuum of the Lebenswelt.¹

In order to understand Bultmann's epistemological framework it is necessary to have a clear understanding of his perception of the paradoxical relationship in which the timeless and temporal dimension of man's being are to be seen. Bultmann approaches the but it also entails a "massive contradiction involving fundamental features of the New Testament and reaching into every corner of it" (p. 79). Interestingly enough, such dichotomy is not a feature of Heideggerian thought either. "Ontologically 'world'--says Heidegger--is not a way of characterizing those entities which Dasein essentially is not; it is rather a characteristic of Dasein itself" (Being and Time, 1.3.14). Thus, if Bultmann's essential dichotomy comes from neither the Bible nor from Heidegger, from where does it come? In my opinion it comes from the acceptance of the timeless dimensionality of Being and reason.

Bultmann explains the origin of the timeless-temporal dichotomy that his interpretation of the world and man's authentic being entails in the following sentence: "Whereas to ancient man the world had been home—in the Old Testament as God's creation, to classic Greece as the cosmos pervaded by the deity—the utter difference of human existence from all worldly existence was recognized for the first time in Gnosticism and Christianity, and thus the world became foreign soil to human self" (TNT 1:165). See Ogden, Christ without Myth, pp. 58-60; Miegge, p. 62; and Roberts, pp. 22, 23, 50-55. Obviously Bultmann does not consider the possibility that a different kind of conceptuality may be working in the New Testament. As he develops his exegesis, Bultmann "selects" the available conceptuality that should fit within his chosen framework for intelligibility.

interpretation of this paradoxical relationship from the side of man's temporal nature. Heidegger's analysis helps Bultmann to reduce existence to the "act of decision" or "resoluteness.\(^1\) As an act that belongs to a temporal entity (man), the act of decision is always to be found "in time" yet it can be either temporal or timeless depending on what is its "source" or "cause." If the source is man, then the act of decision is temporal and consequently sinful.\(^2\) If the source is God, and the act has no human "co-origin,"

\(^1\) As Bultmann reduces man's existential analysis to the act of decision, he is applying traditional abstraction to the result of Heidegger's phenomenological analysis in order to find the "core" of existence. "Only in the act are we ourselves" (FU, p. 62). Roberts (p. 323) in his conclusion believes that "the effect of his [Bultmann's] work is to reduce the content of Christian theology to a single idea, that of the act of decision in which man draws his self-understanding and thus his self into conformity with his authentic being as potentiality to be" (p. 323). See also ibid., p. 305. Additionally, it is to be noticed that Bultmann's reduction of existence to the "act of decision," which disregards and even contradicts Heidegger's analysis of the all-inclusive dynamic center of existence as "the moment of vision" in which "nothing can occur" (Being and Time, II.4.68.a), follows the Protestant tradition that rejects the primacy of the intellect and favors the primacy of the will and action. For Bultmann the center of existence is the "act of decision" in isolation from everything else in experience, an act in which no knowledge is possible (FU, p. 63; Roberts, pp. 179, 181). For Heidegger, on the contrary, the center of existence is to be found in direct continuity with the whole of man's being both in its ontic and ontological levels. Moreover, this "center of gravity" in existence is not, and cannot be, an "act." It is rather an essentially cognitive event that Heidegger calls "the moment of vision." Bultmann's reduction is necessary in order to provide the "point of contact" in time for timeless transcendence.

\(^2\) Bultmann does not speak much about the act of decision as temporally executed. This is due to the fact that Bultmann is concerned with the interpretation of the act of faith which denies the temporal happening of human resoluteness as a whole. The following statement gives a clear idea of Bultmann's understanding regarding the way in which the act of decision functions in temporality: "The present is the moment of decision, and by the decision taken the yield of the past is gathered in and the meaning of the future is
and man's part is rather passive as that which is "acted upon" by the transcendent "act of God," the act is timeless. The latter is chosen. This is the character of every historical situation; in it the problem and the meaning of past and future are enclosed and are waiting, as it were, to be unveiled by human decisions" (PE, pp. 141, 142). It should be noticed that Bultmann still interprets the "act" of decision in a way that avoids the obvious difficulty of explaining why the act of decision should involve knowledge in its temporal level, but should not include it in its timeless one.

"Only in the act are we ourselves" (FU, p. 62). Yet, "the act can be free only if it is simultaneous with the must" (ibid.). And "the must is a word spoken by God and is wholly outside our control. Only the free act is ours" (ibid.). So it is in being "acted upon" by God as the timeless transcendent "must" that man's being reaches its "authentic" dimension and meaning. This dimension, however, requires the denial of world and time in all its forms. This denial implies that "every objectively discernible piece of behavior, of speech, every confirmed character-trait or role-identity of the person doing the act, is inessential" (FU, p. 63). See also JCM, p. 41; Essays, p. 158; Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 63; and Roberts, p. 291.

Roberts explains that Bultmann "has limited existence to moments of pure existential decision, which can have no essential relationship to anything worldly" (p. 181). As freedom happens in the act of decision, it does not require a timeless entity to explain it. "The Christian view of freedom indicates that freedom, as freedom of the individual, is not a quality, but can only be an event at any given time" (Essays, p. 310). As is seen later, what this position requires is only a timeless potentiality. That is to say, in the divine-human encounter man is only passive. An active role as the one, for instance, Thomas suggests the active intellect is able to perform is ruled out by Bultmann. Yet, in order for the encounter to actually "happen" ontologically, man has to have a passivity sensible to timelessness. Man must have a timeless passive potentiality upon which God could act. Such passivity does not exclude knowledge. Yet it is not "knowledge" because knowledge is an "act" performed by man in time, and the "act of faith" as "act of God" is performed in timelessness. For further commentary on the timeless "act of faith" in time, see FU, p. 253; Essays, pp. 101, 102, 104; TNT, 1:331; KM, pp. 26, 27, 31; Roberts, pp. 24, 58.

According to Bultmann, Jaspers' temporality is not authentic because he merely refers to time within the closed continuum of history and its traditions (KMII, p. 189). Yet, Jaspers does not essentially differ from Bultmann's position since he also recognizes that man's real "historicity" is to be found beyond the continuum of time as he talks of the relation between Existenz and transcendence (Philosophy of Existence, p. 27). Bultmann also criticizes Cullmann
what in religion is called grace, freedom, and salvation (justification by faith).

Obviously, theology is concerned with the understanding of the act of faith which results from the encounter between temporality and timelessness. Yet as timelessness is unknowable and inexpressible, our talking about it must use temporal language in an analogical sense. Bultmann refers to man's timeless, passive potentiality of being in the language provided by the phenomenological analysis of man's being, analogically applied. At this point it should be remembered that "analogy" implies the denial of the first obvious temporal meaning that is revealed by the phenomenological analysis in order to apply it to a non-temporal reality.

The encounter, in the "moment of decision," happens in the timeless dimensionality. Yet, since man has only passive potential timelessness and, therefore, can only function temporally, the timeless act of faith can be cognitively considered only from the perspective of temporality, in which the timeless act of faith is seen as happening in the "moment" of decision and pertaining to the

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1 On man's authentic being as belonging properly to the realm beyond knowledge, see FU, p. 253; GV, 4:128; Roberts, pp. 24, 25, 179, and Ogden, Foreword to Existence and Faith, p. 16. "Thus we find ourselves led to the conclusion that our own existence, since it depends on our act, can never be known by us" (FU, p. 63).

2 "Thus the determination that the man of love acquires from the thou is exactly analogous to the threefold determination of man by death, which is made visible by existential analysis" (EF, p. 110).

3 See p. 232, nn. 1-3 above.
"present" in isolation from past and future. This is what Bultmann calls the "eschatological event," namely, the timeless act of God in the temporal experience of man. The "moment," the "now"—as the

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1This is possible due to Bultmann's "punctilear" view of time (Heinrich Ott, "Objectification and Existentialism," in Kerygma and Myth II, ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch [London: S.P.C.K., 1962], p. 317). The "punctilear" understanding of time belongs to the Aristotelian tradition that interprets time from the viewpoint of timelessness as the "now" or the "moment" (p. 91, n. 2 above). It is clear that Bultmann does not follow Heidegger in his interpretation of time in the "flux" of it. The "moment" as the "now" allows for the isolation of the "present" act from both past and future, that is, from time. This "isolation" in time provides the necessary room for man's time­less transcendence to act upon temporal man in a non-temporal, non­historical way. Thus in the "moment" temporality, as act of faith (past, present, and future), is denied. In the act of love, they are not denied but "suspended," as for transcendence to cause the act of faith. This is due to the fact that "the 'decision of love, however, is not a second decision alongside faith; it is precisely faith itself" (FU, p. 181).

Faith and love are the two faces of one and the same act. Faith points to the timeless side, love points to its temporal side. Yet the act is not caused in time but in timelessness. In this "causing," temporal dimension as a whole is suspended, yet, at the same time conserved and transformed. Thus Bultmann can speak of "continuity" and say that the act of faith is not to be reduced or "confined to a single moment" (FU, pp. 181, 182). "Every instant has the possibility of being an eschatological instant and in Christian faith this possibility is realised" (PE, p. 154). Thus the "continuity" is thought of regarding the reach and effects that the encounter has in time, but not to the act itself which is not man's possession (PE, p. 155), but has to be repeated over and over again.

2Bultmann explains (PE, pp. 152-54) how the paradox of human being as being at the same time an eschatological and historical being is to be understood by referring to Christ in whose case man's experience of transcendence reaches its highest and exemplar point. The "eschatological" dimension in Christ is described by saying that "the advent of Christ is an event in the realm of eternity which is incommensurable with historical time" (ibid., p. 153). Applied to man, Bultmann describes the "eschatological" dimension by saying that "for Christian existence, its eschatological character is never a state of affairs prevailing within the world, but a continual limitation of its existence in the world. It exists only in so far as it constantly presses beyond its limits" (Essays, p. 88). See additionally Essays, p. 112; FU, p. 193. Throockmorton (pp. 134, 135)
passive potentiality for timelessness of temporal man—is the only point in which timeless God can "act" in time. God cannot act temporally, that is, in the flux of time, in the Lebenswelt. He can only act on the Lebenswelt indirectly through his timeless act upon man who, having a potentiality for timelessness can, as temporal being, introduce God's action into time as he "translates" it into his ongoing experience in time as the authentically "new" element that confers upon him the gifts of freedom.

In accepting God's "indirect" action in time, Bultmann is explains how Bultmann reaches the interpretation of the eschatological dimension of man from the starting point of the isolated temporal present. The isolated temporal present is already the product of a timeless interpretation of the flux of time. Julius Schniewind points out that Bultmann "tends to confuse eschatology with timelessness" ("A Reply to Bultmann," in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch [New York: Harper & Row, 1961], p. 75). What Bultmann is actually doing, though, is not confusing but reducing the temporal eschatology of the Bible to the timeless dimension of the encounter. This reduction is demanded by both his ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure.

Bultmann expressly rejects the idea of a "point of contact" between revelation and man (FU, p. 316). The study of the context of such a declaration shows that Bultmann is concerned with the idea that such a "point of contact" implies, in traditional theology, the positing of a "better self," a timeless substance, which therefore is to be distinguished from the "regular" temporal self (substance). For Bultmann such a distinction is not possible. Yet, having denied this classical interpretation of the "point of contact," it is obvious that his idea of "now" within time considers existence as a whole as "passive potency" for the encounter with the timeless God (coram deo).

An actual "new occurrence" cannot be provided in time. Time only repeats itself. Something really "new" is bound to come from outside time, namely, from timeless transcendence (EF, p. 107). In this context Bultmann speaks of authentic "historicity" to refer to that historical experience caused by the "new" timeless act of God who saves and delivers man from himself, that is, from his past. Thus, it is not temporality and historicity as pertaining to the Lebenswelt but as pertaining to the eschatological timeless act.
following Kant's pattern regarding the way in which timeless freedom
in man can be considered to be a condition or cause in the empirical
(temporal) realm without breaking the closed temporal continuum of
the phenomena.\(^1\) Of course, Bultmann applies to the divine-human

\(^1\) Kant provides a detailed explanation regarding the way in which
the timeless causality of man's pure reason should be under-
stood as it determines the empirical temporal realm of the phenomena
without breaking the causal continuum of natural and historical
causality (Critique of Pure Reason, pp. 319-330). The causality of
reason for Kant is timeless (p. 326). By affecting the timeless side
of human will, timeless reason is able to indirectly "act" upon tem-
poral phenomena as it affects the timeless side of what belongs to
the temporal continuum. The will as it is affected by timeless
reason keeps being a temporal phenomenon conditioned by temporal
causality, which is not broken by the "new" timeless conditionality.

Briefly, Kant's interpretation allows the introduction of
a timeless cause, through an "indirect" kind of conditionality, into
the temporal dimension of nature and history without breaking the
closed natural and historical continuum. Kant suggests that "pure
reason as purely intelligible faculty, is not subject to the condi-
tions of time. The causality of reason in its intelligible character
does not begin to be; it does not make its appearance at a certain
time, for the purpose of producing an effect. If this were not the
case, the causality of reason would be subservient to the natural
law of phenomena, which determines them according to time, and as
a series of causes and effects in time; it would consequently cease
to be freedom, and become a part of nature. . . . But in other
respects, the same cause belongs also to the series of phenomena.
Man is himself a phenomenon. His will has an empirical character,
which is the empirical cause of all his actions. There is no condi-
tion--determining man and his volition in conformity with this
character--which does not itself form part of the series of effects
in nature, and is subject to their law--the law according to which
an empirically undetermined cause of an event in time cannot exist.
For this reason no given action can have an absolute and spontaneous
origin, all actions being phenomena and belonging to the world of
experience. But it cannot be said of reason, that the state in which
it determines the will is always preceded by some other state deter-
mring it. For reason is not a phenomenon, and therefore not subject
to sensuous conditions; and, consequently, even in relation to its
causality, the sequence or conditions of time do not influence
reason, nor can the dynamical law of nature, which determines the
sequence of time according to certain rules, be applied to it. . . .
This freedom must not be described, in a merely negative manner, as
independence of empirical conditions, for in this case the faculty
of reason would cease to be a cause of phenomena; but it must be

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encounter what in Kant is only an inner anthropological occurrence.\textsuperscript{1} Nonetheless the Kantian pattern that explains the possibility of an indirect relationship between the timeless realm of the noumenon and the temporal realm of the phenomenon is at the core of Bultmann's understanding of the divine-human encounter.

Bultmann's interpretation of the past and the future as modes of temporality is to be understood in the context of this "indirect" kind of "causation." Since the religious Christian reality of redemption happens in timelessness, namely, in the act of God and its correlate, the act of faith, the past as belonging to the temporal dimensionality of the phenomena is understood as sin.\textsuperscript{2} Yet, the past is sin only when it is taken as the determinative cause in man's moment of decision, namely, of his being.\textsuperscript{3} When the regarded, positively, as a faculty which can spontaneously originate a series of events" (pp. 326, 327).

\textsuperscript{1}Bultmann in his use of Kant's pattern sees God playing the role of Kant's "pure reason" and man playing the role of will with its timeless and temporal levels.

\textsuperscript{2}"To live on the basis of the world, that is of the past, is what is called sin. To live on the basis of the future is called living in dependence on God" (\textit{Essays}, p. 81). Thus, it is clear that temporality per se is not sin. Sin rather consists in disregarding the timeless determination of God's act and letting the world determine man's being by conditioning his moment of decision. It is also clear that the future is not considered as temporal mode, but rather as the perspective within the flux of time from which the timeless act of God can be expected to appear. See \textit{Essays}, pp. 80, 81; \textit{KM}, pp. 18, 19; \textit{FU}, p. 258; and Gogarten, \textit{Demythologizing}, pp. 53, 54. As usual Bultmann believes that his interpretation of the past as the essence of sin is the Biblical Pauline position. "Paul is convinced that man is able to be free from his past, indeed, that he does not wish to be free but prefers to remain as he is. That is the essence of sin" (\textit{PE}, p. 44).

\textsuperscript{3}Sin happens when temporal man lets time become his master (\textit{FU}, p. 258). In this context time as past event determines man's
determinative cause of man's decision is seen in the timeless act of God, the past, which is not erased from man's reality as phenomenon, is to be understood analogically as providing general insights to be used in the expression of man's self-understanding of faith.¹

Bultmann's interpretation of the future as temporal modality agrees in general with Bloch's "not-yet."² However, departing radically from Bloch, Bultmann sees the "not-yet" as providing in man being, replacing God's timeless authentic determination. On the other hand, God's causation in redemptive encounter does not do away with the temporal mode of man's being, but rather it explains and interprets it in relation to "new" situations provided by the timeless encounter. Thus, it can be seen that Bultmann is following the traditional Thomistic pattern according to which temporality receives its meaning from the timeless understanding of Being. For further commentary on redemption and forgiveness as freedom from the past, see Essays, p. 112; Schniewind, p. 51.

¹Roberts (pp. 28, 29) explains how according to Bultmann's analogical understanding of the past we have to consider it in isolation from its pastness (its actuality). Bultmann suggests that the past must be considered not as things that happened, but as picturing ways of behaving and understanding ourselves in the present moment. This provides the background, the historical situation, in which the new understanding of ourselves could be expressed (FU, p. 257).

²See p. 149, n. 3 above. "Future cannot be characterized otherwise than as nothing" (JCM, p. 77). Roberts remarks that "Bultmann's future is an idealized future of which nothing can be known, and over which we have no control. It is a Future which is 'darkness', a future which never comes" (p. 54). This future never "comes" because it is not temporal but analogical. In its analogical sense it only points to man's potentiality for timelessness. Hence the future is always present as openness and as such is never accomplished because that for what it is openness and potentiality does not pertain to time but to timelessness. Obviously, this interpretation of the future as temporal openness for timelessness is not Heidegger's, who sees the future in the context of the being-in-the-world structure of Dasein. According to Heidegger the temporal nature of the future is constitutional of both authentic and inauthentic existence, and not only of the inauthentic as Bultmann suggests (Being and Time, II.4.68.a).
the necessary "openness" for his radical passive potentiality for timelessness, that is to say, for being acted upon by God's timeless redemptive act.¹

In short, Bultmann's interpretation of man's being follows the classical tradition that considers man's being as receiving its meaning from the realm of the timeless dimensionality.² As usually held in traditional philosophy, the temporal mode of man's being is not denied but rather interpreted from the viewpoint provided by timelessness.³ At the same time Bultmann carefully avoids the traditional understanding according to which timelessness was thought

¹ "Faith includes free and complete openness to the future" (JCM, p. 77). "To live on the basis of the future is called living in dependence of God" (Essays, p. 81). For further commentary, see Roberts, pp. 28, 290. Roberts comments that according to Bultmann "authentic man is only possibility, and therefore only future" (p. 29). Bultmann himself says that "what we never are here and now, precisely that is our true being" (EF, p. 281). Hence, man's future is taken in precedence to the present and past because in the phenomenological analysis of time it is the future which provides the necessary ground for the idea of "openness," which may provide the basis for the application of analogy. Thus, the future as openness, analogically understood is suitable for expressing man's passive potentiality for timelessness. Thus analogically God's act is a "future" act since, from the perspective of temporal man, it can be only perceived as coming from the as yet undecided future. Thus, not only the present but also the future are interpreted analogically by Bultmann. For further commentary on Bultmann's analogical interpretation of the future as a mode of man's being, see KM, pp. 19, 32; and Roberts, pp. 74, 75, 81, 86.


³ Austin Farrer evaluates Bultmann's timeless emphasis, declaring that "Dr. Bultmann seems to have no difficulty with the belief that personal existence can kick off the body and survive; his unbelieving existentialist teachers would hardly follow him there" ("An English Appreciation," in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch [New York: Harper and Row, 1961], p. 22).
to be a substance or entity. Timelessness in man is just a passive potentiality of man's being or entity which can be grasped cognitively by analogy to the temporal mode of the present, the "moment," the "now." But the present as temporal mode does not provide the meaning of man but rather the "place" in which man as existentiell can reach his true meaning, freedom, and redemption in the timeless encounter with God.

Man's passive potentiality for timelessness which differentiates Bultmann's anthropological ontology from Existentialism, is a consequence of his interpretation of God's being as timeless. If God is timeless and an actual encounter between man and God occurs, then man's being is required to be at least open (potential) to timelessness. And, as this potentiality for timelessness determines the meaning of man's being, Bultmann's system is still developed in the traditional pattern for reason's structure, according to which meaning is to spring from timelessness into temporality.

Now it is necessary to consider Bultmann's interpretation of the epistemological framework. The ontological framework provided

1Consequently, there is not a kind of entity which, like Thomas's idea of soul, could be thought of along the lines of entity or substance, even a divine substance. On the contrary, man's timelessness is conceived only as passive potentiality, and so it allows for the paradoxical interpretation of man's being as eschatological and historical (PE, p. 154). Bultmann believes that "faith insists not on the direct identity of God's action with worldly events, but, if I may be permitted to put it so, on the paradoxical identity which can be believed only here and now against the appearance of non-identity" (JCM, p. 62). The Kantian pattern of Bultmann's ontology is apparent in his anthropology.

2See FU, p. 58.
the necessary understanding of the nature of the "object" to be understood, namely, God's act on man's potentiality. The epistemological framework has to deal with the cognitive process which theological reason is supposed to follow in order to provide a proper knowledge of its particular "object" or subject matter.

**Epistemological Framework**

As in the case of the ontological framework, Bultmann does not develop his epistemological framework in a systematic way. This fact explains why the analysis of Bultmann's interpretation of reason's structure requires more space than the analysis of Aquinas's interpretation. As happened in the case of Aquinas, Bultmann's interpretation of "natural reason" sets the stage for the functioning and interpretation of "theological reason." Natural reason and

1. Roberts believes that Bultmann's epistemological approach "is such a tangle that one hardly knows where to start sorting it out" (p. 172). Yet, the analysis of Bultmann's epistemological framework is neither impossible nor bound to be unclear. The problem with it perhaps is that there has been no serious analysis of Bultmann's epistemological framework so far.

2. As far as I know there is no in-depth study of Bultmann's epistemological framework.

3. "Natural reason" stands for the interpretation of reason and its functioning within the different scientific enterprises. It corresponds to what Aquinas called lumen rationis.

4. While he speaks of presuppositions, Bultmann does so in relation to the particular task of hermeneutics (JCM, p. 48). He does not pay much attention to the fact that his hermeneutical system as a whole is conditioned by his interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks, veritable presuppositions which he accepts without due criticism. Cf. Thiselton, p. 232, and Bruce Wilshire, "James and Heidegger on Truth and Reality," Man and World 10 (1977):92.

5. "Theological reason" is Bultmann's interpretation of reason's structure in relation to the supernatural realm of theology.
theological reason do not contradict each other; on the contrary, they complement each other. It is precisely this "harmony" between the "supernatural" and natural realms that makes Bultmann's rational structure so appealing. Of course, as is seen later, Bultmann understands this "harmony" in a way that differs substantially from Thomas's understanding.

The analysis of Bultmann's epistemological framework of reason's structure is developed in two steps. First the functioning of natural reason is analyzed. Second, the interpretation of the functioning of theological reason is considered.

Natural Reason

In order that the broad and complex interpretation of scientific natural reason in its epistemological framework may be appreciated as a whole, its presentation is divided into three major issues, namely, the cognitive realm, the metaphysical framework, and objectivity.

The cognitive realm: the closed temporal continuum. At this point the determination of the epistemological framework by the ontological framework is apparent in Bultmann's Kantian pattern. This determination is produced by what I call Bultmann's first foundational ontological dichotomy, namely, the Kantian dichotomy between the timeless noumena and the temporal phenomena.¹ In the context

Theological reason corresponds to what Aquinas called lumen propheticæ (Revelation, origin of theological knowledge) and lumen fidei, the actual functioning of reason in the theological enterprise.

¹The fact that cognition is interpreted as belonging exclusively to the phenomenal realm of the Lebenswelt is expressed in a
of his Kantian understanding of the timeless-temporal Parmenidean dichotomy, Bultmann accepts as "fact" the interpretation which circumscribes cognition to the temporal realm and declares that knowledge of the timeless realm of the Platonic thing-in-itself is impossible. Thus, knowledge belongs to the closed continuum of temporality. This idea, namely, the idea of the closed continuum of causality as pertaining exclusively to the temporal realm, reminds one of Kant's epistemology. In short, the closed temporal continuum summary way by Kant himself: "The conception of a noumenon is therefore merely a limitative conception, and therefore only of negative use. But it is not an arbitrary or fictitious notion, but is connected with the limitation of sensibility, without, however, being capable of presenting us with any positive datum beyond this sphere" (Critique of Pure Reason, p. 188). For the relation of the noumenal realm to timelessness in Kant's conception of God, see ibid., pp. 371, 372. The ens summum just cannot act in the phenomenal realm.

Bultmann expresses clearly that "the conformity to law [closed continuum] which is part of our conception of nature does not require proof but is presupposed as axiomatic" (FU, pp. 247, 248). He further adds that "we cannot free ourselves from that presupposition" (ibid.). Regarding the conformity to law or to the closed temporal continuum that determines the cognitive realm, Bultmann explains that such "conception is not 'an interpretation of the world,' 'a judgment about the world,' 'a world-view'; it is not a conclusion about the world, either subjective or based on a conscious decision. It is given in our existence in the world" (ibid.). Even when Bultmann affirms that the closed continuum is taken for granted by modern man (JCM, p. 16), his dependence on Kantian philosophy can hardly be ignored. The closed-continuum presupposition is accepted by most liberal Protestant theologians today, for instance, Tillich (Systematic Theology, 1:116) and Dooyeweerd (1:93). However, Bultmann is the one who applies it with more coherence and follows it to its final consequences for theology. What Bultmann considers a "fact" or "given to existence," however, Macquarrie considers to be a "pseudo-scientific view... that was popular half a century ago" (An Existentialist Theology, p. 168). For an introduction to available criticism of Bultmann's closed-continuum presupposition, see Thiselton, pp. 260, 261. Regarding the closed-continuum as applied to God's transcendence, see GV 4:132.

The following statement from Critique of Pure Reason shows how the closed-continuum presupposition which Bultmann sees as a
which plays the role of basic determinative category in Bultmann's epistemological framework is not "just given" to us,¹ as Bultmann "given," has been philosophically expressed by Kant's interpretation of reality as divided into noumena and phenomena. "The principle of continuity forbids any leap in the series of phenomena regarded as changes (in mundo non datur saltus); and likewise, in the complex of all empirical intuitions in space, any break or hiatus between two phenomena (non datur hiatus)—for we can so express the principle, that experience can admit nothing which proves the existence of a vacuum, or which even admits it as a part of an empirical synthesis. For, as regards a vacuum or void, which we may cogitate as out and beyond the field of possible experience (the world), such a question cannot come before the tribunal of mere understanding, which decides only upon questions that concern the employment of given phenomena for the construction of empirical cognition" (p. 174) Thus, the closed continuum is not "given to our experience," as Bultmann claims, but rather a complex epistemological construction that results from Kant's epistemological theory.

Even though the intellectual basis of the closed continuum idea is to be found in Kant it is introduced in the exegetical realm by Ernst Troeltsch who provided the classical expression of the basic presuppositions of the historical critical method. For instance, Troeltsch says that exegesis must follow the principle of "analogy" according to which "the fundamental homogeneity of all historical events" must be affirmed, and the principle of "correlation" (p. 732) must be affirmed, and the principle of "correlation" according to which "the reciprocity of all manifestations of spiritual-historical life" (ibid.) is to be posited as a basic rule. Thus Bultmann, through the influence of the scientific approach to Biblical exegesis that finds its roots in Troeltsch receives also indirectly the influence of Kant who expressed philosophically the closed continuum principle after which Troeltsch developed the basic principles for the historical critical method. For an introduction to the influence of Ernst Troeltsch in theology see Roland H. Bainton, "Ernst Troeltsch—Thirty Years Later," Theology Today 8 (1951):70-96. For a discussion on the presuppositions of the historical critical method as expressed by Troeltsch see Gerhard Hasel, "Method in the Interpretation of the Bible." (Paper written at Andrews University, January, 1983), pp. 26-59 [duplicated]).

¹FU, p. 248. Regarding the way in which Kantian philosophy influences Bultmann's closed-continuum presupposition and its influence on the overall Bultmannian theology, see Roberts, pp. 140, 144. Bultmann explicitly explains that the closed continuum is to be regarded as theological presupposition insofar as theological thinking is linked to the hermeneutical and exegetical tasks. "The historical method includes the presupposition that history is a unity in the sense of a closed continuum of effects in which individual
uncritically affirms, but it is rather the final product of a long process of philosophical interpretation in which classical reason finds its mature expression in Kant's epistemological framework.

This first Bultmannian dichotomy circumscribes cognition to the temporal phenomenal realm but does not deny the timeless noumenal one. It just denies cognition, the capability of functioning in relation to the timeless noumenal realm which Bultmann's pattern accepts as the realm for religious experiences.¹

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¹The basic difference between Thomas's and Bultmann's epistemologies is to be found here. Bultmann recognizes no "active intellect" for crossing the gap between timelessness and temporality as Thomas did. Additionally, for Thomas there is not a clear-cut gap between timelessness and time, as Bultmann claims, but rather a hierarchical interwoven merging of both of them in the ontological constitution of reality as a whole. Another basic difference is to be found in Bultmann's interpretation of God's timeless being as a nonentity. As a consequence of this interpretation, Bultmann's God cannot leave timelessness so as to relate to temporality directly. Thus the closed-continuum presupposition is not a requirement of science as such (Roberts, pp. 142, 143) but rather of Bultmann's particular interpretation of God's Being. Consequently, I suggest that a criticism of the closed-continuum presupposition should not focus on the temporal level of scientific causality as Robert (pp. 140-44) and Thiselton (pp. 260, 261) do. On the contrary, it should focus on an analysis of the dimensionality of Being in which God's nature is theologically understood.
The interpretation that sees the closed continuum as determining the limits of the cognitive realm requires that theological reason, in its scientific modality, should explain how it can be possible for "knowledge" to relate to its religious origin (timeless realm) if knowledge is only possible within the temporal context of the closed continuum.

Metaphysical system. Now that the cognitive realm has been identified as pertaining exclusively to temporality, it is necessary to know the background of intelligibility to which each particular knowledge is supposed to relate in order to have meaning and inner coherence. In Aquinas this background was provided by his hierarchical interpretation of reality as a whole. Bultmann replaces

Scientific reason is to be seen as the modern rejection of both the transcendent and the timeless realms. Scientific reason works within the ontological dimension of temporality. Science does not relate to timeless speculations. Bultmann accepts this Kantian pattern.

This points to the basic problem of theological reason as found in the Bultmannian system. The problem consists in how to explain the existence of theological knowledge when the subject matter that pertains to theology belongs to the timeless realm and, at the same time, any possible knowledge can only belong to the temporal realm of the closed continuum.

The metaphysical framework for intelligibility (interpretation of reality as a whole), which in Aquinas corresponds to the hierarchical interpretation of reality within the Aristotelian tradition, in Bultmann is divided in two: the timeless framework of the noumena for theological intelligibility and the phenomenal framework for objective scientific intelligibility. Thus, in Bultmann's system the same proposition may have two different meanings depending on the framework for intelligibility that is being applied at the time. The analysis of the scientific interpretation of the world (Weltanschauung) provides the metaphysical framework for objective knowledge (natural reason). The timelessness of God's being provides the framework for theological knowledge (theological reason).
Thomas's hierarchical explanation of reality with a scientific interpretation of the world.¹

The interpretation of the world or world-view is to be provided by science² through its "permanent principles."³ Yet, since the background of intelligibility provided by scientific world-views refers to time, they are not "absolute," "necessary," or "unchangeable," predicates as the later pertain only to timelessness. Scientific world-views do change.⁴ Nonetheless, they are to be preferred over against traditional ontological reflections and

¹"Weltanschauung is a theory about the world and life, and about the unity of the world, its origin, purpose or worth—or again, its worthlessness—about the meaning of it all—or again, about its meaninglessness," Essays, p. 8). Since God, and hence faith, stands in the realm of timelessness, "a Weltanschauung stands in sharpest contrast to belief in God" (ibid.). See also ibid., p. 72, and Roberts, pp. 42, 43.

²"For all our thinking today is shaped irrevocably by modern science" (KM, p. 3). "It is science which determines that view of the world 'through the school, the press, the wireless, the cinema, and all the other fruits of technical progress' (ibid., p. 5, n. 1). Cf. Roberts, p. 10, and Hans-Werner Bartsch, "Bultmann and Jaspers," in Kerygma and Myth, A Theological Debate II, ed. Hans-Werner Bartsch [London: S.P.C.K., 1962], p. 199. Putnam explains that "reason had to be coextensive with science because what else could it be?" (p. 186).


⁴According to Bultmann even though science provides the "accurate" world view, it does not provide a final closed interpretation of the world. The very "true" scientific interpretation of the world, as it pertains to the temporal realm of the Parmenidean doxa, changes according to its nature (KM, p. 3; PE, p. 70). The framework for intelligibility (world-view) is provided, basically, by the sciences of nature and not by history. That is, by a cosmological interpretation provided no longer by philosophy but rather by natural sciences. As the framework for the intelligibility of the whole leaves out not only timelessness but also, within the temporal realm, history, a further reduction of what can be called "real" is achieved.
mythology because they are developed according to the formal "permanent principles" of science.¹

At this point, where the changeable temporal reality is considered to reach its intelligibility from the "permanent principles" of science, the traditional timeless cognitive categories shaped by tradition from Plato's original interpretation of the idea as "form"² are incorporated as the basic meaning of scientific objective categories through the Kantian pattern.³

Temporal reality is supposed to find its meaning from the background of intelligibility provided by categories shaped in and from the traditional timeless interpretation of Being's dimensionality.⁴ It is to be noted, then, that Bultmann's understanding of the nature of scientific knowledge pertains to a positivistic model.⁵

¹For Bultmann the main point regarding science "is not the concrete results of scientific research and the contents of a world-view, but the method of thinking from which world-views follow" (JCM, p. 37).

²See p. 87, n. 3 above.

³Regarding the Greek origin of modern scientific categories, see Raschke, pp. 375-79; Putnam, p. 216; Perotti, pp. 96, 97; Heidegger, Discourse on Thinking (New York: Harper and Row, 1966), pp. 55, 56; and Heisenberg, Across the Frontiers, p. 116. Regarding how the classical ontological categories of Platonic-Aristotelian origin were preserved at the very core of Descartes' scientific rational system, see Savagnone, "La ognoscibilità," p. 381. For an analysis of the way in which the traditional categories of reason, from their Platonic origin to their Kantian formulation were developed, see chapter I above; cf. Raschke, p. 383.

⁴This pertains to the Kantian epistemological framework. See pp. 111-113 above.

⁵See Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology, p. 168. It should be noted that even Heidegger's understanding of the nature of scientific thought is also positivistic, not showing awareness
which has the tendency of taking physics as metaphysics.¹

In short, Bultmann's metaphysical framework for the background of intelligibility is developed as a scientific world-view which is to be constructed within the Kantian-Positivistic tradition.² Thus, as is seen in the next section, the scientific positivistic understanding of science appears as a determinative element mainly as it shapes the meaning of "objectivity."³

**Objectivity.** The analysis of objectivity discloses Bultmann's second dichotomy, namely, the dichotomy between nature and history.⁴ Since the permanent principles of the intelligibility of the way in which recent discoveries and science's own criticism affected the nature of scientific epistemology. See Raschke, p. 380; cf. Lauer, p. 172, and Peter Kampits, "The Myths of Reason and Critical Rationalism," Listening 15 (1980):112-16.

¹See Putnam, p. 15, and Roberts, p. 143.

²Jaspers remarks that modern science "is known to surprisingly few: indeed, there are many scholars, and Bultmann, a serious historian, is apparently one of them, who are unfamiliar with its principles" ("Myth and Religion," p. 135). Be that as it may, Bultmann's concept of science appears to be more positivistic and scientific, replacing metaphysics with physics and cosmology.

³It is precisely at the level of objectivity that the Kantian-positivistic understanding of science shows up in Bultmann's system. It is also at this level that new scientific discoveries suggest that a "new" temporal interpretation of objectivity and knowledge as a whole is necessary. For a criticism of the positivistic scientifcism followed by Bultmann, see, for instance, Whitehead, The Function, p. 27; Trigg, p. 100; Kampits, p. 114; Putnam, p. 125; Kraft, p. 53; Michael Kandmann, "Critiques of Reason from Weber to Bloch," Telos [1976]:187-98; Perotti, p. 41.

⁴"Our relationship to history (Geschichte) is wholly different from our relationship to nature. Man, if he rightly understands himself, differentiates himself from nature. When he observes nature he perceives there something objective, which is not himself. When he turns his attention to history, however, he must admit himself to be a part of history; he is considering a living complex of events.
of temporal reality find their basic meaning in Plato’s “idea,” the concept of objectivity that they ground applies first and more properly to nature, which seems to have room for the generality, permanence, and exactness that such a traditional interpretation of objectivity requires. On the other hand, as history refers to the individual (in time, in the Lebenswelt), form as a timeless category, falls short of the dynamic reality of the object.  

in which he is essentially involved. . . . Hence there cannot be impersonal observation of nature” (Jesus, p. 11). See additionally, FU, pp. 190-92; Heinrich Ott, Geschichte und Heilsgeschichte in der Theologie Rudolf Bultmanns (Tübingen: Mohr, 1955), p. 50; N. J. Young, History and Existential Theology: The Role of History in the Thought of Rudolf Bultmann (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 18-22; and Thiselton, pp. 245-51. Michelson, following the Bultmannian pattern, suggests that “one ought no longer to juxtapose nature and supernature, but nature and history” (The Rationality of Faith, p. 23). See also ibid., pp. 28, 36, 37, 73, 89.

