Christian-Buddhist Dialogue in the Writings of Lynn A. De Silva

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CHRISTIAN--BUDDHIST DIALOGUE IN THE WRITINGS OF LYNN A. DE SILVA

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CHRISTIAN--BUDDHIST DIALOGUE IN THE WRITINGS OF
LYNN A. DE SILVA

A Dissertation
Presented in Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Theology

by
Tissa Brian de Alwis
November 1982
CHRISTIAN—BUDDHIST DIALOGUE IN THE WRITINGS OF
LYNN A. DE SILVA

A dissertation presented
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree
Doctor of Theology

by
Tissa Brian de Alwis

APPROVAL BY THE COMMITTEE

Robert M. Johnston
Professor of Theology

Daniel A. Augsburger
Professor of Historical Theology

Gottfried Oosterwal
Professor of Mission

Walter B. T. Douglas
Professor of Church History
and History of Religion

Edmund F. Perry
Professor of the History
and Literature of Religions
Northwestern University

Gerhard F. Hasel, Dean
SDA Theological Seminary

23 November 1982
Date Approved

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ABSTRACT

CHRISTIAN-BUDDHIST DIALOGUE IN THE WRITINGS OF
LYNN A. DE SILVA

by

Tissa Brian de Alwis

Chairman: Robert M. Johnston
ABSTRACT OF GRADUATE STUDENT RESEARCH

Dissertation

Andrews University
Seventh-day Adventist Theological Seminary

Title: CHRISTIAN—BUDDHIST DIALOGUE IN THE WRITINGS OF LYNN A. DE SILVA

Name of researcher: Tissa Brian de Alwis

Name and degree of faculty adviser: Robert M. Johnston, Ph.D.

Date completed: November 1982

This dissertation studies the theological implications of inter-religious dialogue that call for resolution from the Christian standpoint, the Christian self-understanding in religiously plural context, and the essentials of authentic inter-religious dialogue by an analysis and evaluation of Lynn A. de Silva's dialogue with Sri Lankan Buddhism.

Chapter I surveys the historical factors which heightened the encounter between the religions and describes the background from which De Silva's theology emerged. Developments in the debate on inter-religious dialogue in missionary conferences in Asia and in the World Council of Churches reveal the confrontation between Asian and European theologies. It is shown that De Silva's dialogical
concerns arose out of existential contact with Sri Lankan Buddhism, and that the resurgence of Buddhism and the transition in Christian missionary attitudes led to a Sri Lankan expression of Christianity.

Chapter II describes De Silva's holistic dialogical approach in contrast to theoretical Western approaches. The basic ingredients essential to authentic dialogue and its objective, as spelled out by De Silva, are noted. In his appraisal of the Buddhist approach to dialogue, dialogical exchanges with Buddhist thought leaders, and use of Buddhist terms, a practised theology of dialogue emerges.

Chapter III describes the translational nature of De Silva's dialogical theology. The process of conveying concepts from one religious context to another is traced in his use of Tilakkhana (the three signata of Buddhism) as a conceptual framework in the development of: (1) a Christian-Buddhist estimate of man—the relation between anattā (non-self) and the Christian teaching about the spirit, (2) an inclusivist Christology—Christ as Dharma-Logos, and his salvific role in the religions, and (3) anattā and the indispensability of God.

Chapter IV evaluates De Silva's treatment of Christianity and Buddhism as complementary systems and sifts out that which is theologically decisive for authentic inter-faith dialogue. It deals with the Buddhist response to De Silva and assesses his dialectical approach. It is shown that the salvific status accorded to other religions is crucial to Asian Christian self-understanding on the questions of church and mission.
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PRONUNCIATION GUIDE TO BUDDHIST TERMS

Consonants

c as ch in rich

t as th in think

t as t in to

d as th in then

m as ng in ring

ū as u in rule

Vowels

a as u in but

ə as u in fur

ā as a in art

ī as ee in seen

ū as u in put

N.B. (1) Vowels e and o are always long in Pali and Sanskrit except when followed by a double consonant, e.g. [sic] ettha.

(2) In the consonants, the aspirates kh, gh, dh, th, dh, bh, are pronounced with h sound immediately following as in blockhead, pighead, cathead, loghead etc., but, in each instance combined with the preceding consonant in pronunciation.¹

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INTRODUCTION

Inter-religious dialogue, more especially the relation of Christian faith to religious pluralism, forms the essential backdrop of this study. Not only is it one of the dominant missionary and pastoral issues for Christians today, it is clear that the time when theological formulation can proceed independently of the reality of other living religions has clearly passed. Though Christianity had existed in small pockets in Persia, India and China from an early period, it was with the geographical discoveries of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries that Christian Europe came to realize that people belonging to other ancient religions were living in distant places. Medieval Europe, in which the Church dominated all aspects of life, now came into contact with other ancient religious cultures. As successive Western powers took control over different parts of the world, Christianity, moving with the conquering powers, came to be looked upon as a "militantly expansionist and aggressively proselytising faith."¹ The Christianity which accompanied the imperialist invader of Asian and African countries was, with rare exceptions, incredulous as to the worth of non-Christian religions and impatient of their survival.² The Christian claim of an exclusive revelation in

²That this was the settled attitude of European Christians to

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Jesus Christ, which alone was able to provide a true and adequate knowledge of God which is salvific, was the motive force behind the missionary enterprise. The Christian position that it was the true religion and its denial of the validity of claims to truth by other religions precluded the possibility of dialogue. As R. Panikkar succinctly observes regarding the era of self-sufficient Christendom:

> It is a fact of history, fraught with powerful theological repercussions, that for the last thousand years at least the Church has never entertained the idea of a dialogue with the world religions. Whenever she has embarked upon missionary activity she has always spoken directly and one-sidedly to men rooted in different religious climates and has therefore ignored the bonds binding these others to their own cultural and spiritual traditions.

There has, however, since the nineteenth century, been a confluence of several factors which have led inexorably to encounter and dialogue between Christianity and other faiths. Radical changes other religions is well attested. For a description of this general attitude in relation to 19th century Britain, see H. A. C. Cairns, Prelude to Imperialism (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), pp. 150ff. Notions of nineteenth century triumphalism spilled over into the twentieth. At the World Missionary Conference at Edinburgh in 1910, an interpreter of the conference could write, "The spectacle of the advance of the Christian Church along many lines of action to the conquest of the five great religions of the modern world is one of singular interest and grandeur." See W. H. T. Gairdner, "Edinburgh 1910: An Account and Interpretation of the World Missionary Conference," London, 1910, p. 135.

The rationale behind the missionary endeavour and its attitude to other world religions is evident in nineteenth century Christian hymnody. In Bishop Heber's well-known missionary hymn, "From Greenland's Icy Mountains," people of other faiths are "men benighted" or "the heathen in his blindness." Christians, by contrast, are said to have "the lamp of life," and their "souls are lighted with wisdom from on high." (The Church Hymnal [Washington D. C.: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1941] p. 345).

brought about by scientific technology have resulted in a rapidly shrinking world. The conquest of distance, the expansion of world trade and industrialization, and the unifying effect of mass media have vastly increased personal contacts between Christians and men of other faiths. For M. M. Thomas, chairman of the World Council of Churches (WCC) Central Committee and one of the foremost Indian theologians of dialogue, it is not simply the conquest of distance through the development of modern communications that is compelling all faiths to reinterpret their understanding of God, man, and the world, in relation to other faiths. He sees the ferment of a revolutionary world drawing people of all faiths, including the humanistic faiths that are non-theistic, into the stream of a single universal history.  

Among the forces in the modern world working as a ferment in all cultures and religions are the process of secularism, the revolt of the oppressed and the poor, the Socialist and Communist movements of Western societies, and the Nationalist movements of Asian and African peoples for political independence. As Jacques-Albert Cuttat, Swiss ambassador to India and organizer of several inter-religious dialogue conferences has so aptly stated, the meeting of religions "constitutes an inevitable  

1Man and the Universe of Faiths (Madras: Christian Literature Society, 1975), p. 1. Paul Tillich also assigned a role to humanistic faiths, terming them quasi-religions, in the current meeting of world religions. Religion was for him the state of being grasped by ultimate concern, thus quasi-religions were those which have elevated national and social concerns to unlimited ultimacy. He took the seemingly paradoxical position "that the main characteristic of the present encounter of the world religions is their encounter with the quasi-religions of our time" (Christianity and the Encounter of the World Religions [New York: Columbia University Press, 1963], p. 5).  

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corollary of the contemporary confrontation of peoples and civilizations."¹

With the rise of Asian independence movements there has been a resurgence of Asian religions. These religions now take an apologetic stance, having first undergone reinterpretation to bring out their adequacy for contemporary life. They became mission conscious, broke the territorial limits to which they had hitherto been confined and began to make incursions into the Christian West. Christians, increasingly conscious of living in a religiously plural world, are being compelled to rethink their approach and attitude to other religions. Sociologist Peter L. Berger maintains that modernity has multiplied the choices, that modern man thus lives "in a pluralized world of competing views," and that "this has given all religions in the world a commonality of condition that must have an effect on their relations with each other."² There are no longer any isolated areas in the realm of world views and religion. While theologian Paul Tillich hoped that new types of systematic theology would be developed as a result of the encounter with world religions,³ orientalist Otto Wolff contends that it is actually dangerous to concern


oneself only with the Christian religion seeing how close the religions have moved to one another today:

Even the Western Christian or theologian, no matter of which confession, is no longer in a position to carry on an exclusive monologue. The purely internal demonstration of truth of Christianity stands naive and unarmed before the encircling active movement which has broken forth from the non-Christian religions.

Speaking on behalf of Evangelical Protestants, whose attitude to dialogue has been one of disinterest and non-participation, David Hesselgrave says, "Unless as evangelicals we are willing to risk locking ourselves up in a closet of monologue where we speak primarily to one another, the question for us is not, 'Shall we engage in dialogue?' but, 'In what kinds of dialogue shall we engage?'" Carl F. H. Henry, calling for a major evangelical conference on missionary concerns relating to non-biblical religions, voices the same concern: "The only adequate alternative to dialogue that deletes the evangelical view is dialogue that expounds it. The late twentieth century is no time to shirk that dialogue." Waldron Scott maintains that this hesitance is largely limited to the North American context, which inherited the religious triumphalism of an earlier generation of evangelicals. Eighteenth and nineteenth-century evangelicals like

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Jonathan Edwards and Josiah Strong expected Christianity to prevail over all the earth. However evangelicals outside North America "frequently have a more open approach to non-Christian religions and to inter-religious dialogue."¹

The days of religious isolationism and the period of self-sufficient Christendom are over, and dialogue is seen as the major if not the only viable basis of encounter with the world religions. Asian Christians have repeatedly stressed the need for restating Christian theology in relation to the faiths in Asia.² Today it has come to be recognized that significant inter-religious dialogue must take place between Asians in the Asian milieu. It has been pointed out that "with four centuries of missionary presence the Christians are numerically and qualitatively an insignificant minority: a mere 2 percent of the Asian masses," and while Africa is becoming numerically and qualitatively a powerful Christian voice within the Third World,


²Dr. Eddie Asirvatham traces the attempts of Indian Christians to restate Christian belief and experience in the light of India, and more especially of Hindu thought and tradition. See Eddie Asirvatham, Christianity in the Indian Crucible (Calcutta: Y. M. C. A. Publishing House, 1957), pp. 118 ff.
"Asia, as circumstances clearly indicate, will remain always a non-Christian continent."¹ Asian Christians who have always been a minority in the midst of other religions, and have been already in dialogue for many years in day-to-day contact with them, are beginning to engage in dialogue dealing with theological or doctrinal content. Thus Wesley Ariarajah, a Sri Lankan Methodist, calls dialogue "a new principle of the theological task in Asia," and notes that: "It is significant that most of the new theological thinking that has come out of Asia is from people who live in an 'inner dialogue' with their culture and tradition."² It is in this context that the works of Sri Lankan theologian Dr. Lynn A. de Silva on Christian-Buddhist dialogue take on special significance, and have been selected for this study.

The Problem

The subject of inter-religious dialogue raises a number of basic implications for Christian theology that call for resolution. There is a clear need to determine the Christian self-understanding in the new context of religious pluralism, as well as the theological significance of people of other faiths and ideologies. Since the various cultural contexts and historic situations where the gospel is preached and Christian faith expressed are so different, there are


also specific theological emphases relative to the particular dialogue situation to be considered.

Reviewing a number of WCC statements on dialogue, beginning with the interim policy statement and guidelines adopted at Addis Ababa in 1971, Samartha, director of the WCC sub-unit on Dialogue with People of Living Faith and Ideologies, emphasizes the need for careful theological reflection on three unresolved areas. First, there is the need to be clear about the nature and purpose of dialogue, particularly its theological basis, and so he asks: "What exactly is the purpose of dialogue with neighbours of other faiths? To join them? To eliminate differences? To shape a world religion?" The second central question is, "Does dialogue lead to syncretism?" The third, which is related to the other two, is: "Does dialogue blunt the cutting edge of mission? Is it a substitute for proclamation? What is the relation between dialogue, witness and mission?" The text of the statement adopted at the landmark Chiang Mai Theological Consultation in 1977 seemed to touch on the entire gamut of Christian theology. The participants found agreement possible in several areas in which there were "fruitful discussions" and "growth of understanding." However, there were other areas in which agreement was found to be more difficult and at times impossible.


2 Four particular issues commended for further theological attention were:
What is the relationship between God's universal action in creation and his redemptive action in Jesus Christ?
Are we to speak of God's work in the lives of all men and women only in tentative terms of hope that they may experience something of him, or more positively in terms of God's
Methodological Considerations

Aim of Study

In stating the aim of this study we must keep in mind the tension in any theological framework that takes seriously both the claims of Christian theology to hold universal validity as well as the self-understanding of the dialogue partner. Questions Christians must ask are: Does the notion of the plurality of religious truth or a common religious heritage connote a limited validity of the Christian vision of truth? Are other religions as valid as Christianity, i.e., are all religions ultimately the same? How salvific is revelation apart from the Judeo-Christian scriptures? Is Christianity one among many different saving encounters with the divine given to men in different historical and cultural settings? Is authentic dialogue on matters of theological substance possible? What are the goals and dimensions of such a dialogue? The aim of this study is to seek answers to the basic theological implications of inter-religious dialogue that call for resolution from the Christian standpoint, as well as self-disclosure to people of living faiths and in the struggle of human life and ideology.

How are we to find from the Bible criteria in our approach to people of other faiths and ideologies, recognizing as we must, both the authority accorded to the Bible by Christians of all centuries, particular questions concerning the authority of the Old Testament for the Christian Church, and the fact that our partners in dialogue have other starting points and resources both in holy books and traditions of teaching?

What is the biblical view and Christian experience of the operation of the Holy Spirit, and is it right and helpful to understand the work of God outside the church in terms of the doctrine of the Holy Spirit?

as to the related issues of the Christian self-understanding in the new context of religious pluralism and the essentials of authentic inter-religious dialogue, by an analysis and evaluation of the dialogical approach to Sri Lankan Buddhism in the writings of Dr. Lynn A. de Silva.

Relevance

The need for a study of this nature is highlighted by Paul Löffler who draws attention to the inadequacy of "theoretical new approaches" and calls for "a practised theology of dialogue" which is the result of actual meetings with representatives of other religions. Löffler sees two serious shortcomings in the various attempts to define a new Christian approach to men of other faiths: "It is striking for me how retrospect and introvert the entire undertaking has been." He finds these abstract concepts of dialogue are expressed entirely within Christian terms of reference, thus, "It must be doubted that these positions adequately deal with the reality of living religions."¹ De Silva's works on the other hand, as Panikkar points


Löffler illustrates his criticism of the introvert nature of Western theologies of dialogue pointing out how retrospective in most cases their points of orientation are. Thus Khodr draws on Patristic concepts which have been formulated before any encounter of Christianity with the great religions (though Löffler does not deny that Christian theology orients itself on biblical sources and criteria elaborated in Patristic Theology); Schlette leans on classical Roman Catholic theories of general and special revelation; and likewise, "Barth's re-affirmation of radical discontinuity between biblical revelation and religions is part of an inner-Christian argument partly directed against the medieval scholastic 'analogia entis' and partly against liberal Protestantism of the history of religion school in the last century" (ibid.).
out, deal "with the concrete problems of the Christian dialogue" with Buddhists.¹ Since the corpus of De Silva's works is a restatement of the fundamentals of Christian theology in relation to Sri Lankan Buddhist thought, speaking from its context and its terms, it commends itself to us as a most fitting test case for a study of authenticity in religious dialogue.

Method and Plan

Since De Silva's theology is presented as an Asian theology, and more especially as a theology that arose out of the living context of dialogue, chapter 1 attempts to provide the historical setting and perspective in which his theology took shape. It focusses on the religiously plural situation in Asia--in particular to the situation of dialogue in which De Silva has engaged Sri Lankan Buddhism for three decades. The chapter includes a brief description of developments relating to the debate on inter-religious dialogue in the World Council of Churches--where De Silva emerges as an influential Asian spokesman; an account of the resurgence of Buddhism and the transition in missionary attitudes; and, a survey of the events and the literature of the Buddhist-Christian dialogue in Sri Lanka.

In chapter 2 De Silva's theology of dialogue is discussed, i.e., his views on the principles or basis of inter-religious dialogue and the theological significance of people of other faiths. De Silva's reflections on the historical perspective of the Buddhist-Christian

encounter in Sri Lanka; his estimate of Buddhism, appraisal of the Buddhist approach to dialogue, and use of Buddhist terms; and, dialogical exchanges with Buddhist thought leaders are dealt with in this chapter.

Chapter 3 describes the translational nature of De Silva's theology, and considers a statement of the framework, starting point, and guidelines for the development of an indigenous theology. Constituting a major section of the paper, this chapter consists of a careful delineation of De Silva's dialogical theology on a topical basis. His understanding of both the Christian standpoint, as well as the meeting point in Buddhism on themes such as the human predicament; the doctrine of man, Christ, and God; creation and redemption; and mission are explicated at length. The Buddhist response to these topics has also been included.

Chapter 4 addresses itself to a critical examination of De Silva's dialogical theology and method, taking into account his recurrent thesis that Christianity can be expressed authentically in dialogue. In order to select the most suitable criteria for the evaluation of the theological implications of those emphases that have emerged from the investigation in chapters 2 and 3, a multiplex approach has been followed. Thus evaluative criteria have been drawn from biblical dialogical principles, typologies of dialogic modes in the early Christian Church (e.g., the Apologists and the

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1His position that dialogue is neither a temptation to syncretism nor an impediment to mission is well stated in the fundamental propositions of his address at the WCC session at Nairobi in 1975. See below, p. 62.
Alexandrians), in subsequent Church history where Christians found themselves in a milieu of religious pluralism, and from contemporary approaches.

This chapter is one of reflection and summation which are largely shaped by findings and conclusions in the foregoing chapters. An attempt has been made to draw together the theological conceptions on dialogue which have emerged by sifting out that which is theologically decisive and influential for dialogue. New directions and lines of investigation for reconstructing frameworks of theological understanding of other religions are suggested on the basis of the findings.
CHAPTER I

THE MATRIX OF AN INDIGENOUS THEOLOGY

The Historical Setting

By the nineteenth century, liberal Christians were looking more sympathetically at the world religions as a result of the development of scientific and historical knowledge. Edward Burnett Tylor's study of religion in culture, conducted in 1871, paved the way for studies in anthropology of religion and sociology of religion.¹ Orientalists, notably F. Max Muller with the series Sacred Books of the East, made the sources of oriental religious traditions available to the Western scholar.² Muller was already speaking of a "dialogic process" between the religions, it was "a kind of Durchsprechen" that is, "in German the threshing out of a subject" comparable to the dialogues of ancient Greece.³ A vast amount of studies in comparative religions followed and gave rise to the development of theories of religion in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. These theories sought to posit explanations for the origin, evolution, limitations, and dynamics of religious systems. The foundational works of this period include H. H. Bancroft's Native Races of the Pacific Coast (1880) and Edward Sapir's Culture and Personality (1929).

¹ Primitive Culture (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1874).
³ F. Max Muller, Ramakrishna: His Life and Sayings (London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1898), p. 25.
differences, and similarities among the religions. The task of classifying religions according to main recognizable types was also undertaken, notably by Nathan Söderblom (1865-1931) who drew a clear distinction between the prophetic and mystical types of religious approach. In all these comparative studies Christianity was included as one of the several phenomena to be studied.

The focus of the discussion next shifts to the East and centers around the towering figure of Hendrik Kraemer who "took up a position as different as possible from that of all the supporters of the comparative method." Kraemer denied the basic premise of the comparative method which had assumed that the possibility of comparison between religions is self-evident. There was a radical discontinuity between the biblical revelation and all religions including Judaism and Islam because it "has stood and stands under continuous and direct influence and judgment of the revelation in Christ." The uniqueness of Christianity calls for an uncompromising proclamation of the Gospel. The task of Christian mission was therefore conversion, not dialogue,

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1 H. Kraemer lists the main theories produced by the scientific study of religion under two divisions: (1) the naturalistic-psychological with a natural explanation of religion, and (2) the transcendental-philosophical which regarded religion as the realm in which the human spirit transcends nature and encounters the Ultimate (Religion and the Christian Faith, [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1956], pp. 54-57).


it was the "announcement of the Message of God which is not adaptable
to any religion or philosophy."\(^1\)

In formulating this view of radical discontinuity in prepara-
tion for the third ecumenical missionary conference at Tambaram in
1938, Kraemer was in direct opposition to the "fulfilment theory"
which had gained some credence since Edinburgh 1910.\(^2\) Kraemer was
also implicitly rejecting the inclusive view published in the report
Re-thinking Missions: A Laymen's Inquiry after One Hundred Years in
1932. Edited by W. E. Hocking, and representing a liberal attitude
toward theology and missions, this report envisioned that in a "world

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 302. Kraemer's position, formulated prior to
Tambaram 1938, remained basically unchanged in his later works. In
Why Christianity of All Religions, published in 1960, he maintained
that the acceptance of other religions as valid alternatives would be
a betrayal of Christ. Christianity was not absolute, nor even in all
respects the 'best' religion. Accepting the Barthian distinction
between revelation and religion he maintained what is absolute is
not Christianity but the revelation of God in Jesus Christ. Chris-
tianity is the best religion because it is there that the Gospel is
to be heard, and the Christian church is the body of Christ to whom
alone God is savingly revealed. See Why Christianity of All Religions

\(^2\)The "fulfilment theory," most typically expressed by J. N.
Farquhar, held that in Christianity Hinduism finds its explanation
and consummation. Influenced by the evolutionary theories of his time
and their application to theology, he presented Christ as the fulfilment
of the highest aims and aspirations of Hinduism: "In Him is focused
every ray of light that shines in Hinduism. He is the Crown of the
faith of India" (The Crown of Hinduism [London: Oxford University
Press, 1913] p. 457). In similar vein in 1913 Rev. R. G. Milburn of
Bishop's College, Calcutta, proposed that the Old Testament should be
replaced by the Vedantic writings in the Indian Church. See D. B.
Forrester, "Not to Destroy but to Fulfil," The Indian Journal of
missionary, in his development of the hypothesis concluded that all
religions were moving toward a universal faith in which the "common
centre is the universal Christ as manifested in the personality of
faith" in which the insights of all the great religions are combined, 
"we can desire no variety of religious experience to perish until it 
has yielded up to the rest its own ingredient of truth." Kraemer who 
could see no such agreement among religions warned against syncretism 
as a danger to Christian authenticity and held that "points of contact 
in the real, deep sense of the word can only be found by antithesis." 
In his view of biblical realism other religions were great coherent 
systems. Every religion was "a living, indivisible unity," and the 
significance of any part of it could not be understood, "without keep­
ing constantly in mind the vast living unity of existential apprehension 
in which this part moves and has its being." Kraemer considered it 
a fatal mistake to use the uniqueness and finality of Christ as an 
argument against incarnation and adaptation. But he also held that 
all attempts at incarnation and adaptation have syncretistic distor­
tions as their inevitable accompaniment. This emphasis, which came 
to be equated with the fear of syncretism, was to influence missionary 
theology decisively regarding inter-faith relations in the years to 
come.

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2 Kraemer, Christian Message, p. 139.
3 Ibid., p. 135.
4 Ibid., pp. 308-327. Murray Rogers maintains, that among 
other things, the impact of Kraemer's writings "created among Asian 
Christians what one might describe as a pathological fear of any form 
and Society 12 (March 1965): 38. M. M. Thomas considered the fear of 
syncretism after Tambaram to be theologically destructive for the 
Indian Church "because it made the churches close in on themselves and 
live in imported shells of Western confessions rather than open them­selves to their own milieu with a view to confessing in categories
Asian theologians reacting to Kraemer now began to formulate a theology of inter-religious relations very differently. Notably, the "rethinking Group," which had been formed in 1936 by Indian Christian laymen who were concerned about the need for interpreting the Christian faith in terms of Hindu spirituality and ethos, "found Kraemer's interpretation of the Revelation of God in Christ unsatisfactory for a meaningful encounter between Christian faith and Hinduism."\(^1\) According to M. M. Thomas, Kraemer's stance had only served to


\(^1\) K. C. Abraham, Interpreting Christian Social Ethics in Modern India (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University Microfilms International, 1980), p. 13. The "Rethinking Group" was so called because of the title of its best known publication, Rethinking Christianity in India, ed. D. M. Devasahayam (Madras: Sudarsanam, 1938), which was an Indian reply to Kraemer's The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World. Contributors to the book included Justice P. Chenchiah, V. Chakkarai, A. N. Sudarisanam, Eddy Asirvatham, G. V. Job, S. Jesudason and D. M. Devasahayam. For a brief survey and evaluation of some major Indian and Sri Lankan theological positions in the light of Kraemer's offensive against syncretism see G. C. Oosthuizen, Theological Battleground in Asia and Africa (London: C. Hurst & Company, 1972), pp. 14-47. Oosthuizen sees two general divisions of thought in Indian Christian approaches to Hinduism and Buddhism, viz., the "orthodox" and the "modern". The essential characteristic of the orthodox approach is that it takes the Bible alone as its norm for theology. The modern approach seeks to bring scientific thought and the metaphysical expositions of man as seen in philosophy and religion into harmony with the theological exposition of the Bible. Oosthuizen lists Bishop A. J. Appasamy and "Rethinking Group" members P. Chenchiah, V. Chakkarai and G. V. Job as those in whose theological efforts Hindu philosophy had a marked influence. He sees the attempt of these men to establish Pratyaksha (intuition) as the important or only norm of Christian theology as unacceptable to a historically rooted Christianity. Their syncretistic approach has an anthropocentric basis of construction, the emphasis on religious experience in place of the Scriptural norm derives from the universalistic philosophical outlook of Hinduism. Thus Oosthuizen views these men as having made the grave mistake of having consciously or unconsciously shifted the axis from the Gospel to Hinduism. Then there is a different approach by men like D. G. Moses,
freeze the established syncretisms of Western Christianity. Thomas, along with Paul Devanandan, D. T. Niles, Russell Chandran, and others, felt the inadequacy of Kraemer's approach to Asian religions and sought a more adequate post-Kraemer theology that "emphasized the positive potentialities of the inter-religious traffic rather than the danger of syncretism."¹

After the Tambaram Conference in 1938, the next event of major importance in the inter-religious encounter was the establishment in 1950 of the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society at Bangalore. Founded by Devanandan and Thomas it grew to be the most influential dialogue center in Southern Asia and gave expression to a post-Kraemer inter-religious theology.² Established

Surjit Singh, P. D. Devanandan, and Sri Lankans D. T. Niles and S. Kulandran, which has its axis in Scripture. The Indian representatives reject Radhakrishnan's idea of Santana Dharma, i.e., a Pan-Hinduism which includes and utilizes elements from all types of religion. Rejecting pragmatic utility they maintained that the criterion of religious truth is Scripture. What is significant for Oosthuizen is that in relating to Eastern religions, these men are careful not to compromise "the creed of the Christian Gospel" and take their axis in Scripture.

²Through the Christian Institute for the Study of Religion and Society (CISRS) Devanandan and Thomas began to develop a theology of dialogue conversant with the Indian experience. Having made a thorough study of the Hindu renaissance, beginning with Ram Mohan Roy and the Brahma and Arya Samaj movements of the 19th century through to Gandhi, the Neo-vedanta of Radhakrishnan and the secular humanism of Nehru, Devanandan saw Christ at work in reformed Hinduism. See P. D. Devanandan, Preparation for Dialogue (Bangalore: CISRS, 1964)p. 161. As Nirmal Minz points out a basic proposition of Devanandan's theology is that "God's purpose in Jesus Christ is an all-inclusive cosmic process touching nature man and society" ("Theologies of Dialogue--A Critique," Religion and Society 14 [June 1967]: 9). In this wider Christology the coming of Jesus Christ as the first fruit of a new
to develop a dialogue between Christian theologians and the leaders of
renascent Hinduism, the Institute organizes seminars and study con­
ferences on the living faiths of India. It publishes the journal
Religion and Society, in addition to papers and books, and has built
up an impressive body of materials dealing with dialogue, the social
revolution, the Christian role in nation-building and other issues.
In 1938 Kraemer's thrust put an end to the idea of a common religious
basis for inter-religious fellowship which had been mooted in the
Jerusalem International Missionary Conference (IMC) meeting in 1928.
It also effectively set back Hocking's emphasis on religious rela­
tivism. However, by 1950 Devanandan, who had been associated with the
"Rethinking Group" and shared its concerns, along with Thomas and
other CISRS associates, led out in the movement towards a post-Kraemer
inter-religious theology. The post-Tambaram tendency to absolutize

humanity is the promise of the new creation for all. The cosmic
Christ is present in every aspect of human history and culture, he
can therefore take form in different cultures and reform from within
them.

For M. M. Thomas, since cultures are moulded inwardly by
the spirit of their religions, "The idea of Christ's transcendence has
to be extended to include religions. If Jesus Christ transcends the
Christian religion, as its judge and redeemer, it opens up the pos­
sibility of Christ reforming all religions and in-forming Himself in
them" (Man and the Universe of Faiths [Madras: Christian Literature
Society, 1975] p. 151). Here is a Christocentric relativisation "which
relativises all expressions of religiosity radically" (Ibid., p. 148).
For the basis of this post-Kraemer theology of religious pluralism,
Thomas says he has drawn on the dialectical theology of Barth, since
"its understanding of Jesus Christ as the humanism of God rejecting
and electing all mankind in Jesus Christ points to a transcendent power
which can renew them all." (Ibid., p. 147).

1 For a description of the profound impact made by Kraemer's
book, The Christian Message in a Non-Christian World, both on the
Tambaram delegates and on Christian thinkers in general, see Eric J.
the Christian religion over against other religions was now countered by a theology of religious and cultural pluralism. The new era of theological openness became evident not only in the activities of the CISRS in India but throughout Christendom where we find both Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians beginning to formulate ideas very differently from Kraemer.¹

¹Even in the West a new era of theological openness is evident. Among both Protestant and Roman Catholic theologians there is a shift from discontinuity to religious pluralism. Hans Küng, Karl Rahner, Wolfhart Pannenberg, and John Hick provide notable examples of this theological trend which has been prominent since the declaration of Vatican II on the relation of the church to non-Christian religions. The declaration seemed to question the traditional Roman Catholic dogma, extra ecclesiam nulla salus, and admit there might be saving light in non-Christian religions.

Soon after the Vatican Council declaration in 1964, Hans Küng proposed that the world religions should be regarded as "the more common, the 'ordinary' way of salvation," and "the way of the Church can be considered as the great, the 'extraordinary' way of salvation!" For Küng, "The men of world religions are not professing Christians, but, by the grace of God, they are called and marked out to be Christians" ("The World Religions in God's Plan of Salvation," Christian Revelation and World Religions ed. J. Neuner [London: Burns & Gates, 1967], pp. 53-56). Even prior to Vatican II, the influential Catholic theologian Karl Rahner had proposed a similar radical shift with the notion of an "anonymous Christianity." ... "Christianity does not simply confront the member of an extra-Christian religion as a mere non-Christian but as someone who can and must be regarded in this or that respect as an anonymous Christian." Thus Rahner concluded that in a genuine sense other religions could be termed "ways of salvation." ("Christianity and the Non-Christian Religions," Theological Investigations 20 [Baltimore: Helicon Press, 1966]: 131).

Wolfhart Pannenberg's proposal of an "unconscious participation in salvation" by those unreached by the Christian gospel may be considered a liberal Protestant version of this anonymous Christianity. He suggests that the concept of Jesus' descent into hell and his preaching in the realm of the dead is the way of salvation for those who were never exposed to the revelation in Jesus Christ. The solution lies in a post-mortem encounter with the person of Christ, or a second chance after death (Jesus—God and Man, tr. Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebé [Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1967], p. 272).

The final step or the end result of this theological trend may be seen in what John Hick calls "the Copernican revolution in theology." He welcomes what he terms, "the shift from an ecclesiocentric to a theocentric understanding of the religions." The
Christian dogma is no longer at the center, rather it is God who is at the center of all the religions of mankind. Hick has taken the final step in abandoning the "Christ only" of salvific revelation. According to him all religions are equally valid, therefore he predicts that the relation between the religions will "perhaps be somewhat like that now obtaining between the different denominations of Christianity in Europe or the United States" (God and the Universe of Faiths [New York: St. Martin's Press, 1973], pp. 130-132). With this affirmation of religious pluralism, the swing of the pendulum is complete. Christianity is for many no longer the absolute religion, and the goal of the present encounter of religions is, as it is for Paul Tillich, "Not conversion but dialogue" (Christianity and the Encounter of the World's Religions [New York: Columbia University Press, 1963], p. 95).

However, Paul Knitter has drawn attention to some resistance in German Protestant theology to this trend toward theological openness. Writing from the standpoint of Roman Catholic tradition he makes a call to a "dialogue within dialogue," i.e., a dialogue among Christians in order to engage more effectively in a dialogue with non-Christians. In a case study of Paul Althaus' attempt to elaborate a theology of religions which would avoid the extremes represented by Troeltsch and Barth, Knitter has evaluated Protestant attempts to understand and encounter other religions. He notes that Althaus bases his efforts on his "Protestant heritage", especially on the doctrine of justification, thus:

As a "case study," he would seem to imply that any theologian who adheres to this traditional understanding of justification cannot really judge the non-Christian religious world as anything more than a negative preparation for Christ. The religions can never be ways of salvation; they can only voice "questions"; never can they provide real answers.

This downgrading of the theological significance of other religions is traced largely to the "inescapable influence of Karl Barth." And though attitudes have changed to some degree, German Protestant theologians do not pay much attention to other religions ever "since Barth unleashed his apocalyptic 'No' to religion and since it took on added resonance--mainly through the works of Hendrik Kraemer--in the third World Missionary Conference in Tambaram in 1938." See Towards a Protestant Theology of Religions: A Case Study of Paul Althaus and Contemporary Attitudes (Marburg: N. G. Elwert, 1974), pp. 182-184.

It must also be kept in mind that Evangelical Christianity, with its concept of the uniqueness of the Christian revelation and the lostness of those outside its pale, continues as the most powerful stream in mission. The 1969 survey of North American Protestant agencies with overseas ministries revealed 33,290 active missionaries working in 181 nations or other geographic subdivisions outside the United States of America and Canada. Of this number Asia received twenty nine percent. See North American Protestant Ministries Overseas 9th ed., (Monrovia, California: Missions Advanced Research and Communication Center, 1970), pp. 2-3.
Inter-Religious Dialogue--the Debate
in the World Council of Churches

The conflicting emphases, i.e., the danger of syncretism vis-a-vis the positive values of inter-religious dialogue, come into sharp focus in the thinking and activities of the World Council of Churches (WCC). A study of WCC assemblies, documents, and the activities of the WCC unit on dialogue, provides a picture of the role played by Asian theologians in this debate. It not only serves to highlight the theological implications of inter-religious dialogue but also identifies De Silva's role in the debate and introduces us to his theology of dialogue.

The history of the WCC, especially since Evanston 1954, provides a graphic picture of the growth of inter-religious dialogue. The discussions at WCC assemblies and studies undertaken at various consultations, in which serious attempts were made to grapple with the issues raised by the encounter of the Church with other religions, indicate a steady proliferation of dialogical activities.¹ Along with

¹A large number of organized dialogues, some bi-lateral, others multi-lateral, were held under WCC auspices. The consultations included, the relationship of Christians with men of other faiths, Mexico 1963 and Kandy 1967; dialogue in relation to evangelism, Bangkok 1973; and review, evaluation, and future directions at Chiang Mai 1972. Beginning with a continuing dialogue with Jews, and later Muslims, people of four different faiths—Hindu, Buddhist, Christian, and Muslim—were brought together at the Ajaltoun Consultation in March 1970. In the same year twenty three Christian theologians met at Zurich to evaluate the Ajaltoun Consultation. Since the WCC central committee formulated a policy statement on interim guidelines for dialogue at Addis Ababa in 1971, a wide programme of actual dialogues was carried out initiated by the Sub-Unit on Dialogue with people of Living Faiths and Ideologies and by various dialogue centers. The second multi-lateral dialogue in Colombo in 1974 included Jews in addition to the other faiths represented at Ajaltoun. At Nairobi, 1975, for the first time in the history of WCC assemblies, five members of other faiths were present—a Jew, a Hindu, a Buddhist, a Muslim, and a Sikh.
this increased activity there has been a marked change in theological emphasis with regard to the inter-religious encounter, a change that is reflected in official statements of the WCC and in the terminology used to describe people of other faiths. *Uppsala to Nairobi*, a report commissioned by the central committee of the Council in preparation for the fifth assembly, points out that the later formulations sought to avoid the description of other religionists as "non-Christians." Thus, "It is no longer 'The Gospel and Non-Christian Religions' or 'The Word of God and the Living Faiths of Men.' It is now 'Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies.'"

In a significant article espousing the viewpoint of evangelicals Klaas Runia observes a similar theological shift as inter-religious dialogue occupies an increasingly prominent place in the thinking and activities of the WCC. Maintaining that the official report of the Nairobi Assembly had failed to do so, Runia goes on to distinguish three different levels of dialogue: (1) coming to a better mutual understanding; (2) searching together for a better form of society; (3) dialogue in missionary communication. It is at the third and crucial level, involving theological issues, that Runia calls for extreme caution and a careful listening to Scripture "lest one fall into the dangerous trap of syncretism." For Runia the trend is alarming, he sees real dangers in the  irenic approach toward other religions.

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Though he can go along with "a kind of dialogue whose purpose it is to listen sensitively in order to understand," he asks: "But is there not more to the present shift within the WCC toward assigning an even greater role to dialogue? Is there not a special brand of theology that lies behind it, a special view of both the Christian faith and other religions?" In answer to his question he takes his stand firmly with Kraemer and points out what he sees as dangerous errors in Protestant, Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox dialogical theology. He takes particular exception to what he calls an endorsement of the new syncretism by S. Wesley Ariarajah, a Methodist minister from Sri Lanka. Ariarajah has called the event of Jesus Christ "a" and not "the" decisively significant event in man's entire history, thus giving up the uniqueness of Jesus Christ. Runia therefore concludes, "Evangelicals can only say a heartfelt No against this kind of view."

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1 Ibid., p. 30.

2 These include: the view that somehow all religions are ways of salvation; that Jesus Christ is in one way or another active in other religions; the attempt to relate Christian worship and the meditative use of the holy books of other faiths; the notion which he finds common in Roman Catholic theology that elements of grace are present in non-Christian religions though in a hidden manner; the view of Eastern Orthodox Metropolitan Georges Khodr that through the work of the Spirit Christ is made present in other religions; the view of Dr. S. J. Samartha (Director of the WCC Sub-Unit on Dialogue with People of Living Faith and Ideologies) that the Holy Spirit is also at work in secular faiths and ideologies; and finally, his overriding concern is that the missionary mandate of the Church will be vitiated by mixing various religious ideas and experiences.

3 Runia, p. 41. According to Carl E. Braaten extreme positions have been taken by protagonists on both sides of this debate. It is the ecumenical fashion for men such as Paul Knitter and John Hick to maintain that no exclusive claim belongs to the core of the Christian message. They hold, that there is salvation without Christ in other religions, "not only outside the church, not only apart from faith in Christ, but apart from Christ altogether." See "The Uniqueness and
By Evanston, 1954, the influence of Hendrik Kraemer was on the wane, and by 1961 at the New Delhi Assembly dialogue had come to be looked upon as a form of evangelism. According to the official report Christians must take up conversations with men of other faiths, "knowing that Christ addresses them through us and us through them." Therefore "Dialogue is a form of evangelism which is often effective today."² It was at Uppsala, 1968, that the proponents of dialogue came into confrontation with the evangelicals. The major point at issue dealt with the relationship of dialogue to evangelism as explicated in the report "Renewal in Mission." It was highly controversial. Slack observes, "Certainly no section draft had aroused more concern even before the section discussions began."³ D. T. Niles of Sri Lanka, who had been involved in ecumenical thinking about evangelism ever since Tambaram in 1938, found it refreshing. Niles sees for the first time the right posture about evangelism, the report endeavours

Universality of Jesus Christ," Mission Trends No. 5: Faith Meets Faith, eds. Gerald H. Anderson and Thomas F. Stransky (New York: Paulist Press, 1981), p. 81. Evangelical Protestants have had sharp negative reactions to such expositions of dialogue, "preferring instead to hold a monopoly for Christians on the salvation which God in Christ has accomplished for the world." (Ibid). Representatives of this "exclusive mindset," such as Harold Lindsell, "restrict salvation in the end to those who actually hear the gospel and put their faith in Christ" (Ibid., p. 79). Thus in his description of the evangelical thrust in the debate, Braaten says: "We find a new affirmation of the heritage of exclusiveness among the neo-evangelicals who are conducting a vigorous campaign against every form of universalism" (Ibid., p. 73).


²Ibid., p. 84.

to tell what God was doing in the world and gets out of the posture of "we" and "they."\(^1\) John R. W. Stott, the prominent evangelical Anglican, found the report disturbing and wondered whether the crucified Lord was central enough in the report. Stott maintains that it was pressure from the evangelicals that forced an acceptable wording of the relationship of dialogue to proclamation. The statement reads, "As Christians we believe that Christ speaks in this dialogue, revealing himself to those who do not know him and correcting the limited and distorted knowledge of those who do."\(^2\) As proposed earlier in the discussion it was worded: "In this dialogue Christ speaks through the brother, correcting our limited and distorted understanding of the truth." If this wording had been agreed upon, Stott maintains, "This would have turned evangelism upside down and presented dialogue as the proclamation of the gospel to the Christian by the non-Christian."\(^3\) At the Nairobi Assembly John Stott would recall the lament of Bishop Arias that "evangelism had become the Cinderella of the WCC," and challenge the Council to prove it had a heartfelt commitment to evangelism: "You say that you do, but where is the evidence?"\(^4\) Thus the significance of dialogue as it relates to evangelism

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 76.
continues to be a sharply controversial issue as the debate shifts to Nairobi.

