A Critique of Three Psychological Theories of Behavior and the Presuppositions Which Underly Their Model of Man

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Andrews University
School of Graduate Studies

A CRITIQUE OF THREE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF
BEHAVIOR AND THE PRESUPPOSITIONS WHICH
UNDERLY THEIR MODEL OF MAN

Thesis
Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Master of Arts

by
Marek Jantos
August 1981
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APPROVAL BY THE COMMITTEE:

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July 7, 1981
Date Approved
ABSTRACT

A CRITIQUE OF THREE PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF BEHAVIOR AND THE PRESUPPOSITIONS WHICH UNDERLY THEIR MODEL OF MAN

by

Marek Jantos

Chairperson: Ruth R. Murdoch
Problem

Each psychological theory of behavior is based on a specific model of man. The models of man in turn, are built on particular presuppositions concerning the nature of man. To fully understand the implications and limitations of the different models and theories it is necessary to examine the presuppositions upon which each model and theory is built. The purpose of this study is to examine and critique the presuppositions of three models of man as presented in three psychological theories of behavior.
Method

The method of this study consisted of a search of literature using as primary sources the writings of the authors of the theories and as secondary sources commentaries on the theories. On the basis of the statements found in the primary sources, each theory's model of man was restructured and the underlying presuppositions critiqued.

Conclusions

The models and presuppositions of the three psychological theories of behavior underestimate the uniqueness and complexity of human nature. This leads to a theoretical dehumanization of man and to a psychological dilemma of meaninglessness in existence. A Christian model of man may provide a more complete, meaningful and coherent view of man and should be further studied in more detail.
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CHAPTER I

THE PROBLEM

Introduction

The field of psychology is characterized by a proliferation of theories on human behavior and personality. Among these theories some are panoramic in nature attempting to encompass the whole range of psychological phenomena, while others are more restricted giving special attention to particular aspects of human behavior. Each of the theories consists of concepts that are proposed on the basis of insight, intuition, imagination, experimentation or analogy with something that already exists. Naturally no two theories are in total harmony in the interpretation of data on human behavior. In reviewing the literature it becomes apparent that the most basic root of the differences in opinion and interpretation stems from a nonscientific level, namely from a philosophical base.

Each psychologist, like all scientists, is led in his research and interpretation by certain a priori beliefs commonly known as presuppositions. These presuppositions are the basic underlying assumptions about the nature of the subject matter and the nature of scientific inquiry. The significance of presuppositions in the study of the models of man stems from the fact that they act as preconceived guidelines in research, discussion, and interpretation of data concerning the nature of man. Presuppositions in psychology and the resulting
methods have formed the basis for the development of various models of the nature of man. Around these models of man have grown schools of thought which not only deal with the theoretical aspects of psychology but also extend themselves into various practical applications. Applications can be found in such practical domains as testing, diagnostics, counseling and therapy. But before a particular diagnostic tool or therapeutic method can be personally accepted by the counselor, therapist, or diagnostician, an understanding of the presuppositions which underly the tools and methods is necessary. A tool probing a person's unconscious mind obviously is constructed on the assumption that in humans an unconscious level of the mind exists. Likewise a therapeutic approach utilizing principles developed in animal laboratories is based on the assumption that man's behavior shares a common denominator with the behavior of animals. In this manner presuppositions underly tools, methods, and models, and most of these presuppositions relate directly to questions concerning the nature of man.

Justification of Study

The individual student, teacher, or practitioner needs to be aware of the hidden presuppositions in theories, models and methods of psychology. This is especially important in the case where an individual's philosophy disagrees with the philosophical presuppositions of the theory. From the perspective of a Christian philosophy there are numerous unacceptable presuppositions in the existent theories of behavior which carry with them unacceptable implications concerning the nature of man.

From the Christian view one of the first challenges is the
identification of presuppositions which agree with or contradict the Christian philosophy. A Christian psychologist cannot accept models of man, or products of models which belittle man's humanity to mere materialistic and fatalistic concepts or, on the other hand, elevate man to levels of unrealistic super humanity. It is necessary to scrutinize the different views of man and cautiously select tools and methods built upon acceptable presuppositions. The Christian must operate on the basis of presuppositions that are in harmony with his own philosophy.

**Purpose of the Study**

The purpose of this study is to critique three psychological theories of behavior and their presuppositions concerning the nature of man. The three schools studied are: the psychoanalytic, the behavioristic, and the humanistic.

The psychoanalytic school is a theoretical and therapeutic approach developed by Sigmund Freud on the basis of his experience with the treatment and analysis of hysterical patients. Its major concepts include the assumption of unconscious mental processes and the emphasis of the role of human sexuality and aggression in the structure and dynamics of personality. Its therapy consists of free association, dream interpretation, and the analysis of transference and resistance. The behavioristic school derives its name from the term "behaviorism" which was originally coined by John B. Watson and popularized by his successor, Burrhus F. Skinner. Behaviorism is an approach in psychology emphasizing the application of scientific analysis to the study of human behavior. It restricts its research
to observable and measurable phenomena and, consequently, denies the existence of such immaterial attributes of man as his consciousness or his soul. Likewise the humanistic school is identified by certain unique conceptions of human beings. It places above all authority, the authority of human experience and the being's natural desire for self-actualization. It does not rest upon psychoanalytic or behavioristic concepts of man, but draws upon the writings and ideas of such philosophers and theorists as Søren Kierkegaard, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Abraham Maslow, Carl Rogers, and numerous others. It shares a commonality with such humanistic conceptions as Gestalt, Phenomenology, Daseinanalysis, Existentialism, and Experientialism.

This paper briefly examines the historical development of each school's view on the nature of man, outlines its main concepts, introduces its major theorists and reconstructs each school's model of man by drawing upon the individual school's theoretical claims.

Because of the number of proponents and diversity of ideas in each school of thought, it would be beyond the scope of this study to include the ideas of every proponent of each theory. Therefore the following proponents are used in this discussion. The psychoanalytic model of man is constructed on the basis of the presuppositions and ideas of Sigmund Freud. The behavioristic model is based on the presuppositions and ideas of Skinner, with some input from the ideas of Watson. The humanistic model is based on the presuppositions and ideas expounded by Rogers and Maslow. For the purpose of this discussion any further reference to the psychoanalytic, behavioristic, or humanistic theories should be identified with the theoretical expositions of the above proponents.
Definitions

A number of terms frequently used in the discussion need to be defined. The terms and definitions follow:

Behavioristic School. A theoretical system of doctrine in psychology by which the investigation of human behavior is limited to objective, observable phenomena and to the methods of natural science. This approach is usually associated with the teachings of J. B. Watson and B. F. Skinner.

Humanistic School. A theoretical system of doctrine in psychology founded by A. Maslow emphasizing man's unique ability to experience selfhood, self-determination and self-actualization.

Model of Man. A theoretical view and representation concerning the nature, origin and functioning of man.

Presupposition. An antecedent belief or assumption adhered to in the absence of substantiating evidence.

Psychoanalytic School. A theoretical system of doctrine founded by Sigmund Freud emphasizing the role of unconscious drives and of early childhood experiences in the study of human behavior.

School of Psychology. An independent theoretical system of doctrine adhered to by one or more proponents in the field of psychology.

Materials and Methods

The materials and methods used consisted of a research of literature using as primary sources the original writings of the theorists and as secondary sources commentaries on the theories. In the general discussion of the second and sixth chapter, wider reference is made to commentaries and evaluations which relate not only to the
theoretical models of man but also to the discussion of the nature of presuppositions and the nature of models, as well as alternative philosophical viewpoints.

The approach to the construction of the three models of man in chapters III, IV, and V consists of a synthesis of statements and ideas expressed by each of the theorists concerning the nature of man. Overall the study adopts a global outlook upon theories and models, and, consequently devotes no space to the discussion of intricate theoretical details or differences that exist among the different schools of thought.

Organization of the Thesis

The thesis consists of six chapters. Chapter I is a general introductory chapter, presenting the problem, purpose, methods, materials, and organization of the study. Chapter II consists of a discussion of the study of man and the concepts of models and presuppositions. Chapters III, IV, and V present the three theories and their models of man in the following order: Chapter III--The Psychoanalytic Model; Chapter IV--The Behavioristic Model; and Chapter V--The Humanistic Model. Chapter VI--A Critique of the Three Models of Man and Chapter VII--Summary, Conclusion and Recommendations conclude the study.
CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGY--THE STUDY OF MAN

The search for knowledge and understanding of human nature dates back to some of the earliest written records of man. Philosophical literature bears a record of philosophical speculation on this question.\(^1\)

In modern times, questions of human nature are vigorously debated not only by philosophers, theologians, historians, and anthropologists, but by scientists as well. Despite the accumulation of knowledge about the nature of man, many questions remain to be answered and resolved.

Psychology is an area of study that attempts to provide answers to these questions. Psychology has moved from a narrow focus on mental processes to the study of the whole person. Many issues remain to be resolved.


CHAPTER II

PSYCHOLOGY--THE STUDY OF MAN

The search for knowledge and understanding of human nature dates back to some of the earliest written records of man. Philosophical literature bears a record of centuries of contemplation on this question.¹ In modern times the human-nature issue has been vigorously debated not only in philosophy but also in psychology, theology, history, anthropology, archeology, sociology, and other sciences. Despite the accumulated wealth of facts and numerous models and theories of man, scientists still search for an objective knowledge that would resolve some of the mysteries surrounding human nature.

One of the fields in which man is closely studied today is psychology. Historically the term psychology represented an area of philosophy which dealt specifically with the philosophical issues pertaining to the nature of man,² but with time much of psychology has moved from an almost complete preoccupation with philosophical issues to the point where it practically denies them.³ Yet there seem to be

two major classes of problems with which psychology is concerned. There are those that can be solved by scientific methods and those that cannot. The first are scientific whereas the second are philosophical. The scientific problems of psychology naturally receive the greater proportion of consideration in psychological publications, while the philosophical ones are frequently ignored. In ignoring the philosophical issues psychologists are not doing away with them but, like many other scientists, they introduce their own prior beliefs or presuppositions and on the basis of these presuppositions establish their own working views or models of the world.

The contemporary philosopher Micheal Polanyi stated in one of his lectures concerning the study of man:

Man must try forever to discover knowledge that will stand up by itself, objectively, but the moment he reflects on his own knowledge he catches himself red-handed in the act of upholding his knowledge. He finds himself asserting it to be true, and this asserting and believing is an action which makes an addition to the world on which his knowledge bears.

In this respect the scientist is frequently caught, as Polanyi stated, "red-handed in the act of upholding his knowledge" or, in actuality, his own prior beliefs. Any such contributions to knowledge made on the basis of prior beliefs need to be closely examined, for they may be an addition to the realm of knowledge or they may simply be a

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further proliferation of models and theories that will not stand in
the face of objective examination.

In the case of psychology, every model and theory is based on
philosophical presuppositions. Yet, because of the neglect of discussion
of philosophical issues, psychologists are frequently unaware of them.
Some may not even realize that a denial or ignorance of metaphysics is
metaphysical in itself. Heidbreder remarks on this point:

Psychology. . . because it is a young science and
was very recently a part of philosophy is on its
guard against metaphysics; so much so, in fact,
that a system of psychology may adopt either
deliberately or unintentionally, a metaphysics to
justify its dismissal of the problems it considers
metaphysical.1

Thus Chapters III, IV, and V examine the presuppositions of three major
models of man and discuss some of the metaphysical issues involved.
But the present chapter further examines the nature of presuppositions
and the nature of models in psychology, hopefully, making the reader
aware of the significant role presuppositions play in the formulation
not only of theories but also the psychological concepts of man.

Presuppositions

Presuppositions basically consist of assumptions and beliefs
about the nature of truth and the nature of reality. They are not
based on fact or logical evidence but rather on a personal choice
of belief and conviction. In the context of theories and models
they frequently remain undisclosed, but yet form the basis for the
construction of models and theoretical constructs. Their influence

1Edna Heidbreder, Seven Psychologies (New York: Appleton-
was early recognized in the field of philosophy. The philosopher
Hegel expressed his concern about presuppositions in the following way:

A critical examination into the reality of knowing
does not seem able to be affected without some pre-
supposition which is laid as an ultimate criterion.
For an examination consists in applying an accepted
standard and on the final agreement or disagreement
wherewith of what is tested, deciding whether the
latter is right or wrong; and the standard in general,
and so science, were this the criteria is thereby
accepted as the essence or inherently real (Ansich).
But, here where science first appears on the scene,
neither science nor any sort of standard has justi-
fied itself as the essence or ultimate reality; and
without this no examination seems able to be
instituted.

As Hegel states, presuppositions once laid down act as if they
were the ultimate criterion for what is right or wrong, truth or error.
Yet, as criteria, they cannot be justified by science or any other
standard. But for a proper examination of any kind, such criteria
need to be delineated and presuppositions which represent a working
view need to be made. However, when presuppositions are held as
inflexible, rigid, and absolute truths "they cripple the honest pursuit
of knowledge." Evidence obtained on the basis of presuppositions
cannot be held as "the evidence" or "the truth." C. S. Peirce
illustrates this well when he states,

When I have asked thinking men what reason they had to
believe that every fact in the universe is precisely
determined by law, the first answer has usually been
that the proposition is a "presupposition" or postu-
late of scientific reasoning. Well, if that is the

1Georg W. F. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, quoted in

2Cosgrove, p. 17
best that can be said for it, the belief is doomed. Suppose it be "postulated" that does not make it true nor so much afford the slightest rational motive for yielding it any credence.¹

Yet science often adopts the attitude that some evidence becomes "the evidence" for the justification of a postulate or presupposition. Thus room is made for personal beliefs and interpretations to be introduced as knowledge and truth. Alfred Whitehead warns against the problem by stating that "there are no brute self-contained matters of fact, capable of being understood apart from interpretation as an element in the system," and no absolute facts that science can produce for "every scientific memoir in its records of the facts is shot through and through with interpretation."²

The implication of this observation has a significant bearing not only upon the philosophical systems of thought but also on the psychological interpretation of human behavior. In psychology where man becomes his own object of study, objectivity appears impossible. Illustrating this point again Whitehead states:

Whenever we attempt to express the matter of immediate experience, we find that its understanding leads us beyond itself, to its contemporaries, to its past, to its future, and to the universals in terms of which its definiteness is exhibited. But such universals, by their very character of universality, embody the potentiality of other facts with variant types of definiteness. Thus the understanding of the immediate brute fact requires its metaphysical interpretation as an item in a world

¹Charles S. Peirce, quoted in Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, 4:278.

with some systematic relation to it. When thought comes upon the scene, it finds the interpretations as matters of practice.¹

There is no way that the psychologist can become objective in his study of man, for his own beliefs, experiences, and nature are so closely interwoven with his object of study. The natural practice of metaphysical interpretation is so much a part of the science of behavior, and of all science, that the present knowledge of man cannot be viewed in any other way except in the light of the presuppositions contained within the various models and theories.

This point can be well illustrated by a brief study of some of the general presuppositions of modern psychology. Tracing the historical roots back to the time before the founding of the first psychological laboratory by Wilhelm Wundt in 1879, it is possible to identify certain events and ideas preceding 1879 which had a profound role in shaping the presuppositions of psychology. Cosgrove identifies two major roots.² The first "root" of psychology is a way of thinking called "empiricism." The seventeenth century was characterized by an approach to knowledge which emphasized discernment of reality by the physical senses. Thus empiricists defined reality by what physical senses could perceive or instruments could measure. This led to the denial of the existence of anything that was immaterial. Accordingly the existence of an immaterial mind of man, denoted as the soul, was for practical purposes denied and

¹Whitehead, pp. 21-22.
rejected because of its inaccessibility to physical senses or instruments of measurement.

A second root that profoundly influenced the presuppositions of psychology—and hence its methods and theories—was the theory of evolution. The popularization of the theory of man's evolution from lower primates began to restrict explanations of man's nature to those attributes and processes that could result from an evolutionary system. The attention of scientists was redirected to lower order animals, and there theorists sought to find principles which would lead to an understanding of human behavior. Thus Cosgrove points out "if empiricism made man just physical, then evolution helped to make him just animal."¹

Undoubtedly these early beliefs exerted a considerable influence upon the new field of psychology. This is somewhat evidenced by early publications which specifically dealt with issues of psychophysics (as was the case with Gustav Fechner's Elements of Psychophysics.)² By the time Wundt established his laboratory in 1879, the "philosophic, not scientific, presuppositions had already determined what form the study of man would take." Following Fechner's title, the first laboratory of experimental psychology was called a laboratory of "psychophysics"—psych being the Greek word for "soul" or essentially the nature of man, which was to be explained by physics, or "matter," hence the reason for the joint name psychophysics.³

²Gustav Fechner published his Elements of Psychophysics in 1860.
As a consequence of these early presuppositions, psychology has chosen to study man and animal in the empirical fashion. Likewise psychologists have also felt a great deal of freedom to study animal subjects and generalize to human nature.

As a result of the different theoretical orientations arising from the varying philosophical presuppositions, psychology has been divided into three major schools of thought, frequently labelled as the three forces of psychology. For one, the psychoanalytic school exerted its major influence upon the field through its animalistic and instinctual outlook upon man and psychopathology. Secondly, behaviorism challenged the influence of the mentalistic schools of thought and proposed to objectify the study of man by adopting the empirical approach. But since the time of psychoanalysis and of behaviorism, a third force has identified itself in psychology—that of the humanistic approach. The humanistic school proposed new outlooks promoting a higher view of the nature of man. All three approaches have sought throughout the years to justify and substantiate their views and presuppositions about the nature of man and the nature of their methods. Today the three forces within psychology seem to be no closer together than when they first made their appearance.

When Whitehead stated that philosophy does not initiate interpretations but that its search for a rationalistic scheme is the search for more adequate justification of interpretations,¹ he may have made an observation which could justly apply to the field of psychology. It appears that much of the research in psychology

¹Whitehead, Process and Reality, p. 22.
is not only bent upon the discovery of pertinent facts which would throw new light on the nature and behavior of man, but also upon the justification of its presuppositions about the nature of man.

Models

In the field of psychology, models serve various functions and have a number of different meanings. In general everyday use, models may refer to miniature representations of larger scale objects, or to people who serve as patterns for artists or manufacturers; or the term may refer to an organizer whose appearance a mimic imitates.¹ For psychology the term model has in a somewhat modified sense all three of these meanings.

In psychology there are mathematical models, stimulus-response models, cognitive-function models, and many others too numerous to mention. Some consider the term "model" to be a synonym for "theory," but, in general, the two terms are seen as representing somewhat different concepts. The model is in most cases a separate system representing the ideas, laws, and relationships of a theory. It is an external organization which contributes to the construction, application, and interpretation of a theory.² As a general rule the adjective preceding the term model describes the source of the general inference principles and the structure of the underlying theory. Thus when referring to the psychoanalytic, behavioristic, or humanistic model of man, reference is made to the theoretical ideas and constructs within a theory which promote a particular view or image of the nature of man.

¹Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary, s.v. "Model."
Models in the context of this discussion stand as representations of what each theoretical orientation perceives the true nature of man to be. Furthermore, models can be seen as patterns upon which further theoretical constructs are proposed and as organizers for the implementation of theoretical ideas into the practical realm of therapy. Thus the psychoanalytic model of man gives rise to the free-association method of therapy, where the past and the unconscious are relived in the therapeutic setting. The behavioristic model of man leads to behavior modification where behavior is reprogrammed on the basis of contingencies of reinforcement; and the humanistic model of man promotes transactional analysis and group therapies where one being assists the other in growth and recovery.