1 See p. 251, nn. 2-4, above. Bultmann himself explains how knowledge of nature derives its epistemological structure from Greek ontology. “In all such factual knowledge or knowledge of principles, the world is presumed to have the character of something objective, passive, accessible to simple observation. That is the world is conceived in conformity with the Greek understanding of being. Research into facts and principles has not altered fundamentally since it was developed by the Greeks” (FU, p. 187). He further believes that the Greek epistemological framework is both necessary and authoritative for knowledge as a whole. Science has been “developed in exemplary fashion in the Greek world, and every future age that does not wish to lapse into barbarism learns from the Greek world” (Essays, p. 87). Cf. ibid., pp. 86-89, 165; FU, p. 187; Roberts, pp. 26, 27, 172; Tillich, Systematic Theology, T: 178, 179; Thiselton, p. 441; Gogarten, Demythologizing, pp. 52-62 passim; Lorite, p. 292, and Heidegger, “A Non-Objectifying Thinking,” p. 28.

2 It is apparent, then, that Bultmann’s second dichotomy is also grounded in the time-timelessness ontological dichotomy of classical thinking. Knowledge qua knowledge is produced when categories are applied to the sensory data. Yet categories, even in Kant, have been shaped on the basis of Greek timeless ontology. Consequently, scientific categories are not able to grasp history as they grasp nature. Yet, as Ogden makes plain, there is no knowledge
Even though scientific objectivity as developed and applied in the study of nature cannot provide categories for grasping and understanding the whole of temporal realities, notably man as historical reality, it certainly provides, in Bultmann's opinion, the framework for determining in the temporal realm what is real and what is not, what is a fact (even a historical fact), and what is not. Here, the timeless epistemological framework appears as determinative of temporal reality. In other words, something can only be real, a fact or an event, if it fits the scientific epistemological framework—that is, if it pertains to the closed continuum and can be grasped through the traditional categories of timeless objectivity. History, then, is subordinated to both ontology and natural science.

Besides it should be noted that the same basic understanding of objectivity that is used for the study of nature is also used for

without objectivity (Christ without Myth, p. 25). Every knowledge as it relates to entities, is bound to be objective, even historical knowledge.

1 "Modern man acknowledges as reality only such phenomena or events as are comprehensible within the framework of the rational order of the universe. He does not acknowledge miracles because they do not fit into this lawful order. When a strange or marvelous accident occurs, he does not rest until he has found a rational cause" (JCM, pp. 37, 38). See additionally KM, pp. 5, 7; Kraft, p. 52; and Pizzuti, "Teologia," p. 575. As seen later, this determinative aspect of the ontological and epistemological frameworks is to be applied even upon theological knowledge (KM, p. 4).

2 It is, then, apparent why Bultmann considers that the worldview (cosmology) is not that important regarding its particular content or interpretation of the world and sees its importance rather as a "method of thinking" (JCM, p. 37). Nothing which is not "approved" before the tribunal of scientific principles can be considered as "real" or have any meaning at all.
the study of historical realities. As we approach the analysis of the epistemological category of objectivity as applied to temporal historical realities, it is necessary to remember that the first ontological dichotomy has already determined that history is the realm of what is relative. The category of the absolute corresponds to the timeless dimensionality of God's being.

At this juncture our analysis needs to turn to Bultmann's third dichotomy, which he sees between Historie and Geschichte.

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1 I am aware that Bultmann explicitly declares that objectivity in historical science is to be distinguished from objectivity in nature (PE, p. 117). Yet a more careful study of Bultmann's suggestions on the meaning of historical objectivity shows that it is not objectivity as such that is to be interpreted differently but rather the way in which objectivity and man (the subject which has become the subject matter) are to be related. Moreover, historical research faces the fact that in its realm objectivity must not be detached from the cognitive subject; on the contrary, it must include "the subjectivity of the historian" which Bultmann considers, following Historicism, "a necessary factor of objective historical knowledge" (PE, p. 119). Cf. ibid., pp. 121, 122, and J. Robert Toss, "Historical Knowledge as Basis for Faith," Zygon 13 [1978]:220. In historical knowledge, objectivity "is not attainable in the sense of absolute ultimate knowledge" (PE, p. 121). Michelson provides a good description of the way traditional objectivity is to be understood when applied to the study of Historie (The Rationality of Faith, p. 65).

2 EF, p. 89; cf. PE, pp. 11, 124; Roberts, p. 115.

3 For an example of Bultmann's actual usage of these concepts in theological discourse, see KM, pp. 35-38. Schniewind explains the general meaning of these terms which, by the way, are not Bultmann's creation, but pertain to German theological conceptuality. "In German theology we are familiar with the remarkable distinction between Historie and Geschichte. The distinction would appear to go back to Martin Kähler (1892), though this is not absolutely certain. Von Dobschütz pertinently asked whether the distinction were possible in other languages. Be that as it may, it is undoubtedly a real distinction. Geschichte means the mutual encounter of persons, Historie the causal nexus in the affairs of men. The latter is the subject matter of historical science, which seeks to divest itself of all presuppositions and prejudices and to establish
This dichotomy appears because the epistemological category of objectivity even as it is adapted for historical investigation\(^1\) is still timeless and therefore unable to reach the subject matter of history, namely, the concrete existentiell individual in the Lebenswelt.\(^2\) What historical scientific objective categories are able to reach is Historie.\(^3\) What falls out of the reach of scientific objectivity (but is nonetheless partially included in it) is Geschichte. In Geschichte we have reached the realm of the existentiell. Historie works with these aspects of the concrete individual that may be known when the categories of objectivity are applied. Geschichte appears in that realm which lies beyond Historie without denying, however, any of the objective data established in Historie. Geschichte happens within the limits set up by Historie.\(^4\)

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\(^1\) See p. 255, n. 1 above.

\(^2\) PE, p. 116; FU, p. 59. For further commentary see Roberts, pp. 26, 27; and Kraft, p. 59.

\(^3\) "It is possible, for instance, to fix objectively a certain part of the historical process, namely, events in so far as they are nothing but occurrences" (PE, p. 116). See also Runzo, p. 408.

\(^4\) The three dichotomies of Bultmann's thought are inclusive. That is, the ontological noumen-phenomenon dichotomy includes the epistemological nature-history dichotomy, which includes the disciplinary Historie-Geschichte dichotomy. In other words, for Geschichte to appear as a realm of reality, it is necessary to apply the nature-history epistemological dichotomy within the mediate intellectual context provided by the noumen-phenomenon ontological dichotomy.
Since Christian theology as a cognitive enterprise finds its origin in propositions that are handed down from the past,¹ the Historie-Geschichte dichotomy seems to provide the necessary framework for developing a careful evaluation of both the cognitive material handed down from the past (Historie, historiography) and the existentiell act of faith (in the realm of Geschichte) that constitutes the origin of theological reason. Historie is reached through the historical critical method, which tries to determine the objectivity and historicity of the knowledge handed down by Christian tradition.² As it makes plain the real scientific objective meaning

¹In its broadest sense it is possible to speak of tradition. In a more restricted sense, it can be applied to the Biblical account about the origin of the Christian religion and its theology which are the grounds of Christian tradition.

²It is not my purpose to investigate Bultmann's understanding of the historical critical method or its application in theological exegesis. The phenomenological analysis of reason's structure needs only that the connection between the historical critical method as rational procedure and Bultmann's general interpretation of reason's structure be seen clearly. Bultmann firmly believes that scientific reason directly requires (and theological reason indirectly through via negativa) the correct, radical application of the historical Critical method to the original documents of the Christian Faith, particularly to the New Testament (TNT, 1:251).

The basic categories and procedures of this scientific method, Bultmann says, have been worked out "from the time of the Enlightenment onward" (ibid.). "It is in accordance with such a method as this that the science of history goes to work on all historical documents. And there cannot be any exceptions in the case of Biblical texts if the latter are at all to be understood historically. Nor can one object that the Biblical writings do not intend to be historical documents, but rather affirmations of faith and proclamation. For however certain this may be, if they are ever to be understood as such, they must first of all be interpreted historically, inasmuch as they speak in a strange language in concepts of a faraway time, of a world-picture that is alien to us. Put quite simply, they must be translated, and translation is the task of historical science" (EF, p. 282). See also Essays, pp. 234, 235. Cf. Gogarten, Demythologizing, p. 38; Jaspers, Philosophical Faith,
of Christian tradition, the historical critical method shows what is not the object of theological reason. Yet, in Bultmann's system, the purpose of the scientific investigation of history is not the obvious immediate goal of the "reconstruction of past history" but rather the interpretation and understanding of it by remembering that the scientific results are just an objective expression of its


It seems clear that for Bultmann the historical critical method is a necessary preliminary step which is to be taken in order that theological reason may be consequently applied. It is also clear that, as the historical critical method works in the realm of objectivity, it applies as framework for intelligibility both the ontological and epistemological dichotomies (EF, pp. 290-95). In its history for the hidden objectivity of the Christian documents, then, the historical critical method needs to utilize not only the principles and method of thinking that a scientific inquiry requires but also the concrete results of such inquiry in the different areas of knowledge that may be involved in the Christian documents to be interpreted.

Bultmann makes it very plain that since the historical critical method works out in the realm of temporality, its results are not absolute but always tentative (FU, pp. 15, 30, 31). As the historical critical method works with history, the past, its objectivity represents for theological reason what is to be negated. Hence, any possible variation that historical science may introduce in its interpretation of the Bible never affects the functioning and meaning of both theological reason and Christian faith. Theological reason finds its "subject matter" not in history but in the timeless acts of God in time; more precisely, in Geschichte, since Geschichte as happening is never past but is always a renewed resolve in the present, in the "now." This is the reason why Bultmann is not afraid of applying scientific reason in the interpretation of Biblical tradition. What is consumed by scientific criticism "is only the fanciful portraits of Life-of-Jesus theology, and that means nothing other than Christos kata sarka" (FU, p. 132). Bultmann's position "presupposes the final divorce of Reason and faith and history and faith. . . . There is no such thing as an objective historical basis for faith" (Ross, p. 212). It is in this context that Bultmann sees nature and history leading men to grace (Essays, p. 118).

TNT, 2:251.
existentiell source, that is, of history as Geschichte.  

Geschichte points to that dimension, still in time, which the cognitive categories cannot grasp. This is the realm of the existentiell.  

It is within this realm that the contact between the noumenal level of God's timeless Being and the phenomenal order of man's temporal being occurs.

In order to grasp the meaning of history as history it is necessary to apply abstraction to the results provided by the historical critical method. "Historical science, therefore, is the interpretation of such works. It has the task of understanding the objectifications of life by reducing them, so to speak, to the ground from which they grew, namely, the ground of the creative life of the soul which reveals itself only in its objectifications" (PE, p. 124). In this founding of the meaning of history on its ground, namely, Geschichte, the present, as temporal mode, takes precedence over the future (Michael E. Quigley, "Revelation and the Problem of Historicism," Heythrop Journal 17 [1976]:298). The result of such abstraction from past as a whole to past interpreted from its present (as the Geschichte which constituted it is considered and interpreted from the "now" of the original "happening") is that "we look on what is repeated, constant, and typical as something striking a chord in us—something we can understand" (Essays, p. 320). In this way, history loses its uniqueness and temporal meaning.

The existentiell corresponds to the realm of the esse which cannot be reduced to knowledge in Aquinas's system either. In this sense the existentiell (esse, Geschichte) provides the ontological foundation for essentia or Historie as knowledge. See Roberts, pp. 180, 181; p. 235, n. 1 above.

At this point Geschichte appears as what lies beyond the reach of knowledge. As soon as Geschichte is expressed in cognitive forms, it is no longer Geschichte but Historie which can be analyzed and understood by natural scientific reason through its usual procedures. Thus, Geschichte provides a realm in time and in history which cannot be reached by knowledge yet is the source of knowledge. Bultmann sees in this realm that which is left out by traditional categories, the opportunity for placing ontologically the context between timelessness and temporality without disturbing the cognitive realm of the closed continuum of science. Thus, Geschichte is not the realm of the "irrational"; on the contrary, it is the realm that provides the possibility of a deeper level of understanding and rationality. Jaspers (The Great Philosophers, p. 313) explains how in the Kantian pattern the realm of the unfathomable is not "irrational," but that which "reason experiences as the limit of reason
Geschichte does not provide the ground for an understanding of history as a whole.\(^1\) It rather provides the place for the happening of individual historical phenomena.\(^2\) Thus, the meaning of Historie is referred to Geschichte as to its ground and therefore to the present as the "now" in which Geschichte is possible.\(^3\) The and draws into the light of reason." Bultmann's idea of encounter does not deny Jasper's view but goes beyond it. Man has a contact with the unfathomable (which is not irrational) beyond the limits of reason. The problem is that such a "grasp" is not cognitive but experiential, existential. See FU, p. 35; GV 3:132; and Roberts, pp. 12, 37, 38. Jaspers, who works within the same general pattern for rationality, explains that while the sacrificium intellectus "is unbearable to any rational being, an acceptance of scientific cognition is by no means the end of the faith in revelation; for this faith is beyond scientific cognition and untouched by it. It is neither cognoscible nor combatable if it gives up the aberrations it has kept falling into" (Philosophical Faith, p. 53).

\(^1\) "Today we cannot claim to know the end and the goal of history. Therefore the question of meaning in history has become meaningless (PE, p. 120). Cf. JCM, p. 48; PE, pp. 110, 113, 119. This is what Runzo calls the relativism of Bultmann's philosophy of history which "becomes essentially the relativism of his general epistemology" (p. 404).

\(^2\) Even when the meaning of history as a whole, according to Bultmann, cannot be reached, "there still remains the question of the meaning of single historical phenomena and single historical epochs" (PE, pp. 120, 121).

\(^3\) See p. 259, n. 1 above. Geschichte as circumscribed to the present is reduced to the act of resolve which from its "punctual" experience in time provides the ontological room for the "self knowledge of the living mind" (PE, p. 122). The understanding which pertains to Geschichte is described by Bultmann as "hearing." "We call understanding by such appropriate 'hearing' historical understanding, because here the understanding is itself a historical action in which I grasp my own possibility" (FU, p. 190). Thus the meaning of historical understanding as "self-understanding" does not consist "in what is said, what can be understood as a 'timeless' expression of meaning, as an 'eternal truth', but in the fact that is said. Just because it is said, my situation becomes a new situation, and I myself--deciding this way or that--become a new person" (FU, p. 193). This interpretation of "self-understanding" referred to an actual momentaneous experience in time, yet in disconnection from time (past
"now" of Geschichte as existentiell act of decision provides the point of contact with timelessness; that is, it provides the historical side of man's passive timelessness.¹ When the Act of God happens, the "moment" becomes the "eschatological" moment in which the meaning of history is realized.² The "now" of Geschichte as the moment of decision and resolve provides, within the scientific epistemological framework, the level in which the contact between timeless God and temporal man may happen without contradicting or upsetting the structure of reason.

Theological Reason

It is time now to turn to Bultmann's interpretation of the functioning of theological reason³ in the context provided by natural reason. In order for theological reason to exist, some kind of contact between God and man is necessary. This contact is to be found and future) it is possible only on the basis and framework provided by Bultmann's dichotomies. This isolated way of interpreting meaning and history does not stem from the phenomenological analysis (Heidegger, Being and Time, II.5.74).

¹See p. 232, nn. 1, 2, and 3 above.

²"The meaning in history lies always in the present, and when the present is conceived as the eschatological present by Christian faith, the meaning in history is realised" (PE, p. 155).

³The use of the term "theological reason" applied to Bultmann's system does not mean that he recognizes a new kind of reason for theological purposes as, for instance, Aquinas's active intellect. What is different between natural and theological reason is their objects to which they are related. Theological reason finds its "object" in God's timeless transcendence. "Theological reason," then, in Bultmann's system, points to the way in which natural reason deals with its "new" subject matter.
in Bultmann's idea of "encounter." It is necessary, then, to consider the "encounter" as the source of theological knowledge (revelation) from the perspective of both involved parties, namely, God and man. And, second, to deal briefly with the form which theological reason is supposed to take as it is applied to the cognitive materials that are found in the original documents of the Christian Faith, namely, the Bible.

Origin: Revelation. According to Bultmann, theological knowledge has its origin in revelation understood as the act of God. In order to grasp what "act of God" and "revelation" mean, it is necessary to bear in mind the ontological and epistemological frameworks so far analyzed. Theological reason does not deny natural

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1 It is important to bear in mind that the "encounter" is not to be understood in analogy to substance (des substantiell Seienden) but rather in analogy to historical personal relations as given when concrete ontic Daseins relate to each other (Essays, p. 271). In short, the encounter is to be understood in terms of "act," as that which "happens" in the moment of decision and resolve.

2 As in the case of Jaspers (p. 114, n. 1 above), Bultmann's interpretation of theological reason is developed on firm ground (JCM, pp. 70-72). Hence Funk seems to be correct in remarking that Bultmann's position is not subjectivistic, at least in the sense of not being groundless (Foreword to Faith and Understanding, p. 25). Cf. Roberts, p. 181; and Gogarten, Demythologizing, pp. 55, 56. It should be noted that Bultmann differs from Jaspers precisely in his interpretation of the man-transcendence relationship as possible only as a result of God's act (KMII, pp. 189-99).

3 God's act implies "revelation." "We cannot speak of what God is in Himself but only of what He is doing to us and with us" (JCM, p. 73). Since Bultmann has not developed a detailed ontology of God's being, it is difficult to see what he means with his distinction between God in Himself and God in His act. It seems, however, that he wants to shift the question of God from the cognitive realm (what the idea of being in himself implies), to the idea of personal existence which relates to will and decision. See JCM, pp. 43, 73; TNT, 1:190, 191; and PE, p. 96. Yet, as the ontological
First, since the "act" pertains to God, revelation must "happen" within the dimensionality of God's being, namely, timelessness. Yet, God's act must reach temporal man in order to be revelation. Thus, revelation requires that the act of God should connect timelessness with temporality. However, God's act cannot happen "within" temporality because this would imply both some temporality (even as potentiality for time), which would disrupt the interpretation of the Being of God as timeless and "wholly other," and the negation of the closed continuum that Bultmann's Kantian epistemological framework requires. Bultmann solves the problem by suggesting a passive potentiality for timelessness in man's temporal being.  

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1 Bultmann's position regarding the relationship between natural and theological reason agrees with Thomas's in that both theologians see it as a harmonic relation of complementation. Yet, Bultmann does not accept theological reason as a perfecting or a higher level of functioning of the natural powers of reason. This and the closed-continuum epistemological presupposition are perhaps the two main differences to be found between Aquinas's and Bultmann's rational systems. "Exegesis presupposes the lumen naturale; otherwise it is meaningless" (EF, p. 101).

2 See p. 215, nn. 1-3; and p. 216, n. 1 above. "The work of God cannot be seen as a universal process, as an activity which we can observe (as we observe the workings of the laws of nature) apart from our own existence" (FU, p. 59). See JCM, pp. 61, 62.

3 Bultmann explicitly denies that man has the potentiality for an active contact with timelessness as in Aquinas's active intellect (FU, p. 316). Yet, he also speaks explicitly about man "being endowed" by the "dimension of eternity" of God's life (Essays, pp. 107, 108). Thus, a passive potentiality for timelessness is ascribed to man. See p. 232, nn. 1, 2, and 3 above.
Thus the act of God is considered as happening "within" the causality of temporality and not "between" worldly events. The timeless act of God is to be found "within" temporality but not as being itself temporal.

Second, since God is conceived as acting (and not talking), revelation is not a communication of knowledge (propositions) but only the experience that man has when he is encountered by God. The Biblical concept of "Word of God," therefore, is to be understood and interpreted on the basis of God's timeless act. At this point, the thought of the action of God as an unworldly and transcendent action can be protected from misunderstanding only if it is not thought of as an action which happens between the worldly actions or events, but as happening within them. The close connection between natural and historical events remains intact as it presents itself to the observer (JCM, pp. 61, 62). The timeless act of God "within" time is what Bultmann calls in theological language "the eschatological event" (FU, p. 202). For an introduction to the criticism of Bultmann's interpretation of eschatology as timeless, see Thiselton, pp. 265, 266.

1"The thought of the action of God as an unworldly and transcendent action can be protected from misunderstanding only if it is not thought of as an action which happens between the worldly actions or events, but as happening within them. The close connection between natural and historical events remains intact as it presents itself to the observer" (JCM, pp. 61, 62). The timeless act of God "within" time is what Bultmann calls in theological language "the eschatological event" (FU, p. 202). For an introduction to the criticism of Bultmann's interpretation of eschatology as timeless, see Thiselton, pp. 265, 266.

2"God's revelation is primarily an event, not a communication of knowledge" (FU, p. 210). Cf. Macquarrie, Existentialist Theology, p. 241. Is it that God cannot speak? Not at all. It is that man has not categories for understanding or hearing whatever a timeless knowledge may be. On the other hand, God cannot talk human language because this implies for him to be "between" temporal causality and hence not to be "wholly other" or timeless. Yet, the Kantian framework of reason's structure accepted by Bultmann allows in man a category for grasping a timeless act. It is, then, through the act of God that man gets in contact with (encounters) God and that the subject matter of theology is given. Yet, what God's action is cannot be known. Regarding the meaning of God's action it is necessary to apply the rational procedure I am trying to analyze here. As the procedure is applied, we learn, first, that we know what God's act is not (via negativa), namely, it is not knowledge as propositions; and second, that what God's act is can be indirectly expressed by analogy to what man's act as existentiell means (FU, p. 258). As is clear, the Thomistic traditional procedure is at work, yet within a different ontological and epistemological framework.

3To be sure, what is meant by 'word of God' can be clarified in a formal way: but precisely this formal clarification tells us
Bultmann sees clearly the danger of reducing the act of God, his Word, and revelation to the realm of timelessness. In order to avoid that misunderstanding of his position, Bultmann applies the Kantian structure for the interpretation of the relation between timelessness and time and finds in the "act of preaching," which is ontically produced by the church, the temporal counterpart of the timeless act of God. As God's timeless act has no cognitive content, so its temporal counterpart in the preaching of the church has to be seen in the act as "speech event" and not in its cognitive content. Bultmann's epistemological framework, however, finds in that no 'content' of the word of God can be conclusively exhibited but rather can only be heard in the immediate moment" (EF, p. 91). See FU, pp. 149, 190, 301, 302, 306, 204, 213; Thiselton, p. 229; and TNT, 2:50, 60-63, 66, 69.

1"Are we not in danger of relegating the divine dispensation, the history of salvation, to the dimension of timelessness?" (JCM, p. 78).

2See p. 239, n. 1, and p. 240, n. 1 above.

3"Revelation is effected precisely in the proclamation" (FU, p. 211). "Proclamation is event, is itself a part of the revelation" (ibid.). "God encounters us in preaching" (EF, p. 87).

4"The Word is also constituted by the church" (FU, p. 213). The church, as an "otherworldly" community, which is grounded in the existentiell participation of ontic "acts of faith," is the fit instrument for expressing the act of God. And, the expression in preaching is the only one recognized by Bultmann.

5In this case, the implication is not that we should find a preaching without words, something which would be impossible since preaching happens in the world. The idea of "speech event" emphasizes the abstract act--the temporal counterpart of God's timeless act. "Act" is always "abstract" in Bultmann in the sense that it refers to the "mere happening" in disconnection of any past, future, or cognitive contents whatsoever. See FU, pp. 212, 209; EF, p. 87. Michelson gives a pertinent description of this aspect of...
the "act of faith" the correlate for the "act of God," and through it the timeless-time relation is smoothly bridged through man's passive potentiality for timelessness.¹

Revelation finds its ground in the timeless act of God but reaches the cognitive realm from the perspective of the "act of faith" which is the temporal human side of the divine-human Bultmann's thought and how this motif is developed by post-Bultmannian theology, notably by Ernst Fuchs and Gerhard Ebeling (The Rationality of Faith, pp. 91, 92).

¹ There has been criticism of the way Bultmann ties down God's timeless act to the temporal act of preaching, not because God's act cannot have a temporal counterpart within the Kantian pattern, but rather because the timeless act of God is conditioned for its happening to a particular temporal act and tradition as well. This position has been challenged, notably by Ogden (Foreword to Existence and Faith, pp. 20, 21); Jaspers ("Myth and Religion," pp. 148, 149); and Franz Buri (Macquarrie, The Scope of Demythologizing, pp. 129-153). From an epistemological point of view the problem arises when the timeless act of God cannot happen except in connection with temporal historical act, namely, the act of preaching.

Bultmann puts it this way: "The kerygma, the summons, is therefore teaching in so far as it implies a specific understanding. It gives instruction concerning a fact--but a fact which must not be regarded as an objective fact of the world. Therefore the factual communication is not merely the imparting of information which is incidental and secondary; it is itself a part, as the preaching authorized by the saving act is a part, of the saving act itself. There is no way of going behind the preaching to a saving fact separable from the preaching--whether to a 'historical Jesus' or to a cosmic drama" (FU, p. 212). See also ibid., pp. 209, 310; cf. TNT, 2:240; Essays, p. 12. The salvific revelatory act of God, thus, seems to be conditioned to temporality and to human initiative. The problem is even more complex because even though the content is not the "principal" aspect of preaching, it forms an important part of it. Thus, it is not only preaching as act but preaching regarding a particular content, the Christ event. See EF, pp. 89, 90; Essays, p. 114; FU, p. 308; and Miege, pp. 84-89. Christian preaching, then, has the monopoly on salvation. God cannot save outside the Christian tradition. Jaspers criticizes this aspect of Bultmann's thought as representing a remnant of the Lutheran-Pauline myth of justification by faith ("Myth and Religion," p. 149).
encounter. Yet, since knowledge pertains to the temporal realm, revelation can reach it only indirectly, as suggested by the Kantian pattern. To put it briefly, revelation directly reaches the subject (of the subject-object relationship) and only then, indirectly through the subject, reaches the object whose objective content is not modified. Let us see now how, according to Bultmann's explanation, revelation reaches both the subject and the object.

God's act reaches the subject not at his cognitive level but rather at its existential level. Existence has been reduced to the act of decision, and decision provides knowledge, not about objects

1 "The possibility of understanding is, of course, based on the operation of the divine act" (FU, p. 210). "But 'revelation' ('unveiling' apokalypsis) designates not the knowledge communicated but the event which puts the man in a new situation" (ibid.). Cf. EF, pp. 86, 89.

2 "The hiddenness of the wonder as wonder counterpoises its visibility as a world event" (FU, p. 253). "This is the paradox of faith, that faith 'nevertheless' understands as God's actions here and now an event which is completely intelligible in the natural or historical connection of events" (JCM, p. 65). For a full discussion of Bultmann's application of Kant's pattern, see the entire section, ibid., pp. 62-65.

3 The indirect relation between revelation and knowledge is explained in a very accurate way by Bartsch as he comments that "in the shift of self-understanding from unbelief to faith, a shift which Bultmann's existentialist interpretation makes clear, we can discern the creative force behind the shift, which is the eschatological action of God. Not that we can discern it directly, in an objective kind of way: it is only manifested indirectly through the shift itself. Bultmann helps us to see that it is to this action of God that the witnesses are really testifying. They do this by speaking of it in objective language, making it visible by means of miracles, etc. All that is openly visible is the shift of self-understanding, which points to the action of God. But that action cannot be perceived or known: it can only be accepted or rejected in decision" ("Bultmann and Jaspers," pp. 200, 201).

4 This reduction has been required by the timelessness of God. It is not present either in Heidegger's or Sartre's philosophies, for instance.
but primarily about the existentiell who performs the act in independence of any objective element that may be involved in it.\footnote{EF, p. 59.} Self-understanding is a level of knowledge that as such pertains to time and more particularly to human relationships and actions.\footnote{EF, p. 59.} Self-understanding is "grasped," not through cognitive categories but rather in the act of decision,\footnote{EF, p. 59.} in existentiell experience as the

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"Self-understanding belongs to human beings as such" (FU p. 210). Bultmann explains that this existential knowledge happens when "I am myself involved" (FU, p. 188). That is what existentialists call knowledge in the first person. Bultmann further says that "my self-understanding given in my experiences never has the character of a knowledge of something present at hand, and therefore self-understanding itself does not have the character of being present at hand, but is seized only in resolve" (ibid.). "The historical situation cannot possibly be 'seen' in the Greek sense as an objective fact; it can only be heard as a summons. For the situation demands resolve and is only understood when the resolve is taken" (p. 187). The experiential level of knowledge pertains to any knowledge insofar as every knowledge is produced by an existentiell. Thus Bultmann states that "all understanding of anything (that is, of anything in the world) is always ultimately an understanding of myself" (p. 187). "I cannot simply accept what is said as information: for I understand it only by affirming or denying... this is a matter of the disclosure of my own possibilities which I understand as mine only by grasping them or by rejecting them as a perversion of myself. Understanding, therefore, is always simultaneously resolve, decision" (p. 158). "Understanding presupposes a coherent life-complex in which the one who understands and what is understood belong together" (p. 315). This is not going beyond the subject-object relationship, as, for instance, Gogarten (Demythologizing, pp. 48-52) and H. Ott ("Objectification and Existentialism," pp. 312-314) suggest, but rather is the acceptance of the subject-object pattern and the philosophical tradition that determines its Kantian interpretation. Once this pattern is accepted, epistemological room for theology is found at the level of the individual (existentiell) as historic (Geschichte).

\end{quote}
act of decision and not to the involved object. Thus, self-understanding as knowledge refers to the existent qua existent in independence of any information regarding the world.

In the world, sinful man cannot but develop his self-understanding from the viewpoint of and within the framework provided by the closed temporal continuum. Yet, when the divine-human encounter happens, the act of God encounters man as a whole; therefore revelation is its result, the act of faith, involves meaning. But since both the ontological dimensionality of God (timeless) and the epistemological dimensionality of man (temporal) do not allow a cognitive relationship in the traditional mode of vision (theoria, discloses to the man a situation of existential self-understanding, a possibility of self-understanding which must be grasped in action" (FU, p. 301).

1FU, p. 200.

2As Husserl says: "All experiences are conscious experiences" (Ideas, pp. 141, 142). Hence, since the act of God is act only insofar as it reaches man conditioning his "act" as the "act of faith," which is the act of man as a whole, the act of faith must involve meaning, knowledge, understanding. Yet, it cannot get into man's experience through the objective level of knowledge but only through the levels of action and self-understanding. "Faith is really an understanding" (FU, p. 302). "For Christian knowledge has a genuinely historical character. It is therefore an understanding which is consummated in resolve and is an understanding of one's self" (p. 207). "God's revelation is primarily an event, not a communication of knowledge. But the event is a basis for both a knowledge and a teaching, since it makes possible a new self-understanding" (p. 210). See also FU, pp. 205, 209, 316, and EF, p. 86. "There is indeed a knowledge that is also given in revelation, however little the latter is a supernatural arrangement for communicating remarkable doctrines. I am given a knowledge, namely, of myself, of my immediate now, in which and for which the word of proclamation is spoken to me. Thus, it is not an observer's knowledge, not a world-view in which man is interpreted as a phenomenon within the world on the basis of certain general principles of explanation, but rather a knowledge that is only opened up to me in
as contemplation), Bultmann proposes that the understanding of the way the relation is accomplished must be reached by analogy to the level of existentiell encounter, to which the cognitive level of self-understanding corresponds.¹ In other words, the encounter with a timeless God can only be grasped by man within the mode of self-understanding which excludes any propositional content.² Yet revelation produces knowledge, but a nonpropositional kind of knowledge.

The encounter through the act of God places man in a truly "new" situation;³ for it places man in contact with timeless God.

¹Bultmann explains that when two persons meet in time "revelation" happens. "One person 'reveals' himself to another through an act of friendship or love and also through an act of hate or meanness. And, indeed, if in such cases the revelation is given by a word, this word has the character of an occurrence and is not merely a mediating and informing communication about some state of affairs. Rather the revealing word is itself the state of affairs or at least belongs indissolubly to it" (EF, p. 59). As the encounter with temporal persons places man in a new situations, so does the encounter with God. Thus, the meaning of God's act is to be grasped by analogy to the knowledge we have of man's encounter with man.

²This entails that the "knowledge" we find in self-understanding as a result of God's action is not an objective knowledge belonging to the temporal realm (Essays, pp. 67, 68; KMII, p. 183; FU, p. 301; JCM, pp. 36, 65). Knowledge is rather an experience of the subject at the ontic existentiell level. This experience, therefore, "happens" without words, propositions, or any kind of objective content even regarding the existentiell himself. If any content were expressed regarding the existentiell, it would not be an "experience" or "self-understanding," it would be somebody else's understanding applied to the subject.

³FU, p. 193; EF, p. 59.
In the cognitive realm this encounter is experienced by man in terms of the self-understanding which is faith. The self-understanding of faith constitutes the cognitive origin of theological meaning. Yet, "revelation" in itself is not to be confused with the self-understanding of faith. Revelation in itself is the act of God that happens in timelessness,¹ and in relation to which man "reacts" cognitively by developing the "new" self-understanding that faith is. The self-understanding of faith is, therefore, the temporal counterpart of a timeless act (the encounter itself). However, it should be noted that the temporality to which the self-understanding of faith belongs is interpreted by denying the actual flux of time.²

Even though the act of cognitive correlate of revelation

¹See p. 267, n. 1.

²For Bultmann theology is "a historical science in that it speaks of a specific occurrence in human existence" (EF, p. 94); see p. 236, nn. 1-3 and p. 237, n. 2. Bultmann himself explains this to be understood within the context of self-understanding of faith. "In faith I deny the closed connection of the worldly events, the chain of cause and effect as it presents itself to the neutral observer. I deny the interconnection of the worldly event not as mythology does, which by breaking the connection places supernatural events into the chain of natural events; I deny the worldly connection as a whole when I speak of God. I deny the worldly connection when I speak of myself, for in this connection of worldly events, my self, my personal experience, my own personal life, is no more visible and capable of proof than is God as acting" (JCM, pp. 64, 65). If timeless is to be seen in relation to the temporal closed continuum, it should share in its temporality. Such a possibility is to be completely rejected. Such is the result of a radical application of the timeless dimensionality for intelligibility to God's transcendence. Neither God nor man can be reached by objective knowledge. Their beings have to be reached beyond that; in man's case in self-understanding, yet beyond that as the act of faith suggests to the phenomenological analysis; in God's case in self-understanding of faith, yet even beyond that as the "wholly Other" idea requires. This going beyond objectivity, therefore, requires the temporal cognitive dimension of "self-understanding"
entails meaning and understanding, it is not as yet theological knowledge.¹ In order for theological knowledge to be constituted, the self-understanding of faith is to be expressed and consequently, it has to enter the realm of objectivity and propositions, that is, cognition as available in the flux of time. The self-understanding of faith reaches objectivity both in the mode of myth² and of existential propositions.³ Only the latter, though, are, properly speaking, and the classical procedure of analogy. For additional commentary see GV, 3:117; TNT, 2:86; and Roberts, pp. 42, 50, 51. Cf. KMII, p. 190; FU, p. 192; and Roberts, pp. 285-87.

¹EF, p. 89. "Theological propositions--even those of the New Testament--can never be the object of faith; they can only be the explication of the understanding which is inherent in faith itself" (TNT, 2:237, 238).

²"Myths give worldly objectivity to that which is unworldly (Der Mythos objectiviert das Jenseitige zum Diesseitigen)" (JCM, p. 19). De Nys comments that myth expresses objectively that which is not objective ("Myth and Interpretation," pp. 28, 29). Ogden puts Bultmann's understanding of myth in an abridged way. "Myth or mythological language is language through which man (1) attempts to articulate his experience of that non-objective ground or horizon which ultimately determines his human existence (2) by 'objectifying' this horizon, speaking of it as embodied in object-like actualities, images of which are drawn from more familiar experienced objects (3) which actualities are represented as having a history of their own, in which history they also act so as to critically determine human historical events" (Christ without Myth, pp. 25, 26).

³Theological propositions have to be distinguished from philosophical and mythical ones. "Propositions of philosophy, so far as they contain truth, are in themselves 'right teaching'" (TNT, 2:240). Yet, "the propositions of theology are not themselves 'right teaching' but, so far as they contain truth, teach what the 'right teaching' is--a teaching which is not found by investigation but is given in the kerygma" (ibid.). Philosophy expresses cognitively the realm of the encounter. Theology expresses what is encountered in it. Theological propositions express what Bultmann calls the "kerygma." The "kerygma" is teaching "in so far as it implies a specific understanding" (FU, p. 212). The "kerygma" as grounded in God's act essentially belongs to the timeless realm (TNT, 2:240). "Kerygma" is mediated into knowledge through self-understanding and
considered to be "theological." Mythical expressions are theological only insofar as they have existential meaning.

The meaning of theological propositions, however, is not objective but existential. But, since theological propositions use objective meanings to express their existential one, they are bound to have a double meaning. First, they have the historical objective meaning that relates every proposition to its natural or historical ground and background of intelligibility. Second, they have the theological or existential meaning that relates the same objective constitutes the "existential core" to which theological propositions refer. "That the kerygma never appears without already having been given some theological interpretation rests upon the fact that it can never be spoken except in human language and formed by human thought" (ibid.). As Ogden suggests, this implies a differentiation between the objectivity of myth (which demythologization denies), which corresponds to natural or historical knowledge, and the objectivity of the existential statements which correspond to the self-understanding (Christ without Myth, pp. 49, 50). Yet, since the existentiell is the realm in which both objectivities are grounded and both are expressed in objective terms, the differentiation seems not to have ontological basis.