At Nairobi in 1975 the issues of dialogue, i.e., the fear of syncretism as opposed to the positive potentialities of inter-religious traffic, occupy center stage. At Uppsala dialogue had received only marginal attention as part of concern for mission, but now it comes up for discussion in the sections and at the plenary sessions. Representatives of five other faiths were present as guests and participated in the section discussions. The Section 111 theme of "Seeking Community," with people of other faiths, cultures, and ideologies, when presented in the plenary session, was almost forgotten as repeated allegations of syncretism were made. Dr. Stanley Samartha, director of the WCC programme on Dialogue with People of Living Faiths and Ideologies, notes that the discussion of Section III was marked by fear,--"fear of losing the 'uniqueness' of Christ, fear of weakening the sense of 'mission', and the persistent fear of 'syncretism'."

In the main, it was the European theologians, evangelicals from Scandinavia, West Germany, and England, who voiced their fears. The Asian and African participants called for a more definite endorsement of the dialogue approach. Dr. Lukas Vischer, director of the Secretariat of the Faith and Order Commission, observes that: "Although the groupings in the debate were in fact much more complicated, the disagreement was regarded exclusively as a conflict between European and

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Asian theology." It is in this context that we must take note of the contribution made by Lynn A. de Silva, who was one of the leading voices for the Asian viewpoint. The Nairobi debate serves to highlight the fundamental theological implications of dialogue with reference to the Asian situation which is determined by the plurality of religions. It also introduces us to De Silva's role in the WCC debate as a practitioner of dialogue in the Asian context.

Dr. Samuel Rayan, the Roman Catholic observer who took part in the section discussions, sees the tension between Asian and northern European theologians resulting from the difference in theological perspectives. Summarizing the European viewpoint Rayan notes that the Europeans saw dialogue as leading to an "illegitimate syncretism." No community of prayer with people of other religions was possible. Only sociological dialogue could be had, and it could have only one purpose: "To know them in order, to evangelize them." These conclusions rested on reasoning such as: "Christ is only in the church and nowhere outside. He is present only in the Word and Sacraments. In the world He may be present as Creator, not as Redeemer. Otherwise why did he become incarnate and teach and die on the cross?" The

\[\text{The view point of Asian evangelicals, who are numerous in East Asia and as fearful of syncretism as their Western counterparts, was evidently not heard at Nairobi. Yasuo C. Furuya, Professor of Theology at the Tokyo Union Theological Seminary, speaking on behalf of Asian Christians rejects John Hick's view that all religions are equally valid, and concurs with Hendrik Kraemer that oriental religions are "formidable opponents." See "The Significance of Asian Christianity: A Note to Western Theologians," Pacific Theological Review 9 (Spring 1977): 24-26.}\]

strong European opposition resulted in a revised draft with a new preamble, which in turn brought forth a counter-reaction to the critical contributions from European theologians:

Is every Christian experience and every theological initiative which is not North Atlantic invalid, inadmissible, and unworthy of a hearing? Or is it that the extensive syncretism of the Bible and Western Christianity is entirely in order while all syncretism elsewhere is to be ruled out a priori as illegitimate? Or are the Evangelicals deeply influenced by fear of the unfamiliar and the unknown? Or is it Christian smugness and an over-confidence in armchair theologies?

In the conflict between European and Asian theology at Nairobi, Douglas J. Elwood hears "the collective voice of Asia" loud and clear. He cites two Sri Lankans—the Rev, Kenneth Fernando who, speaking from the floor, observed that "exclusivism" is a far greater danger for most Asian Christians than "syncretism"; and Wesley Ariarajah who pointed out that at least in its theological formulations, symbols, and practices, Christianity is itself a syncretistic religion. Carmencita Karagdag of the Philippines felt that the revised preamble had become overcautious and reflected what she called "The paranoia of Western countries which have little or no contact with other faiths." The two weightiest and theologically most influential contributions came from Principal Russell Chandran of the Church of South India, and Dr. Lynn A. de Silva, a Methodist from Sri Lanka, Chandran

1Rayan, "Ultimate Blasphemy," p. 133.


reviews the history of the question from Edinburgh 1910 to show that the pendulum had swung back to the position at Tambaram 1938. He emphasizes that it was "the first-hand experience of those who have lived and moved with people of other faiths," along with a deeper theological understanding of the gospel, that "led many to modify or abandon the Kraemerian approach and to adopt the approach of dialogue."

Since the response of people of other faiths deepens our knowledge and experience of Jesus Christ and his gospel, for Chandran, "the Church which evangelizes is also evangelized." Thus he makes a plea to the European theologians to avoid the mistake of making judgments on the basis of traditional doctrines, and calls on them "to be willing to listen to the testimony and insights of those who have a more intimate knowledge of other faiths and are in no way less committed to Jesus Christ and his mission."¹

The other major contribution was that of Lynn A. de Silva. Samartna characterizes De Silva's contribution as "one of the most powerful interventions in the Assembly in support of dialogue" from one who has had many years of actual experience of dialogue.² Hallencreutz describes it as the personal witness of an experienced theologian from Sri Lanka; and goes on to say "that 'sharing in spirituality' does not necessarily mean abandoning the Gospel's claim to exclusiveness. Instead, inter-religious contact may offer fresh angles


² "Courage for Dialogue" p. 31. As a leading spokesman in the WCC for the Asian viewpoint, De Silva must be considered a shaper of
of approach to the interpretation of the Gospel message."^1 After surveying the contributions of De Silva, Chandran, and others, Hallencreutz effectively sums up the basic point of contention between the Asian and European theologians:

The heat of the Asian theologians' reaction would seem to be explained by their impression that theologians from religiously fairly homogenous environments in Europe were questioning their theological integrity, when they were trying to penetrate the traditional ecclesiastical exclusiveness in their own environments, where richly differentiated religions predominate and where they had also met with genuine religious experience in their neighbours.2

It is in terms of this confrontation between European and Asian theologies that De Silva's own theology of dialogue must be seen. Significantly he chose to title his editorial reflections on the Nairobi debate "Freedom from Teutonic Captivity."3 The passing of the

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2 Ibid.

report on "Seeking Community" by an overwhelming majority is seen as the Protestant equivalent of the approval of dialogue by Vatican II. And for him the significance of this confrontation between first- and third-world theologians is three-fold:

1. It revealed the strength of the Afro-asian solidarity in their commitment to dialogue; 2. it revealed more clearly than ever before that the Third World Churches will no longer tolerate being dictated to by the Western Churches; 3. it revealed their determination to break away from teutonic captivity and discover the Christ who "Frees and Unites" in the living context of Asian and African religions.

As stated in the introductory remarks of his address to the general assembly, De Silva's concern is to set at rest the many misgivings, fears, and anxieties voiced by the Europeans about dialogue. These arise, he pointed out, in the minds of people who have not encountered people of other faiths, nor even lived among them. In a speech that may well be looked upon as his manifesto for dialogue, he maintains that one can share in the spirituality of others without in any way diminishing full and loyal commitment to one's own faith. Instead of being a temptation to syncretism, dialogue is a safeguard against it; thus it is possible to seek the wider community without compromising the true skandalon of the gospel. Asian Christians must therefore break down the walls that separate one religion from another and seek to express the universal Christian faith in the thought-forms and life-forms of Asia. De Silva's stance is decidedly post-Kraemerian and in line with that of P. D. Devanandan, M. M. Thomas, and D. T. Niles

1 Ibid., p. 2.

who advocated the positive potentialities of inter-religious dialogue. It is to the evaluation of this stance by an examination of the corpus of his writings that this study is devoted, however, in order to spell out the aims of our study, we must now turn to De Silva's particular dialogue situation in the Asian context and his dialogical approach in it.

Buddhist--Christian Dialogue in Sri Lanka

"It is granted on all hands that the dialogue between Buddhists and Christians is most seriously undertaken in Ceylon, now Sri Lanka, due to their mutual willingness to come to grips with the economical and religious problems which beset their nation."¹ This assessment by Joseph J. Spae, the well-known Catholic scholar in Buddhist studies, underscores the importance of surveying the Buddhist-Christian dialogue in the Sri Lankan context. Spae also underlines the importance of De Silva's role in this dialogue: "Christians in Ceylon have engaged since 1963 in an intensive study of Buddhist doctrine and institutions at the Study Centre for Religion and Society in Colombo under the leadership of the Rev. Lynn A. de Silva."² Not only is De Silva the foremost Christian leader in this dialogue, but as Spae notes elsewhere, this study center "is perhaps the most active of all study centres. It is ably led by Rev. Lynn A. de Silva, a biblical scholar and prolific writer on Buddhist-Christian relations."³ De Silva's

²Ibid.
contribution as a Christian leader, both before and after his appoint-
ment as the director of the Study Center, is worth noting. Born in
1919 and ordained to the Methodist ministry in 1950, he served as
a teacher, superintendent and circuit minister, manager of fourteen
Methodist schools in Sri Lanka, and editor of the "Christian News
Bulletin" and the Sinhala journal Suba Hasun. Having worked as co-
translator of the Bible into Sinhala since 1964, he became the chief
translator of the joint Protestant-Roman Catholic translation of the
Bible in 1973. Other positions occupied by him included that of
William Paton Lecturer at Selly Oak Colleges, Birmingham, England, in
1970-71, and Visiting Lecturer in Asian Religions at the University of
Bristol in the same year; member of the committee on research of the
senate of Serampore college, responsible for the M. Th. and D. Th.
degrees; and, Executive President of the National Council for Religion

De Silva was in charge of the Study Center since 1962.
The Study Center was set up in 1951, with Rev. G. B. Jackson as secre-
tary, because of the growing conviction in the Sri Lankan Methodist
Synod that the gospel needed to be relevant in the context of the nation-
al culture and heritage particularly as a result of the impact of
resurgent Buddhism after independence. By arrangement with the Methodist
Synod, the work of the center was integrated with the National Christian
Council and thus became a center for inter denominational activity.
Originally set up "to study and interpret the religious and social
movements of the people of this land, in order to assist the Church to
fulfil its calling to witness and service in the life of the nation," it was later organized under two divisions:
(a) The concern of the Division of Buddhist Studies is to promote study and research in classical Buddhism and modern developments in Buddhism, and to foster a deeper understanding of Buddhism among Christians with a view to engaging in dialogue with Buddhists.

(b) The concern of the Division of Frontier Studies is to explore the theological and social implications of the Christian faith for the life of the nation.1

J. J. Spae observes that this assignment has been successfully carried out by the Center by organizing dialogues, meetings and seminars: "Some of these top-level colloquia are held at the Centre itself; others in universities, including Buddhist ones, at the International Buddhist Centre, and even in the local parishes."2 In 1977 the Study Centre for Religion and Society was renamed the Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue. It was now set up as an autonomous body, not "subject to the direction and control of any religious body or institution." While Buddhist-Christian studies and dialogue continued to be the main emphasis, provision was made for other studies by the addition of the Division of Studies of other Faiths and Ideologies.3

The various publications of the Institute are of vital interest to our study. In addition to several books on dialogue between Christianity and other religions, the Institute publishes the quarterly Dialogue, in which De Silva had a leading Buddhist philosopher as co-editor. Michael Rodrigo, of the National Catholic Seminary at Kandy, says: "Dr. Lynn


2Spae, "The Buddhist-Christian Encounter" p. 11

de Silva's study-centre occasional bulletins as they treat of racism, oppression, the gap between the rich and the poor, the relationship between developed and developing nations, ecology and pollution bring dialogue into sharper focus.\(^1\)

De Silva has pointed out that the origin of the study center and the increase in dialogical exchanges resulted from the changed historical situation. After Sri Lanka became independent in 1948 and after the Buddha Jayanthi (the 2500th anniversary of Buddhism) in 1956, "The conviction of the need to restate the Christian message in a Buddhist idiom grew stronger."\(^2\) The approach of De Silva and the Center to the dialogue with Buddhism must therefore be seen in relation to the revival of Buddhism in Sri Lanka, by taking note of previous attempts at dialogue, and most importantly by tracing the transition in Christian attitudes and approaches to Buddhism from the early missionary period to the present.

Sri Lanka, an island republic in the Indian ocean off the south-eastern coast of India, is the geographical setting of this study. The salient fact of Sri Lanka's ancient history is the coming of the Sinhalese ("Lion-race") in the sixth century B.C. However, its history has remained somewhat shadowy, belonging to the realm of myth and legend, till the introduction of the Buddhist religion in the third

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century B. C. when its authentic historical era begins.\textsuperscript{1} There are certain developments in the history of Sri Lankan Buddhism and Christianity that are of paramount importance in our study of the encounter between the two religions. De Silva draws attention to the fact that Sri Lanka had a long and dominant tradition of Buddhism and Buddhist culture since the third century B. C. and identifies two dominant characteristics that have been evident in this Buddhist national heritage:

One is the religio-national solidarity. From the very beginning Buddhism was recognized and accepted by the state as its official religion. There has been a close-knit interpretation of religion and state, of monk and monarch, as in the West. The other characteristic is the sense of destiny and mission. The Buddhists believe that they are the "chosen people" and that Sri Lanka is the land favored by the Buddha, the land in which the Dhamma (Buddhist doctrine) will shine in all its glory, its light radiating throughout the world.\textsuperscript{2}

\textsuperscript{1}Other important historical landmarks are the coming of invaders from Europe (three successive colonial powers) beginning in the sixteenth century; the Chola invasions from South India beginning in the eleventh century which left a permanent Hindu-Tamil population in the north by 1325; and national independence gained in 1948. The Sinhalese constitute the majority community (71.9 percent) and the Tamils the largest minority (20.5 percent). Smaller groups are the Ceylon Moors, descendants of seafaring Arab merchants; Malays; Burghers, partly descendants of the Dutch, partly Eurasians; and a small number of naturalized Europeans, Indians, and other nationalities.

Religious affiliation seems to largely follow the pattern of communal distribution. The Sinhalese are mainly Buddhists and the Tamils are principally Hindus. Moors and Malays are uniformly Muslims, the Christians are constituted mainly from the Sinhalese and Tamil groups. With a population of over fourteen million, the statistics of religious affiliation in 1977 are as follows: Buddhists 67.4 percent, Hindus 17.6 percent Christians 7.7 percent, and all other 0.1 percent. See K. M. de Silva, "Religion," p. 379. This breakdown serves to indicate the religiously plural nature of the country today and the inevitability of inter-religious encounter and dialogue on a day-to-day basis.

With regard to the first characteristic it is especially significant that Buddhism entered Sri Lanka through the conversion of the king, thus from the very beginning Buddhism came to be closely identified with the institution of kingship in Sri Lanka. The pre-eminent sacro-political role played by the king involved more than building of viharas and stupas, it also meant the royal authority would be exercised for the purification of the Sangha whenever it was found to be corrupt. The Sinhalese national chronicles record several instances when the king exercised his royal prerogative and performed Sodhana, a ceremony of purification in which he unfrocked bhikkus who were unworthy of the role. It is this aspect of Sri Lankan Buddhism, i.e., its close connection with the institution of kingship according to the Buddhist tradition that was to profoundly affect its encounter with Christianity.  

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1Earliest Buddhism, i.e. precept and practice as taught and lived by its founder and immediate followers, was of a non-political nature. With the conversion of the Indian Emperor Asoka in the third century B.C., we see the development of the connection between Buddhism and political authority. Originally the normative pattern for those who sought salvation was that of mendicant wanderers, and missionary preaching constituted one of the major functions of Buddha's followers. With the conversion of Asoka we have the development of the concept of the Cakkavattin or Dharma-raja (the ideal Buddhist king), and the state becomes a soteriological institution. The model of the ideal king whose devotion to the Buddha, the Dhamma, and the Sangha was complete and effective, is central to the history of Sinhalese Buddhism. Buddhism made its entrance to Sri Lanka in the reign of Tissa (247-207 B.C.) who sought the title of "Devanampiya" from Asoka since it meant "Beloved of the Gods" and was equivalent to "His Majesty." The list of Tissa's successors indicates that the title "Devanampiya" continued to be used by kings in Sri Lanka till the middle of the sixth century A. D., and W. Rahula notes that, "As time went on, the title seems to have been regarded as a specific title of Buddhist kings" (History of Buddhism in Ceylon [Colombo: M. D. Gunasena & Co. 1956], p. 28). Regina T. Clifford sees the Buddhist state as existing for "the protection and promotion of the dhamma, functioning in a way parallel to the sangha in the spiritual realm," and points out that Devanampiya-tissa, Dutthagamani and Parakkamabahu, the three ideal kings of the
On the loss of state patronage under European occupation of the island beginning in the sixteenth century, Malalgoda pertinently comments:

An important consequence of the transfer of political power into alien hands, as far as Buddhism in Ceylon was concerned, was the loss of state patronage which it had enjoyed for centuries, and which, . . . was a necessary condition for the proper functioning of its central institutions. Under the Portuguese and Dutch, the strength of the state machinery was not merely withdrawn from Buddhism; it was actively used against Buddhism on the side of Christianity.\(^1\)

Also of great importance to our study of Buddhism's encounter with Christianity is the second dominant characteristic identified by De Silva, viz., the Dhammadipa (island of Buddhist doctrine) tradition, which gave an expressly national character to Sri Lankan Buddhism.\(^2\)

According to this tradition the Buddha is said to have consecrated Sri Lanka to become the sanctuary of the true dhamma and prophesied that it would be the place where Buddhism would flourish. The influence

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\(^2\)The distinctly national character of Buddhism on the island goes back to the earliest days of its establishment and was largely due to the efforts of Mahinda, its first missionary to Sri Lanka. According to a legend recorded in the Samantapasadika, the traditional history of Buddhism in Sri Lanka by Buddhaghosa the fifth century Buddhist commentator in India, Mahinda tells the king that Buddhism could be deep-rooted only when a "son born in the island of Tambapanni became a monk here (i.e., in the capital city of Anuradhapura), studied the Vinaya here and recited it here." Sukumar Dutt concludes that: "Mahinda's idea undoubtedly was that Buddhism in Ceylon, to be deep-rooted must become Ceylonese Buddhism. So it eventually became and remained so through all the centuries." (Buddhism in East Asia [Bombay: Indian Council for Cultural Relations, 1960], p. 27).
of the tradition is such that the chronicled history of traditional Sri Lanka (as recorded in the Pali chronicles, the Mahavamsa, Dipavamsa, and Culavamsa) is virtually the history of Buddhism in the island. Regina T. Clifford maintains that the Dhammadipa tradition, "comprises the central thread running through centuries of Sinhalese Buddhism."¹ Bardwell L. Smith sees in these chronicles a world not unlike that of the Old Testament. Like Jewish history it is ethnocentric history: "It is Heilsgeschichte. It is the sacred history of a people destined with a sacred mission, namely, to maintain the purity of the Dhamma in a world of impermanence and self-seeking."² To the Sinhalese, Buddhism was not merely a set of beliefs, rites, and legends but also the central theme in the history of their island and culture. Thus Buddhism's religio-political concept, and the Dhammadipa tradition which forged the inextricable links between Sinhalese nationalism and the national religion constitute key elements of the historical and ideological background to the encounter with Christianity. De Silva therefore insists that to fail to take full cognizance of Sri Lanka's Buddhist national heritage is to fail to enter into meaningful dialogue.

In rejecting Buddhism Christians have rejected the nation and the people and as a result Christianity itself has been rejected. This is something that Christians have not yet understood. Buddhism, the nation and the Buddhist people have throughout the history of our country been so inextricably

¹"The Dhammadipa Tradition of Sri Lanka," p. 36.
associated that to reject one means to reject the other two. Thus the rejection of Buddhism has meant the rejection of the nation and the people.¹

As we turn to Buddhism's early encounter with Christianity, its resurgence in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and the dialogue situation at the present time, these distinctive aspects of the Buddhism that took root in Sri Lanka take on special significance. Though a Christian community existed in Sri Lanka in the sixth century only historical records and archaeological evidences of it remain today.² Christianity came to stay with the advent of the colonial powers—the Portuguese (1505-1658), the Dutch (1658-1796), and the British (1796-1948). The Portuguese arrived in 1505, and under their protection Roman Catholicism was established in the coastal areas. A twentieth-century Christian assessment of the 150 years of Portuguese rule and their coercive missionary methods sees them as a denationalizing force:

The Portuguese in Ceylon, like their brothers the Spaniards in America, committed horrible cruelties in the name of


²Indian Christians confidently hold that the Apostle Thomas brought the Gospel to India in A. D. 52. It is certain that by the sixth century there was a flourishing Christian community in the Malabar area and one in Sri Lanka. Recent archaeological findings of Nestorian crosses locate it at Anuradhapura, the ancient Buddhist capital of Sri Lanka. According to the account by the Greek navigator Cosmas Indico Pleustes in his Universal Christian Topography, Cosmas says when he visited the island about the year 522 he found a Church of Christians with clergy, a congregation "with a presbyter appointed from Persia and a deacon, and all the apparatus of public worship." See F. E. Keay, A History of the Syrian Church in India (Madras: Society for the Propagation of Christian Knowledge in India, 1951), p. 19.
Christ. With them religion and temporal power went hand in hand. In the parts they conquered the Sinhalese were forced to give up their names. The old temples and monuments, some of them valuable works of art were destroyed and Sinhalese art was strangled. Is it then a wonder that non-Christians blame Christianity as a denationalizing force?¹

A recent Buddhist assessment merely quotes Sir Emerson Tenent’s remark that the Portuguese period was marked by "rapacity, bigotry and cruelty." It goes on to observe that Buddhists were subjected to forced conversions on a large scale, Buddhist religious opinions were insulted, and schools were set up with the sole intention of propagating the Catholic faith. The writer then sums up the impact on subsequent Christian-Buddhist relations:

It is probable that the anti-Buddhist propaganda emanating from such institutions formed the earliest incitement to anti-Catholic feeling which moved the Sinhalese Buddhists to resentment against any foreign faith—a phenomenon which ultimately has had such a profound effect on inter-religious attitudes, and in the course of time generated what has come to be known as 'militant Buddhism.'²

According to Wijesekera, under Dutch rule Buddhism did not suffer to the same extent by direct persecution as under the Portuguese. However, their hold on education and the introduction of an alien culture did great harm to the temple-oriented educational system and the social life of Sinhalese Buddhists.³ The Dutch government imposed

³Ibid.
heavy civil disabilities on all who would not profess its brand of Protestant Christianity. After nearly one and a half centuries of Dutch rule, when the country was being ceded to the British, there were over 478,000 professed believers. Yet within the next ten years more than half this number had declared themselves to be Buddhists, and "a large proportion of the 'Government-Religion' churches were in ruins." As it happened, with the collapse of each successive colonial regime great numbers of baptized Sinhalese returned to their traditional Buddhist beliefs.

It is with the British era that we see the resurgence of Buddhism and a transition in Christian missionary attitudes and approaches to Buddhism—the two most significant factors that paved the way for the present dialogue. Kitsiri Malalgoda is correct in stating that the distinctive feature of the Buddhist revival of the nineteenth century was that it depended on voluntary efforts rather than state patronage. Though this colonial order differed radically from that of the traditional Sinhalese-Buddhist kingdoms, it also represented a radical break from the religious intolerance of the Portuguese and Dutch. Thus Malalgoda says: "The British in contrast to their colonial predecessors, professed a policy of religious liberty, and this policy, however qualified or attenuated it was in actual practice, was significantly different in that it allowed the free operation

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of voluntary efforts to promote Buddhism. The beginnings of the Buddhist renewal in Sri Lanka are thus intimately linked with this official policy of neutrality, it provided the Buddhists the option of voluntary self-help despite the attempts of the missionaries to "dis-establish" Buddhism in the nineteenth century.

The attitude of the missionaries to Buddhism was clearly the expression of nineteenth century evangelical triumphalism, and they regarded the destruction of Buddhism as one of their main objects.

1 "Buddhism in Post-Independence Sri Lanka," Religion in South Asia, ed. G. A. Oddie (Columbia, Missouri: South Asia Books, 1977), pp. 183-184. Under the British there was no active suppression of the Buddhist religion as in Portuguese and early Dutch times. When the British brought the hitherto independent Kandyan kingdom under their rule, the Kandyan provinces were ceded under the Kandyan Convention of 1815. The fifth article of the Convention stated: "The Religion of the Buddhoo professed by the Chiefs and inhabitants of these Provinces is declared inviolable and its Rites and Ministers and Places of Worship are to be maintained and protected." The Christian Governor certainly could not take the place of a Buddhist monarch, however the Buddhists were left alone for the most part. There was, however, governmental backing for the propagation of Christian missions, with the Anglicans receiving preferential treatment. The report of the Committee of Inquiry, appointed by the All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress in 1953, notes that Buddhism continued to be undermined during the British regime by discriminatory laws, the expropriation of temple lands and the use of government funds for the promotion of Christian schools as a means of proselytisation. See The Betrayal of Buddhism: An Abridged Version of the Report of the Buddhist Committee of Inquiry (Balangoda, Sri Lanka: The All-Ceylon Buddhist Congress, 1956).

2 The process of disestablishment aimed at was the severance of the association which the State had entered into with Buddhism at the Kandyan Convention of 1815. In a pamphlet titled, "The British Government and the Idolatry of Ceylon," R. Spence-Hardy argued for the disestablishment of Buddhism on the grounds that there could be no connection between a Christian government and an idolatrous religious system, and, that by dissociating the State from Buddhism the religion would lose its hold on the people. See K. M. de Silva, Social Policy and Missionary Organizations in Ceylon 1840-1855 (London: Longmans, Green and Co., 1965), pp. 67-73.

3 Malalgoda points out that the apocalyptic and inevitable triumph of Christianity over all other religions, which was very much a part of the early nineteenth century evangelical frame of mind, was
They undertook a serious study of the Sinhalese and Pali Buddhist Scriptures with a view to, as stated by D. J. Gogerly at the time, "overturn from its base, if possible, the whole system of the Buddha." The Methodist historian W. J. T. Small traces the unsympathetic approach of the missionaries to Buddhism to the fact that the Buddhism in Sri Lanka at the time was intermingled with superstitious beliefs and practices and to basic theological presuppositions common to evangelical Christianity in England at this time, e.g., the absolutely sharp and clear-cut distinction between Christianity and every other religion or way of life. The efforts of the missionaries had the effect of strengthening instead of weakening Buddhism. In spite of the confident expectations of the Christians, the second half of the nineteenth century was to see a powerful Buddhist revival, and the Christian approach to Buddhism was to undergo a profound change.

Serious opposition to Christianity began to develop with the forming of The Society for the Propagation of Buddhism. A number of widely prevalent among both the missionaries and the colonial administrators of nineteenth century Sri Lanka. J. Forbes, an English missionary writing in 1840, expresses the general tenor of the ideas Christians held regarding the future of Buddhism: "I anticipate that Buddhism shorn of its splendour, unaided by authority, and torn by internal disension, will not long have power to retain even its present slight control over the actions of its votaries... and that it will fall into disuse before Christianity is prepared to step into its place." Twenty one years later the prominent Sinhalese Christian, James Alwis, while discussing the "prospects of Buddhism" in the course of a lecture he delivered in Colombo, declared: "There are, indeed, good grounds for believing that Buddhism will, at no very distant period, disappear from this island." See Buddhism in Sinhalese Society 1750-1900, pp. 173-174.


2 Ibid., p. 156.
Buddhist pamphlets and tracts aimed at discrediting Christianity and proving the Bible untrue appeared in reply to the Christian publications. Among the other methods used by Buddhists to counteract the teachings of Christianity were the production of school books, legends and ballads. Most striking was the series of public religious debates between the Buddhists and Christians. The revival of modern Buddhism is often dated from 1873 when the most notable of these, the Panadura Debate, took place. The Panadura Debate had far reaching effects as the eloquent Buddhist spokesman Migettuwatte Gunananda claimed a resounding victory over David de Silva, a Wesleyan clergyman. A most significant result was that the account of this controversy reached the United States of America and inspired Colonel Henry Steele Olcott to come to Sri Lanka in 1880 to champion the Buddhist cause.\(^1\)

Colonel Olcott played a vital role in the development of what later came to be known as "Protestant Buddhism,"\(^2\) in which individual efforts and voluntary associations played a vital role. Olcott advised the Buddhists:

> If you ask how we should organise our forces, I point you to our great enemy, Christianity, and bid you look at their

\(^{1}\) Vito Perniola, "Buddhism in Modern Ceylon," *Studia Missionalia* 12 (1962): 68.

\(^{2}\) In summing up the implications of the term "Protestant Buddhism," which G. Obeysekera used to describe the changes brought about in Buddhism as a result of its confrontation with Christianity, K. M. de Silva refers to three basic aspects: (1) Buddhism's protest against Christianity, (2) the imitation of the norms, practices, and organizational forms of Protestant Christianity as could be seen in the Society for the Propagation of Buddhism, Young Men's Buddhist Associations, Sunday schools, Buddhist schools modelled on missionary schools, Buddhist catechisms, etc., and (3) the process of laicisation, also a feature of Protestant Christianity in which the traditional position of leadership of the clergy was handed over to the laymen. See K. M. de Silva, "Religion," p. 386.
large and wealthy Bible, Tract, Sunday School, and Missionary Societies—the tremendous agencies they support to keep alive and spread their religion. We must form similar societies, and make our most practical and honest men of business their managers.¹

The list of Olcott’s achievements on behalf of the Buddhist cause is impressive. Realizing that the educational backwardness of the Buddhists was the principal obstacle to Buddhist renewal, he re-organized the Buddhist educational system on modern principles. Hitherto education had largely been the preserve of the colonial government and the missionaries. He founded the Buddhist Theosophical Society (BTS) of Ceylon and within a few years opened three colleges and 200 schools for some 20,000 children. The BTS adopted a Buddhist flag and prevailed upon the British Governor to declare Vesak (the Buddhist festival of the full moon commemorating its founder’s birth) a public holiday, a significant victory for Buddhism as hitherto only Christian Sundays and British national holidays had been celebrated.²

The overall impact of the revival greatly stimulated the self-respect of the Sinhalese Buddhists. Anagarika Dharmapala was an outstanding leader of the Buddhist revival, whose goal of restoring the Sasana (the teachings of Buddha) and resuscitating Dhyana (meditation) in Sri Lanka forged strong links between the revival and nationalism. John R. Mott, doyen of the foreign missionaries to Asia in his day, took serious note of the element of nationalism in the Buddhist revival:


²Benz, Buddhism or Communism p. 40.
The southern part of the island of Ceylon is Buddhist, and while Buddhism there, until about the year 1880, was comparatively inert, it has since then been largely resuscitated. Its leaders carry on an aggressive propaganda. . . The movement is, moreover, decidedly more hostile to Christianity than it has been in the past, representing Christianity as alien and Buddhism as national. This attempt to identify Buddhism with national patriotism and to urge upon people that loyalty to the country implies loyalty to this religion is undoubtedly one of the most serious and significant aspects of the Buddhist revival.1

John Mott was writing around 1910 when Christians in Sri Lanka were still a privileged group but were for the most part outside the surge of nationalism which led to Sri Lankan independence in 1948. Based on non-indigenous concepts and interpreted on Western lines, Christianity was looked upon as an aspect of the foreign occupation. After the First World War missionaries in Sri Lanka and other Asian countries began to see the need, though very hesitantly, for coming to terms with nationalism.2 Already the revival of Buddhist activity and

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1 The Decisive Hour of Christian Missions (New York: Student Volunteer Movement for Foreign Missions, 1910), pp. 50-52.
2 Even during colonial times there were Western missionaries who saw the need for a more open attitude to Asian cultures and religions. An outstanding example in the Sri Lankan context is Alek Fraser, the renowned missionary principal of Trinity College, Kandy. In 1907, Fraser submitted a paper to his fellow missionaries in which he said that Buddhism was advancing faster than Christianity and making converts from all three of its rivals, Christianity, Islam and Hinduism. Christianity in Sri Lanka was on the defensive because Buddhism was represented as the national religion and Christianity as foreign, with Christ as merely the Western Buddha. One of the great weaknesses that Fraser put his finger on was that the theological training of the Sri Lankan clergy was based on the English Bible and the writings of Western theologians: "You will find pastors in Ceylon who would gladly show their keen if ignorant partisanship on a Wace-Driver discussion, but who have neither seriously considered nor recognized the vastly more important and interesting problems raised by the impact of Christianity on Buddhism." Fraser listed a number of proposals to change this undue Westernization. Among these were the redesigning of the school curriculum "to knit them to their own people"; thus (1) Sinhalese, Tamil and Sri Lankan history should be prominent, (2) Western ethics
the reform of Buddhist institutions had served to freeze the Christian population at the figure that had been attained by the end of the nineteenth century.\(^1\) The introduction of a free education scheme on secularist lines before independence, and the government takeover of most

should be illustrated and compared with Eastern, and (3) real Buddhistic literature should be studied and compared with the Bible. See W. E. F. Ward, Fraser of Trinity and Achimota (London: Ghana Universities Press, 1965), pp. 53-55. Fraser was in effect making a call for a real sense of national solidarity on the part of the Christian and the Church in Sri Lanka. He realized that if Christianity was to be meaningful it had to enter into dialogue with the culture and religion in the Sri Lankan national context. A fact, as P. D. Devanandan pointed out half a century later, that Asian and especially Western Christians had long failed to realize: "What we, as Christians everywhere, have yet to realize is that nationalism in Asian lands had reached a new phase in its growth and development. A new meaning-content is put into that word which other people, especially those in the West, are not able to understand." See P. D. Devanandan, The Gospel and Renascent Hinduism (London: Student Christian Movement Press Ltd., 1959), pp. 23-24.

\(^1\) S. Arasaratnam uses census figures to show that evangelism practically ceased and that the Christian element of the population frozen at around 10 percent maintained a remarkable uniformity in the twentieth century.

### Table 1

PERCENTAGE OF CHRISTIANS IN TOTAL POPULATION

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<th>Census Year</th>
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<td>1970*</td>
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*This is a Pre-Census estimate.

denominational schools in 1960 drastically curtailed the influence that Christian churches in Sri Lanka had wielded. With the introduction of universal suffrage and the continued increase of Buddhist representation in legislative bodies, political parties began competing with each other to restore Buddhism to its "rightful place," i.e., the state patronage it enjoyed in traditional Buddhist societies. For Sri Lankan Christians confronted by the revival of national culture, the Westernism of their religion proved to be a source of embarrassment and frustration. Dialogue, as Lynn de Silva has pointed out, "is no longer a matter of choice—it is a necessity." To fail to enter into dialogue with the Buddhist religion and its culture amounted to rejecting the people and the nation as well.

The antipathy evoked by the rejection of Buddhism as a false religion gave rise to the slogan "to be a true Sinhalese one must be a Buddhist," which by implication meant that Christians could not be true Sinhalese: they could only be second-class citizens, aliens in the land of their birth, with no identity except their identification with colonialism, capitalism and imperialism. Dialogue is therefore an essential part of the discovery of our identity as persons and as a community. It is the discovery of our true identity in a plural society that makes living authentic and proclamation meaningful and relevant.

The Christian dialogue with Buddhism, impelled largely by historical circumstances, began as a movement toward indigenization with the Protestants in the forefront. This meant the revival of indigenous names and dress, the cultivation of native arts and crafts among Christians, and the appointment of nationals to positions of church leadership. It also dealt with the externals of worship such as music and

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2 Ibid.
architecture. Thus when the WCC sponsored an interdenominational theological college, it had as its two-fold object:

(a) For the sake of presenting the Gospel to the people of Ceylon in the language and idiom of the swabasha speaking people of the country;
(b) For the closer integration of the Church into the life of the Nation, and indigenisation not only of its worship but its life and thought.¹

Though Catholics lagged behind the Protestants in the dialogue with Buddhism, Michael Rodrigo claims the pacesetting of Vatican II found an echo in Sri Lankan Catholicism. Soon after the council a complementary theological training programme on a contextual level was organized. Since 1966 Bhikku Anomandassi has been teaching Buddhist studies at the National Catholic Seminary in Kandy. In 1973 the Uva diocese organized a Ministries School for a ministry of dialogue with Buddhists and with other religions. The ministries to different religions, known as sevakas (meaning servantship), were engaged in the study of principles of dialogue and languages in the preparation of dialogists for the diocese. Since 1975 the Ministries School has celebrated religious festivals annually—Thai Pongal, a harvest festival, with the Hindus; Milad-un-Nabi, Prophet Muhammed's birthday, with Muslims; and Vesak, a triple Buddhist festival recalling the birth, the enlightenment, and the passing-away of the Buddha. At the initial Vesak celebration, the Buddhist speaker, the Venerable Amarakongana Amarawansa of the Diyatalawa training school for monks said: "Till today, one would have thought that the Buddha Jayanthi of some years ago was the climax of it all. Today, we find we have gone further in a Dhamma Jayanthi where doctrines of truthfulness get together to feast

Buddhism. It is a signal victory for religion." Rodrigo, however, observes that Catholic efforts at dialogue have not always been a success story, thus "Where the tenets of Vatican II do not percolate to the people, dialogue easily evaporates." He regrets that the Catholic Messenger no longer carries the middle-page spread of festivals of other religions, that the many inter-faith seminars organized by the women religious in Colombo have ceased since 1974, and that the non-Christian news bulletin from the Archbishop's House in Colombo ended after its second volume in 1969.1

The church was seeking to give a truly Sri Lankan expression to Christianity. As D. T. Niles told the WCC Assembly at New Delhi in 1961: "The trouble with the missionaries was that they brought Christianity to us as a potted plant. Now we are breaking the pot and putting the plant in our own soil."2 According to a Buddhist participant in the current dialogue, Mahinda Palihawadana, professor of Sanskrit at Sri Jayawardenepura University, "Divorced from temporal power after decolonization, Christians are profoundly concerned, especially at an individual level, to renativize themselves culturally, without discarding the Christian heritage that they have acquired." He goes on to draw attention to the intellectual aspect of this process of indigenization and cites as examples the Study Centers led by Lynn de Silva and Aloysius Pieris.3 The early period of the Buddhist revival had been marked

by theological disputation and polemics on doctrine between the Buddhist and Christian clergy, in more recent years there have been some initiatives towards theological dialogue. These theological approaches by Christians have proved to be significant steps towards rooting the Gospel in Sri Lankan soil, and Buddhist initiatives in turn are an indication of the changed climate from one of disputation to dialogue.

The rather brief work of Dr. D. T. Niles, \textsuperscript{1} Buddhism and the Claims of Christ, first published in 1946 under the title Eternal Life Now, merits description as the first major Sri Lankan effort to restate the Christian message in Buddhist terms and thought-forms. Claiming that the study of Buddhism has fertilized his faith and enriched his understanding, Niles says of his use of Buddhist terms such as annica, dukkha, samsara, sarana, anatta, sila, samadhi, panna and arahat: "I use these words and ideas not as intending to graft into the Christian faith elements of truth as I see them in Buddhism, but as attempting to state the Christian faith in language that already had significance for you." \textsuperscript{2}

A rather different approach is taken by Dr. Bryan De Kretser in his doctoral dissertation at the University of Edinburgh on \textit{Man in Buddhism and Christianity}. \textsuperscript{3} More in the nature of an academic statement

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{1}Niles was a President of the Methodist Church in Sri Lanka, as well as one of the WCC Presidents. He was also engaged in dialogue with Hinduism and is the writer of a number of other theological works.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{2}(Richmond, Virginia: John Knox Press, 1967), p. 22.}

\footnotesize{\textsuperscript{3}(Calcutta: Y. M. C. A. Publishing House, 1954). De Kretser was a minister of the Reformed Church in Sri Lanka at the time this work was written, and later embraced Catholicism. He is now at Prithipura Homes for Handicapped Children, an inter-religious venture.}
on the Buddhist and Christian conception of man, De Kretser "is not concerned with the immediate problem of Evangelism."\(^1\) He has sought to explicate the relations between the Buddhist and Christian man with the tools of Reformed Theology as shaped by Karl Barth, Emil Brunner and Reinhold Niebuhr and claims his work is no more than a study of comparative religion. However, as the introductory remarks indicate, it is an approach that seeks to make an authentic contribution to the present dialogue:

Several students of Comparative Religion, and of Buddhism, have contrasted the "dogmas" of Buddhism with an oversimplified version of Christianity, which no Church would accept, or else they have reduced both faiths to a few simple moral principles. Both these methods seem to fail to do justice to the two religions, for the Christian faith is not just "the Fatherhood of God and the brotherhood of man", nor is the message of Buddhism, a pure, a rational Ethicism.\(^2\)

Two outstanding Catholic contributions have come from Fr. Aloysius Pieris, SJ, director of the Tulana Research and Encounter Center, and Fr. Tissa Balasuriya, OMI, director of the Catholic Center for Society and Religion in Colombo. In addition to promoting dialogical encounters, they have also made written theological contributions. Balasuriya's approach to Asian religions takes its cue from Latin American Liberation Theology and calls for "Interreligious Action-Reflection." Reflecting with believers of other religions means respecting and reflecting on their scriptures too, and Christians must "have a satisfactory view of the role of the Buddha in our world vision and in our Christian thinking."\(^3\) Pieris also takes his cue from Liberation Theology.

\(^1\)Ibid., p. i.
\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 1-2.
In the Western tradition theology and theo-praxis parted ways. The Asian Christian is called to liberation-praxis, the locus of which is in Asian religiosity and poverty. This locus is the "God-Experience (which is at once the Man-Concern) of God's own people living beyond the Church." Which is to say, for Pieris, "Theology in Asia is the Christian Apocalypse of the non-Christian experiences of Liberation." ¹ Also worth noting is Pieris' "Sacramental theory" which, M. M. Thomas says, "seems an original contribution from Asia." ² In addition to these principal contributions there are several journal articles and pamphlets on the subject, most of them coming out of the dialogue centers.

Of the three principal Buddhist initiatives, two were from Sri Lanka and the other from Thailand. The first is A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God, by Dr. Gunapala Dharmasiri, presently Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Sri Lanka. It is indeed a


² "Book Reviews," Religion and Society 20 (September 1973): 100. Pieris traces the Christian attitude to non-Christian religions in the last four centuries as moving from their interpretation first as anti-Christian (to be conquered), then as non-Christian (to be adapted), now as pre-Christian (to be fulfilled), and probably soon as anonymous Christian, which is to lead to the sacramental approach as advocated by him. The attitude toward non-Christian religions should be one of "assumption", since Christ did not merely appear as a man but fully assumed human nature. The idea of conquest wrongly identifies the kingdom of God with the visible church, and adaptation makes the incarnation too docetic since it robs a culture of its religious content. Even the Vatican Fulfilment theory fails to satisfy though it takes the kingdom as "a wider reality" than the church since Pieris finds it difficult to consider non-Christian religions as purely natural religions as contrasted with Christianity as supernatural. In the sacramental form of the Kingdom, the Church must "explicate in her own life" the presence of God and anonymous Christianity implicit in the religions surrounding her. Thus, for Pieris, the relationship between the church
critique, however Dharmasiri maintains that his intention is not to disparage Christianity and that "it is instructive for Christians to see what other religionists have to say about Christianity." Moreover, "If the Buddhist's criticisms are unsound, the Christian can always point it out and show why they are unsound and this might at least, help the Buddhist to correct his own wrong perspectives. And by these means a real understanding among religions may be brought about." The problems that current Christian theology has with the concept of God are traced to "the fundamental irrationality and anti-rationality of the Christian faith," which Dharmasiri sets out to critique from the

and other religions should be one of "mutual fulfilment, mutual conversion, mutual competition... by which all religions including Christianity march towards fulfilment in the Total Christ which is the Kingdom." See The Salvific Value of Non-Christian Religions According to Asian Christian Theologians Writing in Asian-published Theological Journals 1965-1970, ed. Asandas Balchand (Manila: East Asian Pastoral Institute, 1973). For another notable contribution by Aloysius Pieris, see "Western Christianity and Asian Buddhism: A Theological Reading of Historical Encounters," (Dialogue New Series 7 No 2 [May-August, 1980]: 49-85).