As with presuppositions, models have heuristic or tool value for science. But model thinking must be of the strictly "as if" variety where models serve as working analogies of the vaguely understood nature of the real. But, unfortunately, models of the nature of man are too often promoted and looked upon as true representations of the real. On the basis of metaphysical presuppositions, theorists have constructed models to which they have vigorously adhered both in theory and practice. As a result, models and theories appear to be falling into disrepute, for, as Chapanis points out, models have numerous limitations which detract from them being accepted as truth.\(^1\) In his discussion of models Chapanis points out that for one thing, models are not subject to change in the case of incongruent data. Secondly, they limit research

to only that which is warranted by the model. In this respect, models determine the structure and the type of research. As Chapanis states, "to a considerable extent the generality of our experimental findings depends on the fidelity of the model we have made of the real world." The results and conclusions based on such research will stem directly from the basic concepts, assumptions, relationships, and principles built into the models. Thus a model becomes a teutological technique "because we get out of the model only what we have already put into it."^1

In further criticisms of models Chapanis points out:

1. "Models invite overgeneralization." Often people forget the fact that models are only analogies and after an analogy has been made there is the problem of forcing the analogy too far. If a human brain is likened to a computer, precaution needs to be exercised in trying to explain away the brain in computer terminology. "A computer is no more a brain than the Palomar telescope is an eye, or a bulldozer a muscle."^2 If man's behavior is likened to animal behavior then the tendency exists to make man out to be altogether like an animal. Models are always incomplete and, therefore, when used to give a total account of the object or function modeled, they are subject to error.

2. "Models entice us into committing a logical fallacy." Using symbolic form to point out this fallacy, it is easy to show how the conditional statement, if A then B, can be used to misleading conclusions. A model proposes certain variables, constants, and assumed relationships (these are the A's). From these proposed variables are deduced certain dependant consequences (the B's of the conditional

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^1Ibid., p. 121.  
^2Ibid., p. 126.
statement). The problem then arises that if the deduced consequence or function is found to agree with some function in real life (asserting B to be true), the model maker asserts that this proves the validity of the variables, constants, and assumed relationships which he started out with (the A's).¹

True-life situations can be found which relate to some of the claims of models, but this does not necessarily mean that the true-life situation proves the validity of the model. In terms of a model nothing can be proved; at the most it can be said that the evidence has failed to disprove the claim. If there was absolutely no truth in any of the models, they would cease to exist. But the fact that there is a grain of truth in a model does not prove the model's credibility. "Occasion­ally," states Lochman, "it is argued that if there is a reality, then one and only one model can provide the best description of it,"² but as of today no such model has yet been found. This does not dis­credit the fact that reality exists, rather it indicates that no model has been found for it.

3. "Models are too often not validated." This is a criticism that is leveled at the model builders and the models themselves.

Even when we find model builders attempting to make some validation of their models, we sometimes find them using as scientific evidence, the crudest form of observations collected under completely uncon­trolled conditions.³

Sufficient evidence of this problem can be found in the chapters on the models of man that follow. Models often are valued above the uniqueness of individual differences, and frequently the nature of

¹Ibid., p. 123. ²Lochman, p. 128. ³Chapanis, p. 130.
reality will be misconstrued simply to make it conform to a model. This danger especially exists in such complex subjects as human beings. It is necessary to recognize that some aspects of nature will never perfectly conform to theory and much less to models.

Despite the weakness and limitations of models, it is true that models play a major role in explaining and interpreting human behavior and other psychological functions. Most psychological research is proposed on the basis of models, and data are interpreted in terms of the principles proposed by models. But because of the recognized deficiencies and weaknesses of models there are protests—based on humanistic grounds—against the use of models for the explanation of all human behavior. The protests object to simplification of human behavior which overlooks the uniqueness and complexity of humanity.

Human nature in its totality—and all the essential abstractions from it, such as beauty, truth, rationality—are not "things," but aspects of a whole movement. Things can properly be conceived in terms of models. But the whole movement of human nature cannot be contained in any models. Rather it is capable of continually revealing itself anew in fresh and unexpected ways that are in essence inexhaustible.

In the wake of evidence suggesting that models have the retroactive effect of influencing human behavior, a greater caution is urged and closer examination is required. As social models of behavior have been observed to stigmatize as abnormal or deviant that which is original and unique, there is need for a re-examination of the role of models and their significance in real life. The philosopher Abraham Bohm, "Human Nature as the Product of Our Mental Models," in Jonathan Benthall, The Limits of Human Nature (New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., A Dutton Paperback, 1974), p. 108.

1 Ibid., p. 93.

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Heschel adds his criticism in these words.

The animality of man we can grasp with a fair degree of clarity. The perplexity begins when we attempt to make clear what is meant by the humanity of man . . . .

We can attain adequate understanding of man only if we think of man in human terms, "more humano," and abstain from employing categories developed in the investigation of lower forms of life.¹

Models, if they are to be accepted, should rise above such limitations. From a Christian point of view, man should be allowed to identify the self with something greater, broader, more uplifting, and more stable than the animal world—or even the social conception of human nature.

Summary

It is difficult for man to arrive at an objective view of himself. He attempts to arrive at a true knowledge of his nature by various means, and among these means is the method of model building. Models, however, cannot be built without some prior philosophical and theoretical base. Due to a lack of absolute knowledge concerning his own nature, man builds models of himself on the basis of his metaphysical beliefs which in this study are labelled as presuppositions. The presuppositions of each model in turn determine how good the models will be in reflecting upon the true nature of men. Although models are very useful in scientific research, they can be detrimental in fields such as psychology, because in relating to human behavior and human nature, they touch upon a sensitive and complex field of study. Likewise models based on limiting presuppositions can, and do, grossly misrepresent the nature of man.

CHAPTER III

THE PSYCHOANALYTIC MODEL OF MAN

The history of any science is marked by periodic revolutions in thought that drastically change the conceptual foundations of the science. Such names as Copernicus, Newton, Darwin, Mendel, and Einstein immediately remind us of scientific innovations that have left a permanent impact upon the sciences. Likewise in psychology one can identify ideas and discoveries which have revolutionized its models and theories. Such names as Pavlov and Watson, Wertheimer and Kohler, and their respective theories and philosophies of behaviorism and the gestalt, are just some of the many names that could be mentioned. But from among the many different psychologists Freud possibly stands out as one who, as a single individual, changed most drastically the conception of man.

Through the school of psychoanalysis Freud attempted to construct the first metapychology for the analysis of behavior. The central hypothesis of psychoanalysis was the existence and direction of the unconscious in all of human behavior. Through a series of concepts about the unconscious, its drives, instincts, and defenses, "Freud transformed our image of man." ¹ Thus what began as a method of treating

mental patients "soon became a wholly new conception of man." Overall the impact of his ideas is perceived as another revolution in thought that influenced the foundations of the science of psychology. In his own estimation of his work, Freud compared himself to such prominent men as Darwin, Copernicus, Kepler, and Columbus. Laying claim to the discovery of the unconscious he likened it to Columbus' discovery of the new world. As one who frequently dreamed of becoming great, he had a very high opinion of his discovery.

A biographical study of Freud's life is synonymous with the historical study of the development of psychoanalysis. His early educational experience together with his background of mystical beliefs are closely related to the psychoanalytic presuppositions on the nature of man. But despite Freud's claims to originality, many of his ideas can be identified with the philosophical writings of such men as Friedrich Nietzsche and Arthur Schopenhauer. The present chapter examines the historical development of the psychoanalytic theory, its main concepts and its model of man.

The Historical Development of the Psychoanalytic View

It is of considerable interest to identify some of the known influences which contributed to the development of the psychoanalytic views and presuppositions on the nature of man. There exist

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2. Roazen, Ibid, p. 521
3. Ibid, p. 522

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certain patterns in the evolution of Freud's ideas on the role of the unconscious, the sexuality and aggressiveness of man. It is not possible to discuss all of the known influences and patterns in the psychoanalytic history because it is not the purpose of this discussion to do so, but some space is given to the discussion of Freud's own life and the historical development of his views. Some consideration is also given to the role of mysticism and of the occult phenomena in the development of psychoanalysis.

Sigmund Freud - The Author

Sigmund Freud was born in 1856 to a Jewish wool merchant living in the Czech town of Moravia. When Sigmund was four years old the family of eight children and two adults moved to Vienna where Freud spent most of his lifetime studying, working, and writing.

Freud attended the famous medical school at the University of Vienna, where ambitiously he pursued his medical study in the hope of joining some of the teaching celebrities through some brilliant discovery that would bring him rapid fame. In one of his first efforts, Freud experimented on himself and others with the supposedly harmless substance of cocaine and wrote favorable appraisals of the drug's remedial properties in the treatment of various disorders and addictions.¹

Later his ideas on cocaine fell into disrepute when the remedial properties of the drug were questioned and finally discredited. This temporary set-back, however, did not reduce his ambitious drives. In 1885, after receiving a travel grant, Freud decided to

travel to Paris and study under Jean-Martin Charcot who used hypnosis in the treatment of hysteria and traumatic neurosis. After a stay of several months he returned to Vienna and translated a volume of lectures by Charcot into the German language. But gradually Freud became disillusioned with the use of hypnosis in the treatment of hysteria and modified the approach into what became known as his free-association technique. Freud, together with the Viennese psychiatrist Joseph Breuer, published, in 1896, a book on *Studies in Hysteria*. Breuer, who enjoyed one of the wealthiest clienteles in Vienna, helped Freud establish a practice by directing some of his own clients to him. Shortly after the publication of their book, Freud broke off his relationship with Breuer but maintained a close contact with his friend and confidant, Wilhelm Fliess, who was an ear and nose specialist in Berlin.¹

The six-year period from 1894-1899 has been seen by some biographers as a time of precipitation for many of the fundamental beliefs and ideas in the psychoanalytic approach. Four events intermingled in Freud's life seem to have exerted a great influence. These include Freud's intimate relationship with Wilhelm Fliess, his own neurotic disturbances, his self-analysis, and his consequent elaboration of the basic principles of psychoanalysis.²

²Ibid.
Freud found in Wilhelm Fliess a close friend to whom he disclosed many of his original ideas. In a letter dated September 21, 1897, Freud disclosed to Fliess his disappointment with the original ideas on hysteria which he no longer perceived as adequate. He therefore began to disclose new ideas concerning the interpretation of dreams and the recall of early childhood memories. Likewise he began to crystallize in his own mind ideas concerning early experiences of sexual trauma and feelings of hatred toward the parent of the same sex. Eventually these ideas formed a part of Freud's Oedipus complex concept.

During this period of reformulation of ideas, he engaged in continual self-analysis, searching in his own mind for sexual childhood memories which could possibly account for his own neurosis. As he searched his memories he noticed frequent resistance to the release of certain past experiences, and this led him to a closer examination of the mental phenomena of resistance.

Closely intermingled with Freud's own self-analysis was the analysis of his patients. As he compared his memories with those of his patients, he observed a definite emphasis upon childhood sexual experiences. Gradually he became preoccupied with the analysis of problems pertaining to certain sexual zones—particularly the anal memories and fantasies. As he engaged in the uncovering of the past through self-analysis, he sensed an improvement in his own neurosis, and through this experience Freud was led to the development of the psychoanalytic methodology. He was so convinced of the effectiveness of self-analysis that, as Ellenberger points out, Freud "never ceased
self-analysis, and from that time on he devoted a moment to it daily.\(^1\)

From that time onwards psychanalysis began to stand for an exploration of the past. Freud wrote in one of his case studies,

> It appeared that psychoanalysis could explain nothing belonging to the present without referring back to something past . . . . Not until a long detour, leading back over her earliest childhood, had been made, did a dream present itself which on analysis brought to her mind the hitherto forgotten details of this scene, so that a comprehension and solution of the current conflict became possible.\(^2\)

Freud interpreted current illnesses on the basis of earlier experiences which, though not pathogenic in themselves, did endow the latter illnesses with their pathogenic quality. Most of the earlier experiences were repressed in the unconscious and thus it required therapy to make conscious that which was being repressed. Thus Freud further defined the task of psychoanalysis as consisting of the uncovering of that which is hidden in the unconscious. "The task of a psychoanalytic treatment can be expressed in the formula: its task is to make conscious everything that is pathogenically unconscious."\(^3\) He became a firm believer in the existence of the unconscious. The whole success of the therapeutic process depended, according to Freud, on the therapist's successful unravelling of the unconscious. Furthermore,

\(^1\) Ellenberger, p. 447.


success was closely identified with the therapist because the client was perceived as too weak to resolve unconscious problems on his own. But through the analysis of dreams, slips of the tongue, and an understanding of the process of transference, the therapist relieved the client from the "operation of repressed instinctual impulses."

Freud viewed the client as a helpless being with little or no strength of his own and at the mercy of the therapist. In speaking of the client he states: "... what turns the scale in his struggle is not his intellectual insight—which is neither strong enough nor free enough for such an achievement—but simply and solely his relation to the doctor."¹ The therapist's successful resolution of unconscious conflicts and impulses sets the person free and prepares him for a normal life after the therapist has once more withdrawn from it.² Thus psychoanalysis became a method characterized by an emphasis upon uncovering the past.

Freud on Human Sexuality

In 1905 Freud published his "Three Essays on Sexuality"³ in which he dealt with sexual deviations, infantile sexuality, and sexual transformation in puberty. The major themes of the book revolved around the concepts of libido, the sexual instinct with its successive phases, the choice of love object (particularly in the Oedipus complex), interpretation of character types of neuroses and deviations, sexual symbolism, and inquiry into early events of sexual life and sexual fantasies. But, as Ellenberger points out, doctrines of sexual mysticism

¹Ibid., p. 455.  
²Ibid., pp. 444-445.  
and theory abounded during Freud's day.¹ Numerous books were in print on the topic of sex and character, and sex and psychopathology. Some of Freud's ideas could be traced to his associations with Wilhelm Fliess, others to the writings of philosophers and authors of his day, and some to Freud's interests in mythology and mysticism.

Freud's contacts with Fliess were stimulated by a common interest in the topic of human sexuality. Fliess was the author of theories whose three main points were the correspondence between nose mucosa and the genital organs, the bisexuality of human beings and the existence in each individual of double periodicity—a feminine one with a cycle of twenty-eight days and a masculine one with a cycle of twenty-three days. Freud at one stage during his neurosis had a nose condition of his own treated by Fliess. Later he directed one of his hysteria patients to Fliess asking Fliess to decide whether there was a connection between his patient's symptoms and a possible nose condition. Fliess consequently operated on the client's nose leaving the patient to suffer postoperative consequences of such severity that further surgery was performed by an independent surgeon. Yet Freud viewed Fliess as a man in whom one could place boundless trust.²

Ellenberger further points out in his historical study of psychoanalysis, "Nothing is more remote from the truth than the usual assumption that Freud was the first to introduce novel sexual theories." Apart from Fliess, who combined sexual mysticism with a mysticism of numbers, other much discussed systems of sexual mysticism included Joseph Winthuis, who in his book The Two-Sexed Being reported on the

sacred worship of sexuality in a native tribe in New Guinea; the Russian
Vassili Rozanov, the promoter of sexual transcendentalism, who taught
the holiness of sex and its identification with God worship; and Arthur
Schopenhauer, whose *Metaphysics of Sexus* was a brand of sexual mysticism.¹

Some writers, such as Thomas Mann, go so far as to say that psychoanalytic
concepts were Schopenhauer's ideas "translated from metaphysics into
psychology."² This, of course, relates not only to Freud's ideas on the
sexuality of man but also on the unconscious and the death instinct.
Interestingly, Arthur Schopenhauer was one author whose work Freud
acknowledged and whom Freud credited as being a forerunner of psycho-
analysis. In Freud's words:

> There are famous philosophers who may be cited as
forerunners--above all the great thinker Schopenhauer,
whose unconscious "will" is equivalent to the mental
instincts of psychoanalysis. It was this same thinker,
moreover, who in words of unforgettable impressiveness
admonished mankind of the importance, still so greatly
underestimated by it, of its sexual craving.³

Likewise the concept of the Oedipus complex which Freud later
systematized can be traced back to ancient mythology. The three com-
ponents of the Oedipus complex include the incestuous wish toward the
mother, a wish to kill the father, and the image of a cruel, castrating
father. As Ellenberger shows, the mythological model of that complex
is found in the ancient myth of Saturn and Jupiter. Saturn was threatened

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¹Ibid., p. 545-546.

²Thomas Mann, *Essays of Three Decades* (New York: Knopf, 1947),
pp. 411-428.

³Sigmund Freud. *A Difficulty in the Path of Psychoanalysis*,
stan. ed., 17:143-144.
with death by his father Uranus, the first god of the world, but was saved by his mother. Saturn then castrated his father and ate his children except the youngest, Jupiter, who was saved by his mother. Later Jupiter supplanted his father.\(^1\) In the classical study of little Hans, Freud diagnosed Han's phobia as a wish to supplant the father. Hans' wishes to possess his mother and hopes for the death of his father and the wish to marry his mother were explained in terms of the Oedipus complex. Thus the concept of the Oedipus complex instead of being original with Freud can be traced to ancient mythology.

There is also indisputable evidence of Freud's use of mystical symbolism in the interpretation of the unconsciousness and the interpretation of the sexuality of man. He was always eager to interpret symptomatic acts in terms of their symbolism. Various objects such as clothing and household items as well as architectural structures were all regarded as having symbolical meaning to the neurotic patient.\(^2\) Many of the symbolic meanings were arrived at through mythological interpretations, others were a result of Freud's inventiveness.

**Freud on the Unconscious Mind**

Freud's depth psychology can be understood as a combination of findings from his own self-analysis and the analysis of his patients. His studies of dreams and parapraxes are the main concepts in the study of the unconscious. Although the terms and concepts used in Freud's depth psychology are not really original, Freud's systematization of

\(^1\)Ellenberger, pp. 505-506.

them and his unique synthesis bring him credit for a new model of the mind. Both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche were philosophers of the unconscious, and were forerunners of the ideas of psychoanalysis, but observers do agree that "Freud was the inventor of a new mode of dealing with the unconscious, that is, the psychoanalytic situation with the basic rule, free association, and the analysis of resistances and transference. This is Freud's incontestable innovation."¹

The new innovations have been credited in a large degree to his so-called "creative illness." Defining this creative illness and giving some of its features, Ellenberger states:

> It occurs in various settings and is to be found among shamans, among the mystics of various religions, in certain philosophers and creative writers . . . . It is a polymorphous condition that can take the shape of depression, neurosis, psychosomatic ailments, or even psychosis . . . . The termination is often rapid and marked by a phase of exhilaration. The subject emerges from his ordeal with a permanent transformation of his personality and the conviction that he has discovered a great truth or a new spiritual world.²

Indeed this seems to have been the experience of Freud. He experienced mental pain and suffering as he brooded over the psychological apparatus and the root of his neuroses. He increasingly concentrated on his early memories, continuing to subject them to thorough self-analysis. His self-analysis reached a fruitful stage when he was able to revive memories from fiction. He remembered feelings of jealousy toward his little brother and his father, and later after the death of both brother and father, the subsequent feelings of guilt.