Additionally, according to Bultmann, the "kerygma" is reached through the objective application of the existentialia (Jaspers, "Myth and Religion," pp. 138, 140). Thus the distinction is grounded on Bultmann's interpretation of the epistemological framework, according to which theological propositions are those that, still being on the objective side of knowledge, are aware that their foundation is to be found in the existentiell experience of self-understanding. As propositions they still are objective, yet they are closer to the "true" meaning because they avoid as much as possible the reference to natural and historical realities. To properly reach a theological meaning, however, even theological existential propositions are not enough. They still are on the temporal side. If the timeless dimension of the encounter is to be reached, an analogical procedure is to be applied from the starting point provided by the existential propositions which express the self-knowledge of faith.

1This is because they correspond to the "fact" provided by the encounter (FU, p. 212). See also Macquarrie, Existentialist Theology, p. 6.
propositional expression to the self-understanding to which it is related as its origin. Therefore, even when theological meaning as such, as originated in the timelessness of God, is to be considered as "objective" in the sense of not being groundless, theological propositions are to be recognized as subjective since they have their source in the subject in independence of the temporal objects and significations to which they refer. Propositions in their objective meanings are just "used" as the only available vehicle to express the meaning of what the subject alone has experienced. Consequently, the particular propositions that any cognitive subject may choose to express his own faith depend not on objective norms but rather on the sheer spontaneity of the subject.

Abstraction: Demythologization. Bultmann does not discuss any procedure that the subject should follow in order that his self-understanding of faith may be properly expressed. However, he does

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1See for instance, FU, p. 189, and De Nys, pp. 33-35.

2Theological propositions are "determined by the believer's situation" (TNT, 2:238). They are, therefore, incomplete (ibid.). They "may be only relatively appropriate, some more so, others less so" (ibid.). The kerygma can appear "only in a form modeled by an individual's understanding of his own existence or by his interpretation of his own existence or by his interpretation of that understanding" (pp. 240, 241). See also FU, p. 213, and Macquarrie, Existentialist Theology, p. 242. This subjectivity is more visible in the realm of myth, because mythical authors were much less careful in their choice of objective expressions.

3The divine encounter happens to every Christian. The encounter is the same for all men whether prophets, apostles, or believers. Cf. TNT, 2:237, 238. Bultmann suggests no rule for the cognitive expression of the encounter. It just has to happen in the realm of temporal objectivity.
suggest a procedure that reason is supposed to follow in order to grasp the meaning that theological propositions seek to convey. This procedure is widely known through its popular name of "demythologization" (Entmythologisierung).

As a cognitive procedure, demythologization can be applied to any kind of theological proposition.\(^1\) Yet, due to the relevance of the Biblical tradition for the constitution of Christian theology, demythologization has been developed by Bultmann mainly as a hermeneutical procedure\(^2\) adapted to the particular cognitive features of the Bible. Since this investigation is concerned with rational procedures, demythologization will be considered and analyzed as a rational procedure. Demythologization is an abstractive procedure which is required, in Bultmann's opinion, due to the fact that the Word is hidden in Scripture because its propositional mode combines "summons and information."\(^3\)

Biblical conceptuality is mythological, and myth, according to Bultmann, has three basic modes or meanings. First, myth refers to the meaning of its objectivity understood in the context of a primitive world-view.\(^4\) Second, myth finds its proper "object" and

\(^1\)Ibid.
\(^2\)[JCM, pp. 18, 45. See Thiselton, p. 230.]
\(^3\)[FU, p. 306; JCM, p. 71.]
\(^4\)"Biblical mythology is, according to Bultmann, "not only irrational but utterly meaningless" (KM, p. 8). Bultmann believes that the objective acceptance of Biblical cosmology "would involve a sacrifice of the intellect which could have only one result--a curious form of schizophrenia and insincerity' (KM, p. 4). Bultmann is only partially right. The acceptance of Biblical cosmology would
therefore its "true" meaning as it is understood as an expression of man's self-understanding of faith.\(^1\)

Third, myth refers to objectivity as such and knowledge in general as the temporal vehicle for expressing what is timeless.\(^2\)

indeed mean the sacrifice of the intellect. Yet, what Bultmann is not aware of is that the intellect which would be sacrificed is only the particular interpretation of reason's structure that he has uncritically accepted from Kantian tradition. See additionally KM, pp. 2-5, 8; JCM, p. 43; PE, p. 12; Kampits, p. 113; Rousas J. Rushdoony, *By What Standard?*: An Analysis of the Philosophy of Cornelius Van Til (Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1959), pp. 12, 13; Thiselton, pp. 255, 256, 280, 289; and Roberts, pp. 131-40.

"The real purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself in the world in which he lives. Myth should be interpreted not cosmologically, but anthropologically, or better still, existentially" (KM, p. 10). In order that such an interpretation may be carried out, Bultmann explains that "the criterion adopted must be taken not from modern thought, but from the understanding of human existence which the New Testament itself enshrines" (KM, p. 12). Here two relevant aspects of Bultmann's interpretation of Biblical conceptuality should be noticed. First, even though it is possible to find in the Bible a "concern for the existential," to take such a concept as "criterion" for theological intelligibility is determined not by the New Testament but rather by the Kantian pattern. Second, this criterion entails Bultmann's acceptance of at least some Biblical propositions as "objectively meaningful" and "true." It is, then, according to Bultmann, an objective understanding of man, namely the self-understanding, as developed in the New Testament by Paul and John, that is supposed to provide the pattern for demythologizing by replacing the content of traditional categories. For further commentary see JCM, pp. 18, 55; Thiselton, pp. 2, 230; De Nys, p. 29; and Ogden, *Christ without Myth*, p. 27.

"Mythology is the use of imagery to express the other-worldly in terms of this world and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this side. For instance, divine transcendence is expressed as spatial distance. It is a mode of expression which makes it easy to understand the cultus as an action in which material means are used to convey immaterial power" (KM, p. 10, n. 2). See also KM, p. 103; and JCM, pp. 20, 83. This mode or level of myth is not only to be applied to the Biblical world-view but to any world-view insofar as every world-view is temporal. It applies, therefore also to the "true" (in the objective level) scientific world-view. The conflict between world-views, even
It can be clearly appreciated that Bultmann's idea of myth is only the result of a consistent application of his particular interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure and of the origin of theological meaning as well. This application determines that other insights or interpretations of what mythological conceptuality may be are simply ruled out without further investigation or explanation.¹

When Biblical conceptuality is taken as propositions to be interpreted in search of their theological meaning, the abstractive procedure of demythologization as understood by Bultmann follows and includes three major steps, namely, the scientific, the existential, and the analogical.

The first step aims to discover the "true" objective meaning of Biblical conceptuality which is to be achieved through the application of scientific categories (the epistemological framework).²


²"Exegesis presupposes the lumen naturale; otherwise it is meaningless" (EF, p. 101). And the lumen naturale presupposes Greek
This step, which is mainly developed in exegesis through the historical critical method, entails the complete denial of the Biblical world-view, which is replaced by a scientific one. The "true" objectivity reached both in the realms of nature and history is that which the application of the timeless scientific categories allows. The true objectivity is abstracted from the false, mythological one. The practical result for theology of reaching the "true" objective meaning of Biblical propositions is the discovery that the realm of faith is not reached by it at all.

conceptuality and its timeless primordial presupposition. For Bultmann the Biblical conceptuality is only "apparent objectivity" (KM, p. 16). It includes many "contradictions and roughness" (ibid.) which require evaluation. Cf. Thomas, "The Epistemology," p. 384. This evaluation is to be accomplished by the application of scientific categories (Thiselton, p. 262; Ian Henderson, Myth in the New Testament [London: SCM, 1952], p. 46). Thus theology becomes ancilla scientiae; cf. Kamphis, p. 108. Bultmann plainly states that Biblical conceptuality is mythological "because it is different from the conception of the world which has been formed and developed by science since its inception in ancient Greece and which has been accepted by all modern men. In this modern conception of the world the cause-effect nexus is fundamental" (JCM, p. 15).

1 It is, of course, true that demythologizing takes the modern world-view as a criterion. To demythologize is to reject not Scripture or the Christian message as a whole, but the world-view of Scripture, which is the world-view of a past epoch, which all too often is retained in Christian dogmatics and in the preaching of the Church. To de-mythologize is to deny that the message of Scripture and of the Church is bound to an ancient world-view which is obsolete" (JCM, pp. 35, 36). And, since "the mythical view of the world must be accepted or rejected in its entirety" (KM, p. 9) Bultmann rejects it as a whole, replacing it by the scientific world-view as "true" framework for intelligibility (Scientificism). Cf. KM, p. 9; Roberts, pp. 128, 129.

2 Funk clearly expresses the way in which the historical critical method contributes to the abstractive process of demythologization. "There can be no question of discarding historical criticism. But we must understand its true significance. It is needed to train us for freedom and veracity—not only by freeing us from
The second step aims at the disclosure of the theological-existential meaning that the objective proposition is expressing. To reach this theological level of meaning, propositions are considered only insofar as they are an expression of a Dasein's self-understanding. This requires a previous understanding of objectivity as a whole, including scientific objectivity, in order that self-understanding as such may appear. It is, then, through the existentialia that the content or meaning of the self-understanding that myth enshrines is reached. And only through abstraction (via a specific traditional conception of history, but because it frees us from bondage to every historical construction which is within the scope of historical science, and brings us to the realization that the world which faith wills to grasp is absolutely unattainable by means of scientific research) (Foreword to Faith and Understanding, p. 31). Tillich also believes that "scientific explanation and historical criticism protect revelation; they cannot dissolve it, for revelation belongs to a dimension of reality for which scientific and historical analysis are inadequate" (Systematic Theology, 1:116). Cf. KM, p. 12.

1 See p. 272, nn. 1-3, and p. 273, n. 5 above.

2 "Faith itself demands to be freed from any world-view produced by man's thought, whether mythological or scientific" (JCM, p. 83). Roberts explains that this corresponds to what Bultmann sees as a radical application of justification by faith in the realm of epistemology (p. 46). See also JCM, pp. 15, 16; Roberts, pp. 126, 127; M. Sales, "Mythe et foi aux colloques de Rome," Archives de Philosophie 31 (1968):293, 294.

3 Here the ontological framework as represented by the Heideggerian analysis of the structure of man's being provides the categories for the abstractive procedure of demythologization. Here is where the difference between Bultmann's and Jasper's interpretation of demythologization should be seen. Jaspers does not believe that an adequate understanding of both myth and existence is present in Bultmann's procedure. According to Jaspers the existentialia are not to be used as scientific categories for leading demythologization to its existential results. See "Myth and Religion," pp. 145, 146. Regarding demythologization as understood by Barth, see H. Ott, "Objectification," pp. 334, 335.
negativa) of objectivity can the existentialia be applied and render the proper theological meaning.¹

Now the third step in the cognitive abstractive process of demythologization may be taken. Since both the self-understanding, as pertaining to the ontic experience of the existentiell, and the conceptual expression of it (its theological-existential meaning) belong to the temporal realm, the timeless being of both God and man can be reached only when the timeless ontological gap is bridged through the traditional application of analogy. Analogy is to be applied, according to Bultmann's system, from the starting point provided by the self-understanding of faith and not from the traditional one provided by the intellect (as, for instance, in Aquinas). The analogical procedure as such, however, seems to be basically understood in the same way, as it provides the bridge to reach the timeless being of both God and man.²

¹De Nys remarks on this step in the process of demythologization by saying that "beneath and within the superstructure and vehicle of mythological expression resides the existential-theological meaning which those texts express. The business of interpreting them, then, is the business of uncovering and stating in appropriate concepts this meaning. To do this interpretation must detach this meaning from its mythological vehicle and superstructure. To demythologize is to perform this detachment" (p. 33).

²Bultmann's treatment of analogy is inadequate and fragmentary (Ogden, Christ without Myth, p. 169). He rejects the traditional approach of analogia entis insofar as it worked on the objective understanding of both God's and man's beings (Essays, p. 107). Consequently, the traditional procedure which grounds theology on the proofs of God's existence is also rejected by Bultmann (FU, pp. 314, 53, 320; Roberts, p. 259). We cannot reach either God's or man's being due to their timelessness (FU, pp. 60-64). Bultmann explains that in his system it is not possible to "speak of God's action in general statements," it is only possible to speak of "what He does here and now with me" (JCM, p. 66). It is, then, through man's
Summary and Partial Conclusion

The phenomenological analysis of Bultmann's interpretation of the epistemological and ontological frameworks of reason's structure shows that he has accepted as a fact the classical, timeless, primordial presupposition as contained and expressed in the Kantian pattern. It also has shown that even though Bultmann has incorporated within his system several Heideggerian motifs, notably the existentialia, he does not use Heidegger's insights regarding the primordial presupposition for the constitution of meaning and for the interpretation of the frameworks of reason's structure.

In the ontological framework, Bultmann considers man's being as an entity to be basically temporal. Yet, in the theological realm, man finds himself in an entirely new situation, namely, coram deo, which opens man's being to a passive potentiality for timelessness and, in consequence, to a new and true meaning of his being as a whole. God's being as "wholly other" is conceived in traditional timeless terms. God's timelessness requires, in order that the divine-human encounter may ontically happen, that even temporal man should be interpreted in his innermost being as timeless, at least as having a passive potency for a timeless encounter. Thus, the real meaning of man's being is reached theologically not from the perspective of temporality but rather from the perspective of timelessness. The old Aristotelian procedure which understands and interprets time with timeless categories is followed.

action that analogia is to be applied and "God himself reached" cognitively (JCM, pp. 68, 69). Cf. EF, p. 110; Macquarrie, The Scope, p. 134.
Bultmann's interpretation of natural reason, which deals mainly with nature and history, follows the traditional Platonic-Aristotelian interpretation of objectivity as timeless transcendental forms and categories in the Kantian pattern. Yet, the metaphysical background for intelligibility is no longer provided by the Aristotelian-Thomistic hierarchy of being but rather by a positivistic, scientific interpretation of the world.

Theological reason is interpreted as functioning in the realm constituted by scientific categories as that which they cannot reach (Geschichte, existentiell). Theological meanings, therefore, cannot pertain to the objective side of knowledge but only to its subjective side, as the reflection in temporal knowledge of the self-understanding that the believer develops as a result of the salvific-revelatory act of God (encounter) that happens in timelessness.

There are two consequences of this interpretation of theological reason in the context of natural scientific reason. First, objectivity applies only to the realm of science and, consequently, is to be denied in toto by theological reason. And second, demythologization, as an abstractive process, can reach only the subjective level of the self-understanding as act. Only from the epistemological ground provided by the self-understanding as act can the traditional analogy be applied so as to bridge the gap between timelessness and time.

Conclusion

The phenomenological analysis of reason's behavior in theology shows that Christian theology as a whole has been constituted
on the ground provided by the timeless Parmenidean primordial presupposition. Catholicism and conservative Protestantism have followed the Aristotelian-Thomistic interpretation of reason's structure. Liberal Protestantism has departed from this pattern by replacing it with the Kantian one, which is just a variation worked out on the same traditional interpretation of the primordial presupposition. It would seem, then, that theological criticism should decide between these two patterns. Yet prior to that, theological criticism needs to address itself to the ground of Being, that is, to the critical analysis of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure.

Regarding the primordial presupposition, the phenomenological analysis of the theological context has revealed, first, that the issue has not as yet been addressed by theological reflection, and, second, that the timeless primordial presupposition has been adopted as a fact without further criticism. Yet, the phenomenological analysis of the philosophical context has revealed both the hypothetical nature of reason's structure (showing that reason cannot be taken just as a "fact," as a "given") and the foundational "choice" that lies at the ground of reason's hypothetical nature namely, that reason's structure can function and constitute meanings in two dimensionalities: time and timelessness. Thus the philosophical context points out the necessity for theology to forsake its naive epistemological dependence on one philosophical tradition and enter into a criticism of theological reason.

It seems clear that a criticism of theological reason must begin by addressing itself to the understanding and interpretation
of the ground of Being as primordial presupposition. But, how could such foundational reflection be developed theologically, in independence of philosophical traditions as a whole, so as to provide a viewpoint which could decide whether reason's structure should function timelessly or temporally as it constitutes theological meaning? The only possibility would be provided by a phenomenological analysis of a "fact" of theological reason which appears as not being the product of a philosophical interpretation of the primordial presupposition, whether timeless or temporal. Within the Christian tradition such a "theological fact" of reason can be provided only by the Biblical conceptuality.

It is necessary, then, that a third aspect of theological reason be phenomenologically analyzed, namely the "fact" of Biblical conceptuality as working within a dimensionality. Consequently the analysis of the Biblical context is aimed (as was the analysis of the "fact" of theological reason as found in the history of theology) at the discovery of the dimensionality or primordial presupposition of its reason in order to provide the background for a decision regarding the dimensionality which theological reason should adopt as it constitutes theological meanings.

Let us focus, now, on the analysis of the way in which reason has been utilized and interpreted in the constitution of theological meanings in the original writings of the Christian tradition, namely in the Bible.
CHAPTER III

THE THEO-ONTO-LOGICAL STRUCTURE OF REASON IN SACRED SCRIPTURE

In order that the possibility\(^1\) of a criticism of theological reason may be affirmed, theology must address itself to the interpretation of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure by itself, that is, in independence from the philosophical Parmenidean understanding.

So far, the analysis of the philosophical context has shown that Reason can constitute meanings following either of two opposite interpretations of the primordial presupposition, namely, timelessness and temporality. The analysis of the theological context has shown that Christian theology as a whole has constituted its meanings following the Parmenidean timeless interpretation of Reason's structure. Theology as yet has neither considered nor actually taken the

\(^1\)Possibility should not be confused with need. The need of a criticism of theological reason is apparent when the many different and even contradictory theological systems are considered seriously (for instance Aquinas's and Bultmann's regarding the possibility of accepting a direct knowledge about God [chapter 2 above]). Kant's Critique of Pure Reason was motivated by a similar situation in the philosophical realm (pp. 257-93). Kant believed that if reason's activity produced two contradictory conclusions regarding the same subject matter, something had to be wrong in the rational procedure itself. Even though the necessity of a criticism of theological reason is obvious, its possibility is not. Thus, the possibility of a criticism of theological reason needs to be shown and established.
primordial choice that Reason's structure requires. On the contrary, theology, as developed so far, has uncritically adopted the philosophical timeless interpretation of Reason that was available in its formative years.¹

The very possibility of a criticism of theological reason depends on the actual existence of a theological reflection on Being's dimensionality. In order that a viewpoint for the criticism of theological reason may be found, the actual theological reflection on Being's dimensionality should relate to the very roots of Christian thinking² and should be independent from the classical

¹("Formative years" refers to a very broad span of time which can go as early as the third century B.C. and as late as the nineteenth and twentieth centuries A.D. Because of lack of space I cannot analyze the history of Greek influence in theology (often called "Hellenization"). In general, the history of Greek influence on Christian theology can be clearly perceived in any serious history of Christian thought, as, for instance, Justo J. González (A History of Christian Thought, 3 vols. [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970-1975]); Adolf Harnack and Reinhold Seeberg.

²Perotti remarks that, according to Heidegger, the ontological reflection must return, in search of its own foundations, to the origins of Western thinking, namely to early pre-Socratic philosophy (p. 75). In my opinion a critical approach to theology also needs to return to its origins in order to get to the foundation of its presuppositions, notably, its primordial presupposition. In other words, the search for a viewpoint from whose perspective the possibility of a criticism of theological reason may be affirmed is to be directed at the theological reflection on Being's dimensionality as early as possible in the history of Christian reflection. Heidegger, in the philosophical realm, goes back to discover the original Greek interpretation of Being before Plato and Aristotle. In this chapter I intend to do likewise in the theological realm, that is, to go back in the history of Christian reflection so as to find the theological reflection on Being prior to theology's acceptance of the Parmenidean interpretation of it.)
Parmenidean interpretation of it. As has been seen in chapter 2 above, the theological context does not provide such an original reflection. Thus it appears that in order that the criticism of theological reason may be affirmed as possible, another context needs to be considered, namely, the Biblical context.

In their independence from the Parmenidean tradition, Biblical writings, as a "fact" of theological reason, provide the starting point for searching after the necessary viewpoint that a critical

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1The "independence" idea is already at the root of the sola Scriptura principle. Heidegger, within a traditional understanding of theology expresses, nonetheless, the necessity of "independence" as he considers that the task of theology is "to place in discussion, within its own realm of the Christian faith and out of the proper nature of that faith, what it is to think and how it is to speak" ("Non-Objectifying Thinking," p. 30).

2That the Bible is a "fact of reason," and particularly of theological reason, is apparent. As a "fact" its possibility does not need to be shown or proven. The "fact" just appears when the words and meanings of sacred Scripture are considered as what they are, that is to say, as a product of Reason's activity in constituting meaning. The approach to Biblical writings as "fact" of Reason is cognitively prior to any historical, scientific, or metaphysical consideration of its content. Moreover, it is even prior to any theological interpretation of revelation and inspiration. Even if the reader considers Biblical conceptuality to be "mythological," he has, nonetheless, to recognize it as "fact" of theological reason which may be phenomenologically analyzed in search of the dimensionality in which they were constituted. In this regard it should be remembered that "scientists seem to be becoming more aware of how their development of paradigms and theoretical frameworks, the power of root metaphors to give rise to images which organize their research, may be derived from the same human capacities which create myths" (Schreiter, p. 1810). Claude Levi-Strauss says that myth has its own logic as "science of the concrete" (The Savage Mind [Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1966], pp. 11-14). "General myth and first philosophy are not contrasted in content but in idiom" (William E. Abraham, "The Origins of Myth and Philosophy," Man and World 11 [1978]:177). "Thought has scarcely touched upon the essence of the mythical, especially with regard to the fact that the mythos is the saying, while saying is the calling-into-appearance" (Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, p. 94).
approach to the interpretation of reason's structure in theology requires. The Biblical writings are to be considered as a rational fact of theology insofar as they are the product of Reason's functioning in constituting the meanings they express.\(^1\) As a rational fact, the Biblical writings imply a primordial presupposition.\(^2\) It is the purpose of this chapter to discover and show the primordial presupposition in which Biblical meanings have been constituted in order that theology may have a ground for choosing the dimensionality in which Reason is to be used as doctrinal, ethical, exegetical, and historical meanings are constituted.

In order that this purpose may be accomplished within the limits of the present investigation, it is necessary to single out, from the broad scope of Biblical literature, a particular passage in which the original reflection of theological thinking on Being's dimensionality may be explicitly found. In order to be representative of Biblical rationality as a whole, such a passage should be first "ontological," in the sense of dealing expressly with Being, and second should be found as early as possible in the history of theological thinking. It can be seen, then, that a working choice needs to be made in order to select a passage that, as representative of Biblical rationality, may provide the locus on which the phenomenological investigation in search of the original theological

\(^1\) The same procedure was followed in both the first and second chapters of this dissertation. Both philosophical and theological writings were approached and analyzed as "facts of reason."

\(^2\) See p. 67, nn. 1-3 and p. 68, nn. 1-3 above.
interpretation of the primordial presupposition may be developed.¹

Such a foundational and representative passage of Biblical rationality is found in Exod 3:14, 15.² This passage is independent from

¹As in the case of the phenomenological analysis of the theological historical context, in the analysis of the Biblical context it is impossible to address ourselves to the whole scope of available materials of Biblical writings. Thus I have to make a choice, a selection of a passage, in order that the analysis may be possible. The passage to be selected should represent a primordial reflection on Being's ground and Reason's dimensionality so that the interpretation of the primordial presupposition in which the Biblical meanings as a whole have been constituted may be discovered. See p. 75, n. 3 above.


It should be remembered that the Rev 1:4 statement has parallels in ancient literature. For instance, the idea was familiar for Hellenistic readers who were familiar with a similar expression regarding Zeus who is referred to in a song of doves in Dodona as
the traditional Parmenidean interpretation of the ground of Being and it also reflects on Being early in the history of theological thinking.

Since Parmenides wrote about the fifth century B.C. (Ancilla to Pre-Socratic Philosophers, p. 41; and p. 76, n. 1 above) and the Exod 3:14, 15 passage was produced no later than the eighth century B.C., approximately, it seems that a Parmenidean influence on Exod 3:14, 15 fragment is the general, approximate, non-conclusive result of the Documentary Hypothesis of the historical critical method (Brevard S. Childs, The Book of Exodus: A Critical, Theological Commentary [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1974], pp. 52, 53; Ernst Sellin and Georg Fohrer, Introduction to the Old Testament [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1968], pp. 146, 147; and Otto Eissfeldt, The Old Testament: An Introduction [New York: Harper and Row, 1965], pp. 166, 169). Yet, even within the Documentary Hypothesis, recent tendencies recognize that this date represents the moment when pre-existent traditions were put in writing (E. Alan Cole, Exodus: An Introduction and Commentary [Downers Grove, Illinois: Intervarsity Press, 1973], p. 14). Consequently, the understanding of Being which is rendered by Exod 3:14, 15 would be much older than the eighth century B.C. If the conservative approach is considered, the actual date of Exod 3:14, 15 could be as early as the fifteenth century B.C. (Eissfeldt, p. 158; and William A. Shea, "Date of the Exodus," The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia [1979-1982], 2:230-38).

The Bible as a whole does not present another reflection on the ground of Being. It should be remembered that the revelatory setting in which Moses's rendering is expressed finds a parallel in
The selection of the Exod 3:14, 15 passage and its context (Exod 3-6) for my epistemological investigation in search of the Biblical interpretation of the primordial presupposition of Reason's structure is due to three main considerations. First, this is the text in which the idea of Being is explicitly addressed and put into words in Biblical writings. Moreover, the text introduces also a foundational interpretation of the epistemological framework.

Second, it seems clear that this original and foundational grasping the revelatory setting in which Parmenides's reflection is produced. See Jaspers, The Philosophical Faith, p. 53. As the NT seems to repeat and refer to Exod 3:14, 15 foundational ontological statement (Childs, pp. 80, 84; and p. 134, n. 2 above) whatever the meaning of Exod 3:14, 15 may be, it should be understood as applying to both the OT and the NT. By the way, this has been the approach to classical theology so far. The problem with traditional theology is that it interpreted the text in a Parmenidean framework for intelligibility.

Classical theology has considered Exod 3:14, 15 as the place in which the identification between speculative ontology and the Biblical idea of God found its ground and expression (Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of God [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1949], pp. 128, 129). Consequently, this text was employed as the "proof text" for Christian ontology (Dennis J. McCarthy, "Exod 3:14: History, Philology, and Theology," The Catholic Biblical Quarterly 40 [1978]: 318; Childs, p. 58). The phenomenological analysis of the text needs to be aware of such identification in order to avoid it through the application of a methodological epoché.

As I suggest that Exod 3:14, 15 provides both a reflection and its expression on the ground of Being, I am referring to the text as providing insights into the realm of foundational ontology. I am aware that Protestant theology is uncomfortable regarding a "mixing" of theology with philosophy. "In practice philosophia christiana has never yet taken shape; if it was philosophia, it was not christiania, if it was christiania, it was not philosophia (Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 4 vols. [Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1959], 1:5). Obviously Barth's position is not shared by Catholic theologians for whom the philosophy-theology relationship is a fact. Yet, what Barth is actually rejecting is the classical interpretation of ontology in its Thomistic details, which he incorrectly identifies with the whole of philosophia christiana. As the search for the primordial presupposition of theological reason in its Biblical context is undertaken, the possibility of a philosophia biblica will be evaluated.
of Being is not denied but rather recognized and adopted by Biblical tradition both in the OT and NT. And third, theologians and philosophers of all times, notably in modern times, recognize Exod 3:14, 15 as the locus classicus for a discussion of the Biblical understanding of Being.¹ Due to lack of space it is not possible now to provide further arguments or to show beyond any doubt the wisdom of my selection. Yet, as I proceed in analyzing the text and the history of ontological interpretations of it, its paramount position not only as the locus classicus for theological ontology but additionally as a foundational reflection on the ground of Being formally similar to that of Parmenides of Elea in the classical philosophical tradition or to Heidegger's in contemporary philosophy, is going to be seen with increasing clarity.

In order that the phenomenological investigation of Exod 3:14 15 in search of the Biblical interpretation of the primordial presupposition may be accomplished, the following steps are taken. First, it is necessary to see if Exod 3:14, 15 actually expresses a foundational reflection on the ground of Being--that is, if it is indeed an ontological text. In other words, it is necessary to determine from the text whether or not Exod 3:14, 15 puts Being into words already with a particular foundational interpretation. This first step requires both an overview of the main interpretations Exod 3:14, 15 received through the history of theology, and a phenomenological-exegetical analysis of its content and context. Second, if the first

¹See below, pp. 298-320.
step does establish the ontological nature of the text, it will be necessary to inquire about its interpretation of the primordial presupposition.¹

Exod 3:14, 15 is the object of an ongoing discussion regarding its meaning² from which no certain gain has been obtained in the ontological realm since Thomas Aquinas's classical interpretation,³

¹As I continue my investigation following the phenomenological procedure I will try to "show" rather than "prove" the possibility of an ontological understanding of Exod 3:14, 15. Yet every "showing" implies a "seeing." I can try to clarify my "showing" as much as possible, yet I can do nothing regarding anybody's "seeing." The problem of the "seeing" that the phenomenological approach entails is worsened by the fact that Exod 3:14, 15 focuses its "showing" in the realm of the "unthought," which is the foundation and condition of what is being expressed and thought in its words; cf. Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, p. 24. The realm of the "unthought" is the realm of the primordial presupposition which conditions the whole of our interpretation of reason's structure and its actual functioning as it constitutes meanings.

Hence, while I am trying to "show" what is being thought in Exod 3:14, 15, those who read my "showing" are bound to understand it from the background of intelligibility provided by their own "unthought" primordial presupposition and even an "unthought" (uncritically assumed) epistemological framework. Yet, even though difficult, the "seeing" of the "unthought" primordial presupposition may be accomplished at least after a long and painful path. This path is the one I am about to take from the side of the "showing." The reader must be prepared to take its counterpart from the side of the "seeing."

²Through the historical survey of theological interpretations of Exod 3:14, 15 it will be seen that there is "no scholarly consensus" regarding its meaning (David Noel Freedman, "The Name of the God of Moses," Journal of Biblical Literature 79 [1960]:151), and that in this passage, which includes "most of the major theological problems" (Childs, p. 88), there is still today "very much of a mystery" (E. Shild, "On Exodus iii 14 -- 'I AM THAT I AM'," Vetus Testamentum 4 [1954]:296).

³This does not mean that Thomas's is the only interpretation of the text. It rather means that the many different interpretations of it do not either go beyond or basically deny Thomas's ontological interpretation. The differences between extant interpretations appear in relation to the way in which the classical ontological meaning is supposed to be related to the actual meaning of the text.
this fact makes its phenomenological analysis to be more complex and
difficult than is the analysis of Parmenides' fragment, about whose
ontological meaning and relevance there is a wide and solid consen-
sus.\(^1\)

Even though my investigation focuses on the ontological and
epistemological relevance and meaning of Exod 3:14, 15, an exegetical
method needs to be used, otherwise no meaning could be derived from
the text. Since I do not follow the "scientific" historical critical method\(^2\) but instead have decided to follow a more phenomenological

\(^1\)See p. 84, nn. 1-4, and p. 85, n. 1 above.

\(^2\)The reason why the historical critical method cannot be used
in this critical research for the primordial presupposition of Exod
3:14, 15 is that the historical critical method already exists as
such on the basis of a timeless interpretation of the subject matter
which the enterprise of investigation is trying to discover, namely,
the Biblical interpretation of the primordial presupposition. In
short, the historical critical method presupposes what is supposed
to be investigated and reached at the end of the exegetical procedure
(p. 116, n. 1 above). The same is true regarding the historical-
grammatical (also known as grammatical-historical) method which
assumes the basic guidelines of Greek ontology and epistemology.

Moreover, since the historical critical method is not the
"only possible view" (Michael Butterworth, "The Revelation of the
Divine Name?" The Indian Journal of Theology 24 [1975]:52), I believe
that the phenomenological procedure is more appropriate for this par-
ticular epistemological search. The possibility that both the his-
torical critical and historical-grammatical methods may be used in
Biblical exegesis can be addressed only after the Biblical interpre-
tation of the primordial presupposition has been reached.

Besides, it must be taken into account that regarding
Exod 3:14, 15, the historical critical method suggests many "critical"
theories about how the text should and should not have been origi-
nally written, causing, in that way, more confusion than clarifica-
tion (Childs, pp. 61, 62). In my particular view this "scientific"
methodology reveals the scholar's inability to really reach what is
being thought and expressed in the text. The very claim that the
actual redaction of the text needs to be rearranged for the text to
have "meaning" shows that the presuppositions and primordial presup-
position on which the historical critical method has been con-
structed are not those of the text. What happens epistemologically
approach\(^1\) similar to the one utilized in the analysis of both the philosophical and theological contexts,\(^2\) and, since such an approach is more familiar to philosophers than to theologians and exegetes who are bound to follow either the historical critical method or the traditional grammatical-historical method, it is necessary to clarify at least three main features of the phenomenological exegetical procedure to be followed as related to the Biblical text.\(^3\)

when the historical critical method is applied to the text is that the cognitive subject, through his "scientific" understanding of the epistemological framework, changes the subject matter of investigation (cognitive object) after his own image. This "putting" sense into the text does violence to it at its structural level as the text's meaning is rearranged to fit extra-Biblical categories. Thus, it can be seen that the movement of intelligibility that the historical critical method follows comes not from the text but rather goes toward it. For further analysis and criticism of the historical critical method, see George Eldon Ladd, The New Testament and Criticism (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1978); and Gerhard Maier, The End of the Historical Critical Method (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1977).

\(^1\)For an introductory summary to the way in which phenomenology has been understood and used by theology, see Edward Farley, Ecclesial Man, pp. 235-72. In general, theology has understood phenomenology as a "method of obtaining essences or meaning" (ibid., p. 272) which was supplemented by existential philosophies. Yet the phenomenological method is applied by theology mainly to the study of faith as an experiential religious phenomenon. Farley proposes, from a better interpretation of Husserl's phenomenology, an "intersubjective matrix of Faith" (ibid.).

\(^2\)If the phenomenological procedure was appropriate for the philosophical and theological investigations, it should also be appropriate for the investigation of the Biblical context.

\(^3\)Even though phenomenology is widely used as a scientific procedure in several disciplines, I am not aware of any consistent application of it to the exegetical enterprise. Yet, the phenomenological procedure is used, at least in some degree, by several exegetes. See, for instance, Ignace de la Potterie, La vérité dans Saint Jean, 2 vols. (Rome: Biblical Institute Press, 1977).
First, phenomenological exegesis applies a scientific, philosophical, theological, and doctrinal epoché. In other words, as the text is analyzed in search of its meaning, every prior existent theory is "suspended" or "bracketed out." Yet epoché is not ignorance of those theories. Phenomenological epoché can be applied in its fullness only when all the involved theories are properly understood, otherwise they will not be suspended but rather ignored or, worse, applied unconsciously.

Second, phenomenological exegesis, through epoché, works and is grounded on the "things themselves," which in our particular case are the meanings of the text itself as it is. Phenomenological exegesis does not go "beyond" the thing itself as it appears (text).

1 Epoché means suspension of judgment. In this case suspension of judgment as represented in scientific, philosophical, theological, and doctrinal theories. Bultmann himself, for instance, knows about the necessity of applying a methodological epoché in the exegetical enterprise. "Every exegesis that is guided by dogmatic prejudices does not hear what the text says, but only lets the latter say what it wants to hear" (EF, pp. 289, 190). The problem with Bultmann's approach is that epoché is not applied to the rational ontological presuppositions.

2 I apply only theoretical methodological epoché. Historical epoché, that is, the suspension of history as such, cannot be applied because all categories and presuppositions (whether timeless or temporal) develop and are given in and through history (Valone, "Conflicts in the Later Husserl," p. 212). Cf. Taylor, "Lebenswelt and Lebensformen," pp. 188, 189.

3 That is why my analysis of the text needs to provide at least a broad view of the way Exod 3:14, 15 has been understood throughout the history of theology.

4 Heidegger, Being and Time, Int, 2.7.c.

5 In order to have a text at all, Textual Criticism is required.
in order to find its meaning in a kind of traditional *sensus plenior*, but it rather looks for meaning in the text as it appears.  

Third, phenomenological exegesis presents its results not by "constructing," "building up," or "proving" its assertions and statements, but rather by "describing" or "showing" what has been heard or seen while the exegete catches at least some glimpses of what is being thought in the text.  

After these preliminary considerations, it is time to proceed into the search for the primordial presupposition of Biblical rationality such as it is foundationally expressed in Exod 3:14, 15 within the epistemological and constructive limits of this investigation.  

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1 Yet phenomenological exegesis recognizes the existence of a *sensus plenior*, of a "hiddenness" of meaning, but such "hiddenness" pertains and is found within the text and not beyond or behind it, as, for instance, in the mind of God (R. Brown, *The "Sensus Plenior" of Sacred Scripture*, chap. 1). Whatever the nature and meaning of a particular hiddenness may be, the phenomenological procedure unveils it by making it visible in the text and never behind it. See Heidegger, *Being and Time*, Int, 2.c.