1 Editorializing in Dialogue, Aloysius Pieris sees Dharmasiri's work as a ruthless critique of Christianity: "Its tone is polemical, its language provocative and its purpose apologetical. " However, Pieris goes on to say: "But Dr. Dharmasiri is perhaps the first Buddhist thinker in Sri Lanka who has taken Christian theology with academic seriousness. This is something Christians have long been waiting for... The contextual theology which we must construct in a Buddhist milieu can never become a reality till Buddhist scholars begin to bring present day theology into a crisis point. Dr. Dharmasiri, for all we know, has already begun the process for us." See "A Buddhist Critique and a Christian Response," Dialogue New Series 2, No. 3 (November-December 1975), pp. 83-85.

standpoint of early Buddhism. The next contribution by Dr. Shanta Ratnayake, Lecturer in Philosophy and Religion at the University of Georgia, sets out in detail an exposition of the idea of Perfection and the way to Perfection as found in the Buddhist way of "Insight-Wisdom" expounded by Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga*, and the Christian way of "Faith" as expounded in *The Works of John Wesley*. He draws out both the comparisons and contrasts of the spiritual itinerary that a Buddhist or Christian may take in the pursuit of the summit of perfection.¹

Finally we have the Thai Bhikku, Ven. Buddhadasa Indapanno, making his contribution in the fifth series of the Sinclair Thompson Memorial Lectures on Christianity and Buddhism. His contribution is of special significance in view of the close relationship between Thai and Sri Lankan Buddhism, and of De Silva's reply to Indapanno in his work, *Why Believe in God? The Christian Answer in Relation to Buddhism*.² The basis of Indapanno's approach to dialogue was that "The founders of all religions in the world were born to help man achieve perfection of which he is in need." In comparing Christianity with Buddhism the word "religion" should be defined as "'a system to observation and practice which binds men to the highest thing,' call it what you will--God or Nirvana." There is need of "a terminology of religious terms common to all religions" so that in fairness to each other the outer form of one religion could be compared with the outer form of the other, and the


inner essence with the inner essence. On this basis Indapanno finds many points in agreement between the New Testament and the Tripitaka, which in turn forms the basis of the Buddhist attitude towards Christianity. Since Christ "laid special stress on action or practice of the commandment," he concludes that both Christianity and Buddhism "are religions of action--to be done by oneself." And so,"in this way both religions are in agreement in all respects."^1

With this survey of Buddhist-Christian dialogue in Sri Lanka we must now see De Silva's theological stance in its perspective. The dialogical approach following the pattern of the Incarnation was an attempt by the church to take a form that would not be alien to the Buddhist culture. It confronted the church with a new set of challenges and problems, as David Young has so aptly stated: "Through dialogue one begins to discover what the Church might look like if it were to take a Ceylonese shape. But it is by no means easy to decide in what ways the Church should absorb the culture in which it is set and in what ways it should remain distinctive."^2 The question is fraught with larger and more difficult problems when it takes place at the level of doctrinal teaching and conceptual thought, the more usual sphere for which the term "dialogue" is used. De Silva, whose writings enter into this discussion of beliefs and ideas with Buddhism, insists that despite the dangers and difficulties involved, if Christianity is to be authentic to its calling, there is no alternative to incarnational dialogue:

The grain of wheat must fall into the native soil; it must die; it must take root in that soil; it must grow and bring forth its own fruit. What we need is not Christianity in Burma or Thailand or Ceylon. What we need is Burmese Christianity, Thai Christianity and Ceylonese Christianity.  

It is to a consideration of De Silva's own theology, an Asian theology that derives from the particular dialogue situation of Sri Lanka, that this study has been devoted. As the capstone of his speech at the WCC General Assembly in Nairobi, De Silva claimed that "above all, dialogue is essential for us to discover the Asian face of Jesus Christ." He is not content that Asians should live in imported shells of Western confessions, but he wants theology in Asia to have its own identity. His dialogical concerns arose out of existential contact with Sri Lankan Buddhism and thus an Asian theology must result from specific Asian historical contexts and be related to the particular socio-cultural and religious factors of the dialogue situation. Walls of separation built up through the fear of syncretism and by "out-moded theological pre-suppositions" must be broken down, thus he maintains "radical new thinking is necessary, which, to those in teutonic captivity may appear heretical." As to the risk of heresy as the gospel is allowed to take its own shape in diverse Asian contexts, he holds with John A. T. Robinson, the Bishop of Woolwich, that there is "more danger

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2. Breaking Barriers. p. 73.

in static doctrinal fundamentalism than in most heresy." An authentic Asian theology must confront the limited perspective of Western theologians who did their thinking in Christian surroundings. Thus De Silva's comprehensive statement of the theological basis for his restatement of Christian thought in relation to Theravada Buddhist thought deserves our careful attention as we set out to specify the aims and scope of this study:

Theology is a living thing and has to do with our very existence as human beings in a particular situation and therefore must be related to the traditional beliefs, classical expressions of faith, and cultural forms. Theology is not an intellectual activity that takes place in the seclusion of a classroom, but a human activity that takes place in a culture; it is not a theoretical science with a fixed structure of thought applicable to all times and all places, but one that is dynamic and mobile and adaptable to changing circumstances. Of course there are elements of constancy and continuity and an unchanging content in any theology, but the form or the mode undergoes change in relation to the context. Authentic, living theology arises from an interplay between the "Logos" and the culture in which it seeks to express itself. The theologian, being part of the culture, cannot but speak from its context and in its terms.

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De Silva has written extensively on inter-religious dialogue describing its basic premises, its historical dimensions, its goals, and "the rules of the game." His address to the WCC General Assembly at Nairobi in 1975 may be considered his manifesto on dialogue as it represents his mature thinking on the subject. It is a restatement of his basic thesis, a summary of the underlying propositions of his dialogical approach, and a powerful assertion of the significance and importance of dialogue in the Asian context. Stated as a polemic against the paralyzing fear of syncretism which inhibited dialogue, he advances three fundamental propositions:

1. Dialogue does not in anyway diminish full and loyal commitment to one's own faith, but rather enriches and strengthens it.
2. Dialogue, far from being a temptation to syncretism, is a safeguard against it, because in dialogue we get to know one another's faith in depth. One's own faith is tested and refined and sharpened thereby. The real test of faiths is faiths-in-relation.
3. Dialogue is a creative interaction which liberates a person from a closed or cloistered system to which he happens to belong by an accident of birth, and elevates him to spiritual freedom giving him a vision of wider dimensions of spiritual life by his sharing in the spirituality of others.¹

In the latter part of his Nairobi address De Silva makes a case for the necessity of dialogue in an Asian context characterized by

¹Breaking Barriers pp. 72, 73.
religious pluralism. Dialogue he says, is urgent and essential to
rid Christianity of its image as an aggressive and militant religion
which has obscured the gospel and made Jesus Christ "appear as a
Western Christian of an affluent society." Dialogue is also essential
because misunderstandings and prejudices of the past, caused by the
negative and exclusivistic attitude of Christians to other faiths,
has made proclamation ineffective and irrelevant. There is a need to
create a healthy atmosphere "where we can receive as well as give,
listen as well as proclaim." Finally, dialogue is therefore seen as
being supremely essential "to discover the Asian face of Jesus Christ
as the suffering servant, so that the Church itself may be set free
from its institutional self-interest and play the role of a servant in
building community--the community of love or the kingdom of God."¹

**Dialogical Approach, Leitmotifs, and
"the Rules of the Game"

The extreme difficulties of Buddhist-Christian dialogue in
the Sri Lankan setting are epitomized in the reply of a learned Buddhist
monk to an invitation by De Silva to speak at a meeting organized to
promote inter-religious dialogue:

I see no common ground where we could meet. While Christ-
ianity takes its stand on faith, Buddhism takes its stand
on reason: while Christianity depends on divine revelation,
Buddhism depends on human intelligence. The God of Christ-
ianity is a divine being who became human; the God of
Buddhism is a human being who became divine. Christianity
talks from heaven, Buddhism talks from earth. We start from
different premises. The situation being such, I wonder if
we could truly communicate. Our efforts to meet might look

¹Ibid.
like the monkey trying to kiss its fiancee through a glass wall. The screen of dogma stands between us.\footnote{1}

This statement is for De Silva an example of the ignorance which has led people of different faiths to believe that dialogue is impossible. It also vividly describes the tragic relationship between the two religions resulting from the foreign rulers attitude of superiority. The conclusion by Buddhists and Christians that there is no common ground on which to meet results in claims of exclusiveness, disputes, and clashes. De Silva nevertheless contends that even with a religion like Theravada Buddhism which denies the basic tenets of Christianity, dialogue helps to "dissipate this mist of ignorance and discover areas of agreement."\footnote{2} The task before Christians and Buddhists is to penetrate this screen of dogma in the common search for community, and to be open to be addressed by those who belong to the other faith. As a result of the fear of syncretism, Christians have built walls to protect themselves from what they call "non-Christian", resulting in "an unchristian ghettoism", "a segregated spirituality that stinks", and a church which has become "a lonely crowd in a crowded world." Outmoded theological presuppositions within the Christian community, ill-informed attitudes, and predetermined judgments have isolated Christians, and the task before them now is to break down these walls "so that we can be truly Christian."\footnote{3}

\footnote{1}{"Dialogue a Matter of Necessity," p. 10.}
\footnote{2}{Ibid.}
\footnote{3}{"Freedom From Teutonic Captivity," p. 2.}
A Holistic Approach

De Silva's dialogical stance is the fruit of a practised theology of dialogue, though he often uses Buberian categories to describe it. In his explication of dialogue in the I-Thou relationship, he has stressed the need of mutuality, a kind of believing-in-love, and a concerned openness in which human authenticity is experienced. The presence of the Buddhist monk's "screen of dogma", which prevents communication and meeting in love, is a lamentable situation because man, as Martin Buber has pointed out, is "neither organic nor rational, but dialogic," and "becomes an authentic being only in a living relation with other individuals." For De Silva, "meeting in love or being engaged by the faith of others is the central meaning of dialogue."

Thus to fail to enter into dialogue, which is seen as the most really human of all relationships, is to ignore "the imperative of love that makes dialogue imperative." To remain walled in by dogmas, creeds, confessions, and prejudices "is not only a denial of authentic living but also a falsification of the faith one professes, because love (maitriya in Buddhism, Agape in Christianity) is central in all religions." Thus he sees the need for dialogue on three inter-related levels:

1. Intellectual, where conceptual clarification and understanding of the teaching of different religions is sought.
2. Experiential, where we seek to share one another's spiritual experiences for mutual enrichment.
3. Socio-political, where in developing nations there is a common search for community, for a just and stable society and for peace, justice and development.

Eric Sharpe and Richard W. Taylor, theoreticians of dialogue who have outlined types of dialogue similar to the levels described by De Silva, have observed that in praxis sharp dichotomies have been placed between the different types. For Taylor, the dialogue which is usually planned and achieved between churchmen and men of other faiths is discursive dialogue. He sees this as the typically Western approach, "In the Western tradition this is the dominant strain. It involves abstraction and analysis through the use of common sets of categories or symbols." He clearly sees discursive dialogue as often being almost the exact opposite of "Buberian dialogue," and it results in a "crippling situation" comparable to the Buddhist monk's "screen of dogma":

This is because there is an important sense in which intellectualizing in terms of categories becomes a putting up of thought processes as a screen between man and man whereas the major facet of buberian dialogue is that it seeks to explicate a relation of loving openness between man and man.¹

Reacting to Taylor, Eric Sharpe maintains that due to the variety of pre-suppositions that underlie the use of the word "dialogue," the mere use of the word does not ensure agreement as to its precise meaning. There is a need for some semantic tidying up, and so he says, "I agree with Richard Taylor that there is potential conflict in principles between discursive and human (or 'Buberian') dialogue, though I do not agree that the achievement of discursive dialogue only is necessarily a 'crippling situation.'"² Thus Sharpe distinguishes between discursive dialogue which "involves meeting, listening and


discussion on the level of mutual competent intellectual inquiry," and human dialogue which is based on the I-Thou relationship, in which the important activity is to "penetrate divisive doctrinal and ideological rationalizations in order to get to the root of the matter—the fact that man is meeting man." Nevertheless, for Sharpe, being occupied only with discursive dialogue is not a "crippling situation." And instead of becoming, as Taylor sees it, "a screen between man and man," discursive dialogue is "our only key to the understanding of what men actually believe—as opposed to what we would like them to believe."

De Silva's own approach does not proceed on such sharply divided lines precisely because it developed in an unstructured way out of the needs of his particular dialogical situation. While in agreement with Sharpe's emphasis on the importance of discursive dialogue, De Silva's holistic approach avoids the pitfalls of Taylor's "crippling situation." Thus, De Silva observes, that while some seek to avoid dialogue on the intellectual level, as it is at this level that tensions and clashes on ultimate issues can arise, others feel that "honest intellectual confrontations are mutually enriching," and "a healthy dialectical tension is a good thing and if carefully handled can be used creatively." This approach is therefore able to appreciate the precise nature of the dialogue partner's beliefs, and is a safeguard from what Sharpe sees as the great weakness that besets a purely 'human'

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1 Ibid., pp. 82-83.
2 Ibid., p. 91.
approach in dialogue, i.e., "a tendency to treat the 'partner in
dialogue' as an abstraction, separable from his cultural, intellectual
and religious setting." De Silva also includes the 'Socio-political
level' with its emphasis that the solution of pressing social issues
must be accomplished by dialogue between men of various faiths. This
holistic view of dialogue is, as De Silva's experience indicates, the
result of an awareness that comes from living in day-to-day contact
with other religions, and sharply contrasts with the Western emphasis
on an almost exclusively discursive dialogue. He therefore explicitly
warns against the compartmentalization of the dialogue experience:
"The confrontation of minds for intellectual understanding, the meeting
of hearts for spiritual enrichment and the joining of hands for social
upliftment are all aspects of human experience which cannot be separated
from one another. One must be buttressed by the others."^2

Commitment

If De Silva opened his Nairobi address affirming that full and
loyal commitment to one's own faith is strengthened rather than dimin­
ished by dialogue, it is because for him "genuine dialogue can take
place only between committed people." Commitment to one's own religious
vision does not, however, preclude openness to that of others; rather De Silva
maintains, that, "Partners in dialogue while being deeply committed to
their respective faiths must be open to the insights of others."^3

^1 "Goals of Inter-Religious Dialogue," p. 84.
^3 "What Is Dialogue?" Dialogue New Series 1, No. 1 (January-April
He recognizes that every religion has its "jealousies," i.e., those points at which the adherents of every religion claim a universal significance and finality.

For instance the Muslims claim that the Holy Q'ran is not just another revelation but is God's word. The Jews claim that Israel's covenant with God and her attachment to the Holy Land has a central significance in the determinate purpose of God. The Christians claim that in the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, God has acted decisively for all mankind.

Thus a fact which needs to be recognized, accepted and respected is that dialogue partners are "committed people having specific convictions at the heart of their allegiance." This commitment is not however inimical to dialogue, because "the hard core of commitment need not constitute an impenetrable screen of dogma; rather, mutual understanding of one another's convictions can lead to a breakthrough into deeper commitment without being imprisoned in systems of thought, dogma or tradition." The end-result of this holding together of commitment and openness is meeting (emphasis De Silva's), i.e., genuine meeting resulting in authentic human existence. And since "genuine meeting is based on trust, mutual acceptance and respect for each other's convictions and integrity," dialogue becomes, for De Silva, "neither an encounter of porcupines nor a coming together of jelly fish, but a meeting of persons."2

Meaningful dialogue between committed partners results in genuine meeting but always entails risk. However, for De Silva, it is the only viable answer to the twin fears of syncretism and the betrayal

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of mission. It has been found to be in practice the most effective safeguard against syncretism: "We have discovered that the more openly religious dialogue is conducted, the more clearly the specific differences of the Christian Gospel emerge."\(^1\) It is not dialogue that blunts proclamation but the lack of it. Dialogue inevitably involves risk, but it is the inescapable means of proclaiming the Gospel in an authentic manner in the multi-religious Asian context:

Where we cannot enter into a meaningful relationship with others, meaningful proclamation of the Gospel becomes impossible. Where there is no authentic living the authentic notes of the Gospel will not be heard. How can we proclaim the love of God if we do not love our neighbours? If we are not prepared to listen to what people of other faiths have to say to us, how can we expect them to listen to what we have to say to them? In such a situation effective proclamation becomes irrelevant and well-nigh impossible. Proclamation without meeting in love is a noisy gong or a clanging symbol.\(^2\)

In answer to the query of a Buddhist participant at a Buddhist-Christian consultation in Pilimatalawa, Sri Lanka, De Silva draws attention to the fact that both the Buddhist and the Christian do indeed take proclamation seriously. The Buddhist sought to know what Christians hoped to achieve through dialogue: "Does this mean that it is the firm intention of the Christian Church to baptize people of all nations into Christianity so that in the end there will be only Christians in the world and no people of other faiths?"\(^3\) In


\(^2\)Ibid.

\(^3\)Lynn A. de Silva, "Proselytism," Dialogue New Series 4, Nos. 1 & 2 (January-August 1977): p. 37. The question arose from a discussion centering on a statement from the Nairobi section report, "Seeking Community: The Common Search of People of Various Faiths, Cultures and Ideologies": "We are all agreed that the Great Commission of Jesus Christ which asks us to go out into all the world and
De Silva argued that Christians take Christ's commission in Matthew 28:19 as seriously as the Buddhists take Buddha's commission, "Preach, O Bhikkus, the doctrine which is glorious in the beginning, glorious at the end, in spirit and in letter. Proclaim a consummate, perfect and pure life of holiness..." He further cites the pledge taken by the delegates to the first World Buddhist Fellowship held in Kandy, Sri Lanka, in 1950, in obedience to this Commission: "To strive with might and main to make known the sublime doctrine of the Buddha, so that its benign spirit of service may pervade the whole world." He says there should be no objection to Buddhists winning converts in all parts of the world by proclaiming the Buddha Dhamma.

In fact to "strive with might and main to make known the sublime" teaching of the faith one holds is a sure sign of vitality of that religion. This "should not in any way be abandoned or betrayed, disobeyed or compromised", whatever maybe the religion: ... Just as Buddhists would be happy to receive converts to Buddhism, so Christians would be happy to receive converts to Christianity.

In the light of his view of dialogue as "a genuine meeting based on trust and mutual acceptance," De Silva accepts the risk of dialogue in which each dialogue partner is prepared to have his most cherished and basic convictions about religion challenged. As R. Panikkar notes, "This love-understanding of the neighbour is risky; it involves the possibility of one's own conversion so strongly that one's

— make disciples of all nations, and to baptize them in the Triune Name, should not be abandoned or betrayed, disobeyed or compromised, neither should it be misused. Dialogue is both a matter of hearing and understanding the faith of others, and also of witnessing to the gospel of Jesus Christ."

1Ibid., p. 38.
previous beliefs may be greatly changed or even superseded.¹ For Panikkar dialogue becomes a religious act par excellence at the point when the intra-religious dialogue begins, i.e., "when the two views meet head-on inside oneself, when dialogue prompts genuine religious pondering, and even a religious crisis, at the bottom of a Man's heart; when interpersonal dialogue turns into intrapersonal soliloquy."² De Silva argues that such genuine religious conversions are not at odds with the Gospel commission as Jesus desired converts and not proselytes:

Jesus sternly condemned proselytism. "Woe to you Scribes and Pharisees, hypocrites" He said, "for you traverse sea and land to make one single proselyte, you make him twice as much a child of hell as yourselves" (Matthew 23:15).

In Jesus' Temptations too we see that He rejected proselytism, (Matt. 4: 1-11). He refused to win people by material inducements or by doing sensational things or by using worldly power or influence. Never did He coerce people to follow Him. Like the Buddha who sent out His disciples to preach the Dhamma so Jesus sent His disciples to proclaim the Good News and there is not the slightest hint anywhere not even in the Great Commission that He encouraged proselytism.³

Like Jesus, Gautama too did not make proselytes or encourage cheap discipleship. De Silva describes the practice in vogue at the time of the Buddha's preaching ministry. Bands of religious seekers engaged in debates explaining and defending their faith, and when a flaw was revealed the loser was expected to follow the victor's religion.

²Ibid., pp. 8-9.
³"Proselytism," p. 38. De Silva seems to imply a substantive difference between the terms "convert" and "proselyte". Proselyte is evidently used pejoratively, like the epithet "rice-Christian", in contrast to the making of disciples who were convinced converts.
Citing an instance of Gautama's concern to make only convinced converts, De Silva points to the spirit of tolerance, charity, and freedom characteristic of the dialogues of the Buddha:

The Buddhawon many converts in this way for, unlike other teachers, he had the amazing ability for detecting and pointing out erroneous thinking. Yet he never disparaged another faith nor coerced the loser to follow him. This is clearly seen from the story of Upali the millionaire, a follower of Niganta Nathaputta. After a discussion with the Buddha he was convinced of the truth of the Dhamma and decided to follow the Buddha. But the Buddha advised him first to make a thorough investigation and come to a decision of his own free will. After he became a devotee of the Buddha, he was encouraged to continue his charity to the disciples of his former teacher.¹

Conversions then, are not to be influenced by extraneous factors. They occur beyond the stage of increased understanding and mutual enrichment. Since they are a response to truth-claims, both partners must enter the dialogue as fully committed members of their own religious traditions. Only full commitment ensures the integrity of inter-faith dialogue and results in genuine conversion and not merely a more subtle and sophisticated form of proselytism.

Community

Central to the objectives of dialogue is the task of building community. De Silva places dialogue in the context of the common human search for community at the local, national, and international levels. Its positive purpose is "to affirm the unity of mankind, understand our responsibility to one another and harness all resources for living together in community."² Attention is drawn to the need for dialogue

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in the light of the irreversible empirical fact that we live in a pluralistic world in which many religions exist, and therefore must learn to live together in peace and harmony. Thus dialogue seeks to promote racial and social harmony, generate a universal consciousness, and most importantly to create "an atmosphere in which people of different religious convictions can live together in openness and mutual respect working together for the building up of a world community."2

In the quest for new human relationships that go beyond the economic and political structures, De Silva emphasizes the special role of religion. Millions have been disillusioned with religion, seen it as a divisive force, and turned to science. People of different religious faiths can no longer live in a state of mutual warfare and rivalry. Alluding to Arnold Toynbee's observation on the failure of materialism and nature's need to "turn to the realm of the spirit for satisfying man's hunger for infinity," De Silva calls on men of different religious communities "to serve a community creating role." This role is described as participation in an effort to recreate human community by bringing in the spiritual insights of all religions and ideologies to that participation.3

In one of his lengthier editorials, which he significantly titles "Holy Worldliness" (using Dietrich Bonhoeffer's striking

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3Ibid., pp. 2-3.
expression by which he denoted a simultaneous involvement in this world through participation in a reality that takes one beyond this world), De Silva explores the relevance of religion to the quest for world community. The issues addressed are from the discussions of the fifth Christian-Buddhist encounter in Sri Lanka. Issues raised by science and technology, the challenge of new models of society based on ideologies like Marxism, and the question of spirituality, i.e., "the spirituality of the secular" which challenges the traditional notions of the 'spiritual,' are dealt with. On the one hand, religion has become unreal with its other-worldliness, and on the other, "this-worldly secular ideologies" tend to make everything, including man, a means to an end. The need is for these two approaches, religion and secularity, to meet, correct, and supplement each other--i.e., religion serving secularity by guarding it from being inhuman, and in turn being protected by secularity from unreality. Therefore, "If religions preach a way of life as a private passport to heaven they will have no relevance to this world. If religious virtues cannot be translated into social values they are more than useless." Citing several examples of Marxist humanism, De Silva points out that it is being increasingly recognized that "human nature is not simply the product of social existence, but has a deeper personal dimension." This need of man to go beyond himself so that he reaches a spiritual dimension of life is also true of Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru's scientific humanism. The Buddhist insight of the need of a spiritual struggle to overcome the root-conditions of lust (lobha), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha) is placed alongside the Christian insight of losing oneself in order to find oneself, i.e., of
becoming an authentic being by eliminating selfishness. The ultimate goal in the search for community, the goal to which man can move away from himself, can be called Nirvana or the kingdom of God.¹

In another editorial on community, this time basing his comments on the discussions at the "Theological consultation on Dialogue in Community" held at Chiang Mai, Thailand, 1977, De Silva points out that the goal of world community is neither syncretistic nor in conflict with the objectives of mission. The traditional Christian view of the end as an ingathering of all peoples into the Christian church, he maintains, has not allowed us to look over our self-protective fences. However, as the Buddhist proverb ("When a finger points to the moon it is foolish to look at the finger") indicates, there is a need for proper perspective. Dialogue breaks down these fences and becomes the means of achieving community while at the same time it guards against losing one's religious identity or the specificity of one's faith. "Any religion worth its salt must not only preserve its saltiness, but also seek ways of adding its undiluted flavour to the emerging world community, to which the finger points." When dialogue is used as an evangelistic means of accomplishing the dream of baptizing everyone into the Christian church, it becomes "the python approach" to other religions, "the python spews saliva on its prey before swallowing it." This type of mission has no place in a pluralistic world as it refuses to accept the fact that other religions also have a mission.²


De Silva is concerned with defining the task before the religions in today's pluralistic world in which the visible boundaries of traditional religious communities are fast breaking down. The task is the achievement of "complementarity" which results in the discovery of a framework of values which can coexist with other faiths. Claims made by people of different faiths should not be in opposition, "but in complementarity with whatever is good, true and noble in each religion." This "complementarity" finds a distinct congruity with "the sharing in the spirituality of others" theme of his Nairobi address: "Part of the nature of this complementarity will be a re-assessed and renewed understanding of one another's religion." The direction in which the finger points is towards "a kind of symbiosis" in which people of all faiths could coordinate their resources to build community.¹ The realization of mankind's search for community in which authentic living is possible requires the contribution of all religions:

The religious life of man should not be regarded as mutually exclusive systems but as dimensions of a universal spirituality. Therefore all spiritual experience in its various manifestations must be given full recognition in our theologies which cannot remain exclusive any longer but must be global in outlook. We need to adopt a catholic humanitarian world view; we need to realize that the convergence of all spiritual traditions is essential to the future of man and society.²

This is, however, not a sanction to absorb the spirituality of other religions without critical study, and De Silva insists on making it clear that the world community that is envisaged is not a syncretistic

¹"Turn to 'Community' as the Focus," p. 2.
amalgamation: "The purpose of dialogue is not to seek for the lowest common denominator; not to create a Parliament of Religions; not to work towards one world religion."¹ Neither does it mean "the absorption of all world religions into one world religion. It is not a fruit-salad of religions put together. The one world will be typified by unity as well as diversity." Employing the terms "labelled religion" and "global religion", De Silva maintains the inclusivity of, and complementarity between, religion in its particular form and the global vision. The universal and the particular aspects of the religions are consistently held together, and even though it is not possible to say what the one world will finally look like, "it is important to stress that each religious tradition must be kept distinctive while it reaches for universal diffusion among all men. It is essential that these be concrete expressions of the one religious world."²

The theme of search for community through dialogue, which is a fundamental aspect of De Silva's theology, must await a fuller development in the next chapter in which writings such as his definitive work The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity³ is considered. That he assigns a theological basis to the current meeting of world religions and ideologies and the movement toward one inter-dependent humanity, and that it is central to his concept of mission is clear.


³ The Problem of the Self in Buddhism and Christianity (New York: Barnes and Noble, 1979). See especially chapter 12—"The Kingdom of God--Community of Love."
We must have the wisdom to understand the signs of our time and to discern God's activity outside the institutional Church and in the revolutionary process, and go forward hand in hand with others to build a new world order. We can no longer look at each other through a glass wall, and stand aloof from what is happening all around us. A major part of our mission is to break down that wall and join hands with others in our search for community and for a better world.1

The Rules of the Game

An indispensable ingredient for authentic dialogue, De Silva maintains, is that the participants are able to enter into the "game" with a genuine openness because a basic mutuality has been found with regard to the "rules." It is when the encounter is truly religious that dialogue is fruitful, for when committed participants meet with a genuine openness to truth it always entails the risk of conversion. To consent to this mutual openness, i.e., one which accepts the risk of conversion either to particular beliefs or the religion of the other, is to play the game fairly. Note De Silva's definition of openness in this context:

Openness means being penetrable or accessible to one another; it implies a willingness to subject oneself to a process of mutual correction and learning. This involves critical appreciation and balanced judgment based on sober criticism pursued in a rational manner with modesty, respect and charity.2

In his editorial in the initial issue of Dialogue, De Silva advances the two basic rules, or "underlying general principles", which are applicable to dialogue in any context: "the disposition to listen," and "the ability to speak." The raison d'etre of the journal

Dialogue, the editorial claims, "is to foster among Christians a desire for an adequate and sympathetic understanding of Buddhism so that we could listen with sympathy and 'speak the truth in love.'" Applying the rules to his own dialogue situation, De Silva underlines the importance of the mutuality that should be found between Christians and Buddhists if dialogue which is both creative and genuine is to be achieved.

The simple truth is that no creative dialogue is possible unless we speak in terms that the other can understand, and how else can this be done except by a sympathetic understanding of the beliefs and practices and habits of thought of those with whom we are engaged in dialogue, and in our context it means the Buddhists among whom we live. The purpose of this knowledge is not simply to collect objective data about Buddhism, but to understand our Buddhist brethren better so that we may be understood better by them. This is the sovereign cure for Avidya (ignorance) which is the root cause of conflict and disputation.¹

In November 1963, De Silva attended a talk by Gunaseela Vitanage, secretary of the Bauddha Jatika Balavegaya (Buddhist National Movement), on the subject "The Search for the Historical Jesus." At this meeting De Silva replied to some of the issues raised in Vitanage's talk and subsequently dialogued with Vitanage in the columns of the Ceylon Daily News and Dialogue. He has drawn attention to the manner in which these dialogical exchanges were conducted. Unlike Buddhist-Christian controversies of earlier times, they were free of acrimony and invective, thus he perceives a true spirit of dialogue. Noting that the criticism of religious beliefs is often construed as a personal attack, and that these beliefs "are so much a part of our associative-emotional mind," De Silva points

out that the success of this and future dialogues depends on a care­ful adherence to the twin rules of "listening" and "speaking".

Dialogue therefore calls for a "delicate sensitivity on both sides", and the ability to listen with sympathy and understanding and speak the truth in love. We are glad that this discussion on the historicity of Jesus Christ has preserved the essential elements of dialogue and we hope that with such dialogues as this a new era in Buddhist-Christian relationships will begin.¹

When sensitive listening and speaking in love take place, both partners submit themselves selflessly to the dialogue experience. Nothing is preplanned or orchestrated, truth is permitted to come to light. De Silva takes pains, therefore, to explore the wealth of meaning in the term "dialogue" and to define what it is and what it is not, as well as to reiterate the foundational nature of the basic rules.

Dialogue is not a pleasant conversation, nor a controversy nor a negotiation nor an argument. Dialogue is a discussion, verbal or written, in a sincere effort to reach mutual understanding. It is an earnest effort to appreciate the truth in the other's convictions. It is not an attempt to make compromises in order to appear to be modest, but a frank facing of our agreements and differences. Dialogue therefore involves an openness to listen and a disposition to speak—to listen with sympathy and interest to the extent of being affected by what we hear and to speak with modesty and respect in a way the other can understand.²

De Silva has spelled out the implications of the disposition to listen and the ability to speak for the Christian and the Church. He speaks of the "assumptive power" of the Church, i.e., of the ability "to take into itself the treasures in other religions and


²Why Can't I Save Myself? The Christian Answer in Relation to Buddhist Thought (Colombo: Christian Study Centre-Division for Buddhist Studies, 1966), p. i.
bring them into full fruition in Christ." It is through this assump­tive power that the Church becomes a microcosm of the divine common­wealth. By functioning as a catalyst, it enables all religions to develop those elements that promote the growth of the divine common­wealth within their own culture. The task of the Church is to exer­cise reverent care and generous appreciation in the study of the specific features of other religions to see what they might contri­bute to the fullness of the Christian faith. Thus he spells out what the "listening" and "speaking" of true dialogue involves:

(a) We should be able to lay ourselves open to the deepest influences coming from people of other faiths, and become one with them in mind and spirit.
(b) We should be able to see things through the eyes of Buddha or Confucius and others who searched for the solu­tion to the riddle of existence.
(c) We need to learn the language they speak and under­stand their modes of thought in order to open up lines of communication.
(d) In certain cases it will be our duty to lead non­Christians into a deeper understanding of their own faith and encourage them to live their own faith better, so that they could reach their best and bring their wealth to en­rich world community. 1

As we go on to consider De Silva's estimate of a resurgent Buddhism and its apologetic claims, and the application of the "rules," his dialogical approach must be viewed in the historical perspective of the Buddhist-Christian encounter in Sri Lanka. We turn now, there­fore, to De Silva's reflections which provide this perspective from within his own Christian community.

"The Early Period" and "The Modern Approach"

Commenting on the Buddhist monk's striking simile of "the screen of dogma" that separates Christianity and Buddhism, De Silva acknowledges the existence of a state of "theological apartheid." Christians are held largely responsible for this negative attitude toward Buddhism, which has in turn evoked a negative response. Noting the antipathy evoked by the rejection of Buddhism as a false religion, he points out that Christians have not as yet fully recovered from the damage that has been done.\(^1\) In his essay, "Encounter with Buddhism", De Silva has traced the transition to a more positive attitude to Buddhism from within the history of Methodism in Sri Lanka, providing an useful insight into the background of his own dialogical method.\(^2\)

In his account of "the early period," i.e., from the arrival of the first Wesleyan missionaries in 1814 to the Edinburgh Conference of 1910, the attitude of Methodist missionaries to Buddhism is described as "radical exclusivism."\(^3\) The two main factors which conditioned the attitude of the earliest Methodist missionaries were the background of their missionary theology and the prevailing state of religion in the country. Since the missionary theology held that Christianity was the only true religion and all other religions were pagan and false, Buddhism was considered a particular brand of paganism.


\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 570-574.
The belief that with the expansion of the "Christian West" the "heathen religions" would be overthrown preparing the way for the kingdom of God was also part of this theology. The presence of demonism, superstition, and slavery in the country convinced the exclusivistic missionaries that all religions were pagan and confirmed their uncompromising and exclusive attitude. It was the polemical thrust of their writings, and the Buddhist response to them, that led to the Buddhist-Christian controversies climaxing in the Panadura Debate of 1873. Significantly, one of the ten conditions of the debate was that "Christians should try in their talks to prove that Buddhism is false, and Buddhists should likewise try to prove that Christianity is false."¹

Contrasted with the negative approach of the early period is the transition to a new outlook in what De Silva terms "the modern approach."² The influences that brought about this transition could be summed up under two headings: (1) the availability of a better

¹Ibid. This condemnatory attitude was not directed to the Buddhists themselves, while paganism was denounced, "men--to whatever faith they belonged--were valued as persons who were to be saved, because Christ died for them." De Silva also notes that the works of Gogerly, Hardy, and Ward, the three greatest Methodist missionary scholars, included scholarly descriptive writings in addition to polemical ones. They undertook a serious study of the religion and sought a true and accurate exposition of the Buddhist texts. The two strands that characterized their work were scholarly restraint and evangelical passion, thus "They never allowed their scholarship to be blurred or coloured by their evangelical zeal, neither did they allow their evangelism to be based on ignorance and prejudice." However, it was their polemical works which exhibited a spirit of arrogance that had a negative impact on Buddhist-Christian relations. Hardy wrote, "Turning from Buddha to Christ is like passing away from deep darkness to the most intense light." Gogerly regarded Buddhism as "a citadel of Satan's kingdom," and his book Kristiyani Prajnapti is described by De Silva as "a violent attack on Buddhism and an uncompromising defence of Christianity."

²Ibid., pp. 574-579.
knowledge of Buddhism in the West, and (2) the emergence of a new missionary approach. The first was brought about through the translations of Rhys Davids; the work of German scholars; Edwin Arnold's *The Light of Asia*; and, the missionary activity of Buddhists like Anagarika Dharmapala in the West. The second resulted from the influence of Hocking and the school of thought which believed in the unity of all religions; the recognition at Edinburgh 1910 that other religions, however limited, were also light-bearers; and, the Tambaram debate in 1938 on how to correlate the content of the Christian Kerygma with the religious and cultural context in which it was proclaimed. The two outstanding figures exemplifying this new approach were A. Stanley Bishop, the first Methodist missionary to catch the spirit of this new attitude, and D. T. Niles, the Sri Lankan contributor. Both Bishop and Niles sought "to find meaning for Buddhist concepts in the Christian context, and restate the Christian message in a way that would carry meaning for the Buddhists."

This historical perspective of Buddhist-Christian relations from within his own Christian communion constitutes an useful basis for understanding De Silva and his stance toward Buddhism and his estimate of it. In his own work, and that of the Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, we find the developed expression of "the modern approach." It is thus aptly pointed out that,

The basic assumption of the early period was that there are no contact points between Christianity and Buddhism. The characteristic of the modern period is the growing feeling that there are contact points between the two religions, and consequently the main drive of the thinking of this period is the search for a common basis on which dialogue is possible.¹

¹Ibid., p. 574.
In De Silva's constant quest of a common basis through meeting with Buddhist representatives, we see a practised theology of dialogue emerge.

Estimate of Buddhism

In his introductory remarks at Nairobi, De Silva stated that the age of disputation was over and the age of dialogue had begun. He sees the painful period of controversy as being virtually over and finds Buddhists themselves taking the lead in the dialogue.¹

He has welcomed the initiative of Dr. Padmasiri de Silva, Head of the Department of Philosophy in the University of Sri Lanka, who affirms that a renewed understanding of one another's faith will result in the discovery of "a framework of values which can co-exist with other faiths as found in the pluralist structure of Sri Lanka."²

In response to both Buddhist and Christian initiatives to find this common basis, Lynn de Silva has made a serious appraisal of the Buddhist approach to dialogue.

Concept of Dialogue in Early Buddhism

De Silva has shown that the concept of inter-religious dialogue is rooted in Buddhism from the earliest times. He draws

¹The call to dialogue was initially received by Buddhists with the suspicions that it was motivated by the failure of Christians to reach their missionary objectives, and by a desire to curry favour with the Buddhists since the loss of their privileged status with the advent of Sri Lankan independence in 1948. Thus Buddhist participants at the first bi-lateral dialogues organized by the Study Center in 1963 could remark, "Dialogue is a subtle invitation to the 'heathen' fly to walk into the parlour of the 'Christian spider,'" and, "Christians are now trying to kiss the hand they failed to cut off." See "Dialogue in the Context of Sri Lanka Buddhism," p. 90.

attention to Gautama's tolerant approach which is specially evident in the Kalama Sutra. In the third century B.C., the Emperor Asoka "instituted the practice of what he called samavaya (which may very well be translated 'Dialogue'), that is the coming together of exponents of different religions in religious assemblies, evidently, that they may get to know each other better." The emperor also commended proficiency (bahusruta) in the scriptures of different faiths, the practice of vuccigutta or the restraint of criticism of other religious sects, "and the promotion of what constitutes the essence of all religions as their common good (mula)." With its irenic approach Buddhism spread rapidly, but when Buddhist missionaries went to China, Buddhism met with its first real test since "it had to compete with a highly developed civilization with strong philosophical traditions." Despite the friction and disputations that followed, it is considered significant that some form of dialogue (as is evident from the Chinese text Li Huo Lun, i.e., "Treatise on the Clarification of Doubts") emerged, and that Buddhism and the two Chinese religions were mutually enriched by the encounter.

The final result of the Buddhist missionary enterprise in China was a "Three in one" religion in which the fundamental elements of the two Chinese religions, Confucianism and Taoism, and the imported religion Buddhism, came to represent parts of a whole while remaining separate identifiable religious systems stimulating and enriching one another.

De Silva cites instances of the influence of the Buddha's teaching and Asokan edicts on Asian political leaders in an editorial commentary on the Non-aligned Nations Summit of 1976. The Sri Lankan Prime-Minister Srimavo Bandaranaike's quote from the Buddha's last discourse, the Mahaparinibbana sutta, "If we can meet together in concord, so long may we be expected, not to decline but to prosper," is
The history of the Christian encounter with Buddhism in Sri Lanka, it has been shown, was far from conducive to promoting dialogue. In its reinterpretation to meet the challenges of the modern world, Buddhism has posed a challenge to Christianity. De Silva suggests that the Christian response to the Buddhist challenge should take account of "(a) the claims made by Buddhists to the detriment of Christianity; (b) the main areas of disagreement and the possible solution to them; and (c) the specific questions facing Christians living in a Buddhist environment." This last aspect which has to do with the manner and form of the Christian message as it seeks to express itself in an indigenous culture, is discussed in the last section of this chapter. The second aspect refers to theological-philosophical or conceptual differences which receive detailed treatment in the next chapter. Of immediate import to our discussion of De Silva's estimate of Buddhism is the cognizance he takes of the the basis of the editorial, and is commended to people living in multi-religious and multi-racial contexts. The Indian Prime-Minister Indira Gandhi's use of an Asokan edict to explain the Indian notion of a secular state is an application of the principle of mutuality among the different religions in India today: "Secularism means neither irreligion or indifference to religion, but equal respect for all religions--not mere tolerance, but positive respect. Secularism demands constant self-examination and unceasing exertion. That great truth is inscribed on rocks by Asoka. That no man reverences his own religion unless he reverences others' religions also." He also finds it most encouraging that some leaders of third world countries which have emerged from colonial domination and exploitation, like Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, are deeply committed Christians. The evident implication is that Nyerere's political experiment of socialism, i.e., "Ujamaa" or Familialhood, in which Christian, Muslims and the followers of the traditional African religions are all part of the extended family, is an example of concord. See "Concord," Dialogue New Series 3, No. 2 (May-August 1976): 43-45.

Buddhist resurgence with its positive missionary outlook and his evaluation of Buddhist apologetics, as a prelude to our study of the response he makes to the claims made by Buddhists to the detriment of Christianity in their first major dialogical encounter.