On the basis of his own experiences and the comparative

¹Ellenberger, p. 549. ²Ibid., p. 488.
experiences of his patients, Freud began to reformulate his ideas about the origins of hysteria and obsessions. He placed new and greater emphasis upon the mental process of resistance. His own mind was preoccupied with problems pertaining to former sexual zones, memories, fantasies, dreams, and the resistance that is experienced while trying to recall the past.

In proposing his theory of hysteria, Freud emphasized the significance of early childhood sexual experiences. He set out to show that during puberty, chains of memories diverged and converged in nodal points but always end with events of a sexual nature. However, the events of puberty were not of such magnitude as to precipitate later hysteria. Thus Freud proposed that puberty events were only precipitating causes that revived unconscious memories of a much earlier childhood trauma. These earlier traumas were always of a sexual nature. In case studies, Freud claimed to have found that many of the patients were victims of seductions by adults in the immediate environment.¹ These traumatic experiences though lost to the conscious mind, were responsible for the pathogenic nature of the mental illness in later years.

It was Freud's belief that these traumas had to be relived, and the unconscious made conscious, so that the patient could be relieved of the burden of negative past memories. It is at this point that the interpretations of dreams and slips of the tongue (known as parapraxes) take on a special significance.

¹Ibid., p. 488.
Freud took great pride in his discovery of the significance of dreams and parapraxes. He considered it a major discovery to find that dreams were meaningful expressions of unfulfilled wishes. Being a great dreamer who kept records of his dreams, he was able to fill his publication *The Interpretation of Dreams* with much illustrious content. On the topic of dreams he states:

Dreams . . . are not meaningless, they are not absurd; they do not imply that one portion of our store of ideas is asleep while another portion is beginning to wake. On the contrary, they are psychical phenomena of complete validity—fulfillments of wishes, they can be inserted into the chain of intelligible waking mental acts; they are constructed by a highly complicated activity of the mind.¹

Speaking of this discovery he wrote a letter dated June 12, 1900 to Fliess: "Do you suppose that some day a marble tablet will be placed on the house, inscribed with these words,

In this house on July 24th, 1895
the Secret of Dreams was revealed to
Dr. Sigmund Freud²

In speaking about dreams, Freud did perceive them as being indeed complex mental activities. As Ellenberger explains, in the Freudian model the dream is an edifice having two stories. The upper story consists of both latent and manifest contents. The latent content is that part of the dream that is infiltrated with childhood memories and unfulfilled sexual wishes, as well as certain events of the past day, known as the day residue. From among the trivial events of the past day, the dreamer chooses the one that shows some relationship

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to a childhood memory. Thus through events of the past day an individual is led back past the puberty stage to an early childhood memory expressing an unfulfilled wish of that remote time. Before the content of the unfulfilled wish can be released as manifest content, it is censored. Through displacement, condensation, symbolization, and dramatization the unconscious material is censored and released to the preconscious level and some of it penetrates into the conscious. The censoring mechanisms act as guardians of sleep which prevent that which is unpleasant from reaching the conscious. Feelings and wishes which would disturb and awaken the dreamer are disguised in a less disturbing form. However, a failure of the censoring mechanism results in awakening nightmares.

Freud's originality in dream analysis is found in the following four innovations. The first is his model of the dream with its distinctions of latent and manifest content and its pattern of living in the present and past simultaneously. The second is his identification of the role and functions of the censor which controlled and distorted the expression of latent memories. The third innovation is the use of free association through which the therapist can enter into the deeper levels of the unconscious. The fourth was the introduction of systematic interpretation of dreams in the process of psychotherapy.

Freud, Mythology and the Occult Phenomena

Because there was a lack of scientific evidence for the construction of a metapsychology, Freud seems to have drawn heavily

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1Ellenberger, pp. 490-493.
upon mythology and mystical symbolism for the interpretation of human behavior. His writings are filled with interpretations based purely upon legend and mythology.^ Likewise his interest in occult phenomena penetrated much of his thinking and filtered into his theories and interpretations of human behavior. At times Freud was ambivalent about admitting the influence of the occult phenomena on his psychological interpretations. He seemed to renounce occultism, as was the case in his dealing with Jung:

> I can still recall vividly how Freud said to me, "My dear Jung, promise me never to abandon the sexual theory. That is the most essential thing of all. You see, we must make a dogma of it, an unshakable bulwark." . . . In some astonishment I asked him, "A bulwark--against what?" To which he replied, "Against the black tide of mud"--and here he hesitated for a moment, then added--"of occultism."2

Yet this statement reflects more on his feelings of displeasure with Jung than on his feelings of displeasure with occultism. From among Freud's disciples, Jung went the furthest in this field in his attempts to understand graphology and astrology, even alchemy, and, in later years, flying saucers.3

Yet there are numerous statements which clearly indicate that Freud possessed a high interest and appraisal of the occult. He lectured upon the relationships of dreams and occult phenomena and regarded occultism as being that "other world" lying beyond the bright

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3 Roazen, p. 233.
world generated by relentless laws of science. Quoting from a lecture on "Dreams and Occultism," Freud stated:

Occultism asserts that there are in fact "more things in heaven and earth than are dreamt of in our philosophy." Well, we need not feel bound by the narrow-mindedness of academic philosophy; we are ready to believe what is shown to us to deserve belief.

Freud was convinced of the existence of the psychical forces other than human and animal minds. Thus he felt that science had no right to withhold from the experimental study of the occult phenomena. Freud perceived the function of psychoanalysis as partially consisting of the attempt to make scientific that which had until then been unrecognized because of its occult overtones. Freud stated in a lecture: "There is a real core of yet unrecognized facts in occultism round which cheating and fantasy have spun a veil which it is hard to pierce." But at the same time he cautioned that psychoanalysts should not adopt the occult as a religious belief. Rather Freud encouraged a closer working relationship between occultists and analysts.

To this day psychoanalysis is regarded as savouring of mysticism, and its unconscious is looked upon as one of the things between heaven and earth which philosophy refuses to dream of. The numerous suggestions made to us by occultists that we should cooperate with them show that they would like to treat us as half belonging to them and that they count on our support against the pressure of exact authority . . . . Alliance and cooperation between analysts and occultists might thus appear both plausible and promising.

2 Idem, New Introductory Lectures, 22:36.
Among some of the occult phenomena that had special appeal to Freud were clairvoyance, telepathy, and thought transference.\(^1\) Frequently he restated his interest in the occult and admitted to its influence upon his own thinking. Quoting Freud's words: "It may be that I too have a secret inclination towards the miraculous which thus goes half way to meet the creation of occult facts."\(^2\)

On at least two other occasions he firmly confirmed his interest in the occult by stating:

I am not one of those who dismiss a priori the study of so-called occult psychic phenomena as unscientific, discreditable, or even as dangerous. If I were at the beginning rather than at the end of a scientific career as I am today, I might possibly choose just this field of research, in spite of all the difficulties.\(^3\)

In another instance, Ernst Jones, a close disciple of Freud, quotes him as saying, "If I had my life to live over again I should devote myself to psychical research rather than to psychoanalysis."\(^4\) Freud's interests in the occult introduced into psychoanalysis a great amount of mysticism and symbolical interpretation. The extent of his involvement in occultism can never be truly assessed since much of the work and inquiry was carried out in secrecy. As Roazen points out, many of Freud's

\(^1\)Reuben M. Rainey, Freud as a Student of Religion: Perspectives on the Background and Development of His thought (Missoula, Montana: Scholars Press, 1975), p. 95.


disciples treated Freud more as a prophet than a scientist and psychoanalysis as a revealed religion. Those that were close to Freud were bound by secrecy and formed a committee which was strictly secret in its actions. Each of the members were bestowed with special rings which symbolized their close ties and marked the recipients as specially chosen bearers of his message.\footnote{Roazen, p. 323.}

The extent to which this influenced his model of man cannot be fully evaluated, though it is known that he believed in the immortality of the soul\footnote{Freud, Delusions and Dreams in Jensen's Cradiva, stan. ed., 9:71-72.} and in the power of psychic communications among people.\footnote{Idem, Psychoanalysis and Telepathy, stan. ed., 18:189,203}

**Freud's Psychoanalytic Theory**

The concepts of Freud's psychoanalytic theory can be divided into three subareas; the structural, the dynamic, and the developmental. The principle structural concepts were the id, ego, and superego. The principle dynamic concepts consisted of instincts, libido, cathexis, anticathexis, and anxiety. The principle developmental concepts were identification, displacement, defense mechanisms, and the psychosexual stages.\footnote{Nordby and Hall, A Guide to Psychologists and Their Concepts, pp. 45-46.}

**Structural Concepts**

The id, ego and superego are the main constructs of the personality. The id is the matrix within which the ego and superego...
become differentiated. It is everything psychological that man inherits and that is present at birth, including the instincts. The id is likewise the reservoir of psychic energy and derives its energy from the inner bodily processes. When the energy level is raised to a high level either by external overstimulation or internal excitation, the id functions to discharge the energy and return the organism to a more normal level. This principle of tension reduction is called the pleasure principle. According to this principle the organism is guided in its actions by an avoidance of pain and a seeking of pleasure. At times the pleasure may be arrived at through hallucinatory experiences in which the desired objects are present in the form of a memory image which serves in the partial fulfillment of the wish.

The ego comes into existence because the id lacks contact with the objective world of reality and the organism cannot exist only on hallucinatory experiences. Thus the ego translates the subjective wishes into objective realities, by searching for those objects which will satisfy the subjective needs. But at times the ego has to integrate the difficult and conflicting demands of the id with the realities of the external world and the ideals of the superego.

The superego is the moral agent which represents the traditional values and ideals of society which have been instilled into the person by the rewards and punishment meted out by a parent or some other individual in authority. The superego comes to play the role of a conscience and punishes the person for wrong actions by means of guilt feelings.¹

Dynamic Concepts

One of the most important dynamic concepts in the psychoanalytic model is that of the instinct—the instinct being defined as "an inborn psychological representation of an inner somatic source of excitation." The instinct's psychological representation is called a wish, and the bodily excitation it stems from is called a need.¹

The instinct is perceived as having four characteristic features; a source, an aim, an object, and an impetus. The source is a bodily condition such as hunger or sexual excitation; the aim is the reduction of either the hunger or sexual excitation, the object is the action or the thing which satisfies the need; and, finally, the impetus is the force or strength which determines the intensity of the drive.

Freud recognized two classes of instincts, the life instincts and the death instincts. The life instincts propagated by libidinal energy serve the objective of the survival of the individual and the propagation of the species. The death instincts are destructive drives through which the person fulfills his wish to die. Among the death instincts are also the aggressive drives which perform their work in conspicuous ways against the individual himself or against other members of the society.²

The terms cathexis and anticathexis represent the investment of energy and the restraining of energy, respectively, in the fulfillment

of the instinctual needs. The investment of energy in an action or image which will gratify an instinct is called object-cathexis. But some of the energy will be used for example by the ego to restrain the id from acting impulsively and irrationally. The restraining forces are known as anticathexes in contradiction to the driving forces or catheces.\(^1\) The ego and the dictates of the superego may have to restrain the expression of the unacceptable, and, in the final analysis, the dynamics of personality consist in the interplay between catheces (driving forces) and anticathexes (restraining forces).\(^2\)

One other important concept in the dynamics of personality is anxiety.\(^3\) Anxiety stems from a fearful threat of instinctual drives, and a correlation exists between the potency of the drive (such as sex) to be held back and the degree of anxiety to be endured. Freud identified three types of anxiety; reality anxiety which stems from the recognition of real threats and dangers in the environment, neurotic anxiety which is the fear of being overcome by the instinctual drives of the id, and moral anxiety which is a fear of punishment by the conscience. Anxiety which cannot be dealt with by effective measures is said to be traumatic. When the rational methods fail to reduce anxiety, the individual falls back upon unrealistic ones and may enter upon a state of infantile helplessness, resorting to psychological defense mechanisms.

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 40-41.


Developmental Concepts

Freud perceived the psychological development of an individual as resulting from four major sources of tension: (1) the psychological growth processes, (2) frustrations, (3) conflicts, and (4) threats. As a direct result of tensions arising from these four sources, the individual is forced to learn new methods of reducing tension. This process of learning is also the process of psychological growth and development.

Freud suggested two methods by which the individual resolves his frustrations, conflicts and anxieties. The two methods include the process of identification and displacement. Identification\(^1\) may be defined as a method by which a person incorporates into his own personality the features of another person's personality. It is a process of identifying with people and imitating some of their personality traits. Within each age level of growth, different figures with which to identify are found. The purpose of identification is the trial and error adaption of features which assist the individual in achieving the desired goals. When desired instincts and drives are inhibited and blocked, however, the individual diverts the libidinal energy to substitute objects. This process is known as displacement.\(^2\) Freud proposed that all of man's behaviors can be accounted for in terms of a few basic instincts. He believed that the sexual and aggressive instincts could account for most behaviors even though the

\(^1\)Idem, Group Psychology, stan. ed., 18:105-110.

behaviors did not appear sexual or aggressive. Through the process of displacement it was possible for sexual and aggressive desires to be expressed under the disguise of more socially and culturally acceptable channels.

Defense mechanisms are resorted to in psychological growth, when the level of anxiety becomes burdensome. In order to relieve the ego of excessive anxiety the individual may resort to repression, projection, reaction formation, fixation, or regression.

Through the process of repression\(^1\) an individual can force out of consciousness and into unconsciousness anything that may cause excessive anxiety. The material in the unconscious is not permitted to rise to the conscious level and thus may offer a form of temporary relief from the pressures of anxiety.

Another form of psychological defense is the process of projection\(^2\) whereby the source of the anxiety is attributed to the external world and not the individual's impulses or guilt feelings. Thus an "I hate you" may be turned around to "you hate me". Through this mechanism the individual places the blame on others and not himself.

A third mechanism is that of reaction formation\(^3\) whereby the anxiety-producing feeling is replaced in consciousness by its opposite. Thus where there was the feeling of hate there is now displayed a feeling of love. Though the original unacceptable feeling is displaced by an acceptable one, it nevertheless exists but is masked by an appearance

\(^{1}\)Idem, Repression, stan. ed., 14:146-158.


that does not cause anxiety.

Finally Freud proposed the mechanisms of fixation and regression.\(^1\) According to these concepts if the anxiety and pressure of growth and development become too great, the individual may temporarily or permanently withdraw into an infantile world where pressures do not need to be faced. Thus a person may regress to a level where during the process of growth he previously fixated. Through fixation and regression personality development may be slowed down.

Freud believed that the early years of life play a decisive role in the formation of personality. He outlined four stages of growth through which each individual passes successively and which contribute to the formation of character. Each stage is marked by the concentration of libidinal energies around different erogenous zones (zones of dynamic activity acting also as sources of pleasure).\(^2\)

The first stage is the oral stage and is marked by the concentration of dynamic activity around the mouth. Tactual stimulation of the mouth is the principle source of pleasure. The outcomes of the interactions between cathexes and anticathexis at this stage act as the prototypes for many later character traits.

The oral stage is followed by the development of cathexes and anticathexes around the eliminative functions of the anal stage. The explosion of feces and the accompanying feeling of relief are the main sources of pleasures during this stage which correlates approximately with the second year of life.

\(^1\)Idem, Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis, stan. ed., 16:339-357.

Finally comes the phallic stage which is the last of the three stages in the pregenital period. During the phallic stage, pleasure is derived from the sex organs which at this point become the leading erogenous zones.

Following the oral, anal, and phallic stages, the child goes into a prolonged latency period when most of the impulses are held in a repressed state. But following this dynamically quiet period comes the genital stage which reactivates the pregenital impulses and leads the person into the final stage of maturity. In this stage (commonly correlated with adolescence) one obtains gratification from the stimulation and manipulation of his own body. It is at first a stage of self-love or narcissism in which people are cathexed only because of the additional forms of pleasure to which they may contribute. The time eventually comes when selfish motives begin to extend to more social altruistic behaviors and adolescent pleasure seeking is replaced by socialized group activities, marrying, and family raising.

Each one of the four stages of development represents a contribution to the final organization of personality. Likewise there are no clear-cut transitions from one stage to another. The transitions occur at individual time paces and contribute different amounts of prototype material to the development of personality.

A Model of Man

Freud's psychoanalytic theory exerted a major influence in the field of psychology through its revolutionized view of the nature of man. Indeed, "... through a series of concepts about the
unconscious, its drives, instincts, and defenses, Freud transformed our image of man.1 As a theorist Freud boasted about the potential impact of his ideas and in his own sight perceived them as more revolutionary than even the ideas of Copernicus and Darwin. Quoting from his introductory lectures, Freud is on record as saying,

In the course of centuries the naive self-love of man has had to submit to two major blows at the hand of science. The first was when they learnt that our earth was not the center of the universe but only a tiny fragment of a cosmic system of scarcely imaginable vastness. This is associated in our minds with the name of Copernicus. . . . The second blow fell when biological research destroyed man's supposedly privileged place in creation and proved his descent from the animal kingdom and his ineradicable animal nature. This revolution has been accomplished in our own days by Darwin, Wallace and their predecessors. . . . But human megalomania will have suffered its third and most wounding blow from the psychological research of the present time which seeks to prove to the ego that it is not even master in its own house, but must content itself with scanty information of what is going on unconsciously in its mind.2

Thus Freud in brief words summarized the thesis of his psychoanalytic theory. The new discovery that was to deliver to mankind the "most wounding blow" was enveloped in the idea that the unconscious mind is the true determiner of man's behavior. According to this discovery, man was the helpless prisoner of unconscious drives and instincts.

But Freud arrived at this view of man on the basis of many other prior beliefs and presuppositions. Among these is the evolutionary view of the nature of man which gives rise to Freud's animalistic view of man. As an animal man is consequently perceived as being motivated

1Roazen, p. 4.

in all his behaviors by the unconscious mind which in turn is driven by the powers of inherited instincts.

The Origin of Man

Freud in his development of the psychoanalytic model of man carried on from the so-called "revolutionary ideas" of Darwin and Wallace. Freud's first meta-presupposition was the belief in the evolution of man from the lower primates of the animal kingdom.

Freud was never a confessed believer in the existence of God or in the act of creation as taught by the special revelation of the Judeo-Christian scriptures. He dismissed the idea of God as a myth and an illusion created by humanity to comfort them in the face of their helplessness. Freud explained the concept of God as being a creation of primeval guilt feelings arising from the murder of the chieftain of the primal human horde.¹ The mental creation of a God, was for Freud, another piece of evidence of the operation of the Oedipus complex.² Religion, for Freud, was the imprint of ignorant times.³ Elsewhere he states,

If we attempt to assign the place of religion in the evolution of mankind, it appears not as a permanent acquisition but as a counterpart to the neurosis which individual civilized men have to go through in their passage from childhood to maturity.⁴

Furthermore, he regarded religion as the greatest enemy of science.⁵

⁴Ibid.
⁵Ibid., p. 160.
For Freud, it was "the great Darwin" who provided the key to the solution of the question of the origin of man. It was Darwin who, in Freud's mind, "proved" that man descended from the animal kingdom and possessed an ineradicable animal nature.