2 In this way the phenomenological procedure puts the exegete in touch with what is before every theory, namely, the thing itself which is the source and ground of every possible theory. It can be seen that even in the exegetical realm "l'objet de la phénoménologie nous transporte sur un plan différent, plus difficilement accessible mais plus proche aussi de réel originaire" (Waelhens, p. 391).

3 Indeed, the phenomenological procedure stands in very close relationship to the Biblical principle expressed in Rev 2:7: "He that hath an ear, let him hear what the Spirit saith unto the churches."

4 An additional clarification is necessary regarding the phenomenological procedure to be followed in the analysis of Ex 3:14, 15. As I develop the method in search of the primordial presupposition that Ex 3:14, 15 entails, I will not dialogue with every single exegete who has addressed himself to the text, nor shall I argue with those whom I quote. I will only use those materials which are useful to clarify my phenomenological analysis already produced by exegetical scholarship on the subject.
As Exod 3:14, 15 is approached phenomenologically it is necessary to first ask about its subject matter. In other words, does Exod 3:14, 15 think, talk, and express Being or not? Is our text ontological? Can it point to the ground of Being and its interpretation according to Biblical rationality?

In order to discover the ontological relevance of Exod 3:14, 15, first the broad lines in which it has been interpreted so far must be brought into light so that the phenomenological epoché may be applied to them and the text itself may be reached. And second, the meaning of the text must be reached in order to discover whether its subject matter speaks and expresses Being or not.

Theological Interpretation

It is not possible to understand in depth Exod 3:14, 15 without a general awareness of the most relevant ontological interpretations.

1 According to the philosophical analysis of presuppositions that was developed in chapter 1, it is obvious that presuppositions cannot be denied so as to claim a presuppositionless reflection. Yet, the search for presuppositions, notably for the primordial presupposition, may "suspend" them in order to ask the text for its own primordial presupposition, thus avoiding imposing upon the text the exegete's presupposition.

In order that this procedure may be successfully applied, the exegete needs to know what is to be "suspended." Furthermore, it is obvious that the analysis itself works on the presupposition that the Bible is the result of the functioning of Reason's structure. Yet this is a fact that applies to every human intellectual production, which is not being investigated here.

2 At this point the phenomenological investigation of the text may either confirm or deny any of the extant theories or even may propose a new one. This is the text's prerogative.

3 In other words, neither an extensive nor an exhaustive overview is intended in this study due to its epistemological limits.
of it that are available in the history of theology and exegesis. As I attempt to provide a brief summary of such interpretations, the following question will lead the way. Is Exod 3:14, 15 an ontological text according to Christian tradition? If it is, what kind of ontology is it supposed to express? Is Exod 3:14, 15 supposed to work in a timeless or, instead, a temporal interpretation of Being's dimensionality?

This specialized historical survey is developed in the following three steps: (1) the interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15 before Thomas Aquinas; (2) the interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15 by Thomas Aquinas; and (3) the interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15 after Thomas Aquinas.

**Exod 3:14, 15 before Thomas Aquinas**

**Early Jewish exegesis.** The way in which the LXX translated Exod 3:14 (ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὄν) is generally understood as "metaphysical." According to Henry Barns, Rabbinic writings had the same general

The survey to be presented is, therefore, necessarily specialized. For a brief introduction to the history of interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15, see Jaroslav Pelikan, Luther the Expositor: Introduction to the Reformer's Exegetical Writings, companion volume to Luther's Works (Saint Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1959), pp. 23-26; Childs, pp. 84-87; and Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, pp. 128-32.

metaphysical interpretation of it.\textsuperscript{1} It seems clear, however, that when rabbinic thought renders the Divine Name on a present, past, future temporal formulation\textsuperscript{2} it points to an interpretation of Being that is somewhat different from traditional Thomism. Thus, whatever ontological meaning the rabbinic renderings may involve, they cannot be understood as expressing the Thomistic interpretation of Being, but rather as expressing an understanding of the original ontological meaning that is found in Exod 3:14, 15 on which both the rabbinic and the New Testament renderings find their ground and source.

In short, some rabbinical writings seem to reveal an ontological understanding of Exod 3:14, 15 which differs from Greek Thomistic interpretations. Yet, because they do not approach the text from a philosophical perspective, the ontological potentiality of the text is not further developed.

Augustine of Hippo. At the climax of Patristic theology a different theological approach can be easily perceived as Augustine's interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15 virtually contains the whole Thomistic doctrines of the Divine Name and analogy.\textsuperscript{3} Augustine allowed Greek

\textsuperscript{1}Barns, p. 337. I cannot agree, however, with Barns's interpretation which sees that the ancient versions "sont nettement pour le sens métaphysique" (ibid.), at least in the clearly Thomistic sense in which Barns understands metaphysics.

\textsuperscript{2}M. Ford presents, for instance, the Melkita's rendering of Exod 3:14 as "He who was in the past and he who will be in the future. It is he who is in the world. . ."; and Rabbi Isaac's (ca. 300 A.D.) as "I am he who was and I am he (Who is) now, and I am he (Who will be) for ever" (p. 377). The rabbinic rendering is, then, very similar in its general meaning to the ὁ ὁμοίως καὶ ὁ ἄνευ καὶ ὁ ἀπὸ ἀρχῆς μέχρι ᾗ ἀρχής (Rev 4:8) of NT times.

\textsuperscript{3}Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 192.
ontology to be the constitutive element of his interpretation of God's nature.\(^1\) Whatever God is, it must naturally be what Greek Being was supposed to be, yet in its highest level.\(^2\) According to Augustine, then, Greek ontology provides the material content for the meaning of Exod 3:14, 15. Thus the timeless primordial presupposition is seen as pertaining to the subject matter of the text. Although timelessness does not come out of the text, as the text speaks of Being, it is taken for granted that it must refer to timelessness since that is the only available interpretation of Being provided by the extra-biblical realm of Greek philosophy.\(^3\)

\(^1\) Augustine provides a Platonic interpretation of God as essence, as immutability of what is (Gilson, Thomisme, pp. 126, 127). Thus, timelessness is assumed to be the deeper meaning of the text.

\(^2\) "But God is without doubt a substance, or perhaps essence would be a better term, which the Greeks call ousia. For just as wisdom is so called from being wise, and knowledge is so called from knowing, so essence is so called from being [esse]. And who possesses being in a higher degree than He, who said to his servant Moses: 'I am who am,' and 'He who is, has sent me to you.' But all other things that are called essences or substances are susceptible of accidents, by which a change, whether great or small, is brought about in them. But there can be no accidents of this kind in God. Therefore, only the essence of God, or the essence which God is, is unchangeable. Being is in the highest and truest sense of the term proper to Him from whom being derives its name. For what undergoes a change does not retain its own being, and what is subject to change, even though it may not actually be changed, can still lose the being which it had. And, therefore, only that which is not only not changed, but cannot undergo any change at all, can be called being in the truest sense without any scruple" (Augustine, The Trinity, trans. Stephen McKenna [Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 1962], 5:2).

\(^3\) Augustine not only identifies "the summum esse and the summum bonum (Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 129), but he also identifies, in my opinion, the understanding of Being with the Parmenidean Neo-Platonic interpretation.
In short, Augustine's theology assumes the identification between the Neo-Platonic interpretation of Being and the Biblical idea of the Name of God as expressed in Exod 3:14.

The Pseudo Dionysius. According to the Areopagite, the Name of God is connected with the philosophical approach of negative theology in an explicit, direct way.\(^1\) The movement of meaning from philosophy into the text (that is, into the idea of the divine name) is also present in the Pseudo Dionysius. He emphasizes the idea of absolute transcendence. Since God is the philosophical absolute, the super-essence or existence, no name is an adequate pointer of his actual esse or Being. Thus, whatever Exod 3:14, 15 may mean regarding God's being, it will not reach its unspeakable essence. The name rather will be a kind of pointer toward the utter mystery of God's Being.\(^2\) Yet, when the unspeakability of God's Being\(^3\) is

\(^1\)The Divine Names (New York: Macmillan Co., 1966), 1:6. Brunner summarizes the position of the Pseudo Dionysius regarding the Being of God in the following way: "The Divine Nature is unspeakable. Certainly, just as the Divine Being is 'nameless', so also it can be described by all kinds of names, just as the One who transcends all existence is also the All-existing. We can, therefore, say everything about God as well as nothing" (The Christian Doctrine, p. 120).

\(^2\)A comparison between the Pseudo-Dionysius and the Jasperian structure could be revealing. Even though such a comparison cannot be developed here because of lack of space, it can be suggested that the Pseudo-Dionysius approach to the idea of God's Being may be considered in general as a pre-Kantian antecedent of Jasperian thought on God's Being.

\(^3\)"Thus, as for the Super-Essence of the Supreme Godhead (if we would define the Transcendence of its Transcendent Goodness) it is not lawful to any lover of that Truth which is above all truth to celebrate It as Reason or Power or Mind or Life or Being, but rather as most utterly surpassing all condition, movement, life,
affirmed within an equivocal approach to Being as a whole,¹ a precise interpretation of the ground of Being is being held, namely, timelessness.

In short, also for the Areopagite the Name of Exod3:14, speaks of Being, yet it must be negatively understood² because of his radical acceptance of the timeless Parmenidean presupposition which determines the meaning for both God's Being and God's absolute transcendence.³

Exod 3:14, 15 according to Thomas Aquinas

Early in his Summa Theologiae Aquinas introduces the concept of the Name of God⁴ into the core of both his theological and philosophical systems.⁵ Before considering Thomas's interpretation of imagination, being, rest, dwelling, union, limit, infinity, everything that exists" (Dionysius, 1:5).

¹That is to say, Dionysius follows the Parmenidean via negativa regarding the interpretation of Being's dimensionality involving the equivocal relation between transcendent and immanent beings and which rejects the Platonic-Aristotelian analogical procedure which considers both transcendent and immanent beings as analogical.

²Dionysius, 5:1, 3.

³There is no doubt that the Bible speaks about God's transcendence. Yet, nowhere can we find the idea of utter unspeakability of God. On the contrary, the very purpose of God's revelation in the Bible is to let His name be known (Exod 6, 7). Therefore, whatever one's interpretation of the idea of Biblical transcendence may be, the concept of absolute transcendence as found in the Areopagite must be considered as a violation of the Biblical interpretation of it.


⁵Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 130. According to E. L. Mascall, the starting point of Thomas Aquinas's theology is...
Exod 3:14, 15 three important facts need to be noted: (1) Aquinas constructed his system only after he considered and criticized the already-existing ones—thus he rejects the equivocal understanding of being that the Pseudo Dionysius followed and follows the analogical way as classically understood by Greek philosophy, notably by Plato and Aristotle;¹ (2) Thomas knew Exod 3:14 only through Jerome's Latin translation which renders the ho ὁν of the LXX by the Latin qui est;² and (3) Aquinas's main question as he dealt with the problem of God was, What really makes God God?³

Let us take a brief look into the way in which Aquinas understands Exod 3:14, 15 in the context of his theological system.⁴ He addresses himself to the issue of God's name only after the 'metaphysics of Exodus' which expressing God as ipsum esse subsistens draws into unity all the other attributes and operations of God (He Who Is: A Study in Traditional Theism [London: Lowe and Brydone, 1962], p. 13). It is possible to see how Aquinas concentrates in the interpretation of Exod 3:14 the basic principles of his great synthesis of Judeo-Christian revelation—which sees God as the Great Act—and Greek philosophical thought—which sees God as the Great Thought of the universe (ibid., pp. 5, 7). Let us note, however, the equivocity in which the "Act of God" idea stands. In other words, the meaning of "act" is different in relation to the context for intelligibility in which it is used. Thus it has different connotations whether it is related to the Thomistic or Biblical contexts.

¹ "Et hoc modo aliqua dicuntur de Deo et creaturis analogice, et non aequivoce pure neque pure univoce. Non enim possemus nominare Deum nisi ex creaturis, dicitur secundum quod est aliquis ordo creaturarum ad Deum ut ad principium et causam, in qua praeeexistunt excellenter omnes rerum perfectiones" (ST, I. 13, 5).

² See Barns, p. 338, n. 1. Thomas was not acquainted with the Hebrew original.

³ Massignon, p. 10.

⁴ His theological system as developed in his mature thought is found in the Summa Theologiae.
discussion about both God's existence (esse) and nature (essentia) have been developed and established. As the text and its idea of God's name is addressed, Thomas asks not for its meaning but rather for its "appropriateness." In this context Thomas considers that the name provided by Exod 3:14, "He who is," is the most appropriate for God because of three main reasons: (1) because the name means ipsum esse, it may refer more properly to God's nature; (2) "He

1ST, I. 2-11. This already shows that Aquinas does not go to the text in order to develop his understanding of Being from it, but, on the contrary, he goes to the text with a previous non-Biblical interpretation of it.

2Gilson explains that according to Aquinas God does not reveal the meaning of Being in Exod 3:14. The meaning is revealed from the philosophical extra-Biblical reflection on Being which was already grasped by Augustine (Thomisme, p. 137). Obviously, the name only reveals the idea of Being as the meaning of the "sound-name," but not the meaning of Being itself.

3In other words, does the Biblical idea of a name of God, and particularly the name provided by Exod 3:14, fit God? Yet, I wonder, how can one decide on the "appropriateness" of a name without having already a clear idea about the meaning and nature of the reality the name is supposed to be naming? As far as I can see, such a decision is impossible without the assumption of an already accepted interpretation of the nature of the Being to be named. It seems, then, that Aquinas comes to the text with an already taken ontological position to which the text is supposed to relate.

4"Primo quidem propter sui significationem. Non enim significat formam aliquam, sed ipsum esse. Unde cum esse Dei sit ipsa ejus essentia, et hoc nulli alli conceniat, ut supra ostensum est, manifestum est quod inter alia nomina hoc mame proprae nominat Deum; unumquodque enim denominatur sua forma" (ST, I. 13, 11). See also Savagone, "La Cognoscibilita," p. 72.

5At first glance ipsum esse seems to be an idea which may be found within the range of meaning intended by the "I am who I am" of Exod 3:14. Yet it must be remembered that for Aquinas ipsum esse has a very precise ontological meaning. For an introduction to Thomas's idea of ipsum esse, see pp. 168-74 above. Briefly, however, let it be said that esse, for Thomas, is the act of existence, essentia is what specifies the act of existence, and ens refers to
who is" is to be considered the most appropriate name for God because of ejus universalitatem; and (3) the present tense in which "He who

anything that exists as a reality or substance (ST, I. 3, 4 n. a). Yet, to say God's esse is to refer to God's essentia because God's essentia est suum esse (ST, I. 3, 4), which means that "est igitur Deus suum esse et non solum sua essentia" (ibid.). Thus, the name of God as such is used by Aquinas to signify naturam divinam and the Tetragrammaton to signify "Dei substantiam incommunicabilem, et (ut sic liceat loqui) singularem" (ST, I. 131, 1 ad 1). However, it is not possible really to distinguish between God's naturam and God's esse (ST, I. 3. 7), hence whatever may be said regarding God's nature in Thomas's theology forms part of the deeper meaning of Exod 3:14. In short, to say that the Exod 3:14 passage means God as ipsum esse entails its total identification with the ideas of esse and essentia as pertaining to the Being itself of God.

Universality is required from God in Aquinas's system because of the ontological context provided by his interpretation of Being. Such an understanding is based upon Aristotle's idea of the universal nature of metaphysics and theology understood as intellectual disciplines (Metaphysics, 6.1, 8-12). In Aquinas's theology God's essence is interpreted from categories which have been developed for the understanding of things, namely, matter and form, potency and act. Thus, God must not be composed of either matter or form, but He is to be identified with His own essentia vel naturam (ST, I. 3. 3). It is apparent that this procedure reduces the possibility of understanding God's essence to the level of things.

According to this requirement of Thomas's ontology, the less determinate or concrete a name is, the more "fitting" it will be to God's nature, which is utter simplicity (ST, I. 3. 7). Thus, "quolibet enim alio nomine determinatur aliquis modus substantiae rei; sed hoc nomen QUI EST, nullum modum essendi determinat, sed de habet indeterminate ad omnes, et ideo nominat ipsum pelagus substantiae infinitum (ST, I. 13. 11). Obviously, the ideas of God's simplicity and universality derive from Thomas's ontological Aristotelian framework for intelligibility.

The Tetragrammaton fits God because it is a universal name, that is to say, an abstract name, which lacks any concrete determination. Again, the abstract meaning of Aristotelian categories for being are imposed upon Exod 3:14 as it is assumed both that it talks about Being and that it interprets it in the classical Aristotelian way. The text is not asked for its meaning. There is no dialogue with the text. There is no search for the "hidden" meaning within the text. The text is thought to have, behind it, a deeper meaning which is provided by classical Aristotelian philosophy.
is" is rendered\(^1\) is considered an additional argument for its appropriateness as the name of God "whose existence does not know either past or future, as Augustine says."\(^2\)

Consequently, according to Aquinas, Exod 3:14 entails three main ontological ideas: (1) the idea of ipsum esse or "act of existence"; (2) the twofold idea of universality and simplicity; and (3) the ideas of timelessness and unchangeability.\(^3\) All these basic ideas find their ontological ground in the context of Thomas's own philosophy and are not provided by the text itself.\(^4\) Yet, at the same time, Thomas sees that these ideas pertain to the deeper sense

\(^1\)At least according to the Latin translation available in Thomas's time. See above, p. 304, n. 2.

\(^2\)ST, I. 13. 11. Of course Thomas is talking about the present tense in Latin. No discussion is to be expected about the Hebrew imperfect tense or its "notion of time." It is possible that, after all, the present tense may be the better way of understanding the Hebrew imperfect in this particular instance. Yet, it is not possible to deduce timelessness from the grammatical feature of a present verbal tense. Thomas does not do that either. He just sees it as "fitting" the already developed timeless understanding of God's Being that he brings to the text. For Thomas, "aeternitas non est aliud quam ipse Deus" (ST, I. 1. 2) and "ipsa aeternitas successione caret tota simul existens" (ST, I. 10. 1). Hence God, as ipsum esse is timeless. Consequently Aquinas considers that the Bible uses metaphorical terms to refer to God and "eternity in temporal and successive terms although eternity exists instantaneously" (ST, I. 10, 1 ad 4). Thomas explains the way in which God is supposed to relate to His creatures by suggesting that "God is said to be related to a creature because the creature is related to Him, just as, according to Aristotle, the knowable is said to be related to knowledge because knowledge is related to it" (ST, I. 13, 7 ad 4).

\(^3\)See SCG, I. 22; and Mauer, "Tetragrammaton," p. 277.

\(^4\)The only thing that the text provides is the word "Being." In other words, it speaks Being. Yet Thomas's interpretation of its ontological meaning is grounded on Aristotelian philosophy.
of Exod 3:14 as such. Thus, for Aquinas the subject matter of Exod 3:14 is ontological, yet its meaning is to be found behind the text in the Aristotelian tradition of philosophical interpretation.

As I proceed with the historical analysis of ontological interpretations of Exod 3:14, 15, my main question is: Does the history of Christian theological interpretation after Aquinas reject or follow his ontological interpretation? In short, has Thomas's interpretation actually been denied and overcome as a whole? Or, on the contrary, should the entire scope of Biblical and theological scholarship be seen and interpreted as still working within the ontological tradition that finds in Thomas Aquinas its greatest expositor?

Exod 3:14, 15 from Thomas Aquinas until today

It is under the direction of Biblical exegesis, which appears late in the history of theology,¹ that Exod 3:14, 15 was first analyzed and considered for itself and not from a predetermined systematic viewpoint.²  As a result of the exegetical approach some new

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¹The exegetical enterprise of Biblical theology as an independent discipline is a rather recent phenomenon which can be traced back as early as 1745 (Gerhard Hasel, Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, rev. ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977], p. 18). The process of liberation from its bondage to systematic theology and philosophy has been slow and gradual.

²Traditionally, the text has been interpreted as expressing a basic ontological meaning which is assumed to be the same classical Aristotelian one. During the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, OT scholars in the process of liberation from systematic theology and philosophy have turned their attention toward Exod 3:14 with the explicit intention of rejecting the inherited abstract philosophical interpretation.
interpretations of the text have been offered. 1 According to Ernst Jenni, 2 current interpretations of Exod 3:14, 15 may be divided into three major types. First, there are those interpreters who follow Thomas in claiming that the text reveals God's essence. Second, there are those who understand it as a refusal to answer Moses' question, thus pointing to the utter mystery of God's essence. And, third, there are those who understand it as a declaration regarding God's work in history. As I deal with current interpretations of the text I will follow Jenni's general categorization in order to simplify a very complex situation. Yet, before doing that, as a general context, I think it is helpful to also become acquainted with the Reformers' approach to Exod 3:14, 15.

1 OT scholars have been trying to find, in dialogue with the text, a different interpretation, an interpretation that should be as far as possible from the traditional one and, at the same time, that should be as near as possible to the "ideological milieu" of sacred Scripture (Walter Zimmerli, Old Testament Theology in Outline [Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1978], p. 20). For instance, J. A. Motyer presents a survey of interpretations on the meaning of our text from a linguistic viewpoint. He reports interpretations such as, for instance, "C. E. Simon, 89: not 'to be' but 'to act'; Ryder Smith, The Biblical Doctrine of Man, 44 'the active one'; B. W. Anderson, The Living World of the OT., 34: 'Activity, not eternal Being'" (The Revelation of the Divine Name [London: Tyndale Press, 1959], n. 58).

In the same line of thought the following statements are relevant: "'Yahweh', in which both the idea of nearness, of being present and the idea of mystery are found" (Th. C. Vriezen, An Outline of Old Testament Theology [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1958], p. 147); and Ludwig Köhler who points out that it should be considered as "the Existing One, the Living One" (Old Testament Theology [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1953], p. 42).

In short, during the last two centuries the general tendency of Biblical exegesis has been the rejection of any possible relationship with traditional interpretations of Exod 3:14; at least this is their explicit purpose (Childs, p. 87). Of course, the Thomistic interpretation has always found its supporters within Catholicism and Neo-Thomism.

2 Jenni, p. 484.
Reformation. In broad lines the Reformers’ approach belongs to the traditional ontological interpretation. Yet, with their emphasis on the theologia crucis, they also stress the personal dimension of the name. In short, the text is still understood as ontological as in the classical tradition, but the emphasis has shifted toward God’s action in history, mainly as seen in the person and work of Christ.

Classical ontological interpretation. This position is still mainly held by Thomist and Neo-Thomist theologians. Yet, because of the current emphasis on historicity and God’s activity in creation, even this school of interpretation stresses this aspect. Yet, in spite of such an emphasis, it is clear that for this school the deeper sense of the text is not to be seen in its “historical” nuances but rather in its deep ontological level. Exod 3: 14, 15 is

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1For a brief commentary on Luther’s Calvin’s and Zwingli’s interpretations of Exod 3:14, see Childs, pp. 86, 87. See also John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 2 vols. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1979), 1. 13, 23.
2Jenni, p. 484.
5Childs, pp. 86, 87.
6See, for instance, Mascall’s book He Who Is.
7Barns, p. 336.
considered as expressing in "germ" the actual Being of God.  

Briefly, then, Exod 3:14, 15, according to the classical ontological interpretation reveals two modes of God's being, namely, the timeless "existing" Being of God in its innermost nature, and his inner Being as He manifests Himself within the order of and relates to created things as l'être historique.

The "refusal" interpretation. There is a theological trend that wants to get rid of the philosophical interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15 by asserting that the real meaning of God's answer "I am that I am" is actually the refusal to define God in any human terms. Consequently, the name is interpreted as pointing to the utter mystery of God's nature.

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1 Ibid., p. 335
2 Schild, pp. 297-301.
3 Edmond Jacob believes that the new element that God reveals to Moses in the rendering of the Name is the ontological idea of "he who is" in an abstract meaning which the Israelites—who had very little grasp of abstract ideas—could not develop in a too highly sophisticated metaphysic (Theology of the Old Testament [New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958], pp. 51, 52). Köhler, on a philosophical basis, decides that the meaning of the name points to Existence, Being, and Life (p. 43).
4 Barns, p. 333.
5 "Le nom suggère l'impossibilité de définir Dieu" (Dubarle Revue des Sciences Philosophiques et Théologiques 34, 1951, pp. 1ff., quoted by Vriezen, p. 235, n. 4). See also Edward W. H. Vick, Speaking Well of God (Nashville: Southern Publishing Assn., 1979), p. 56. Consequently, this text has been interpreted by this school as rejecting the traditional ontological definition (Brunner, The Christian Doctrine, p. 120) by pointing to the obvious fact that God's nature surpasses every blasphemous intent of definition.
6 Gottfried Quell, "Kurios," TDNT (1979), 3:1065. For additional information on those who support this view, see Moshe...
Even though the "refusal" theory explicitly wants to get rid of the classical philosophical tradition, it actually follows it; for the via negativa which emphasizes that the absolute transcendence of God\textsuperscript{1} is accepted as ground for the refusal. Thomas's interpretation is rejected only insofar as its analogical procedure is not accepted. Yet Thomas's interpretation is still working as the timeless primordial presupposition of God's being is accepted.\textsuperscript{2}

In short, this kind of interpretation rejects the philosophical Aristotelian thought and works with the Parmenidean timeless interpretation of the primordial presupposition of Being which requires the absolute transcendence of the divine Being as wholly other which, consequently, is conceived to be unknowable.

Greenberg, *Understanding Exodus* (New York: Behrman House, 1969), p. 83, n. 2. From a Biblical exegetical point of view, this interpretation has been focused from the perspective provided by the analysis of the parallelism that may be found between Genesis 32 and Judges 13 (Childs, p. 69). Yet, Childs properly argues that Exod 3:14b appears as a positive answer to Moses's inquiry (p. 59). Childs further points out that the text does not use the 'âni 'âsher 'âni construction which would fit better the idea of mystery and refusal (ibid.). Thus, according to Child's criticism, the refusal theory does not find a firm foundation in the text.


\textsuperscript{2}The "refusal" theory is grounded in the particular timeless interpretation of Being which is at the basis of the interpretation of absolute transcendence as "wholly other." This via negativa tradition was originated by Parmenides (p. 79, n. 3 above). Aristotle and Thomas, on the other hand, suggested the analogia entis procedure in order that the gap (Platonic chôrismos) may be bridged. The "refusal" theory denies the bridge (analogia) but accepts the gap (chôrismos), which obviously is also at the very root of Thomas's classical thinking.
"Historical" interpretation.¹ It is within this school of interpretation that the most radical rejection of the traditional ontological interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15 is to be found. This interpretation is provided by OT exegesis and embraces many different approaches and nuances.² Many of them stand only on the basis of philological speculations that rather avoid the ontological subject of Exod 3:14, 15, which at times seems to surpass the philosophical capabilities of some exegetes.³ There are, however, among the many exegetical interpretations three trends that, because of their relevance regarding our ontological inquiry, deserve to be singled out. They are the "Hiphil," the "Future," and the "Presence" theories.

Let us consider first the "Hiphil" theory. As the name suggests, this theory is based on the hiphil form of the hypothetical verbal stem from which the tetragrammaton is supposed to have been

¹I call the wide range of interpretations provided by OT exegesis "historical" because in general they point to a realm other than the one posited by the traditional ontological approach. This realm other than the ontological is the historical. Thus, for instance, the idea of "creator" is not a historical idea in the sense of being given in time and temporality but rather as it points to a dimension other than the one to which the traditional timeless abstract being belongs. So, I call these theories "historical" insofar as they relate God to history and not because they make God historical.

²That is the reason why it is not possible for me to develop here a complete and exhaustive history of exegetical interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15.

³The philological approach has been widely used and from its results many different meanings have been suggested for the Tetragrammaton. For an introduction to the different results of the philological approach to the interpretation of Exod 3:14, 15, see B. W. Anderson, "Names of God," Interpreter's Dictionary of the Bible (1962), 2:410, 411.
According to this theory, the main idea that would be conveyed by the tetragrammaton is that of "creator." 2

Even though this theory may assume different forms, 3 its general hypothetical foundations 4 which stand on the insecure ground of linguistic analogies and the fact that so far there is no known hiphil of hāwā in Hebrew, make it highly improbable. On the other hand, from the ontological viewpoint, the idea of "creator" which is suggested by this theory is not denied but, on the contrary, is rather included in the traditional interpretation of Being. 5

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1 This theory seems to have been suggested by W. F. Albright in "Contributions to Biblical Archeology and Philology," Journal of Biblical Literature 43 (1924):363-78. See also Childs, pp. 63, 64. The theory stands on parallels and analogies to extra-Biblical materials--Proto-Aramaic, pre-Islamic, Babylonian, Egyptian, and Canaanite. It is argued that "the name Yahweh could be a hiphil from the verb hawah" (Jacob, p. 50). According to D. N. Freedman, the qal rendering of the MT and LXX are to be interpreted as secondary developments ("The Name of the God of Moses," Journal of Biblical Literature 74 (1960):152. Yet, no proof of this assertion is provided by Freedman.

2 Childs, p. 79; D. N. Freedman, "The Name," p. 152.

3 See, for instance, Child's commentary and criticism of F. M. Cross's version of it (pp. 63, 64); and J. Philip Hyatt's rendering of it as meaning "Sustainer of X (ancestor of Moses)" ("Yahweh as 'The God of my Father'" Vetus Testamentum 5 [1955]: 130-36).

4 Jacob, p. 50. On the other hand, in my opinion, this "isolation" from the context of intelligibility that is provided by the text itself is perhaps the main reason so as to reject the likelihood of the hiphil theory. For further criticism of this theory, see Childs, pp. 63, 64.

5 To say that God is ipsum esse is not the same as saying that God is "creator" ex-nihilo. Yet, according to classical Thomistic interpretation, the active dynamic understanding of God as ipsum esse includes (in His relation to the world) the idea of "creator." See p. 169, n. 1 above. Thus, from an ontological viewpoint, this theory seems to be able to reach God's Being only in its relation to history.
Second, let us consider the "Future" theory. This theory stands on the future interpretation of the temporal idea of the imperfect tense in which 'ehyeh is rendered in Hebrew.\(^1\) On the basis of this grammatical interpretation, a wide range of meanings have been suggested. For instance, the text is understood as being only an expression of God's promise to be with His people in a hopeless situation,\(^2\) or as related to God's promise of redemption,\(^3\) or as referring to God's "presence" with His people,\(^4\) or as pointing to God's inscrutable purposes,\(^5\) or as suggesting that since God's nature is "full of the future" His essence needs to be understood as it relates to history--mainly regarding what God is still expected to do in the future.\(^6\) This last nuance is at the core of recent

and to the world. It does not contradict the ontological interpretation of Thomas Aquinas but rather assumes it in order to see the idea of "creator" as relative to God's activity in the world.

\(^1\)For instance, see Motyer, p. 23; Greenberg, pp. 82, 83; and Martin Buber, Moses: The Revelation and the Covenant (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958), p. 52.


\(^3\)Motyer, p. 23; Buber, p. 52. "En sorte que, à travers le dynamisme exprimé par le verbe Hayah, il est possible de retrouver le sens de 'résultat de l'action' qu'exprime souvent ce verbe; 'Je deviendrai bien que Je deviendrai (avec les hommes)', 'Je subsisterai', ou 'Mon action de devenir avec (Israël) se maintiendra' (cf. Exod 33:19)" (André Lacoque, Le devenir de Dieu [Paris: Éditions Universitaires, 1967], p. 105).

\(^4\)Motyer, p. 24.


theological trends such as Theology of Hope\(^1\) and Theology of Liberation.\(^2\)

Even though constructed upon a debatable future interpretation of the imperfect of hayā,\(^3\) from an ontological perspective, at


\(^2\)It has been said often, in recent years, that the expression used in Exod 3:14 (‘Ehyeh āsher ‘ehyeh) is correctly translated not as 'I am who am', which can be interpreted within our categories in the sense of a vigorous but static assertion of God's transcendence, but rather as 'I will be who will be.' A new kind of transcendence is emphasized: God reveals himself as a force in our future and not as an ahistorical being. Grammatically, both translations are valid. It would be better perhaps to use an expression which emphasizes the characteristic of permanence: 'I am he who is being.' But the use of similar expressions (thirty-one times throughout the Bible) and the context of the Covenant in which the above passage is found, lead us rather to stress the active sense of the terminology employed" (Gutierrez, pp. 164, 165). See also O'Collins, p. 137. Of course, there are differences of emphasis between Gutierrez's and Moltmann's positions regarding the interpretation of Exod 3:14. See Gutierrez's criticism of Moltmann's emphasis on the future dimension of God which forgets, according to Gutierrez, the idea of action in the present (p. 217).

\(^3\)A temporal future tense is not so obvious and necessary in Hebrew. In Hebrew the perfect tense refers mainly to a finished action in itself, while the imperfect denotes a not-yet-finished action (Mayer Lambert, Traité de Grammaire Hébraïque [Hildesheim: Verlag Dr. H. A. Gerstenberg, 1972], p. 239). The imperfect expresses, then, a durative action (ibid., p. 244) that can refer, according to the context, to past, present, or future actions (ibid.). Hence, the kind of action which the verb refers to may be grasped with some degree of certainty as referring to an action "qui est représentée comme commencée, incomplète, soit qu'il s'agisse du passé, soit qu'il s'agisse du futur" (Barns, p. 344).

Yet, in my opinion, no ontological conclusion or meaning may be grounded or derived either on the basis of the kind of action conveyed by the Hebrew imperfect as verbal form, or by the stative or active ideas which the verb hayā may be seen as conveying. No ontological meaning about the "temporal" nature of God's being in itself can be deduced from these ideas; otherwise we find ourselves in the same kind of intellectual movement in which Aquinas was when he saw God's timelessness grounded in the present tense of the Latin qui
first glance at this interpretation it appears that what this trend is in fact doing is not rejecting Thomas's ontological interpretation

est. We would find ourselves hanging our own preconceived ontological ideas on the idea of "incompleteness" allegedly provided by the Hebrew verb. Barns warns against the interpretation of the imperfect as basis for the idea of God's development (p. 338). It is true that hāyā means "becoming" (William L. Holladay, A Concise Hebrew and Aramaic Lexicon of the Old Testament [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1978], s.v. hāyā), but it is also true that in depending on the context hāyā does not always mean "becoming," but on the contrary, it may be used to express general statements (Barns, p. 336). Lacocque argues that hāyā is not stative but active and that as a consequence the idea of God developing in time is suggested by the text (p. 21). What about the "future" tense of 'ehyeh? Is it to be translated as future or as present? Of course the "future" theory needs a future translation in order to provide a rational for its temporal historical interpretation over against the traditional ontological one. Furthermore, to give some ground for their theory, some exegetes connect the 'ehyeh in verse 14 with the 'ehyeh in verse 12 whose context requires a future translation. Thus, it is claimed that Moses's question in vs. 13 is but an extension of his question in vs. 11. Thus, the argument goes on, the context in vs. 14 is the same that is in vs. 12, therefore also the second 'ehyeh is to be translated in future tense (J. Gerald Janzen, "What's in a Name? 'Yahweh' in Exodus 3 and the Wider Biblical Context," Interpretation 33 [1973]: 235). I think that such an "arrangement" of the context violates both the inner dialogic dynamics of the broader passage (Exod 3:4-17) and the inner dynamics of meaning that springs from the structure of parallelism in which the vs. 14 and 15 are constructed. If the meaning is supposed to be determined by the context, the exegete should pay attention to its intelligibility as a whole and should not begin by rearranging it on account of some presuppositions that are imposed upon the text.

The future interpretation of Exod 3:14 has been held also on the basis of its alleged parallelism with Exod 33:23 regarding God's back--past--which Moses could see, and His face--future--which remained unknown to Moses. This theory was put forward in July 1952, in Cambridge, by the late Professor William Manson (Boyd, p. 178). Boyd has properly remarked that in Hebrew the temporal ideas conveyed by ḥār and panim are precisely the opposite ones to those claimed by Manson. Ĥār, referring to time, means "after" indicating, thus, a future tense, and panim, referring to time, means "before" indicating, hence, a past tense (pp. 178, 182; Holladay, s.c. Ĥār and panim). Consequently, this attempt to provide a ground for the "Future" theory failed as it did not recognize the proper temporal bearing of the words involved. Finally, it should be noted that even among those who stand for a historical interpretation of the text there are some who translate 'ehyeh in present tense (Barns, p. 334; Buber, p. 52).
but rather emphasizing by means of the future grammatical tense God's activity and relation to history. The text simply does not make explicit the supposed ontological dimension as claimed by Thomistic tradition.¹

Third, let us consider the "Presence" theory. This theory also expresses God's activity in history yet without arguing its position from the basis of the future tense of the verb involved, kind of verbal action, or philologies. On the contrary, it relies more on the inner historical nature of Biblical thinking which is particularly seen at work in Exod 3:14. For this trend of interpretation the particular "nature" of Biblical thinking appears to be "self-evident." This theory claims that according to the Biblical kind of reflection, Exod 3:14 thinks Being, but not as Being itself—abstract Being—but rather as continuous "presence" of God with His people through history.²

¹As the investigation goes on, it should be noted that the general idea presented by this theory which sees the text as pointing to God's activity in history stems from the text and its Biblical context. This theory, however, does not see any ontological relevance or meaning in the text. God's activity in history refers to God's revelation or manifestation to historical temporal beings. It refers to revelation and not to God's Being in itself. Thus, the Thomistic ontological interpretation is neither replaced nor challenged. On the contrary, it is assumed as necessary intellective context for the interpretation of God's action as pertaining only to "revelation" and not to His Being.