Appeal of a Resurgent Buddhism

We have already noted De Silva's identification of the two dominant characteristics of Sri Lankan Buddhism, i.e., its religio-national solidarity and the Dhammadipa concept that Sri Lanka is the land favored by the Buddha for radiating the light of the Dhamma throughout the world.¹ He also draws attention to the new missionary dynamism of a resurgent Buddhism, resulting from a renewal of the missionary ideal of earliest Buddhism to meet the challenges of the modern world. This missionary outlook which is not merely international, but universal or cosmic, is traced back to Buddha's commission to his disciples to preach the Dhamma: "Go ye now, O Bhikkus, and wander for the gain of many, out of compassion for the world, for the good, for the gain and for the welfare of gods and men. Let not two of you go the same way. Preach, O Bhikkus, the doctrine..." The light of the Dhamma was for all worlds, "for the welfare of gods and men," thus giving the Buddhist missionary outlook a cosmic dimension. The Buddha is also depicted in several Nikayas as one "born into the world for the good of many, for the happiness of many, for the advantage, the good, the happiness of gods and men, out of compassion for the world." Thus De Silva concludes, "The Buddhists feel that it is their duty to fulfil this

¹See above, pp. 38-42.
mission. The consciousness of such a cosmic mission is by far the most powerful operative force in the Buddhist resurgence."¹

In describing the process of reinterpreting Buddhism to make it capable of becoming a world religion, four prominent themes have been traced in Buddhist apologetic literature.² First, Buddhism is presented as "the only religion capable of being the basis for world peace." To support this contention pointed reference is made to the two world wars fought among Christian nations, whereas in contrast "during the past two-thousand-five-hundred years of Buddhist history not one drop of blood was shed in the cause of Buddhism." Missionaries to Eastern countries are depicted as coming with imperialistic motives, "carrying the Bible in one hand and the sword in the other." Buddhism alone is posited as the solution since it teaches better than any other religion how Tanha (craving or desire), the root cause of evil, can be conquered by the practice of meditation and other ways of discipline. Second, it is claimed that truth

¹"Buddhist-Christian Dialogue," pp. 170-176. The activities of international Buddhist organizations to carry out this mission are described at length. The World Buddhist Fellowship founded in 1950 at the Temple of the Tooth in Kandy, Sri Lanka, resolved "to strive with all might and main to make known the sublime doctrine of the Buddha, so that its benign spirit of service and sacrifice may pervade the entire world." The Lanka Dhamma Duta Society is a special missionary agency for activity in Germany. The World Buddhist Sangha Council, founded in 1966 in Sri Lanka, has made a serious attempt to reconcile the Theravada and Mahayana schools of thought, and one of its major concerns "is to unite the different sects in Buddhism for more effective evangelism throughout the world." The activities of the Buddha Sasana Council established by an Act of Parliament in Burma in 1950 and the Thailand Religious Department to propagate world-wide Buddhist missions are also described. The Buddhist emphasis on vigourous inward preparation for their missionary endeavours is reflected in the numerous meditation centers that have been set up: "Meditation centres are considered to be the centers of power in Buddhism."

²Ibid., pp. 177-182.
of the Buddha Dhamma is scientifically and experimentally demonstrable. De Silva cites the contention of Dr. K. N. Jayatilleka, a leading Buddhist scholar, that science has not only controverted the specific dogmas of Western religion but also vitiated the general religious outlook on things, particularly the belief in a personal God. Buddhism, on the other hand, is not at variance with science, "so long as scientists confine themselves to their methodology and their respective fields without making a dogma of materialism."\(^1\) Not being a blind faith like Christianity, Buddhism is able to invite people to "come and see" (ehi passico). Third, since the primary aim of Buddhist missions is not conversion but the inculcation of Buddhist principles and the permeation of the world with the spirit of Buddhism, it is presented as "a universal religion without sectarian interests." Fourth, "Buddhism has an unrivalled social message." Apologetic claims and developments in this regard include; (a) the belief that the principles essential for a good and stable government, as outlined by the Buddha, are embodied in the Dasa-Raja-Dhamma or the Ten Duties of the King and have been exemplified in Asoka's reign; (b) the adaptation of the Buddha's message to fit into a socialist framework with the emphasis on the Bodhisattva ideal of service to mankind, rather than the individualistic ideal of Arahant; (c) the interpretation of Metta (loving kindness) as a principle of social action by U. Thittila, the Burmese monk; and, (d) the development of the Lokanibbana (nibbana on earth), i.e., the Burmese Buddhist utopian idealism of "a state which is attainable within history\(^1\) Ibid., p. 178. Cf. K. N. Jayatilleke, Buddhism and Science, ed. Wu Shu (Kandy: Buddhist Publication Society, 1959), p. 1.
and towards which history is moving." Resurgent Buddhism has had considerable impact on the West, strongly appealing to the secular mood and especially "to many people disillusioned by dogmas, rituals and ceremonies in other religions."

De Silva has also observed that the presence of tensions and disruptive forces in Buddhism poses difficult questions which Buddhism like other religions will have to face. There is the laity's loss of faith in the Sangha, the third Refuge, because of participation by Buddhist monks in politics. Buddhists have been made painfully conscious of "sins of division" in their ranks, as in Germany and England where missionary Buddhism is becoming divided into different camps. The disparity between theoretical or philosophical Buddhism and popular Buddhism as it is practiced is becoming more marked. The application of textual criticism to the Buddhist canon poses the question: How will the second Refuge, the Dhamma, stand in the face of higher and lower criticism?

With its encouragement of free thought, the spirit of the open mind, and a critical approach to religious truth, Buddhism has held strong appeal. Buddhist spokesmen have claimed that the spirit of Buddhism has as its basis this attitude of tolerance. We now consider De Silva's examination of this claim in a series of dialogical exchanges that proved to be one of the most intensive episodes of the give and take of dialogue in the Buddhist-Christian encounter in Sri Lanka.

Buddhist Tolerance and Christian "Absolutheitsanspruch"

The claim that Buddhists are most loudly trumpeting today is that Buddhism is a tolerant religion, with no record of the shedding of one drop of blood in the cause of
spreading the Dhamma during the last two thousand five hundred years of its history. This is a claim which carries with it a reproach to Christianity which has had a bad record of war and bloodshed. Buddhism has a clean sheet; Christianity has many dark spots.¹

In this statement De Silva has starkly stated the central issue of a series of dialogical exchanges that took place between De Silva and Buddhist spokesmen in 1966 and 1967, i.e., Buddhist tolerance versus Christian intolerance. The series of exchanges were the result of a seminar organized by the National Christian Council (NCC) Study Centre in July 1966 on the subject of the Buddhist attitude to Christianity and vice versa. The presentations were given wide publicity in the national newspapers, and discussions were continued in the columns of the Ceylon Daily News and subsequently in Dialogue. De Silva seems to have been the sole Christian spokesman, while Buddhist viewpoints were presented by two English Buddhists, Alec Robertson and Alfred Vial, and Sri Lankans, Gunaseela Vitanage and K. N. Jayatilleke, who was Head of the Department of Philosophy at the University of Ceylon.² A delineation of the claims,


² Delivering the Dona Alphina Ratnayake Trust lecture on "The Buddhist Attitude to Other Religions," at the University three months earlier, Jayatilleke described the Buddhist attitude as one of critical tolerance. Of Buddhism's ability to combine missionary zeal with this tolerant outlook he said: Not one drop of blood has been shed throughout the ages in the propagation and dissemination of Buddhism in the many lands to which it spread and religious wars either between the schools of Buddhism or against other religions have been unheard of. Very rare instances of the persecution of heretical opinions are not lacking but they have been exceptional and atypical" (See: The Buddhist Attitude to other Religions [Colombo: Public Trustee Department of Ceylon, 1966], p. 1).
the responses, the counter responses in these exchanges gives us an insight into De Silva's approach to this sensitive issue in the encounter.

Alec Robertson's opening talk at the N. C. C. seminar reflects the main thrust of the Buddhist claim: (1) That not a drop of blood has been shed in the propagation of Buddhism is said to be "to the unique credit of Buddhism"; (2) that the encounter of Upali the millionaire with the Buddha is a demonstration of "the rare and unique tolerance of the Buddha"; (3) that the Buddha's attainment "to the ecstasy of the GREAT COMPASSION (Maha Karuna Samapathi)" every morning and afternoon extending his boundless compassion to all beings shows "the Buddha's incomparable love" which treats "all beings alike without any invidious distinction whatsoever"; and (4) that conversions by force and propagation by the sword have not been necessary since Buddhism's appeal lies "in its own intrinsic merit and unsurpassing beauty." Thus, Robertson maintains, "It is verily this spirit of kindly tolerance and boundless compassion which epitomises the life and teaching of the Buddha, so that it extends a hand of fellowship and goodwill to Christianity and other religions despite their divergent and vast doctrinal differences." A. as of agreement in doctrine, as well as basic differences, are found relating to salvation, the doctrine of God, approaches to life and death, faith, and reality. However, Buddhism does not claim the monopoly of truth, neither does it condemn any other religion. And it has never claimed absolute or totalitarian authority. Robertson's conclusion merits quotations at length since

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1See above, p. 73.
the source and basis of this tolerance is traced to the broad perspective of Buddhism, which is able to contemplate all beings with goodwill and lovingkindness in the light of the fundamental doctrine of rebirth.

According to the Immutable Laws of the Dhamma as discovered and explained by the Buddha, even a Christian who leads a good life will be born in a heavenly abode in the next, while a Buddhist who violates these Immutable Laws would be reborn in the lowest hells. Buddhism is able to hold such a tolerant view because the next birth in a happy or sorrowful state is not the final end and goal of a being's sojourn in Samsara. Such re-birth is only a step in a series of other steps leading finally to Emancipation in Nibbana. . . .

Thus there is no antagonism or acrimonious disputes in Buddhism against other religions. These systems are treated as conditioned states in which Man finds himself according to his spiritual development.!

Soon after Robertson's talk was reported in the Ceylon Daily News, responding as Director of the N. C. C. Study Center which organized the seminar, De Silva affirms the dialogic intent of the meeting:

One of the important things for us today is to study one another's religions sympathetically and deeply so that we can intelligently discover where we are at one and where we are at odds. A right understanding of our agreements will certainly promote amity and concord, but our differences need not divide us if we rightly and intelligently understand them. Samaditthi, right understanding, can be the basis of unity even when we disagree on certain points.2

He admits the presence of the arrogant, exclusive attitude of the Crusaders among some Christians even at the present time. Citing an instance from the Mahavamsa, and quoting the reflections


of the Sri Lankan Buddhist scholar Dr. E. W. Adikaram on
the incident, De Silva goes on to point out that this arrogant ex-
clusive attitude has also been found in Buddhism. The story from
the Mahavamsa narrates the dismay of the Buddhist king Dutugemunu
after he had slain "millions" of Tamils. He is then comforted by
ten Arahants who tell him that unbelievers are "not more to be es-
teemed than beasts." Dr. Adikaram's comment indicates that this
arrogant unBuddhistic attitude to men of other religions is surfac-
ing in present day Buddhism.¹ De Silva holds that neither Christ-
ianity nor Buddhism is to be blamed for the crimes committed by the
followers of these religions, but that "if we are to find out the
real attitude of one religion to another we must find out what the
attitude of the founders of the different religions was to people
of other faiths."²

Thus the true Christian attitude to other religions is the
attitude of Jesus. The attitude of the Jews was similar to the
attitude reflected in the passage from the Mahavamsa, they looked on

¹Ibid., p. 8.
²Ibid.

The full quote from Dr. Adikaram's article, "Buddhism and the
Doctrine of Hate," which appeared in the Ceylon Daily News Vesak
Supplement of May 25, 1964, reads:
"Mahavamsa, the historical Chronicle of the Sinhalese
Buddhists, has made the biggest murderers the greatest
protectors of Buddhism in Ceylon. King Dutugemunu,
who according to this Chronicle ruthlessly killed millions
of Tamils, did so to save the Buddha Sasana from extinction.
Was the author of the Mahavamsa, who was a Buddhist monk, so
grossly ignorant of the fundamental teachings of the Buddha
or was he, too, a helpless victim of the doctrine of hate
which had infiltrated into Buddhism even at that time? . . .
The present day Buddhist, faced with the impossible con-
tradiction of trying to practise both love and hate sim-
ultaneously, has become unbalanced and blind. This has
forced him to escape into a kind of militant Buddhism which
is no Buddhism at all."
all Gentiles or non-Jews as 'dogs.' To show that the attitude of Jesus was altogether different, several incidents from the Gospels are cited. The story of the good Samaritan (Luke 10:25-57) shows that it was not Jewish leaders, priests, or theologians that practised the will of God but the outcast Samaritan; in the incident of the ten lepers (Luke 17:11-19) only the "foreigner" who was despised by the Jews receives commendation for his gratitude; while orthodox Jews did not believe that a non-Jew was capable of faith, Jesus commends the faith of the Canaanite woman (Matthew 8:5-13); and in the story of the Roman Centurion (Matthew 8:5-13), which De Silva finds the most impressive, Jesus commends the faith of a non-Jew above the faith of the Jews who believed that they were the chosen people of God. These incidents show that "Jesus treated all people alike, and that He extended His boundless love and respect to all people irrespective of race or creed." Referring to declarations made by the WCC and the Vatican Council, De Silva notes that the attitude exemplified in the life of Jesus has also received emphasis in the councils of the Church.¹

Gunaseela Vitanage's reply to De Silva does not concern itself with doctrinal differences, it addresses the issue of dialogue between the two religions. He welcomes the move by the NCC Study Centre to organize the seminar inasmuch as the traditional Christian attitude "has been one of aggressiveness and hostility until the other day." He notes that it was comparatively recently that Karl Barth characterized any attempt at dialogue with the non-Christian religions

¹Ibid., pp. 8-10.
as "howling with the wolves" and refers to similar strong expressions by nineteenth- and twentieth-century Popes. This assiduous cultivation of exclusivism has been largely responsible for Christian exclusiveness, intolerance, and aggressiveness. Since traditional habits of thought die hard, even the organizers of the seminar have yielded to "the temptation of trying to prove that Buddhism is inferior to Christianity, and that where the Christians have erred, the Buddhists have also erred." Lynn de Silva's article "is typical of this ambivalent attitude."

Vitanage faults De Silva for committing a breach of mutuality. By citing the Dutugemunu story and quoting Dr. E. W. Adikaram in support of his view, De Silva has attempted to make out Buddhism is not without blame in using the secular arm for its propagation. Whereas Alec Robertson has carefully abstained from referring even by implication to Christian methods of propagation, not even making a passing remark about "the crimes committed by Christians," Vitanage designates De Silva's position—that neither religion can be blamed for the crimes committed by their followers, a use of the 'tu quoque' argument. Since men of all religions are capable of both good and evil, Vitanage is in agreement with De Silva that a religion cannot be blamed for the crimes of its followers, but he maintains that it must be held responsible for any crimes directed and inspired by its leaders. Thus he poses the challenge: "Taking the historical role of Buddhism for over twenty-five centuries, can Rev. de Silva say that Buddhism ever inspired any crime against humanity for its own expansion and aggrandisement?"
Raising the question as to whether pacifism is a viable option when a country is being invaded, Vitanage points out that the Tamils slain by Dutugemunu were invaders. Whether he was a hero or murderer depended on who was sitting in judgment. Moreover, he suggests that the words put into the mouths of the Arahants in the Mahavamsa passage may be purely apocryphal. Citations are made from Edmund Holmes and Rhys Davids in support of Robertson's claim that not one drop of blood has been shed in the propagation of Buddhism. Notwithstanding the use of bulldozer methods to destroy Buddhism, he points out that many educated and sincere Buddhists hold Jesus Christ in reverence and regard him as a Bodhisattva. Sarvapalli Radhakrishnan is quoted at length to make the point that Buddhism and Christianity are twin expressions of one great spiritual movement. Vitanage does not see the Buddhist-Christian problem in Sri Lanka as one stemming from doctrinal or metaphysical differences. Rather it is one of social and economic conflict between an underprivileged Buddhist majority and a privileged Christian minority. The imbalance created in colonial times needs correction. The objective of dialogue should therefore be neither to convince the Buddhists of the error of their ways nor to establish the superiority of Christianity, rather it is in the words of Dr. J. B. Pratt, "to ratify a treaty of enduring peace, alliance and friendship between the two great religions."^1

^1Gunaseela Vitanage, "Buddhist Attitude to Christianity," Dialogue Old Series, No.13 (December 1967): 13-17. Evidently Vitanage considers Pratt's comment on the Buddhist-Christian conflict highly significant since Pratt had spent a lifetime in the East as a Christian missionary and it summed up the Buddhist position. The full quote read:

The attitude of the great majority of Buddhists towards Christians and towards Christianity is one of genuine
Dr. K. N. Jayatilleke's response to De Silva on the question of Buddhist tolerance can be dealt with briefly, as his main concern is the clarification of doctrinal misrepresentations of Buddhism on questions such as the relation of the Dhamma to theism. The Dutugemunu story, he argues, has not been viewed in the total context of the Mahavamsa, since the Mahavamsa also makes it clear that it did not hold non-Buddhists as necessarily wicked. Examples of this can be found in references to non-Buddhist Tamil kings like Elara, Sena, and Guttika, who are described as having ruled 'righteously'.

Jayatilleke contends that the question of whether it is un-Buddhistic to fight in even a defensive war is a different one from that of the estimate one places on peoples of other religions. He therefore asks De Silva, "If Dutugemunu was an un-Buddhistic and un-Christian murderer, how much more so were Constantine I and Winston Churchill? Would Rev. de Silva say that the latter were not Christian?" In the light of modern knowledge, both Buddhism and Christianity are having their credentials questioned, so careful studies need to be done "on the basis of an honest quest for truth, which implies a readiness to give up as well as to accept."

De Silva's lengthy reply to Vitanage and Jayatilleke consists mainly of the response to Vitanage's challenge to provide historical friendliness. If there is to be a fierce and long continued war between the two religions, it will be all the work of Christianity. For its part Buddhism would be only too glad to ratify a treaty of enduring peace, alliance and friendship between the two religions.


evidence of crimes inspired by Buddhism for its expansion. Pleased with the objective and dispassionate manner in which the discussions are proceeding, and confident he will not be misconstrued because of an earlier positive dialogical encounter with Vitanage, he ventures "to make some comments on a delicate matter." He then proceeds to present extensive historical evidence from authorities such as Dr. Edward Conze, Sir Charles Eliot, William K. Bunce, and Dr. S. Paranavitana, indicating that Buddhist behavior was not different from the Christian, but as Conze has pointed out: "In their desire to express disapproval of Christianity, many authors have painted the record of Buddhism too white."

The evidence from Conze, Bunce, and Eliot consists of numerous instances of Buddhism's use of violent and warlike measures in Tibetan, Japanese, and Chinese Buddhism. These include the canonization of a monk who assassinated an oppressive king, a Buddhist king making war to seize a copy of the scriptures, popular movements resorting to violence using Buddhist terminology, the persecution of some Buddhist sects by soldier monks, the development of a warrior class in Zen Buddhism, and violent ecclesiastical quarrels. Quoting Dr. S. Paranavitana, the Sri Lankan historian and Curator of the National Museum, on the military exploits of Dutugemunu, De Silva makes the point that a band of bhikkus accompanied the army, and the campaign assumed the character of a holy war: "The ideological factor was duly taken into account; it was installed into the minds of the soldiers that they were risking their lives and fortunes. . .

\footnote{See above, p. 80.}
solely for the glorification of the faith which was so dear to them.¹ De Silva reiterates that his objective in pointing out these facts is not to serve as self-justification for Christians, neither is it to bring any reproach on Buddhism, but Vitanage's challenges makes it necessary. "For the sake of truth it is very necessary for us to test the claims we make for our respective religions in the light of historical facts."

Conceding that there is a lot of truth in Vitanage's analysis of the Buddhist-Christian problem in Sri Lanka, De Silva calls for self-examination on both sides and to "a joint endeavour without assuming that 'all fierce and long continued war between the two religions' will be 'all the work of Christianity.'" In answer to the question raised by Vitanage and Jayatilleke as to whether it was unBuddhistic or unChristian to fight in a defensive war, an article in Bhavan's Journal on the Chinese invasion of India in 1962 is cited. The choice between unmitigated pacifism and the use of force as a defensive measure was discussed. The point was made that it was historically incorrect to say that India was a peace-loving nation practising Ahimsa as at no time even after the Buddha did the people of India abjure war, and even Asoka waged war till he had nothing more for which to fight. De Silva points out that Bhavan's Journal justified the resistance against the Chinese aggression in the same way that Dutugemunu interpreted the war against the Tamils. Asking how "our understanding of Christian love and Buddhist maitriya stands in the light of this," he proposes "a heart-searching dialogue" between

Robertson's reply, ending the series of exchanges, was for the most part a refutation of the allegation that he had misinterpreted Christian doctrine. He also made the counter charge that De Silva had made "a travesty and hotch-potch of the two teachings as expounded by the Founders of the two doctrines" in his attempt to reconcile the fundamental doctrines of the two religions. Regarding Buddhist-Christian relations he faults De Silva with having forgotten the original noble sentiments of mutual understanding, goodwill, and fellowship, with which he inaugurated the discussions. To Robertson's "consternation and utter dismay," De Silva has struck a discordant note "by referring to the so-called atrocities committed by King Dutugemunu against the Tamils, which is nothing but an undesirable manoeuvre to make the readers think that the Buddhists were no better than the Christians in their intolerance and arrogant attitude to other religions." Robertson considers it a pity that the Dutugemunu

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J. B. Pratt's proposal, which De Silva commended for the study of both Buddhists and Christians, said:

"There are four possible relations that the two religions may hold to each other in the future. They may, namely, continue in the state of mutual warfare which to a considerable extent characterizes them today. Secondly, one of them may succeed in destroying the other. Thirdly, they might conceivably coalesce. Or, finally, they might tacitly agree to settle down and live side by side, as partners, perhaps, in a common business, as friendly rivals, but not as foes. As the reader may have guessed, this last is in my opinion the consummation most devoutly to be wished" (See, The Pilgrimage of Buddhism, p. 734).
incident should have been brought up. It disrupts the healthy trend he had set in the opening talk, since it was never his intention to expose the "multitudinous atrocities and examples of intolerance" on the part of Christians. In support of his contention that history attests to Buddhism's spread "through its own intrinsic merits without resorting to the secular arm," he quotes at length from Dr. H. Von Glasenapp's *Buddhism and Christianity* and Canon B. H. Streeter's *The Buddha and the Christ.*

J. J. Spae commenting on the criticisms of Buddhist intolerance by De Silva in the NCC seminar, as well as criticism made by others, submits that such considerations should give pause to Buddhists in judging Christian intolerance. De Silva has noted in a subsequent comment that when Buddhists become aware of these facts, it is bound to have a salutary effect on recent arrogant tendencies in their midst. However, he cautions that:

>This must not lead to self-justification on the part of Christians in any way. These hard facts should rather serve to make Buddhists and Christians realize that sin or *tanha* (desire) which has been the cause of war and rumours of war, is the enemy against whom we have unitedly to wage a spiritual battle.*

Along with this emphasis on the need for a preparedness by the dialogue partners to face hard facts and answer tough questions,

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De Silva calls for an on-going dialogue as the seminar revealed their mutual ignorance of one another's beliefs.¹

"Tolerance," says J. J. Spae seeking to identify the basic issue in the exchanges between De Silva and Buddhist spokesmen, "is that characteristic of their faith which Buddhists in dialogue are most likely to mention in contradistinction to Christianity's 'intransigence,' or what Germans call its Absolutheitsanspruch." However, it is not simply a matter of Buddhist tolerance versus Christian intolerance, as it is the Absolutheitsanspruch of both religions that hinders dialogue. To the Buddhist the very nature of the Christian's faith, with its dogmatism, caste-consciousness and intellectualism, betrays an innate superiority complex. Thus Spae detects "an insidious prejudice in the mind of Buddhists in regard to Christians which is liable to surface at almost every turn of the dialogue." The Buddhist, likewise, claims some type of finality and superiority as a basis of identity and acceptability, thus Spae maintains:

The Christian partner in dialogue ought not to be astonished that his Buddhist interlocutor too cherishes some notion of his religion's own superiority, exclusiveness, and finality. Thus in the baldest terms, a modern English Buddhist tells us that "Buddhism is not just a way to Enlightenment, but the only way", and that "Buddhism is superior to all other forms of religions" (Dialogue no. 10, p. 3). Another Westerner converted to Buddhism, states: "The Buddhist regards all other religions as first steps to his own" (ibid no. 13, p. 25).²


Following the seminar and the publication of both viewpoints in the Ceylon Daily News on Buddhism's claim to have always been a tolerant religion in contrast to Christianity's intolerance and smug exclusiveness, De Silva observed: "But when we examine the matter closely we see that Buddhists are guilty of the same sin that they condemn in Christians." He was reflecting on the Buddhist viewpoint as presented by Alfred Vial and Alec Robertson. Vial contended that tolerance to the average Buddhist meant that he must be prepared to "endure" and "put up" with people of other faiths because they are people of a very low level of intelligence, and that this exclusive attitude finds support in the words of the Buddha.1 Robertson is also said to reflect this attitude by his contention that Buddhism is able to hold a tolerant view because of its belief that this one life is not decisive in determining one's eternal destiny, and other religious systems are thus treated as conditioned states in which man finds himself according to his spiritual development.2 De Silva thus concludes:

From this it is seen that Buddhists would regard other religions inferior to their own, that they would "put up" with people of other faiths because this earthly span of life is not decisive and all have a chance of accepting the true faith in another birth.

The Buddhist and the Christian claim to the superiority of the respective faiths is equally strong. Both are guilty of arrogating superiority to themselves; but the Buddhist view that this life is not the only one is more accommodating and conducive to a tolerant attitude, whereas the Christian view of the decisiveness of this life tends to give support to an attitude of intolerance.3

1 Cf. "Buddhism and Other Religions," pp. 3-6.
2 See above, p. 95.
Here De Silva introduces us to another significant aspect of his dialogical theology. In a later explication of the notion of progressive sanctification after death, he considers the difficulties which the theory of *karma* and rebirth presents, as well as those encountered in the "Double Predestination" theory. It is evident that in this early encounter he has already seen it as a potential meeting point between the religions.

It is a hopeful and encouraging sign that in the thinking of contemporary theologians the old theory of double predestination built on the notion of a single determinative life confined to this world, is giving way to a more open and less dogmatic view, according to which human life is to be seen as a continuous process extending beyond the grave in which the positive elements are developed and the negative diminished, until man becomes perfect as his heavenly Father is perfect. There is scope in such a theology to go beyond tolerance to genuine reverence to people of other faiths.¹

Along with this concern to go beyond tolerance to a genuine reverence of the other's religious convictions, he adds the proviso that there must be a firm theological foundation to ensure a genuine reverence. Since the absence of such a foundation would make dialogue a deceptive pretense, he calls upon Christians to re-examine their theological presuppositions in order to lay the foundation for an honest and sincere dialogue.²

**Discovering the Asian Face of Jesus Christ**

In the development of his theology De Silva has consistently maintained the validity of expressing the meaning of Christ and Christianity in terms of the indigenous religious traditions of Asia.


²Ibid.
The call at Nairobi "to discover the Asian face of Jesus Christ as the suffering servant" was in effect a call to Christianize Asia by Asianizing Christianity.

One of our urgent tasks is to redeem Christ from the Mediterranean and Western setting and present him in the framework of the thought-patterns of and mental world of people of other faiths. Christ is there in the searchings of the people of other faiths, buried and unknown and perhaps consciously rejected because of our poor Christian witness to him, and our distorted presentations of him. We need to rediscover Christ in the context of the pluralist world in which we live, a task in which people of other faiths can help us.

Symbiosis and Reconception

De Silva describes this process of discovery as a "symbiosis", and again he terms it a "process of 'reconception' or reassessment." He wonders whether, as dialogue deepens, it would not be possible "to visualize that people of all faiths should aspire together towards a kind of symbiosis." For the Christian symbiont this dialogical process connotes the development of "a new intellectual

2 "The Turn to 'Community' as the Focus for Dialogue," p. 2. De Silva traces the origins of this view to Harvard professor W. E. Hocking's Hibbert Lectures in 1939. Hocking considered ways to a world faith seeking a solution to "the scandal of plurality" which the meeting of the world religions had made painfully evident. The way of radical displacement which calls the hearer to "be done with the old allegiance and take on the new one", and the way of synthesis in which there is a mutual teaching and learning incorporating into one's religion certain elements of other religions, both fell short of providing a solution. Hocking therefore proposed the way of reconception as the desirable relation between the religions. This way led one to understand one's own religion better, to reconceive it, to arrive at a deepened self-understanding, and thus discern the essence which underlies all the profusion of religious expression (Living Religions and a World Faith [London: Allen & Unwin, 1940],
apparatus with words, concepts and thought forms taken from other
religions,\(^1\) because "a symbiosis of the idioms is possible if only
we are prepared to learn the language proper to each other's religion
in its particular territory."\(^2\)

De Silva's Use of Buddhist Terms

Raising the question, "What right have I to use terms and
ideas that belong to Buddhism to express Christian truths?" De Silva
pp. 139-208). Paul Devanandan and John Macquarrie have also contri­
buted to the development and definition of the idea of reconception
in De Silva's thought. He takes note of Devanandan's emphasis that:
"By the process of reconception, every religion should reconceive its
own essence so as to somehow include as a new element in its own
essence the essence of other religions. In this way we do not commit
ourselves to an enduring plurality of religions or to an amalgamation
of religions" (Preparation for Dialogue pp. 139-140); as well as
Macquarrie's commendation of the idea that "As religions get to
know each other, they begin to reconceive themselves in the light of
what they learn from the other faith. This takes place without
people moving out of one religion into another" (Christian Unity and
definition of the concept De Silva sees it as the means to achieve
the goal of dialogue without compromising one's sense of religious
commitment or the sense of community.

"Here there is no attempt to eliminate differences by holding
that all religions lead to the same goal and therefore differ­
ences do not really matter; neither is there the hope that
separate identities will in the end vanish in a larger framework
of one World Religion. Reconception will it is believed, lead
to a relation in which identities will be seen not as exclusive
but as relational; it will be a relation of commitment and open­
ness. It will be a relation in which we regard the religious
life of man not as enveloped in mutually exclusive systems but
as dimensions of a universal spirituality. It will be a re la­
tion in which we discover a unity of relatedness in the midst of
diversity. It is in this way that the intensity and vitality of
religions in their particular forms can be power-cells in communi­

\(^1\)"The Understanding and Goal of Dialogue," p. 7.

provides the simple answer, "I am doing what is inevitable in a multi-religious context and what most religious teachers have done." In his use of Buddhist terms De Silva seems to have found a contact point in dialogical method which goes back to the Buddha himself. He notes that the Buddha "baptized" the terms and thought-forms of other religious systems by giving them a particular Buddhist flavor, and thus incorporated them in his own system.

In seeking to proclaim the Dhamma he used the language of the people so that the people from different traditions who engaged in dialogue with him could understand what he said. "How I know well," said the Buddha, "that when I approached various assemblies, even before I sat down there, or had spoken or begun to talk to them, whatever their language, so was my language. And I rejoiced them with a talk on the Dhamma, made it acceptable to them, set them on fire, gladdened them."

In one of his earliest dialogical encounters, a debate on the historicity of Jesus Christ with the Bauddha Jatika Balavegaya (Buddhist...

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1 The Problem of the Self, p. xiii.

2 Dialogue and Mission: Some Lessons From the Past," p. 16. Since phraseology can often become a barrier to right understanding, De Silva takes note of the importance the Buddha attached to correctly understanding the message which its expression is meant to convey. The advice given by the Buddha to one Cunda, found in the Digha Nikaya 29: 18, and 19, "as to how he is to deal with a person who has mixed up meaning and phraseology," is considered highly significant for inter-religious dialogue:

"Unapproving, unblaming, ye are to address him thus:--
Of this meaning brother, either this is the phraseology or that: which fits better? Or:--Of these phrases either this is the meaning or that: which fits them better?
If he reply: Of this meaning brother, just that phraseology is the more fitting of these phrases brother, just that meaning fits them better, he is neither to be set aside nor upbraided. Neither setting him aside nor upbraiding him, ye are with careful attention to explain to him both meaning and phraseology." (See "Buddhist-Christian Dialogue," pp. 196-197).
National Movement), De Silva had occasion to make a case for his use of Buddhist terms. In a rebuttal of Gunaseela Vitanage's charges that Christianity was a cult and had no true historical foundation, and that the Gospel is a "syncretism of Jewish Messianic ideas and Pagan Gnostic ideas", De Silva both asserts the historical reality of Christ and Christianity and refutes the charge of syncretism.\footnote{\textit{Buddha Jatika Balavegaya}, pp. 24-27.}
Maintaining that Christianity did not rise in a vacuum, Vitanage contended that the virgin birth, the death, resurrection and ascension were attributes of the saviour-gods of the mystery religions which were applied to Jesus without a historical reality behind them. Having first shown that Jesus unlike these mythical figures was set in a definite historical period (of which the social, political and religious background was well known), De Silva agrees that Christianity like every other religion was not born in a vacuum. If it did, it would have remained in the vacuum and disappeared, however, "If it is to spread it has to make its message intelligible by using the thought-forms, terminology and idiom of the day."\footnote{Ibid., p. 27.} He points out that the Buddha was influenced by Hindu cosmology and mythology and used Hindu concepts and terms, even the first four of the Five Precepts which are considered to be distinctively Buddhist have been taken over almost verbatim from Jainism. Thus he argues from the Buddha's historical context that the use of the thought-forms and terminology of the environment does not necessarily mean a lack of historicity or result in a syncretistic distortion.

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Can we therefore conclude that Buddhism is a syncretism of Hindu and Jain ideas? If we examine the sources of the life of the Buddha we would see the multifarious influences that have played upon them. Can we therefore deny the historicity of the Buddha? There is no doubt that the New Testament writers make use of the thought-forms, terminology and even mythology of the day, but, the important fact is that they use them to express in an intelligible way a reality which they had seen with their eyes and touched with their hands.\[1\]

De Silva argues that a religious message can pass from one context to another while remaining essentially the same message. This holds true even though words and terms in the context of one religion convey quite different meanings in the context of another. It is necessary to get behind the terminology and understand the meaning that underlies the form of words, and also "to employ terms and modes of expression with which the one who is listening is familiar."\[2\] Thus he does not share the fear of many Christians that the acknowledgement of spiritual truths in other religions will weaken the Christian's commitment to his own faith. Buddhist terms and concepts have taken on real meaning for him in the context of his own faith enabling him to see new dimensions of truth "as I looked at Christian teaching through Buddhist eyes, as it were."\[3\] He is convinced that his experience with Buddhism has deepened and broadened his own faith, and that "There are truths in Buddhism that can be absorbed or adapted into Christianity and which can fertilize and enrich a Christian's own faith. Some of these can be a corrective to certain deviations from


\[2\]Why Can't I Save Myself? p. ii.

\[3\]The Problem of the Self, p. xii.
biblical truths." While he has attempted to demonstrate the truth of this statement in his own dialogical writings, De Silva also draws attention to Rhys Davids' observations regarding the Buddha's use of such terms as *Karma*, *Dharma*, *Nirvana*, and *Brahma*, indicating an experience in which the adopted terms deepened understanding, facilitated communication, and may be said to have expanded to fill the new context. Rhys Davids maintained that for the most part the morality, metaphysics, and principles of Gautama could be found in the orthodox Hindu systems of his time, and these were taken over by the Buddha and "adopted," "enlarged," "ennobled," and "systematized."\(^1\)

\(^1\)Ibid.

CHAPTER III

THE TRANSLATIONAL THEOLOGY OF LYNN DE SILVA

IN THE CONTEXT OF SRI LANKAN BUDDHISM

From our survey of De Silva's dialogical method it becomes evident that in his view dialogue takes place in living relationships among people. It is a form of incarnational ministry, with an awareness of the global situation in which the Christian lives and respect for the situation into which the word must be translated. In Sri Lankan dialogue one must take into account the living realities of the Buddhist religion as a way of life that is set in a culture which permeates every part of society. However, dialogue takes place not only at the level of culture and custom; there is also "a confrontation of minds for intellectual understanding."\(^1\) There is the need to grapple with the question of religious truth which is inseparable from cultural presuppositions and social values. And it is on this level of doctrinal concepts that De Silva has made his most notable contribution to the Buddhist-Christian dialogue.

The Framework of a Translational Theology

De Silva's theology may be described as a translational theology.\(^2\) It is an attempt to explain the Christian message in the

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\(^1\)See above, p. 68.

\(^2\)John Ross Carter provides a concise definition of the term: "Translational theology is the attempt to provide new form for traditional content, to give new expression to the salvific
terms and thought-forms of the Buddhists. It is an indigenous exp-
pression of Christianity that seeks a responsive chord in Buddhism.
He maintains that such an approach is inevitable in a multi-religious
context, and that the history of the Christian church has been one
of communication, i.e., a process of conveying concepts from one
religious context to another:

When we turn to the New Testament we see how its writers
pressed into the service of the gospel words, concepts, and
symbols taken from Greek philosophy, Mystery Religions and
Gnosticism, in order to make sense of the Christian message
in the context in which it was proclaimed. This kind of
thing is bound to happen in the multi-religious context in
which we live today.  

The Johannine Paradigm

In the task of conveying concepts from one religious context
to another, of communicating central biblical concepts by drawing
upon weighty concepts in other religious traditions, the Johannine
writings are for De Silva the classic paradigm. He observes a parallel
between the Buddha's use of the term Brahman and John's use of the
term Logos. It is pointed out that though the Buddha rejected many
ideas associated with the word Brahman, he used it repeatedly to
depict the highest life, and that "just in the same way St. John, in

activity of God in Christ. The newness which translational
theology seeks is not merely the novel. Rather, it is the
fresh attempt to make relevant responses to the issues and
questions raised by men and women within the Christian
community and in other religious communities as they encounter
one another in different times, in different places, and in
different contexts" ("Translational Theology: An Expression of
Christian Faith in a Religiously Plural World," in Christian Faith in
a Religiously Plural World, ed. Donald G. Dawe and John B. Carman

1The Problem of the Self, p. xiii.
order to convey to the readers of his gospel the idea of the Eternal Christ who became Incarnate, used the Greek term Logos (Word) which was meaningful to them."\(^1\) Since scores of such examples could be given, De Silva maintains that "there can be no valid objection to the employing of terms and modes of expression of one religion to communicate truths of another religion.\(^2\)

The two inseparably intertwined strands of theology and language are at play in John's use of the expression "God is Light": "When John says that 'God is Light' he is using a symbolic expression that had a universal significance in religious and philosophical thought and is particularly marked in the Johannine writings."\(^3\) He sees John's equation of the logos of his Gospel with the equivalent of Philo's "archetypal Light"\(^4\) as the plunge that had to be taken if

\(^1\) Why Can't I Save Myself? p. ii. The close resemblance of the Johannine logos and dharma of the Buddhist scriptures has led De Silva to trace a parallel to the Buddhas as revealers of the eternal dharma. For a brief exposition of the term dharma, which seems to have been the basis for the adaptation of the word to translate logos in the new translation of the Sinhala New Testament, see "Good News of Salvation," p. 452. He has also entered into the discussion on the understanding of the meaning of God in terms of Dhamma in dialogue with the Thai monk Venerable Indapanno. See below p. 223-224, cf. Why Believe in God?


\(^4\) Ibid., p. 287. De Silva points out that Philo, an Alexandrian Jew who had imbibed both Greek and Hebrew culture, was referring to the words of the psalmist in Ps. 104:2 when he said: "God is light, and not light only, but the archetype of every other light; or rather, more ancient and higher than any archetype." De Somnis, 1:75.
the Gospel was to be meaningfully communicated to John's religious and philosophical environment:

The Logos in the fourth Gospel is equated with "the real Light" which is equivalent to what Philo calls "the archetypal Light" and Christ the incarnate Logos is called the "Light of the World." Although in the Gospel the writer stops short of going all the way in adopting the language of current religious philosophy in defining God in terms of Light, in the Epistle he is less guarded. In spelling out the teaching in the Gospel, he is, as C. H. Dodd says, "giving it a turn which brings it nearer to the current forms of expression, and nearer, no doubt, to the language of the heretics whom he is criticising." In view of the need to communicate in an intelligible language he even risks the possibility of syncretism and defines God in metaphysical ontological terms as Light.

In the same vein, John Ross Carter has referred to the translation of "the Word" (Logos) as dharmayano or dharma-person in the joint Protestant-Catholic Sinhala New Testament, of which De Silva is the chief translator, as an "example of translational interaction" which "might play an important part in sharing faithfully the Christian testimony of the saving activity of God in Christ." Significantly Carter notes that whether or not dharmayano continues as a profoundly engaging translation "depends not only upon the insights the term might enable Sinhalese Christians to gain but to a considerable degree upon the response of Sinhalese Buddhists."  

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1"Christian Community within Communities," p. 287.
2"Translational Theology," p. 177. Carter is referring to Nava Givisuma, The Sinhala New Testament: A Common New Translation, which was approved by the Bible Society and the Catholic Bishop's Conference in Sri Lanka in 1975. Carter, who did his doctoral dissertation on dhamma as a religious concept within the Theravada tradition, is persuaded that the Christian translators misunderstood what the Buddhists were saying since "they were not alert to the affirmation that dhamma, on the highest level, transcends personalistic ascriptions" (ibid., p. 175). However he readily recognizes that translational theology is not only relational but also personal, and making such a
Guidelines and a Basis for an Indigenous Theology

The integration of Buddhist terms and thought-forms into Christianity is therefore imperative for De Silva if theological thinking is to be meaningful and relevant. He offers three basic guidelines for a restatement of the Christian message in the idiom of indigenous cultures, with illustrations from the context of his own theology, viz., Buddhism. The three essential principles are:

1. "the need for a delicate sensitivity to the sentiments of the people to whom the Gospel is preached"—as can be seen in the revulsion the Buddhist feels toward the killing of the fatted calf in the story of the prodigal son;

2. "the need to redefine basic theological terms in the light of Buddhist thought"—an example of which is the use of the vernacular work kukkucca (Pali) to translate the word repentance, kukkucca meant nothing but remorse, and remorse is offensive

judgment about the meaning of dhamma is for him an illustration of how personal translational theology can be. This on-going task, of discovering in "oneself and in scripture a process of thinking that represents a continuity within the Christian tradition and that is in accord with the deepest apprehensions of religious truth of men and women of other religious communities," will be one that is "wholesomely exhilarating" for "Christians whose intellect is buttressed by the Holy Spirit" (ibid., p. 174). Thus of the use of dharmayano (dharma-person) to replace vakyayano (Word-person) of earlier translations, by De Silva and the translators of the new Sinhala New Testament, Carter says:

"Some Sinhalese Christians, our brothers and sisters through discipleship in Christ, have listened carefully to the testimony of some Sinhalese Buddhists, our brothers and sisters through the teachings of Christ, and have drawn upon their own religious experience to discern the magnificence of a Theravada Buddhist concept. . . . These Sinhalese Christians have grappled intellectually with the concept within the Buddhist religious heritage. They have struggled with the moral issues of possible divisive reactions within and between the Buddhist and Christian communities in Sri Lanka and, perhaps elsewhere. Assuredly they have prayed for guidance in this demonstration of faith expressed through translational theology" (ibid., p. 175).
to Buddhists as it is a defilement according to Buddhist preaching; and, (3) "the need for baptizing Buddhist terms into Christianity"—as is illustrated in the effectiveness of Adoniram Judson's translation of Holy Spirit with the word Vinyana (which, according to some schools of Buddhist thought in Burma, denotes supramundane consciousness that transcends mortality and persists after death in Nirvana) while discarding the word Nat which means a deity or divine inhabitant of the heavenly realms. De Silva has raised the question whether such a translational theology could be developed on the level of basic doctrines. He has maintained that for such a task Asian theologians are in need of new bottles for new wine which is produced locally, since "we are now convinced that our experience and the new insights we have gained through dialogue cannot be expressed within the framework of traditional Christian theology." Thus of his own encounter with Sri Lankan Buddhism, he is able to assert that "one of the basic principles that must be borne in mind is that the Christian message could be commended to the Buddhists on the basis of a theological structure oriented to the conceptual framework of Buddhism." In 1967 he proposed such a basis for an indigenous Christian theology. Since then his thought has undergone considerable development and several of his major theological works have been published. However, the 1967 proposal in the form of a comprehensive

2 "Dialogue a Matter of Necessity," p. 11.
statement represents his basic theological thrust and therefore serves as an useful introduction to the discussion of this theology on a topical basis:

Christianity, like Buddhism, can characterize man's existential situation in terms of Anicca, Dukkha and Anatta. Man's lost condition is due to his denial of these three realities of creaturely existence, in pretending to be his own lord. Anicca means impermanence or transitoriness. There is no unchanging reality in existence as such. Dukkha, though ordinarily translated 'suffering', means much more than that and is probably best translated by the word 'depravity', which is suggested by the two syllables Du (contemptible) and Kha (void). Anatta means soullessness or mortality. Man is mortal; there is no immortal soul in him. But Buddhism speaks of the Real and the Permanent ("There is, O monks, an unborn, unoriginated, unmade and unconditioned"), of Redemption (Vimukthi) i.e. of an escape from the born, orginated, made, and conditioned, and of the Deathless (Amata). If these three negative facts in existence, as Buddhism teaches, mean anything, their counter positive realities cannot be derived from the existential situation itself. Anicca cannot produce that which is permanent; Dukkha cannot give rise to redemptive grace; Anatta cannot 'put on' immortality by itself. The source of these positive realities has to be found outside the human situation. The Christian solution to the problem can be stated as follows: Anicca is overcome by God, who is the Unchanging Reality: Dukkha is overcome by Christ, in whom is redemptive grace; and Anatta is overcome by the Spirit, who gives ontological reality to the individual. Thus the Christian Trinity is the answer to the three signata in Buddhism.