Freud adopted a number of other Darwinian concepts which were, of course, built on the assumption of man's evolution from lower order animals. Among them is the biological concept of the instincts and the assumption that man's individual development goes through the same phases as the evolution of the human species. Both the theory of instincts and the adopted principle that "ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny" are derivatives from Darwin's theory and significantly shape Freud's psychology of man.

Freud viewed man as being basically an animal in nature. In perceiving man's life to be governed by the instincts of life and death, he likens man's nature and heritage to the heritage of other animals. Freud states:

... if any explanation at all is to be found of this instinctive life of animals, it can only be that they bring the experiences of their species with them into their own new existence--that is they have preserved memories of what was experienced by their ancestors. The position in the human animal would not at bottom be different. His own archaic heritage corresponds to the instincts of animals even though it is different in its compass and contents.

Thus Freud concludes that "the present development of human

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3 *Ellenberger*, p. 236.
Man the Subject of the Unconscious

Through the three terms; the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious, Freud classified human mental life. The unconscious formed the base of all mental life while the preconscious mediated between the subconscious and the conscious. Somehow Freud did not devote much space and time to the discussion of the conscious but rather concentrated almost totally on that level he termed the unconscious. Briefly, he explains the reason for by-passing the conscious: "There is no need to characterize what we call conscious, it is the same as the consciousness of philosophers and of everyday opinion. Everything else that is mental is in our view unconscious." All of human behavior is determined by the unconscious.

The correlates of the unconscious, preconscious, and conscious are labelled as the id, ego, and the superego. The id contains everything that is inherited, that is present at birth, that is laid down in the constitution; above all, it contains the instincts. The ego, as an intermediary between the id and the external world, possesses the necessary organs for receiving stimuli and affecting actions to protect the id. The superego is a further differentiation of the ego which constitutes a third power, opposed to the ego and acting as an agency promoting the early moral influence of the parents.3

1Idem, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, stan. ed., 18:42.
3Ibid., pp. 144-147.
But it is the id, states Freud, that is the true expression of the individual organism's life. Real life consists in the satisfaction of the id's innate needs: and the forces which we assume to exist behind the tension caused by the needs of the id are called instincts.

Freud identified two classes of instincts:

According to this view we have to distinguish two classes of instincts, one of which, the sexual instincts of Eros, is by far the more conspicuous and accessible to study. . . . The second class of instincts was not so easy to point to; in the end we can recognize sadism as its representative. On the basis of theoretical considerations supported by biology, we put forward the hypothesis of a death instinct.

Both instincts, the instinct of life (Eros) and the instinct of death (Thanatos), serve conservative functions. The instinct of life serves the cause of the continuance of life while the instinct of death endeavors to re-establish a state of things that was disturbed by the emergence of life. Thus life itself is a conflict and compromise between these two trends. At times the instincts operate against each other or combine with each other. Freud cites examples of real life instances where the two instincts act in combination, "the act of eating is a destruction of the object with the final aim of incorporating it, and the sexual act is an act of aggression with the purpose of the most intimate union."
In no normal person does the normal sexual aim lack some designable perverse element . . . 1

Parental love, which is so touching and at bottom so childlike, is nothing but parental narcissism born again . . . 2

The conclusion of it all:

We have to conclude that all the feelings of sympathy, friendship, trust and so forth which we expend in life are genetically connected with sexuality and have developed out of purely sexual desires by an enfeebling of their sexual aim, however pure and non-sensual they may appear in the forms they take on to our conscious self-perception. To begin with we know none but sexual objects; psychoanalysis shows us that those persons whom in real life we merely respect or are fond of may be sexual objects to us in our unconscious minds still . . . 3

This then is the wounding blow of psychoanalysis upon human nature—man is an animal with no understanding and control of the unconscious passions and instincts that determine his thinking, feeling, and action. Though men consider themselves as friendly, gentle, and loving creatures, in reality they are "creatures among whose instinctual endowments is to be reckoned a powerful share of aggressiveness." 4

Having made this revelation Freud believed that every man "will have to bow his head humbly before the truth of this view of man." 5

The concurrent and mutually opposing action of the two basic instincts gives rise to the whole variation of the phenomena of life. 6

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2 Idem, Collected Papers, 4:49.
3 Ibid., 2:319.
6 Ibid.
Whenever one or the other of the instincts moves out of proportion of the fusion of the instincts, the most tangible results arise. Thus, as an example, "A surplus of sexual aggressiveness will turn a lover into a sex murderer, while a sharp diminution in the aggressive factor will make him bashful or impotent."¹ Likewise, if an instinct should be deprived of the opportunity to express itself due to perhaps stringent defense mechanisms or the moral controls of the superego, they become turned inwards where they begin to act self-destructively.

Holding back aggressiveness is in general unhealthy and leads to illness (to mortification). A person in a fit of rage will often demonstrate how the transition from aggressiveness that has been prevented to self-destructiveness is brought about by diverting the aggressiveness against himself: he tears his hair or beats his face with his fists, though he would have evidently preferred to apply this treatment to someone else.²

Man in accepting civilized group life has had to subject himself to many restraints which cause the instincts to be self-directed and destructive.

This however, is not yet the factor that delivers to humanity the "most wounding blow," for the blow that Freud spoke of is a psychological one. The discovery of the unconscious and the revealing of the instincts are mere scientific discoveries for Freud. The blow delivered to humanity lies in the ridicule that the self-loving man is no longer the master in his own house.³

The implications of the presuppositions of man's animal nature, and of the existence of an unconscious mind driven by instincts is

that man becomes a helpless pawn moved around by forces beyond his control. Not only is man unable to control these unconscious forces but he is also incapable of understanding them. Thus his behavior is governed and determined in a way that is beyond his conscious comprehension. This naturally has many further implications.

To the surprise of mankind, all of human behavior, according to Freud, is motivated by the sexual and death instincts. Man is born into this world with the desire of incest, cannibalism, and lust of murder.\(^1\) Bowing to social barriers he is forced to divert his sexual inclinations away from his parents to other people who closely resemble them\(^2\) and his cannibalism and lust of murder find expression through alternative aggressive sexual instincts.\(^3\) According to Freud, although these perversions appear suppressed they are abundantly evident throughout all of human life, beginning with childhood right through to old age.

At the earliest stages of development when the infant gratifies his hunger, he is in actuality satisfying his cannibalistic sexual tendencies. Freud states:

I have been driven to regard as the earliest recognizable sexual organization the so-called "cannibalistic" or "oral" phase, during which the original attachment of sexual excitation to the nutritional instinct still dominates the scene . . . . In this phase the sexual aim could only be cannibalism-devouring.\(^4\)

\(^1\)Quoted in E. Ludwig, Dr. Freud, (New York: Hellman Williams and Company, 1947), p. 79.


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 159.

\(^4\)Ibid., An Infantile Neurosis, stan. ed., 17:106.
Speaking of the stage that follows the anal stage, he states, "A second pregenital phase is that of the sadistic-anal organization. . . the organ which, more than any other, represents the passive sexual aim is the erotogenic mucous membrane of the anus."¹ Deliberating on this point, Freud explains:

> Since the column of faeces stimulates erotogenic mucous membrane of the bowel, it plays the part of an active organ in regard to it; it behaves just as the penis does to the vaginal mucous membrane, and acts as it were as its forerunner during the cloacal epoch.²

Probably, unbeknown to most, the sex instincts guide all of these human behaviors and satisfy their never-ending needs by means beyond man's comprehension.

The sucking pleasures of young babies, the loving actions of parents, and even the most innocent feelings of people, share the common denominator of perverted instinctual drives.

The evidence of psychoanalysis shows that almost every intimate emotional relation between two people which lasts for some time--marriage, friendship, the relation between parents and children--contains a sediment of feelings of aversion and hostility, which only escapes perception as a result of repression.³

Speaking further about the feeling and principle of love, Freud states,

> /The/ condition of being in love in ordinary life outside analysis is also more like abnormal than normal mental phenomena . . . ⁴

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Summary

The psychoanalytic theory presents man as a primitive animal creature driven by instinctual forces originating within his own being or passed on to him through heredity. Though the repertoire of human behavior appears somewhat sophisticated, most of it is explained in terms of two basic instincts, those of life (Eros) and those of death (Thantos). The sexual drives represent the life instincts of procreation while the aggressive drives represent the death instincts of destruction. The interaction between these two basic psychogenic forces result in the diversified forms of human behavior.

Through the unique combination of ideas, and Freud's so-called "discovery of the unconscious," man is not only portrayed as a primitive animal, but most of all as a subject of drives and forces beyond his control. This fact, according to Freud, delivers a major blow to man's image of himself.
CHAPTER IV

THE BEHAVIORISTIC MODEL OF MAN

At the turn of the twentieth century a new approach to the study of psychology was beginning to exert its influence upon the young science. Up to that time introspectionism had been the chief method in studying human behavior and many had expressed contempt for what went by the name of psychology. The new approach of behaviorism emerged as a reaction against the abortive explanations of human behavior offered by the introspectionists. Turning away from mentalistic and psychic interpretations, the challenge of behaviorism was "either to give up psychology or else make it a natural science." In calling for the development of a natural science, behaviorism in theory called for the confining of all psychological study to visual observations of behavior and for the exclusion of retrospective observation.¹

With an emphasis upon physically observable data, behaviorism became strongly opposed to methodologies based on subjective intuition. Behaviorism began to reinterpret concepts of human behavior in light of experimentally derived facts. Building upon the meta-presupposition of evolution, behaviorism derived its facts chiefly from the experimental use of animals, justifying the extrapolation of evidence from animals to man on the contention that there is no dividing line

between man and brute.\(^1\) Although these contentions drew much criticism, the criticism did not deter the behaviorists from building a new approach on the assumption that man shares a common nature with the lower-order animals. As a natural science, behaviorism subscribed to the general view of determinism believing that all observable events have sufficient causes, and that the knowledge of these causes is fundamental for the prediction and control of human and animal behavior.

**Historical Development of the Behavioristic View**

Without tracing back the development of the empirical method to the early observationalist traditions of Bacon, Locke, Berkeley, Hume and others, one can identify some of the more modern predecessors of twentieth-century empirical psychology. Among the many significant names are those of men such as Gustav T. Fechner, Wilhelm H. Wundt, Ivan Pavlov, and Edward L. Thorndike.

**Fechner's and Wundt's Psychophysic**

Fechner's early interests centered on the development of a natural philosophy. With a keen interest in physics, Fechner wrote a treatise on electricity and other physical phenomena while at the same time, in his speculative mood, he addressed himself to cosmic questions of life after death. Later in the years from 1838-1840 there occurred a transition in his interests which resulted in a move from physics to physiology and psychology. Fechner applied principles of physics to the explanation of physiological and psychological occurrences. He subjected to experimental investigation such problems

as color vision, perception, and sensation. The root from which Fechner's later work the Psychophysick ultimately developed was to be found in Fechner's interest in Edward H. Weber's experiments upon the senses of touch, sight, and hearing. Fechner himself believed that there must be a connection between physical stimuli and consequent sensations. He worked on measuring stimuli and sensations in an attempt to discover minimal thresholds, later arriving at the general formula that sensation is in proportion to the logarithm of the stimulus. The term psycho-physics was the name Fechner gave to the science of measuring sensations by the required stimuli.¹

Fechner's views were later defended by Wundt who further subjected them to experimentation in his own laboratory. Taking Fechner's basic ideas a step further, Wundt studied the immediate consequences of sensation. This led to his conclusion that every sensation, if unhindered, is followed by a muscular movement. The process of the movement and of the response would in part be determined by the structure of the organism, but besides structural differences reflex processes would be accompanied by further sensations in the muscles which would result in an association of the muscle-sensation with the recognized stimulus. In this manner behavior would become subject to psycho-physical explanation. In adopting this psycho-physical parallelism it was assumed by the early experimentalists that all processes could be treated in terms of both physiology and psychology. The general principle of connection that was introduced as a result of this parallelism was given the name of "association".²

¹Peters, Brett's History of Psychology, pp. 584-591.
²Ibid.
Thorndike developed an interest in the ideas of association as they were presented in Wundt's Lectures on Human and Animal Psychology and attempted to demonstrate the occurrence of learning through association in the field of animal and human behavior. Working independently of Thorndike, Pavlov likewise studied learning through association. At first Pavlov studied the "conditioned reflex" by using a metronome as a signal for food, but later he postulated a principle of "reinforcement" by which he referred to the learning that occurred as a result of the stimulus being followed by the actual food. Pavlov carried out a great amount of empirical work on the effect of stimuli and conditioned responses which has been incorporated into the modern works of behaviorists.¹

Thorndike's and Pavlov's Laboratory Experiments

Both Thorndike and Pavlov studied behavior and the principles of learning through the observation of laboratory animals, and, as Brett stated, "as animals cannot talk there was never any question of using introspective reports to confirm the hypotheses which they formulated about them." Thus modern behaviorism carried on the practice of experimentation with animals, and its progress made in animal psychology. Behaviorists made a contribution to the study of human behavior by suggesting that "actual behavior of human beings should be studied rather than their introspective musings."²

Modern Behaviorism

John B. Watson, who is regarded by his successors as "the

¹Ibid., p. 696. ²Ibid.
first explicit behaviorist,"¹ carried on in the same tradition establishing his own laboratories for animal psychology. For Watson, psychology was a "... purely objective experimental branch of natural science" where "... introspection forms no essential part of its methods" and where "the behavior of man with all its refinement and complexity, forms only a part of his [the behaviorists] total field of investigation." The reason for this was that the behaviorist "... recognizes no dividing line between man and brute." Consequently human behavior becomes only a small part of animal psychology, where man is only one among the many animals, and no more special than the other animals.² Watson attacked the traditional studies of consciousness and argued that man's behavior must be described in "no other terms than those you would use in describing the behavior of the ox you slaughter." He advocated that, "... man and animal should be placed as nearly as possible under the same experimental conditions. Instead of feeding or punishing the human subject, we should ask him to respond by setting a second apparatus until standard and control offered no basis for a differential response."³ Admitting that this objectivity "drove and still drives many timid souls away from behaviorism," Watson shared an interest in applying to the study of man "the same kind of procedure and the same language of description" as was found useful in the study of lower animals. Watson's interests were predominantly methodological. In desiring to apply the same methodological procedure


to the study of human beings he stated:

In short the cry of the behaviorist is "Give me the baby and my world to bring it up in, and I'll make it crawl and walk; I'll make it climb and use its hands in constructing buildings of stone or wood; I'll make it a thief, a gunman, or a dope finder. The possibility of shaping in any direction is almost endless."

Adopting the empirical presuppositions that only the physically discernable is knowable, he disregarded human qualities which could not be quantified in scientific measures. Thus refusing to speak of the soul or the mind, he urged the view that man is only a machine programmable and manipulatable like any other piece of engineered equipment. For purposes of his study, Watson defined man as "an assembled organic machine ready to run, . . . an automobile of a sort. . . this man, this organic animal, this John Doe, who so far as parts are concerned is made of head, arms, hands, trunk, legs, feet, toes, and nervous, muscular and glandular systems." This mechanistic objectivity characterized the beginnings of the empirical approach to human psychology and consistent with the empirical presuppositions behaviorism of the 1980's continues in the same tradition.

The most recent spokesman of the behavioristic theory is B. F. Skinner. Skinner outlines in clear detail the behavioristic approach and depicts in clear terms the behavioristic model of man.

**Skinner's Behaviorism**

To begin with, Skinner pointed out that behaviorism was not a science of behavior but rather the philosophy of that science. The reason for this is that the study of human behavior is not restricted

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1Ibid., p. 9.  
2Ibid., p. 269
to the behavioral approach but is shared by other schools of psychology as well. Behaviorism, Skinner points out, is more specifically the philosophy of "this special version of a science of behavior." Apart from addressing itself to issues of behavior it asks clear philosophical questions concerning a science of behavior.

- Is such a science possible? Can it account for every aspect of human behavior? What methods can it use?
- Are its laws as valid as those of physics and biology?
- Will it lead to a technology, and if so what role will it play in human affairs?  

Clearly the questions seek to define an epistemology of the science of behavior.

**Behaviorism as a Philosophy**

Skinner's interest in the philosophical aspect of psychology does indeed reflect his early interests. In his autobiography he admits that his "earliest interest in psychology was philosophical," and in referring to a discussion he held with Alfred Whitehead, he stated that what was needed in the science of behavior was a "psychological epistemology."  

Skinner redefined the term behaviorism in the following words:

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2. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Ibid., pp. 409-410.

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Indeed, as a philosophy it rests on certain metaphysical presuppositions and, consequently, it does not need to be argued but rather defined in terms of its assumptions and reviewed in its basic propositions.

Skinner believed that an objective science of behavior was indeed possible.

A program of methodological behaviorism became plausible only when progress began to be made in the scientific observation of behavior, because only then was it possible to override the powerful effect of mentalism in diverting inquiry away from the role of the environment.

Mentalistic explanations allay curiosity and bring inquiry to a stop.¹

Thus to make such a science possible and give it absolute certainty, methodological behaviorism restricted its study of human behavior to observable facts only, believing that man could be explained meaningfully in scientific terms. In doing so, behaviorism attempted to become totally free of the numerous mentalistic concepts that lacked scientific explanation. Skinner firmly stated his position when he said, "I am a radical behaviorist in the sense that I find no place in the formulation for anything which is mental."² As far as the scope of his scientific approach was concerned he said, "I know of no essentially human feature that has been shown to be beyond the reach of a scientific analysis."³ As far as the validity of the laws of behaviorism are concerned Skinner stated, "It [behaviorism] offers, I believe, the clearest possible statement of the causal relations between behavior and environment."⁴

¹Skinner, About Behaviorism, p. 15.
³Idem, About Behaviorism, p. 263.
⁴Ibid., p. 273.
He was most optimistic about behaviorism's philosophy and methodology. Not only did Skinner see in it an epistemology for psychology but he also looked upon it as providing a potentially powerful tool for controlling human behavior. This later aspect of behaviorism appeared so promising that Skinner spent much of his time writing on the possibilities of controlling human societies through behavior engineering.\(^1\)

The implications of this new philosophy could lead, he believed, to a psychological revolution which would put an end to all of the races' problems.\(^2\) In more humanistic terms, Skinner explained that:

This is not time then, to abandon notions of progress, improvement or, indeed, human perfectibility. The simple fact is that man is able, and now as never before, to lift himself by his own bootstraps. In achieving control of the world of which he is a part, he may learn at last to control himself.\(^3\)

Skinner was convinced that the whole hope of human survival and the acceleration of the evolutionary process could be promoted through the precise study of the laws of behavior and the manipulation of necessary factors in the environment.\(^4\) In this respect he shared with Watson a common desire for the control of human behavior. On this point Watson stated:

The interest of the behaviorist is more than the interest of a spectator, he wants to control man's reactions as physical scientists want to control and manipulate other phenomena. It is the business of behavioristic psychology to be able to predict and control human activity.\(^5\)


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 4.

\(^4\)Ibid.

\(^5\)Watson, *Behaviorism*, p. 11.
Both proponents realized the potential implications of behaviorism's experimentation. Skinner hoped to apply the findings of his research not only to individuals but also to government and international affairs.\(^1\) Thus as a science and as a philosophy, behaviorism has as its aim the control of all humankind through a knowledge of the laws that govern human behavior.