²For instance, Exod 3:14 is interpreted as meaning "The present one," "He who is there" (Greenberg, p. 82); "Active being," "manifested being" (G. Henton Davies, Exodus: Introduction and Commentary [London: SCM Press, 1967], pp. 71, 72). Buber understands Exod 3:14 as expressing an absolute future meaning "I shall be present," "I will be always present" (pp. 52-54). Martin Noth interprets it as "active Being" and considers possible a future translation (Exodus: A Commentary [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1962],
Ontologically, however, "presence" is not Being, but assumes Being as its ground for manifestation in history. Thus the text does not refer to Being but to its manifestation in relation to history.\(^1\)

Again, as in the case of the future and hiphil theories, this position necessarily presupposes the traditional timeless Thomistic interpretation of ontology. For only the dogmatically acceptable of traditional ontology prevents Biblical "presence" from becoming Being in itself.

**Summary and Partial Conclusion**

Even though this survey of interpretations of Exod 3:14, 15 has been neither comprehensive nor exhaustive, it is clear enough to suggest some general conclusions regarding its ontological relevance and meaning.

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\(^1\)The ontological bearings of this theory are properly and clearly explained by Vriezen. "In this name Yahweh reveals His Being only in its 'formal aspect' by speaking of His actual presence. This is not a real qualification of Yahweh's Being, for Yahweh does not mention His name; but at the same time He does more than this: He gives man the most solemn assurance of His presence. For him who understands this there is no more need to ask about His name. Taken in this way this word of God to Moses typifies as shortly and essentially as possible all that Israel believes and knows concerning God. This name Yahweh, thus taken to mean "He who is" without any further qualification of His Being, is therefore of fundamental importance. God can only be denoted as the Real One according to the functional character of His Being, not in His Being itself" (p. 236). In this statement the articulation between "presence" and "Being in itself" is spelled out explicitly. Other authors do not express it explicitly, yet their interpretations seem to work in the same general understanding that was expressed by Vriezen (Hans K. La Rondelle, Perfection and Perfectionism: A Dogmatic-Ethical Study of Biblical Perfection and Phenomenal Perfectionism [Berrien Springs, Michigan: Andrews University Press, 1975], pp. 43, 44, and n. 36).
Until the time of the Reformation the text was considered both to be ontological—that is, it expresses Being—and to agree with the classical Aristotelian interpretation of Being and its primordial presupposition. After the Reformation, and as a result of the investigations performed by OT exegesis, the subject matter of the text is no longer considered to be Being, but rather God’s action in relation to history. In a word, the text is seen as referring to God’s presence but no longer to God’s Being.

The Being-presence dichotomy at which Biblical exegesis has arrived in relation to the meaning of Exod 3:14, 15 can stand only on the basis of an uncritical acceptance of the traditional timeless interpretation of Being in the Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition. What the text presents cannot be Being because its meaning differs from what must be accepted as the only possible meaning for Being in itself, namely, timelessness. Thus, modern OT scholarship eludes the ontological discussion by denying that Exod 3:14 expresses and interprets Being in itself. Exegesis has shifted the focus of attention regarding Exod 3:14, 15 from the ontological realm to the relational realm of historical presence. In my opinion this is an uncritical surrender to inherited ontological presuppositions. I rather see the Biblical idea of "presence" as a pointer that requires a new analysis of ontology from the lines of intelligibility that stem from the text of the Bible itself.¹

¹Yet OT scholarship falls short of an ontological conclusion regarding the idea of "presence" because of a dogmatic acceptance of a timeless interpretation of Being which OT scholarship cannot find either in Exod 3:14, 15 or in the Bible as a whole. Thus OT
Phenomenological Analysis

The main purpose for developing here a phenomenological analysis of the text is to discover whether it thinks and speaks scholarship reaches the conclusion that the text names Being but does not think of or refer to Being.

The phenomenological method of exegesis that I have chosen to follow as a tool for developing the ontological analysis of Exod 3:14, 15 agrees with the results reached by many OT scholars who, along with Vriezen, think that in Exod 3:14, 15 the important thing is to discover what the passage meant theologically for the Israelites (pp. 194, 195). See also Jacob, pp. 48-50; Zimmerli, p. 19; Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., Toward an Old Testament Theology (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1978), pp. 106, 107; von Rad, pp. 179-87; and Robert Alan Cole, Exodus: An Introduction and Commentary (Downers Grove: Inter-Varsity Press, 1977), p. 22. Thus, philological speculations should be avoided since "philological theology is faulty theology" (Köhler, p. 40).

Besides, some OT exegetes consider that the historical critical method does not affect the theology of Exod 3:14, 15 since it "n'a abouti à aucun resultat essentiellement contraire aux donnees bibliques" (Barns, p. 347). See also Janzen, p. 230, and D. J. McCarthy, who suggests that the historical critical method should be put away in order that exegesis may work with the text as it is because "no matter what the possible origins of the text or parts of it may be, the emphasis on hyh is there" (p. 318).

One of the main points developed by the historical critical method regarding Exod 3:14, 15 stems from a comparative study of Gen 15:2, 7 and Exod 6:2-3. This comparative analysis is approached with the presupposed idea that the Bible is the product of a combination of pre-existent traditions which once arose from separated groups (Motyer, pp. 2-4). However, this presupposition has been properly analyzed and criticized by M. H. Segal (The Pentateuch: Its Composition and Its Authorship and Other Biblical Studies [Jerusalem: Hebrew University, 1967], pp. 4, 5). As the phenomenological approach aims to grasp what is being thought in the text, a basic knowledge of both the immediate and broader contexts appears to be necessary. It needs to be remembered that, due to the epistemological-constructive nature of this study, I be highly selective in the use of available exegetical materials. Consequently, I will discuss only those aspects of the text and of the exegetical analysis of it that are especially relevant to the ontological purpose of this study. For further information of broader exegetical issues related to the analysis of Exod 3:14, 15, see, for instance, A. M. Dubarle, "La révélation de Dieu à Moïse," La Vie Spirituelle 119 (1968):11-23; J. P. Hayatt, "Was Yahweh Originally a Creator Deity?" Journal of Biblical Literature 86 (1967):369-77; N. Lohtink, "Die priesterschriftliche
Being as its subject matter or not.\(^1\) The analysis addresses four main aspects: (1) the context (3-4:17); (2) Moses's question (vs. 13); (3) the 'ehyeh 'āsher 'ehyeh statement (vs. 14); and (4) the parallel structure that makes vss. 14, 15 a literary thematic unity.

The context

The main structure (3:1-4:17). From a thematic point of view this passage can be divided in the following way: (1) the theophany, from 3:1 to 3:9; (2) the divine-human dialogue, from 3:10-4:17, which in the final analysis is a continuation of the theophany.\(^2\) The transition between these two sections in the text is made in 3:10 where God's commission is uttered for the very first time.\(^3\) Verse 10, so to speak, reveals another dramatic ontological transformation in Moses\(^4\) as he becomes God's chosen mediator.\(^5\) This change in Moses

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\(^1\) This is necessary particularly due to the context of historical interpretations. The classical approach thought that Exod 3:14, 15 referred to Being itself. Recent OT scholarship thinks that it does not refer to God's Being but rather to His relationship and manifestation to historical beings.

\(^2\) Janzen, pp. 4, 5.

\(^3\) Childs, p. 77.

\(^4\) In relation to a previous change in Moses' personality, see Exod 1 and 2. From Exod 1, 2 it is possible to infer that a deep change had happened in the life and personality of Moses by the time of the burning-bush. From a young liberationist, as apparent from his early experience in Egypt (Exod 2:11-15), he was transformed, during his forty years in the wilderness of Midian (Acts 7:30), into a careful, reflective, and mature person who knew what responsibility is all about. On the other hand, Moses seems to be well aware of Israel's spiritual condition back in Egypt.

\(^5\) Jacob, p. 51. In this regard I cannot accept the suggestion...
himself, in my opinion, affects the meaning of the text as a whole.\(^1\)

The dialogue (3:10-4:17).\(^2\) Obviously the dynamic structure of divine-human dialogue of the text is at the very root of the meaning of that which is being thought and expressed in and through the text.\(^3\) The dialogical dynamics of the text may be differently interpreted.\(^4\) Nonetheless the meaning of the text can be reached only as such dialogical structure is carefully followed from the lines of Traditional Criticism according to which Moses's call was given by Israel. See D. J. McCarthy, p. 312.

\(^1\) Moses should be considered as the first shālīḥah ("messenger," "representative"). As a matter of fact, Moses is the one from whom the category of shālīḥah itself finds its Biblical type. See E. von Eicken and H. Lindner, "Apostle," New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology (1980), 1:127-29.

\(^2\) The context in which the theophany of Exod 3:2 appears is addressed in the second part of this chapter as I deal with the ontological significance of the passage. At that time the "theophany" proves to be of paramount importance.

\(^3\) I fully agree with Childs when he remarks that the subtle dialectic of the chapter "is missed by those who subsume the divine element within the category of the psychological" (pp. 72, 73).

\(^4\) For instance, Childs considers that there is no logical connection between Moses's questions and God's answers. "The progression of the dialogue is more visceral than rational. Each time in which the objection is fully met, a new one springs up, unconnected with the latter. No visible gain is ever made. The picture emerges of one person trying to reason with another who is throwing up arguments, but basically whose will, not mind, is resisting the call. Moses' initial objection points to his own inability. Soon, however, his objection can flatly contradict God and attribute the worst to the people. In the end he is trapped and his real doubt emerges" (Childs, p. 71). Nonetheless, Childs recognizes within the interplay of elements a skillful design working through. "In a real sense, each of the subsequent objections arises from the perspective of past experience (3:11, 13; 4:1, 10) and each of God's replies points him forward to the new reality of faith which has been promised (3:12, 14; 4:5, 11ff.)" (Childs, p. 72). It is not clear, however, what Childs means by "logical connection" and "skillful design." These two ideas expressed by Childs seem to be somehow contradictory.
of intelligibility that are brought into it as the dialogue advances through the harmonious participation of both involved and concerned parties. In short, the text under consideration is found

Due to lack of space it is not possible here to show the way in which the subtle dialectics of the text progresses as it keeps on bringing new elements of judgment and information, thus providing a foundation for further questions and answers. The way in which God answers Moses's question by providing more than what Moses requested is worth noticing. In His answers God does not limit Himself to what has been asked by Moses, but rather Moses's questions are God's opportunities for giving additional revelation regarding the mission He is placing upon Moses and the details Moses must know in order to accomplish the mission successfully (Childs, p. 71).

It should be also borne in mind that the very content of God's revelation in this passage (God's plan for Israel's liberation) stems from the dialogical dynamics where Moses's so-called objections (which can also be understood as Moses' contribution in the development of the expression of God's plan of salvation for Israel) are part of the revelation itself. Divine and human elements, working together in dialogue, produce the final expression of God's plan. In other words, God does not appear in Exod 3:14, 15 as bringing a pre-determined, final strategy. God rather works out His plan with Moses's active participation. What is Moses's contribution to God's plan? Obviously Moses does not provide either the foundation or the guidelines for the plan, but rather his deep and personal knowledge about the spiritual condition of Israel. God, of course, also knows the situation (Exod 3:7-9). Yet God allows His messenger to identify himself with the mission which is being considered for the first time.

The text shows God interested in the dialogue and in the plan. Is Moses also that interested? Or is Moses in fact trying to get rid of the mission? Some exegetes understand Moses's participation in the dialogue as revealing precisely a negative attitude (Childs, pp. 74, 75). I do not deny that this is a possible interpretation, yet the context also allows for a kinder view, according to which Moses, overwhelmed by the unexpected mission to which God is appointing him (with the humble character acquired through his previous experience in the wilderness), questions God, motivated by a deep sense of inadequacy. On the other hand, Moses's questioning also reveals a real desire to accomplish the mission and even, already, an actual involvement in the mission itself. In this regard, it should be noted, as Childs remarks, that the introductory hinneh in vs. 3:13 gives not a hypothetical meaning to Moses's statement and question ('im) but, on the contrary, gives the idea of Moses's accepting God's mission: "agreed, I come to the people . . ." (p. 66).
embedded in the context of a dialogical dynamics of intelligibility in which the mission of liberation and redemption of Israel is being presented and explained.

Moses's question

Within the dialogical structure of the text, the analysis of the question\(^1\) which evokes the answer in which the divine statement about the Name of God and its meaning is uttered appears, then,

\(\text{\textsuperscript{1}}\)The headline of this section may be somewhat misleading since in Exod 3 (vss. 11 and 13) Moses utters two questions. Obviously, I am concerned with the meaning of the second one. A word of clarification regarding the relationship that exists between both questions is, however, necessary. Are they two different questions or rather two aspects of the same one? Janzen seems to agree with the latter (pp. 234, 235). He, however, does not provide solid evidence for such an interpretation. What Janzen is actually trying to do is to ground the idea of "presence" in the text. In order to do that he wants to equate both 'ehyeh (vss. 12, 14), giving more strength to the hypothesis that sees the questions as being the same. I think this reasoning is faulty. The same answer does not necessarily entail the same question. On the other hand, the answers cannot be equated. In vs. 12 the 'ehyeh 'im construction differs from the 'ehyeh 'asher 'ehyeh construction found in vs. 14. As a matter of fact, the 'ehyeh 'im construction gives the verb haya a particular meaning which differs from the English "to be." 'Ehyeh 'im has the connotation of presence which is not included in the simple form of haya (Holladay, s.v. haya). Thus the 'ehyeh 'im construction should be understood as expressing a single concept in which "to be" takes over and includes the meaning of "presence" or "standing by." Consequently, I am of the opinion that the text presents two different answers for two different questions. Both questions and answers are dynamically connected within the dialectic structure of the passage. The answer to the first question leads naturally and logically to the formulation of the second.

In vs. 11 Moses questions about himself. He has been sent (vs. 10) to deliver the children of Israel. So far nothing more has been explained. In a glimpse Moses can grasp the situation as it is: the mission lies far beyond his capabilities. Hence, his first question is at the same time the sincere confession of his inability: "Who am I?" The entire passage shows that Moses was already feeling the weight of the task upon him. Moses's first question is also a subtle invitation for God to further reveal His plan for Israel's liberation.

God's first answer comes: "I will be with thee" (vs. 12).
to be of paramount relevance. Consequently, many studies have been
directed toward the analysis and determination of its meaning as pre-
cisely as possible. It is necessary, then, to ask for the meaning
of Moses's question. What was Moses asking for? One group of schol-
ars believes that Moses asked for the "meaning" of the name,\(^1\) while
another group thinks that Moses was asking God to identify Himself
by uttering His name.\(^2\) Such divergence has led scholars to a careful
and time-consuming analysis of the meaning of the interrogative pro-
noun used by Moses, namely, mā in connection and comparison with the
other available interrogative pronoun, namely, mī.

\[\text{The interrogative pronouns "mā" and "mī." The difference of meaning between these two interrogative pronouns as related to the idea of name has been pointed out notably by Martin Buber, who basically sees mā (what) as asking for what finds expression or} \]

This clarifies a little further Moses's new nature (being) as shālīfāh
"It appears that Moses's question is answered by way of God's implicit redefinition of who Moses is" (Jantzen, p. 234). Moses's nature as messenger is not to be defined from the viewpoint of the one who is sent in isolation but rather in relationship to the presence of the sender (God).

God goes on and gives Moses a token of His presence. Childs
has suggested that here zeh (this) connects this token way back to
the theophany of the burning bush (vs. 2) and way ahead into the
expected future when the liberation will be accomplished (p. 74).
God's presence as experienced when the dialogue took place is not
only promised to continue in the future, but God is also involving
Himself with His messenger (in terms of His presence) in the mission
of liberation. He has already synthetically described (vss. 7, 8).
At this point in the dialogue, Moses's second question is uttered.

\(^1\)Segal, p. 5. "Moses asks for a description of God's nature and character" (Schlief, p. 297). According to Lacocque, Moses asked for "quid Deus cum hominibus" (p. 95). See also Motyer, p. 20.

\(^2\)Motre, p. 7; Vriezen, p. 235; Davis, p. 71.
lies concealed behind the name (essence), while m̀î (who) is seen as asking for a person's name.¹

Yet, the actual meaning of both interrogative pronouns is not as clear as Buber suggests, for it depends mostly on the context in which the question is asked and on its antecedent.² Thus, in order to understand the subject matter of Moses's question it is not possible to rely on a pre-established abstract meaning of the interrogative pronoun. The entire passage has to be examined in order that its intentionalities, as a whole, may be grasped.³

"If you wish to ask a person's name in Biblical Hebrew, however, you never say, as is done here, 'What (m̀abh) is his name?' or, 'What is your name?', but 'Who (m̀i) are you?', 'Who is he?', 'Who (m̀i) is your name?' 'Tell me your name.' Where the word 'what' is associated with the word 'name', the question asked is what finds expression in or lies concealed behind that name" (Buber, p. 48). Motyer accepts Buber's thesis and provides Biblical examples for it (pp. 17, 19). See also Walter C. Kaiser, "m̀a," Theological Wordbook of the Old Testament (1980), 1:490.

²Because of lack of time and space I have been unable to do a complete study on the subject comparing each single Biblical occurrence of the m̀a and m̀i interrogative pronouns in their immediate contexts. Yet, from a partial checking on the cases mentioned by Motyer, I am inclined to agree with Butterworth when he affirms that this distinction cannot be established from the Hebrew usage only (pp. 48, 49), and that it is safer to conclude that its meaning is "what is it," with several possible shades of meaning (ibid.). For instance, Motyer affirms that m̀i "expects an answer instancing individuals or, as in the case of rhetorical questions, calling attention to some external feature if not the mere name, then, for example the person's ancestry" (p. 19). However, m̀i sometimes seems to ask for more than mere superficial information [Exod 3:11; 2 Sam 7:18; 1 Sam 18:18; Deut 5:26]. On the other hand, m̀a sometimes seems to be used to ask for simple information (Exod 4:2).

³Yet Buber's suggestions can be taken in the context that points to Being as an additional evidence which may reinforce the ontological relevance of the text. In my opinion, however, the meaning and ontological relevance of this passage cannot be decided only on the basis of the meaning of the interrogative pronoun m̀a.
The idea of "name." Moses asks for God's name. In Moses's time there was a close connection between the meaning of the true name and the being of a person.\(^1\) In my opinion this connection is present in the text as part of its context for intelligibility.\(^2\) Yet the name is only part of the general context to be considered. To answer the question about the meaning of Moses's question, it is necessary to return to the text and its context.

Setting Moses's question in missionary context. Moses, the messenger, ponders the practical aspects of God's mission (v. 13)\(^3\) within the missionary context in which the dialogue develops. Moses foresees that the people are bound to be doubtful about the mission.

\(^1\) "The 'true' name of a person, like that of any other object, is far more than a mere denotative designation for men who think in categories of magic; it is the essence of the person, distilled from his real being, so that he is present in it once again" (Buber, p. 51). Von Rad expressed the particular way in which the idea of name was understood in Ancient Near Eastern cultures in the following statement: "Name was not just 'noise and smoke': instead, there was a close and essential relationship between it and its subject. The subject is in the name, and on that account the name carries with it a statement about the nature of its subject or at least about the power appertaining to it" (pp. 181, 182). Of course, the relation name-subject itself may assume different ways and meanings in Scriptures, but that which is important for our investigation is the fact that the name was directly related to the essence or nature of the named person.

\(^2\) This fits the deeper sense that the interrogative pronoun mà seems to suggest. It also fits God's answer (vs. 14).

\(^3\) After receiving God's assurance regarding the enterprise of liberation as being His and not Moses's responsibility, Moses proceeds to describe the situation that is likely to be expected upon his arrival at Egypt and his presentation of God's mission as so far explained in the text. In Moses's understanding, the people—perhaps Moses too?—would consider the information so far received as insufficient.
in both its divine and human aspects. In vs. 13 Moses expresses his belief that doubt is to be expected regarding the divine partner in the dialogue.¹ As Moses expresses the people's doubt, the text turns from being dialogical into being "trialogical."²

In general terms it seems that Moses's evaluation of the reaction to be expected from the perspective of the third party in the trialogue was accurate enough since God neither denies nor corrects it; on the contrary, He rather proceeds to face it. God's answer reveals that Moses's question was relevant and that it addressed a very important aspect of the nature of the mission which still stood in need of further clarification.

Israel and Moses's question. From what has been discussed so far, it is possible to conclude, agreeing with Childs, that the verification of Moses's commission before the people is linked to the revelation of the divine name.³ Since the text now runs in a trialogical structure of meaning, it is possible to focus the

¹Moses expresses his doubts regarding the human partner in Exod 3:11, and later, in a positive statement in Exod 4:1.

²As Moses expresses his second question as representative of the third party in the dialogue—that is, the people—who are the recipient of the mission, our text turns from a dialogical to a trialogical structure in which three coordinated levels are connected with each other, namely, the sender (God), the one who is sent, the messenger (Moses), and those to whom the entire movement of sending is addressed (the people, Israel). Consequently, it is very difficult to say that the question was only Moses's and not the people's and vice versa. "This passage is often treated as if Moses is seeking information for himself, but in fact he is visualizing the Israelite in Egypt as seeking that information from him" (Motyer, pp. 20, 21); cf. Childs, p. 66.

³Ibid.
significance of the question and the related verification\(^1\) of Moses's mission from the viewpoint of each party, namely, God, Moses, and the people. Yet, scholarship in general, following the emphasis which flows from the text itself, approaches the issue from the people's perspective.

The question that naturally arises regarding the idea of verification is: In what sense may the people of Israel have seen as necessary "Moses's knowledge of God's name for the verification (partially at least)\(^2\) of his divinely appointed mission? Due to Israel's previous knowledge of the name\(^3\) as utterance (sound-name)

\(^1\)The idea that the "verification" should take place through the simple uttering of God's name can be true only if the people's previous knowledge of it is assumed. If the people did not know God's name already, the "verification" could happen only as a revelation of the nature of Moses's sender. The latter would fit the mà pronoun as asking for the meaning of the name and not only for its simple utterance as a sound (Motyer, pp. 20, 21). It would also fit the actual answer that is found in vss. 14 and 15. See also Butterworth, pp. 47, 48. Yet, if the first possibility happens to be the intended one, the second possibility of the meaning of verification is still possible, but not vice versa.

\(^2\)I have already suggested that the doubt-verification level of Moses's inquiry on behalf of the people has two stages, one related to God, the other related to His messenger (Exod 4:1). Hence, it is apparent that the "verification" that would have been provided through the revelation of God's name was not going to be enough either for the people or for Moses. The uttering of the name was rather the beginning of a process of verification which was to continue throughout history on the ground provided by the sound-name itself as utterance and its particular meaning.

\(^3\)The actual knowledge of God's name by the Israelites in the time before the Exodus has been challenged by historical criticism in relation to the Documentary Hypothesis, mainly on the ground of the interpretation of Exod 6:2, 3. According to the historical critical method several previous mentions of God's name in Genesis are anachronisms (Greenberg, p. 132). This interpretation, however, has been shown to be faulty (Segal, pp. 2-8). Hence, mention of the name "Yahweh" in pre-Mosaic times, for instance in Genesis 15:7, has
which could be identified in the midst of a situation of religious conflict, and to the particular dynamic of intelligibility in

1The idea of spiritual conflict arises from the actual context of the polytheism and spiritual darkness in which the people were living at that moment (B. W. Anderson, p. 408; Paul F. Bork, The World of Moses [Nashville: Southern Publishing Association, 1978], p. 22). I consider that Josh 24:14, 15 provides Biblical evidence of this situation. Gottfried Quell suggests that Josh 24:14 and 15 implies the polytheistic nature of the "God of the Fathers" ("The Old Testament Name of God," TDNT [1965], 3:1073). In my opinion, however, the context in Josh 24 does not support Quell's conclusion because "God of the Fathers" in this context need not be identified with God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob. The context rather points back to Egypt (vs. 14) and, because the gods referred to are identified as heathen gods (vs. 15), the text seems to refer not to the polytheistic nature of the "God of the Fathers" as standing for "God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob," but rather to the pagan gods of Egyptian origin which the people of Israel were worshipping instead of Yahweh.

It is not possible to determine to what extent this situation affected the people as a whole and their awareness regarding the already-revealed utterance of God's name. I do not think that from this situation of religious darkness it is possible to infer that Israel as a whole was worshipping heathen gods, forgetting, thus even the utterance of God's name. In my opinion it is more likely that there was a situation of spiritual conflict among the people as some worshipped Yahweh while others worshipped heathen gods. A situation of spiritual conflict like this implies that both parties were aware of the name of the involved deities, among them Yahweh. Another aspect to be considered in this respect is the singular form 'ābīka used in Exod 3:6.

Nonetheless, it is also possible to assume that some of the "Egyptian" concepts about the nature and function of the names of gods may have influenced Israel's own idea of the significance and importance of the name of their God (Buber, p. 51; Bork, p. 19). Yet, from this it is not possible to conclude that the motivation of Moses's question has to be interpreted only in the context of the Egyptian usage of names, forgetting the whole context of intelligibility in which Exod 3:14, 15 appears.
which the question (vs. 13) is grafted and which it triggers,\(^1\) it can be seen that the question required at least the utterance of the name which has not yet been mentioned.\(^2\)

As a matter of fact, in a context of spiritual conflict like this, the claim of being sent by a God\(^3\) who has not expressed His name makes no sense at all, since even those who worshipped pagan gods related to them by name. Moses would find himself presenting a testimony that would not bear the minimal required evidence to be considered as true by the people.\(^4\) Thus, it can be seen that the

\(^1\)Regarding the dynamic progress of meaning in the passage under consideration, it should be remembered that so far God has not identified Himself by name, rather He has introduced Himself in relation to His past historical interventions in covenant history. His proper name has been carefully omitted from the dialogue. It seems as if, after all, God is making room for Moses's question.

\(^2\)Since ancient times the name of the divinity played an important role both in worship (Gen 4:26) and in God's self-revelation (Gen 12, 15, 17). Hence, whatever the "sense" in which Israel may have considered the name of God and its place in the "verification" of Moses's mission, it is obvious that (in this context at least) the simple uttering of the name so far not-mentioned is required. Yet, this does not hinder God from going beyond the minimum necessarium providing further ground and information regarding Moses's mission as the utterance of the name presents also the opportunity for the revelation of its meaning.

\(^3\)The information Moses already has is enough for him to make a positive identification of the God who has appeared to him. Otherwise, he would not have accepted the mission so readily. If the suspicion that he was before a false God had arisen in his mind, Moses would not have even discussed further his mission. Yet Moses feels, correctly, that in the very special kind of relationship that his new nature as šālīḥah involves (vs. 12), a mere inference will not be enough either for him or for the people. This is apparent when the question is analyzed from Moses's viewpoint.

\(^4\)"In the ancient world, where man's life was surrounded by many divine powers, it was important to know what kind of god men were dealing with. For unless the god's name were known, it was impossible to enter into relationship with him and invoke him in
"verification" and the "grounding" of Moses' mission before the people coincide and require at least the utterance of the already-known name of God (YHWH). At the same time this minimum requirement provides room for God's own initiative of furnishing further revelation about Himself.

The Meaning. From what has been presented so far, it is not possible to define in clear terms the precise and exact meaning of the question from Moses's viewpoint. The approach that reaches the closest to the actual meaning of what is being thought and expressed in the question is that which accepts an inclusive flexibility that does not attempt to define beforehand what has to be the meaning of God's answer. In any case, the answer given to a question reveals what has been understood by the one who was originally addressed with the question, in this passage, God. Thus, whatever the "precise meaning" of Moses's question may be, it should not be sought in isolation from God's answer; rather, it should be found in a worship" (B. W. Anderson, p. 408). The uttering of the name seems to be necessary in this context of spiritual conflict.

In my opinion it is not possible to determine Moses's actual understanding and motivation when he expressed his question. I think that such determination is not indispensable for discovering the ontological meaning of the text since the question has meaning in a trialogic context. That is to say, the framework for intelligibility in which the question is expressed seems to emphasize more both the people's reaction demanding divine credentials and God's actual answer, than the precise determination of Moses's personal motivation and understanding as he uttered the question.

I doubt that a "precise" exclusive meaning could be reached at all.
dynamic dialectical tension with God's answer.

Is the question really asking for a revelation of the meaning of the name, namely, about God's nature? I see no objection for this connotation to be included in what is being asked for. As a matter of fact, a revelation of God's nature fits well in the context so far described. The other possibility, namely, that the question should include only the uttering of the name, is also possible. Hence I agree with Childs as he remarks that the context points toward both possibilities included in the question.\(^1\) The fact, however, is that in vs. 14, God, answering Moses's question in order to provide a sure foundation and "verification" before the people of Moses's mission, both utters His name and attaches to it the revelation of its new, unexpected ontological meaning\(^2\) regarding the nature of the sender.

God's answer

Exod 3:14, 15, especially the first words, has attracted the attention and speculation of theologians throughout the centuries. That this situation is understandable is due to the fact that this is the only passage "in which an attempt is made to cast some light on the meaning of the name 'Yahweh'"\(^3\) which is widely used in the

\(^1\)Childs, p. 75. As I have already suggested, the very idea of name conveys the idea of "nature," as asked for.

\(^2\)Freedman, p. 151; D. J. McCarthy, p. 317. Yahweh is the "sound-name" uttered for the first time in the text. The name has appeared before in chap. 3 (vss. 4, 7) but not as uttered by God. The name Yahweh is used in the narrative itself along with "Angel of the Lord" (vs. 2) and 'êlôhîm (vss. 11, 13, 15) to refer to God.

\(^3\)Zimmerli, p. 152.
Quell tells us that exegetes find this name to be a "puzzling word designed to explain." Even though this word has been understood through the centuries to have an ontological meaning or to be related to ontology, by itself it does not require an ontological

According to Quell, it is used 5,321 times in the OT (p. 1067).

It is not necessary to review again the history of theological interpretation on Exod 3:14. See above pp. 298-320. Let it be remembered, however, that as a whole, historical interpretations have been developed by considering the expression of the name itself in isolation from its context. So much emphasis has been placed lately on the philology of the name and on the proper translation of the 'ehyeh 'asher 'ehyeh statement that the real dynamic of intelligibility of the text as a whole has been neglected. Regarding the overemphasized philological studies, see, for instance, the Kenite and Egyptian theories (Quell, p. 1066); the Assyrian hypothesis (T. Rees, "God," The International Standard Bible Encyclopaedia, (1939), 2:1254; and the "Titany" theory (Freedman, p. 152); cf. D. J. McCarthy, pp. 313-15. The philological approach has led to the conclusion that "the original meaning and derivation of the word are unknown. The variety of modern theories shows that, etymologically, several derivations are possible but that the meanings attached to any one of them have to be imported and imposed upon the word. They add nothing to our knowledge" (Rees, p. 1254; Kühler, p. 40; Barns, pp. 342-43; Quell, pp. 1067, 1069).

Other theories, besides the classical Thomistic one, try to qualify the idea of Being present in the text from the assumption of the traditional Thomistic interpretation as context for intelligibility of what the text actually says. I part company with the "hiphil" theory because I see no real basis for reducing the meaning of the entire passage to the probable meaning suggested by the hypothetical philological speculation that claims a hiphil sense for the word "Yahweh." I part company with the "future" theory because there is not sufficient evidence that the context requires a future temporal meaning. D. J. McCarthy suggests that if this statement is considered as future, it would be an absolute use of the future tense (with no predicate) usage which implies that the speaker is not extant (pp. 315, 316). On the contrary, on the basis of the context--God's activity in the past (vs. 6) and in the future (vs. 10, 12)--I think that a present tense which refers to the God who draws near His people to bring them assurance in the present time of trouble fits the text as a whole better. Otherwise God would be a "distant" God, a God who lives either in the past or in the future.
meaning; neither does it deny it.

In order to be able to see what is thought in Exod 3:14, 15, it is necessary to bear in mind four basic points: (1) that the statement 'ehyeh 'asher 'ehyeh is not actually the name of God but the explanation of its meaning;\(^2\) (2) that the context leans in favor of a present tense for 'ehyeh;\(^3\) (3) that the meaning of the name involves a double dimension, namely, that word as sound or sign ("sound-name")—as, for instance, Baal means "possessor" or Adon means "Lord," "master,"--\(^4\) and the actual significance that the

but who does not live in the present with His people. Furthermore, I do not agree with the "future" theory because it basically reduces the meaning of Exod 3:14, 15 to the meaning of Exod 3:12 (the progression of the text goes unnoticed, God is just repeating Himself). For similar reasons I also part company with the "presence" theory. Nonetheless, the "presence" theory is, in my opinion, the one which harmonizes the most with the Biblical context as a whole. Yet, it still tries to "define" or "qualify" the meaning of God's name (Being), assuming Greek ontological categories which are brought into the text as framework for the interpretation of the very idea of "presence" as not referring to Being itself. Such an interpretation is warranted neither by the text nor by its context.

\(^1\)As a matter of fact, the meaning-of-the-name level toward which the question is open may receive an ontological answer or any other answer as the one who utters it may wish.

\(^2\)Schild, p. 296. The name is uttered by God for the first time in this passage in vs. 15.

\(^3\)See p. 316, n. 3 above.

\(^4\)Köhler, p. 41. Let us recall, for instance, the case of Abram whose name was changed by God to "Abraham" which means "Father of nations" (Gen 17:5). Obviously the sound "Abraham" had the already-mentioned meaning of "Father of nations" attached to its sound. However, it is also clear that the actual meaning of the "Father of nations" idea receives further and wider connotations as it relates to the reality it refers to, that is, in connection with what had already happened, was happening, and was going to happen in the future to Abraham's descendants. Indeed, the real meaning of "Father of nations" was greatly enriched at the cross and will
meaning of the "sound-name" has from reality itself—as, for instance, the signification of "possessor," "lord," or "master," depends on the actual realities of which they are signs; and (4) that God's explanation of His "sound-name" is expressed with the Hebrew verb for "to be" (hāyā). ¹

With these considerations in mind it is now possible to see that Exod 3:14, 15 reveals not only the name (which actually appears in vs. 15) but also its meaning (as "sound-name") as "Being." The emphatic Hebrew construction can be neither missed nor ignored. No matter what tense may be chosen for its translation, one thing is clear: 'ehyeh 'āsher 'ehyeh spells out Being. ² Yet, it is also clear that no qualification or definition whatsoever is made in such a way. The construction in Exod 3:14 does not make up an explanation of the Hebrew verb—merely a declarative statement of what the verb means. This is similar to the construction in which God tells Moses, "I am the Lord." (Exod 3:14). Thus, the "sound-name" is Being, not non-Being. The name 'ehyeh 'āsher 'ehyeh is God's explanation of His "sound-name." This is a clear indication of God's choice of words for His name. The Canaanite-Phoenician way of thinking about the Being of God from the viewpoint of natural forces (Vriezen, pp. 181, 182) does not apply to the Hebrew construction in Exod 3:14. The verb 'ehyeh is not used as a copula (D. J. McCarthy, p. 316; and Vriezen, p. 235). The verb appears in qal imperfect, first person singular, in an idem per idem construction in which "the second verb serves as predicate, and this, as a cognate accusative, emphasizes the verbal action" (Freedman, p. 153). The 'āsher particle functions as a relative pronoun connecting the first and second 'ehyeh (Shield, pp. 297-301).

¹This is obviously not used as copula (D. J. McCarthy, p. 316; and Vriezen, p. 235). The verb appears in qal imperfect, first person singular, in an idem per idem construction in which "the second verb serves as predicate, and this, as a cognate accusative, emphasizes the verbal action" (Freedman, p. 153). The 'āsher particle functions as a relative pronoun connecting the first and second 'ehyeh (Shield, pp. 297-301).

²See, for instance, D. J. McCarthy, pp. 316, 317, and Vick, p. 34. God chooses Being rather than non-Being for his name (Langdon...
a statement regarding the meaning in which the divine Being should be understood. The text opens a dimension, namely, the ontological dimension,\(^1\) which is linked as it appears with the very same reality of God.\(^2\) The God-Being connection is established in the uttering of the name.\(^3\) There is, then, an explicit Biblical basis for interpreting God ontologically.

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\(^2\)God is drawing near to His people who may be prone to regard God as not existent or in analogy to material things, as pagan nations did. God presents Himself, then, as Being, as Reality. Yet he does not present "qualifications" regarding how such reality, such Being, should be interpreted. The parallelism between vs. 12 and vss. 14, 15 shows that God will be known through His own presence and revelation.

The ontological dimension appears as soon as Being is expressed in words, that is, as it becomes "logos." "The primary occurrence which makes theology metaphysical, which makes it a logic of the theos, is the way of responding to revelation. As soon as this encounter with God becomes objectified by its being verbalized in accordance with the rules of logic (categorical proposition) theology becomes metaphysics" (Perotti, p. 64). Yet, theos may be considered to "appear" in two different interpretations of reality as a whole, namely, timelessness and temporality. Perotti, commenting on Heidegger, speaks in the context of timeless logic and metaphysics. On the other hand, as is shown in the second part of this chapter, Exod 3:14, 15 expresses logos and Being (onto-logia) in a temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure.

\(^2\)According to Perotti, Heidegger suggests that the naming happens in Being. "Naming is, first of all, a bringing into language, that is to say, one names a being in Being" (p. 99). In Exod 3:14, 15 Being itself comes into the open, is named. Naming "is a saying (Sagen), and saying is a showing (Zeigen), bringing forth into the openness of Being" (Perotti, pp. 99, 100). Thus Exod 3:14, 15, in naming Being, deals with the ground of Being as it brings Being into openness. Being is named, and thus its dimensionality as ground of Being co-appears along with God (theos), providing the basis for the coherence and unity that reason's structure requires.