Tilakkhana--Christian-Buddhist Meeting Point

The Buddhist understanding of the human predicament arose out of an existential concern and not mere theoretical interest. Since it begins with an analysis of the human condition, it is for De Silva the right starting point for theology, "for a living theology must begin with living existential realities and not with metaphysical

speculations."¹ Thus the Tilakkhana analytic—anicca, dukkha and anatta,² the three marks or characteristics of all existence discovered by the Buddha in his diagnosis of the human predicament—has been chosen as the basis of his dialogue with Buddhism. In his attempt to restate the fundamentals of Christian theology in relation to the Theravada Buddhist thought of Sri Lanka, De Silva considers the Tilakkhana analytic an adequate basis, because in it "we have a comprehensive analysis of the human predicament, in which the anthropological, and experiential problems converge embracing the whole breadth of human existence."³ Here he finds an avenue for Christian faith to meet Buddhist thought since the essence of the Buddha's teaching is summed up in the Tilakkhana and it forms the conceptual framework of Buddhism.

De Silva points to "the Great Renunciation" of Prince Siddhartha⁴ as a paradigm for understanding the human predicament and


²According to the Theravada, the three characteristics (ti-lakkhana) or the general characteristics (samanna-lakkhana) of the universe and everything in it are, like the teaching of the Four Noble Truths, a teaching peculiar to the Buddhas (buddhānam samukkamsikā dhamma-desana). See G. P. Malalasekera, "Anattā," Encyclopedia of Buddhism (1961), 1: 267. Anicca (impermanence), dukkha (suffering), and anattā (soul-lessness) are the hallmarks of all existence in the space-time order of reality.

³"Emergent Theology," p. 222.

⁴One of the most significant episodes in the life of the Buddha, the Great Renunciation is the account of the Buddha as a youthful prince driving forth from his palace and seeing three sights, an old man, a sick man, and a dead man. While pondering the meaning of what he saw he was told by the charioteer, "This comes to all men." On seeing the fourth sight, a hermit who had gone forth into the
finding a solution to it, and then traces striking parallels of this
description of the human predicament in modern existentialist writers.
The three sights seen by Siddhartha correspond to the three signata--
anicca, dukkha, and anattā. Experiencing "ontological shock" the
prince asks the question that all men ask, "Will this happen to me?"
The fourth sight of the serene hermit signified that "there was a
transcendent state beyond conditioned existence."¹ De Silva relates
Siddhartha's experience to Søren Kierkegaard's conclusion that the
man who comes to realize that "all men are mortal" knows the universal
essence of existence. However, this man will only feel the need to
find a purpose and a destiny in life when he concludes in his own
case: "I too must die." The aim of Kierkegaard and the Buddha was
identical, it was to help men to experience the truth of anicca,
dukkha, and anattā, i.e., "to help people understand the real nature
of existence and seek for a rationale of authentic living which can
bring liberation from conditioned existence."² More pointedly De
Silva finds a parallel in Nietzsche's reference to the three ways
in which the threat of the possibility of non-being comes to man:
"They meet an invalid, or an old man, or a corpse--and immediately
they say: 'Life is refuted'."³ Seeing the existential significance

¹ "Emergent Theology," p. 222.
² Ibid.
³ Ibid., cf. Friedrich Nietzsche, Thus Spake Zarathustra,
of this passage Tillich describes three aspect of anxiety which De Silva understands in terms of Tilakkhana:

Anxiety is "the state in which a being is aware of its possible non-being" (i.e., the possibility of anicca). This awareness is due to the fact that "nonbeing is part of one's own being" (i.e., man is anatta). It is an "existential awareness" because "Anxiety is finitude, experienced as one's own finitude" (i.e., the state of dukkha).1

Thus De Silva concludes that an Asian Christian theology should begin where Buddhism begins, i.e., attempting to understand man's existence out of the concrete experience common to all men.

Tilakkhana--the Biblical Context

In the Tilakkhana analytic, De Silva sees a fundamental category in which a genuine congruence can be achieved with basic biblical teaching. Thus in tracing the consonance of the Tilakkhana analysis of existence with Biblical themes, he has sought to establish contact with Buddhism in its own idiom and thereby to understand Buddhism within Christianity and Christianity within Buddhism. He locates anicca and dukkha in a number of Biblical passages which speak of the transitoriness, suffering, and anxiety of human life (Ps 144:3-4; Eccl 2:11; 2 Cor 4:18). He has undertaken expositions of Ps 90 and Rom 8:18-25 as in both passages "the undertones of the terms anicca, dukkha and anatta occur together." Thus though there is no systematic exposition of the human condition in the Bible as is found in the Buddhist texts, he maintains that the Tilakkhana analytic could be employed to do theology in the Buddhist context as

"the polarity of conflict between being and the possibility of non-being that lies at the core of human existence, the mood of anxiety, the finitude and precariousness of man's life, is a familiar theme that runs through the Bible."¹

Commenting on Rom 8: 18-25 De Silva observes that Paul's description of the human predicament with the terms mataiotes, pathemata, and phthora have close approximations to the Pali terms anicca, dukkha and anattā, respectively. The Buddhist overtones are said to be striking. Firstly, the whole creation is subject to vanity (mataiotes). This means that all things in nature are perishable and therefore impermanent (anicca). By the use of mataiotes Paul is saying "that the whole universe is in 'bondage to decay.' The Greek words mataiotes mataiotetos is a refrain of the 'Vanity of Vanities, all is vanity' of Ecclesiastes. It means that all things are subject to corruption and decay." Secondly, Paul uses pathemata to indicate that "the whole of creation, nature as well as man, is groaning in travail. There is a derangement in nature. Nature is subject to dukkha." Thirdly, with the use of phthora Paul indicates that the creature is subject to mortality, to decay, and to death, which means "Man is Anattā."²

In his exposition of Ps 90 in its correspondence to the Tilakkhana analytic De Silva notes that the Psalm lends itself to meditation in a Buddhist style. In this meditation attributed to Moses, the transience, misery, and emptiness of human existence is

¹."Emergent Theology," pp. 223-224.

measured against the Eternity, Majesty, and Power of God. In the third verse man is anattā, he is turned back into dust from where he came; in the fifth, he is anicca, his life is like a dream as the grass withers; and, in verses nine and ten, man's life is dukkha because his short span of life is full of toil, trouble, and anxiety. Summing up the cumulative impact of the Psalm in its correspondence to the Tilakkhana analytic, De Silva points out that in the Biblical context the solution to man's predicament of anicca, dukkha, and anattā can be found only in the eternity, majesty, and glory of God:

In this whole Psalm there is no attempt to blur the truth of the nilhility of human existence by a facile belief in the immortality of the soul, of which there is not the slightest hint in the Old Testament. The pathos and the melancholy pessimistic tones are unmistakably clear. In this human situation there is no security, no hope of fulfilment. There is no security unless we can see beyond the transience of life to the Eternity of God; there is no hope unless we can see beyond the misery of life to the Majesty of God. There is no fulfilment unless we can see beyond the emptiness of life to the Glory of God.¹

De Silva's theology develops, it would seem, out of the attempt to communicate the biblical solution to the questions raised by the Tilakkhana analysis. Since inter-faith dialogue is a search for living truth he sees the need for Christians to be honest in the interpretation of their own tradition and to re-root the Christian message in basic biblical teaching. They must also be ready to listen carefully to the implications of what is being said to them so that the insights of one religion can fertilize another. Thus we see his theology developing in the quest for a common language of understanding.

in the context of Sri Lankan Buddhism, with the common predicament of both Buddhist and Christian as the starting point for the clarification of the fundamental themes of man, salvation, and God.

"Anattā-Pneuma"—A Christian-Buddhist Estimate of Man

A long-standing assumption among adherents of both religions, including students of comparative religion, has been that Christianity and Theravada Buddhism are so unlike each other (apart from common ground on the ethical plane), that it would be impossible to have any kind of fruitful dialogue. A powerful stream in Christendom has traditionally taught that man possesses the quality of inherent immortality, which stands in direct opposition to the Buddhist doctrine of anattā. By seeking to understand Buddhism on its own terms and in its own idiom, De Silva finds basic agreement between the Christian and Theravada doctrine of man. He finds that while Buddhism has remained true to its scriptural teaching of the doctrine of anattā, traditional Christianity has moved away from the biblical teaching about man into acceptance of the doctrine of the immortal soul. Modern biblical scholarship, however, rules out the notion of an immortal soul inhabiting the body and also discredits the popular Christian belief of the resurrection of the flesh into a heavenly world. Though both religions rule out eternalistic notions about man, neither succumbs to a nihilistic view as both teach there is a future life and a hereafter beyond the grave, raising the crucial questions: "What is it that survives death? What is its nature? What is its relation to the physical body? If there is no soul how can we speak of
Thus De Silva's delineation of the truth about the nature and end of man evaluates the Buddhist and Christian answers to these questions.

De Silva's estimate of man begins with the account of man in his falleness. He has attempted to help Buddhists understand Christianity within their description of the human predicament. Indicating basic commonality (as well as differences and distinctions) in the fundamental categories of sin and tanha, he has dealt with the problem of suffering and the significance of anattaness in Christianity and Buddhism in the solution of man's predicament. He then takes up the Buddhist view of man and confronts the dilemma posed by the Theravadins, viz., the problem of denying the self or the soul without falling into the error of nihilism, and of affirming self-identity without falling into the opposite error of eternalism. The discussion of the question of self-identity in relation to the doctrine of anatta, of karma and rebirth, and nibbana, with its numerous logical difficulties is taken up. Finally, using biblical perspectives in relation to the doctrine of anatta as a possible solution to the problem in a Buddhist-Christian context, he proposes that it is in the understanding of man as anatta-pneuma (non-egocentric relationality) that one should seek for a solution to the problem of self.

Tilakkhana and the Human Predicament

De Silva's explication of the human predicament in terms of Tilakkhana and the biblical perspective begins from man's existential situation. Man's predicament is that he is conscious of the tension

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1 The Problem of the Self, p. 1.
between what is and what ought to be. With regard to himself, in relation to suffering, and in relation to the world in which he lives, man is compelled to say:

We feel that we are made for blessedness; perfection is what is meant for us, but we do not have what should have been ours. Our experience of the conflict between what is and what ought to be points to the fact that something has gone wrong somewhere.

This conflict in man has been described by some modern writers in terms of anxiety which bears a striking resemblance to dukkha, a word which defies precise definition. In his exposition of the term, De Silva notes that ordinarily it may be used in different contexts to mean discomfort, illness, unsatisfactoriness, unrest, etc. In its wider sense it can be best expressed by the phrase "existential anxiety" and "indicates the human predicament in all its aspect, comprehending the totality of existence." It describes man's "fallenness," i.e., "the predicament in which man is, bound by conditioned existence in samsāric life." In seeking to understand the human predicament De Silva finds that the Genesis story of the fall and the Buddhist parallel known as the Aqqanna Sutta found in the Dīgha Nikāya constitute an useful starting point since both stories begin with the "what is" in the human predicament--the fact of the fallenness of man. The two fall stories indicate a congruence in Christian-Buddhist understanding of the human situation and clearly

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3The Problem of the Self, p. 28.
show that anatta and anicca have a direct bearing on dukkha in all its aspects.

Both Buddhism and Christianity are seen as employing symbolic stories to explain the human predicament. The account of the fall in Genesis and the Agganna Sutta are for De Silva "myths", i.e., not fables but picture-thoughts "symbolizing religious and other-worldly truths which cannot be expressed in historical or scientific categories," in which we see striking similarities with regard to fundamental aspects of man's fallen condition. Thus he maintains that the

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1"The Problem of Suffering," p. 5. De Silva notes that though the Agganna Sutta has not had serious recognition as a Buddhist parallel to the fall, it has been recognized as such by scholars such as Berriedale Keith and Bhikku Sangarakshita. Sangarakshita's specific reference to this Sutta, in A Survey of Buddhism, p.108, is cited: "The transition from sensation to craving, from passive feeling to active desire, is the psychological fact standing behind all myths of the 'Fall of Man' from paradise to earth, from a blissful to a miserable state and sphere of existence" (ibid., p. 6). Since the Agganna Sutta is much longer than the Genesis account of the fall, and is not so well known, De Silva has condensed it and compared it with elements in the biblical account as follows:

"This Sutta begins somewhat like the book of Genesis, pointing to the beginning of this world-cycle (Kalpa) when 'all had become one world of water, dark, and of the darkness that maketh blind,' almost echoing the words in Genesis 1:1: 'The earth was without form and void and darkness was upon the face of the deep.' At that time, the Sutta goes on to say, there were 'Radiant beings' 'self-luminous traversing the air in abiding loveliness.' Here again we are reminded of a similar notion in a passage in Ezekiel which might be considered to be a complementary story of the Fall. Ezekiel speaks of such 'Radiant beings' whom he calls the 'Cherub,' supernatural beings 'perfect in beauty' (ch. 28:11-19). These beings, according to the Agganna Sutta, lived in the world of light (Abassara loka). Ezekiel says that the Cherub lived in 'Eden the garden of God.' The symbolism in both stories points to a state of blessedness and perfection. But from this state of blessedness these beings fell. This fall came about in this wise. After a long long time a kind of crust or scum formed over the world of water. This was the beginning of the solid earth. This earth-scum was endowed with colour, odour and smell. This tasty earth, like the fruit in the Garden of Eden, was a
concern of the Genesis writer was not to make a scientific or philosophical analysis of the origin of things, rather it was the existential concern of dukkha. Moreover, the doctrine of creation provides source of temptation to these Radiant beings. One being, giving way to this temptation, tasted the savoury earth. The others followed his example. The act of one being involved the others too, just as Eve's act involved Adam. Now as these beings gratified their taste, their self-luminance disappeared, their bodies became solid and differences in their bodily features came to be noticed. When these differences were noticed by these beings, pride and envy entered them, and as they became vain and conceited, the savoury earth disappeared. Outgrowths of soil and creepers then appeared and passed away in the same way. Finally rice appeared and as these beings feasted on the rice their bodies became more and more solid, differences in their bodily features more and more pronounced. Then they became conscious of sex-distinctions. Here again we have a parallel in the Genesis story of the Fall, where it is said that when Adam and Eve ate of the fruit of the tree, 'the eyes of both of them were opened and they knew that they were naked' (2:7). As a result of the consciousness of sex-distinctions passions arose and burning entered the body,' and these beings 'in consequence thereof followed their lust' and became more and more subject to mortality. Thus the Fall was complete" (ibid., pp. 5-6).

1De Silva holds that the creation narratives are not the starting point of Old Testament theology and belong to a later date. Subscribing to the documentary hypothesis he dates the P account (Gen 1:1-2; 4a) in the times of the exile or later, and the J account (Gen 2:4b-25) to the time of the early monarchy. Israel's spiritual history is said to begin with the covenant, and the first prophet to take serious note of the doctrine of creation was Jeremiah, "who saw the meaning of God's sovereignty in the fact that God was Creator, and who perceived in the constancy and orderliness of nature the pledge of his faithfulness promised in the covenant" ("An Existential Understanding," p. 81). Thus creation was embraced within the theological meaning of the covenant relationship and was looked upon as the first act of God's saving deeds through the eyes of the covenant faith:

"This is a significant point, because it was during the suffering in Exile that the people seriously asked the question about the meaning of existence and found the answer in the doctrine of creation, which underscored the relationship between the Creator and creature, thus reasserting their covenant faith. It is, we might say, the dukkha situation that gave meaning to the doctrine of creation. Thus the meaning of the doctrine of creation is best seen in relation to dukkha " (ibid).
De Silva draws on the scholarship of Karl Barth, Emil Brunner, and Claus Westermann to underscore the existential significance and bring out the spiritual meaning of creation. Creation had nothing to do with a cosmogony, it was not a phenomenological account of how all things were brought into being, rather it revealed the purpose and meaning of existence. He maintains that:

It is pre-eminently a religious affirmation about the sovereignty of God and the absolute dependence of the creature. The intention of the creation story in Genesis 1 is not to analyse man's essence or to define God's nature, but rather to indicate man's task and his relationship as creature to the Creator.

Christianity is in agreement with Buddhism in rejecting speculative theories about the origin of the world. The Buddha's main objective was to proclaim a solution to the existential problem of dukkha, as his conversation with Bhaggava and Sunakkhatta in the Patika Suttanta of the Dīgha Nikāya reveals. Rejecting the theories that the world has come out of "something," that it had come out of itself, and that it had happened by chance, the Buddha said: "Whether the beginning of things be revealed, or whether it be not, is the object for which I teach the Dhamma this: That it leads to the thorough destruction of Dukkha for the doer thereof."

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1 "An Existential Understanding," p. 79.
2 Ibid., p. 82.
3 Ibid., p. 81.
The Falleness of Man

There are obvious differences between the fall stories in the Buddhist and Christian scriptures. In the Agganna Sutta there is no mention of God, the tree, or the serpent. De Silva sees differences of imagery in these myths, but both point to the central underlying truth that man is in a state of falleness. Three aspects of man's falleness are common to both accounts, the fact of the fall, its cause, and its consequences.

The Fact of the Fall

Both stories describe the evil state man is in and point to a state of blessedness prior to that. In the Agganna Sutta the beings are "made of mind, feeding on rapture, self-luminous, traversing the air in abiding loveliness." In the Genesis myth man is made in the image of God and dwells in the garden of Eden. Both also say that man has fallen from this state of blessedness. In Genesis man's image is distorted and he is driven out of Eden; and in the Buddhist myth the beings lose their lustre, descend from the Abassara world to earth where their bodies become solid, and become subject to mortality.¹

The Cause of the Fall

The cause of man's fall in both stories is seen as desire (tanha), which is equated with sin. In both stories temptation comes in the form of food---"the fruit of the tree" and "the savoury earth." Asserting that "both these are images of desire (tanha) which is the

cause of man's fall," De Silva points out that "the word 'desire' (tānha) is right there in the Genesis story." In Christ's temptations "the devil attempts to arouse desire in our Lord." James traces temptation to desire (1: 14-15). Thus De Silva concludes, "Desire (tānha) is sin."

He also draws attention to the remarkable points of contact between the Christian analysis of sin and the Buddhist analysis of tānha. Just as classical Christian theology makes a threefold analysis of sin, viz: lust, pride (hubris), and unbelief, classical Buddhism also makes a threefold analysis of desire, viz: Kāma tānha (sensual craving), Bhavatānha (craving for existence), and Vibhava tānha (craving for self-annihilation or suicidal desire). The Christian idea of lust and the Buddhist idea of kāma are viewed as being more or less identical in meaning. Just as lust refers to all aspects of man's relation to himself and to the world, so too kāma is not to be understood in a narrow sense as striving for sensual pleasure, it is the desire for anything, even for Nirvana. Pride and Bhava tānha are also very close in meaning. The Buddha would have wholeheartedly agreed with Tillich's definition of pride as "turning to one's self as the centre of one's self and the world," since Bhava tānha is the desire to make the self the center of everything. However, in the Christian context pride meant "the self-elevation of man into the sphere of the Divine." There is also a correspondence between unbelief and Vibhava tānha, though Buddhism does not think in the Christian sense of turning away from God. The Buddhist view involves the

\[1\] Ibid.
loss of faith in any ultimate values leading a person to despair and suicidal desire.  

The Consequences of the Fall

Man's predicament is the consequence of the fall and has been described in Buddhism under the categories of anattā, dukkha, and anicca. De Silva has seen the Tilakkhana as a valid description of man's tragic existence which Christian theology can accept as a fundamental basis for dialogue. While he finds basic areas of agreement with the Buddhist analysis of the consequences of the fall, he also points out fundamental differences and distinctions.

That man has come under the power of finite existence by reason of his sin is indicated by his expulsion from the garden in Genesis and the luminous beings losing their lustre and their bodies becoming solid in the Agganna Sutta. According to the Buddhist analysis of finitude everything changes and lacks substantiality, i.e., all is anicca and anattā. The aniccaness of man is indicated in both stories as decay and death are the consequences of man's sin. That all things are anicca need not sound strange to the Christian—Paul said that the things that are seen are temporal, Jesus said heaven and earth will pass away, and sin gives death the power which it otherwise would not have. Man's state of existential anxiety derives from his awareness of his fallenness, i.e., his awareness of anicca, which is the possibility of non-being; and of anattā, which is the fact that non-being is part of one's own being because man does not have an immortal soul; and, the experience of dukkha, in which finitude is experienced as one's own finitude.

1Ibid.
Creatio ex Nihilo and Creaturely Reality

Attention has been drawn to the distinctively Christian doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (of which the Buddha was not aware and is not found in the Pāṭika Suttanta) which implies the absolute impermanence (anicca) of all things apart from the creator. It is this doctrine that best expresses the truth of man's creatureliness, or his anattaness and aniccaness. Apart from the creator who maintains all things by the power of his word they would cease to exist:

As they were created out of nothing at His Word, so they vanish into nothingness at His Word. As all things, including man, have been created out of nothing, so all things including man stand vis-a-vis the threat of non-being (anattā and anicca). On the other hand it implies the Lordship of God over existence. In other words God is the Uncreated, man is the created; God is Asankhata (Unconditioned), man is the samkhata (conditioned). 1

It is maintained that man is ontologically anattā since in conformity with biblical teaching Christianity asserts that man is naturally mortal. The symbol of the tree of life guarded by the cherubim and flaming sword so that man may not eat from it and live forever makes it obvious that "Man becomes eternal only in relation to the Eternal, apart from the Eternal man is mortal. In other words apart from God man is Anatta." 2 The Bible also asserts implicitly,

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Christian theological comment on the creator-creature relationship as expressed in the doctrine of Creatio ex nihilo has been cited by De Silva to elucidate the truths of man's creatureliness (anattaness), and of his being threatened by non-being (anicca). Thus Karl Barth would say that the doctrine denies that any creaturely power can of itself overcome the negativities of anicca, anattā, and dukkha because all things (ta panta) are upheld by God's word:
in the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo*, that in spite of the creation man is threatened by the possibility of chaos:

According to the cosmology of Genesis, chaos surrounds the habitable world on every hand. Man's life was suspended above the formless abyss and surrounded by the waters of chaos which threatened to engulf him and his world. He thus lived existentially with the threat of falling into the abyss of non-being. Unless the Creator upholds His creation by His power the waters would sweep in and the world would return to the precreation void.¹

The doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* therefore gives precision and depth to the perception that all things are anicca—that the universe is samkhata, a structure of finitude; that man is ontologically anattā—having only a conditional immortality; and, that when man fell into sin anicca and anattā became a reality bringing him into a state of dukkha—the existential awareness in which finitude is experienced as one's own finitude. Anicca and anattā now become real to man as misery and anxiety drive him to utter despair and hopelessness because non-being is now an ultimate possibility. It is pointed

¹"Creaturally reality means reality on the basis of *creatio ex nihilo*, creation out of nothing. . . . The creature is threatened by the possibility of nothingness and of destruction, which is excluded by God—and only by God. If a creature exists, it is only maintained in its mode of existence if God so wills. If he did not so will, nothingness would inevitably break in from all sides. The creature itself could not rescue and preserve itself." ("An Existential Understanding," pp. 85-86). Cf. Karl Barth, Dogmatics in Outline (New York: Harper, 1959), p. 55. For John Macquarrie the importance of the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* is that man is, in so far as he participates in Being, but at any time he may cease to be. Man is the paradigm of creaturely being (the equivalent of anattaness and aniccaness) because "he actually experiences the 'nothingness' that entered into his existence" ("An Existential Understanding," p. 86). Cf. John Macquarrie, Principles of Christian Theology (New York: Scribner, 1966), p. 198.
out that in both stories the earth is cursed because of man's sin. In Genesis the ground was cursed because of man's sin, and it was to bring forth thorns and thistles. In the Agganna Sutta beings gathered themselves and bewailed saying, "From evil and immoral customs becoming manifest among us, powder has enveloped the clean grain, and where we have reaped is no regrowth; a break has come, and the rice-stubble stands in clumps." Because of man's sin the entire universe is overtaken by Dukkha:

The universe itself has fallen. The Bible certainly affirms that the structure of the finitude is good in itself but under the conditions of human sin it has become a structure of destruction. Under the conditions of sin suffering lays hold on a man in a destructive way. Dukkha is an element of finitude. Dukkha does not only mean mere physical or mental pain or anguish. These are only the symptoms of the deceased (sic) nature of existence in which man is involved. Dukkha is the description of finitude as such. The whole creation travails and groans in pain as St. Paul says. Suffering is an expression of finite existence.

The Problem of Suffering

De Silva's description of the consequences of the Fall takes up the universal question: "Why do people suffer?" Man suffers because the Fall has affected man in three ways (morally, biologically or physically, and socially), and nature is said to be affected materially. It is in these consequences that we can find the causes of human suffering, because consequence and cause are linked up with each other.

The Moral and Social Causes of Suffering

Both myths of the Fall indicate a moral cause, as both speak of the evil ways of man after he fell. Though sin is a universal

fact, the Bible also speaks of suffering as punishment for the sin of the individual. Evil results from a broken relationship, and for Christians, "Sin is primarily a break in our relationship with God." In Buddhism the moral basis for suffering is found in the teaching of karma, which concerns the good or bad actions of man. The term karma (Pali kamma) literally meant action or deed. The opening verses of the Dhammapada describe karma as the law of cause and effect or action and reaction:

All that we are, is the result of what we have thought; it is founded on our thoughts, it is made up of our thoughts. If a man speaks or acts with an evil thought, pain follows him, as the wheel follows the foot of the ox that draws the cart... If a man speaks or acts with a pure thought, happiness follows, like a shadow that never leaves him.  

It is nevertheless pointed out that neither in Buddhism or Christianity can we say that there is either "an exact correspondence between sin and suffering," or "an exact equivalence between sin and punishment, merit and reward." Jesus suffered though he was without sin and we know that innocent people suffer. Even karma fails as an adequate explanation as the cause of all suffering. The Buddha suffered even after his enlightenment when he had "burnt up all unskill," i.e., when there was no akusala (demerits) left and according to the law of karma there was no cause to effect suffering.  

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2 The Problem of the Self, p. 38.
4 Ibid. The general assumption that according to orthodox Buddhist doctrine karma is the cause of all suffering, it is pointed out, is not acceptable to many Buddhist scholars. De Silva notes that according to the Sinhalese scholar Aggamahapandita Polwatte
therefore points out that though the doctrine of karma with its corollary, the doctrine of reincarnation, seems to offer a satisfying explanation of suffering, it poses serious logical difficulties from the Buddhist viewpoint:

According to this theory, we have no memory of what each of us was in a previous existence, and do not have any sense of moral responsibility for what we are supposed to have done then, and because, according to the Buddhist theory of rebirth, there is no identifiable permanent self that develops a destiny from life to life, the doctrines of karma and reincarnation fail to give a satisfying explanation of suffering.

In his discussion of the social causes of suffering, De Silva proposes an answer, at least in part, to the puzzling question of the suffering of the innocent and the saints. The pain which the Buddha suffered after his enlightenment was not due to his karma or to any fault of his. It was due to the malice of his traitorous disciple Devadatta, who rolled a great stone against the Buddha from which a

Buddhadatta Thera, the Buddha discarded such a fatalistic doctrine of karma as a heretical view. The Thera refers to a conversation between King Milinda and the Venerable Nagasena in the Milinda Prasna, in which Nagasena affirms four instances in which the Buddha suffered after the Buddha "attained omniscience when he had burnt up all unskill and there was no unskill remaining in the Lord." Nagasena explains the Buddha's post-enlightenment suffering by pointing out that karma was only one of the eight causes of suffering. The first four (Vata samutthana--wind upset, Pitta samutthana--bile upset, Semasamutthana--phlegm upset, and Sannipata--union of the humours) were biological reasons; five and six (Rituperalima--change of seasons--and Visamaparihara--stress of circumstances or being attacked by adversity) were material reasons relating to changes and circumstances in nature; seven (Parokkamika--aggression of an enemy) was the social cause of suffering; and lastly there was karma, the moral reason for suffering. Thus Nagasena points out to the king that not all that is experienced is rooted in karma, it is only one of the eight causes of suffering, and therefore "Small is what is born of the maturing of the kamma, greater is the remainder." Ibid., p. 7.

Ibid., p. 9
broken splinter grazed the Buddha's foot causing it to bleed. De Silva maintains that this suffering could be understood only in the social context, "because we are meant for fellowship, when that fellowship is broken everyone suffers as a result." Deeper than social unity, this fellowship meant that man is "dialogic" by nature, i.e., that man does not merely belong to society but to an organic solidarity. Paul using the symbol of body (1 Cor 12:12) and Jeremiah the proverb "The fathers have eaten a sour grape, and the children's teeth are set on edge" (Jer 31:29) illustrate the fact that due to this organic solidarity what happens to one happens to all: "We are so interrelated that we cannot do anything alone; our sin can bring suffering on others."^2

The Physical and Material Causes of Suffering

Man's physical nature is affected by the Fall, disease, decay, old-age, and death has set in. According to the biblical view of man, as well as the psychosomatic concept in modern medical science, the human personality is a unity. Thus just as man is not what he ought to be morally or spiritually, physically too he is not what he should be--and suffering is the result. This is true of the whole of nature, as both Buddhist and Christian Fall myths indicate that nature has been affected by man's actions--the world is no longer the realm of light (Abassara Loka) or the Garden of Eden. Thus in Rom 8:19-23, Paul speaks of a fallen world which stands in need of redemption as man does, and De Silva concludes, "So closely linked are

^1Ibid., p. 10.

^2Ibid.
human nature and physical nature that the Bible thinks of the ultimate redemption of man as involving the transformation of the physical universe. Since man and the world have fallen, man as well as the world must be redeemed.1

The Quest for Deliverance

Both Buddhism and Christianity are agreed that sin or tanha is at the root of man's state of dukkha. However, De Silva considers it very important that a distinction be made between the Buddhist understanding of suffering as identical with finitude, and the Christian understanding of suffering as an element of finitude:

In Buddhism Dukkha is finitude and finitude is Dukkha; they are identical. Existence and evil are the same. In Buddhism the basic malady of Man is finiteness and the suffering it implies. In Christianity the malady is sin. So the Buddhist quest is for deliverance from finiteness, from existence itself. For Christianity salvation is from sin on which suffering is dependent. When sin is conquered the structure of finiteness will change and suffering will be transformed. But Christianity knows that such a transformation of suffering is only partly possible in space and time.2

In Christianity sin is in relation to God the Creator, and is to be understood in the Creator-creature relationship. And man's predicament--the existential anxiety that arises from his knowledge of the hiatus between the "what is" and the "what ought to be," and the suffering it entails--is the result of turning away from God. In Buddhism man's predicament is that he is bound by conditioned existence in samsaric life. Threatened by the possibility of non-being, he

1Ibid., p. 11.

conceives a false notion of the self as a permanent entity. This imaginary notion of the self is in conflict with the fact that "decay is inherent in all things" (anicca), and the result is dukkha—the state of existential anxiety. The root cause of dukkha is tanha, i.e., "the desire or thirst to exist, to re-exist, to continue to exist, which arises as a result of the belief in a permanent self or soul which has thrown man into the predicament in which he is." Thus the elimination of the root cause of dukkha means the elimination of tanha, which in effect means the elimination of the notion of self. The Buddhist solution, therefore, to this conflict between the fact of impermanence and the false notion of a permanent self, is the realization of the fact of one's own soullessness (anattā):

The solution to the problem consists in dispelling the false notion of the 'self'. When it is seen that decay (anicca) is inherent even in the so-called self, when one realises that even the so-called self is impermanent, the conflict ceases and dukkha comes to an end, for there can be no conflict between the law of impermanence (anicca) and the impermanent self (anattā), because they are seen to be identical.

We now turn to De Silva's exposition of the Theravada estimate of man, because it is through the minute analysis of the empirical self that Buddhism brings one to a realization of the fact of soullessness (anattā) which leads to freedom from dukkha.

The Buddhist View of Man—the Theravada Explanation

De Silva sets out to gain an in-depth understanding of the Buddhist view of man, especially the Theravada point of view developed

1. The Problem of the Self, p. 28.

2. Ibid., p. 29.
on the basis of the scriptural canon. This view was built on the doctrine of anattā, which forms the subject of the anattalakkhana sutta—the second sermon of the Buddha—and is considered to be one of the main cornerstones upon which the edifice of the Buddha's teaching is built. Undertaking a detailed analysis of the doctrine of anattā (etymologically, anattā consists of the negative prefix an plus atta—the self or the soul), he examines the various soul theories that were found in the Buddha's Vedantic background. There were two main sets of views—sassatavāda, i.e., eternalistic views according to which the soul had no beginning in time and hence no end, and uccchedavāda or annihilationist views. The Brahmajāla sutta claims to have dealt exhaustively with the various theories, and some teachers who held soul theories "wriggled like eels" refusing to give clear answers regarding the origin, nature, location, knowability, and destiny of the atta. It is against this background that the Theravadins developed their doctrine of anattā as found in the Pali scriptures. The Theravada view contradicted all previously held

1 The Theravada Buddhist tradition has at its center a body of scripture, the Tipitaka (three baskets). Regarded as canonical and authoritative, the three Pitaka are Vinaya—the rules that were to be followed by the monks and their community; Sutta—a collection of the sayings, discourses, and sermons of the Buddha and his disciples; and Abhidhamma—the doctrine of the Buddha arranged systematically according to subject matter. Orthodox Theravadins maintain that the Tipitaka is literally "the word of the Buddha" (Buddha vacanam) which was committed to memory soon after his parinibbana. Other Theravadins hold that "the contents of the completed canon can be considered the 'word of the Buddha' because they are encompassed by the supreme wisdom of the Buddha." See George D. Bond, "The Dhamma and 'Sola Scriptura': The Interpretation of Scripture in Theravada Buddhism and Christianity," Dialogue New Series 2, No. 2 (May-August, 1975): 50-51.

2 The Problem of the Self, pp. 11-16. Tracing the meaning of atta (atman in its Sanskrit form) in the Vedantic background,
De Silva finds its original meaning and derivation obscure. Sometimes it could mean "breath" in the sense of "life", or the breath-life that could leave the body and return to it again. In the Vedantic conceptual framework ātman was the little self that was a part of Brahman, the manifestation of which was sometimes personified and called Brahma, the Great Self, God or the Absolute. The realization of the oneness between Brahman and ātman was prevented by ignorance (avidya), and salvation (moksha) meant the removal of this veil of ignorance. Thus the concept of the self came to be expressed in the words tat tvam asi ("that thou art"), and "the ātman came to be thought of as an eternal immutable substance, free from the vicissitudes of change and decay."

Prior to and during the time of the Buddha there were many ātman or soul theories that could be classified into two groups, i.e., the eternalistic and the annihilationist view points. The eternalists held that the soul was eternal and had arisen without a cause (adhiccasamuppanna). Pakudha Kaccayana, a contemporary of the Buddha, held that a person could not be killed as he was constituted of seven uncreated immutable elements and at death the body dissolved into these seven eternal elements. The Samkhyaists held to a doctrine of the eternal existence of a plurality of souls. Makkhali Gosala, another contemporary of the Buddha, held the Samsāra Visuddhi theory of a cycle of reanimation, a fixed series of existences which everyone passed through till he was completely purified and freed from misery. The Jaina view was that the soul was intrinsically omniscient though cluttered up by material particles of Karma, and the soul would shine in its natural and intrinsic lustre when the Karmic particles ceased to be. The Upanishads maintained that the ātman, being conscious, had real thoughts (satyasam kalpah) and was free from death (vimrayūḥ).

All the eternalists held that the soul had no beginning in time and hence no end, thus De Silva concurs with S. Radhakrishnan's summation of Hindu thought upon the soul— that "If there is one doctrine more than another which is characteristic of Hindu thought, it is the belief that there is an interior depth to the human soul which, in its essence, is uncreated and deathless and absolutely real" (Cf. Eastern Religions and Western Thought [London: Oxford University Press, 1939], p. 83).

In opposition to the eternalists the annihilationists maintained that after the death of the body sooner or later the soul is completely annihilated. Ajit Kesakambali, another contemporary of the Buddha, held that a man is constituted of four elements which are completely annihilated at death when the elements return to their corresponding mass of great elements. Other annihilationists denied the existence of an ātman. Some admitted a dualism of body and soul as a concession to the annihilationists saying that if there was an ātman it ceases to exist at death, either in this world or in another. It was against this backdrop of eternalist and annihilationist theories of the soul that the Theravadins developed their doctrine of anatā. Ibid.
views in an all-embracing sweep. In its analysis of the various aspects of the individual it concluded that there was no attā since none could be found when the person was so analyzed. Discussing the analytical and ethical arguments for the Theravada position De Silva first describes the two-step analysis of man it undertakes and then proceeds to illustrate the distinctive significance of this analysis from Buddhist literature.

The Analytical Argument

The Nāma-rūpa analysis was the first step. Nāma (literally, name) could be translated into English by the word "Mind," though in Buddhist psychology it is a collective name for the psychological and mental aspects of the human being. Rūpa, (literally, form) could be translated as "Matter," "Body," or "Corporeality" and is a collective term describing the physical aspect of being. De Silva points out that Nāma and Rūpa are interdependent and belong to each other in an integral manner, "thus Namarūpa (Name and Form) taken together comprise the psycho-physical organism which constitutes a person as a separate and distinct individual."¹ The second step, the analysis of man into the five Khandhas (aggregates), is the classic Theravada Pancakkandha theory. The Namarūpa psychosomatic organism consists of five khandas, i.e., rūpa, and the four subdivisions of nāma-

¹The Problem of the Self, pp. 17-19. De Silva points out that there is much in common between the Buddhist view of mind and matter and the view held by some process thinkers like Sewell Wright (who looks upon mind and matter as two aspects of the same reality). Buddhism, however, does not accept a permanent element as is found in modern process philosophy which recognizes an inner reality, e.g., "the within of things" (Teilhard de Chardin) or the "element of mind" (Hartshorne). A number of passages from Buddhaghosa are cited to underscore the Buddhist view that mind and matter cannot exist without each other.
Vēdanā (sensation or feeling), Sanna (perceptions), Samkhāra (mental states or activities, volition), and Vinnāna (consciousness). Though eighty-one basic elements make up these five aggregates, none of them is permanent, therefore there is no soul. Summing up the Theravada Buddhist concept of how man is constituted, De Silva says, "When the five aggregates come together they take a certain form or shape and what is thus formed is given a name. Thus we have 'name and form' (nāma-rūpa), but when the elements disintegrate there is no nāma-rūpa, no person, no ego."¹

The significance of the Pancakkhandha analysis is then elucidated from the chariot illustration in the conversations of the Arahant Nagasena and King Milinda and from several scriptural passages. The theme that is stressed repeatedly is the impersonality and emptiness (sunnatā) of the five aggregates, thus "the notion of the self as an entity, is the result of the mistaken identification of one of the aggregates with the so-called self." The point is also made that in the Buddhist texts the reality of the puggala (person) is denied. References to a person, a self, or rebirth of a being should be understood as a "conventional mode of speech," consequently, "The only actual realities are those psycho-physical phenomena, although they have only a momentary duration. There is no permanent reality; the only reality is impermanence."²

¹Ibid., pp. 19-21.
²Ibid., pp. 23-24.
The Ethical Argument

In the Anattalakkhana Sutta the analytical and ethical arguments are correlated, anattā is related to anicca and dukkha. Succinctly stated by De Silva, the ethical argument for the Theravada "no-soul theory" was that:

The delusion of a permanent self is the root cause of dukkha and so one must get rid of the false notion of the self by traversing the Noble Eightfold Path. It is the false notion of the self that gives rise to tanhā (craving), which in turn leads to birth, decay, old age and death (jāti, jārā, marana). As long as there is a belief in the existence of the 'self', there will be a thirst for existence, and as long as there is a craving for existence there will be a manifestation of the khandas in some concrete form, which is subject to dukkha.1

Walpola Rahula, expressing the Theravada point of view, holds that according to the teaching of the Buddha all the evils in the world can be traced to the false notion of the self.2 The Anattalakkhana Sutta undertakes an analysis of the five aggregates of the psycho-physical complex to show that they are devoid of any soul substance. An immortal soul could not be subject to suffering, and since all khandas are subject to suffering it means that they are anicca (impermanent). Thus, "the fact of anattā is corroborated by the fact of anicca, which, by stressing the transient character of all khandas, leaves absolutely no room for any notion of a permanent self or substance."3 The ethical import being that if all khandas

1 The Problem of the Self, p. 24.
3 The Problem of the Self, p. 27. De Silva takes note of the importance of the concept of anicca to the Sri Lankan Buddhist mind,
are subject to dukkha and anicca, one must perceive their true nature by the right understanding which comes by following the Noble Eightfold Path. When the real nature of the khandas is perceived, i.e., that "decay is inherent in all things," one conceives an aversion to them and is freed from the shackles of tanhā. Until one attains to the knowledge that in reality there is no self there can be no deliverance from samsāric existence.