Because Skinner considered speculation on the mental and psychic aspects of behavior to be superfluous, he restricted his explanations of behavior to a few very important concepts. Among the most significant are those that differentiate between respondent and operant behavior and the reinforcement schedules.

**Respondent Behavior**

The concept of respondent behavior is significant because of its contribution to the differentiation of simple forms of behavior from more complex behaviors. Respondent behavior is observed when an organism makes a response to a presented stimulus. It is a simple form of behavior which is correlated with specific eliciting stimuli. Such a correlation is known as "a respondent" and is "intended to carry the sense of a relation to a prior event."\(^2\) Respondent behavior carries more of the connotation of a reflex type of response where the stimulus is matched with an elicited behavior. The elicited behavior, when reinforced, increases in frequency or magnitude and thus respondent conditioning is observed.

\(^{1}\) Skinner, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, p. 64.

Operant Behavior

Operant behavior is more complex. It is seen as being "emitted" and not "elicited." It is emitted not in the sense that behavior exists in the organism and then comes out, but rather emitted in the sense that it appears. The environment in return either reinforces or punishes such a response. If a stimulus is present when a response is reinforced, the stimulus acquires some control over the response, and consequently the response is more likely to occur in the presence of such a stimulus.

To the stimulus and response is added the notion of consequence. In the case of a positive consequence the behavior is said to be strengthened and the consequences themselves are called "reinforcers." The frequency and schedule of reinforcement directly influences the rate of response, thus showing that behavior changes as contingencies change. This is most clearly illustrated when reinforcement is withheld and behavior undergoes "extinction."^\textsuperscript{1}

The strengthening of behavior which results from reinforcement is called "conditioning." But unlike respondent conditioning, the stimuli in operant conditioning do not elicit a given behavior but simply make the occurrence more probable.\textsuperscript{2} As a consequence of the reinforcement the person receives from the environment, he learns to deal with the environment effectively, and this in itself is perceived as having survival value.\textsuperscript{3}

\textsuperscript{1}Idem, About Behaviorism, pp. 58-82.
\textsuperscript{3}Idem, About Behaviorism, p. 44.
Skinner's investigations have been primarily concerned with operant behavior and contingencies of reinforcement. These concepts, according to Skinner, form the basis for understanding and controlling behavior: "Contingencies of reinforcement have the edge with respect to prediction and control. The conditions under which a person acquires behavior are relatively accessible and can often be manipulated."\(^1\) Furthermore, such an approach makes it possible for methodological behaviorism to "limit itself to what can be publicly observed."\(^2\)

Through the concept of operant conditioning and contingencies of reinforcement, behaviorism makes a major shift in the attribution of cause of behavior "Since mental or psychic events are asserted to lack dimensions of physical science, we have an additional reason for rejecting them" and, as a result, a move is made to study behavior in terms of variables lying outside of the organism and "in its immediate environment and its environmental history."\(^3\)

**Role of the Environment**

In this move, the environment takes on a new and very significant role. The environmental history of the organism controls its behaviors. In Skinner's words, "the genetic endowment of the species plus the contingencies to which the individual has been exposed still determine what he will perceive."\(^4\) In respect to the influence of

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 49  
\(^2\)Idem, *Beyond Freedom and Dignity*, p. 81.  
\(^4\)Ibid., *About Behaviorism*, p. 82.
the environment, operant conditioning is seen as a part of the overall "biological system" in which operant behavior has the function of supplementing natural selection.\(^1\) In this way behaviorism transfers the responsibility for behavior from the organism to the environment. Skinner summarizes this shift in the following words:

> As a science of behavior adopts the strategy of physics and biology, the autonomous agent to which behavior has traditionally been attributed is replaced by the environment—the environment in which the species evolved and in which the behavior of the individual is shaped and maintained.\(^2\)

The behavioral concepts are seen as complementing the process of evolution, and an understanding of the interactions between the organism and the environment can be used to control man's behavior in an effort to enhance his chances of survival.\(^3\)

However, in shifting the locus of control from "autonomous man" to the "observable environment" Skinnerian behaviorism does not deny the existence of physiological correlates of behavior within the organism. It hopes that physiology will eventually explain these correlates. Now adequate physiological information is lacking and therefore nothing shall be permitted to divert attention away from the external environment.\(^4\)

\section*{A Model of Man}

Behaviorism's philosophy and its consequent views of the nature of man has been very influential in many spheres of life. In

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 49-51.

\(^2\)Idem, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 175.

\(^3\)Idem, Cumulative Record, p. 4.

\(^4\)Idem, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 186.
the form of behavior modification techniques, behaviorism has penetrated not only therapy clinics but also the schools--through instructional programs, the homes--through new concepts in discipline, the social work--through ideas on the use of rewards and punishments in manipulating people's behavior, and the business world--through new methods of increasing production and new techniques of marketing. But now in applying the behavioristic concepts to a world of human beings, little consideration has been given to the underlying behavioristic presuppositions about the nature of the human being. Through the empirical presupposition man has been reduced to only those qualities that can be physically observed or scientifically quantified. Through the evolutionary presupposition his behavior has been explained in terms of principles developed through animal experimentation. The overall tendency is to disregard any intangible human qualities and restrict explanation to observable phenomena only.

The Origin of Man

As in the psychoanalytic model of man, behaviorism accepts the evolutionary theory of man's origin. The presupposition of man's evolutionary origin underlies the theoretical structures of both Watson and Skinner. The theory of evolution established for animal psychology the desired link between man and animal. This observation is confirmed by Brett's statement that,

The theory of evolution was, perhaps, the most decisive of all the postulates of other sciences in its influence on psychology, in that it occasioned the abandonment of any dogmatic separation of human from animal modes of behavior. The start of animal psychology was
one such offshoot of the realization that men are, after all, animals.

Building upon the evolutionary presupposition, behaviorism applies its laboratory derived principles to human behavior problems.

Man the Subject of the Environment

Evolutionary ideas complement the behavioristic notion of environmental determinism. According to the behavioristic model, man is a subject of environmental forces. The environment is seen as determining man's behavior through two distinct contributions.

The environment made its first great contribution during the evolution of the species, but it exerts a different kind of effect during the lifetime of the individual, and the contribution of the two effects is the behavior we observe at any given time.2

The first contribution was made in terms of a genetic inheritance of specific anatomical and physiological characteristics, while the second contribution is made through the environment's control of behavior through contingencies of reinforcement.3 Furthermore, the extent to which either contribution can be altered or changed, to that extent behavior can be changed.4

By reducing the explanation of behavior to environmental factors, behaviorism does away with the dualistic notions of mind and body. Instead, behavior is perceived as being a part of the organism and mental functions are in actuality behavioral responses to the environmental contingencies of reinforcement.

1Peters, Brett's History of Psychology, p. 694.
2Skinner, About Behaviorism, p. 19. 3Ibid., p. 228.
4Ibid., p. 19.
The concept of a "mind" is rejected and regarded as counterproductive in the analysis of behavior. Even though behavioristic concepts cannot sufficiently explain all kinds of thinking, the concept of mind is ruled out as worthless. Furthermore, the common belief that the mind gives meaning to various structures in the environment has been reversed and the experiences of size, shape, motion, position, number, and duration are seen as features of the environment. Adding to this Skinner states: "It may be true that there is no structure without construction but we must look to the constructing environment, not to a constructing mind." The concept of the mind is regarded as confusing. It represents a setback in the analysis of human behavior. "By attempting to move human behavior into a world of non-physical dimensions, mentalistic or cognitive psychologists have cast the basic issues in insoluble forms." The concept of mind is viewed by the behaviorists as an invention which is as remote today as it was when Plato is said to have discovered it.

The behaviorist then sets out to reinterpret in behavioristic terms all the common functions attributed to the mind. Such further concepts as thinking, reasoning, the will, consciousness, and feelings are not abolished but are restated in different terminology. The mind is redefined as not a separate inner entity but as the person himself.

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1 Idem, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, pp. 185-186.
2 Idem, About Behaviorism, p. 129.  
3 Ibid., p. 131.  
4 Ibid., p. 131.
Human thought consequently becomes equated with human behavior. "Thinking takes on the dimensions of behavior, not of a fancied inner process which finds expression in behavior." The mistake is "in allocating the behavior to the mind." Taking the point a little further, Skinner believes that to admit that one "thinks", as in "I think so", may in actual fact be an admission of weakness. The term "I think" when contrasted with the term "I know" implies "defective stimulus control." Thus behaviorism does away with the term "thinking" on the grounds that such cognitive explanations of inner processes are not explanations at all but inventions serving no useful purpose.¹

Another cognitive process which is discredited in the mentalistic sense is "reason." Although for many people it is a highly admirable function which supposedly distinguishes man from brutes, the behaviorist perceives it in behavioral terms. The capacity of reason which impels to the discovery of truth, to the giving of advice and warnings, is easily explained in terms of contingencies of reinforcement. New solutions, advice, and warnings can be identified with possible reinforcing consequences. As an example, to give reasons for preferable changes in behavior is to point to possible reinforcing consequences. Furthermore, such reasons can only be given on the basis of a long history of prior conditioning.² Likewise the making of choices can be explained in terms of the past history of reinforcements. A choice is simply an act. The freedom of choice is simply the opportunity to act without being physically restrained. But what is chosen is determined by past rewards and punishments or, in other words, the consequences of past choices.³

¹Ibid., pp. 114-130. ²Ibid., pp. 142-143 ³Ibid., pp. 124-126.
A similar explanation is given for the concept of the "will." The will is seen in terms of probabilities of behaving. "A willingness is a readiness or likelihood." A will to act refers to the probability of behavior that brings about known reinforcing outcomes. Again, as with choosing, the conditions which determine the form of probability of an operant are in a person's past history. Since the events of past history are not obviously represented in the current setting, they are easily overlooked. This leads to the problem described by Skinner: "It is easy to believe that the person is free to choose, the issue is determinism." This however, may lead to further questions concerning other cognitive functions such as creativity and creative behavior. If the will, the freedom of choice, and reason are all reduced to outcomes of reinforcement contingencies, is there room left for possible creative behaviors? In behavioristic terms, creativity is seen as the "accidental variations in behavior . . . selected by their reinforcing consequences." It is a natural selection of behaviors which has survival value. Thus the concept of operant conditioning solves the problem in terms similar to those of the evolutionary theory. Behaviorism does not credit the individual with such unique attributes as reason, thinking or creativity. In Skinner's words, "it is always the environment which builds the behavior with which problems are solved."  

With this reinterpretation of the behaviors of man, it is certainly interesting to find out what has happened to the so-called unique nature of man. Is man being really abolished by this scientific

1Ibid., pp. 59-61.  
2Ibid., p. 126.  
3Idem, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 185.
analysis? According to Skinner, "What is being abolished is autonomous
man—the inner man, the homuneculus, the possessing demon, the man
defended by literatures of freedom and dignity." Skinner feels that
the "Abolition has been long overdue." The "autonomous man is a device
used to explain what we cannot explain in any other way. He has been
constructed out of ignorance."¹ However, as man and his behavior comes
under further scientific analysis, "the very stuff of which he is
composed vanishes."²

The picture which emerges from a scientific
analysis is not of a body with a person inside, but
of a body which is a person in the sense that it
displays a complex repertoire of behavior. The
picture is, of course, unfamiliar. The man thus
portrayed is a stranger and from the traditional
point of view he may not seem to be a man at all.³

Behaviorism in its philosophy attacks the dualism which gives
rise to the concept of a body with an inner mind. It seeks to replace
the dualism by simply reducing man to a physical body. In doing away
with man's dualistic nature it seeks to reduce the complexity of his
behavior. "Only then can we turn from the inferred to the observed,
from the miraculous to the natural, from the inaccessible to the
manipulable."⁴ But from the behaviorist's point of view, does this
then dehumanize man? Does it make him a mere animal or just a machine?
No, it is not dehumanizing. For man is still seen as much more than
animal. His behavior is much more complex, but like an animal he comes
within the range of scientific analysis. Likewise, man does not become
a machine just because his behavior is analyzed in mechanical terms.

¹Ibid., p. 191. ⁴Ibid., p. 191.
²Ibid. ³Ibid., p. 190.
⁴Ibid., p. 191.
However, "man is a machine in the sense that he is a complex system behaving in lawful ways. This does not reduce his extraordinary complexity. But it is true that the many functions previously assigned to the "Autonomous man" are gradually transferred from man to the controlling environment.

If the environment is the sole determiner of behavior, does man make any unique contribution which would give him some form of identity? In the behavioristic approach the only identity a person may develop comes from the acquiring of a repertoire of behavior. The self is defined as a "repertoire of behavior," but "there is no place in the scientific position for a self as a true originator or imitation of action." Thus, to the behaviorist, man is not denied uniqueness but he is denied responsibility for his behavior.

Summary

Building upon the presuppositions of empiricism and of the evolutionary origin of man, behaviorism explains the nature of man in terms of physically observable properties and scientifically monitored changes of behavior. Man's behavior is explained in terms of his structural characteristics and the environmental stimuli which determine his responses through the operation of reinforcement contingencies. Because of the deterministic nature of behavioristic psychology, the behavior of man is perceived as rational, predictable, and, consequently, controllable. Taking a purely objective approach to the study of man,

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1Ibid., p. 193. 
2Ibid., p. 189. 
3Idem, Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 189. 
behaviorism insists on abolishing the mentalistic explanations and terms which cannot be justified through scientific observation. Through contingencies of survival and the contingencies of reinforcement, behaviorism transfers the control of behavior from man to his environment. As a result man becomes an organism which has no free will or free choice but is guided in all of his actions by his genetic endowment and the forces of his life environment.
CHAPTER V
THE HUMANISTIC MODEL OF MAN

The phenomenological model of man rests upon a philosophy that contrasts sharply with both the behavioristic and psychoanalytic views of the nature of man. The so-called client-centered, non-directive, self-theories are all versions of the phenomenological tradition. The most fundamental characteristic of the phenomenological approach is its emphasis on the whole person and his ability to experience meaningfully the world in which he lives.

In 1962, Abraham H. Maslow and a group of psychologists gathered under his leadership and applied the term "Humanistic psychology" to all those theoretical orientations which desired to redirect the attention of psychology to the study of the human beings as healthy, singular entities. The humanistic movement has exerted considerable influence in the field of psychology and has gained the label of "third-force psychology," signifying the impact it has had in contrast to the influence of psychoanalysis or behaviorism. The main thesis of this new approach was to:

1) Center attention on the experiencing person and set experience as the primary phenomena in the study of man.

2) Emphasize such distinctive qualities as choice, creativity, valuation, and self-realization.
3) Establish meaningfulness as the criterion for the selection of problems for study and not objectivity which works at the expense of significance.

4) Place the ultimate concern with the valuing of the dignity and worth of man.¹

These four characteristics form the platform from which humanistic psychology approaches the study of the behavior of man. In adopting such a base humanistic psychology strongly opposed the reductionistic approaches of psychoanalysis and behaviorism which sought to explain the complexities of human behavior in solely physical and animal terms. Likewise turning away from a deterministic interpretation of behavior, humanism raises the place of man to the level of a master of his own environment. Human beings are seen as the designers and architects of their own world, and no longer victims of the impersonal forces of the environment or of the urges of the unconscious mind. In these fundamental issues humanistic psychology parts from the assumptions of either psychoanalysis or behaviorism. Alvin R. Mahrer confirms this trend in these words, "It is on this point that humanistic theory aligns with existentialism and parts company from the natural sciences, including contemporary psychology and psychiatry..."² The emphasis now moves away from the atomistic and animalistic views of man and focuses on the human being as a whole person capable of a deeper, more meaningful experience with the world around him.


The "potential for experience" becomes the basic personality unit of humanistic psychology. The word "potential," as in "potential experience," is the chief concept, but "experiencing" itself is more than a concept--it is something that is felt by the human organism and requires special attention. Experience can only be accounted for by the organism experiencing it, consequently, individual persons are the only reliable sources of data. For the humanistic approach experience becomes the construct that replaces such other constructs as wishes, needs, and contingencies.

By accepting experiencing as the formal basis of personality description, humanistic theory leaves behind wishes, drives, needs, goals, impulses, and other constructs which draw attention away from the specific nature of sheer human experience.¹

The humanistic approach directs the attention fully to the person who is the locus of all experience.

The totality of all the individual's separate experiences is known as the person's phenomenal field. Deriving from the designation "phenomenal," the term phenomenology is the title given to the study of the totality of individual experiences.

The essence of the term "phenomenology" is found in the unique method of studying man and his behavior. Heidegger, who originally coined the term, defined it thus: "Phenomenology means . . . to let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the very way in which it shows itself from itself."² It neither designates the object of its

¹Ibid., p. 20.

research nor characterizes the subject matter; phenomenology primarily signifies a methodological conception. As a method, phenomenology together with other concepts such as the Gestalt, Daseinanalysis, existentialism, and experientialism forms a part of the overall humanistic approach which rests upon the humanistic conception of the nature of man. The meaning of humanistic theory rests upon the writings of such persons as Søren Kirkegaard, Edmund Husserl, Martin Heidegger, Gordon Allport, Abraham Maslow, Micheal Polanyi, Carl Rogers, and others too numerous to mention.¹

The Historical Development of the Humanistic View

Humanistic psychology developed out of the dissatisfactions with the observationalist method. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the humanists began to search for a philosophical base upon which they could construct a new image of man. The past work of philosophers who expounded at length on the higher potential of the human nature was at their disposal. Among the many authors mentioned earlier is Heidegger whose philosophy well represents an effort to present a higher view of humanity.

Heidegger's Phenomenology

For Heidegger the subject of greatest interest was the nature and meaning of the human being. As Jones states: "His aim was not merely to call attention to Being—that would be useless—but to evoke in us the amazement that he felt in the presence of Being."²

¹Mahrer, Experiencing, p. 13.
²Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, 5:290.
Heidegger, in his philosophical investigation into the nature of Being, provides much of the inspiration and the basic material upon which later humanists and existentialists have sought to build their theories. The theories of Maslow and Rogers, which will be discussed later, can be understood and appreciated better when looked upon in the light of the work of such men as Heidegger and his method of phenomenology.

Heidegger, through his writings, made a major contribution to the long list of descriptions of what it is to be man. One of the first significant characteristics of Being that Heidegger expounded was summed up in the term "Dasein." He used the term to describe the unique qualities of Being that make it a Being. One of these distinguishing qualities stands out in the fact that it is "in its very Being, that Being is an issue for it." The Being has in its nature the ability to reflect about itself and consider its own nature. Furthermore, Being has the capacity to understand itself. "Understanding of Being is itself a definite characteristic of Dasein's Being." Part of the understanding of itself arises out of its ability to perceive itself and its environment. Being, therefore, "understands itself in terms of its existence."\(^1\)

Dasein, or the entity of "Being" through its ability to reflect upon itself and the ability to understand itself, is no longer limited to reacting to the world of stimuli; rather it is capable of responding in accordance with its perception of itself and of the stimuli. Thus Dasein has attitudes towards the world and toward stimuli which bear directly upon the type of response it makes. In reflecting about its

\(^1\)Heidegger, *On Time and Being*, pp. 32-33.
own nature and the nature of the surrounding environment, Dasein makes choices, evaluation, and judgments. Unlike other kinds of being, such as plants or animals, Dasein adjusts its behavior in accordance with its own judgments. Therefore, "Dasein is in the mode of choosing, of facing possibilities, and it cannot escape having its Being in this mode of Being. To neglect to choose, to refuse to choose, to fear to choose are all ways of choosing."¹ Dasein exists in the world and is a part of its world. Dasein in reality structures its own world. The world is full of potential which is ready at hand for Dasein to use. As a result of these possibilities, Dasein often lives ahead of itself in that it is a forward-looking, future-looking creature, and its nature cannot be fully understood in terms of the present because it extends itself in time beyond the present. But there is more to the discussion of existence; namely, the question of the origin of Being.