\(^3\)The Being-theos connection has been made, thus grounding the ontological nature of theological reflection. The ontological
It is necessary now to see, through the parallelism in which Exod 3:14, 15 is constructed, how the revealed meaning of the "sound-name" YHWH becomes a "center of light" which points beyond itself to the way and dimension in which God's Being and, consequently, Being's dimensionality, is understood in Biblical rationality.

An open ontological structure

The parallelism in which vss. 14, 15 are constructed "has long been observed."¹ "Verse 14a appears as a parallel to v. 15, with 15b providing a literary bridge to v. 13."² Consequently, this text is considered to be a "very complex unit both in substance and

reflection must be connected to the analysis of the doctrine of God. God is the supreme Being. Yet, since this ontological connection between God and Being is made at the level of God's "sound-name," its ontological relevance and significance is only indicative. In other words, the meaning of the Being expressed in the text is not revealed by it. The text rather points to its meaning as to be found outside of it. In this respect Thomas Aquinas and the whole of theological tradition were right: the ontological meaning of the text is to be found beyond the text in philosophy. Yet, Aquinas and the tradition as a whole have always chosen an extra-Biblical philosophy to provide the meaning, the ontological meaning of the text. At this point it is necessary not to leave the text but to keep asking it and its context for further ontological "clues" regarding the way in which the interpretation of such foundational dimension is expected to be carried on. It is for that reason that it is necessary not to pass from the analysis of the meaning of the "sound-name" to the investigation of the essential meaning that flows from the reality pointed out by the text, namely, Being.


¹Childs, p. 69.
²Ibid., p. 70.
style."¹ Because of the triple introduction some scholars consider
the text as being "overloaded."² In its threefold construction Noth
sees literary grounds for explaining the parallelism away by suggest­
ing the presence of secondary materials in vs. 14. The real answer
would be provided by vs. 15.³ This interpretation is developed, how­
ever, prior to and in independence of the ontological implications
expressed through this parallel construction.

It is necessary, then, to analyze this particular parallelism
in order to discover its ontological relevance and significance.
Before analyzing it, it is necessary, however, to visualize the
parallelism itself.

The Parallelism

\[
\begin{align*}
\text{a1)} \text{ and b1)} & \text{ said c1)} \text{ Elohim d1)} \text{ to Moses e1)} \quad \text{f1)} \text{ I AM WHO I AM g1)} \\
\text{a2)} \text{ and b2)} & \text{ said c2)} \text{ He d2)} \text{ you e2)} \text{ say this to f2)} \text{ I AM g2)} \text{ has sent me} \\
\text{a3)} \text{ and b3)} & \text{ said c3)} \text{ Elohim d3)} \text{ to Moses e3)} \text{ also say this to f3)} \text{ YAHWEH the g3)} \text{ has sent me} \\
\text{also} & \text{ to the people of Israel} \\
\text{also} & \text{ God of your Fathers, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob} \\
\text{THIS is MY NAME forever and THIS is my memorial throughout all generations.}
\end{align*}
\]

¹Von Rad, p. 180.
²D. J. McCarthy, p. 316.
³Noth, pp. 43, 44. Consequently the relation between 'ehyeh
and YHWH is understood only on the basis of phonetic grounds.
Ontological significance. The three statements that constitute the parallelism are constructed following the same pattern in which the subject is the same, namely, God (ʾêlôhîm) (c1, c2, c3); the principal verb is the same, namely to say (ʾāmar) (b1, b2, b3), and the indirect object is the same, namely Moses (d1, d2, d3). The connection between these three statements is made by the simple usage of a consecutive waw (a1, a2, a3), with the only addition in b3 of the adverb ʾêd.

The progression of meaning within the parallelism, which distinguishes it from a simple tautology or senseless repetition, is to be found in the direct object (f1, f2, f3). The simple statement in f1 is developed and integrated into a phrase of its own in the second (e2, f2, g2), and third (e3, f3, g3) parallel sentences. What is added is the explicit connection of the meaning of God's name with Moses's mission (e2, g2, g3). The addition of the explicit command in which the mission is expressed is also rendered in a parallel structure.

What is developed at length within this parallel construction, namely, that which does not appear in the same way any of the three times, is the declaration regarding the name of God (f1, f2, f3). As the mission has been already presented (vss. 10, 12), the only real progression of meaning in this parallelism is centered in the way the meaning of the name of God is presented. If there were no progression regarding the name of God, this would surely be a senseless repetitive passage. The text, however, not only is to be seen progressing as it grounds Moses's mission, but it should be
understood also as a literary device to identify or connect the revealed meaning (f1) with the mission (f2, g2), with the already known "sound-name" YHWH (f3), and with the already-mentioned description of the God of the Fathers (f3).

The sentence is so carefully constructed there is no room for confusion regarding this important matter: YHWH is identical with the God of the ancestors, the covenant God.\(^1\) Also, Being and mission are so essentially linked that there is, so to speak, a missionary dimension of Being and an ontological dimension of mission. Being is the very foundation of Moses's mission (f2, g2). Moreover, Being, which is uttered and identified with the God of the Fathers,\(^2\) is the very meaning of the name Moses was wondering about.\(^3\) The Being-mission-Yahweh idea is, therefore, stated clearly through this parallel construction. Furthermore, it is necessary to notice that this idea opens itself up (within the parallelism itself), beyond the realm properly embraced by the parallelism, in two main ways. First, the already-mentioned identification between YHWH and the God of the Fathers connects the Being-mission-Yahweh idea with Exod 3:6, 13, 16\(^4\)--with God's past activity, with a God who has already been, as it were, "in mission" in the past; a God who entered into a covenant relationship with the fathers, and a God who

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\(^1\) Von Rad, p. 180.

\(^2\) Ibid.

\(^3\) The second "I am" is the bridge between "I am who I am" and YHWH (Greenberg, p. 83).

\(^4\) D. J. McCarthy, p. 316.
is faithful to His covenant in the present difficult situation (Exod 3:7-9).  

Second, the Being-mission-Yahweh idea-reality opens itself up through the demonstrative pronoun zeh (this) which connects explicitly the dynamic progression of f1, f2, and f3 with the conclusion to the action expressed by the main verb 'āmar (b1, b2, b3). 'Elōhîm rather culminates the progression of thought in which He has expressed and grounded together mission, His name, the newly-revealed ontological meaning of His "sound-name," and His past redemptive-missionary activities by opening all this up through the clear final statement: "This is my name forever and this is my memorial through all generations" (Exod 3:15c).

It is interesting to note that in His conclusion God does not refer to a "definition" of the meaning of His name even though the meaning of His name is the basis for His answer to Moses's question. Through the meaning of the "sound-name" as a pointer beyond itself to the reality to which it is open, the name introduces the interpretation and understanding of both God and His Being. The name is a memorial. The Hebrew word for "memorial" is a noun constructed on the verbal stem zkr, "remember," "think (about)," "declare," "proclaim," which over against šēm, "name" (which refers to the name that has been spoken) denotes the act of utterance.  

1 I cannot agree with the interpretation that sees in the text the expression of a magical formula. See Martin Rist, "The God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob: A Liturgical and Magical Formula," Journal of Biblical Literature (1938):289-303. To see in the text a magical formula does not follow either from the text or its context. The "magical formula" idea is artificially imposed upon the text.

2 Childs, p. 80.
then, an act of remembrance, and remembrance entails temporal extension. The "through all generations" (יְדֵי-דָּוִדְדָּוִד) idea opens up the meaning of the passage to the future, connecting it with every possible future utterance of the name of God and, more particularly, with every future self-revelation of YHWH Himself. Hence, the additional meanings that future revelations may bring regarding God are to be understood on the background for intelligibility that is provided by the ontological light that shines from Exod 3:14, 15 toward both past and future.¹

It must be also noted that through the parallelism of this central text, the Being-mission-name idea-reality is placed in temporal historical extension which embraces the three temporal ec-stasies, namely past, present, and future.² In this context, the God, Being, and mission ideas stand together in unbreakable inner

¹See Childs, p. 335. On Exod 33:19, see, for instance, Zimmerli, p. 20. In the Exod 3-4 passage it is possible to find an example of this distension-tension idea in 4:11 where the revelation of God's name, 'ănōki YHWH, appears connected with the idea of creator. Thus, the idea of "creator" properly adds a new connotation of meaning to the meaning of the "sound-name," that is to say, to the idea of Being. In short, the text makes a real connection with reality as it is given, and so Being is not reduced to the idea of Creator (as it happens, for instance, in the "hiphil" theory). On the contrary, Being receives further meaning as it includes within its own connotation a new shadow of the meaning of Being, namely, creator.

²The opening into the past is achieved through the "God of the fathers" idea. The opening into the present comes through the "I AM WHO I AM" expression which draws God's presence near to the reality of His oppressed people. And the opening to the future is clearly through the "memorial for all generations" idea. "Extension" points to the fact that Being as it is grounded in a temporal dimensionality cannot be frozen and reduced to a static reality or concept. Thus "extension" points to Being's manifold "ontic appearances" which constitute the ontological basis for the cognitive
relationship. The meaning of the divine name (as "sound-name") is clearly given in the text itself along with the name. The text provides the meaning of God's "sound-name," but it also points to its essential meaning and interpretation as an additional and permanent task for which basic directions are given in the text itself through its temporal openness.

From what has been said above, it should not be concluded that the idea of Being, as presented in Exod 3:14, 15 was "empty" of meaning for both Moses and the people. To assume that would amount to suggesting that the text clarifies an unknown X by means of another unknown X. The idea of Being had a basic elemental meaning already for Moses and the people of his time. That meaning was concentrated in the reality of God's presence; otherwise it would not have been revelation at all. Hence, Being is to be understood from the seminal dimension of "presence." Yet the meaning of "Presence" is immediately filled up through the lines of intentionality that come to it from its past and future extensions. These ontological extensions are the basis for the epistemological tensions of meaning in which the ideas of Being, God, and mission are

activity. In order to grasp the meaning of its "extended" subject-matter reason must gather in "tension" the lines of intelligibility that flow from the "extension" in which its object is found.

That is why I consider the "presence" theory to be closer to the Biblical meaning. Furthermore, it can be seen that revelation and Being "co-appear" in presence. Revelation points to the ontic appearance as source (origin) of theological knowledge. Foundational ontology considers the ontic appearance as Being. Neither Being nor logos, however, may stand in isolation from each other. Being and *logos* (revelation) belong together. Yet, the dimensionality in which both co-appear seems to be interpreted in a non-traditional way.
Biblically constituted and understood.¹

Summary and Partial Conclusion

From the brief phenomenological analysis of the text that has been so far developed, it is possible to conclude that Exod 3:14, 15 speaks and thinks Being, providing, therefore, the ground for a Biblical ontology² and a Biblical analysis of the interpretation that the primordial presupposition of reason's structure has assumed in Biblical rationality. The text not only expresses and thinks Being as it utters the name of God along with its meaning as "sound-name," but it also shows that the "essential" or ontological meaning of it cannot be "defined" from inside the text. Yet, it is not to be "defined" or interpreted from an extra-Biblical philosophical reflection either. The ground for a Biblical interpretation of both God and Being is centered along the lines of meaning and intentionality that flow from the reality of God's ontic presence which appears in

¹This is why I part company with the "presence" theory. Moreover, it is clear that the Biblical idea of "presence" does not accept any external category to be used as background for intelligibility from which its meaning should be interpreted. On the contrary, the Biblical idea of "presence" as ontic reality stands by itself in its own context. Furthermore, it is the light in which the very categories to be used in the understanding of God, Being, and mission are to be constituted.

²I agree, then, with James Barr when he suggests that it is not possible to say that Greek static thought on Being is not present in the Bible on the basis of semantic considerations taken from isolated features of the Hebrew language. If the Hebrews did not have an idea regarding static Being, it was not because they did not have linguistic means to express it (The Semantics of Biblical Language [Glasgow: Oxford University Press, 1961], pp. 58-72). This contradicts interpretations such as Rees's, who sees that the idea of God as absolute (meaning "self-existence") "would be a metaphysical abstraction, not only impossible to the time at which the name
the distension-tension of the three temporal ec-stasies, namely, past, present, and future. Consequently, according to Biblical thinking ontology cannot precede the study of God (doctrine of God). There cannot be a reflection on Being prior to its "ontic" appearance or presence. On the contrary, God's "ontic presence" is the ground for the reflection on it—onto-logia. Thus, the structure of Biblical reason does not follow the traditional onto-theological order but rather functions in a particular theo-onto-logical order. This order expresses the independence of Biblical ontology and rationality from any extra-Biblical reflection, theory, or interpretation.

originated, but alien to the Hebrew mind at any time" (Rees, p. 1254).

The problem with these two kinds of interpretations of Biblical ontology is that they are not sensitive to what is being thought and expressed in the text ontologically, due to dogmatic acceptance of the Greek timeless interpretation of Being and reason.

1If this expression of independence is followed to its final consequences in the discovery of the Biblical interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks, the sola Scriptura principle could be applied and implemented in toto. So far, the sola Scriptura principle has been applied only partially because it uses reason as a tool in its classical or scientific interpretation, thus always introducing extra-Biblical categories in the constitution of exegetical or dogmatic meanings.

2There are not many approaches that address themselves to the analysis of Biblical philosophy; among those who do, see notably A. J. Heschel's and Claude Tresmontant's. Yet they follow the classical approach according to which Being is thought of and interpreted in extra-Biblical timeless categories. According to M. Friedman, Heschel holds that "God does not reveal Himself, nor does the prophet speak of God as He is in Himself, as ultimate Being" ("Abraham Heschel among Contemporary Philosophers: from Divine Pathos to Prophetic Action," Philosophy Today [1947]:297). Claude Tresmontant has written extensively on the subject. See, for instance, A Study of Hebrew Thought; Christian Metaphysics (Dublin and Melbourne: Gill and Son, 1965); Études de métaphysique biblique
Yet the Biblical understanding of the primordial presupposition that stands at the foundation of both ontology and reason has

(Paris: J. Gabalda et Cie., Editeurs, 1955); and The Origins of Christian Philosophy (New York: Hawthorn Books, 1963). Sometimes Tresmontant seems to be heading toward working in a temporal dimensionality as, for instance, when he says that the "sensible is not deprived of meaning" (Hebrew Thought, p. 51) or that the question indeed "is to decide whether the forms of Greek reason are those of human reason" (ibid., p. 114). Yet when his approach is seen as a whole, his thought appears to be, as Brian J. Cudahy suggests, that of an existential, personalistic, anti-dualistic process-oriented philosopher ("Claude Tresmontant and Biblical Metaphysics," Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 41 [1967]: 228). Yet his anti-dualism is rather an anti-Platonism which does not deny the timeless Parmenidean interpretation of the primordial presupposition. Interestingly enough Cudahy's evaluation of Tresmontant's approach to Biblical metaphysics concludes by remarking that "the most significant unresolved problem, though, is whether the ontological categories Tresmontant claims he has found in the Old Testament have actually been drawn out of the Hebrew experience or projected into it" (p. 228). In my opinion, it seems to be clear that Tresmontant, working within a traditional approach to reason imposes on Biblical intelligibility traditional timeless epistemological and ontological categories.

The same dependence upon traditional categories and ordo can be seen in E. Farley's application of his interpretation of Husserl's epistemology to theology (Ecclesial Man, pp. 232-234). Within the same general approach to Biblical metaphysics or Biblical philosophy may be seen, for instance, Leander Keyser's (The Philosophy of Christianity [Burlington, Iowa: The Lutheran Literary Board, 1928], pp. 78, 25); Walter A. Kaufmann's (Critique of Religion and Philosophy [Garden City, New York: Doubleday & Co., 1961], pp. 303-305); Arthur F. Holmes's (All Truth Is God's Truth, pp. 4-5, 125-28), Stewart McDowall's (Evolution, Knowledge and Revelation, pp. 15, 16), and Sydnor Stealey's (p. 126) approaches to Biblical philosophy. Cf. Lovejoy, p. 5; and M. Ott, "Objectification and Existentialism," p. 322.

Yet, on the other hand, there is also present in current theology a trend that is sensitive to the Biblical theo-onto-logical order and its temporal dimensionality even though only pointing toward such a direction without drawing further reflection or conclusions from it. See, for instance, the "future" and "presence" theories of interpretation on Exod 3:14 (pp. 315-19 above). Oscar Cullmann also points in the same direction when he remarks, in his Christ and Time: The Primitive Christian Conception of Time and History (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1950), that "for Greek thinking in its Platonic formulation there exists between time and
not as yet been discovered. It is necessary, then, on the ground and context provided by the ontological relevance of Exod 3:14, 15, to focus on the interpretation of the dimensionality for Being and reason in which Biblical rationality has been constituted.

The Biblical Interpretation of Being: Temporality

To know that Exod 3:14, 15 thinks and expresses Being is not enough for grounding the viewpoint that a criticism of theological reason requires. Thus, it is necessary to go beyond the initial discovery of the ontological status of Exod 3:14, 15 into a search for the interpretation of the primordial presupposition in which both Being and logos are understood in Biblical rationality.

Since neither Exod 3:14, 15 nor the Bible as a whole develops systematically an interpretation of either the epistemological or eternity a qualitative difference, which is not completely expressed by speaking of a distinction between limited and unlimited duration of time. For Plato, eternity is not endlessly extended time, but something quite different; it is timelessness. Time in Plato's view is only the copy of eternity thus understood.

"How much the thinking of our days roots in Hellenism, and how little in Biblical Christianity, becomes clear to us when we confirm the fact that far and wide the Christian Church and Christian theology distinguish time and eternity in Platonic-Greek manner" (P. 61). Cullmann goes on to say that for primitive Christianity there was no qualitative difference between time and eternity. "Thus time and eternity share this time quality. Primitive Christianity knows nothing of a timeless God. The 'eternal' God is he who was in the beginning, is now, and will be in all the future, 'who is, who was and who will be' (Rev 1:4)" (p. 63). "The New Testament knows only the linear time concept of Today, Yesterday, and Tomorrow; all philosophical reinterpretation and dissolution into timeless metaphysics is foreign to it. It is precisely upon the basis of this rectilinear conception of time that time in Primitive Christianity can yield the framework for the divine process in his omnipotence fixes, for those ages into which he divides the whole process" (p. 53). The same could be said of Moltmann's general approach to eschatology, see for instance Theology of Hope, pp. 15-58.
the ontological frameworks of reason's structure, no particular theory can be found as a guide to our search for the Biblical interpretation of the primordial presupposition. Nonetheless, since Exod 3:14, 15 utters Being precisely in a way which is prior both to any ontological or epistemological theory, the level of the ground of Being appears with greater force. Yet in order to discover the Biblical interpretation of the primordial presupposition, it is necessary to go back to the text and question it from both the ontological

1In theology as a whole this is a fact which is accepted without further reflection. Tillich, for instance, expresses the situation in a negative way when he plainly affirms that "theology as such cannot produce an epistemology of its own" (Systematic Theology, 1:94). Some consider that Biblical thought is not capable of abstract thinking (Stéaley, p. 131), yet others consider that to derive ontological and epistemological theories from the Bible is possible (p. 15).

Both approaches, however, agree in the fact that the Bible by itself does not offer any elaborated reflection either on the ontological or epistemological frameworks. This has been generally misunderstood as entailing the incompatibility between Bible and philosophy.

2Even those who, like Stéaley, see that the Biblical narrative contains a theory of knowledge suggest that such a theory is to be "derived" from the text, since it is not explicitly developed in it (Stéaley, p. 15). Thus, the search for the interpretation of the primordial presupposition of Biblical reason cannot begin from an evaluation of its epistemological or ontological theories, as was necessary in the analysis of both the philosophical and theological contexts. In the analysis of the Biblical context, then, it is necessary to go directly into the consideration of the dimensionality of Being itself.

3Regarding the nature of the pre-ontological level, the level of the "no-thing" (Heidegger, The Essence of Reasons, p. 23; and p. 67, nn. 1, 2 above). Being and God have been connected in an unbreakable bond in Exod 3:14. Yet, they have not been identified as one. They rather stand together. Neither is prior to the other. Yet, God as "ontic presence" reveals both what God and Being are and mean; cf. Stéaley, p. 123.
and epistemological viewpoints. The result of such a questioning should provide at least a brief introduction to the understanding of the Biblical interpretation of reason's dimensionality and, at the same time, a basis for the subsequent development of both a Biblical ontology and epistemology.

It is time now to analyze the way in which the ground of

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1The Bible as a whole, and Exod 3:14, 15 in particular, are to be considered as "fact" of theological reason, that is, as constituted by human minds. As reason is involved as the constitutive tool of meaning, both ontological and epistemological frameworks must be involved in such a constitution. "This "fact" of theological reason cannot be denied even by those who, due to their own interpretation of the primordial presupposition and of reason's structure as a whole, consider the Biblical writings as a product of primitive, mythological, non-scientific minds. "Lévi Strauss has pointed repeatedly to the fact that, like magical thinking and savage mind, myth cannot be qualified as prelogical or reduced to practical need, but that it has to be taken as a self-presentation of the human mind" (Kampits, p. 113). And, as a product of human mind, Biblical thought shares in and works with the structure of reason. Francis Strickland sees religious thinking sharing the systematic nature of reason's structure as he declares that "a world-view of some sort is not only an affair of philosophy but inevitably underlies religious thinking as well. This does not mean that religious believers consciously adopt a philosophy. Very few indeed ever do this. It simply means that when implications of our fundamental religious beliefs are thought out in a philosophical way, it is found that they imply a certain way of looking at the world. Indeed, philosophy of some kind underlies all religion, for some conception of the Divine is the foundation of religion, and this necessarily means a view of ultimate reality and some thought of the way this ultimate reality is related to or manifests itself in human life" (p. 47). I do not deny that Biblical thought implies both an ontology (world-view) and an epistemology (theory of knowledge). Yet in the text under investigation Biblical thought directs itself toward expressing the dimensionality in which reality as a whole is interpreted as it relates to YHWH's ontic appearance.

2The criticism of theological reason must begin with a reflection on the ground of Being and reason. The discovery of the Biblical interpretation of the primordial presupposition is the foundation for developing the criticism of theological reason and the technical philosophical expression of the Biblical interpretation of the ontological and epistemological frameworks.
Being is interpreted by Biblical rationality. The analysis will be developed in two steps: (1) from the viewpoint of the ontological framework, the being-appearance relationship is discussed; (2) from the viewpoint of the epistemological framework, the being-logos relationship is examined.

Ontological Framework: Being and Appearance

Exod 3:14 speaks and thinks Being in the present time. This is, however, not enough for grasping the Biblical understanding of the primordial presupposition. The text connects God and Being essentially. Both of them "co-appear" as the "ontic presence" of God is given. Yet, the order of meaning comes from God into Being (theo-onto-logical ordo) and not as in classical thought from Being into God (onto-theo-logical ordo). Consequently, the interpretation of the ground of Being can be done only as God "appears" or is "present." Thus God and Being are to be interpreted from the starting point provided by God's "ontic presence."²

¹See above, p. 347.

²It should be noted that due to the theo-onto-logical order, our text suggests the meaning of "appearance" referring to God cannot be derived from either the philosophical or the theological contexts. As it has been shown in chapters 1 and 2 above, both philosophy and theology accept the Parmenidean timeless interpretation of the primordial presupposition in whose context the idea of "appearance" receives its traditional meaning over against the idea of Being. Yet, in Biblical rationality "appearance" is the given from which the meaning of the primordial presupposition is to be reached.

For those familiar with Heidegger's thought and his starting point in Being and Time from Dasein's appearance, the procedure I am following should not be difficult to grasp. The main difference between my approach and Heidegger's, obviously, is to be seen in the starting point. Heidegger starts from Dasein as appearance; from
The "ontic" presence of God, its appearance, cannot be interpreted, then, from the viewpoint of any already-established theory.

Dasein he goes to the interpretation of the ground of Being; and from the ground of Being he interprets God. In Biblical rationality, however, the movement of intelligibility is different. The starting point is not the appearance of Dasein but the appearance of God. From God (theos) Biblical rationality goes to the ground of Being (ontos) and from the ground of Being, it goes on to interpret man and reality as a whole.

It is necessary, then, in the search for the Biblical interpretation of the ground of Being that the classical interpretation of "appearance" be placed under methodological epochē. Heidegger provides a summary statement regarding the traditional meaning of "appearance." "At first sight the distinction seems clear. Being and appearance means: the real in contradistinction to the unreal; the authentic over against the inauthentic" (Introduction to Metaphysics, p. 98). He further adds that "it was in the Sophists and in Plato that appearance was declared to be mere appearance and thus degraded. At the same time, being, as idea, was exalted to a supra-sensory realm. A chasm, chôrismos, was created between the merely apparent essence, here below, and the real being, somewhere on high. In that chasm Christianity settled down, at the same time reinterpreting the lower as the created and the higher as the creator (ibid., p. 106). This distinction, according to Heidegger, has "remained dominant not only in Western philosophy," but it permeates "all knowledge, action, and discourse" even where it is "not specifically mentioned or not in these words" (ibid., p. 94). This distinction also reaches the heart of modern science (ibid., p. 107). See also Heidegger, Early Greek Thinking, p. 25; and Sartre, Being and Nothingness, p. xlvii. As Heidegger suggests, this interpretation of "appearance" is adopted by theology as a whole and is applied in the constitution of theological meaning not only at the dogmatic but also at the exegetical level.

In order to get acquainted with the dualistic way of interpreting the "being-appearance" relationship in both dogmatics and exegesis, see, for instance, Anselm, Proslogion, trans. M. J. Charlesworth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1965), p. 8. The dualistic interpretation of being and appearance is also present in Barth when he holds that the encounter "represents God in so far as it is determined, made and used by God as clothing, temple or sign; in so far as it is a peculiarly a work of God, which above and beyond its own existence may and must serve to attest the objectivity of God and therefore to make the knowledge of God possible and necessary" (Church Dogmatics, 1.1.17), cf. O. Cullmann, Christ and Time, pp. 62, 63, and in J. Moltmann, Theology of Hope, pp. 51-58, when he affirms that "where Yahweh 'appears', it is manifestly not in the first instance a question of cultivating the place and time of his appearance. The point of the appearances to particular men in particular
whether philosophical or philological. Rather, God's "ontic presence" is to be considered as the basis and starting point for the revealing of His Being and thus of its ontological understanding.\(^1\) The idea of "presence," therefore, involves both the "ontic" and the "ontological" levels regarding God as reality. Consequently, the interpretation of God's Being should follow the lines of intelligibility that flows from God's "ontic presence" itself, particularly as grasped by the early ontological reflections of Exod 3:14, 15 and context.\(^2\)

In Exod 3:14, 15, the idea of "presence" is presented in the context of temporal openness that relates the God-being-mission situations lies in the promise. The promise, however, points away from the appearances in which it is uttered, into the as yet unrealized future which it announces. The point of the appearance then lies not in itself, but in the promise which becomes audible in it, and in the future to which it points" (Theology of Hope, pp. 99, 100); in Von Rad as he says that "the whole narrative [Exod 3] context leads right away to the expectation that Yahweh intends to impart something—but this is not what he is, but what he will show himself to be to Israel" (p. 180); and in Motyer as he explains that "as regards the meaning of the verb, care must be exercised to exclude the sense 'to be essentially' because the verb properly means 'to be phenomenally', corresponding to the Greek ginesthai and not to e inai. Metaphysics are not involved" (p. 22). See also Vriezen, pp. 236, 249; and D. J. McCarthy, p. 317.

\(^1\) It should be recalled that the "ontic" and "ontological" levels stand and belong together. Neither is given without the other. The ontological level points to man's understanding of the Being who appears. Yet, the grounding level of ontology is the "ontic."

\(^2\) For the purpose of a criticism of theological reason it should be realized that this passage is irreplaceable. It thinks Being at the level of its ground, at the very beginning of Christian reflection. Any other reflection on the ground of Being would not embrace and influence Christian tradition as a whole. Furthermore, as far as I am aware, there is no other primordial reflection on the ground of Being besides the Exod 3:14, 15 passage.
reality-idea to the three temporal ec-stasies which point, beyond the ontological statement of Exod 3:14, 15, toward the reality from which the Biblical meaning of Being must be searched and found. "Presence," according to the text, opens itself up from the temporal present in which the I AM WHO I AM statement is rendered and which is shared and understood by Moses.

In other words, "presence" as an "ontic" realm springs from what actually happens. In Exod 3:14, 15 what actually happens is properly described in 3:2, where the "theophany" of the burning bush is recorded. It is from the reality expressed by this theophany that the idea of "presence" finds its meaning and can be uttered in Exod 3:14, 15. Consequently, a proper understanding of the meaning revealed by this particular theophany is foundational for the enlightening, from the text itself, of the basic meaning and realm of "presence" in its inner connection and relation to both God and Being.

Biblical theophanies have been interpreted in various ways.¹ However, as I approach the text following the phenomenological method of exegesis, all interpretation must be placed under epoché, in order that the meaning of what is being thought and expressed in the text may be reached.

¹Again, due to lack of space, it is not possible to develop here a detailed history of the theological interpretation of the "theophany" idea. As a general evaluation, however, it can be said that some scholars consider the very idea of "theophany" in a pejorative sense, as being simply "naive" (Jacob, p. 74). Other scholars understand it plainly as a "sign" which must be explained in natural terms and along the lines of the history of traditions (Noth, pp. 39, 40). And, there are even other scholars who suggest that Biblical
The subject in Exod 3:2 is the "Angel of the Lord" (mal'ak YHWH). At first glance it would seem as if the subject in Exod 3:2 is other than the subject in Exod 3:14 ('elohim). The flow of meaning in the text, however, points to the identification of both "Angel of the Lord" and "Yahweh" in this particular narrative. The verb in Exod 3:2 is *yērā',* a niphal imperfect of the basic verbal form *rā'ā,* which in its niphal form means "to be seen," "to let oneself be seen," "to appear." The LXX translates it as ἀπετίθη, keeping, however, the original reflexive Hebrew sense.

Theophanies must be explained as mythical in parallelism to extra-Biblical occurrences (Moltmann, *Theology of Hope,* pp. 98, 100).


4 Gesenius, p. 138. The LXX translates ὁ ὄφθη ὃς αὐτὸς ἄγγελος κυρίου. This translation could be understood at first glance as a passive (ὁ φημ.) with αὐτὸς as agent. However, the passive voice is very rarely used with dative. Additionally, ὁμοῖος in the LXX is used in reflexive sense, as, for instance, in 1 Kgs 18:1 (ὁ φημ.), "show thyself," where a passive voice is used in reflexive sense for the translation of a hiphil of rā'ā. Thus ὁφθημαί σοι would mean "I will appear to thee" (A. T. Robertson, *A Grammar of the Greek New Testament in the Light of Historical Research* [Nashville: Broadman Press, 1934], pp. 619, 820; and William F. Arndt and Wilbur F. Gingrich, *A Greek-English Lexicon of the New Testament and other Early Christian Literature* [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1952], s.v., ὁράω). Moreover, Exod 6:3 translates the same Hebrew niphal (this time in first person singular) as follows: καὶ ὁφθην τὸς Αἴγας καὶ Ἰοὰκ καὶ Ἰακώβ, θεὸς ὃς ἄντων. Here ἰδών is clearly not an agent (Robertson, pp. 623-625, 820), so it must be understood as being used with accusative, keeping the original reflexive niphal sense as it does, for instance, in the
The reflexive idea conveyed by the verb yêra', which is properly translated into English as "appeared," expresses clearly the idea of "presence." What does "presence" ("appearance") mean? Who or What is present? From the context it is clear that the one who is present is YHWH.

It is necessary now to formulate the following question: According to the text, is appearance to be identified with Being or is Being rather to be found behind and beyond its appearance? Does the text reveal a gap between Being and appearance or not?

The English verb "to appear" has an implicit reflexive sense which the Hebrew niphal makes explicit. The reflexive sense of God's "appearing" is explicitly thought and expressed in Exod 3:2. When the text is asked, who is the subject of the "appearing," the answer, obviously, is YHWH. And, due to the reflexive sense in which the action is expressed, the answer to the question about what or who is the object of the action of God's appearing is the same, namely, YHWH. In His appearing, YHWH is both the subject who causes the action and the object on which the action is accomplished. Thus the "appearance," the "presence" of YHWH is YHWH Himself, is Being.

^Gesenius, pp. 137, 138; Motyer, pp. 12, 13. It is possible, then, to see here a correct translation of the Hebrew preposition 'el by the Greek τοιον. In Exod 3:2 the Hebrew preposition 'el, which appears also in Exod 6:3, requires the reflexive sense of niphal.

1Gesenius, pp. 137, 138; Motyer, pp. 12, 13. It is possible, then, to see here a correct translation of the Hebrew preposition 'el by the Greek τοιον (Gesenius, p. 51). Hence, 'ωθη must be reflexive in order to match both the general preposition and the Hebrew niphal sense.
The "appearance" of YHWH and YHWH as Being in itself (on the "ontic" level) are the same, they are the one and same "ontic" reality. Between them there is no "gap," "chasm," or "chorismos."^2

The ontological meaning of Exod 3:2, 14, as a unity, points, therefore, to the "ontic presence" of God's Being as correlated to the "ontic presence" of Moses's human being (Dasein). The way in

1*Heidegger suggests that the naming of God "causes the High One Himself to appear in words, not merely to tell of his dwelling-place, the Serene, the holy, not merely to name him with reference to his dwelling-place" ("Remembrance of the Poet," in Existence and Being, ed. W. Brock [Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1949], p. 263). In a sense, then, the text "makes God appear" as it connects God's ontic presence with an explicit expression of the ground of Being providing in that way theological (independent from philosophy) access to the reflection on the primordial presupposition.

2*On the contrary, current theology understands God's appearance by stressing the subject or source of such an appearance. God in Himself is the "source" or "ground" of His appearance. But the "appearance" is not God in Himself, but rather "as he appears." Thus the Platonic chorismos is to be found at the very heart of theological intelligibility in open contradiction to Biblical intelligibility which knows no gap or chasm whatsoever.

It should be noted, however, that there are some theologians, mostly OT scholars, who, conscious of the niphal reflexive sense of the text, are able to grasp its meaning as self-presentation. For instance, see Zimmerli, pp. 70-81; Quell, p. 1064; Childs, pp. 88, 89; Köhler, p. 99; Noth, p. 257; Raoul Dederen, "Revelation, Inspiration, and Hermeneutics," in A Symposium on Biblical Hermeneutics, ed. Gordon M. Hyde (Washington, D.C.: Review and Herald Pub. Ass., 1974), p. 6; and notably Buber, pp. 41, 116, 127. By the way, in the OT, the same verb in the same verbal form is used for referring to the "appearance" of man (1 Kgs 18:2) and things, for instance, dry land (Gen 1:19) and stones (1 Kgs 6:18).

Even in Buber's statement that in the theophany we find the "imageless presence of the invisible Who permits Himself to be seen" (p. 127), no ontological conclusion is reached, and, consequently, the old timeless primordial presupposition automatically fills the meaning for the dimensionality of reason's structure. Nonetheless, I consider that OT scholarship clearly points to the identification of Being and appearance in Biblical rationality. OT scholarship merely falls short of reaching the obvious ontological meaning that Exod 3:2, 14, 15 expresses because of its uncritical acceptance of traditional Greek epistemological and ontological categories.

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which Exod 3:2-15 expresses what happens as it thinks the happening and puts it into words reveals a basic ontological meaning which entails, or better requires, the authentic and total rejection of the classical *analogia entis* by eliminating its ground, namely, the Platonic *chorismos*. This Biblical interpretation of the ground of Being as it co-appears with the supreme Being provides a clear temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure.

At this point care must be taken not to draw hasty conclusions about the meaning of God's being as given in the temporal dimension so as to affirm without further clarification the idea of God's temporality, which would be misleading. So far, time and temporality in general have been interpreted from the framework provided by traditional timeless categories after the Aristotelian model which makes time the realm of what is not Being, of what is not real, of what develops. The entire idea of time and development is considered as "imperfect" and as a lower expression of Being and reality.

The Bible shows a different interpretation of the primordial presupposition. It denies that that which appears is "mere" appearance which needs to be denied so that Being in its real meaning,...

A similar situation can be seen in the area of systematic theology where some theologians are also conscious of the being-appearance identification at least implicitly. Carsten Johnsen clearly denies the Platonic *chorismos* at its epistemological level when he underlines that "it is again our unfortunate traditional trend of dichotomizing almost any reality that passes through our disrupted minds. In this present case it is nothing less than God Himself who is 'cut to pieces' by our foolish dualist mania" (The Maligned God [Mézien, France: The Untold Story Publishers, 1980], p. 243).
significance, and intelligibility may be reached. For Biblical rationality the revelatory appearance is Being, reality itself, God as He is in Himself. This implies, in the language I have chosen to express the Biblical interpretation of reason's dimensionality, that God is temporal.

Yet the meaning of whatever God's temporality may mean is to be derived from His appearance as a whole (as extended in time) and not to be deduced from the classical interpretation of temporality—not even the Heideggerian interpretation of time. Such a deduction considers and applies time as a category of His Being. On the other hand, the Biblical text as so far analyzed introduces time as ground of Being and dimensionality of reason but not as category. Thus there is no cognitive basis to interpret temporality in relation to the Being of God. What God's temporality means is to be discovered as God's Being and God's temporality co-appear in the "ontic-presence" of God. To get a glimpse of what God's temporality may mean implies to have at the same time a glimpse of what God's Being may mean. And to have such a glimpse does entail a modification of our own idea of what both Being and Time may mean.