Neither Eternalism nor Nihilism

In summing up the Theravāda point of view, De Silva concludes that the clear evidence of the scriptural texts is that the Buddha had neither an eternalist or an annihilationist view. The fourth book of the Abhidhamma describes three types of teachers in the world, the nihilist or annihilationist (uccheda vadin), the eternalist (sassata vadin), and finally, the one who was neither an eternalist nor a nihilist, "He is the Buddha." The Dhammapada likens eternalism and nihilism to two warrior kings who are to be conquered if the goal is to be reached. The Dhammasangani dismisses both eternalism and nihilism as speculative theories. In a well-known conversation with Vacchagotta found in the Samyutta Nikāya, the Buddha makes it clear to Ananda that he remained silent when pressed for a direct answer to the question: Is there a self or is there not a self? "because he did not want to side in with the eternalists or nihilists, for both

thus a frequently uttered formula is sabbe samkhāra aniccā (all samkhāra are impermanent). Other classic statements of the Buddha on the transitoriness of all phenomena are: Aniccā vata samkhāra uppā-davayadhhammino (impermanent are the samkhāra which are subject to origin and decay); and, Vayadhammā samkhāra, appamādona sampadetha (subject to decay are all compounded things. Do ye abide in heedfulness).
these views are not in keeping with his knowledge that 'all things are not-self'." Thus for De Silva it is quite clear that anattā meant neither an absolute negation nor a positive affirmation, and paraphrasing Walpola Rahula he concludes that the correct Theravāda position "is to look at things objectively and see their real nature as a combination of psycho-physical aggregates in a continuous process of change."

The Buddhist contention that it does not fall into the errors of nihilism or eternalism confronts it with the problem of reconciling the doctrine of anattā, which denies the self, with the doctrine of karma and rebirth, which affirms the identity and continuity of the self. As De Silva has aptly stated:

To save what it holds as an empirical and psychological truth which has a moral significance, Buddhism rightly rejects the notion of an immortal soul; to save what it holds to be a necessity of justice it retains the belief in karma and rebirth. How can these two conflicting views be maintained without falling into the errors of nihilism and eternalism?\(^1\)

The problem is posed most acutely in relation to the concept of Nirvana. Is it total annihilation or eternal bliss? And, who is it who attains Nirvana? We now take up the discussion of these problems confronting the Theravadin.

Problems Posed by the Theravada View

In his long dialogue with Sri Lankan Buddhism De Silva has endeavored to listen empathetically and understand it from within.


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 2.
He has also been consistent in practising the other basic component of his dialogical method, viz., "the ability to speak", which involved approaching a subject analytically and critically. Thus having listened in depth to the Theravada viewpoint he undertakes a critical examination of the Buddhist position. In 1961 at a consultation on Buddhist-Christian encounter in Rangoon, he presented a paper analyzing the doctrine of anattā, and then went on to "show how this doctrine calls for the Christian solution." He was responding to Bhikku Walpola Rahula who seemed to be suggesting that a middle course between the Scylla of eternalism and the Charybdis of nihilism was to be found in the doctrine of becoming (bhava). That is, as De Silva elaborates: "Man is to be understood not as a static being, but as a moment in the process of becoming. There is nothing that remains unchanged in the process of becoming. All is becoming, nothing becomes." He argued that Paul Tillich's criticism of the process philosophies would be a valid criticism of the Buddhist doctrine of becoming. The Theravada position that nothing persisted in the


2Ibid., p. 59.

3In the Tillichian dialectic of being and becoming though the dynamic character of being implied the tendency to transcend itself, it also tended to conserve its own form as the basis of its self-transcendence. Thus his criticism of process philosophies was that: "Becoming would be impossible if nothing were preserved in it as the measure of change. A process philosophy which sacrifices the persisting identity of that which is in process sacrifices the process itself, its continuity, the relation of what is conditioned to its conditions, the inner aim (telos) which makes a process whole." (Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951-63], 1:181.
process of becoming was not tenable because it lead to nihilism. Thus there has been in Buddhism an age-long quest for a concept of the identity and continuity of the self that avoids the pitfalls of nihilism and eternalism. In a comparison of the affinities of Buddhism and process philosophy, De Silva notes, almost two decades after the Rangoon consultation, that "in the Buddhist theory of becoming, personal value in the sense of self-conservation, does not appear to be preserved, and this is what seems to have led to the search for a principle of self-identity."^1

The common man found the Theravada interpretation of anattā unintelligible and incompatible with his strong belief in rebirth. According to Edward Conze the most controversial tenet of Buddhism has been the anattā theory because it suggests that nowhere can a "self" be apprehended, and that "The prospect of complete self-extinction, welcomed by the true Budhist, seems so bleak and arid to many students of the Dharma that they dream up a 'true self' which, they say, will be realized by the extinction of the false, empirical self."^2 De Silva notes the presence of an instinctive belief in an identifiable permanent "self" throughout the history of Buddhist thought which the different schools tried to smuggle in but was persistently resisted by the Theravadins. Recent developments in Buddhism indicate either the rejection of the belief in rebirth due to its incompatibility with the doctrine of anattā, or the attempt

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^1 The Problem of the Self, p. 48.
to smuggle in the notion of an indestructible soul in one form or another.¹

¹Ibid., pp. 49-62. De Silva has surveyed the main ideas of the different schools that arose in the quest of the identity and continuity of the self in relation to the anatā doctrine. The idea of an indestructible soul was so much a part of the Indian religious scene, that the Theravadins had to constantly resist attempts to re-introduce the idea in some form and thus subvert the anatā doctrine.

Two centuries after the Buddha, the Puggalavadins or Personalists claimed that the self was real. They held that in order to remember, recognize, and repeat texts there must be a knower. Thus the Buddha was able to recall former lives because there was a continuity of the same self. The self was identifiable and distinct from the five khandas, on the grounds that it was not the five khandas that bore the burden of craving. The bearer of the burden was the person or the self since the renunciation of craving lays the burden down. To harmonize their theory of the self and anatā they proposed a theory of correlation using the analogy of fire. Just as fire and fuel co-existed in a kind of structural unity, so the self co-existed with the khandas. Thus the Personalists maintained that the self was a reality in the ultimate sense, and that it can be an object of true experience. Problem of the Self, pp. 49-51. Cf. Buddhist Thought in India, p. 125. In the attempt to hold on to the self other schools proposed pseudo-selves. The Sautrāntikas and the Mahīśāsakas taught that the khandas migrated from one life to the other. The Sautrāntikas postulated an incorruptible "seed" of "goodness" which persisted through all change till emancipation was found in Nirvana. The Yogācārins maintained that there were some wholesome and indestructible dharmas. Against all these attempts the Theravadins remained the champions of soullessness.

De Silva has also surveyed attempts to hold on to the notion of the soul in recent Buddhist studies. J. G. Jennings maintains that the Buddha rejected the idea of rebirth, and that Buddhism is exclusively a system of ethical conduct in which the Buddha saw the self as a collective karma, "according to which every action, word and thought of the individual, transient though he be, brings forth inevitably consequences to be suffered or enjoyed by others in endless succeeding generations" (The Problem of the Self, pp. 53-55). Cf. J. G. Jennings, The Vedantic Buddhism of the Buddha (London: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. xxxvii. T. A. P. Ariyaratne, holding a similar ethical emphasis, rejects the theory of rebirth as being rationally incompatible with anatā. The Buddha's aim was to remind all men that they had only one span of life to live, and therefore they should strive earnestly and forget the self. The Problem of the Self, p. 55. Cf. T. A. P. Ariyaratne, The Philosophy of Anatta: Reconstruction of the Real Teaching of Gotama (Nugegoda, Sri Lanka: Deepanee Printers, 1974), p. 58.

A. K. Coomaraswamy has contended that the Buddhist and Vedantic teaching are in agreement, and that the self is atman. The
Buddha and Sankara are saying the same thing because the self that the Buddha denied in the Anattalakkhana Sutta was only the false self, not the Supreme Self of the Upanishads. De Silva notes that orthodox Theravadins resisted this tendency to Hinduise Buddhism maintaining that Buddhism was not merely a reform movement within Hinduism but a radical revolt with contradistinctive teachings. *Problem of the Self*, pp. 55-57. Cf. A. K. Coomaraswamy, *Hinduism and Buddhism* (New York: Wisdom Library, n.d.), pp. 58-62.

Mrs. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, in contrast to Coomaraswamy, holds that the atta is not the Supreme Self but the immanent deity in man which made him a real self. The positive affirmation of the self is said to have given place to the doctrine of anattā and the negative concept of Nirvana under the negativistic trend in Monastic Buddhism. Thus she maintains that in the "folk-gospel" of the Buddha, "Attha is essentially a standpoint of man, not of one who in gaining it ceases somehow to be man. It is the man who is valuing: this is my aim. It becomes meaningless if, in winning it he wanes out" (The Problem of the Self, p. 58). Cf. C. A. F. Rhys Davids, *Wayfarer's Words* (London: Luzac, 1941), pp. 643-644.

Christmas Humphreys, one of the best known exponents of Buddhism in the West, agrees with the doctrine of anattā while rejecting the Theravada interpretation of it as meaning an unqualified no-self. He speaks of the self as a changeless principle. There is an immutable PRINCIPLE on which all speculation is impossible, this first and ultimate Form is SELF, and "It has not nature, for it is beyond all predicates, and being the essence of Life it is the exclusive property of none". (Problem of the Self, p. 60). Cf. Christmas Humphreys, *Studies in the Middle Way* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1951), p. 42. De Silva finds Humphrey's use of the Pauline terms body, soul, and spirit to define the self most interesting as he comes very close to the biblical understanding of these three terms: "Taking Body to include those factors which compose the 'personality', Soul to mean the nobler qualities of man which form his essential character, and Spirit as the Life which fills all forms alike and is the monopoly of none, we have a working analysis of man's constituents which may be reasonably called the self, the Self and the SELF respectively" (See Problem of the Self, p. 60). Cf. *Studies in the Middle Way*, pp. 42-43. The term Body he uses in the sense of "personality", composed of the lower attributes or khandas, and Soul is used to refer to the evolving bundle of attributes or characteristics forming "character". About the Spirit he says that this Atmān, "so far from being that which distinguishes man from man is actually the common denominator of all forms of life and is hence the philosophic basis of the brotherhood of man" (Problem of the Self, p. 60). Cf. Buddhism, p. 86. Thus he considers the common Christian conception of an "eternal soul" which distinguishes each man from his neighbour, and which will be either "saved" or "damned" at death according to his deeds, a caricature of the teaching...
Anattā in Relation to Rebirth and Karma: The Problem of Self-identity

De Silva poses the problem of self-identity, which Theravada Buddhism has wrestled with from the earliest times in its attempt to reconcile the doctrine of anattā with the belief in karma and rebirth, in the form of two persistent questions: (1) If there is no self or soul who is it that is reborn? (2) How can you deny the self and yet assert moral responsibility, which karma implies? To the first question the traditional Theravada answer was that the person who is reborn is neither the one who died nor another (na ca so na ca anno). Having earlier expounded this answer at length, De Silva now gives the gist as follows:

At death, consciousness perishes only to give rise to another consciousness in a subsequent re-becoming. The moment of dying begets the moment of consciousness in the womb and passes on its heritage of karma. The renewed life-flux inherits all past experiences. Each successor 'has all the potentialities of the predecessor and more'. The new being is neither absolutely the same as the past (because of its different composition), nor is it totally different (because it becomes within the identical strain of karma-energy).

...of St. Paul. De Silva finds Humphrey's emphasis on the social and existential dimensions of the self very significant as it echoes biblical teaching, and says: "Attention should be drawn to Humphrey's idea of spirit as a relationship and thus 'the philosophic basis of the brotherhood of man'. This is a thoroughly biblical idea which is a heritage he has brought into his new-found faith and system of thinking" (The Problem of the Self, p. 61).

The Problem of the Self, p. 45. De Silva is careful to distinguish the Buddhist notion of rebirth from the Hindu belief in a transmigrating soul. The Buddhist explanation of the process of rebirth or re-becoming is found in the theory of Dependent Origination or Conditioned Co-production (Paticca-samuppāda). The principle of this theory, found in the formula. "when this is, that is: this arising, that arises; when this is not, that is not; this ceasing,
that ceases", does not deal with a theory of evolution or of the origin of life. Rather it is concerned only with the process of birth and death. It maintains that the objects of our experience exist dependently and conditionally, therefore instead of simply perishing away produces some effect or other. According to the law of karma, which operates in its own field without the intervention of an external agency or lawgiver, beings are born in various states in accordance with their good or bad deeds. As long as the karmic force survives, there is rebirth or rebecoming. The beginning of this process of cause and effect which goes on ad infinitum cannot be determined since it is impossible to say whence this life-flux was encompassed by avidya (ignorance). However, when there is a complete cessation of ignorance there will also be an ending of samsara (the cycle of birth and death). See the Problem of the Self, pp. 37-48.

In a detailed explanation of how rebirth takes place De Silva seeks to clearly delineate the Theravada viewpoint. The Theravadins maintained that the doctrine of Anatta was consistent with the belief in rebirth and attempted various explanations of their paradoxical stance. Several similes (both modern and ancient) which aid in clarifying the paradox na ca so na ca anno are given. According to Nyanatiloka Mahathera's explanation of the Theravada view of rebirth, nothing transmigrates from one life to the next. The father and mother only provide the necessary physical material for the formation of the embryonic body. Regarding the characteristic features, the tendencies and faculties lying latent in the embryo, Nyanatiloka's explanation of the Buddha's teaching is as follows:

"The dying individual with his whole being convulsively clinging to life, at the very moment of his death, sends forth karmic energy which, like a flash of lightning, hits at a new mother's womb ready for conception. Thus, through the impinging of the karmic-energies on ovum and sperm, there arises, just as a precipitate, the so-called primary cell" (ibid., p. 40). Cf. Nyanatiloka Mahathera, Karma and Rebirth (Colombo: Buddhist Publication Society, n.d.), p. 2.

The high authority of Buddhaghosa, the fifth-century Buddhist commentator, is cited by De Silva to explain the Buddhist belief "that as a rule the thought, volition, or desire which is extremely strong during lifetime, becomes predominant at the point of death and conditions the subsequent birth." In his explanation of the last thought as the mental act of transitive causation, Buddhaghosa maintains that:

"No elements of being transmigrate from the last existence into the present, nor do they appear in the present existence without causes in the past existence. For at the hour of death, the last conscious act is as a man who, to cross a ditch, swings himself over by a rope hung on a tree above him. Yet he does not alight, for, while the last conscious act dies away (and this is called 'passing'), another conscious act arises in a new life, and this is called 'rebirth' or conception. But it is to be understood that the latter conscious act did not come into the present life from the previous life" (See The Problem of the Self, p. 42). Cf. The
The Theravada answer to the second question, as to whether there could be moral responsibility without an identifiable self or soul, was in the affirmative. Because there is an identity and continuity of process it was maintained that there is moral responsibility.¹

The Problem of Self-identity and Nibbāna

If the doctrine of anātta is taken in all seriousness and in reality there is no immortal soul or self, the Theravadin must explain "What is it that attains Nibbāna?" Various answers have been posited depending on the meaning of Nibbāna, or the interpretation of the meaning of Nibbāna.² Most of these were paradoxes which did not settle the issue, and attempts to smuggle in some idea of a soul in a disguised form to save Buddhism from a nihilism are evident. The dilemma persists because the various solutions to the question of self-identity in Buddhism in relation to the doctrine of anātta,

Path of Purity, vol. 3 (Pali Text Society, 1931), p. 655. Anuruddha, the eleventh century writer, in the Abhidhamma-athasangaha (Compendium of Philosophy) proposes a concept of the "Stream of Being" in which the image of the "stream" provides a sort of identity of the self. However for Anuruddha the notion is based on the ground of continuity, and "the causal process consists in the individual transmission of potentiality." Thus De Silva concludes his summation of Anuruddha's thought: "Hence there is no conscious subject behind consciousness, no actor apart from action, no percipient apart from perception, no identity apart from continuity" (The Problem of the Self, pp. 43-44). Cf. Compendium of Philosophy, a translation of the "Abhidhamma Sangha" by Shwe Zan Aung; ed. C.A.F. Rhys Davids (London: Luzac and Co., 1963), p. 42.

¹The Problem of the Self, p. 45.

²Ibid., pp. 63-74. Composed of the particles "Ni" (implying negation) and "Vāna" (craving), the Pali term Nibbāna (Sanskrit Nirvāṇa) basically meant the state attained when all forms of craving are extirpated, the karmic forces have ceased to operate, and thus ended the cycle of birth and death. Thus in its most basic definition Nibbana meant the extinction of desire. It is also explained in the

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Buddha's famous Fire-sermon as the extinction of the fire of lust (rāga), hatred (dosa), and delusion (moha). The idea of extinction is also expressed in other passages without the use of the simile of fire as the cessation of thirst (tanha). Even suicide by the one who has attain Arahathood is justified, as the study of the Venerable Channa's suicide illustrates, if there is no craving or desire for the Five Aggregates of Existence. For the Arahath there is no arising elsewhere and Dukkha is ended forever. He has a sense of exquisite joy in knowing that this is his last existence, and that when he divests himself of his body he reaches Parinirvana—the dreamless peace and happiness. Ibid., pp. 63-65.

Nibbāna has also been described as the experience of happiness with the use of such synonyms as sivam (happiness), santam (peace), and the best-known paramamsukham (highest bliss). Nibbāna is looked upon as an experience of self-negation resulting from the extinction of defilements. And the ensuing happiness is experienced even if there is no "experiencing of self" i.e., no sensation, because "that there is no sensation is itself happiness." The two stages of Nibbāna are (1) Kilesa-parinibbāna—the five aggregates still remaining after the extinction of all defilements and (2) khandha-parinibbāna—which takes place with the death of the Arahath when the khandas also become extinct. Thus the Buddha's answer to the question as to whether the Arahath after death continues to live as a distinct individual was neither negative nor affirmative, it left Nibbāna an ineffable paradox, since "The person who attained the goal is beyond measure (na pamanam atti)" Suttanipata 1075 (ibid., pp. 65-67).

Divergent views have been expressed by scholars on Nibbāna, the most discussed subject in Buddhism. De Silva has dealt with four of the major positions in the interpretation of the term. Nibbāna is most often seen as annihilation or extinction since it is impossible to harmonize the doctrine of anatta with any kind of survival. As Paul Dahlke, a representative of this view observes, "Only in Buddhism does the conception of freedom from pain remain purely a negative thing and not a positive in disguise—heavenly bliss" (Ibid., p. 69). Cf. Paul Dahlke, Buddhist Essays (London: Macmillan, 1908), p. 48. As opposed to this nihilistic view which makes Buddhism a philosophy of pessimism and despair, Nibbāna has been interpreted to mean a positive ethical state. Thus in the Tripiṭaka a number of epithets describing Nibbāna as "the harbour of refuge", "the cool cave", "the supreme joy", etc., are found. Of special significance is the epithet "Holy City" or "City of Nibbāna" (Nibbāna Nagara), suggesting a kind of fellowship. This has, however, not been interpreted by Buddhists to mean that there will be some sort of personal existence in the final state, they prefer to leave the matter a paradox because the Buddha rejected both eternalism and nihilism. Since paradoxes neither console the heart nor satisfy the mind some Buddhists have leaned toward the Upanishadic ideal of Moksha with its notion of absorption into the Absolute. This, however, is rejected as a heretical view which has crept into Buddhism.

Since the Buddha denied immortality as a metaphysical concept G. C. Dev has suggested that he accepted it as a moral achievement, thus Nibbāna becomes "the philosophy of permanence in Buddha's ethics," and signifies an "ethical immortality" (ibid. pp. 71-72). Cf. G. C. Dev, Buddha the Humanist (Lahore: Paramount Publishers,
of karma and rebirth, and of nibbāna, have tended either towards nihilism or eternalism. Thus De Silva asks the pivotal question, "Can we arrive at a concept of the self that can hold together both poles of nihilism and eternalism without one contradicting the other?"\(^1\)

**Anattā-Pneuma--Non-egocentric Relationality**

Having explicated the Buddhist view of man and defined the problem of self-identity in the Christian-Buddhist context, De Silva undertakes a careful analysis of the biblical view of man. He finds that it is possible to speak of a Christian doctrine of anattā, which is far more radical than the Buddhist one. Moreover, the biblical perspective avoids the pitfalls of eternalism and nihilism and "proposes a solution to the problem of the self in which the dialectical tension between these two extremes is brought into a synthesis by the concept of the 'spirit'."\(^2\) Taking into consideration that theories

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1. De Silva points out that, though in this view the ethical element has the quality of immortality, it fails to tell us who or what achieves immortality.

Finally De Silva takes note of Rune Johansson's attempt to explain Nirvāṇa as Citta, a state of personality. Nibbāna is described as a state of personality, not consisting of "personal factors" (khandas) but of Citta (mind). Citta is defined as "the core of personality, the centre of purposiveness, activity, continuity and emotionality. It is not a 'soul' (attā) but it is the empirical functional self" (ibid., pp. 72-73). Cf. Rune Johansson, The Psychology of Nirvāṇa London: Allen and Unwin, 1963 p. 30. De Silva sees Johansson's attempt to save Buddhism from nihilism as bordering on the opposite error of eternalism. He concludes that the best we can do is to leave the matter as a paradox, and observes that G. R. Welbon after examining the various interpretations concluded that: "It need be neither cowardice nor ignorance that forces us to say finally that Nirvāṇa's meanings are many and include both annihilation and bliss, negation and affirmation, non-existence and existence" (ibid., p. 74). Cf. G. R. Welbon, The Buddhist Nirvāṇa and Its Western Interpreters (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1968), p. 299.

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\(^1\) The Problem of the Self, p. 74.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 77.
about the self largely focus either on the individual man or on the social man, he proposes that

A plausible solution to the problem of self-identity could be found in the biblical insight that the true self is to be found, not in the isolated individual, but in personal existence constituted by inter-personal relationships; not in the egocentric I, as the anattā doctrine stresses, but in the mutuality of the I and the Thou, which the term pneuma signifies. It is in the understanding of man as anattā-pneuma (non-egocentric relationality) that one should seek a solution to the problem of the self.

In the Christian-Buddhist concept of Anattā-Pneuma we have what may be considered the most significant original contribution by De Silva. We now carefully trace the development of this idea and its implications since it is the central concept that undergirds and informs his dialogical theology.

The Biblical View of Man:
Psyche-Sarx and Nāma-Rūpa

De Silva opens his argument for the Christian-Buddhist concept of Anattā-Pneuma with an exposition of the biblical view of man. He sees fundamental agreement between the Buddhist doctrine of anattā and biblical theology, thus he finds it possible to state the biblical view of man employing Buddhist categories of thought:

Just as in Buddhism man is a unity of nāma-rūpa, so in the New Testament man is a unity of psyche-sarx; just as Buddhism says that there is no soul entity within the nāma-rūpa complex, so the Bible leaves no room for a notion of an immortal soul within the psyche-sarx unity of man. Thus we could, in a sense, speak of the biblical doctrine of anattā. We could put the matter thus: psychosomatic creatureliness is anattā (i.e., soulless and substanceless).²

¹Ibid., p. 74.
²Ibid., p. 84. By marshalling the views of biblical scholars
to reject the dichotomous concept of man, emphasizing man's creatureliness, and examining significant biblical terms, De Silva argues that the Bible leaves no room for the notion of an immortal soul. The Bible is said to present a synthetic view of the self, man is a unity of soul, body, flesh, mind, etc., man must be saved in his entirety since God created man entire, as such the notion of an immortal soul as found in Greek and Hindu thought is not to be found in the Bible.

Christian theologians have acknowledged this contention. A.R. Johnson draws attention to the synthetic, holistic nature of Hebraic thinking, which is characterised by "the grasping of totality." Karl Barth makes an earnest protest that the anthropology marked by a separation of the soul over the body is not the Christian picture, as it is one which "cannot possibly do justice to the biblical view and concept of man." Paul Tillich laments that large sections of Protestant thought have replaced the symbol of the resurrection with the symbol of immortality in its "non-Christian pseudo-Platonic form of the continuation of the temporal life of an individual after death with a body." He therefore calls upon Christians to reject this view of immortality, "for participation in life eternal is not 'life hereafter.' Neither is it a natural quality of the soul" (ibid., pp. 75-77). Cf. A.R. Johnson, The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1964), pp. 1-2; Karl Barth, Church Dogmatics, 13 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), 3, pt. 2:382; Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (London: Nisbet, 1964), 3:437).

We have already noted De Silva's emphasis on the creatureliness of man in his exposition of the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo. See above, pp. 134-136. This doctrine implying the impermanence (anicca) of all things apart from the creator who sustains them by the power of his word, underscores man's anattānata, i.e., the universal characteristic of creaturely being, which leaves no room at all for the notion of eternalism. That the biblical view of the unity of the self is a protection against eternalism (sassesatādīthi) is seen in the Hebrew understanding of the term nephesh. This term which has been translated as "soul" cannot designate an immortal soul because at death the nephesh ceases to exist (Gen 35:18; Job 14:22; Eccl 12:7). Norman Snaith warns that if preachers use Gen 2:7 to refer to an immortal soul they must on the basis of Gen 2:19 acknowledge that animals too have immortal souls. And as H. Wheeler Robinson points out, "The Hebrew idea of personality is an animated body, not an incorporated soul" (ibid., pp. 77-79). Cf. Norman Snaith, "Heart and Soul and Spirit," Preachers' Quarterly 3 (1957) 21; and, H. Wheeler Robinson, Religious Ideas of the Old Testament (London: Epworth Press, 1947), p. 83.

The influence of the Greek notion of the soul on the Wisdom literature of the inter-testamental period is evident. De Silva notes positive hints of a pre-existent immortal soul that goes to Hades in the Wisdom of Solomon. However Jewish thought during this period for the most part looked upon immortality as essentially a gift of God rather than belonging to the intrinsic nature of man. The apocryphal
books Maccabees, Tobit, Judith, and Ecclesiasticus preserve the Hebrew usage of nephesh corresponding to the New Testament usage of psyche, which continues to maintain the same unitary concept of man.

In the study of the uses of the term psyche, De Silva concludes that nowhere in the New Testament is it conceived as existing in a bodiless state. Like nephesh, it is used in the sense of life (Rom 11:3, 16:4), vitality or 'aliveness', and is contrasted with apsychos, a generic term for all inanimate objects (I Cor. 14:7). Scripture also makes it clear that this is only "natural life" as distinct from "spiritual life" (1 Cor 15:54; cf. Rom 16:4; Phil 2:30; 1 Thess 2:8; and 2 Cor 1:23). Psyche is also used in the psychological sense as the seat of feeling, thought, and will (Matt 26:38; Luke 1:46; John 12:27; Luke 12:19; 2 Cor. 1:23; 1 Thess. 2:8; Eph 6:6; Col 3:23; and Phil 1:27). In Rom 13:1 psyche refers to the whole person, and in Rom 2:9 for the whole person as capable of sinning. in 1 Cor 2:14-15 and 15:42-50 Paul uses psychikos to describe the "natural" or "unspiritual" man as opposed to the spiritual man. In instances where psyche seems to receive a heightened meaning (Heb 6:19; 1 Pet 1:22 and 2:11,25) and where the salvation of the psyche is spoken of (Heb 10:39; Jas 1:21; 1 Pet 1:9), De Silva finds the principle of unity preserved in every instance, and nothing in this usage to suggest that psyche is immortal. Ibid., pp. 80-82.

Finally De Silva takes note of instances suggestive of a dichotomy or trichotomy, such as Matt 10:28 and 1 Thess 5:23, and a few passages where one could possibly trace some influence of the Greek idea of immortality, such as 2 Cor 5:1-5; Phil 1:21-23, and 3:8-10. Of the latter he notes that the word psyche does not appear at all in these passages. On Matt 10:28 he quotes Oscar Cullmann's comment on this verse that the reference to "soul" and "body" should be understood in relation to the resurrection, that man should "fear God, who is able to give you over completely to death; to wit, when he does not resurrect you to life." Cullmann's emphasis is that since the soul can be killed and cannot remain without a body, "The soul is not immortal. There must be a resurrection for both; since the Fall the whole man is 'sown corruptible'." W.D. Stacey's comment on 1 Thess 5:23 that Paul is emphasizing the entirety of the preservation of man explains for De Silva the holistic view of man in the New Testament, "The whole man is preserved, and spirit, and soul, and body, simply underline the inclusiveness of the conception. Man in every aspect, man in his wholeness, is to be preserved." The New Testament in particular and the Bible as whole rejects the Greek idea of the soul and holds to the Hebraic conception of man, thus De Silva concludes, "Paul uses a series of terms in his anthropology, such as soma, sarx, nous, psyche and pneuma, which only suggest the diversity of aspect within the intrinsic unity of man" (Ibid., pp. 82-84). Cf. Oscar Cullmann, Immortality of the Soul and Resurrection of the Dead (New York: Macmillan, 1958). pp. 36-37; and W.D. Stacey, The Pauline View of Man, in Relation to Its Judaic and Hellenistic Background (London: Macmillan, 1956), p. 123).
Just as the Buddha declared in his second sermon that none of the aggregates (nor the sum of them) constituted the self or the soul, so too biblical teaching maintains that there is no soul-entity in any of the component parts, nor does the psychophysical unity which results when these parts are put together constitute a person as an independent self-existent being. The Bible uses the striking metaphors of dust (Gen 2:7; 3:19; Isa 40:6; Ps 49:12,20), the shadow (Ps 39:5-6), and the mist (Jas 4:14) to teach that creatureliness apart from the spirit of God is anattā. De Silva holds that the biblical doctrine of anattā is far more radical for two reasons. Firstly, though Buddhism denies the self, it maintains that man has an intrinsic capability to work out his own salvation, though man is anattā he is his own saviour (Dhamma-pada 160,165), and he alone can do something to save himself. In contrast, in Christianity man is saved by grace and not self-effort. Secondly, the implication of the Buddhist theory of karma and rebirth is that "there is 'something' within man, either his karma or an operative mental or psychic force (vinnana) which has the power to cause or perpetuate life after death in 'persons' or momentary 'selves'." The Bible, on the contrary, leaves no room to generate life beyond the grave, it is only by the power of God that man can inherit eternal life. Thus De Silva concludes that "when the Bible says 'no' to eternalism it says so without any reserve."1

Man in the Image of God—
Man as "Spirit"—Pneuma

Even as it says "no" to eternalism the Bible also rejects nihilism with the same commitment in the doctrine that man is created in the

1Ibid., p. 85.
image of God. Here the word *created* indicates man's creatureliness, and the stress on the word *image* indicates a relationship between man and God. The crucial word describing this relationship is "spirit", i.e., *pneuma* in the New Testament and *ruach* in the Old. Thus De Silva sees the need to carefully consider and rightly understand the meaning of "spirit" because it is at this point that the fundamental difference between the Buddhist and Christian views is found. In his search for a Christian doctrine of *anatta* which does not yield to nihilism and which affirms authentic selfhood without yielding to eternalism, De Silva feels that "the term 'spirit' functions descriptively as the central core concept of the authentic 'self', which exists only in relationship." Thus for him it is a theological necessity for the solution of the problem to undertake "a biblically-based new assessment of the meaning of 'spirit', as the personal-communal dimension of man."

In his discussion of *ruach* and *pnuema*, De Silva notes that 'spirit' has to do with the human spirit as well as the Divine Spirit, since the two are implicates of each other. In the New Testament the distinction is made by using the definite article when denoting the Divine Person. Both *ruach* and *pneuma* indicate that the image of God lies not in the human structure, but in the relationship. In the Bible both *ruach* and *pneuma* are "God-given" and not "man-produced," and in no way suggestive of the Hindu notion of man's oneness or identity with God. The biblical emphasis that God is Spirit and man is flesh (Gen 6:1-4) indicates that man can live only if God gives him

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1 Ibid., p. 5.
life, and he dies when God withdraws his spirit (Ps 104:29-30).

Immortality is not man's natural possession, "the terms image and ruach mean the possibility of fulfillment in actuality, what is beyond human potentiality through relation to the Eternal (the Amata)."^1

W. D. Stacey's analysis of pneuma is found particularly helpful by De Silva for elucidating his position. Stacey defines the six senses in which pneuma is used in the Pauline Corpus and warns against confusing God and the natural spirit of man, "... THE SPIRIT OF MAN WAS ENERGIZED BY THE SPIRIT, BUT THE HUMAN SPIRIT NEVER ROSE TO SHARE THE DIVINE NATURE. THERE IS FELLOWSHIP AND COMMUNION, BUT NOT ABSORPTION" (capitals given by De Silva).^2

Though the natural pneuma is no different from the psychē, and

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^1Ibid., p. 87. The nature of this relationship between God and man is described in the Old Testament by the term ruach, which according to Reinhold Niebuhr gradually becomes "the more specific designation of man's relation to God, in distinction to nephesh which achieves a connotation identical with soul or psychē, or the life principle in man" (cf. Nature and Destiny of Man [London: Nisbet, 1943], p. 162). And as Norman Snaith has pointed out, "A man can control his nephesh but it is the ruach which controls him" (cf. The Distinctive Ideas of the Old Testament [London: Epworth Press, 1947], p. 150).


The six senses in which Stacey distinguishes pneuma are: (1) as applied to the Divine--to God, to the Holy Spirit and to the Spirit of Christ; (2) as a divine influence in the life of believers, creating in them "spiritual gifts"; (3) as applied to "seducing spirits" in opposition to the Divine Spirit; (4) as the evil influence which ensued from the disobedient spirits; (5) as a purely Christian spirit created in the believer which enables him to hold communion with God because spirit with spirit can meet; (6) as "the natural possession of every man, which is of itself neither good nor bad, and is not easily distinguished from psychē." Stacey's warning is that sense five, which deals with the spirit of man as it related to God's spirit, should not be confused with six, the natural spirit of man which is mortal, morally indifferent, and liable to corruption. Ibid., pp. 128-9, 142.
though *pneuma* (like *nephes* and *psychê*) connotes aliveness as opposed to the inanimate, for De Silva the distinctive difference between them is that while *psychê* is the life that man shares with the animals, *pneuma* is the life which man only can live. *Psychê* is the self estranged from God, what Paul calls "the carnal self," and ends in death. Though opposed to each other *psychê* and *pneuma* are also interrelated in some passages (Isa 26:9; Luke 1:46-47; Phil 1:27), the *psychê* can be transformed by *pneuma* into the image of God in Christ (2 Cor 3:8), thus "we could say that *pneuma* is *psychê*--the indivisible whole--raised to a new dimension of being by the power of the Spirit." With this understanding of the spirit as a dimension of life, and of the relation of the Divine Spirit to the human spirit, and that man is a creature with the possibility of non-being as well as a creature in the "image of God", De Silva sums up his view of man:

Man is a unity of creatureliness and God-likeness; in other words, a unity of anattâ and pneuma. The nature of man can thus be described as anattâ-pneuma. Anattâ indicates man's organic nature; the fact that within the psycho-physical organism there is no permanent immortal entity and that, as such, man is subject to dukkha and anicca. Pneuma indicates that extra dimension of being which makes man more than just a physical organism or a psychosomatic complex. Pneuma is not another substance or a thing (the 'thinking thing', *res cogita*); it is rather the dynamic quality which makes man a person. Anattâ-pneuma signifies the self-empty but spirit-full life.  

1 The Problem of the Self, p. 89

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The Personal-Communal Structure of "Spirit"

We now come to what De Silva considers to be the real point of difference between the Buddhist and Christian concept of man, viz.,
that according to the Bible the authentic "self" can exist only in relationship. He has pointed out the difficulties of Buddhism in arriving at a satisfactory concept of identity and continuity of the self which steers clear of the extremes of eternalism and nihilism because of its treatment of man from a purely individualistic standpoint. He proposes therefore that from the biblical point of view, a "solution to the problem should be sought within the framework of the personal-communal nature of the self, in which the self emerges as a recognisable identity."¹

¹Ibid., p. 96. De Silva lays the groundwork for the development of this theme by following Tillich closely in the use of the term "dimension" to describe the various forms of life which while preserving distinction maintains a unity without contradiction. Thus the New Testament term "spirit" (pneuma) applies to the individual man as the authentic self, as well as to "the Divine Spirit as the ground of being and the power that creates community and posits the self." It is also seen as "the principle in which all things cohere" and "an all-inclusive totality" in which distinction is maintained. This is not to suppose that the spirit in man is an ephemeral form of the Divine Spirit, rather as Oliver Quick points out, Spirit "represents an invasive rather than a pervasive power" (ibid., pp. 90-92). Cf. O. C. Quick, Doctrines of the Creed (London: Nisbet, 1938), p. 275.

Spirit is seen as constituting personality. It is the life-creating breath of God, "the power of animation", "God's dynamic creative activity" manifest in persons. Citing Kierkegaard's explanation that "the self is grounded transparently in the power which posited it," De Silva indicates that the self is a relation, and that "Spirit is the dimension in which personality actualises itself, not as a separate entity, but as an identity within a unity" (ibid., pp. 92-93). Cf. Sören Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling, Sickness unto Death, tr. Walter Lowrie (New York: Doubleday, 1954), p. 146. The next dimension of spirit "is the communal dimension of life in which a person as a person emerges in community." The New Testament testifies that man is not an isolated individual but a person whose existence is found in the relation of persons, a relation that is constituted by the Spirit. Thus the Holy Spirit becomes the spirit of the "community," and the dimension of the life of the church as the body of Christ (1 Cor 12:13), the source of its unity (Eph 4:3), the fellowship in which Jew and Gentile find communion in God, and the life of the Church consisting of persons in the Spirit (Eph 4:4). De Silva has cited the illustration of the mother-child relationship used by John Macmurray to point out that "Personality is mutual in
The point that authentic being is found in participation, and that in this relationship one goes beyond oneself, is best expressed for De Silva by Martin Buber who refers to the aggregate as being "built up of living units of relation." In Buddhism too there is the comparable notion of the self being build up by the five factors which "are in a sense units of relation." Thus De Silva suggests that sārī, psychē, soma, pneuma, etc., are also relational terms indicating the truth that man is a communal being. Since to be is to be related authentic being is found in relationship, or as Buber put it, "I came into being over against the thou: all life is of the nature of encounter,"^2

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All existence is co-existence, in Kenneth Cragg's words, "One cannot be without interbeing."¹ This does not dispense with self-awareness, which is one of the essential marks of the authentic self, because "self-awareness is a simultaneous experience of self-relatedness." Thus personality is neither lost nor absorbed in communion, neither can it be abstracted from communion without the peril of being completely lost. Thus the paradox of the biblical understanding of the communal dimension of pneuma is that while it is logically possible to become anattā in the nihilistic sense of the word if one severed all relationships, "on the other hand one could lose oneself without annihilating the self in a relationship which takes one beyond oneself."²

Anattā-Pneuma--Three Dimensions

De Silva is now ready to sum up the interrelation between the distinctive Buddhist concept of anattā and the distinctive Christian concept of pneuma. He sees three dimensions of mutual relation in these concepts – the psycho-physical, the ethico-social, and the transcendental.

In the psycho-physical or nāma-rūpa dimension, Theravada Buddhism is unique because of its rejection of the atta, eternal self or soul, or any permanent entity within man. Christian theology can be greatly enriched by absorbing the doctrine of anattā because it is a corrective to the wrong notion of an immortal soul that has invaded popular

²Ibid., p. 99.
Christian thinking. On the other hand the biblical view of pneuma can enrich Buddhism since it goes beyond the pancakkhandha analysis (which seems to reduce man to a psychosomatic organism) and thus contributes to a fuller understanding of the concept of man:

Pneuma points to a dimension of reality which cannot be exhausted by a scientific or psychological analysis of finite life, it signifies that extra dimension of finite life which is constitutive of authentic being which makes a person more than a bundle of aggregates or merely a psycho-physical organism or an unusually complex animal. Pneuma is not some kind of a 'thing' or a substance parallel to the substance of physical entities; it is a dynamic quality of being which lifts man above finite existence.1

In the ethico-social dimension too, anattâ and pneuma complement each other. The significance of the anattâ doctrine here is its emphasis on non-attachment, particularly to the false notion of the soul which is the root cause of all evil. Buddhism, unlike other religions which are also concerned with relinquishing the self, "stands unique in its ethical discipline designed to root out everything that inflames the self." But since this is done from a purely individualistic point of view which can lead to isolation and a socially irrelevant ethic, De Silva proposes that pneuma, which affirms the social dimension, provides the balance that leads to authentic being which is achieved only in relation. But love, which is the basis of the relationship, and is capable of negating exclusive individuality and fulfilling personality, stands in need of anattâ: "If one is not disciplined in non-attachment and forgets the ideal of self-obliteration, one will turn love and interpersonal relationship into a selfish game. Therefore anattâ, with its stress on non-attachment, will always be a

1Ibid., p. 102.
safeguard against such a danger.\(^1\)

De Silva has shown the complementarity and distinctiveness of anattā and pneuma at several points in the transcendental dimension. Though man is anattā, the fact that he is aware of his anattāness and is able to evaluate the flux in which he is involved, indicates that "there is a transcendental quality in man which enables him to rise above his finite existence and affirm the Transcendent."\(^2\) However, anattā understood in its final depth, affirms that this transcendental quality is not found in man or derived from existence. It is to be found in man's relation to God, the sense of the transcendent is derived from the Transcendent. De Silva therefore proposes that the Christian concept of transcendence in pneuma enables us to understand the paradox of transcendence in the Buddhist concept of Nirvāṇa. In Nirvāṇa the realization of emptiness implied in anattā is fulfilled, the self has been transcended because supreme bliss is experienced when man is totally emptied of self, yet Buddhism stresses this does not mean annihilation. The question De Silva has sought to answer in the Anattā-Pneuma concept may well be posed -- "How does the concept of pneuma enable us to understand this paradox in a Christian-Buddhist concept of man?" He answers:

The pneuma concept provides one way of understanding it. Pneuma signifies that capacity for transcending oneself, of going out of oneself and beyond oneself, of losing oneself in communion with Reality: The more a person goes beyond himself, the more is the spiritual dimension of his

\(^1\)Ibid.

life deepened, the more he becomes a true person. In transcending oneself one ceases to be a self-contained entity; but self-hood is always being fulfilled by being transcended. Pneuma signifies communion. The underlying principle is that communion differentiates by negating exclusive individuality and by perfecting personality. Personal identity will be retained in a complete harmony without that identity being expressed in the exclusiveness of self-contained individuality.1

Thus Anattā-Pneuma signifying non-egocentric relationality, or egoless mutuality is the essence of the nature of man.