"Facticity" and "Throwness" are two characteristics of Dasein that relate to the Being's origin and predicament. Firstly, the characteristic of facticity is simply the fact of Dasein's existence. "Because we lack any such explanation, we feel ourselves simply to have been thrown into the world, ignorant of whence we have come or whither we will go... We are, as it were, orphans and "homeless."²

As a consequence of such a predicament, the human being experiences anxiety. "The pure 'that it is' shows itself, but the 'whence' and the 'whither' remain in darkness,"³ and, consequently,

¹Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, 5:295.
²Ibid., p. 307.
³Heidegger, On Time and Being, p. 173.
the uncertainty surrounding its origin causes Being to run away from facing up to itself. The experience of diffused anxiety causes Being to flee from itself and hide in the "they" and the "world."

Dasein's absorption in the "they" and its absorption in the "world" of its concern make manifest something like a fleeing of Dasein in the face of itself--of itself as an authentic potentiality-for-Being-its-Self. . . . But to bring itself face to face with itself is precisely what Dasein does not do when it thus flees."

In this anxiety and fleeing the Being recognizes the "precariousness of our human mode of existence." In an attempt to alleviate the burden of this knowledge the self escapes into the "they" self. "The 'they' self, essentially is our social self--the self that, far from being pure potentiality, has a neat and tidy 'nature'--the nature decreed for it by others, the anonymous 'they.'" 2 The authentic self is sold out to the social self, which in effect is the submission of one's own nature to the nature of the society or the world. The subtle effect of the "they" on Dasein is regarded as "deleterious." The self loses its own identity and begins to accept the identity of others. Consequently, in life "its in the they, not we ourselves who set the standards by which we estimate progress or lack of it." This mode of Being, Heidegger termed as "Fallenness." By falling into the world in this manner the self loses its authenticity. "Fallenness then is inauthencity." Life in this state is regarded by Heidegger as dimmed and thinned out. Jones describes it thus: "We no longer feel sufficiently involved in our world to experience it as it is, in all

1Ibid., p. 229.

2Jones, A History of Western Philosophy, p. 310.
its mystery, diversity, beauty, and terror of Dasein's world as Dasein comes to understand that world in the mood called 'anxiety.' Through fallenness the "they self" absolves us from being free. What life becomes for the "they self" is a conformity to the norms provided by the social class or ethnic group to which one belongs. The true self in reality becomes alienated from Being.¹

To Heidegger, the Being can retrieve itself from the state of fallenness. It can regain its authenticity by accepting the anxiety and living in the "understanding of our indeterminacy" and "our freedom." But being authentic also means realizing and anticipating one's own end, namely, death. Thus the Being in its state of fallenness is being called to authenticity by the voice of the conscience. "The call of the conscience has the character of an appeal to Dasein by calling it to its own most potentiality-for-Being-its-Self." This call comes from within the Self and speaks to the Self. "This call is an appeal to the they-self in its Self; as such an appeal it summons the Self to its potentiality for Being-its-Self, and thus calls Dasein forth to its possibilities."² The character of the caller is indefinite, but, as Heidegger expresses it: "The impossibilities of making more definite what this caller is, are not just nothing." But there is something very distinctive about the call; the nature of the call is positive.³

In summary then, Heidegger creates an image of a Being that is unique in that it has the capacity to think and understand itself. Yet as far as the question of the Being's origin is concerned, the

¹Ibid., pp. 311-313.
²Heidegger, On Time and Being, pp. 318-319.
³Ibid.
answer is unknown. Its existence is a sheer fact that cannot be explained. The Being simply has been thrown into existence. The lack of explanation for its existence is at times a cause for anxiety. But the anxiety should not be a reason for the Being to hide its identity in the "they" of society. Rather the Being, in order to enjoy life to its maximum, should be obedient to its internal call which summons the Being to be its true self.

The concepts of Heidegger are frequently repeated in the various humanistic theories of psychology. Among these theories are those of Carl Rogers and Abraham Maslow who both perceived human nature as having a higher positive calling.

Roger's Self Theory
To make the comparison between Heidegger and modern humanistic psychology clear, Rogers characterizes his theory of personality in these words:

This theory is basically phenomenological in character and relies heavily upon the concept of self as an exploratory concept. It pictures the end point of personality development as being a basic congruence between the phenomenal field of experience and the conceptual structure of the self—a situation which, if achieved, would represent freedom from internal strain and anxiety and freedom from potential strain; which would represent the maximum in realistically oriented adaptation; which would mean the establishment of an individualized value system.¹

The liberation of the Self from imposed values and norms is clearly the object of Roger's therapeutic approach and Heidegger's philosophy of Being. The theme of both theories is that only a liberated self,

and an authentic self, living in congruence with its own calling, brings about a sense of fulfillment and a life lived to its fullest potential.

Heidegger devoted much of his time to constructing a full philosophy of the nature of Being, but Rogers and other humanistic psychologists carry on from where Heidegger seems to have left off and apply the philosophy to psychotherapy, counseling, and personality-theory construction. On the basis of his own experience with patients in psychotherapy, Rogers formulates his own theory of personality that greatly emphasizes the experiencing self as a construct.

**Major Constructs of Roger's Theory**

At the very center of Roger's self theory is the strong emphasis upon the self and experience. Both constructs received much attention during the early stages of the development of his views on the phenomenological world of the individual.¹

Experience is, for me, the highest authority. The touchstone of validity is my own experience. No other person's ideas, and none of my own ideas, are as authoritative as my experience... it is the process of becoming in me.

Furthermore emphasizing the authority of experience and stressing its importance, Rogers states: "Neither the Bible nor the prophets--neither Freud nor research--neither the revelations of God nor man--can take precedence over my own direct experience."² To Rogers experience becomes the authority, not because it is infallible, but  


²Ibid.
because it can be continually checked against the reality existing in the world. Through the process of checking one's own experiences, an individual begins to discover that experience is orderly and lawful. Furthermore, due to the changing nature of experience, "Life, at its best is a flowing, changing process in which nothing is fixed." Allowing oneself to flow along with the experience of life, though it may be a little frightening, is, according to Rogers, the most satisfying and rewarding thing.¹

The Organism and the Self

The organism, psychologically conceived, is the locus of all experience. Experience includes everything that comes to the Being's consciousness and awareness at any given time. The totality of all experience constitutes the phenomenal field. The phenomenal field can be known only to the person himself and forms the individual's frame of reference.² How the individual responds to the world depends on the phenomenal field which is his subjective reality. The individual's behavior is not dependant upon the stimulating conditions of the external environment. Thus the responsibility for behavior is placed with the individual and not with the environment, as was the case in behaviorism.

From this phenomenal field the self gradually emerges. This self is a portion which is characterized by the expressions of "I" or "me." It denotes

The organized, consistent gestalt composed of perceptions of the characteristics of the "I" or "me" and the perceptions of the relationships of the "I" or "me" to others and to various aspects of life, together with the values attached to these perceptions.

Congruence and Incongruence

Congruence and its opposite—congruence—are constructs which add further significance to the previous concepts of organism and self. Besides the conscious symbolizations of experience, there exist also unconscious and unsymbolized experiences in the phenomenal field. As the individual tests his experiences against the real world and makes the necessary adjustments with reality, his behavior can be said to be realistic, but this does not mean that the behavior reflects the true self of the person. Frequently individuals conform to the expectations of the real world at the price of not being true to themselves. People wear false "fronts" or "masks" which are reinforcing as far as the world is concerned but are less reinforcing, if not injurious to personal growth. Thus individuals experience psychological discomfort, anxiety, tension, and confusion. This is the state of incongruence. It is the result of the inauthenticity Heidegger described. Consequently, the individual needs to make a change. In order to alleviate and do away with the anxiety and confusion, the individual needs to return to a state of congruence. Placing the person in the non-threatening situation of client-centered therapy is one way of assisting him in the return to congruence. In the process of therapy

\[1\] Ibid., p. 200.  \[2\] Idem, On Becoming a Person, p. 65.
the individual learns to think well of himself (Self-Regard), to accept his own feelings, and to become more and more his true self. The experiences of the self begin to reflect more the experiences of the organism and thus the self and the organism become congruent.

Positive Regard

Positive regard is the attitude of unconditional acceptance which is required in order for the individual in therapy to feel secure. It is an acceptance free of disapproval and negative evaluation. Positive regard together with nondirective counseling are the two major characteristics of the Rogerian approach.

It is very significant that clients undergoing counseling realize that the counselor listens to them acceptantly and empathizes with their feelings. Through this process the client "little by little becomes able to listen to himself," and while he is learning to listen to himself, "he also becomes more acceptant of himself." To summarize the process of therapy, Rogers states that

... as he /the person/ becomes more self aware, more self acceptant, less defensive and more open, he finds that he is at last free to change and flow in the directions natural to the human organism.¹

Like Heidegger, Rogers believes in the underlying call of humanity to be itself. Rogers believes the call to be natural to the human organism, and both Rogers and Heidegger believe the call to be positive. Moreover, the conditions of acceptance and regard are essential to the growth of the organism and the self.

¹Ibid., pp. 63-64.
Maslow's Self-Actualization Theory

Another prominent and leading spokesman for humanistic psychology is Abraham H. Maslow. Though his theory of self-actualization does not draw as much controversial discussion as the theories of Freud, Skinner, and Rogers, Maslow has been very articulate in presenting the humanistic or phenomenological model of man. He sums up his most recent book, Motivation and Personality, as "representing a different philosophy of human nature, a new image of man."^1

Hierarchy of Needs

Maslow's theory of motivation presents two major concepts--basic needs and meta needs. In a hierarchy of needs the basic needs of hunger, affection, security, and self-esteem fill the lower ranks of the hierarchy; while such needs as beauty, justice, goodness, and wholeness make up the upper ranks. The pursuit and gratification of the higher needs lead to "greater, stronger and truer individualism,"^2 whereas the lower needs are far more localized, tangible, and, if unsatisfied, disruptive to further growth.

The unfulfilled lower needs (mainly physiological needs) not only obscure higher motivations but also produce a "lopsided view of human nature."^3 As the physiological needs become satisfied, the higher needs immediately emerge. And when these in turn are satisfied, new and still higher needs again emerge. At the very apex of the hierarchy stands the need for self-actualization.

^2Ibid., p. 100. ^3Ibid., p. 30.
Maslow's Concept of Self-Actualization

Self-actualization is a need that can never be entirely fulfilled. Maslow does not perceive self-actualization as an end state but rather view it as a continual process of growing and becoming. Some of the traits that characterize self-actualizing people include, among others, a higher acceptance of self and of others; a very realistic, independent, and creative outlook; a problem-centered rather than self-centered approach; and/or an attitude favoring privacy and a degree of detachment while at the same time being able to establish closer and more intimate relationships with a select few. On the whole, Maslow described self-actualizing people as people who are developing "to the full stature of which they are capable."¹

As Maslow searches for a representative sample of self-actualizing people, he admits that "none were found that were usable in our culture and our time (in itself a thought-provoking finding)." In explaining the selection process, Maslow further states:

We had to stop excluding a possible subject on the basis of single fables, mistakes, or foolishness; or to put it another way, we could not use perfection as a base for selection since no subject was perfect.²

As yet not discouraged, Maslow firmly believes that human life will never be understood unless man's highest aspirations are taken into account.

Growth, self-actualization, the striving toward health, the quest for identity and autonomy, the yearning for excellence (and other ways of phrasing the striving "upward") must now be accepted

¹Ibid., chp. 11. ²Ibid., pp. 150, 151.
beyond question as a widespread and perhaps universal tendency.\textsuperscript{1}

In Maslow's view, the acceptance of this assumption is an absolute necessity in the understanding of humanity. According to Maslow, psychology needs to be profoundly restructured around a different view of man. One needs to view man as a being attempting to grow to perfection, guided by "growth motivation rather than deficiency motivation."\textsuperscript{2}

A Model of Man

The humanistic model of man presents what appears to be a more optimistic view of man. In this model such human activities as thought, feelings, beliefs, and values receive special attention. Man is no longer viewed through the deterministic concepts of drives, instincts, and environmental forces; instead, he is looked upon as a self-determiner who controls and creates his own world to live in. As Matson expresses it, man is no longer an "object" or "reactor" but enters the stage as an actor\textsuperscript{3}--the world being the stage and man being the creator of his own acts.

Man's nature is seen as multifaceted; as rational and arational, and as subjective, and, therefore, not suited for study through the methods of natural science. Each person then, is viewed as an individual different from all others and possessing unique characteristics that cannot be justly explained in terms of general scientific rules and principles.

\textsuperscript{1}Ibid., p. \textsuperscript{2}Ibid., p. 159.  
The Origin of Man

The humanistic view is not very specific in its explanation of man's origin and destiny. Heidegger made somewhat of an effort to incorporate into his philosophy some ideas about the origin of man in terms of the concepts of "facticity" and "throwness." Facticity simply refers to the fact of man's existence, and throwness refers to the lack of explanation for man's existence. Consequently the idea of throwness presents man as a being thrown into the world, ignorant of where he came from. Man's lack of knowledge concerning his origin becomes a source of anxiety, but overcoming that anxiety and learning to live with it is a part of the process of growth.

The Holistic Nature of Man

Of great significance to the humanistic approach is the emphasis upon the holistic nature of man. Man cannot be fully understood in terms of independent and dependent variables. The person as a whole is a unique being whose nature is destroyed if viewed in terms of separate units comprising a whole. The self is viewed as a "gestalt," for it "is not a sum of elements but a configuration in which every distinguishable part determines and is determined by the nature of the whole." The self is more than the sum of independent parts, "It is an active living whole, a body mind, the latest term in the evolutionary process."\(^3\) Polanyi illustrates the point well when he states, "Take a

1Mahrer, Experiencing, pp. 180-181.
watch to pieces and examine, however carefully, its separate parts in
turn, and you will never come across the principles by which a watch
keeps time.\(^1\)

Through an emphasis upon the holistic nature of man, the
humanistic model opposes the "analytic-dissecting-atomistic-Newtonian
approach of the behaviorisms and of Freudian psychoanalysis." In his
criticism of the atomistic approach to the study of man, Maslow states:

I have become more and more inclined to think that the
atomistic way of thinking is a form of mild psycho-
pathology, or is at least one aspect of cognitive
immaturity. The holistic way of thinking and seeing
seems to come quite naturally and automatically to
healthier, self-actualizing, and seems to be extra-
ordinarily difficult for less evolved, less mature,
less healthy people.\(^2\)

**Uniqueness of Man**

As general science pursues the discovery of general laws and
principles of behavior, there is a certain concern among humanists
that the uniqueness of man will be de-emphasized. From the genetic
point of view each individual has a very unique hereditary endowment
and the genetic inheritance together with one's own unique experiences
with the world result in such differing personalities that no two
people are ever alike. William James, in quoting an acquaintance
illustrates this emphasis well in the words, "There is very little
difference between one man and another, but what little there is, is
very important."\(^3\)

\(^1\)Polanyi, The Study of Man, p. 47.

\(^2\)Maslow, Motivation and Personality, pp. ix-xi.

\(^3\)William James, "The Individual and the Society," in The
Philosophy of William James (New York: Modern Library, 1925),
pp. 242-243.
In order for individual growth to be permitted, the uniqueness of each individual's constitution and experience must be respected, for as Moustakas points out, "There is no reality except individual reality and that is based on a background of unique experience." The self, consequently, is perceived by this model as "constantly emerging" and changing. "The human person wants to feel that his wholeness is respected and his individuality is treasured." A denial of personal uniqueness "interferes with human understandingness" and blocks the potential forces that exist within the person for creativity, for unique, peculiar, and idiosyncratic expression.¹

Growth and the Positive Nature of Man

When Heidegger spoke of the unknown caller who called the self to become itself, he emphasized the positiveness of that call. But because the call came from within the self and was directed to the self, Heidegger was really implying something about the basic nature of the self, namely its positive direction.² In the more current developments of humanistic psychology, the positive nature of man has received greater emphasis.

Both Rogers and Maslow accept the assumption that man is basically good and desiring to move in that direction. Rogers, drawing upon his years of experience, states:

There is one deep learning which is perhaps basic to all of the things I have said thus far. It has been forced upon me by more than twenty-five years of trying to be helpful to individuals in personal distress. It is simply this; it has

¹Moustakas, The Self, pp. 3-5.
²Heidegger, On Time and Being, pp. 318-319.
been my experience that persons have a basically positive direction. Rogers does not want to be perceived as unrealistic. Realizing that due to defensiveness and inner fears man can become destructive, cruel, immature, aggressive, antisocial, and hurtful, Rogers, on the basis of his experience with individuals still believes that in man can be found "strongly positive, directional tendencies" bound in an urge to "expand, extend, become autonomous, developed, mature." As the encrusted psychological defenses are removed through therapy and meaningful experiences, the urge for growth is released.

The individual has within himself the capacity and the tendency, latent if not evident, to move forward toward maturity. In a suitable psychological climate this tendency is released and becomes actual rather than potential.

Consequently, there is no need to fear man as a beastly animal who needs to be watched and controlled. Rather he can be accepted as an organism able to achieve through the remarkable integrative capacity of its central nervous system, a "balanced, realistic, self-enhancing, other-enhancing behavior." There is only man in man and "this we have been able to release" with "all the richness which that implies."

Rogers acknowledges that this positive view of man is so foreign to the present culture that it will not be quickly accepted. Religion, and especially the Christian tradition, has so permeated modern culture with the concept that man is basically sinful that Rogers realizes it will take time to repair the attitude. But Rogers

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\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 27, 35.  
\(^3\)Ibid.  
\(^4\)Ibid., p. 105.
views his initial steps in that direction as the most revolutionary outcomes of his clinical approach.

One of the most revolutionary concepts to grow out of our clinical experience is the growing recognition that the inner-most care of man's nature, the deepest layers of his personality, the base of his "animal nature" is basically socialized, forward moving, rational and realistic.

Maslow confirms Roger's optimistic outlook on the nature of man and favors, on the basis of present knowledge, a new view of man.

It can certainly be granted by now that our knowledge is sufficient to reject any claim that human nature is, in its essence, primarily, biologically, fundamentally evil, sinful, malicious, ferocious, cruel or murderous.

Again Maslow does not deny the existence of instinctive tendencies toward bad behavior, but he does not perceive them as reflecting on the basic nature of man.

**Man's Subjective Nature**

The being in the humanistic model is perceived as living within a phenomenal field that consists of both a physical and a subjective realm. The subjective realm consists mostly of values, beliefs, attitudes, and feelings. The meaning of each experience is affected by "the values involved in the situation, event, or experience... which comes from the person's personal background." Consequently, no one can understand the individual as well as the individual understands himself. The self in its actions is much more than the external

1Ibid., pp. 90-91.
observer can see. In all its fullness the self can only be experienced and defined or described. Its fullness and richness are beyond any verbal description.¹

According to the humanists, it is on the point of the subjective nature of man that contemporary psychology comes short of understanding the true human nature. From the humanistic point of view psychology does not emphasize enough personal experience, values, beliefs, and purposes in life.