Being itself is not to be understood by denying that that which appears in time is what the classical Parmenidean timeless presupposition requires, but rather by affirming that what appears in time is Being and God Himself. The text not only points to the identification of Being-appearance with the exegetical idea of Presence as the ontic ground for both the Biblical understanding of God and Being but also shows that God's "ontic presence" is not to
be identified with the material place of His appearance,\(^1\) but with His words. Hence, the meaning of God's Being does not have to be related to the material place in which His presence appears but, as in Exod 3:2, 14, 15, basically to God's words. The Being of God is "present" and at the same time "revealed" through and in His words.\(^2\)

\(^1\)It must be noted that the being-appearance "identification" is a dynamic one which must not be understood as related or limited to the particular material nature of the element involved in it, in this case, fire. God is Himself in the fire but He is not fire. To express this fact new epistemological categories need to be created. Our traditional categories are of no use to express this reality because all of them have been shaped within the timeless interpretation of the primordial presupposition.

That Moses did not understand God to be fire is made clear in the text by its use of the beth essentiae (Buber, p. 117) which indicates that the fire was the place of the "presence" but not the presence itself of YHWH (Motyer, p. 14). Moreover, the text makes clear that even when Moses saw the unusual scene of a fire which was not consuming the bush, he did not grasp the presence of the Lord just because of this extraordinary event. The actual presence of YHWH was rather perceived by Moses when God spoke.

\(^2\)Noth, p. 40; Dederen, p. 6. It is to be discussed further, perhaps in some other place, how those theophanies in which God appears in the form of an angel, a warrior, or even the highest theophany ever, Christ, should be understood in relation to God's Being. As a general approach I suggest that those theophanies would be better understood if approached on the basis of a temporal understanding of the ground of Being. The coherent and complete analysis of Biblical theophanies add positive insight in the study of God's Being and its dimensionality. The case of Christ is perhaps the deepest and most complex. No previously-defined ontological categories can be applied to Christ. Categories must appear as the ephapax of Christ's reality is studied. This approach, that follows the theo-onto-logical ordo revealed in Exod 3:14, 15, entails an ontological revolution.

Moltmann perceives this change from afar off when he says that "with the Christian message of the cross of Christ, something new and strange has entered the metaphysical world. For this faith must understand deity of God from the event of the suffering and death of the Son of God and thus bring about a fundamental change in the orders of being of metaphysical thought and the value tables of religious feeling" (The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian Theology [New York: Harper & Row, 1974], p. 215). Moltmann, following Biblical insights, is able
Additionally, in the Exod 3:14, 15 parallelism, God's Being appears in temporal "extension" in the three modes of time (past, present, and future).

Thus, it can be seen that Exod 3:14 points to a temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition of Biblical rationality. Yet, in providing a temporal interpretation of Being's dimensionality, Exod 3:2, 14, 15 does not deny the classical **analogia entis**, because in order to deny it, it would be necessary to accept its reality. **Analogia entis** is rather left groundless by Biblical rationality as there is not even the slightest suggestion of anything like the Platonic *chorismos*. Yet, the analogical procedure as such is not to be dismissed but rather to stand in need of being reinterpreted within the context provided by the temporal primordial presupposition of Biblical rationality.¹

¹Analogia entis is denied as a procedure which assumes for its existence and meaning the timeless primordial presupposition. Yet
In short, Exod 3:14, 15 and its context express both the
dimensionality—namely, temporality— and the structural ordo—
analogical procedure can be thought and applied within the tem­
poral interpretation of the primordial presupposition. The basic
difference between both analogical procedures is that the analogia
entis requires discontinuity with the intelligibility of what is
given in the realm of "appearances" or temporality. The temporal
analogical procedure, on the other hand, requires the continuity of
the meaning and intelligibility of what is given in the realm of
"appearances" with that reality which is beyond the direct reach of
reason's capabilities.

\[1\] Here Biblical rationality parts ways with traditional philo­
sophical rationality and with every single possible philosophical
interpretation of rationality, such as Heidegger's, Sartre's, and
Merleau-Ponty's, that accepts the temporal interpretation of the pri­
mordial presupposition. At first glance such a radical departure,
a complete departure from even those philosophies which share the
same understanding of Being's dimensionality that the Bible holds,
seems to be extreme and unjustified. If the Bible and Heidegger's
philosophy, for instance, work within the same basic interpretation
of Being's dimensionality, why is it not possible to use the already-
developed Heideggerian ontology and its categories for an accurate,
rational interpretation of the Biblical message and for the constitu­
tion of theological meanings?

To attempt such an enterprise, however, would imply that
neither the Biblical idea of "ontic presence" as theophany nor the
real revolutionary intellectual movement of Heidegger's overcoming
of metaphysical thought have been correctly understood. The Biblical
interpretation of the primordial presupposition requires reason to
think from appearance and in continuity with it. Both Biblical writers
and Heidegger do so. Yet between them, so to speak, there is an
absolute chorismos, namely, the chorismos of faith. In other words,
for Heidegger, for phenomenology as a whole, and for much of current
theology (for instance Bultmann's) God just does not appear.
Heidegger accepts no manifestation of God in the present. Past mani­
festations are not relevant today, thus our time is understood as
a godless time (Patricia, pp. 68, 69). Heidegger's problem as he
approaches the interpretation of God is his traditional onto-theo­
logical order. His interpretation of the ontos, surely enough,
differs from the traditional one, yet he still applies it to theology
in the same old onto-theo-logical way that hinders the text from
revealing its ontological content.

For Biblical rationality, however, God does appear. Thus,
should the Heideggerian categories be used as ontological and episte­
mological frameworks of the structure of reason, the classical onto­
theo-logical order, which is grounded in the timeless Parmenidean
interpretation of Being dimensionality, would be applied instead of
namely, theo-onto-logical—in which the Biblical interpretation of reason appears and functions. Thus the necessary basis for suggesting the possibility of a criticism of theological reason has been reached. Yet, in order that the complete picture may be at least introduced it is necessary to have at least an introductory glance of the way in which the primordial presupposition of reason's structure of Biblical rationality is seen from the viewpoint of the epistemological framework.

**Epistemological Framework: Being and Logos**

Since the phenomenological analysis of Exod 3:14, 15 grounds the temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition of the theo-onto-logical order of Biblical rationality. In using Heideggerian categories, reason would be working with an incomplete framework both ontological and epistemological which would, in the final analysis, distort theological meaning as it constitutes it. More than that, reason would be working with inadequate categories since Heidegger's ontological categories are built from the analysis of only part of the ontic reality that is available, namely, things and man. In order to have a complete picture of the ontological framework to be used by theological reason, theologians working with Heideggerian categories are forced to apply to God via analogy the categories that properly belong either to man or to things. Yet a being can be understood only with those categories that belong to it essentially. Thus, theological reason needs, in order to be able to function properly, coherently, and systematically, to have complete understanding of the ontological framework which needs to include in first place the discovery of those categories that pertain to God's Being. To accomplish that, the only way is to let God appear in the theo-onto-logical order of Biblical rationality.

Beyond that, no ontological reflection is developed. There is no technical expression of the ontological framework to be found either in Exodus or in the Bible as a whole. The development and technical ontological expression of the Biblical understanding of the ontological framework of reason's structure is a task that still needs to be done.
theo-onto-logical structure of theological reason from the viewpoint of the ontos, the analysis regarding how the primordial presupposition is seen from the cognitive epistemological viewpoint requires the selection, from Scriptures, of a passage which would address Being (YHWH) from the perspective of the epistemological framework, that is, of the categories and cognitive processes that the subject is supposed to have and follow in order to grasp and constitute meanings regarding both theos and Being according to Biblical rationality.

Even when in this regard many texts could be chosen, the Exodus 6:2-7 passage, which is found within the same narrative that accounts for the development of Moses's mission of liberation which was grounded in Exod 3:14, 15 and its ontological meaning, seems to be particularly enlightening. Yet, the phenomenological analysis

Additionally, this passage is chosen as representative of the Biblical approach to the epistemological framework and its dimensionality because even when it does not pertain to the same literary context to which Exod 3:14, 15 belongs, Exod 6:2-7 is closely related to it appearing in the same narrative. The Exod 6:2-7 passage appears as having Exod 3:14, 15 as its antecedent and ground. Exod 6:2-7 appears in a different historical and literary context than Exod 3:14, 15. Yet, as my brief phenomenological approach suggests this text is connected to its antecedent in Exod 3:14, 15 as YHWH appears again within the general thematic context of the mission of deliverance that was co-grounded with the expression and interpretation of theos-Being (Exod 3:14, 15). Consequently, Exod 6:2-7 is also relevant for our analysis due to the fact that it pertains to the same early original theological reflection to which Exod 3:14, 15 belongs.

As the inner thematic and historical relationship that exists between Exod 3:14, 15 and Exod 6:2-7 has been expressed in different ways by different scholars, I take no time to show it. See for instance, Motyer, pp. 17, 24; and Quell, p. 1071. Furthermore, Exod 6:2-7 does not appear as a mere repetition of Exod 3:14, 15, but rather as its dynamic progression. Moreover, it should be remembered that the philosophical context already showed the foundational role that the interpretation of the ontological framework and its dimensionality play in the interpretation of reason. In other words,
of this text as it is going to be developed in the following pages has not the purpose of discovering whether Biblical rationality is built upon a timeless or temporal interpretation of reason's and Being's dimensionality. The purpose of the brief ensuing phenomenological glance at Exod 6:2-7 is rather to see if Biblical rationality, as it is focused and expressed from the concern and viewpoint of the epistemological framework, recognizes and is constructed on the recognition of the temporal interpretation of Being's dimensionality as grounded and expressed in the foundational Exod 3:14, 15 passage.  

1"And God spake unto Moses, and said unto him, I am the Lord: and I appeared unto Abraham, unto Isaac, and unto Jacob, by the name of God Almighty, but by my name JEHOVAH was I not known to them. And I have also established my covenant with them, to give them the land of Canaan, the land of their pilgrimage, wherein they were strangers. And I have also heard the groaning of the children of Israel, whom the Egyptians keep in bondage and I have remembered my covenant. Wherefore say unto the children of Israel, I am the Lord, and I will bring you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians, and I will rid you out of their bondage, and I will redeem you with a stretched-out arm, and with great judgments: and I will take you to me for a people, and I will be to you a God: and ye shall know that I am the Lord your God, which bringeth you out from under the burdens of the Egyptians" (Exod 6:2-7). (Emphasis supplied.)

2The brevity of my approach to the phenomenological analysis of Exod 6:2-7 is due not only to the fact that within the context and purposes of this dissertation it appears as a corollary to the phenomenological analysis of Exod 3:14, 15 and its conclusions but also to the fact that the scholarly discussion that has been connected with it is not related to my epistemological concerns. Scholarly discussions on Exod 6:2-7 have been mainly related to issues pertaining to the historical critical method. In this context Exod 6:2-7 appears as a key text in the discussion of Source Criticism in which two sources of the Pentateuch (J and E) have been found.
Within this context, and due to the complementary role that the viewpoint expressed by Exod 6:2-7 plays regarding the main purpose of this investigation, the phenomenological analysis of this passage to be developed here will be restricted to pinpointing only those aspects of it that may provide an introductory view to the basic understanding of the primordial presupposition on which Biblical cognitive procedures are constituted. Consequently a complete phenomenological study of this passage is not intended here.

The question for the meaning of Being necessarily involves a cognitive process, namely, reason or logos. Since knowledge is essentially involved in any ontological reflection,¹ the meaning of Being stems not only from God's appearance but also from the way in which such "appearance" is known. Appearance, "presence," implies the knowledge of it, otherwise there would be no "appearance" at all.

At this point the problem appears to be more complex than the one presented by the analysis of the Being-appearance relationship because knowledge, as the "tool" for understanding, has been consistently used in its traditional interpretation which is dogmatically applied for the constitution of theological meaning.²

¹See p. 35, n. 4 above.

²See chapter 2 above. Therefore to speak of reason in theological circles means to speak of "pure" or "abstract," "scientific," timeless reason. There is no "concrete" or "historical" reason working on the assumption of a temporal primordial presupposition. What is called "concrete" and "historical" reason is understood on the
Knowing "Being itself"

Obviously, Exod 6:2 is a kind of introduction to the 6:3-7 passage that follows. It is also apparent that vs. 2 stands in close parallelism to Exod 3:14, 15. It can even be said that vs. 2 is expanding the 3:14, 15 parallelism. The connection to both what follows (vss. 3-7) and what precedes it (3:14, 15) is made by pronouncing the same name whose sound-meaning has just been revealed. 1

Moses's and the people's concern is now centered in the problem of knowing God. 2 Consequently, God proceeds to explain the way

assumption of a timeless primordial presupposition. By the way, it should be remembered, as was pointed out in chapter 1 above, that contemporary philosophical criticism of reason is beginning to develop a temporal interpretation of reason and its primordial presupposition. However, such an interpretation has not as yet been considered by theological epistemology.

1 The 'ănî YHWH expression certainly is different from the 'ehyeh 'ăsher 'ehyeh construction or even from the 'ehyeh in 3:14. Yet, 'ănî YHWH is to be considered in Exod 6:2 as bearing and expressing the ontological meaning revealed in Exod 3:14, 15. Obviously the idea of oath is not directly linked to the name Yahweh in Exod 3:14, 15 as it appears to be in Exod 6:8. However, as the idea of oath is that of personal commitment, it seems that it was already implicitly present at the very foundation of the ontological statement of Exod 3:14, 15. Anyway, 'ănî YHWH cannot be reduced to the simple idea of oath. On the contrary, the idea of oath—personal commitment—must be included in the essence of the broad meaning of God's Being. See Manuel Oliva, "Revelación del nombre de Yahweh en la 'Historia Sacerdotal' Ex 6, 2-8," Biblica 52 (1971):17. In Exod 6:2, then, it is assumed that Yahweh has a particular ontological meaning and even a revelatory function.

2 Moses has the same kind of realistic attitude that he manifested in receiving his mission now that he sees the mission progressing in a different direction than expected. namely, as he sees the mission failing instead of succeeding (Exod 5:22, 23). Again, on this occasion Moses's remarks regarding the progress of his mission were accurate and right to the point. A divine answer was necessary. Consequently, God provided an answer following the same pattern that was set up in Exod 3:14, 15, yet expanding them a little further and stressing this time the way in which the knowledge of
cognition is to be handled in order that God as Being may be reached.

Verse 3, referring to two moments in the history of salvation, speaks about both God's Being and the knowledge of God. The first clause speaks about God's appearance—that is, God's Being. The second clause speaks about the knowledge of God. Obviously, both clauses are essentially part of the same ontological dimension we are interested in, yet each one approaches the same revelatory dynamics from a different viewpoint.

Both clauses are connected through the use of what exegetes God should be approached, an issue which was neither presented nor developed in Exod 3:14, 15.

One moment refers to the times of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob when God "appeared" as (beth essentiae) 'el Shadday. A second moment refers to the Exodus event when God revealed the meaning of His "sound-name" YHWH as expressing Being. Because of lack of space it is not possible to analyze here the way in which the recently-revealed meaning of God's name relates to Yahweh's previous appearances; cf. Motyer, pp. 30, 31. For an introduction to the study of the meaning and Biblical occurrences of 'El Shadday, see Motyer, pp. 29-31, especially p. 28, n. 73.

The meaning of God's Being springs from the whole of His extended appearances. Thus it springs also from His appearances to Abraham as 'el Shadday. Yet Abraham already knew the utterance of God's "sound-name" (Gen 12:7). 'el Shadday was a name (title) used by God in order to illuminate human knowledge of His Being at that particular time even though its ontological relevance would not be understood except after the revelation of the meaning of His name. Thus the ontological dimension was, of course, present in Abraham's time, but only implicitly. The name Yahweh was also present as "sound-name" whose meaning was unknown at the time, but which was already implicitly expressing the ontological dimension that undergirds the whole of God's activities. What was not yet given was the ontological interpretation of the meaning of the name of God as the "sound-name." Exod 6:3 in referring to "appearance" is pointing, implicitly, to the ontological level, even though the ontological status of such "appearance" can be explicitly grasped only after the Exod 3:14, 15 ontological revelation.
call \texttt{beth essentiae}. In the first clause, which speaks about God's appearance, \texttt{beth} obviously has an essential meaning since God's appearance expresses His essence and provides the ground for men's knowledge of Him. The second clause, however, speaks about the knowledge of God. In this context the name appears as a means that is designed to lead theological reflection to the knowledge of the essence of God's Being. The name ("sound-name" and its revealed meaning) is the means which enlightens the way the knowledge of God is supposed to be approached. Yet, the name is not \texttt{YHWH}. The "ontic appearance" is \texttt{YHWH}. Thus, in the first clause \texttt{beth} points not to the means or that in which knowledge is supposed to be approached but rather to the essential identification between \texttt{YHWH} and His

\footnote{The connection between \texttt{'El Shadda} and \texttt{YHWH} in Exod 6:3 is established by means of a Hebrew construction with \texttt{beth} which is explicitly used in the first part of the comparison and only elliptically understood in the second (Motyer, p. 14). As the meaning of this special construction is investigated, it must be borne in mind that Exod 6:3 expresses an antithetical comparison that involves the ontological ("appearance") and epistemological ("knowledge") frameworks of reason's structure. Hence, the precise meaning to which \texttt{beth} points cannot be the same in each part of the antithetical comparison because it depends on the content to which \texttt{beth} refers, which in each case is different.

\textbf{Butterworth} explains that \texttt{beth} may have three possible meanings in this kind of context; namely, it can be interpreted as \texttt{beth essentiae}, meaning "in the manner of," "in the capacity of;") it can be interpreted as \texttt{casus pendens}, meaning "as to my name Yahweh;" and it can be also interpreted in an instrumental sense such as, for instance, "by," or "through" my name (p. 50). Exod 6:3 has been understood as an example of the use of \texttt{beth essentiae} meaning "in the character of" (Kaiser, Toward an Old Testament Theology, p. 106; Buber, p. 49; Motyer, p. 14), so that the name is seen as revealing the character, attributes, qualities, and essence of the person designated (Kaiser, Toward an Old Testament Theology, p. 106). Yet, as the name in itself does not reveal God's essence, but rather points to it, it seems that both the explicit and implicit use of \texttt{beth} in Exod 6:3 should be understood in an instrumental sense.
appearance. In the second clause, the elliptically understood *beth* points to the knowledge of God's Being (His ontic appearance) which is to be reached through the revelatory means provided by the ontological meaning of His "sound-name." Yet, as the name is not *YHWH* Himself, it only points to the cognitive approach to be followed as the meaning of God's Being is searched for.

*YHWH* appears here in the context of the epistemological framework; that is to say, in a context in which the knowledge of God as cognitive process is being thought about. In this cognitive context the name is a center of light. What kind of knowledge does the name, and this text as a whole, point to or reveal? In order to answer this question it is necessary to take at least a quick look at the *niphal* perfect form in which the verb *yāḏāʾ* is used in vs. 3, namely, *nōḏāʾti*.

It is interesting to note that Exod 6:3b, which sees the ontological dimension from the viewpoint of its involved *logos*, uses the same reflexive idea that is found in Exod 3:2, when the ontological dimension is approached from the perspective of its grounding appearance. Since *yāḏāʾ* in its *niphal* form is a revelational term...

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2. Thus the name provides the necessary link between the ontological and epistemological frameworks as it expresses their inner unity grounded in the temporal dimensionality of Being and reason. This link is necessary to provide the foundation for reason's coherence and system.

3. In this case the preposition *lē* may require the passive sense of *niphal* (Gesenius, pp. 381, 501). However, the reflexive idea is also possible (Holladay, p. 129). In Exod 6:3, *lē* is to be translated as if used with a dative of advantage (Holladay, p. 168).
which refers to the knowledge of the essence of God Himself,\(^1\) the
text speaks about letting God Himself be known.

As in the case when Being is considered from the viewpoint
of its "ontic appearance," here, when Being is considered from the
viewpoint of its knowledge, the fact that no "gap," "chasm," or
"chorismos" is suggested by the text as the ground for knowledge
implies that the Bible develops its epistemological framework on a

which is precisely the LXX rendering (αὐτοῦ), which entails a
reflexive sense. The reflexive idea is also suggested, within the
immediate context, by the wā'ērā' which in its first person singular
points to the cause, origin, or source of what is to be known,
namely, YHWH, placing the object to be known (YHWH) beyond any
possible chorismos. This ontological idea of "appearance" which was
already present in Exod 3:2, 14, 15 finds its epistemological coun­
terpart in the nōda'tī which also in a niphal form presents God as
the one who causes the cognitive activity (by His "appearance"
wā'ērā') and at the same time who is the object of the cognitive
action of man.

In a more distant context, the reflexive sense is also sug­
gested regarding the epistemological framework in Num 12:6, which
also deals with God's revelatory process. Num 12:6 uses the hithpael
form 'etwaddā' which has a clear reflexive sense. If God let Himself
be known in lesser revelatory occurrence (through dreams "bahlōm),
He would not do less in the case of a "higher" or "closer" revelatory
experience as in the case of Moses (face to face, mouth to mouth,
"peh 'el peh").

Furthermore, the LXX translation of nōda'tī by ἐξομολογεῖσθαι
clearly stresses the active side of the reflexive niphal in Exod
6:3b. Even if the passive sense of yāda' in niphal is tried, God
would still appear as the object of the verb, namely, that what is
known is God as He appears (wā'ērā'). Such passive meaning would
suggest that man is able to know God by his own initiative and cogni­
tive powers. Yet the text as a whole points to a different kind of
knowledge as it shows that God is known as He acts and "appears" in
His "ontic-presence." Then, a passive rendering which would suggest
a kind of cognitive contemplatio originated in man is absent from the
interpretation that the text expresses. In short, the reflexive
sense should be preferred over against the passive sense of the
Hebrew niphal.

\(^1\)According to Jenni, yāda' in its niphal form means
"selbstkundgabe," "sich zu erkennen geben," "sich-kundgeben," which
let God's essence to be known (pp. 693, 694).
temporal understanding of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure.

In vs. 3 the verb in nippal (nōda'ti) presents God as the one who causes the cognitive activity (the revealing, the appearing, the disclosure of His Being) and, at the same time, the one who is the object of such action, namely, the one who is supposed to be known through the cognitive activity caused by His revealing Himself.

Moreover, the same God who from the perspective of the ontological framework is seen as appearing as He is in Himself is also seen from the perspective of the epistemological framework as the one who is to be known as He is in Himself. Thus, according to the Biblical interpretation of knowledge, God Himself appears as He is as the subject matter to be known by theological reason.¹

Consequently, in Biblical rationality, Being and revelation belong together.² The knowledge of God is directly grounded on His Being since, according to the meaning of God's "sound-name" provided by Exod 3:14, 15, it is God's Being in itself in His mystery that is opened up for human knowledge. In this context the theos-Being idea is to be seen as playing the theos role for reason's system in

¹It seems also apparent that the personal dimension of Being and knowledge which is suggested by the use of the first person singular is a pattern that cannot be ignored in the texts we are considering. See Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. 113; Cole, p. 20; and Butterworth, p. 49.

²Being points to the "ontic" realm of onto-logy, while revelation points to its cognitive realm (onto-logy). Being provides the ground and realm for revelation; revelation happens in Being. On the other hand, revelation provides access to Being; without revelation and its cognitive access to Being there would be no Being. Being is "appearance" and "appearance" entails a cognitive subject
theology,¹ that is, as playing the role of the philosophical ONE, yet in a temporal dimensionality.

The temporal dimensionality of Biblical logos

It is necessary, now, to inquire about the kind of knowledge that the Exod 6:2-7 passage suggests. Is it an intellectual or practical kind of knowledge? Most theologians see the Bible as a whole working with a "personal," "practical" kind of knowledge.² In to whom Being ("appears"). Furthermore, Being is revelation, since it is what is known in its "appearance."

¹On the basis that Christ is one of those appearances of the theos-Being, he is the ONE which provides the unity and coherence of meaning of the whole (metaphysics) from within itself as it develops. In this sense statements such as ἀνακεφαλαίωσαν τὰ πάντα ἐν τῷ Χριστῷ (Eph 1:10), and ἵνα θεός ἴσως πάντα ἐν πάσιν (1 Cor 15:28) should be studied as a development of the ontological idea of One and as providing at the same time further insights into the system of Biblical rationality.

From the perspective of OT theology, Gerhard Hasel sees that "God is the dynamic, unifying center of the OT" (Old Testament Theology: Basic Issues in the Current Debate, rev. ed. [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1975, p. 100]). Discussing the unifying center of OT theology, Hasel further remarks that "an OT theology which recognizes God as the dynamic unifying center is not forced into making the center a static organizing principle. With God as the dynamic, unifying center, the OT allows the Biblical writings or blocks of writings to speak for themselves in that their individual theologies are allowed to emerge" (p. 102). And "in affirming God as the dynamic unifying center of the OT we also affirm that this center cannot be forced into a static organizing principle on the basis of which an OT theology can be structured" (ibid.) And: "This affirmation means that we have anticipated what we later describe as the emergence of the 'hidden inner unity'" (ibid.). This makes clear that the Biblical ordo is an ordo ad Deum as in Thomas and Bultmann, which, nonetheless, as it works in a temporal dimensionality, is also at the same time an ordo ad Christum Cf. ibid., pp. 99, 100.

²Jenni provides a sample of the traditional interpretation of the nature of Biblical knowledge. According to Jenni, the kind of knowledge in which the Bible as a whole is expressed is not an "intellectual" kind of knowledge but rather a "personal," "practical"
In this respect it can be seen that the passage under consideration does not lead to an "intellectual" interpretation of knowledge, if "intellectual" is interpreted exclusively as pertaining to the abstract interpretation of it provided by classical philosophical tradition. Yet, as the interpretation of "intellectual" knowledge may be understood otherwise, it is necessary to ask the text about its own interpretation of knowledge and its intellectuality without tying dogmatically the idea of "intellectual" to its Greek timeless interpretation.

Yada' appears in the Exod 6:2-7 passage again in vs. 7, this time in a clear future sense. The future idea appears as the climax one related mainly to the behavior realm and including, at the same time, an indirect reference to the deity as in "be acquainted with," "to be concerned about," "to care," "acknowledge," and "recognize" (p. 694). Zimmerli goes a little farther and recognizes that yada' has not a "purely intellectual meaning" as it includes the full force of "recognize" and "accept" (p. 44).

To conclude that the Bible follows a "personal" kind of knowledge over against an "intellectual" one entails the dogmatic acceptance of the Greek timeless interpretation of reason and its intellectuality. This is to impose upon the text and the Bible, in general, an extra-Biblical cognitive structure which does violence to it at the very foundation of its intelligibility. The interpretation of the "kind" of knowledge our text and the Bible as a whole represents cannot be decided on an extra-Biblical interpretation of the theory of knowledge; on the contrary, it rather must be discovered from a phenomenological analysis of Biblical rationality. The Philosophy of Science reveals that a truly scientific enterprise follows a method of investigation whose main lines and procedures stem from the nature of the given reality which is to be investigated (Thomas F. Torrance, Theological Science [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1978], pp. 203, 204). Hence, the idea of Biblical "intellectuality" depends on the interpretation of the nature of the subject-matter to which reason refers, namely, God and reality as a whole.

The future sense and its relevance for the theological enterprise has been properly grasped and expressed by Moltmann (Theology of Hope, pp. 100, 118). Yet Moltmann's understanding is...
is reached in a construction in which the flow of meaning progresses (in parallelism to Exod 3:14, 15) from past into present and future. In vss. 3 and 4 the past ec-stasis of knowing God appears, in clear parallelism to Exod 3:15a, as the text proceeds to give further information regarding YHWH as the God of the Fathers, a mighty God who entered into a covenant relationship with His people. Verses 5 and 6 open the text and its thought to the present ec-stasis in knowing God as God's present evaluation of the current situation in which Israel finds itself is repeated and connected to the name YHWH, whose meaning is to be understood from His presence in the present.

Yet, this present meaning, in order to be, must be related and connected to the past from which it comes: "I have remembered my covenant" (Exod 6:5b), and to the future toward which it goes as pointed out by the promise (Exod 6:6, 7). Thus the progression of meaning in the text flows from the past into the present, and toward the

sadly unbalanced as the future aspect of the promise is overemphasized and the all-inclusive progression of meaning in the text (Exod 6:3-7) is forgotten along with the extension-tension relationship among past, present, and future from which Biblical meanings spring.

1The present tense in Exod 6 (as a historical moment) is different from the present in Exod 3. The schema and basic interpretation of what a knowledge of God entails is, however, the same in both passages.

2It is possible to appreciate here the different dimension in which Biblical reason moves. Plato has also an anamnēsis that is supposed to provide the "true" ontological meaning of the thing itself hidden behind the appearances. In Plato, anamnēsis has the cognitive function of bridging the previously posited ontological chōrismos between the two worlds or levels of reality. In Exod 3:15b, however, anamnēsis (zkr) (even when it also has an ontological sense) works in a temporal cognitive dimension in which it gathers the "extension" through which God's Being "appears" so as to make possible the "tension" in which the knowledge about God as Being in itself stands.
future on the basis of the remembrance of God's acts, of God's presence, and of God's promise.

In the context of the progression of meaning that is found in Exod 6:2-7, knowledge appears, then, as the climax in which these three ec-stasies are centered and connected in an extension-tension relationship. Exod 6:2-7, through its inner progression of meaning, clearly suggests, then, that the knowledge of God will happen in the future as a direct result of God's temporal historical fulfillment.

1 In the text under investigation there is also to be found the climax of a progression of meaning that starts from "hearing" (wešhamēcu, Exod 3:18), goes into "believing" (ya'āminū, Exod 4:8), and reaches finally its climax in "knowing" (wādātēm, Exod 6:7). Due to lack of space it is not possible at this point to analyze this enlightening progression of meaning which would provide further and deeper insights for the development of a Biblical theory of knowledge.

2 That the text suggests a future tense for "knowing" God does not mean that knowledge pertains to the future alone, to the not-yet. That would imply that knowledge of God is not available since the future as such is never reached. The text, however, speaks of future knowledge in the sense of a future that is to be actually reached as it becomes actual present (Exod 6:5-7). Exod 3, 4, and 6 speak of a present in which there is knowledge of God in an "extension-tension" structure. The future ec-stasis points to a present-to-come in which further, deeper knowledge about God's Being will be available. Yet, at the same time, the future is already "present" and acting in Moses's own time as "promise" as future "extension" or intentionality is integrated in Moses's actual knowledge through the cognitive "tension" (the intentionality of the "extension" is "back" into the cognitive subject) which God conditions and makes possible through the revelation of His Being as "promise" (prophecy). Thus, knowledge always "happens," that is, is constituted in the present, but it springs from the ontological "extension" of God's temporal historical activity and from the cognitive "tension" that is suggested as the only way to reach cognitively God's revelation.

3 Thus, the phenomenological analysis points to God acting "between" history and not "within" it as Bultmann's theory suggests (JCM, pp. 61, 62); see also p. 264 above. And yet, in an indirect way Bultmann agrees with the conclusion of my phenomenological analysis. He also sees that in the Bible, God acts "within" history.

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of His present promise (vss. 6, 7), which is rooted in His concern of remembering (past) His covenant (vs. 5). Thus, the present, past, and future ontologically "extend" the Being itself of God as He appears. Consequently, the cognitive process as it approaches the temporally "extended" subject matter has to proceed, in order to discover its meaning, through a "tension" ("gathering") process which could harmoniously connect what has been "extended" in its ontological subject matter.

As the Biblical knowledge about God's Being should follow His temporal ontological disclosure, it is apparent that the cognitive framework of reason's structure functions in the temporal dimensionality, gathering, in cognitive tension, what has been presented in temporal ontological extension. Thus, knowledge about God in Himself and knowledge about His acts coincide. Time and history

Yet, due to his "scientific" interpretation of reason, he considers that to be "mythical," and consequently he cannot accept it. See chapter 2 above, second part. Yet, when the text is considered as a "fact of reason" and its temporal dimensionality is discovered, it can be rationally understood and accepted that God acts, in Bultmann's words, "between" history and its phenomena.

Verses 4-7 of chapter 6 explain how God gives Himself to be known. The giving of God to be known is tied up with the name Yahweh (vs. 3); that is, it is qualified as an ontological disclosure. What God gives to be known is His Being itself. In vss. 4-7 God explains how this ontological giving is provided through the past and future "extensions" (ec-stasies) which are grounded and centered in the present of His presence to Moses (vs. 2). Thus the knowledge of God's Being in itself is ontologically grounded in the "extension" which is made available to human knowledge. But knowledge appears as the movement of "gathering" ("tension") of that which is given in temporal historical "extension." Yet, the cognitive "tension" does not destroy the ontological "extension" but rather requires it as its ground. In this context, knowing God's Being in itself and knowing His acts between history is the same thing.

That, according to the OT scholarship, God is understood to be known through His acts is a fact widely known. See, for
appear as dimensionalities that are at the very root of the Biblical interpretation of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure as seen from the perspective of the epistemological framework.¹

The temporal interpretation of the epistemological structure that Exod 3-6 suggests stands in direct opposition to classical timeless theories of theological knowledge which understand the constitution of theological meaning as an abstractive process which moves away from the level of time (sensory perception), which is denied as the level where there is no theological "truth" into the level of "eternal," "timeless" concepts where God Himself and "truth" abide.

Exod 6, in its ontological and epistemological relevance, turns upside down the classical interpretation of the way knowledge is supposed to be constituted theologically. For the text under consideration, God's words of promise are "abstract" concepts insofar as they are not yet "true." The words of the promise, coming from the future ontological extension of God, certainly render knowledge about God. Yet, this is a kind of "abstract" knowledge. When uttered by God in the present as pertaining to the not-yet, future instance, Motyer, p. 6; E. D. Schmidtz, "Knowledge," New International Dictionary of New Testament Theology (1969), 2:396; Greenberg, p. 83; Lacoste, pp. 345, 350.

¹See Schmidtz, 2:396; Moltmann, Theology of Hope, p. 113; Quell, p. 1062; von Rad, p. 185; Zimmerli, p. 21. It would seem that in His temporal extension-tension, ontological-epistemological structure, God puts Himself on trial. His mission, which is shared with Moses, appears to be an ontological trial in which the Being itself of God is at risk. Buber puts it in the following sentence: "What is now only existent in words will then take on real existence. Then Moses will experience the mission of this God as an expression of
realm, the promise is not actually "true." It is not "false" either. It is just "abstract;" it is a hypothesis which will come "true" only when such a hypothesis is historically confirmed by an "ontic" act of God. Thus, according to the Biblical interpretation of knowledge, truth "becomes" when that which has been promised (prophecied) by God happens in actual time and history.¹

As theological reason is interpreted and utilized in Biblical intelligibility in a temporal dimensionality, the constitution of meaning is to follow a temporal approach to both objectivity² and

His Being; not as a spiritual mission, as now, but as a reality apparent to the senses" (p. 47).

¹When God acts truth becomes. That is, truth finds its ontological ground in the temporal act of God as it happens. The temporal ontological dimensionality revealed by Exod 3-6 requires that the epistemological framework (logos) should be both constituted and expressed within a temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition. The analysis of John 1:17 ἐν ἀλήθειᾳ δία Ἰσοῦ Χριστοῦ έγένετο would bring additional light upon the relationship that exists between the temporal ontological grounding and the temporal epistemological grounded levels of theological reason as understood by Sacred Scripture.

In Exod 6 the people are not expected to pierce by faith into the abstract truth that is supposed to be hidden behind the "historical" promise of God. Not even Moses is supposed to do so. Cognitively, the promise is clear and meaningful. Yet the promise finds its ontological ground in God's future act in history. Until the fulfillment time, the promise is abstract knowledge in the sense of not having an ontological ground. Yet the "abstract" meaning of God's utterance (in this case the promise) is the plain meaning of the text as it is and not a meaning hidden behind it. However, this plain, clear, abstract meaning is a partial, "incomplete" meaning. Its "completion" (fullness) is to be reached as its ontological ground happens. On the other hand, the "abstract" meaning of the text has a provisional ontological ground in God's past and present activities. From this, perspective and context, I would suggest, the sensus plenior as hermeneutical principle should be reinterpreted.

²Because of the limits and purpose of this study, it is not possible here to develop any further the way in which objectivity
reasoning. Extension-tension as ontological-epistemological structure that grounds itself in the temporal dimensionality of \( E \) should be interpreted within a temporal understanding of \( E \)'s dimensionality. A complete investigation should develop in detail the idea of Biblical temporal objectivity as part of a Biblical theory of knowledge. I would like to suggest, however, that when Biblical objectivity refers to entities which are commonly available to man (as for instance, man, history, nature, and sciences), it should be interpreted in a way similar to the one pointed out in chapter 1 above (pp. 130-40). Yet, when the constitution of meaning in its objectivity is referred to, entities which are not commonly available to human knowledge, as, for instance, God's appearances and acts, objectivity should be interpreted following the theo-ontological order from the starting point provided by the record of such appearances as found in the Bible. In order that such an interpretation could be accomplished, the Bible as a whole should not be considered primordially as a book of history (as, for instance, Bultmann does), but rather as a book of ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics. History is, no doubt about it, present in the Bible. Yet the interpretation and understanding of the Biblical contribution to historical knowledge should be made after reason has been interpreted and sharpened as a tool for the constitution of meaning in the temporal dimensionality in which the Bible as a whole, including its historical content, is constituted.