**Tilakkhana and Salvation in Jesus Christ**

In the Tilakkhana analytic De Silva has found an effective basis for a constructive dialogue in setting forth "what it means to 'confess Jesus Christ as God and Saviour' when this proclamation is made to Buddhists."2 Not only does he find it possible for Christianity like Buddhism to characterize man's existential predicament in terms of anicca, dukkha, and anattā, he also contends "that in Christ one finds the perfect solution to these problems."3 At the Consultation on Buddhist-Christian Encounter in Rangoon in 1966 he presented a paper in which he posited Jesus Christ as the most complete answer to man's tragic condition marked by Tilakkhana.4 In Psalms 90, a biblical passage in which the Tilakkhana analytic is paralleled, the psalmist who has a vision beyond the emptiness of life to the glory of

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1*The Problem of the Self,* p. 103.
3Ibid., p. 449.
God prays, "Let thy works be manifest to thy servants and thy
glorious power to thy children" (vs.16). It is a prayer for deliver­
ance from the transitoriness, suffering, and insubstantiality of life,
which "is fulfilled in Christ in whom God subjected Himself to the
transience, misery and emptiness of the human situation, in order
to conquer these negativities of life and make their opposites avail­
able to mankind." The meaning of Christ and his credibility as
saviour is therefore best communicated to the Buddhist mind in terms
of Tilakkhena.

Anattā and Man's Need of a Saviour

To bring home man's need of a saviour to the Buddhist, the
point of contact chosen by De Silva is the doctrine of Anattā. The
doctrine is utilized to distinguish the Christian and Buddhist so­
terialogies:

The Bible knows no soul theory at all. In fact it would
not be wrong to say that the Bible has an Anatta doctrine
which is far more radical than the Buddhist doctrine.
While Buddhism says that man is Anatta, it insists at the
same time, rather paradoxically, that man must save
himself by his own efforts; but Christianity would say
that man by himself is Anatta and as such cannot save
himself.1


2 Bauddha Jatika Balavegaya, p. 25. De Silva describes Buddhist
soteriology as "anthropocentric or homocentric," since "Man is res­
sponsible for the predicament in which he is, and the whole responsibil­
ity of deliverance is his alone" (The Problem of the Self, p. 34).
According to the Buddhist doctrine of salvation the ultimate aim of
the Buddhist is to seek liberation for himself from samsāric existence,
i.e., to escape the process of repetitive rebecoming through endless
ages, and enter into Nirvāṇa. Nirvāṇa (a subjective state that can
only be known through experience) is the ultimate goal to which
Buddhist morality is directed. De Silva's dialogue, however, is with
the ordinary religiously minded Buddhist, whose "aim is to escape
Though both Buddhism and biblical Christianity are agreed that the psychosomatic entity called man has no soul entity within it, it is the Bible that carries Anattā to its logical conclusion by teaching that man is nothing by himself and can do nothing by himself about his salvation. Since Anattā is the clinching argument for man's need of a saviour, it constitutes "one of the deepest dilemmas for Buddhism." De Silva reveals the contradiction in the Buddhist position by raising the question, "What is the self that denies the self and at the same time asserts that it alone can save the self?" The inescapable answer is that man stands in need of saving grace. ¹

Three reasons are given in answer to the question, "Why cannot man save himself?"

"Firstly, man cannot save himself, because as implied in the Buddhist doctrine of anatta, man has no power in himself sufficient for salvation." ² According to the doctrine of Anattā, though there is a "being" when the five khandas (aggregates) are in combination there is no abiding personality, the so called person or self is an illusion. ³


²Why Can't I Save Myself, p. 5.

³Ibid., p. 6. This idea is expressed in Buddhaghosa's Visuddhi Magga xvi as follows:

Mere suffering exists, no sufferer is found;
The deeds are, but no doer of the deeds is there.
Nirvana is, but not the man that enters it.
The path is, but no traveller on it is seen.
However, persisting questions (What is the self that denies the self? If there is no self, what does self-effort mean?) led some to argue that the Buddha did not deny the self absolutely. Though strict orthodox Buddhists may differ, a widely prevailing notion was that what the Buddha denied was the unauthentic (olarika) self. He did not explain what the true self was because his chief concern was with ethics not metaphysics, i.e., with enabling human beings to get rid of the olarika self and be liberated. According to Christian teaching and experience also man is anattā, and it is imperative for the Christian to say to himself, "I am anattā" and deny his olarika self if he is to follow Christ.¹

Man's creation in the imago dei, relates him to God.

If this relationship is distorted by selfishness or tanha, man ceases to be the authentic self. He will become an olarika self. In that sense he is anatta; he is not the true self. If man breaks this relationship completely he will cease to be. . . . God alone is immortal and it is only in relation to Him that man can become immortal. All that man is and has is, like the image which is dependent on the object, derived from God.²

¹Ibid., pp. 7-8. Not only does the Bible express the idea that man in himself is 'nothing' with striking metaphors of man as dust, mist and shadow, there is also the recognition of this fact in the Christian's experience. Thus De Silva cites several examples beginning with the statement of the anonymous writer of the mystical work Theologica Germanica: "Man of himself and his own, is nothing, has nothing, can do and is capable of nothing, but only infirmity, evil and wickedness." Isaac Pennington acknowledged, "I am a worm, I am poor, I am nothing in myself." And William Barclay commenting on Jesus' call to deny oneself and take up one's own cross and follow him (Luke 9:23), said: If we are to follow Jesus we must obliterate self and forget that self exists" (Daily Study Bible: The Gospel of Luke [Edinburgh: Saint Andrew Press, 1957], p. 122). Thus in communicating man's inability to save himself by his own effort, De Silva finds that Anattā is a point of contact that Christianity in Sri Lanka "can lay hold on with great advantage, to make the Christian message intelligible and forceful in the environment in which Christians live" (ibid., pp. 7-9).

²Ibid., p. 9.
"Secondly, man cannot save himself because self-saving devices result in making a person more and more self centred."¹ The futility of self-saving devices which try to conquer the self by the power of the self is brought out in the conversation between Nigrodha the ascetic and the Buddha recorded in the Udumbarika Sihanada Suttanta of the Digha Nikaya.² The conversation reveals that Nigrodha and his companions were ascetics of the extreme type whose self-mortifying austerities resulted in a calculated goodness. It becomes impossible for a man to save himself by asceticism because the restriction and repression of the self, or desire, or evil by self-effort only results in their reappearance in another form. Selfishness is at the root of man's nature, and his best deeds are vitiated by it. The man who resorts to self-saving devices becomes hypocritical, "and the merit in which he puts his trust would be a kind of calculating goodness, and religion to him would be a form of self-serving and a source of pride."³

"Thirdly, man cannot save himself, because the way of works, or punya karma, as a self-saving device gives no assurance of salvation."⁴ The lesson that good works fail to give the assurance of the goal which they are believed to ensure is illustrated in a story about King Dutugemunu recorded in the Mahavamsa. When an account of the unparalleled meritorious deeds done by the king has been read he responds:

¹ Ibid., p. 10.
² Why Can't I Save Myself, pp. 11-13.
³ Ibid. p. 13.
⁴ Ibid.
"But all this giving while that I reigned, rejoices not my heart; only the two gifts that I gave, without care for my life, the while I was in adversity, those gladden my heart." Thus good deeds done with the motive of gaining merits become selfish deeds, and the accumulation of merit does not ensure salvation.

Thus Buddhism, De Silva maintains, has rightly diagnosed that self is man's problem, and the Buddhist solution is that man must conquer the self by realizing his emptiness or anattā nature. For the Christian it is impossible to conquer to self by relying on the self, therefore, "He must turn his attention away from self. He must cease to rely on himself and turn to a source outside himself. And outside himself he needs a power greater than his own to save him." 2

Having dealt with man's inability to save himself, De Silva goes on to show that the need of a saviour has found expression in Buddhist faith in numerous ways. In spite of the claims of doctrinaire Buddhists, for the vast majority of lay Buddhists in Sri Lanka the Buddha is not merely a dead teacher but a living saviour who is able to confer blessings on mankind. The history of Buddhism shows that "while with the top of their heads Buddhists deny the need of a saviour, in their hearts they yearn for someone like Jesus Christ, a loving, humble, suffering and forgiving Saviour." 3 Early Buddhists yearning for an object of worship began by venerating the Buddha as a perfect saint and paying homage to his relics. This in turn led to actual

1Ibid., p. 15.
2Ibid., p. 16.
worship though the Buddha had claimed no divinity for himself. Today Sri Lankan Buddhists fulfill the need of a savior by paying homage to modern adaptations of the early Buddhist counterparts of Hindu gods, e.g., Manjusiri, Avalokitesvara, and Padmapani. They look forward to Maitreya, the Buddha-elect who is destined to save the world. G. P. Malalasekera's remarks from World Buddhism of January 1960, explaining the Buddhist attitude to prayer, are cited. He speaks of the "living presence of the Master" and says the Buddha is "unrivalled as a guide and friend to those who seek his guidance." While stating that for the devotee, the Vihara (a Buddhist retreat or monastery) is where the Buddha lives, Malalasekera qualifies this statement by saying that the devotee makes offerings "to someone who to him is yet alive in that the Buddha's teachings are alive." Thus for De Silva, Buddhist history and the existential affirmations by which the Buddhist actually lives today prove that man's heart cries out for a savior.

The Credibility of Christ as Savior

We have seen that De Silva describes man's lostness in terms of Anatta, Dukkha, and Anicca. He has also shown that if these three negativities of finite existence are understood in their final depth

1Ibid. De Silva has also traced the rise of the Mahayana doctrine of grace as opposed to self-salvation. In Japanese Jiriki (the way of salvation by self-power) is contrasted with Tariki (the way of salvation by "other help"), and the belief "that man can be saved only by the grace of Amida through faith in him" closely parallels Christian belief in Christ. Japanese Buddhists adapting the Christian hymn sing, "Buddha loves me this I know; for the Sutra tells me so." Since Mahayana Buddhists do not claim any historicity for Amida Buddha, De Silva concludes that "he is the fragmentary actualization of the universal need for a saviour in a symbolic form. Or in other words, He is the personification of man's need for a saviour" (Why Can't I Save Myself, pp. 18-21).
and meaning salvation has to be sought outside of man and his existence.

Through the Dharma-Logos point of contact, the use of the bodhisatva concept, and an exposition of the deep significance of kenotic Christology in terms of Tilakkhana, he has sought to establish the credibility of Christ as Saviour in the Buddhist mind.

Christ as Bodhisatva and Dharma-Logos

Jesus Christ is presented as the historical actualization of the ideal Bodhisatva who identifies with the Anatta, Dukkha, and Anicca of human existence to bear the karma of humanity. For De Silva the deep truth that the Saviour must identify himself with the sinner is apprehended in the Bodhisatva ideal in Buddhism, in which the Bodhisatva is believed to take different bodily forms in order to be able to save:

A Bodhisatva resolves: I take myself the burden of all suffering I am resolved to do so, I will endure it... I must rescue all these things from the stream of Samsara, which is difficult to cross... I myself must grapple with the whole mass of suffering of all beings. To the limit of my endurance I will experience in all the states of woe, found in my world system: all the abodes of suffering!

This truth apprehended in Buddhism as an ideal and symbolized in the figure of the Bodhisatvas who were, to use Edward Conze's words "productions of the mind and without historical or factual basis" (Buddhism p. 150) was actualised in Jesus Christ within historical existence. In practically all religions there are approximations to this ideal e.g. Avataras in Hinduism and Bodhisatvas in Buddhism, but the Christ event is the only historical actualization of this ideal.1

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1 "The Christian Solution to the Problem of Man," p. 67. The depiction of Christ as a Bodhisatva seems to be an attempt to dialogue with the average lay Buddhist (whose beliefs are strongly influenced by Mahayana concepts) rather than the orthodox Theravadin. The Bodhisatva in the Theravada view means an aspirant for Buddhahood, and in original Pali Buddhism the term was used more or less exclusively to designate the Buddha prior to his Enlightenment. A. G. S. Kariyawasam says that in the Pali canon the Bodhisatvas are treated as "larval forms' of the Buddha", or "a rare type of man appearing at a
Man is saved by Christ's victory over the negativities of human existence. By his incarnation Christ identified himself completely with man's tragic existence, while at the same time maintaining a permanent unity with God. This two-fold participation, in existence, and with the Eternal, "is the power which overcomes the negativities of existence and that power is available for man who participates in Christ."  

In communicating Jesus as the perfect solution to the problems of Tilakkhana, De Silva uses a combination of the Johanine and Pauline ways of presenting Christ as found in the prologue to John's Gospel and in Phillipians 2. Because of the close resemblance between the logos of John's Gospel and dharma of the Buddhist scriptures, he sees "an excellent contact-point" to "present Jesus Christ as the unique revealer of the eternal logos just as the Buddhas are revealers of the eternal dharma."  

This, however, may be done with the proviso certain stage in time and space." However, later works like the Mahayana sutras "went on developing the bodhisattva-concept in such a way that he became an object of devotion and his human nature gradually disappeared. The Mahayanists, in trying to remedy the situation, ended up by making him a saviour" ("Bodhisattva", Encyclopedia of Buddhism [1971], 3:231 Christmas Humphreys says that in contrast to the Theravada ideal of the Arhat, in Mahayana the Bodhisatva "renounces Nirvana in order to help humanity on its pilgrimage. The Bodhisattvas are often called 'Buddhas of Compassion' as love in action guided by wisdom is their aim" ("Bodhisattva", A Popular Dictionary of Buddhism [1976], pp. 46-47).  

\[1\] Ibid.  

\[2\] "Good News of Salvation," p. 452. Having explored the dimensions of the term, De Silva notes that the word dharma has already been adapted to translate the word logos in the new Sinhalese translation of St. John's Gospel. In the Indian philosophical setting dharma could mean "that which forms a foundation", "that which upholds", "the eternal, uncreated order of law in the universe", and "Ultimate Truth". Brahman, the Ultimate Reality of Hinduism, is equated with the dharma of the Buddhist scriptures. Thus in Tillichian terms dharma could be called the "Ground of Being." The other dimension
that the historicity of Jesus is given utmost stress, and the recogni-
tion that the divinity of Jesus is both "firmly rooted in history and
at the same time supra-historical, all embracing and all-sufficient."¹

In dharma De Silva finds an immense wealth of meaning which enables
us to employ it the way John did with the word logos. Because there
is a striking similarity in the logos concept to the idea of the tathā-
gata, in which there is a reaching out for a concept of dharma in per-
sonal terms, it is an useful point of contact to commend the Christian
view of the incarnation to the Buddhist. Thus he says:

We should pursue the idea of the tathāgata identified
with the dharma spoken of as the Lord and having the synonym
dharma-body. The tathāgata as an embodiment of the dharma
is a spiritual principle rather than an individual, and in
later developments his body is described as 'a vesture which
looks like a physical body', but is not material. It is at
this point that we need to press home the truth that 'the
Word became flesh'.²

¹Ibid.
²Ibid.
At this point a logical transition to the Christological hymn in Phil 2:1-11, which explains the relevance of the Christ-event to the human predicament, is seen. Christ identifies himself with the realm of samsara by his incarnation but maintains an unbroken unity with the realm of reality:

For the Christian the eternally existent unborn, unbecome, not-made and unconditioned—the Logos, the Word, the Dharma—was fully manifest in Jesus Christ. He is preexistent and eternally present reality—"Before Abraham was I am." In him, in his incarnation, there was a unique relation between the conditioned and the Unconditioned.

Unconditioned identity—De Silva's kenotic christology

Identity with the Conditioned

The significance of Christ's kenosis for De Silva's Christology is that in his kenosis Christ became sunya (void) and identified himself fully with conditioned existence, which bears the marks of dukkha, anatta, and anicca. This, it is maintained, is clearly indicated in the three assertions found in Phil 2:7-8. Firstly, he became dukkha in order to redeem man from a state of dukkha. When Christ took upon himself the morphe (form, condition, nature) of a doulos (slave or servant) he filled the role of the suffering servant of Isa 53:4-5. This is the biblical image of one who has taken upon himself the suffering of the world. Thus in Heb 2:10, God who brings many sons to glory makes "the leader who delivers them perfect through suffering." Secondly, Christ became anicca by being born in the likeness of man, i.e., by really taking human nature, he identifies with man's

impermanence. When he was born into this world he took upon himself the real conditions to which all men are subject:

There is no room here for the Docetic view that Christ's form appeared to be human, but was actually a spiritual body. The Word really became flesh. To be born in the likeness of man is to be mortal like every man, who has no immortal soul. By becoming man Christ took upon himself this human nature.¹

Thirdly, Christ became anattā. When Christ emptied himself he took upon himself the nature of mortal man and became obedient to the death of the cross....He died a real death like all men, and through his death he truly partook of man's anattāness. He became sin, and the wages of sin is death. This death, De Silva explains, corresponds to anattā since it involves "not only physical death but the possibility of complete annihilation. The experience of Anatta is the experience of the threat of non-being that comes to all."² It is this anxiety of having to die that Christ experienced in the garden of Gethsemane when he prayed that the cup might pass away from him, an anxiety that was not relieved by the expectation of the resurrection. Christ's participation in man's mortality comes to its climax in his death, since "on the Cross he tasted the horror of being ultimately lost when he cried 'My God, My God, why hast thou forsaken me?' He experienced anatta which is a consequence of alienation from God and being subject to natural fate."³

¹Ibid., p. 49.
³Ibid.
Identity with the Unconditioned

The passage in Philippians also suggests that because Christ maintained a permanent unity with the Unconditioned (God), his kenosis was also a plerosis. De Silva has sought to commend this to the Buddhist in terms of Sunyatā (the doctrine of the void, emptiness, negation) and Punnatā (plerosis). Three major antitheses in the passage under consideration indicate the plerosis-kenosis, sunyatā-punnatā identity of Jesus.

Firstly, though he became a servant and suffered on the cross he was exalted and given a name above every other name. Secondly, though born "in the likeness of man," he was in the "form of God." The point is made that there is no suggestion that he renounced his divine morphe, and that "anatta was conquered in his being by being brought into participation with the Unconditioned." Thirdly, though he subjected himself to death and became anicca, "anicca was conquered in his being by his participation in the Deathless (amata)." Thus it is concluded that "Christ negated himself without losing himself. Negation and elevation happened together in his kenosis. This was possible because in a unique sense his identity with the conditioned was an unconditioned identity."¹

The Unconditioned identity

Having affirmed that in Christ's kenosis there was the identity of the conditioned and the Unconditioned, De Silva notes that the doctrine of emptiness means the unconditioned identity of the conditioned and the Unconditioned and then asks, "In what sense is this

¹"Theological Construction in a Buddhist Context," p. 50.
identity unconditioned?" He finds the answer in the sinlessness of Christ. In the light of the implied contrast of Phil 2, between Christ's emptying himself and not grasping at equality with God and Adam's willful act of grasping at equality with God, the sinlessness of Christ stands in contrast to the acts of Adam and all mankind which are motivated by tanha (greed, desire, or presumptuousness):

In Christ's act of emptying himself there was no trace of tanha, which binds man to conditioned existence and puts him under the power of anicca, dukkha, and anatta. Christ was sinless; hence, conditioned existence had no power over him. His identity with conditioned existence was therefore an unconditioned identity and he was thus able to negate himself without losing himself. And this is what makes it possible for mortal man to lose himself and yet find himself, by being "in Christ," by participation in him.¹

It is his simultaneous identity with existence (the conditioned) and his unity with God (the unconditioned) that enables Christ to bear the karma of humanity and solve man's predicament. De Silva explains to the Buddhist how Jesus in his identification with man could be tempted in all points like us and yet be without sin. Without desire (tanha) there can be no temptation, but desire in itself is not sinful. It becomes sinful "when what is desired is desired apart from God." Jesus' victory over temptation rested on the fact that all that was desired was desired within the unity of God. However, "desire and temptation were real to Jesus because His decision was a decision made under the conditions of finite existence." His finitude was real because his temptations were real. Though he had the real desire of any man it "was not actualised under the pressure of temptation as in Adam and Eve." Thus the words of the writer of Hebrews, "He was tempted in

all points like us but without sin," are a summary statement which implies that there was no trace of concupiscence, kama tanha (karmic desire), in Christ. In the temptation story Jesus rejects the offer of food and unlimited power because "there was no trace of Hubris (Bhava tanha) in Him." And since "there was no trace of unbelief in Him," with the cry of dereliction Jesus commits himself to the hands of God. Thus De Silva concludes that Jesus was "wholly man and wholly God," and because he accepted "the elements of tragic existence into this God-man unity" and conquered them, he becomes "the most perfect and all sufficient Saviour of the world."²

The Human Response--Pistis and Saddhā

The total adequacy of Jesus Christ as the answer to anatta, dukkha, and anicca, i.e., the fact "that God's atoning activity in Jesus Christ is an objective reality achieved once for all and for all time," is the basis of the human response.³ Christ lifts man into the sphere of spirit (pneuma) where the destructive elements of tragic existence are conquered, this state of man being grasped and drawn into Christ is described by Paul as "being in Christ" (2 Cor 5:17). Thus for De Silva it can be shown in terms of Tilakkhana that salvation is entirely the work of God in Christ:

It is this simultaneous participation of Christ that makes the human response possible however feeble that response

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¹ "The Christian Solution to the Problem of Man," p. 68.
² Ibid., p. 69.
³ Ibid.
may be. There is nothing within man which makes the response possible because man is anatta. There is nothing in the conditions of space and time which makes this response possible because space and time are dukkha and anicca respectively. Conversely there is nothing within finite existence which bears the character of anatta, dukkha and anicca which makes man acceptable to God. Just here is the paradox; in spite of man's unworthiness, God has accepted him. Man must accept just this.1

De Silva's understanding of the human response to salvation in Christ is found in his exposition of Eph 2:8,9. The four truths implied in these texts—salvation is by grace alone, it is appropriated by faith, the reception of grace leads to good works, and salvation is a right relationship—serve as a basis to delineate the Christian view of man's role in salvation in relation to Buddhist thought.

**Salvation by grace and grace alone**

De Silva points out that at this point he is dialoguing with popular Buddhism, since theoretically Buddhism would explicitly deny the operation of grace, since it conflicts with Buddhist doctrines of self-effort and karma. However, he finds that in Buddhism, as it is practiced, there are striking approximations to the Christian idea of grace. The doctrine of Patti-dana, which has canonical justification (Anguttara Nikaya VII:50), maintains that it is possible to transfer merit acquired through giving alms and meritorious deeds.2 In the Amida cult of the Mahayana stream, as developed by Genku-Honen (the founder of Pure Land Buddhism) and his pupil Shinran, "the doctrine of grace

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1Ibid., p. 70.

2Why Can't I Save Myself, p. 23.
which is implicit in Hinayana Buddhism has come to its full fruition."
According to Pure Land Buddhism man is not saved by self-effort or
human merit but by the "grace of the compassionate Redeemer, Amida
Buddha." De Silva admits that these beliefs, to which the Mahayana
has given ecclesiastical approval, would be condemned as heretical
by the Hinyanists, but cannot be disregarded as they are to be found
in their popular religion.¹

**Salvation is through faith—pistis and saddhā**

De Silva's views on the role of faith in the two religions,
and the relation of the two concepts to each other, are found in the
paper "Pistis and Saddha" presented at the National Christian Council
(N. C. C.) Study Centre Seminar on "Faith in Buddhism and Christianity"
on June 28, 1967. The leading Buddhist participant, Nihal de Silva,
opened the sessions with a paper on "The Buddhist Quality of Faith."
The Christian participants were Dr. G. C. Mendis, Professor of History
at the University of Ceylon, and Fr. Vito Perniola S. J., Professor
of Pali of Aquinas University College in Colombo. Gunaseela Vitanage,
secretary of the Bauddha Jatika Balavegaya, subsequently replied to
Fr. Perniola's paper.

The Greek word pistis and the Pali word saddhā translated by
the one English word "faith" are seemingly identical in meaning, but
Lynn de Silva points out that there are some vital differences. Never­
theless he also find much more that is common in the concepts of faith
in Christianity and Buddhism than is usually realized.² This common

¹Ibid., pp. 24-26.
focused on these similarities and differences. Nihal de Silva held that to a Buddhist saddhā meant "faith or confidence in the Buddha and his teaching." He maintained that in the Buddhist view free-thought can stimulate wisdom and even faith unlike in most theistic religions in which free thought is considered a grave sin. Thus he concludes that Buddhism differs from the theistic religions on two main points: "Firstly, free-thought in Buddhism, unlike in theistic religions, is not considered a heinous crime. Secondly, whereas theistic religions depend mainly on faith for deliverance from suffering, Buddhism on the contrary indicates self-effort as the main factor involved." ("The Buddhist Quality of Faith," Dialogue Old Series No. 12 [September 1967]: 18. G. C. Mendis commenting from the Christian viewpoint sees the seminar as an attempt by the Christians to understand what the Buddhists meant by "faith". He is in agreement with Lynn de Silva that it is only in the later Theravada or in the Mahayana texts that saddhā resembles the meaning of faith in Christianity. According to Mendis, the difference is that the early Theravada Buddhists looked upon the Buddha as a man who showed the way to salvation, while to the Christians Jesus was the Son of God. Thus he concludes, "In Christianity faith involves confidence both in the teacher and in his teaching and is by itself a way to salvation, and thus has a much deeper, more extensive and richer meaning than Saddha in early Buddhism" ("Faith in Buddhism and in Christianity," Dialogue Old Series No. 14 [February 1968]: 4). Fr. Vito Perniola's lengthy paper dealing with the examples of Mālunkyaputta Subaddha and Upali leads him to interpret the act of faith in the Buddhist disciple as total commitment to the Master and his doctrine:

Faith occupies in Buddhism very much the same place that it occupies in other religious systems, and this faith consists in accepting the doctrine of a teacher who has proved himself capable of guiding others, and in fashioning one's life on the model presented by the doctrine of such a teacher. And it is this modelling of one's life that makes of faith not a mere intellectual assent but a real personal commitment" ("Faith in Buddhism," Dialogue Old Series No. 14 [February 1968]: 9).

Gunaseela Vitanage in a lengthy reply contests Perniola's thesis that "faith occupies in Buddhism very much the same place that it occupies in other religious systems." He points out that the Buddha laid no claims to divinity, nor did he claim to be a saviour in the sense of taking the burden of the sins of others on himself; "He only claimed to be the Discoverer of the Way of Release from the ills of the world, and the Instructor and Guide to that Way." Thus the Buddhists repose their faith in him as their friend, guide, and philosopher. The Buddha himself had said that reason (Buddhi) must act as a corrective and guide to faith, and thus he did not expect even his disciples to accept his teachings uncritically. Thus Vitanage maintains that "faith" in Buddhism differs in meaning and concept from "faith" in Christianity. See, "Faith in Buddhism II: A Reply to Fr. Perniola," Dialogue Old Series No. 14 (February 1968): 10-15.
ground is indicated by combining the Barthian definition of faith as trust, knowledge, and confession with the Buddhist scholar Edward Conze's definition of *saddhā* as "a resolute and courageous act of the will," "an attitude of serenity and lucidity," and "a trusting assent to doctrines."\(^1\)

Faith as trust, or a resolute and courageous act of the will, is described by the revered monk Nagasena in the *Milinda Prasna* as the mark of leaping forward (*Sampakkhandana Lakkhana*). He illustrates it with the story of a strong man who crosses a turbulent torrent and is seen by a large crowd which follows and crosses over. Here De Silva sees a remarkable parallel to the Christian view that salvation is by grace through faith:

> Christians would see that the strong man in this illustration represents Jesus Christ in some respects. Of Him it could truly be said that he triumphed over death and crossed over. Not only did He cross over, He has given the promise that He would help, strengthen and guide those who are crossing over from death to life.\(^2\)

Thus trust in Christ enables one to become "a Saddhanusari, a faith-follower of Jesus Christ." Moreover, this attitude of trust and acceptance of authority expressed in relation to the Buddha indicates "that there has always been a bhakti movement—a cult of devotion and faith—in Buddhism which gave a central place to the Buddha as a person." De Silva considers it especially significant that the term *Saddhāvimutti* (emancipation through faith) occurs frequently in the Pali scriptures, and faith is depicted as a way of emancipation by


\(^2\)Ibid., p. 22.
which one could reach Arahathood—the highest ideal in life. Thus he finds that faith occupies a central place as trust in a person and as a way of emancipation in both religions. However, he also draws attention to the vital difference in the Buddhist’s faith in the Buddha and the Christian’s faith in Jesus Christ:

Faith in the Buddha is, theoretically speaking, impersonal or at least less personal than faith in Jesus Christ. The faith which the simple Buddhist reposes in the Buddha and which comes very near to the Christian notion of faith, especially in some of the Mahayana schools, has no place in orthodox Buddhism. But in Christianity the place that Christ occupies is of far greater significance. Faith is an affair of the whole personality.

The second mark of faith sampasādana lakkhana is illustrated by Nagasena by comparing faith with a water-clearing gem which is cast into muddy water to make it clear, pure, and serene. This meant that

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1 Ibid., p. 22. De Silva has also attempted a harmonization of the four stages of emancipation described in the Anguttara Nikaya with the implications of faith in the Christian sense. He says The four stages are:

1. Sotapatti—entering the stream. In this stage one has to be free from three fetters, namely, Personality belief, Sceptical doubt and Attachment to mere rule and ritual.
2. Sakadagami—Once-returning. In this stage one becomes nearly free from the fourth and fifth fetters, namely, Sensuous craving and Ill-will.
3. Anagami—Never-returning. In this stage one becomes fully free from the above five fetters.
4. Arahat—in this last stage one becomes free from five other fetters, namely, Craving for Fine material existence (ruparaga), Craving for Immaterial existence (aruparage), Conceit, Restlessness and Ignorance.

It could be said that one becomes a Sotapatti in the Christian sense when he is free from the first three fetters. Free from personality belief means not trusting in or relying on oneself. Free from sceptical doubt means trusting in Jesus Christ. Free from rule and ritual means that religion be inward and not based on externals. All this is implied in the word faith. See Why Can’t I Save Myself, p. 44.

2 Ibid., p. 23.

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"faith is that which gives lucidity, clarity and illumination." In regarding faith as knowledge or an attitude of serenity and lucidity, Christianity and Buddhism meet since in both religions faith is basic to the attainment of knowledge and truth. However, De Silva notes that the story of Nigantaranaruputta and Citta in the Samyutta Nikaya and that of Vakkali in the Anguttara Nikaya in which faith is sometimes considered to be a hindrance indicates that "Buddhism places a greater value on knowledge than on faith." In Christianity on the other hand, he finds no contradiction between faith and knowledge, as there are many passages in the Gospels (as in John 6:69) where faith and knowledge are used synonymously. Thus he concludes: "For Buddhism the best kind of faith is one which says 'I know'; for Christianity the best kind of knowledge is one that says 'I believe'."\(^1\)

The third aspect, faith as confession or a trusting assent to doctrines is also a feature that both religions have in common. Doctrinal formulations are important as they are the means by which "our experience of faith as trust and illumination become rational and coherent." Thus the Christian creeds, formulated after the time of Christ and the New Testament, were the result of the need to articulate the New Testament faith (trust and knowledge). De Silva notes that the Buddhist participant in the seminar, Nihal de Silva, has pointed out that the Four Noble Truths and the Noble Eight-fold Path have to be accepted on faith, thus "in a sense they could be called the Buddhist Confession."\(^2\)

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 23-24.

\(^2\)Ibid., pp. 24-25.
Salvation--a right relationship

In a sermon at the Kollupitiya Methodist Church on Good Friday in 1969, De Silva contrasted the Buddhist emphasis on salvation as an individual concern with the Christian emphasis on relationship: "The Christian view of salvation is not individualistic; it is conceived in terms of a relationship. Salvation means a right relationship, the basis of which is love." Because God has said through Christ on the Cross that man is accepted unconditionally, man "must accept that he is accepted." Nothing more than the response of faith to God's unconditional love is required. "In this acceptance man is restored to a right relationship with God, and that is what salvation means. For this relationship nothing is demanded, no moral achievement nor intellectual understanding, nothing but acceptance."¹

The nature of this relationship is brought out in the parable of the prodigal son. It is forgiveness that restores the broken relationship, and by stages that relationship is perfected. Thus De Silva depicts the younger son as being overcome by tanha (thirst or desire), leaving for the far country, and when he came to himself, it "meant that he realized he was nothing by himself (anatta)." The son returns home when he realizes "that he was his true self only when he lived in a true relationship, i.e., of a son to his father." The father forgives and accepts him as a son and the broken relationship is restored.²

¹The Cross and the Bodhi Tree (Colombo: Wesley Press, 1969), pp. 4-6.
De Silva then draws attention to the Buddhist version of the story of the prodigal son found in the *Lotus Sutra*, which serves "as a corrective to the sentimental way in which Christians think about the gospel parable." Attention is drawn to the fact that to many the Buddhist parable will seem to be more in accord with reason and common sense, and thus raises the question as to whether the prodigal stands in need of discipline for his own good, lest mere forgiveness be far too sentimental. He points out that forgiveness does not absolve one of discipline, nor does it instantaneously transform one into a perfect being, rather

It means that the barriers to a relationship are removed so that through faith one can enter into the path of holiness which is the beginning of a new life the proof of which is seen in "good works." A relationship implies a life of discipline and service.2

Thus for De Silva the Buddhist parable helps Christians to guard against the notion of a cheap grace since Buddhism has stressed the importance of virtue to complete faith. In the *Vinaya Pitaka*, the Buddha says, "Bhikkus, a Bhikku who is a believer but not virtuous is not complete with regard to this quality. He should complete this

1De Silva sums up the Buddhist parable as follows: "In this story the son goes away from the father and remains separated for fifty years. The father becomes very rich and the son very poor. In his wanderings the son comes upon his father's palace but recognizes no one. But the father now a very old man recognizes his son but does not welcome him. He hides himself and puts the son through a course of discipline to test the genuineness of his conversion and to purify him. It is only on his death-bed that the father reveals himself and explains to the son why he acted in this way" (Ibid., pp. 37-38).

2Ibid., p. 38.
thing."¹ From the Christian viewpoint the old slogan "saved to serve" expresses the truth that faith must bear fruit in good works. In Jas 2:14-19, 26, he finds a strong attack on "the notion that a mere confession of faith or the recital of the creed ensures one's salvation regardless of his conduct and behaviour."² De Silva has also stressed two aspects of Christian service from which Buddhism can benefit:

Firstly, Christian service is ideally non-calculating. There is no thought of gaining merit. . . .

Secondly, the Christian life is not a life of detachment but of involvement; not a way of escape from suffering but a way of love which would bear one another's burdens; not a way of seeking one's own salvation by retiring to a desert or monastery, but of active service in society.³

Non-Christians and God's Plan of Salvation

In his christology and soteriology De Silva addresses some of the thorniest questions pertaining to inter-religious dialogue from the Christian point of view. For the Christian the most basic of all questions is what the confession of Christ as Lord and saviour means in a world in which the overwhelming majority of mankind lives by other faiths and ideologies. If God's action in Jesus Christ has universal and abiding significance, it must cohere with his action in relation to the large majority of mankind which has not encountered Jesus Christ and is not a part of his church. De Silva has squarely confronted the issues of the uniqueness and universality of Christianity

¹"Pistis and Saddhā," p. 25.

²Why Can't I Save Myself? p. 31.

³Ibid., p. 32.
and deals with the "searching" and "embarrassing" questions pertaining to them. If Jesus Christ and his Gospel is the only way of salvation for all men everywhere in all ages, what does the Christian living in the midst of other ancient faiths have to say about the salvation of the countless millions who have lived in the past and are going to live in the future outside the church and altogether outside Christianity? The Christian, according to him, is called upon to answer such embarrassing questions as:

What happens to those who lived before Christ, and those who have not heard the Gospel? What about those who, due to physical, biological and psychological reasons, have not been able to progress in any way? Will they be saved or damned?^1

De Silva's evaluation of Hans Kung's suggestion that the world religions represent the "ordinary" path to God, and Christianity the "extraordinary" way raises crucial questions pertaining to the concepts of Christ as saviour, and of church and mission. If other religions had their own God-given expressions of salvation and revelation, the task of mission loses its urgency and the Christ-event its uniqueness and finality. Thus De Silva asks:

If, on the other hand, we grant that people can find salvation without belonging to the Christian Church and without explicit faith in Jesus Christ, we will be faced with a number of searching questions such as these:
- In what sense is Christ unique?
- What is the purpose of mission?
- Why preach the Gospel at all?^2

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De Silva has essayed the task of finding a way out of this dilemma seeking to understand the theological significance of Jesus Christ to people of other faiths on the basis of "a fresh understanding of the meaning of salvation in the Bible."¹ The basic finding of this analysis of the biblical concept of salvation is "that God's work of salvation is a continuous process related to the particular moments in history, and that God works through all sorts of people and events to achieve His purposes."² He has outlined three biblical strands which lead to the distinctive conclusions he has arrived at.

Firstly, there is salvation in the absolute sense, i.e., "God is the absolute Saviour." The testimony of the entire Scriptures is that God is the God of salvation, and the only saviour. They also testify to the all-encompassing scope of God's salvation consisting of his mighty deeds or acts beginning with creation and consummated in the new creation (Cf. 2 Cor 5:17-18). Though he may send other saviours, it is he himself who saves (Isa 43:11; cf. 45: 21; Hos 13:4). The New Testament also speaks of him as the one and only saviour in no less than six passages (e.g. Luke 1:47; Jude 25). And, because he is identified with God, the saviourhood of Jesus is also thought of in the absolute sense (Luke 2:11; John 4:42; Eph 5:23; Phil 3:20; Titus 1:4; 2:13; 3:6; 2 Pet 1:1,11; 2:20; 3:2,18).³

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., p. 64.
³Ibid., p. 62.
Secondly, there is salvation in the relative sense, i.e., God uses human beings for his saving deeds. Biblical examples are given in which salvation is thought of in a general or secondary sense, viz., a preacher is said to save his hearers, meaning that God saves them through these preachers (1 Cor 1:21; Rom 11:14; 1 Cor 9:22), or Christians may save their unbelieving partners (1 Cor 7:16). De Silva avers that God sends "Saviours" (Gen 45:7) and empowers them to work their deeds of salvation (Judg 6:15-16). Thus in the Old Testament the title "saviour" is used for successful captains (Judg 3:9) and kings (2 Kgs 13:5), and "It is also applied to leaders and deliverers of the people in the course of their history, who need not necessarily belong to the Jewish race and religion (Neh. 9:27)." Speaking in diverse manners and through diverse people, in every age and sphere of human life, God has not left himself without witnesses. They are "ministering spirits sent forth to serve, for the sake of those who are to obtain salvation" (Heb 1:14). Thus he sums up and draws the conclusion that

Ultimately it is God who saves, but He uses human beings to achieve His purposes. In the Divine plan for the salvation of the world, God works in and through the lives of persons of real flesh and blood, sinful and fallible as men are, who were nevertheless chosen to be His instruments, not through any virtue of their own nor through anything such as race or religion that makes them worthy of His choice. In this sense Confucius, Zoroaster and Buddha are saviours.2

De Silva sees the saviourhood of Jesus also in the relative sense. Just as God works through other agents, in the New Testament

1 Ibid., pp. 62-63.
2 Ibid.
God is depicted as working out his salvific purposes through Christ. Just as others were his instruments for the salvation of the world, so Jesus Christ too becomes God's instrument. He manifests God's saving grace (2 Tim 1:10); the world is reconciled to God through Christ (2 Cor 5:19); and he becomes one of the saviours in so far as God works his salvation through him (Acts 5:31; 13:23). For the apostle John it is God who has sent Jesus as saviour into the world (1 John 4:14), and Jesus' saving work is what God does through him.¹

Thirdly, there is salvation in the eschatological sense. Three things stand out in De Silva's exposition of this aspect of salvation: (1) In the New Testament salvation is bound up with the Christ-event, which "like every other historical event in which God has acted to save His people, is only a foretaste or earnest of the great salvation that is to come in the Parousia." He explains that the biblical expression "God has saved", as in Titus 3:5, should be understood as "God will save" because the past is identified with the future in the Hebrew-Greek idiom. We are living in an intermediate state "between the times", and our knowledge of Jesus Christ (cf. Luke 1:77) is the guarantee of the salvation that is to come with the new heaven and the new earth.² (2) Salvation is a cosmic fact, an event in which all things are summed up in Christ. This is an idea inalienably connected with eschatology since our salvation is bound up with the redemption of the universe (Rom 8), and God's plan is to unite all things in Christ (Eph 1:10; Col 1:20).³

¹Ibid.
²Ibid., p. 63.
³Ibid.
(3) Since salvation is eschatological, man now lives in the hope of salvation (Phil 3:20; Titus 2:13; Rom 8:24; 1 Thess 1:8). The Christian message is seen as a message of hope (1 Pet 3:15), and the relation of the concept of hope to salvation is of great significance for our understanding of the Church's mission. In summing up the theological significance of hope, De Silva notes that man is saved by hope (Rom 8:24); it is the earnest of salvation in this age (2 Cor 5:5); our hope must be in the revelation that is to come (1 Pet 1:5); the ultimate source and power of this hope is God himself (Rom 5:5; 15:13; 4:17-21; Gal 5:5; cf. Jer 14:8), the ground of this hope is the resurrection (Rom 1:1-5; 1 Pet 1:3, 21). Thus Christ becomes man's hope (Col 1:27) and the only hope (Eph 4:4).

Eschatology--the key to the uniqueness and universality of the Christ-event

On the basis of this analysis of the biblical concept of salvation, De Silva takes up the questions of the uniqueness and universality of the Christ-event. He is dealing with the embarrassing questions that he has posed relating to the salvation of those who have never heard the gospel, and to the salvific value of other religions. He is aware that this biblical exposition in which God is depicted as working through all sorts of people and events to achieve his saving purpose "may seem to reduce the significance and uniqueness of the Christ-event upon which so much stress is laid in the New Testament." Therefore the question he must squarely confront

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1 See above, pp. 193-194.
2 Ibid., p. 64.
is whether this conception of salvation can do justice to the New Testament sense of the uniqueness of the Christ-event and its insistence that "there is no salvation in anyone else at all, for there is no other name under Heaven granted to men, by which we may receive salvation" (Acts 4:12 N. E. B.). For De Silva this verse and others expressing the same idea can best be understood in the eschatological concept of salvation. He suggests:

We cannot speak of salvation in any sense of finality until the final consummation. Our salvation is bound up with the summing-up of "all things in heaven and earth" in Christ, and it is Christ alone who has the power to do this. No religious leader has made this claim. Therefore we should assert as strongly as possible, as the Bible does, that there is no salvation apart from Christ.

This does not mean that only those who consciously acknowledge the Lordship of Jesus Christ as known in history, will be saved and all others will be lost eternally. The Christ-event is the classic instance of salvation, but not the exclusive event in history through which God has mediated His salvation to mankind. The other events, although they do not measure up to the classic event, are in no way insufficient means of salvation. Each event, like the Christ-event, is a promise and guarantee of the salvation that is to be in the end-time.¹

¹Ibid. For De Silva the solution to the questions of the uniqueness and the universality of the Christ-event must be found in the eschatological context because even commendable attempts, like that of D. M. Baillie to solve the problem by investing the event in time with eternal significance, fall short of the New Testament emphasis. De Silva commends Baillie's position for liberating Christian theology from the error of relativizing the absolute by absolutizing and universalizing the relative. For Baillie the divine sin-bearing was not confined to a moment in history but was eternal, i.e., God's work of reconciliation was not confined to a moment in history but still goes on in every age in the lives of sinful men, whose sin he still bears. Thus Baillie says:

"If we then go on to speak of an eternal Atonement in the very life and being of God, it is not by way of reducing the significance of the historical moment of the Incarnation, but by way of realizing the relation of the living God to every historical moment" (God was in Christ [London: Faber and Faber, 1948], p. 190).
Therefore for De Silva it is in the context of the end-time that the uniqueness of Christ as saviour and the universal scope of salvation in him must be understood.