Summary

The humanistic approach in psychology contrasts significantly with the approaches of psychoanalysis and behaviorism in ideas, methods, and presuppositions concerning the nature of man. It rejects the notion that human nature can be studied in its fullness through the methods of the natural sciences. Because it seeks to redirect the attention of psychology to the subjective nature of man, emphasizing his beliefs, values, and feelings, humanistic psychology calls for a phenomenological approach to the study of man and his behavior. Taking the assumption that unless man is placed in an accepting environment growth and development is less likely to occur and the positive human potential less likely to be expressed.

The humanistic model of man presents an optimistic view of humanity crediting man with a basically good and positive nature. Studying man's nature in holistic terms, humanism attributes greatest value to man as a whole being and refuses to treat man in atomistic and reductionistic terms. Instead it perceives each individual as being unique and deserving of special personalized attention.

¹Ibid., p. 11.
CHAPTER VI

A CRITIQUE OF THE THREE MODELS OF MAN

Importance of a Correct View of Man

One significant lesson to be learned from the study of the various models of man and their underlying presuppositions is that it is important to clarify one's views of the nature of man. Theoretical conceptions of human nature influence many critical issues in life. Speaking of the influence of ideas, Matson, a humanistic psychologist, states, "To know what man has made of man in short, is largely to know what man has made of his world--and why."¹

In the field of applied psychology models take on special significance, for as Cosgrove states, "The accuracy of each particular view of man suddenly becomes important because we must decide who can best treat our anxiety, our marriage difficulties and other disconcerting experiences."² The three models of man reviewed in this study take three different approaches to the resolution of psychological problems.

Each of the approaches is based on distinctive views of the nature of man. The psychoanalytic approach builds upon the assumptions of an unconscious mind ruled by instinctive drives. It presents a


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deterministic view of man which, in practice, leads to free association techniques through which the client learns to interpret and understand his instinctual nature. In behaviorism man is likewise viewed in deterministic terms but this time not originating from internal sources within the individual, but from without, namely from the environment. On the basis of the behavioristic model, man is perceived as an organism governed by external stimuli which are impinging upon him. This view gives rise to behavior modification techniques which consist of the application of reward and punishment schedules to behavioral problems. The humanistic approach builds on the assumption that man is a rational self-determining organism. The humanistic therapist views man as a free agent and treats him in a non-directive fashion allowing him to express his own wishes and to resolve his own problems.

The three views are wide apart in their perceptions of the nature of man, and if either of the three models reflected the true reality then only one model would suffice. But, as Chapanis cautions, "a model always fails to include certain variables and relationships which can be found in the things modeled;" consequently, a single model can never reflect upon the total reality of the human organism. Furthermore,

Models of the human operator can be convenient and useful. But we must remember that any replica or symbolic model of the human operator is at best a coarse and crude approximation of the real thing. The only reasonably accurate model of a human operator is another human operator.¹

It therefore appears that man cannot accurately define his own being and reproduce his own image by means of self-designed models.

¹Chapanis, Men, Machines and Models, p. 126.
Exponents of psychological models of man have found themselves subjects of their own biases and theoretical preconceptions. Each of the spokesmen for the three models of man discussed earlier makes an admission to that effect. Watson admitted in 1913, "I have devoted nearly twelve years to experimentation on animals. It is natural that such a one should drift into a theoretical position which is in harmony with his experimental work."¹ Consequently, it is no surprise to find that for Watson, and the behaviorists, man was simply "an organic animal,"² and since animals cannot talk there was never any question of using introspective reports in the study of behavior. Watson's psychology was basically animal psychology and his views of man did not surpass his experimental train of thought.

Freud likewise adopted an animalistic view of the nature of man. He dismissed the idea of a higher mind in the human being and insisted that "the present development of human beings requires as it seems to me, no different explanation from that of animals."³ Freud perceived man as an animal motivated not by reason but by hidden unconscious drives. In the development of this view he admitted in 1949, "to begin with it was only tentatively that I put forward the views I have developed here but in the course of time they have gained such a hold upon me that I can no longer think in any other way."⁴

¹Watson, "Psychology As the Behaviorist Views It," The Psychological Review 20(1913), pp. 158-177.
²Idem, Behaviorism, p. 269.
³Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, stan. ed., 18:42.
Rogers, coming from a humanistic approach

experience in these words:

There is one deep learning which is perhaps basic to all the things I have said thus far. It has been forced upon me by more than twenty-five years of trying to be helpful to individuals in personal distress. It is simply this; it has been my experience that persons have a basically positive direction.¹

As opposed to the animalistic and deterministic conceptions of Watson and Freud, Rogers views man as a rational, self-determining being, possessing a positive nature.

In reviewing the admissions of these theorists it is difficult to reconcile their views and form, on the basis of their observations and experiences, a congruent model of man. All three theorists claim to have arrived at their conclusions on the basis of years of experience and research. Yet their incongruent ideas speak of one fact, namely, that none of the theories present a full and true model of the nature of man.

The incongruence between the models and theories seems to be best explained by the observations of David Bohn who summed up the diversity of ideas and experiences in model building in these words: "What is missed in this is a perception of the fact that the behavior which seems to prove and confirm the model is mainly a result of the operation of the model itself."²

In the case of the three models discussed in this paper, the presuppositions can be seen as dictating the course and outcome of

¹Rogers, On Becoming a Person, p. 26.

psychological observations and conclusions. Philosophical presuppositions—such as the evolutionary origin of man—place definite restrictions and limits upon the potential usefulness of psychological models. To begin building a model on the assumption that man evolved from lower order animals is to set the stage for psychological claims that man is no different from the brutes, and that he shares a common nature of instincts and drives with the lower animals. Any further scientific research based on such presuppositions and models will only lead to confirm the model and make no contribution to our understanding of the true nature of man.

As a consequence of such a use of models and the resulting misconceptions about human nature "many have felt man's very humanity to be at stake—his capacity for free expression, creativity and self-determination."\(^1\) The danger being posed not so much by man's nature as by the way he applies models to the interpretation of his nature, and by "what he does with his nature."\(^2\)

Pitirim Sorokin in his observations of the study of man notes,

With the degradation of truth, man is dragged down from his lofty pedestal as a seeker after truth, as absolute value to the level of an animal who tends by various "ideologies," "rationalizations" and "derivations" to exalt his greed, his appetites and his egoism.\(^3\)

Scientific rationalizations lead theorists and researchers to the study


of animal characteristics in man and not human traits that make man a unique creature. In this manner, presuppositions such as the evolutionary presupposition predetermine not only the nature of the model but the particular and unfounded views of human nature. The scientist's primary concern should be with the study of human traits. Heschel states that "The animality of man we can grasp with a fair degree of clarity. The perplexity begins when we attempt to make clear what is meant by the humanity of man."\(^1\)

To this complex issue, no model can offer a simple and complete answer. To define human nature in human terms is indeed a difficult task. The largest part of the difficulty stems from the fact that as scientists proceed to survey the ascending stages of life they are confronted with the very "material" which they themselves depend on for their own understanding. One begins to realize that what is being observed about the capacities of living human beings must be consonant with a reliance upon the same kind of capacities for observing it.\(^2\)

This difficulty becomes a real limitation in the study of man, and the construction of models of man.

Human nature in its totality—and all the essential abstractions from it, such as beauty, truth, rationality—are not "things" but aspects of a whole movement. "Things" can be conceived of in terms of models, but the whole movement of human nature is difficult to contain in models. Rather, it is capable of continually revealing itself anew.

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\(^1\) Heschel, *Who is Man?* p. 10.

\(^2\) Sorokin, *Crisis of Our Age*, p. 123.
Critique of Each Model

Before further discussing the limitations of models and critiquing their underlying presuppositions, it is important to point out that models can make specific contributions to the study of man. Models founded on reasonable and meaningful presuppositions can serve to explain certain aspects of human nature and human behavior. Models can draw attention to areas of human studies that have not been considered before. Freud succeeded in directing science's attention to the role of early childhood experiences. The behaviorists drew attention to the roles of positive and negative rewards in shaping behavior. The humanists demonstrated that man as a whole being is more than just the sum of individual parts. Thus models can be useful, providing they are used with an understanding of their limitations. Likewise, their usefulness will depend on the reasonableness and coherence of the presuppositions upon which the models stand.

Psychoanalytic Model

The psychoanalytic model rests on the assumption that because man evolved from lower order animals his behavior requires no different interpretation than does the behavior of animals. Following on from this assumption Freud consistently looked upon human behavior in animal terms. He perceived man as being driven by two types of instincts; the life instincts and the death instincts. The life instincts he chiefly equated with sexual drives and

the death instincts with aggression.

Freud presented a very limited and animalistic view of man. One of the major limitations of his model of man stems from the presupposition of the evolutionary origin of man. Brett in his *History of Psychology*, states:

> The theory of evolution was, perhaps, the most decisive of all the postulates of other sciences in its influence on psychology, in that it occasioned the abandonment of any dogmatic separation of human from animal modes of behavior.¹

Following on from the evolutionary presupposition, Freud stated (as earlier quoted in this chapter) that human beings required no different explanation from that of animals. The psychoanalytic view of man presents no elevating views of man. It speaks of man as of an animal impelled by sexual instincts and aggressive drives.

Freud's interpretations of man's behavior consisted of sexualizing every aspect of human activity. Freud's main thesis was that sex underlies everything. All dreams were fundamentally sexual, all pathological problems were indications of sexual frustrations, familial ties were sexual in nature, boys wanted to have sexual relationships with their mothers and murder their fathers, likewise daughters wanted to possess their fathers and dispose of their mothers. The life of children was fundamentally sexual while the life of adults oscillated throughout life between heterosexuality and homosexuality.² Besides these sexual instincts and drives there was only left for the psychoanalyst the

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¹Peters, Brett's *History of Psychology*, p. 694.
instinct of death to grapple with. This instinct could well be summarized by Freud's statement that "The goal of all life is death."¹ The death instinct was the desire of the organism to return to the inanimate state of existence, "and apart from the sexual instincts there are no instincts that do not seek to restore an earlier state of things."²

Aside from the relatively little time Freud devoted to the study of the death instincts, the major proportion of his work deals with the sexual interpretations of human nature. When it comes to the treatment of neurosis Freud stated:

"I can only repeat over and over again--for I never find it otherwise--that sexuality is the key to the problem of the psychoneuroses and of the neuroses in general. No one who disdains the key will ever be able to unlock the door."³

In another place Freud confirmed the fact that sexuality was the basis for nervous disorders. He states: "It is true that psychoanalysis puts forward lack of sexual satisfaction as the cause of nervous disorders."⁴ The unprecedented extreme of sexual interpretations is well illustrated in a case of a woman's suicidal urges. Freud's explanation of the suicidal urges is as follows: "That the various means of suicide can represent sexual wish fulfillments has long been known to all analysts. (To poison oneself--to become pregnant; to drown--to bear child; to throw oneself from a height--to be delivered of a child)."⁵ But on what basis Freud makes such interpretations

¹Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, stan. ed., 18:38.
²Ibid., p. 41.
³Idem, Collected Papers, 3:137.
⁴Ibid., p. 300.
⁵Ibid., Collected Papers, stan. ed., 2:137.
and claims is astounding and difficult to explain. Numerous other instances could be cited where extreme and unsupported sexual interpretations are made. Salter in his book, *A Case Against Psychoanalysis*, cites many such illustrations.¹ Salter questions Freud's ideas and concludes by asking, "Are not his theories a vulgarization of human nature, and do they not inflate the banal into the absurd?"² Freud's basic contribution to an understanding (or misunderstanding) of human nature seems to involve chiefly the creation of an unconscious mind which psychoanalysis then in turn sexualized and turned into a "raging monster." The unconscious mind became the "untrustworthy home of mysterious Oedipus complexes, cannibalistic urges, death instincts, and homosexual desires in everybody."³

Furthermore, it is interesting to note the psychoanalytic methodology by which the analysts extract proof from the patients for the existence of the psychoanalytic concepts they promote. Freud explained the psychoanalytic methodology in the following words:

> The mechanism of our curative method is indeed quite easy to understand. We give the patient the conscious idea of what he may expect to find . . . and the similarity of this with the repressed unconscious one leads him to come upon the later himself.

In another instance Freud states:

> In a psychoanalysis, the physician always gives his patient the conscious expectation--ideas by the help of which the patient is put in a position to recognize that which is unconscious and to grasp it. On one occasion the physician gives this help more plentifully and on another less. There are some cases that require more assistance and others that require less.⁵

It would appear from this description of methodology that the psychoanalyst in actual fact plants in the minds of patients the material for which a psychoanalyst searches. The patient himself is unable to unearth unconscious material, but the psychoanalyst seems to be offering suggestions as to what may be repressed and hidden in the unconscious. Evidence obtained in such manner does not appear scientific or objective. Salter's evaluation of this approach is that "the psychoanalyst sprinkles and buries false nuggets of Oedipus, castration (or penis envy), and bisexuality. Then as the patient digs (where he is directed to dig) and discovers the planted material, the analyst is convinced that he has struck pay dirt." Thus it would appear that the analyst plants ideas in the mind of the subject and the subject in turn is taught to find what he never possessed in the first place.\(^1\) This leads directly to the accusation made by Kraus who said, "Psychoanalysis is the disease it purports to cure."\(^2\)

Indeed, psychoanalysis comes under considerable criticism from many different sources. In a "Survey of Objective Studies of Psychoanalytic Concepts," Sears concluded that "the further analysis of psychoanalytic concepts may be relatively fruitless so long as those concepts rest in the theoretical framework of psychoanalysis."\(^3\) And the final question to the psychoanalytic position comes from its author Sigmund Freud himself, who stated:

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 46. \(^2\)Kraus, quoted in Salter, p. 38.  
ask me whether and how far I am convinced of
rectness of the assumptions here developed.
I would read that I am neither myself convinced
I ask that others shall. I believe them; or
stated, I don't know how far I believe them.

itors the claims of the psychoanalysts appear absurd and
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The method of study based on the evolutionary presupposition

1Freud, Beyond the Pleasure Principle, stan. ed., 18:59.

2Peters, Brett's History of Psychology, p. 694.

3Watson, Behavior, p. 5.
One might ask me whether and how far I am convinced of the correctness of the assumptions here developed. My answer would read that I am neither myself convinced nor do I ask that others shall. I believe them; or, better stated, I don't know how far I believe them.

To many evaluators the claims of the psychoanalysts appear absurd and unrealistic. From theChristian point of view, one would regard them as not only limited but also socially and psychologically downgrading.

**Behavioristic Model**

As in the case of the psychoanalytic model, behaviorism founds its model on the evolutionary presupposition of the origin of man. The evolutionary theory provides the necessary theoretical link required to justify behavioristic extrapolations from animal psychology to human psychology.

Behaviorism's acceptance of the evolutionary belief carries significant implications for the study of man. For one thing, "the result of the evolutionary presupposition is a developing tendency both to humanize animals and to brutalize man." As Watson states, "man ceased to be the center of reference." The animal world became the center of reference and science sought to interpret man's nature through the study of the laws of behavior that operate among the animal species. Consequently, as Sorokin earlier stated, man was dragged down from his lofty pedestal to the level of the animal. The study of man took on an unusual approach.

The method of study based on the evolutionary presupposition

is clearly typified by the behavioristic claim that . . . man and animal should be placed as nearly as possible under the same experimental conditions. Instead of feeding or punishing the human subject, we should ask him to respond by setting a second apparatus until standard and control offered us basis for a differential response.

The absurdity of such methodology cannot be overlooked. Basically, the requirement of the behavioristic method calls for a conforming of human subjects to experimental conditions where the human subject not only receives the same treatment as the animal subject, but also is restricted by controls to respond no differently from the animal response. What kind of objectivity is required for such methodology? There is nothing objective about this method. If the human subject, under strict controls, is forced to respond in ways no different from the animal response, what has science learned about man? Nothing. As a matter of opinion, such methods impose on human nature experimental facts which are far removed from the true facts.

Experimental facts derived through such methodology are mainly the results of the operation of the model. All that could be proved by this method is that man is capable of responding like an animal if he is not given the opportunity to respond in any other ways. But this method will tell us nothing about the characteristics that make human beings what they are. It tells us nothing about man's uniqueness.

Not only has behaviorism lowered man to the animal level, it has also reduced man to purely physical properties which can be studied through the methods of the natural sciences. For the behaviorists, 1

1Ibid., p. 14.
psychology must observe the methods of the natural sciences like chemistry and physics. Watson typifies the behaviorist's attitude and approach when he states:

Psychology, as the behaviorist views it, is a purely objective, experimental branch of natural science which needs introspection as little as do the sciences of chemistry and physics.¹

Consequently, behaviorism rejects all mentalistic concepts and limits itself to purely observable phenomena. The problem with behaviorism's limited outlook is that it is unrealistic and too simplistic in its approach. The chief criticism by its critics is that it fails to account for the richness and diversity of functions that influence human behavior. Noam Chomsky in an extensive review of Skinner's theoretical concepts, states:

What is so surprising is the particular limitations he has imposed on the way in which the observables of behavior are to be studied, and above all, the particularly simple nature of the "function" which, he claims, describes the causation of behavior.²

In attempting to study behavior through purely objective means, behaviorism places prime emphasis upon material causes and effects of behavior. It places emphasis on the stimuli and responses of the organism without giving consideration to the interactions that occur between the stimuli and responses. In line with this approach it denies man of having control over his behavior and attributes the locus of control to the environment. Simply stated, man does not exert control over himself or the environment, but the environment exerts the control

¹Watson, Behavior, p. 27.
over him. Man is looked upon as a very passive object, subject to the impending forces within the environment. Man is studied in terms of properties which characterize him as if he were a purely physical object and nothing more.

Matson summarizes the impact of behavioristic notions about man in these words:

The idea of man projected by this classical behaviorism was that of an empty organism without inherent or prepotent directiveness, infinitely manageable and manipulatable—in short a stimulus response machine.¹

Behaviorism insists on the denial of man's freedom. Thus it presents, on the whole, a very pathetic image of man. The human being is viewed as an organism lacking the freedom to do what it wishes to do and to be what it pleases to be. And without this freedom, critics feel that it is not too much to say that "... man himself has been explained away and in his place there grins the image of the cheerful robot."² Skinner, in his book Walden Two, expresses this fact in no uncertain terms.

I deny that freedom exists at all. I must deny it—or my program would be absurd. You can't have a science about a subject matter which hops capriciously about."³

Can behaviorism prove that man isn't free? No! The character of Walden Two goes on to say, "Perhaps we can never prove that man isn't free; it's an assumption."⁴ It appears to be an assumption made out of scientific necessity. "The hypothesis that man is not free is essential to the application of scientific method to the study of human behavior."⁵

¹Matson, The Idea of Man, p. 115. ²Ibid., p. 128.
⁵Idem, Science and Human Behavior, p. 447.