1As in the case of Biblical objectivity, Biblical reasoning (which connects Biblical concepts within the temporal dimensionality of \( E \)) needs to be phenomenologically discussed and analyzed. Exod 3-6 does not get into the details of Biblical reasoning which should be found elsewhere throughout Scripture. Regarding the study of Biblical reasoning I would like to suggest that an epistemological analysis of Biblical typology as so far studied in Biblical hermeneutics would prove to be greatly enlightening. Yet typology should not be interpreted from the traditional interpretation of a timeless primordial presupposition, as Raymond Brown does (The 'Sensus Plenior' of Sacred Scripture, pp. 10-22), but rather it should be interpreted from a phenomenological analysis of the Biblical use of typological structures, as, for instance, can be found in Richard M. Davidson's doctoral thesis (Typology in Scripture: A Study of Hermeneutical Structures [Berrien Springs, Michigan: Andrews University Press, 1981]). In this context typology appears as "an historical approach to the understanding of the saving acts of God" (R. T. France, Jesus and the Old Testament: His Application of Old Testament Passages to Himself and His Mission [Downers Grove, Illinois: Inter-Varsity Press, 1971], p. 76).

Biblical exegesis has already produced a great deal of reflection on typology which can provide a starting point for epistemologically expressing the Biblical movement of reasoning that
logos should, then, be followed by both exegetes and systematic theologians as they work together. Exegesis should place itself in the extension-tension situation as presented and represented in the text to be analyzed in order to discover through and in it what was thought and expressed in the text. Systematic theology should place itself in the actual present of history as it develops. In such a context it has to constitute theological meaning in the extension-tension which Sacred Scriptures present as both past and future lines of intelligibility are discovered in the Bible as a whole.\(^1\)


\(^1\) It is not possible here to develop the way in which exegesis and systematic theology should relate and depend upon each other as they work together in the constitution of theological meaning within a common interpretation of both the dimensionality and the frameworks of reason's structure. Yet it can be initially pointed out that the extension-tension ontological-epistemological situation applies to both. Exegesis would constitute its meanings within the extension-tension as seen from the past present in which it was originally uttered. Exegesis would re-constitute the meaning as, for instance, understood by Moses and the people at their times. The extension-tension in which the knowledge of God's Being was given to them is


Conclusion

The phenomenological analysis of the Biblical context for the criticism of theological reason as expressed in Exod 3:14, 15 and Exod 6:2-7 reveals that a criticism of theological reason is possible.

to be re-constituted in order that its theological and ontological meanings might be grasped. The meaning produced by exegesis would constitute the basis for the activity of systematic theology. Systematic theology would consider the result of exegesis as a whole as coming from the past, if the meaning is grounded in history, or from the future, if the meaning is expressed as an abstract promise of God's future action. Then, systematic theology must constitute, within a temporal understanding of objectivity, meanings for the present understanding, action, and mission of the Church as Moses had to do back in his time for accomplishing the mission God appointed to him.

In this context, systematic theology appears as a rational enterprise, not as a contemplative one, but rather as a reflection in action, in mission. In order that systematic theology may be possible as an intellectual enterprise, the development of a Biblical ontology, epistemology, and metaphysics is necessary. See pp. 41-51 above.

Moreover, systematic theology cannot get rid of the extension-tension in which the promise was originally uttered even after its fulfillment. The promise remains as original ontological extension that grounds meaning and provides further insights into the understanding of both God and His Being. As an example of this continuous approach to the understanding of God from the basis provided by the revelation of Exod 3:14, 15 in the extension-tension situation, Exod 33:12-23; 34:14; and 20:1-17 can be considered. In Exod 20:1-17 the ontological ground of Biblical ethics can be found. Once Yahweh is known by the people in His "truth" as He appeared in the past and as He promised to act in the future, God puts forward the "abstract" outline of ethical principles as expressed in the Ten Commandments. Thus the Ten Commandments as "abstract" ethical knowledge, that is to find its ground in man's ontological acts, is previously to find its original partial ground in God's Being. The Ten Commandments, then, in their grounding in God's Being, provide further ontological insights into the understanding of God's Being which would receive even further light when those "abstract" ethical principles are ontologically grounded in man's own free actions. Obviously, the highest revelation of God's Being is to be found in Christ who Himself declared that His work can be interpreted as revealing further insights regarding the meaning of God's name (Being). Christ said that εὐρίσκειν αὐτοὶς τὸ ὄνομά σου καὶ γνῶρισσον...
The phenomenological analysis shows that Exod 3:14, 15 thinks and expresses Being itself. Thus Exod 3:14, 15 is an ontological text, which, at the very dawn of Judeo-Christian thinking addresses itself to the interpretation of the ground of Being. As the idea of Being is expressed, it is tied to the idea of theos as appearance or presence. Consequently, the Biblical interpretation of reason's ordo replaces the classical onto-theo-logical ordo by a theo-onto-logical one. It is in this "order" that the ontological subject matter of Exod 3:14, 15 opens itself up in the three temporal ec-stasies (past, present, and future).

From the revelation of the ontological meaning of the "sound-name" YHWH and through its temporal openness, Exod 3:14, 15 in its parallel structure provides an introduction to the Biblical interpretation of the primordial presupposition from the viewpoint of the ontological framework. Being is thought as appearing in the "ontic presence" (Exod 3:2) which "extends" itself in the three temporal ec-stasies. Thus, from both the identification of Being and appearance and the openness of Being in the ontological temporal distension, it appears that the primordial presupposition of the ground (John 17:26). Regarding the "I am" declarations by Christ as related to the "I am who I am" of Exod 3:14, see Ladd, A Theology of the New Testament, p. 250; and C. K. Barret, p. 342.

As Being's dimensionality co-appears with theos as the ONE that grounds the unity, coherence, and system of reason's system, Biblical rationality finds at its very origin what Heidegger saw as a necessity for his own temporal understanding of reality as a whole. According to Heidegger our times are needy because they are lacking a God who would "assemble on himself man and the things and in this assemblage would arrange the history of the world and man's sojourn in it" (Holzwege, p. 248, as quoted and translated by Vicynias,
of Being has been understood temporally\(^1\) by Biblical rationality.

Moreover, in Exod 6:2-7, the temporal ontological extension is completed as the ground of Being, as expressed through the name YHWH (already ontologically qualified), is approached from the epistemological viewpoint involved in the Being-logos relationship. The phenomenological analysis of the Exod 6:2-7 passage shows that Biblical logos is supposed to follow the ontological grounding temporal extension with an epistemological temporal tension (gathering) of the lines of intelligibility that come from the extended subject matter. Additionally, according to the Biblical interpretation of logos dimensionality, knowledge is considered as reaching the very Being of God who reveals Himself as He acts "ontically."\(^2\)

\(^1\)Michalson (Rationality of Faith, p. 15) points out that thus far, no theologian has put history as center of his system. As Being's temporal dimensionality is thought and expressed in the Bible, the possibility of both a Biblical ontology and criticism of reason is established.

\(^2\)This implies that the common interpretation that sees extra-Biblical philosophy as a must for developing Christian theology is only partially true. Tillich is representative of this posture when he affirms that "the attempt of biblicism to avoid nonbiblical, ontological terms is doomed to failure as surely as are the corresponding philosophical attempts. The Bible itself always uses the categories and concepts which describe the structure of experience. On every page of every religious or theological text these concepts appear: time, space, cause, thing, subject, nature, movement, freedom, necessity, life, value, knowledge, experience, being and not-being. Biblicism may try to preserve their popular meaning, but then it ceases to be theology. It must neglect the fact that a philosophical understanding of these categories has influenced ordinary language for many centuries. . . . The theologian must take seriously the meaning of the terms he uses. They must be known to him in the whole depth and breadth of their meaning. Therefore, the systematic theologian must be a philosopher in critical understanding even if
As neither in the ontological nor in the epistemological frameworks can the suggestion of an original "gap," "chasm," or "chorismos" be found, it appears that the dimensionality in which both Being and Logos (ontological and epistemological frameworks) in Biblical rationality have to be understood is temporal.

As an original reflection on the ground of Being has been found within the Biblical context, the possibility for the development of a criticism of theological reason has been established.

Now the actual criticism of theological reason can begin. As the criticism of theological reason is pursued, it should follow the basic guidelines laid down by the phenomenological analysis of the only available theological reflection on the ground of Being and its dimensionality, namely, Exod 3:14, 15 and context—the two main guidelines that Exod 3:14, 15 and context ground (which should be followed in a criticism of theological reason) are the temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition of the dimensionality of reason's structure and the theo-onto-logical ordo. On the basis of these two main guidelines both the ontological and epistemological frameworks should be investigated in relation to their Biblical interpretation. Such an interpretation should be discovered from

not in creative power" (Systematic Theology, 1:21). Tillich's approach is true, but only partially so, because the philosophy that the theologian needs (in that, Tillich is quite right) must be derived from the Scripture itself and must be constructed in a temporal dimensionality.

As the Biblical epistemology is developed, it is possible to find valuable insights in extra-Biblical epistemological approaches that describe historical reason within a timeless dimensionality as, for instance, Michalson does (Rationality of Faith,
the Bible as a fact of theological reason and then expressed technically in ontological and epistemological language.

(p. 87). In this sense Husserl's, Heidegger's, and Merleau-Ponty's epistemology could also prove helpful in providing insights. Yet, no help can be found for the development of the ontological framework of reason's structure because of its theo-onto-logical order. Thus, the epistemological insights that may help to sharpen the epistemological framework of reason's structure should be selected only after the Biblical interpretation of the ontological framework has been reached.
At the beginning of this study the question regarding the possibility of a criticism of theological reason was formulated. The search for an answer to this foundational question has required the careful analysis of three major contexts in which reason has been both utilized and interpreted in relation to the constitution of theological meanings, namely, the philosophical, theological, and Biblical contexts. Now that the analysis of these three contexts has been completed, it is possible to answer affirmatively the question of the possibility of a criticism of theological reason by theology itself. The evidence provided by the analysis of these three major contexts allows me to conclude that a criticism of theological reason is indeed possible.

The analysis of the philosophical context, for instance, reveals the nature and structure of reason as it functions as a tool for the constitution of meaning. Reason's hypothetical nature was also uncovered. Reason constitutes meaning as it functions always in a subject-object relationship which requires an interpretation of both the ontological and epistemological frameworks. The basic meaning of these frameworks is determined by the interpretation of the dimensionality of Being and reason (the primordial presupposition) on which both of them stand. The analysis of the philosophical context also revealed that philosophy so far has developed two main
interpretations of the dimensionality and function of reason, namely, timelessness and temporality. As a matter of fact the philosophical interpretation of Being (as no-thing) which determines the basic interpretation of reason accepted in Western civilization and science was born as Parmenides provided, at the very beginning of Western philosophy, a timeless interpretation of the primordial presupposition. On the other hand it was only rather recently that philosophy explored and expressed a temporal interpretation of reason's dimensionality. Both interpretations ground different understandings of both the ontological and epistemological frameworks—that is, of reason functioning in the constitution of meaning, yet following the onto-theo-logical structural order which is essential to the very nature of philosophy.

Consequently, as pointed out in chapter 1 above, reason's functioning has been identified and confused with its timeless interpretation. Since the temporal approach to the interpretation of both Being and reason's structure is a rather recent happening in the history of philosophy (nineteenth and twentieth centuries), its actual development is only in its initial stages. On the other hand, the fact that philosophy has developed two different interpretations of reason's dimensionality points to its hypothetical nature and is not to be confused with traditional approaches that relate reason to either relativism or subjectivism. Relativism and subjectivism as philosophical options stand only over against something which is considered absolute or necessary in the context of a timeless interpretation of reason's dimensionality. If a temporal interpretation is followed, relativism and subjectivism as usually addressed and understood in philosophy stand in need of fundamental reinterpretation. In other words, what may be philosophically understood by relativism and subjectivism in a temporal dimensionality of reason depends on the reinterpretation that this dimensionality requires of such basic epistemological concepts as absoluteness, necessity, and truth. Thus the temporality-timelessness disjunction revealed by the analysis of the philosophical context does not point to relativism or subjectivism, but rather goes beyond them to the expression of the fundamental hypothetical nature of reason on which these and any other epistemological concepts are constituted.
It would seem, at first glance, that the philosophical approach to the criticism of reason does not leave epistemological room for a theological approach to it. Yet the very fact that theos as the center of coherence and meaning, is included in philosophy's interpretation of the structure of reason (following an onto-theological order) reveals that the philosophical criticism of reason does not deny the possibility of a theological approach to it, but rather seems to leave such an epistemological possibility open for theology, which must decide about it.

The investigation of the theological context as represented in the systems of Aquinas and Bultmann clearly shows that theology has so far dogmatically adopted the classical timeless interpretation of both reason's dimensionality and its frameworks within the philosophical onto-theological structural order. The two systems share the same interpretation of reason's dimensionality, even though they follow different major philosophical traditions of reason's interpretation. Thomas, representing conservative theology (both Catholic and Protestant), follows a Parmenidean-Platonic-Aristotelian pattern for the interpretation of reason's structure and functioning, while Bultmann, representing liberal theology (Protestant), follows a Parmenidean-Kantian pattern.

Thus, the analysis of the theological context reveals that the cognitive categories (epistemological framework) utilized for the constitution of theological meanings have been interpreted and shaped following the basic Platonic-Aristotelian model. Extra-theological categories are thus brought into theological discourse
from the subject's side as the theologian needs to employ categories for the constitution of meaning. As there are no theological interpretations of rational categories available, theologians are bound to use those interpretations which are available—that is to say, the philosophical interpretations of reason's categories. Because the philosophical interpretations of reason's categories are shaped from the starting point of the ontos, their application to the theological realm—and particularly to its Biblical ground—entails a process of selection according to which only those ideas which match reason's timeless categories are considered as true; and consequently those which do not match them are considered as "myth," "educational examples," and the like. In short, the analysis of the theological context not only shows that theology uncritically follows the timeless interpretation of reason's primordial presupposition (thus ignoring the possible temporal interpretation of it suggested by contemporary philosophy, notably Heidegger and Merleau-Ponty); it also shows that because it follows the timeless interpretation of reason, theology is unable to grasp the intelligibility of the original reflections on which Christian theology is founded.

The question arises regarding the foundation on which theology's choice of a timeless interpretation of reason's primordial presupposition has been made. At this point it is not surprising to discover that, since theology has accepted the onto-theological order of reason's structure, which places the criticism of reason in philosophy's realm, no actual reflection on the dimensionality of reason (its primordial presupposition) has been developed by
Christian theology. The classical Greek timeless interpretation has simply been assumed without any further critical consideration. Yet, since philosophy has advanced a different temporal interpretation that revealed both the hypothetical nature of reason's structure and the uncritical epistemological stand of Christian theology as a whole, the question for theology's intellectual grounds and its own interpretation of reason's dimensionality cannot be ignored any longer.

In order for Christian theology to approach the interpretation of reason's dimensionality and make a decision regarding its meaning, it is necessary that a theological reflection on the ground of Being be found at the origin of Christian rationality, or, if none is found, that an approach to it be provided. Since the analysis of the theological context revealed that the reflection has not been produced nor attempted, the analysis of theological rationality as expressed in the Biblical context stands in need of phenomenological examination in order to determine whether or not such reflection already exists at the intellectual foundations of Christian reflection.

Since Exod 3:14 has been traditionally considered as the locus classicus of an ongoing discussion regarding the meaning of Being within Scriptures, the analysis of the Biblical context was focused on it and its context in order to discover its ontological relevance. The phenomenological analysis reveals that Exod 3:14 and its context express an original reflection on the ground of Being. As such, this foundational passage of Christian rationality (which can be
considered as the theological parallel to Parmenides's philosophical interpretation) provides not only the necessary ground for a criticism of theological reason, as reason's structure is interpreted as functioning in a theo-onto-logical order (grounded on God's "ontic presence"), but also the necessary viewpoint that an actual development of a criticism of theological reason requires, namely, the temporal interpretation of reason's dimensionality (its primordial presupposition).

The analysis of the Biblical context, as represented in the original reflection on the Ground of Being that Exodus 3:14 expresses, shows that Biblical rationality does address itself to foundational ontology as it explicitly puts Being into words. Thus, Exod 3:14 seems to provide the necessary ground, even the intellectual justification, for a Biblical philosophy that can stand independent from the Greek traditions of philosophy. In other words, it seems that we could speak of two different philosophical traditions—namely, the Parmenidean and the Mosaic-Biblical traditions.

Since within Biblical rationality Being co-appears with theos (in His "ontic-presence"), Exod 3:14 and its context provide the necessary basis for a theological approach to the interpretation of reason's structure, namely, for a criticism of theological reason. Moreover, the context of intelligibility in which both the expression of God's Being and its ontological understanding are expressed suggests a temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition of reason's structure at the level of its ontological framework (ontos). The analysis of Exod 6:2-7 complements the picture by suggesting that
also from the perspective of the epistemological framework (logos) Biblical rationality is developed according to a temporal understanding of the primordial presupposition. No chôrismos, gap, or discontinuity whatsoever is either expressed or implied. On the contrary, reason is found explicitly functioning on the assumption of a temporal historical continuity. In short, it seems that theology, in following the Parmenidean philosophical interpretation of reason’s structure was not only disregarding its own rational structures but was following an interpretation of reason which is incompatible with the one used as its original reflection and concepts were constituted and communicated in the Bible.

Once the possibility of both a criticism of theological reason, as expressed in the theo-onto-logical interpretation of reason’s structured order, and also the theological interpretation of reason’s primordial presupposition, namely, temporality, have been established, the problem arises regarding the way in which theology should decide between the classical timeless interpretation of reason adopted in the constitution of Christian theological systems and the temporal interpretation that appears at the origin and foundation of Christian rationality as expressed in the Biblical context.

First of all, it must be noted that the same problem is faced by philosophy which should provide an answer of its own. Here, however, I am concerned only with a theological answer; the philosophical one falls outside the limits and purpose of this dissertation. Philosophy has to provide an answer within its own realm, following its own interpretation of reason’s structure order (that is, within
an onto-theo-logical order). In my opinion, philosophy needs to affirm both of them as it stands on reason's hypothetical nature as its ground for decision; yet this raises questions regarding the very foundations of philosophy as intellectual enterprise as so far understood; and these require urgent, careful philosophical treatment.¹

Within the Christian theological realm, which is the concern of the present investigation, the decision regarding the adoption of a timeless or a temporal interpretation of reason should be made on grounds other than the onto-theo-logical philosophical ones, namely other than on the ground and authority of reason's functioning alone, which, as has been shown, stands in a foundational hypothetical nature that cannot be avoided. Furthermore, because of theology's particular intellectual dependence on the Biblical tradition as

¹The hypothetical nature of reason challenges its traditional role as the criterion and ground for truth not only in theology but also in philosophy. This situation requires, perhaps, that philosophy both reassess its foundational interpretation of truth, and adapt it to the hypothetical nature of reason on which philosophical truth is supposed to stand. The major problem to be faced by such a philosophical reassessment would be related to the interpretation and role of the theos (fundamental unity) in reason's structure. If reason's hypothetical nature makes possible at least two basic interpretations of its own dimensionality, it seems difficult to see how the unity that its own system requires (theos) could be attained.

At this point we may remember Heidegger's own approach to the problem. In his "overcoming" of metaphysics he actually rejected both the traditional timeless interpretation of the theos and the theos itself as part of reason's structure. Thus he understood reason to function in an "onto-logical" order from which the theos was just absent--not only the Christian theos but also the theos as ground for the systematic unity and coherence of reason. Perhaps the only available conclusion, which I obviously cannot establish here, is that the onto-theo-logical interpretation of reason's structure is doomed to failure and that, consequently, it should be replaced by the Christian theo-onto-logical interpretation. Since this would imply philosophy's surrendering of its intellectual foundations to theological reflections, it is very likely that philosophy will develop another solution for this problem.
constitutive of its own essence, it seems that the interpretation that co-appears with the original reflection on the theos should determine the theological interpretation of Being's and reason's (logia) dimensionality. In the philosophical realm, the choice is linked to a purely rational option as it naturally appears from the perspective of the ontos. As the interpretation of the ontos is sought on the basis of reason, reason's hypothetical nature presents two possibilities—the way of timelessness and the way of temporality. On the other hand, when the dimensionality of reason is seen from the perspective of not only the theos but particularly of the Christian theos, it seems that the appearance of the Christian theos as "ontic presence" brings along as "built-in," a temporal interpretation of Being's and reason's dimensionality which is both constitutive of and expressed through the ground provided by its appearance which essentially includes the Word (logia). That is to say, the "ontic appearance," on which not only a criticism of theological reason but also Christian theology as a whole stands, does not appear as a "brute fact" from which no line of intelligibility whatsoever flows to the cognitive subject, who is expected to provide by his own rational hypothetical powers the interpretation of the "brute fact." If this were the case, the onto-theo-logical order would need to be applied and theology would stand in intellectual dependence on philosophy and share in its essential hypothetical nature. On the contrary, however, God's "ontic presence" can be intellectually grasped when it appears not as a "brute fact" but rather (as it is understood by biblical writers) as the most fundamental and
meaningful happening of all, which certainly includes as its source of meaning many lines of intelligibility, among them notably those which essentially provide the ground for temporal interpretation of reason's dimensionality. In this way the theo-onto-logical order of theology as intellectual enterprise can be seen at work. It is no longer the reflection on the ontos (philosophical reflection) which provides the ground for the interpretation of the theos of theology. On the contrary, it is the theos and the lines of intelligibility that flow from it that determine the interpretation of the ontos within which the original reflection of Christian theology has been constituted as a whole.

Furthermore, were it possible for Christian theology to constitute its system and meanings in absolute disconnection from the lines of intelligibility that flow from the Christian theos as presented in the Bible, it would have to accept the reflection of reason's dimensionality from the philosophical perspective. Yet, it is apparent that Christian theology not only cannot detach itself from its original Biblical reflection on the ground of Being from the perspective of the theos but that it essentially depends and is based on it. Otherwise there would be no authentic Christian theology, but only theology as such and in general, as for instance, is the case in early Greek theology. Thus the affirmation of the possibility of a criticism of theological reason co-appears with the theological decision for a temporal interpretation of Being's and reason's dimensionality. Consequently, a critical approach to actually developing a criticism of theological reason should reject the
traditional, timeless interpretation on which Christian theological systems have been so far constituted and should adopt, on the contrary, both the theo-onto-logical interpretation of reason's structure and its Christian temporal interpretation of the primordial presupposition.

This study reaches as its conclusion only the affirmation of the possibility of a criticism of theological reason. An actual development of it has not even been intended. Consequently, an evaluation and criticism of reason's traditional interpretation and behavior in the constitution of theological meanings (as represented in Thomas's and Bultmann's systems) cannot be developed here either. Only on the basis, not of the affirmation of the possibility of a criticism of theological reason, but rather of its actual development could the evaluation and criticism of reason's traditional behavior and systems in theological enterprise be attempted.

Nonetheless, on the basis of the radically different interpretation of both reason's structural order (theo-onto-logical) and dimensionality (temporality) it is possible to suggest at this point that the actual development of a criticism of theological reason implies an "overcoming" of reason's traditional, timeless interpretation, and consequently, of its systematic and dogmatic results. Yet, regarding both the conservative and the liberal interpretations and uses of reason's structure in the constitution of theological meaning, the "overcoming" does not entail a complete rejection of Christian theology as so far constituted.

Moreover, because both the traditional approach to theology
in its systematic and dogmatic results and the critical approach to theology in its yet-to-be-seen dogmatic and systematic results work with the same subject matter, it is possible to foresee that the "overcoming" that a criticism of theological reason entails does not mean the absolute denial of every single Christian truth as it is so far understood and believed in the conservative and liberal traditions of Christian theology. It means rather that on the basis of the constitution of theological meanings with the help, for the first time, of frameworks and categories of reason, theologically developed and grounded, reason would be finally completely "prepared" and "fitted" for its theological task, which in its results would "overcome" traditional systematic and dogmatic formulations in the sense of "going beyond" both liberalism and conservatism.

In other words, as reason is interpreted from a theological basis, its categories and procedures for the constitution of meaning change. Consequently, the result of constituted meanings (dogmatics and exegesis) will change as well. Indeed, not only will the theological answers be different, but even the theological questions will change. A new theological system will arise, which, for the first time, will be free from extra-theological philosophical conditioning. Furthermore, this "overcoming" will not spring from or pertain to any particular tradition of Christian theology (Catholic or Protestant, conservative or liberal). Thus, the actual development of a criticism of theological reason and its ensuing systematic and exegetical results could provide a new starting point for Christian rapprochement. Since the traditional timeless interpretation of
reason's structure is at the basis of the many disagreements that divide Christian theology, the "overcoming" of this interpretation through an authentically theological temporal interpretation of reason's structure and its frameworks as present in the Bible could prove to be greatly beneficial for furthering Christian dialogue, as theological truth is for the first time systematically explored with an intellectual tool (reason) especially shaped and fitted for the specific purpose of constituting Christian theological meanings.

In order that a criticism of theological reason may be actually developed, as a basis for the theological dogmatic and systematic "overcoming" of the liberal and conservative approaches, further study needs to be done. Such a critical enterprise is going to be time-consuming, difficult, and complex, but at the same time very rewarding both intellectually and spiritually. It will require a team effort in which many different specialties will be called to participate, for its development will embrace the entire spectrum of Christian theology. The path that a criticism of theological reason will ultimately follow, however, will be discovered as its actual development takes place. Yet at this initial stage I would like to suggest at least some broad guidelines that could be helpful as the actual development of the criticism of theological reason gets started. To begin with, it should be taken into consideration that a criticism of theological reason should be constructed on the basis of a careful phenomenological analysis of the foundational fact of theological reason that is found in the Bible as a whole. The criticism of theological reason needs to be approached and developed on
the ground provided by Biblical rationality and intelligibility; otherwise it would be neither Christian nor theological.

In other words, the criticism of theological reason is not supposed to create a new theory of knowledge (reason). Such an approach would follow the traditional onto-theo-logical path, and consequently would not be a **theological** criticism. A theological criticism of reason, on the contrary, should begin from the phenomenological discovery of reason's frameworks that appear flowing from the "ontic presence" of God (**theos**). From this starting point the cognitive analysis should aim to discover the ways and categories in which reason's structure has already functioned in the constitution of Biblical rationality. Within this general context, the enterprise should follow the theo-onto-logical structural order, according to which God's "ontic appearance" conditions the understanding and interpretation of Being, and through the interpretation of Being also condition the interpretation of reason's cognitive categories (**logia** or epistemological framework).

The criticism of theological reason needs to work phenomenologically in order to grasp, describe, and epistemologically express the structure, categories, frameworks, and procedures of reason as they co-appear when Biblical conceptuality is actually expressed and developed throughout Holy Scriptures. The results of such an epistemological descriptive enterprise would enable Christian theologians both to properly understand their intellectual and theological roots and to develop their own theological reflections utilizing the same rational procedures that were used in the constitution of the
foundational concepts of Christian thinking as recorded in the Bible.

Within the general context special consideration should be given to the discovery and expression of the Biblical interpretation and usage of both the ontological and epistemological frameworks of reason's structure. The ontological framework should be approached first. Since it is at this point that both the liberal and conservative systems find their intellectual ground in the traditional extra-theological timeless interpretation of reason's dimensionality, the critical approach should develop the theological understanding of Being and its dimensionality through a careful study of the ways the Christian theos appears and is interpreted within Biblical rationality. Thus the Christian doctrine of God and the Christian doctrine of Being will co-appear. This foundational study of Biblical ontology could be summarized under the broad title of God and time.¹

This understanding of God's Being should be investigated within the general framework of intelligibility provided by the temporal interpretation of both Being's and reason's dimensionality as expressed in Exod 3:14 and 6:2-7. It should begin by questioning the timeless interpretation of God's transcendence. Furthermore, an

¹This does not mean the denial of philosophy as a realm of inquiry. It only means the denial of an extra-theological, extra-Biblical philosophy as constitutive of theology and its interpretation of reason's structure. This denial is based on the existence of a Biblical philosophy which only the theo-onto-logical, temporal approach can discover and express. In other words, at this point theology takes over the philosophical task, which has been so far developed in an extra-theological realm and procedure, and develops it within its own realm and according to its own procedure. The result of this philosophical reflection within the realm of theology will replace any extra-theological, extra-Biblical reflection that the interpretation of theological reason or the development of Christian theology may need.
investigation in search of the Biblical understanding of God's transcendence should carefully apply a methodological epoché to every extant theory regarding God's Being and His transcendence. Only through the consistent application of a methodological epoché could the meaning of God's transcendence, as it appears in the framework of a temporal interpretation of Being's dimensionality, be discovered. In other words, an investigation of the way Biblical rationality interprets God's Being should begin by asking how transcendence is understood in the background of intelligibility that is provided by the temporal interpretation of Being's dimensionality expressed in Exod 3:14. Moreover, an interpretation of God's Being should focus on the actual ontological "extension" through which and in which His Being is given. At the same time theologians should recognize the cognitive "tension" which is supposed to gather the flow of intelligibility that proceeds from God's ontological "extension," so that the ontological structure revealed by this flow of intelligibility may be grasped and described. By thus patiently following God's ontic "extension" as it appears in the Biblical interpretation "stretched out" in the three ec-stasies of temporality, and by gathering in cognitive "tension" the flow of intelligibility revealed by God's ontic "extension," the theologian should be able gradually to discover both the Biblical idea of God and the Biblical understanding of Being as they co-appear and are grounded in the theos.¹

¹As a new approach to the understanding of the theos is considered, one discovers that some contemporary theologians have
The interpretation of reason's ontological framework should be completed by the analysis of man's being as it appears and is interpreted in Biblical rationality. Then the interpretation of Biblical metaphysics is to be developed and expressed in order to provide the basis of reason's unity and systematic coherence. Obviously the interpretation of Biblical metaphysics would have to be developed within a temporal interpretation of Being's dimensionality in the context provided by the Biblical ontological interpretation of both God's and man's being.

already expressed seminal reflections which should not be ignored. For instance, Jürgen Moltmann affirms that "God who reveals himself in Jesus must be thought of as the God of the Old Testament, as the God of the exodus and the promise, as the God with 'future as his essential nature', and therefore must not be identified with the Greek view of God, with Parmenides' 'eternal present' of Being, with Plato's highest Idea and with the Unmoved Mover of Aristotle, not even in his attributes. Who he is, is not declared by the world as a whole, but is declared by Israel's history of promise. His attributes cannot be expressed by negation of the sphere of the earthly, human, mortal and transient, but only in recalling and recounting the history of his promise. In Jesus Christ, however, the God of Israel has revealed himself as the God of all mankind. Thus the path leads from the concretum to the concretum universale, not the other way round. Christian theology has to think along this line. It is not that a general truth became concrete in Jesus, but the concrete, unique, historic event of the crucifying and raising of Jesus by Yahweh, the God of promise who creates being out of nothing, becomes general through the universal eschatological horizon it anticipates" (Theology of Hope, pp. 141, 142).

Yet even Moltmann, who is here following an insight provided by OT scholarship (God's action and the "promise" motif) is unable to draw the ontological and cognitive consequences for the understanding of Being's dimensionality and his theo-onto-logical structure that are entailed by the approach to the knowledge of God he is suggesting. Moltmann, like most theologians, still works with an onto-theo-logical understanding of reason's structure which does not allow him to "overcome" the traditional interpretation of reason as used in theology so far. Moltmann's traditional timeless understanding of reason is apparent when he follows the traditional theological idea that plays law and promise against each other (pp. 143-45).
Within the framework of intelligibility provided by a temporal understanding of both Being and reason, Biblical metaphysics is supposed to draw a picture, as clear as possible, of reality as a whole, that is of \( \text{ta panta} \). Yet, within a temporal dimensionality, \( \text{ta panta} \) moves. It does not stand still; it is not static, as in traditional metaphysics. Consequently, as both the whole (\( \text{ta panta} \)) and the thinker who is trying to grasp and express its meaning are supposed to move, it follows that \( \text{ta panta} \) as such cannot be reached nor expressed, as it were, from the outside by trying to embrace it through a single \text{visio } or \text{contemplatio}. On the contrary, if \( \text{ta panta} \) moves, its meaning should be approached, grasped, and expressed as it were from the inside, from within its own movement. At this point the entire Bible provides the basis for an authentically temporal historical metaphysics that grasp the meaning of the \( \text{ta panta} \) from its inside as it moves, extends, and embraces itself in the "extension-tension" movement of Biblical intelligibility.

Even though Biblical motifs, such as, for instance, the sanctuary and the struggle between good and evil, can provide enlightening insights that should be kept in mind as the Biblical interpretation of \( \text{ta panta} \) is investigated, the center of the whole is to be seen in the ontological framework as both God's being and man's being develop together in inner and essential relationship.

At this point, consequently, the Bible as a whole appears to provide the only metaphysical interpretation of the meaning of \( \text{ta panta} \) from inside its temporal flux.\(^1\) Such an interpretation,

\(^1\)God, as the "center" of \( \text{ta panta} \) (as He appears in the OT through and in His "ontic presence" which in the NT reaches its

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when developed in its main guidelines, should provide the general background for intelligibility that is to be the ground for coherence of both theological reason and its system.

Secondly, the epistemological framework should be approached and investigated. The Biblical logia should be studied at the level of the origin of concepts, the constitution of categories (objectivity), and the relation of meanings once constituted, among themselves (reasoning).

At this point a word of clarification is necessary. The suggestion that the theological interpretation of reason "overcomes" the traditional timeless understanding of it does not mean that all rational procedures as known so far must be rejected by a temporal interpretation. As a matter of fact, there are many rational procedures that have been developed in close contact with temporal reality, notably those of the modern empirical sciences. (An evaluation of these procedures and their relation to a temporal interpretation of reason's structure is not possible here; but it should be undertaken as the criticism of theological reason actually developed). Thus, for instance, mathematical, physical, or historical procedures which could be involved and required in the determination

climax in the person and work of Christ), grounds an authentically Christian interpretation of the whole (ta panta) which is developed, from its very foundations, along the lines of temporal functioning of reason's structure. Contemporary metaphysical approaches, such as process theology, evolutionary theory, and Marxism, do recognize that the whole moves. Yet, all of them approach the interpretation of the meaning of ta panta from both an extra-theological ontological framework and a timeless interpretation of reason's epistemological framework. See chapter 1 above.
of information and dates (which obviously play a paramount part in a temporal interpretation of reality as a whole) are not basically to be modified. Yet, as the meaning of any part of data stands in direct relation to the whole to which they belong, the data and dates which such "traditional" procedures provide will assume quite different connotations and nuances as they appear embedded within the Biblical metaphysical framework of intelligibility.

As the investigation of the interpretation of the epistemological framework is pursued through a phenomenological analysis of Biblical rationality, it will be useful to discover how many categories and patterns of reasoning already have been approached indirectly by Biblical scholarship; for instance, the epistemological study of Biblical patterns of reasoning, exegetical and hermeneutical studies on the meaning and structure of Biblical typology may provide deep and decisive insights.

It is only when these basic aspects of reason's criticisms have been discovered and adequately expressed that related epistemological issues can be properly analyzed from a theological perspective, notably the problem of the origin of theological meanings (revelation-inspiration) and methodological hermeneutical patterns and procedures. After these issues are properly clarified, all of the exegetical and doctrinal propositions and meanings that constitute the whole of Christian theology can be properly addressed.¹

Because the interpretation of theological and exegetical

¹Regarding related issues that should be approached once the criticism of reason has reached its initial development, see the Introduction above, p. 13-15.
methodology has been developed on the basis of an extra-theological, timeless understanding of reason's functioning which stands in need of being overcome, methodological procedures (in exegesis, for example) stand in need of radical reinterpretation. Consequently, within the exegetical realm both the grammatical-historical and historical-critical methods stand in need of being "overcome" through the developing of a new exegetical method which should replace them in the search for Biblical meanings. Yet, due to the fact that a complete criticism of reason in all its complexities and details may require a long time to develop and mature, it seems advisable that a criticism of the whole of Christian theology should be approached as a team effort involving all its related areas of concern and specialties. Yet the general understanding should prevail that such an enterprise is to develop along the Biblical lines of intelligibility and that each area and discipline should take into account the discoveries that a criticism of reason may be gradually presenting to the theological community. This, moreover, implies that theological reflection in all its areas should be flexible enough to adjust its own conclusions in an ever-progressing discovering of truth.

The analysis of time and timelessness as primordial presuppositions has pointed to the possibility that a criticism of theological reason can be developed. Some of the tasks and consequences of such a possibility have been briefly suggested. The actual task of developing a criticism of theological reason remains before us. It involves both an opportunity and a risk: opportunity, because theology, after centuries of intellectual dependence, contemplates the
possibility of being finally independent and thus authentically Christian; and risk, because its intellectual independence, its "coming of age" entails the insecurity involved in the "overcoming" of its own traditions and dogmatic exegetical formulations. Will theology accept the risk? Will it strive for its intellectual freedom? Or, on the contrary, will it rather choose to stay in comfortable intellectual dependence, avoiding both the task and the risk? Only the future of Christian theology is able to answer this question.

Perhaps the passion for truth that burns in the soul of every theologian and the sad situation of theological disagreement and lack of unity that theology's intellectual dependence has so far produced could provide the necessary motivation for both facing the task and accepting the risk. If that is the case, the first step to be taken on the path of intellectual independence seems to be clear: the actual development of a criticism of theological reason.
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