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Yet it is an assumption that appears not only unrealistic but from the Christian perspective very undesirable. It gives rise to the assumption of determinism which likewise is adopted out of scientific necessity. "If we are to use the methods of science in the field of human affairs, we must assume that behavior is lawful and determined ..."¹ But if behavior is determined, lawful, predictable, and controllable, then it's just as easy to say that it is mechanistic, and if behavior is mechanistic then man is no more than a machine. The understanding of the role of determinism in behavioristic terms, as opposed to freedom, is of great significance.

The mechanistic image of man makes man very susceptible to the existential disease labelled by Yablonsky as "robopathology" which is characterized by a

"... growing dehumanization of people to the point where they have become the walking dead. This dehumanized level of existence places people in roles where they are actors mouthing irrelevant platitudes, experiencing programmed emotions with little or no compassion or sympathy for other people."²

The nature of the robopath seems to fit in so neatly with the behavioristic image of man. It is the lack of spontaneity, creativity, and humanistic expression that characterizes Yablonsky's description of the robopath.³

These are the characteristics that behaviorism imposes upon its image of man. First, behaviorism analytically reduces man to the level of an animal, then to a set of physical


³Ibid., p. 19.
dimensions and a repertoire of neuromuscular responses indistinguishable from those of other animals except in degree of complexity. It reduces the individual person to an object in an environment and culture which forms and overarches him. It reduces man to a depersonalized, dehumanized level of a complex but manageable mechanism.¹ On the whole, behaviorism alters the nature of its human subject to a point where human psychology becomes a science of robopathology, or indeed as psychology without a soul, where complex machines and white laboratory rats become adequate surrogates for man. In this context one can better understand Watson's expression that man's behavior must be described in "no other terms than those you would use in describing the behavior of the ox you slaughter,"² or that man is "an assembled organic machine ready to run,... an automobile of a sort."³ These expressions and views of human nature are the consequences and implications of philosophical presuppositions adopted by the behavioristic approach. Heschel sums it up as follows:

Empirical intemperance, the desire to be exact, to attend to "hard" facts which are subject to measurement, may defeat its own end. It makes us blind to the fact behind the facts—that what makes a human being human is not just mechanical, biological or psychological functioning, but the ability to make decisions constantly.⁴

If behaviorism denies man the freedom to choose, then we have no right to choose what behaviorism offers us unless that choice has been imposed upon us by a predetermined course of events beyond our control. On the other hand, if man can alter his environment, make

¹Matson, The Idea of Man, p. 128.
²Watson, Behaviorism, p. ix. ³Ibid., p. 269.
⁴Heschel, p. 9.
changes in his behavior and initiate behavioral technologies then there exists an element of choice in human behavior. Either argument refutes the basic premises.

**Humanistic Model**

Humanism with its great emphasis upon man as the experiencing being and upon human qualities such as choice, creativity and spontaneity, differs significantly from the views of both behaviorism and psychoanalysis. The major differences are to be found in the following concepts:

In place of the behaviorist axiom that the causes of man's conduct are to be found in his environment, and of the Freudian axiom that those causes are to be found in his unconscious, the new psychology of humanism proposes the outrageous hypothesis that man may have a directive hand in his own life. . . .

It is humanism's belief that "it is within the human nature of the individual to actualize himself and become whatever he is meant to be," that makes the humanistic model stand apart from the fatalistic views of behaviorism and psychoanalysis. But its high sounding philosophy likewise comes under a considerable amount of criticism.

The humanistic view lacks a well founded base for its model of man. In its theorizing about the nature of man, it says very little about the origin of man. As was pointed out in the fifth chapter, the lack of explanation for the origin of man is a cause of much frustration and anxiety for individual human beings. Heidegger's concepts

of "facticity" and "thrownness" contribute very little to the reduction of that anxiety. Therefore, if nothing is known about the origin of man there is little context for any further explanation of man's nature.

Many criticisms of the humanistic philosophy and its views of man follow along one particular line. To most critics the humanistic view of man lacks completeness and scientific evidence. According to some "it is becoming more and more an ideology, an idea which is inflated to the status of truth quite beyond the force of evidence."¹ According to others "... self theory is a widely popular, secular and humanistic ideology or religion, not a branch of science."² How can the humanistic approach be classified?

Mahrer, himself a humanist, states,

... our position is no more than an assumption. Kant and Heidegger made the person into the constructor of his world by arbitrary fiat, by adopting a particular assumption. Our discussions of the modes by which persons construct their worlds are exfoliations of this fundamental fiat--and not statements of fact about the way things really are.³

Such an admission appears commendable, since it does not hold pretext to being scientific, but names its assumption as an assumption and not as a fact. Matson adds to the above admission by stating that the psychology of humanism carries no built-in guarantee of results, no

insurance against failure, but just a wishful prayer that from among
the available options "man may choose himself" and in a "final act of
faith," the humanist hopes that "he will."  

The humanistic view of man is no more an ideology or a belief
than are the views of psychoanalysis or behaviorism. But it is different
and unusual in the sense that it believes in man, in a being, an entity,
which comes from an unknown origin and moves to an unknown destiny.
If humanism then is an act of faith it indeed must require greater faith
than the faith of the Christian believer, because it requires faith
in the anonymity of evidence. If on the other hand--to quote Matson's
words again--humanism is a "wishful prayer", who on earth or who in
heaven is there to listen to that prayer if there is no creator or
God. Such a theoretical orientation could indeed be disturbing
and anxiety creating.

The ideological and religious overtones of humanism can be
further illustrated from the writings and expressions of its spokesmen.
Maslow labelled humanism as a "humanistic-scientific version of 'Not my
will, but Thine,'"\(^2\) where the "Thine" refers not to a supernatural God
but to the human beings who are acclaimed to possess almost infinite
abilities and potentials.

Robert Valett in his book, Self-Actualization, expresses the
humanistic faith in human beings by quoting the words of Bhagavad-Gita

\[ I \text{ am the creative self that dwells in the heart of every mortal creature;} \]
\[ I \text{ am the beginning of the lifespan and the end of all--whatever in this world} \]

\(^2\)Maslow, Motivation and Personality, p. xxv.
This humanistic faith expressed in the quote above varies little in form and context from the faith of other formal religions. For the humanist the nature of man and the self of each person takes on a definite mystical aura. John Dewey in his book, *A Common Faith*, states, 

... in humanism are all the elements of a religious faith that shall not be confined to sect, class, or race. Such a faith has always been implicitly the common faith of mankind. It remains to make it explicit and militant.2

This same trend can be illustrated from the therapeutic applications of the humanistic approach. Using Carl Roger's therapy method as an illustration one observes certain religious overtones.

Roger's therapeutic procedure is based on the hypothesis that

If I can provide a certain type of relationship, the other person will discover within himself the capacity to use the relationship for growth and change and personal development will occur.3

The relationship spoken of by Rogers consists of an association which is based upon the therapist's genuine, unconditional acceptance of the client. The therapist assumes an almost god-like position, fully accepting the client as he is. A number of problems and questions arise concerning this approach. The major problem centers around the assumption that the therapist, who basically is just another human being


3Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, p. 33.
no different from the client, can offer complete, unconditional regard to the client. The idea of unconditional acceptance may sound appealing, but at the same time it is impossible to implement in the full context of the humanistic philosophy. The practice of unconditional acceptance is incongruent with humanism's belief that the experience of each individual takes precedence over all other matters. Rogers states that "Neither the Bible, nor the prophets--neither Freud nor research--neither the revelations of God nor man--can take precedence over my own direct experience."\(^1\) If each individual's experience becomes the absolute and golden rule of life, most lives will be so self-centered as to make unconditional acceptance of others an impossibility. Each individual will seek to protect his own self-interests and little room will be left for the consideration of the needs of others.

Rogers, who himself came from a Christian background, may have borrowed the idea of unconditional acceptance from the Christian belief in God's unconditional love for and acceptance of man. The Christian belief is rooted in the supernatural source of love--God Himself--and consequently is without limits. But when humanism acclaims finite man as the source of unconditional acceptance and love, it becomes finitely limited and most definitely deceiving in its claims.

The ideological and unscientific nature of the humanistic model can also be illustrated from the attempted research of Maslow. Maslow, in looking for examples of truly actualizing people, concluded that "... none were found that were usable in our culture and our time (in itself a thought provoking finding)."\(^2\) In trying to find examples

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 21.  \(^2\)Maslow, *Motivation and Personality*, p. 150.
of people who would illustrate at least to a minor degree the characteristics of a self-actualizing person, Maslow states:

> We had to stop excluding a possible subject on the basis of single foibles, mistakes, or foolishness; or to put it another way, we could not use perfection as a base for selection since no subject was perfect.\(^1\)

This "thought-provoking finding" of Maslow's, and the unfounded claims of Rogers, lead to the question--is it conceivable that in the humanistic model too much is being expected of man? It appears that

> Man as man has to reach towards being God in order to fulfill his aspirations, yet with God dead and the world as it is, these aspirations are limitations cast back in his face as an absurdity.\(^2\)

The chief criticisms of the humanistic model relate to its absurd claims. Optimistic humanism lacking sufficient evidence and balance may lead those who seek personal assistance and help from its therapists to further psychological crises and self-alienation. Alienation occurs when individuals find and experience a lack of basis for those things they have been taught to believe in. Indeed,

> Whenever a man is not fulfilled by his own views of himself, his society or his environment, then he is at odds with himself and feels estranged, alienated and called in question.

This meaninglessness and alienation may be the price men will have to pay as a result of the unrealistic presuppositions of the humanistic idea of man.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 151.


\(^3\)Ibid., p. 25.
Presuppositions of a Christian Model of Man

From the review and critique of the three models of man it appears that there must be an alternative view of man based on different presuppositions and forming a more coherent outlook. Otherwise, as Sartre reluctantly concluded, "man is a useless passion." Indeed, there is an alternative view which presents a radically different approach to the study of man and leads to a different model of man. The alternative view is represented by the Judeo-Christian philosophy. Although this discussion does not develop a Judeo-Christian model of man, nor discuss any of the details of the model, it does suggest some alternative presuppositions.

The Christian alternative is a controversial alternative. Modern scientists have difficulties accepting Christianity, not so much because of what it teaches about the existence of God, but because of its view of the nature of man.

The Christian model of man rests upon the basic presupposition of the creation of man. It is essential to begin with this belief, for in this basic assumption are to be found numerous differences between the Christian and the contemporary psychological approach to the study of man.

Psychology in an effort to be scientific looks upon man in terms of causes and effects, and studies him as a "thing" or a "being" which is a part of the continuing process of change. Christianity on the other hand looks upon man in terms of creation which itself was an event and not a process. In this sense the Biblical account of the

event of creation is not a scientific explanation of the rise of man, but a revelation of how man came into being and more importantly of who brought him into existence.

The first chapters of the book of Genesis, which give an account of the creation of man, clearly state who brought man into existence. The Biblical record states that God created heaven and earth and that God created man. Furthermore, it states that God created man in His own image. Consequently, the Christian model suggests that man must in some way resemble his creator and that man must possess certain attributes of the character of God.

At this point it must be emphasized again that the presupposition of the Special Creation of man, unlike the presuppositions of psychology and other sciences, refers to an event that is unique and unprecedenteced. The purpose of science is to study the processes of nature while the purpose of religion is to understand nature in relation to the Creator. According to the Christian view man can only be understood in relation to God who brought him into existence. The Christian approach, consequently, emphasizes that God is alive, that He is the Creator, and, furthermore, that He is the Sustainer, Teacher and Lawgiver. Christians believe that only God can reveal the ultimate truth concerning the nature of man and only He can provide the guidelines for the fuller understanding of man.

One of psychology's greatest dilemmas lies in the fact that psychologists attempt to describe and explain human nature while participating in the same nature. This is not the case with the Christian approach which accepts the concept of Special Revelation.
Special Revelation refers to the means and source of knowledge concerning those things which are unknown to man. By means of Special Revelation man can learn more about his human nature, the nature of God and the nature of the surrounding environment. This special form of revelation comes from an Eternal God, who is omniscience and omnipotent, and who speaks to man through the words of the sacred scriptures.

The advantage of this approach is that man can be fully understood not from the uniqueness of his rational capacities but from the standpoint of God. While man is bound by limits, God's transcendence and omniscience knows no limits. Thus, to quote Reinhold Niebuhr:

To understand himself truly means to begin with a faith that he is understood from beyond himself, that he is known and loved of God and must find himself in terms of obedience to the divine will. This revelation of the divine to the human will, makes it possible for man to relate himself to God without pretending to be God.¹

This is man's only means for finding the meaning of life and of understanding his own nature. Man in his own mind can stand outside of himself and the world around him by contemplating his own being and the existence of the world, but he cannot find ultimate answers and meaning in nature or in himself. Only through a relationship to an omnipotent and omniscient God can man's desire for understanding be satisfied.

There is much knowledge about the nature of man that has come to man through human research and investigation. This form of knowledge is differentiated from Special Revelation and is designated as General Revelation. It refers to man's finding of facts and information

through the use of God-given mental capacities. However, at no time can information obtained through General Revelation contradict the information gained through Special Revelation. Both forms of knowledge have a common source. The only time when General Information is at odds with Special Revelation is when the former rejects the later. This frequently is the case with general science. Scientific findings on their own lack the context within which its findings can become meaningful. Science may have truth, but that truth may lie in a framework of error. From the Christian perspective, Special Revelation provides the only true authoritative framework within which all other findings can be understood and correctly interpreted.

Another very important presupposition of the Christian model of man relates to the belief in the fallen nature of man. According to this view when man initially disobeyed the laws of God, he caused himself an injury physically, mentally and spiritually which has resulted in man's diminished capacity for knowledge and understanding. As a result he is dependent upon God for help in overcoming tendencies that he can not overcome by his own strength. Humanism fails to provide any account of the fallen nature of man. It thus falls short of providing a realistic view of man. According to the Christian view, what is required for growth and change is not only man's potential but also God's power. Man in his present fallen nature can only comprehend a limited amount of truth about himself and about God, thus God reveals to man only that which is necessary for his meaningful existence. As long as man is willing to cooperate with God in gaining a fuller understanding of his own nature, God is willing to help him.
Unfortunately, the natural inclination of human reason is to make itself the principle of explanation, and thus, in effect, declare itself to be God. But human reason in its own capacity finds it difficult and impossible to understand human nature.

The significant facts concerning man's nature as revealed by God Himself present a view of man which rises above all other views of man. The Christian approach incorporates the revealed truths about human nature into its model of man. In the Christian model, of foremost importance are the characteristics of man which emphasize man's freedom of choice, his ability for growth, his desire to do good (in spite of his bent towards evil) his capacity to believe in the existence of God, and his need to identify with God as his Creator, Sustainer, and Redeemer.

The Christian model of man does not accept the view that man evolved from lower order animals. Consequently, the Christian model of man finds unacceptable any insinuations that explain man's nature in animal terms and lowers man to the animal level. The Christian model stands to emphasize the human nature of man and refuses to accept presuppositions which dehumanize man's nature. Above all, the Christian model stands to remind man of his relationship to God his Creator.
CHAPTER VII

SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Summary

From the study of the three models of man it is possible to make a number of observations and conclusions. The conclusions presented in this chapter are limited to the scope and purpose of the study as outlined in chapter one. The purpose of the study was to review and critique three psychological models of man and to examine from a Christian perspective their philosophical presuppositions. The study examined the historical development of each model, its theoretical constructs, its views of man and critiqued each model individually. The following are the summary, conclusions and recommendations.

To begin with, it is necessary to acknowledge the complexity of studying man and his human nature in terms of man made models. In its depth and breadth, man and human nature appear mysteriously to evade the scrutiny of scientific inquiry. The characteristics of man's nature are difficult to model and quantify in human language and scientific terms.

It was pointed out that most of what is regarded as knowledge about man has its source not in research but in ideas, philosophies, and beliefs. The presuppositions which underly the views and models of
man discussed in this paper are indeed beliefs arrived at on the basis of philosophical ideas and each theorist's personal convictions. The presuppositions are ideologies and beliefs introduced into psychology by means of theories which in turn give rise to models of man. A critique of the three theories shows that as a result of such presuppositions as the evolutionary origin of man, there is a tendency in psychology to define man in non-human terms which lead to unjust and unrealistic views of man. In the psychoanalytic theory, man could be seen portrayed as an instinct driven animal. Behaviorism on the other hand, regards man as a complex and ignorant mechanism. Humanistically he was presented as a being possessing infinite potentials which if cultivated and developed knew no limits.

The critique showed that diminishing man's image to the level of lower animals obscures psychology's understanding of man's complexity and uniqueness. On the other hand, augmenting humanity to unrealistic god-like levels is overestimating man's powers and abilities far beyond any available evidence. Either trend results in unrealistic and incoherent views of man which neither science nor philosophy can substantiate.

The concern of the human subject is to find meaning in existence and an understanding of human uniqueness. Man's capacity to self-transcend and reflect upon his own nature makes him indeed unique. Yet, two of the models studied—the psychoanalytic and the behavioristic—denied man that uniqueness and explained away his nature in terms of animalistic and mechanistic concepts. The humanistic model theoretically granted man that uniqueness, but in the absence of any evidence
for the source of man's uniqueness. Humanism had nothing to say about
the origin of man. Thus its recognition of man's uniqueness was only
figurative but not factual.

No matter which of the three models one considers, none of them
are realistic or complete in their views of man. Man in his human
nature defies any simple classifications and, above all else, fears a
sense of meaningfulness and a lack of identity. Yet these ultimate
desires of human nature can not be satisfactorily met through the
presently available psychological interpretations. Psychological
models of man fail to give realistic consideration to the origin and
need of human thoughts, feelings, judgments, and values. Consequently
they are, if nothing more, theoretically dehumanizing. It is evident,
however, that as each of the three models of man acts as a base for a
particular therapeutic method, its theoretical dehumanization is closely
linked to real life dehumanization. Consequently, just as physical
death is the liquidation of being, theoretical and practical dehuman-
ization is the psychological liquidation of being human. Thus psychology
through its unrealistic presuppositions and models may be creating a
dilemma that is greater than the one it aims to resolve.

Conclusions

Though the present picture looks gloomy, there is a Christian
alternative to the resolution of the human and psychological dilemma.
The Judeo-Christian philosophy looks upon man from a different vantage
point. The Christian view of man is based upon different presuppositions.
One of them is the creationistic presupposition. Building upon this
presupposition, the Christian psychologist views man as a created being
who was brought into existence by God, made in the image of God, having a purpose for his existence and a destiny to which he looks forward. With these presuppositions about the nature of man the Christian psychologist may be in a far better theoretical and practical position to aid and assist those who need help and search for meaning, identity, purpose and motivation in life.

The Christian presuppositions reject any simplistic and downgrading views of man. They seek to identify man with his creator and give meaning to life. The Christian presuppositions are based on revealed knowledge about human nature and may form a more accurate base for the establishment of a psychological model.

**Recommendations**

The present critique of the philosophical presupposition in models and theories of human behavior has suggested further areas for investigation. The following recommendations are made:

1. It would be worthwhile to focus more extensively on the valuable contributions of each of the non-Christian models critiqued in this paper.

2. Further study should be given to the presuppositions of a Christian model of man. As a clearer Christian view of the nature of man is arrived at, it will become easier to identify further unacceptable presuppositions about the nature of man in the non-Christian models and theories of psychology.

3. Further study should be given to the practical implications of a Christian model of man for educational psychology, counseling and therapy.
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