The vindication of the Christ-event is to be found in the final resurrection and in the concept of progressive sanctification after death. The haunting problems that have dogged Theravada Buddhism in its endeavor to reconcile the doctrines of anātta and rebirth, the persistent questions regarding self-identity and what happens to the self finally, and the contradictions of karma and samsaric existence, find their resolution in the Christ-event focused in the biblical doctrine of the resurrection in relation to the Theravada paradox of na ca so na ca anno. The solution of what happens to the countless millions who have not heard the gospel, and the salvation or damnation of those who due to physical, biological, and psychological reasons have never been able to progress in anyway, is to be found in an "intermediate state," which, De Silva says, Protestants prefer to call "progressive sanctification after death," and Roman Catholics "purgatory." De Silva finds that the "Double Predestination" theory with its notion that at death a person passes either to everlasting damnation in hell or to eternal happiness in heaven "has been one of the greatest stumbling blocks to Buddhists who, in contrast, find in the doctrine of rebirth or reincarnation something far more satisfying." Thus "progressive sanctification" is proposed by De Silva as the Christian alternative to rebirth.

1 "Good News of Salvation to the Buddhists," pp. 453-454. It must be noted that in the dialogue at the N. C. C. Seminar on "The Buddhist Attitude to Christianity," Alec Robertson argued for the advantages of the Buddhist theory of rebirth as it was able to treat
The resurrection body—Na ca so na ca anno

Before the discussion of this intermediate stage is taken up, it is necessary to delineate De Silva's theology of the final resurrection. The ground of man's hope is the resurrection, and God's great salvation comes in the Parousia, but most importantly, for De Silva, it is the resurrection that vindicates the Christ-event:

The idea that the Christ-event marks the end of the periods of time, pointing to its eschatological fulfillment, can make a powerful appeal to Hindus and Buddhists to whom history moves in cycles and has no finality. Such a message could liberate them from the nightmare of karma and rebirth.1

Not only does a final cataclysmic resurrection provide a satisfying answer to the difficulties of the Buddhist notion of cyclic time, the doctrine of the resurrection body gives new meaning to the Buddhist phrase na ca so na ca anno. Meeting the Buddhist in his conceptual framework, De Silva endeavors to show how the biblical doctrine of the resurrection body can provide a satisfying resolution of this Theravada paradox. He has maintained that resurrection is most meaningful in the context of Tilakkhana, because if anattā is real, natural survival is impossible:

From the Christian point of view, to affirm the continuity of one's own karmic force or memory contradicts the truth of anattā. If anicca and anattā are real, there can be

other religious systems as "conditioned states in which Man finds himself according to his spiritual development" (see above, p. 95). De Silva recognized a potential meeting point between the religions if human life is "seen as a continuous process extending beyond the grave" (see above, p. 107).

nothing in man that can survive death. In the Christian view, it is only by an act of re-creation that continuity beyond the grave is possible. This is what resurrection means.1

In explicating the meaning of the resurrection De Silva draws attention to the biblical doctrine of the Resurrection of the Body, which avoids the extremes of an immortal soul, distinct from the body, which survives death, on the one hand, and the resurrection of the flesh on the other. The body here is not the physical body, but the Spiritual Body (sōma pneumatikon), a term which entered Christianity through the language of St. Paul. De Silva has undertaken an exposition of the terms sōma and sarx out of which emerges the significant point that while in its simplest non-ethical sense sōma is synonymous with sarx, it differs from sarx as it is the vehicle of the resurrection life.2 To understand this resurrection body, it


2 The Problem of the Self, pp. 104-107. De Silva's exposition takes note of the close affinities of sōma with the Hebrew word bāsār. Both signify man's solidarity in finite existence and social existence. Man as bāsār is flesh-substance, a part of the finite world bearing the marks of anicca, dukkha, and anatta. However, since this flesh-body is man's God-given form of earthly existence, he stands in ambiguous relation to God and the world. Paul has preserved this ambiguity by using the two Greek words sarx and sōma. Sarx like bāsār basically means flesh-substance common to man and beast, and thus understood could lead to a doctrine of nihilism, but Paul uses the word sōma which negates the nihilistic view. De Silva notes that in J. A. T. Robinson's study of Paul's somatology, sōma is not simply man's body, since sarx not sōma is body as opposed to mind. Robinson sees sōma as the whole psycho-physical unity made up of sarx and psyche, and as the nearest word in Greek for personality, i.e., "the whole man constituted as he is by the network of physical and mental relationships in which he is bound up with the continuum of other persons and things" (in the End, God [London: James Clark and Co., 1950], p. 85). Thus sōma acquires a distinctive sense of opposition to sarx when man is called into a responsible relationship with God. As Robinson notes elsewhere, however, much sarx and sōma may come to describe the same thing because of the Fall, they designate different aspects of the
is necessary to completely rid ourselves of the Greek notion of sōma-sēma, which had as the aim of life the escape from the tomb of the body. For Paul the aim of life was not escape from the sōma but its transformation through pneuma, i.e., "a re-creation or resurrection of the whole person for life on a spiritual plane."¹ Since everything in man is anicca (finite) the Christian hope of survival rests solely on God, as De Silva sums up in the words of Oscar Cullmann, "the whole man who has really died is recalled to life by a new act of creation by God."² The significant point is that individuality is maintained, thus, "The Christian doctrine of the Resurrection of the body is an assertion of the eternal significance and of the uniqueness of the individual person."³ There is no loss of identity, the person continues as the same person; as De Silva explains:

The change that comes about at death is not from a life in a body to a life without a body or with a revivified material body, but from a life in one type of body (earthly body) to a life in another type of body (spiritual body).⁴

human relationship to God, "while sarx stands for man, in his solidarity of creation, in his distance from God, sōma stands for man, in the solidarity of creation, as made for God" (The Body—A Study in Pauline Theology [London: S. C. M. Press, 1947], p. 31. Thus De Silva concludes that "while there can be no resurrection of the flesh, there is a resurrection of the body" (The Problem of the Self, p. 107).

¹Ibid., p. 108.

²Ibid. Cf. Immortality of the Soul and Resurrection of the Dead, p. 27.

³Ibid., p. 109.

⁴Ibid.
This understanding of the resurrection body is helpful in un-tangling one of Buddhism's deepest dilemmas as contained in the para-doax na ca so na ca anno, i.e., the crux of the Theravada concept of rebirth, that the one who dies and is reborn is not the same and not another. Since at death the whole man dies the physical body which holds together a man's distinction, self-expression and individuality in this earthly sphere of existence is completely destroyed. Since nothing is taken up from this body in the resurrection, De Silva explains that

In the resurrection God re-creates anew a 'body' suited to a new sphere of existence in which distinction, self-expression and individuality are preserved. Because this is a re-creation the spiritual body is not the same as the self which existed in an earthly body (na ca so). But because the re-created body preserves the distinction, self-expression and individuality which belonged to the earthly body, the re-created body is not a different person (na ca anno).

1 See above, pp. 153-154.

2 The Problem of the Self, p. 109. De Silva further explains his view in terms of John Hick's "replica" theory (ibid., pp. 112-114). The explanation of some modern theologians like Unamuno, Edwards and Pannenberg, who reject the view that man's soul persists after the decease of the body, that post-mortem identity is preserved in God's memory of man, is found wanting by De Silva. See Miguel de Unamuno, The Tragic Sense of Life, trans. J.E.C. Flitch (London: Fontana, 1962); David Edwards, The Last Things Now (London: S. C. M. Press, 1969); Wolfhart Pannenberg, What Is Man? (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970). To say that when a man ceases to exist that identity is preserved in God's memory, and that one participates in eternity by being remembered by God falls short of the biblical concept. John Hick holds that this view postulates "a static, frozen immortality," and has proposed the "replica" theory which De Silva finds more helpful. See Death and Eternal Life (London: Collins, 1976), pp. 213-216. For Hick it is possible to speak of resurrection as the "replication" of the person who dies, i.e., God creates "an exact psycho-physical 'replica' of the deceased person" (Ibid., p. 279). It is not the living organism of the body itself but "its encoded form that is transmitted" (Ibid., p. 282). De Silva sums up the three-fold significance of the "replica" theory to the Buddhist phrase na ca so na ca anno, as follows:
The intermediate state--rebirth, purgatory, progressive sanctification after death

The embarrassing questions pertaining to the salvation of those outside the church and altogether outside of Christianity, i.e., the unevangelized, derive from the understanding that men are lost because the salvation provided in Jesus Christ has not been made available to them. De Silva has attempted a resolution of this problem primarily on the basis that the eternal destiny of man is not finally determined by the short period of his life between birth and death. He has also advocated the view that the biblical evidence is that God's eternal salvific presence has been operative among all people everywhere.

In 1968 De Silva presented "seed-thoughts" for the basis of a dialogue within a tentative "theological framework which accepts the spiritual significance of reincarnation, purgatory and the intermediate state."\(^1\) Since Buddhism speaks of destroying many fetters and defilements on the path of holiness, he raised the question whether it was not possible to understand reincarnation as Tillich has suggested as a symbol which points to the higher or lower forces (kusala and akusala karma). Purgatory (though it has been repugnant to Protestants due

to the traditional imagery which stressed the sufferings undergone as a penalty to be paid) also symbolizes this process of purging by which a person is fitted for his ultimate destiny. Thus he states:

It must be stressed that these states are not states into which we enter after death. Reincarnation symbolizes the fact that death and rebirth take place continually, not empirically but spiritually. Purgatory symbolizes the fact that death and rebirth is a process of purging and purification which can happen daily beginning in this life. The Intermediate state symbolizes the fact that through death and rebirth, through purging and purification, the person, beginning from this life progresses stage by stage until the goal is reached.

This concept of the intermediate state, which has undergone considerable development since it was initially mooted as a basis of dialogue, contradicts the double predestination theory and provides a Christian alternative to the theory of rebirth. De Silva also sees belief in some such state of progressive sanctification necessary as a Christian theodicy. Suffering and evil in God's world are not without moral purpose, and if man's eternal destiny is finally determined by the span of life in this earthly existence, then as John Hick says, "the whole earthly travail of faith and moral-effort is rendered needless."¹

¹Ibid., p. 163.


Other Christian theologians who have rejected the Double Predestination theory and opted for an intermediate state are cited by De Silva. See The Problem of the Self, pp. 115-117. William Strawson's comments indicate the trend that modern biblical scholarship instead of attempting to divide man into two categories, rather thinks of the process of divine activity as one in which the positive elements are developed and the negative diminished. See "The Future Life in Contemporary Theology," Expository Times 77, (October 1965): 9-13.
De Silva explains that in this concept of progressive sanctification the mental and spiritual qualities of a person continue to grow after death.

The identity and continuity of the self is an identity and continuity in relationships, which death does not sever. 'We pass from death into life,' says St. John, 'because we love the brethren' (1 John 3:14). Love is eternal, because God is Love and he who abides in Love has entered the sphere of the Eternal. This sphere of life begins here and now and continues in the hereafter. And it is in this sphere that a person is progressively sanctified until he reaches perfection.

Thus the corporate solidarity which begins on earth does not end at death since in the New Testament love is the quality of eternal life, and "it is in and through love that resurrection or 'replication' takes place." Through replication as an authentic self the personal-communal context of life in which a person exists continues in the intermediate stage. Thus man does not become perfect at death but

Nicholas Berdyaev calls eternal damnation "one of the most disgusting of human nightmares," and says that while reincarnation has obvious advantages it is another nightmare "of infinite wanderings along dark passages; it finds the solution of man's destiny in the cosmos and not in God" (The Destiny of Man [London: Geoffrey Bles, 1937], p. 279). Archbishop William Temple has maintained that there are no biblical passages that teach a once-for-all decisiveness of the moment of death and endless torment. This misunderstanding is the result of literalistic distortions of symbols and the mixing up of terms such as Hades, Hell, Sheol, Gehenna, Abraham's Bosom, and Heaven. See Nature, Man and God (London: Macmillan, 1960), p. 464. Modern theologians favor an intermediate state, and Paul Tillich describes this process of the development of the positive elements in eternal life as "essentialisation" and notes that "in the case of infants, children and underdeveloped adults, for example, this would be a complete absurdity. In the case of mature people it disregards innumerable elements which enter every mature personal life and cause profound ambiguity" (Systematic Theology vol. 3, p. 444).

1 Ibid., p. 7.
continues to be progressively sanctified “from one degree of glory to another” (2 Cor 3:18). Thus De Silva concludes:

Progressive sanctification in terms of anattā-pneuma means the progressive realisation of anattaness or egolessness by the elimination of the negative elements in man, and the progressive actualisation of pneumaness by the development of the positive elements until individualisation and participation reach perfection in the kingdom of God, through a process of continuous recreation.¹

In addition to progressive sanctification as an answer to the embarrassing questions about the salvation of those who never come to a knowledge of Christ in their earthly lifespan, De Silva pursues a second line of thought, viz., that God's eternal salvific presence has been operative among all people at all times. In an article for a forthcoming publication in honor of S. J. Samartha this line of thought is summed up thus:

There has been from the very beginning of history a communication of the Triune God to the whole of mankind in which He disclosed the divinely intended truth about every man and that there has always been God's eternal salvific presence prior to its temporal manifestation and is still operative among all people whether they are aware of the temporal event or not. “I was found by those who were not looking for me; I was clearly shown to those who never asked about me” [Rom 10:20].²

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¹Ibid., p. 123.

²“Theological Significance of People of Other Faiths,” n.p., 1981, p. (Typewritten.) This article brings together several important aspects of the current discussion on the “universalist testimonies” found in scripture indicating that God's salvific presence has not been limited to the Judeo-Christian tradition. The Bible testifies that the initiative in salvation is with God and not man, and God is salvifically present everywhere in Christ (Titus 2:11). This is indicated in God's dealings with non-Jewish personalities such as the “holy pagans” of Ezek 14:14, 20. Thus God makes a universal covenant with Noah who, like Daniel and Job, is described as a righteous man. In the New Testament, too, mention is made of God-fearing “pagans” such as Cornelius. Another aspect of the current discussion is the universality of the Spirit, indicated most strikingly in the Johanine
Thus De Silva's concept of the "righteous", i.e., in Christian terms those who believe in and have found salvation in Christ, are those "who have responded to that Reality which Christians call God without using this term God or even while rejecting it."\(^1\) Those who have sincerely sought God can attain to everlasting salvation though they were altogether outside of the church and did not hear the gospel because Christ brings grace and judgment to all men. De Silva can therefore agree with Jacques Maritain when he says, "Under many names, names which are not that of God, in ways only known to God, the interior act of the soul's thought can be directed towards a reality which in fact truly may be God."\(^2\) This response to Reality is a response of faith to Christ because "the Christian believes that ultimate Reality was manifest in Christ." De Silva sees this view as being in harmony with the divine initiative in salvation since "eternal life is not a human achievement, although man has his part to play. Eternal life is that which comes from God and which man

gospel. Wherever men have responded to the glory of God in nature or history, the Spirit of Truth has been at work. The functions of pneumatology and Christology are inseparable because the Spirit bears witness concerning Jesus Christ and proceeds from the Father through the Son. Thus De Silva makes the point that it is necessary "to discover the Christ Reality beyond a purely historical point of reference," because "the saving purpose of God revealed in Jesus Christ was operative from eternity and is therefore unconditioned by anything that has happened in history. What happened in history in the Christ event is a temporal moment of an eternal reality. The temporal moment has no significance apart from the eternal reality" (ibid., pp. 4-5).

\(^1\) The Problem of the Self, p. 122.

man appreciates by responding to the Eternal (the Amata); it is life in the Spirit.\(^1\)

The question remains as to what happens to the "unrighteous" or the "lost". De Silva has not dealt conclusively with this question, however a careful reading of his writings on this point indicates that he does not subscribe to the view that the "lost" suffer endless torment in hell. Hell, heaven, and the intermediate stage are not ontological realities, instead he says that

Hell, heaven and purgatory are not sharply separated states, but form a kind of continuum through which one passes from even the "utter state" of near-annihilation which is called hell, to the closest union with God. Thus hell is also a phenomenon within this continuum and can be experienced here and now, and even after death, in varying degrees.\(^2\)

Lostness in the final sense has not been defined by him because in his view the ultimate destinies of men cannot be decided within this lifetime. Thus he indicates that all men go through a "process by which one is purged of all egocentric elements, purified, and fitted for one's ultimate destiny"\(^3\) and is able to say that "there is no one bad enough to go straight into eternal damnation and conversely there is no one good enough to go straight to eternal bliss."\(^4\) The difference in the experience of the "unrighteous" and that of the "righteous" during the intermediate period seems to be a

\(^1\)Ibid.


\(^3\)Ibid.

\(^4\)The Problem of the Self, p. 116.
relative one as all men undergo a progressive actualization of the positive elements leading to perfection. However, the description of the distinctive aspects of the experience of the "unrighteous" is worth quoting in full:

To those who have been rebellious, who have sinned against the truth, who have turned away from the light, the intermediate state involves anguish and remorse, a torturing unrest in the knowledge of having fallen short of the goal about which one becomes acutely conscious when earthly limitations are removed at death. The degree of anguish and torture corresponds to the degree of the separation from Reality. The story of Dives and Lazarus illustrates this distance and anguish, which are symbolised by the term Hell (Geenna). Hell is not a place situated in the underworld. It is not an ontological reality but a psychological experience which a person can have in this life as well as in the next.

De Silva's exposition of the biblical basis of this intermediate state seems to lead ultimately to a concept of universal salvation. Along with C. Harris he sees the parable of Dives and Lazarus as the locus classicus of this concept. The parable is not seen as a description giving details of the life after death, but for De Silva "it cannot be denied that the state of the afterlife depicted here is true to what Jesus knew about it." He maintains that since

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1 Ibid., pp. 121-122.

2 The Problem of the Self, p. 172. According to Harris "Abraham's bosom" was "a common rabbinical designation of the intermediate abode of bliss." He notes two lines of thought which emerge from Jewish and early Christian thinking on the intermediate state, i.e., (a) "a state of painful confinement in which the unrighteous expiated their crimes, and were in some cases cleansed from sin", and (b) "a state of blissful expectancy in which the righteous awaited their reward." De Silva observes that "in both states there is a period of waiting, of purgation and progressive sanctification" (ibid., pp. 119-120; cf. C. Harris, "State of the Dead (Christian)," Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics Vol. 11, p. 837).
Dives and Lazarus went to Hades after death, and Jesus too descended to Hades to preach to the dead (1 Pet 3:18-20; 4:6), it "shows that 'Hades' was not a place of ultimate doom."\(^1\) De Silva also takes note of biblical passages such as Phil 2:9 and Rev 5:13 in which the ultimate triumph of Jesus in every part of the universe is stated. Of special significance are the "many mansions" (Greek monai) in the Father's house in John 14:2. This verse conveys the idea of stages of development rather than an abode or home in the sense of a permanent habitation as from very early times monai has been interpreted to mean "resting-places where pilgrims on their way to eternity stop for training and instruction, as they proceed further and further towards the final goal."\(^2\) Thus this process of

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 119. De Silva notes that Barclay finds the answer to the "embarrassing" question regarding the ultimate destiny of those who lived before Jesus Christ, and of those who never heard the gospel, in Christ's preaching to the dead in Hades. Barclay says that the message of grace has gone into every corner of the universe, and that:

This is the point that Justin Martyr fastened on long ago:

'The Lord, the Holy God of Israel remembered His dead, those sleeping in the earth, and came down to them to tell them the good news of salvation.' The doctrine of the descent into Hades conserves the precious truth that no man who ever lived is left without a sight of Christ, and without the offer of the salvation of God. (Ibid., p. 121. W. Barclay, The Daily Study Bible, the Revelation of John [Edinburgh: St. Andrew Press, 1957], 2:287.

\(^2\)Ibid., p. 124. De Silva finds support for the interpretation of monai as meaning "stages on the way" in the Greek writer Pausanias, and in Origen and Clement of Alexandria. William Temple who described the monai as "wayside caravanserais-shelters" notes that "These many resting-places, marking the stages of our spiritual growth, are in the Father's house. If we are travelling heavenwards, we are already in heaven" (ibid., cf. William Temple, Readings in St. John's Gospel [London: Macmillan, 1963], p. 220).
sanctification which begins here and now progresses stage by stage in the hereafter, till fellowship with God is perfect.

The eschatological community and the meaning of mission

If the questions relating to theodicy, and the embarrassing questions regarding the unevangelized are answered in the concepts of God's eternal salvific presence to all men and progressive sanctification after death, De Silva notes that "other questions arise, particularly with regard to the meaning and purpose of mission."¹ If salvation could be found without belonging to the Christian church or without explicit faith in Jesus Christ, what is the role of the church? What is the purpose and meaning of mission? In answer De Silva makes three significant points.

First, "since salvation is primarily an eschatological concept, mission is defined by eschatology." In this regard Eph 1:9-10 is found to be a significant text because it deals with human history and God's purpose for the entire universe, "things in heaven and things in earth." De Silva's exegesis of this text indicates that the τὸν καιρὸν are a succession of world periods, each ending in a cataclysm. The Christian era is the last in the series, and all history will finally be consummated in Christ. Since all things "are gathered into one in Jesus Christ," the text means that all the diverse factors of the universe, history, and of all being, will be brought together in an all-embracing harmony through the consummation in Christ.² Therefore he maintains:

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¹ "Non-Christian Religions and God's Plan of Salvation," p. 65.
² Ibid., pp. 65-66.
Mission therefore consists in promoting this harmony by bringing all things into a true relation with God in Christ, and thereby into a relationship with one another. Negatively, mission is the breaking down of all barriers that separate man from man and man from God. In this sense, to fight against racial discrimination, caste and other social evils is mission; to stand for justice and fair-play is mission, His mission, whoever does it. On the other hand, to win over non-Christians into Christianity and to turn them against their former brothers is not mission. It is an act of alienation and not reconciliation. The numerical expansion of the Church does not necessarily mean evangelization.\(^1\)

Second, "mission is theocentric and not church-centred." The church is never the sole agent of mission because though God uses others for mission it must never be forgotten that mission remains primarily his activity because he is saviour in the absolute sense. Thus for De Silva the notion of a church monopoly of mission, or the idea of mission in terms of church expansion, are untenable from the biblical viewpoint.\(^2\)

Third, in De Silva's concept of mission, "the main task of the Church is to be the eschatological community in the world." "Ecclesia" is an eschatological term for a community of people living in the hope of the kingdom of God. The church may not be the only instrument God uses, but its mission derives from its very nature as the body of Christ and by virtue of being the eschatological community to which there is no parallel. De Silva therefore explains that the unique role of the church in respect of mission must be understood in relation to the saviourhood of Christ:

\(^1\)Ibid., p. 66.

\(^2\)Ibid.
Just as the Saviourhood of Jesus Christ is thought of in a secondary sense, the Church is thought of in a secondary sense as the instrument which God uses to accomplish His divine purpose by extending the work of Christ. . . .

But just as the Saviourhood of Jesus Christ is also thought of in the absolute sense, in that He embodies the fullness of God, so is the Church the historical embodiment of the fullness of Jesus Christ. To the Church, God has imparted full wisdom and insight and has revealed His hidden purpose, which makes the Church a unique instrument in His hands. The world outside does not possess this wisdom and insight and revelation, but the fact that the Church has this inheritance does not set the Church against the world or other religions; rather it makes the Church responsible for the world.¹

Anatta and God

Theravāda Buddhism has been classified as atheistic because it rejects the idea of an omniscient, omnipotent, personal, creator God. De Silva has acknowledged that Buddhist agnosticism about a personal God, and Buddhism's offer of a way of peace and insight without the need to believe in God, constitutes "a novel and powerful challenge to Christianity." Observing that "the word God has become meaningless in the traditional images in which it has been expressed", and that this situation indicates "the need for a reorientation of Christian thought about God", he raises the question whether the Buddha and Buddhism do in fact deny the reality of God.²

In striking dialogical exchanges with Buddhist thought-leaders he has maintained that the concept of God, which seems to be the most divergent doctrinal issue between the two religions, could become a

¹Ibid.

fruitful area of dialogue. He has carried forward the discussion on the significance of the development of a Buddhology and contributed to the development of the Dharma-God idea. However, the distinctive contribution, which De Silva makes from the Christian standpoint, towards overcoming this Buddhist-Christian incompatibility is that a biblical understanding of anattā can locate the place of "God" in Buddhist thought.

Gautama--"The First Great Death-of-God Theologian"

In one of his earliest publications De Silva discusses the obstacles to belief in God encountered by the Buddhist and examines the Buddha's own attitude to the question. He points out that Gautama was neither a pessimist nor an atheist in the strict sense of the word; what the Buddha had done was to refute "the Brahananical conceptions of the Absolute."¹ For De Silva the Buddha's attitude to God can be explained in terms of the "death-of-God" movement, and the Buddha could be described as "the first great death-of-God theologian." Though this movement has shocked many, it should be welcomed as a prophetic protest movement "which will enable us to get rid of some base notions we have of God, and come to a true understanding of what we mean by God."² Thus de Silva is of the view that

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²Why Believe in God, p. 24. Among the base notions of God that must die De Silva lists "the venerable Book-keeper," "the ruthless Moralist with the big stick," "the grand old Gentleman--the man-size," "the dreadful Judge on a golden throne," and the Aladdin Lamp God."
the Buddha's rejection of Brahmanism and its pantheon of gods should not be considered atheistic or agnostic, nor even non-theistic. Citing Mahatma Gandhi's assessment of the Buddha he maintains that the Buddha was a reformer who revolted with prophetic courage against the base notions of God that were prevalent in his time. Gandhi saw the Buddha as "ONE OF THE GREATEST HINDU REFORMERS" debunking spurious religious practices and inveighing against a system of priestcraft selling the notion of a capricious God who could be bribed or placated by offering sacrifices. For the Buddha such a God was dead, and De Silva concludes that "it is clear that what the Buddha rejected was not the Ultimate Reality that the term 'God' or 'Brahman' signified; what he rejected as Gandhiji says, were the base things that passed in his generation under the name of God."1

The Buddha's role as a reformer helps De Silva understand his seemingly ambivalent attitude to belief in Brahma in the Buddhist scriptures. At times he speaks disparagingly of belief in Brahma, and at other times he gives him all the respect and honour that the Brahmins give him. The Buddha did not reject the concept of Brahma, nor did he deny the Brahmin view that the highest goal is the attainment of reunion with Brahma. For the Buddha Brahma is perfect love, and "the highest Reality whose all-embracing kindness, love, sympathy and benevolence pervade the whole world." Thus he proposed that the way to reunion was by the practice of the four Brahma-viharas, viz., love (metta), kindness (karuna), sympathetic joy (mudita), and equanimity (upekkha). Therefore De Silva notes that:

1Ibid., p. 18.
It is significant that these virtues are called Brahma-viharas, meaning Brahma-like or God-like qualities or abodes. The Buddha affirms that Brahma is perfectly pure, and therefore it is by treading the path of purity that one can come into union with Brahma. . . . From this we see that the Buddha did not deny the God who is perfect Love which the term Brahma signifies. He only denied base notions connected with belief in God.¹

¹Ibid., p. 19. De Silva draws attention to the Buddha's "Great Renunciation", when he "saw the fact of suffering in all its poignancy", and left everything and went in search of the meaning of existence. His biggest obstacle to belief in Brahma centered in the problem of pain, and the Hindu view of suffering as an illusion failed to satisfy him. Thus the Buddha could not reconcile the apparently meaningless pain and suffering with the assertion of an all-wise, all-powerful God of Love (Belief in God, p. 1). De Silva has underscored this point by citing Douglas M. Burns' view of original Buddhism. Burns concluded that original Buddhism must be classified as atheistic and points to some very strong statements made by the Buddha as if in reply to the biblical assertion of the existence of God. He quotes from Isaiah 45:6-7 where Jehovah says:

"There is none beside me.
I am the Lord, and there is none else.
I form the light, and create darkness:
I make peace, and create evil:
The Lord do all these things."

Then Burns quotes from the Buddhist scriptures positing the Buddha's statement of the problem of pain as if in reply to the above assertion about God in Isaiah:

"He who has eyes can see the sickening sight;
Why does not Brahma set his creatures right?
If his wide power no limit can restrain,
Why is his hand so rarely spread to bless?
Why are his creatures all condemned to pain?
Why does he not give happiness to all?
Why do fraud, lies, and ignorance prevail?
Why triumphs falsehood,--truth and justice fail?
I count your Brahma one among the unjust,

Commenting on the significance of the conclusion that Brahma has made the world to shelter wrong, De Silva says that for the Buddha, "That God, that Brahma surely is dead. But not the 'God' who is perfect Love" (ibid., pp. 1, 19).
A parallel development, the "death of Yahweh," is seen by De Silva in the history of the Hebrews, and he makes the significant observation that "what the Buddha tried to do was in some ways similar to what the prophets tried to do." In order to give the people a correct understanding of God, the Buddha and the Hebrew prophets attacked unworthy notions connected with Brahman or Yahweh, but they did not deny the Ultimate Reality that these terms signified. Similarly some theologians have attempted to get rid of the term "God," and instead use terms like "The Ground," "Being Itself," and "Ultimate Concern." Gandhi chose to substitute the term TRUTH, a term which would commend itself to Buddhists as they would find no difficulty in thinking of an "Ultimate Reality in terms of TRUTH as an abstract, impersonal principle." De Silva sees difficulties in this usage as Gandhi was a man of prayer, and one cannot pray to an abstract, impersonal principle. Thus he notes that it was the search for a more adequate term for "the controversial and debased word Brahman," that led the Buddha to use Dharma as a synonym for Brahman. In his

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1Ibid., p. 23. The parallel development in Hebrew history, which begins with the prophets and reaches its climax in the New Testament, depicts the "death of Yahweh" or the transformation of the idea of God. De Silva cites H. E. Fosdick's summation of this transformation which includes the transition from a storm god on a desert mountain (Exod 3:1; 19:18; 20:18) to the God who is a Spirit (John 4:24); from the tribal war god leading his devotees to bloody triumph over their foes (Exod 15:3; 23:22; 1 Sam 15:21) to the God who is Love (3 John 4:16); from the territorial deity to the universal Father (Rev 5:9); and, from "a god whose highest social vision was a tribal victory, it ends with the God whose worshippers pray for a worldwide kingdom of righteousness and peace" (ibid., pp. 22-23). Cf. H. E. Fosdick, A Guide to Understanding the Bible: The Development of Ideas within the Old and New Testaments (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1938), pp. 53-54.

2Ibid., pp. 24-25.
endeavor to speak to Buddhists from within Buddhism De Silva further explores the Dhamma-God idea and engages in the discussion of how theists could speak about God in a way comparable to Buddhists speaking of Nirvana.

The God-shaped Gap in Buddhism

De Silva uses H. G. Wells' phrase "a God-shaped gap" to describe the void created in Buddhism by the "excessive rationalism" of the Theravada school.\footnote{A series of open letters written by De Silva in 1968 to Professor K. N. Jayatilleke, chairman of the Sri Lankan radio broadcast "Buddhist Symposium", provides an insight into the rationalist orthodoxy of scholarly Theravada Buddhists and their attitude to the idea of God. De Silva takes Jayatilleke to task for concluding that belief in an omniscient God and belief in free-will are mutually contradictory and therefore anti-rational. He cites Aldous Huxley, who is said to be "in a sense anti-Christian", to show that while the idea of creation was not contradictory, the doctrine of anatta was irrational. Having pointed out that the Buddhist doctrine of anatta closely corresponds to Hume's theory that man is a bundle or collection of different perceptions, Huxley says: "Hume and the Buddhists give a sufficiently realistic description of selfness in action, but fail to explain how and why the bundles ever became bundles. Did their constituent atoms of experience come together of their own accord? And, if so, why, or by what means and within what kind of a non-spatial universe? To give a plausible answer to these questions in terms of anatta is so difficult that we are forced to abandon the doctrine" (The Perennial Philosophy [London: Fontana, 1959], p. 50). De Silva points out that on the other hand Huxley did not find the notion of a creator of some kind contradictory, thus he could say: "That a temporal world should be known and, in being known, sustained and perpetually created by an external consciousness is an idea which contains nothing contradictory" (ibid., p. 194). De Silva then tells Jayatilleke that the sheer rationality which he claims as a basis for rejecting belief in an omniscient creator God and free-will is a sword that cuts both ways: Now, what you find irrational is quite rational to Huxley, and what he finds irrational is quite rational to you. The main issue therefore is by what criterion you judge who is right and who is wrong. If you have such a criterion how did you get it? Who is to judge
Buddha's ethicism that led to the development of Buddhism as an atheistic philosophy. The Buddha himself was not concerned with the metaphysical speculations of the Brahmins which he considered a hindrance to liberation from samsaric existence. However, De Silva notes that it would be wrong to consider the Buddha a skeptic or an agnostic simply because he remained silent on metaphysical questions. This becomes evident in the worship he accorded to the Dharma, and his substitution of it for the older concept of Brahman. In the case of the Buddha's followers De Silva sees "compensatory modifications" arise to fill in the "God-shaped gap", and in the course of the history of Buddhism "we see that there was a gradual sliding of the simple Theravada negative and atheistic creed into a variety of polytheistic and theistic conceptions." Thus we now consider these two developments relating to the concept of God in Buddhism, viz., the

1The Buddha explains his silence on God and metaphysical questions to his disciples in the Samyutta Nikaya:
"Because, my disciples, it brings you no profit, it does not conduce to progress in holiness; because it does not lead to the turning from the earthly, to the subjection of all desire, to the cessation of the transitory, to peace, to knowledge, to illumination, to nirvana: therefore have I not declared it unto you" (ibid., p. 43).

The Buddha's primary concern was intensely practical. Douglas M. Burns says that the Buddha remained silent on matters beyond the reach of men's conceptual powers as they were irrelevant to life's problems. However he did not deny the possibility of some "cosmic entity," "unifying principle" or "Intelligence" as the basis of existence, neither did he affirm such a possibility. See the chapter "The Buddha and God" in Buddhism, Science and Atheism.

2Ibid., p. 46.
development of the Dharma-God idea, and theistic developments in Buddhism including the development of a Buddhology.

The God "Dharma"

In 1970, at a seminar on "The Buddhist Attitude to God" held at a Sri Lankan university, the significant point was made that "there is evidence to show that the concept 'Dharma' was deliberately substituted by the Buddha for the older concept of 'Brahman' which signified the ultimate Reality for the Brahmins."¹ In 1957, in a pamphlet aimed at helping Christians formulate their answers to questions raised by Buddhists, De Silva drew attention to the Buddha's view of Dharma as an useful point of contact for the discussion of the doctrine of God.² He further developed this view in a dialogical response to the Thai monk Buddhadasa Indapanno. In 1970, he noted that the doctrine of God is a question about which it is generally assumed that there is no agreement at all between Christians and Buddhists, and described his contribution to the Dharma-God idea as an attempt "to carry this discussion further in the hope that there will be a better understanding between Buddhists and Christians."³

In his earliest exposition of the subject De Silva states that Dharma was not merely the teaching of the Buddha, it was for the Buddha the ultimate ideal or norm. The Buddha, and all previous Buddhas, were only discoverers of the Dharma who "were able to discern

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²Belief in God, p. ii.
³Why Believe in God? p. ii.
an eternal orderly principle of the universe in which the rational and ethical elements were fused into one." And in the *Samyutta Nikaya* ii 25-27, *Dharma* is depicted as rationality, as the ideal that is the norm of reason and morality. At this point De Silva is confronted with "the antinomy of the ideal." On the one hand *Dharma* like any other ideal "can be real only as concept," however, it is also an objective norm and thus external to persons. The two ways of resolving this antinomy are, whether to think of *Dharma* as pure mind--"the objective source and sustainer of values," or, of positing "a supreme mind which is the source and sustainer of the *Dhamma*." Thus the logical conclusion for him is that

> Whatever alternative we accept, we would see that both point to the same object that religious worshippers have found, namely, a supreme Being in whom the highest ideals are acknowledged and actualized. If there is nothing beyond the *Dhamma*, then the *Dhamma* must be that supreme Being.²

It is in his dialogical response to Buddhadasa Indapanno that De Silva's most definitive exposition of the *Dharma*-God idea is to be found. He welcomes the contribution Indapanno has made to the Buddhist-Christian dialogue in the Sinclair Thompson Memorial Lectures (1967) by "speaking to Christians in the Christian language." Indapanno has been able to see the meaning of the Cross in relation to the doctrine of *anattā*, and of God in terms of *Dharma*. Thus for Indapanno, "the Ultimate Reality is *Dhamma* which he equates with God."³

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¹ Belief in God, p. 2.
² Ibid., p. 3.
³ Why Believe in God? p. ii. Though Indapanno's contribution to the *Dhamma*-God idea has been welcomed by De Silva, and agreement has been found at several points, there are significant differences
in their views. Joseph J. Spae considers De Silva's Why Believe in
God? an answer to Indapanno's views on the Ultimate Reality and God
Indapanno the conflicting views on God between the two religions
could be resolved if God was understood in terms of Dharma. Reason-
ing that the word "religion" applies to a theistic system of belief
in God and prayers, Buddhists have hesitated to use the word to speak
of the Buddha's doctrine. This was because they did not know what
the term God meant in the language of Dharma. God cannot be explained
in the conventional language of man, mind,or spirit (vinnana), but
must be understood in terms of Dharma, "in the religious language
God means Dhamma or the power of Dhamma which is self-existent
according to Nature" (Christianity and Buddhism, p. 63).

Indapanno maintains that God is neither a person nor spirit,
because then he would be finite and measurable by standards of one
kind or another. Rather God is "Dhamma or Nature in the sense of
something non-constituent, unconditioned or uncompounded (Asankhata-
Dhamma)" (ibid., p. 74). Since Dhamma is complete in itself, even
as that which is called God is complete in itself, a study of the
four aspects of Dhamma would enable us to explain "God" as found in
Buddhism. These four aspects are: (1) Sabhavadhama--the nature of
things, (2) Saccadhama--the Law of Nature, (3) Patipattidhamma--duty
performed according to the Law of Nature, (4) Vipakadhamma--fruits
of practice or realization. Indapanno sees the second aspect, the
Law of Nature as standing directly in the position of God, Dhamma as
nature is God's creation or the result of his will, Dhamma as duty
is abiding by the will of God in order to attain to God, and Dhamma
as results refers to the highest thing that man can receive and is
what Christians call "the grace of God". Basically, for Indapanno,
these four "are, in one way or another, the aspects of 'God in true
religious language'" (ibid., pp. 66-69). To know God in the Dharmic
sense, i.e., to be with God forever is the same as the realization
of Dhamma by the Buddhist. By Dhamma or God is meant "Absolute
Truth", and this truth is attained when all feelings of self and
selfishness are destroyed and one is freed from suffering. This is
"the attainment of the Deathless (AMATADHAMMA) or God", and in this
stage of experience there is no ego-self left to die or to be born.
Nature alone is left, "which is by itself without any death or birth"
(ibid., pp. 27-28).

A significant feature of Indapanno's view is the all-
inclusiveness of Dhamma or God. They are one and the same thing,
and there is nothing that has not come from the Dhamma or God. Not
only does nature in the form of natural phenomena manifest the will
of God, but "in fact all natural phenomena constitute the very God"
(ibid., p. 68). Satan, who is nothing but a test of man by God,
is included in the word 'Dhamma; or God, because if God had not
created Satan what could have created him?" (ibid., p. 71). Thus
he concludes:

"If there were anything else apart from God then God
would not be perfect. Therefore, nature itself is in-
cluded in the word God and there is also to be found
Dr. S. Radhakrishnan has also lent his support to the view that in the mind of the Buddha the concept of the Dharma as the Absolute replaces the Upanishadic concept of Brahman. However, the origins of the Dharma-God idea in oriental studies are traced to Mrs. Rhys Davids and to Wilhelm Geiger, the most exhaustive study of the word Dhamma in Pali literature being the monograph "Pali Dhamma" in German. We now consider De Silva's own exposition of Dhamma as God, as the object of devotion, as the Transcendent Reality, a "personal" reality, and as the Summum Bonum.

Dhamma--the object of devotion

The Buddha's post-Enlightenment utterance that "It is ill to live paying no one the honour and obedience due to a superior," or as in another translation, "Ill at ease dwells the man who reverences Satan or the Devil, call it what you may. So we can see that the so-called God is what in Buddhism we call, 'Dhamma'" (ibid., p. 72).

Ibid., p. 27. Radhakrishnan's assessment of the Buddha's view of Dhamma in his work Gautama the Buddha, cited by De Silva, is worth noting:

"Those who tell us that for the Buddha there is a religious experience, but there is no religious object, are violating the texts and needlessly convicting him of self-contradiction. He implies the reality of what the Upanishads call Brahman, though he takes the liberty of giving it another name Dhamma, to indicate its essential ethical value for us on the empirical plane. The way of the Dhamma is the way of Brahman. To dwell in Dhamma is to dwell in Brahman. The Tathagata is said to have the Dhamma as his body, the Brahman as his body, to be one with Dhamma and one with Brahman."

De Silva also draws attention to the fact that the last three sentences are references to Samyutta Nikaya 1. 141, Anguttara Nikaya 1. 207, and Digha Nikaya 1111. 84, 81 (ibid., pp. 27-40).

not, obeys not," is for De Silva reminiscent of Augustine's words, "My heart is restless until I find rest in thee." He finds the Buddha's statement significant because the Buddha is "ill at ease" (dukkham) if he does not reverence, honor, and obey, i.e., worship, a reality greater than himself. Unable to find anyone worthy of worship in the world of devas (gods) or mankind, since there was no one perfect in all virtues (i.e., sila--morality, samadhi--concentration, panna--wisdom, and vimutti--emancipation), the thought comes to the Buddha to honor and worship the Dharma in which he had been enlightened. Thus he asks, "Suppose this Dhamma in which I have been perfectly enlightened, suppose I were to dwell honouring, reverencing, obeying and serving that Dhamma?" While asking the question it is said that the Brahma Sahampati appeared to him and exhorted him as an enlightened one to "dwell honouring, reverencing, obeying and serving the Dhamma" like all Arahants, supreme Buddhas, and Exalted Ones had done in the past. De Silva notes that the Geigers commenting on this passage say that "here the Dhamma ranks higher than the Buddha as an objective reality." ²

Dharma--transcendent reality

Dharma, as the supreme, all-embracing, sublime, and transcendent Reality was not, De Silva maintains, a creation of the Buddha but a concept that went back to Vedic times. He explains that Dhamman--the oldest form of the word--is closely related to rta in

¹This passage entitled "Holding in Reverence" is found in Samyutta Nikaya 1. 138-140 and Anguttara Nikaya 11. 20-21.

²Ibid., pp. 27-30.
the Rigveda. *Rta* meant "law" or "binding rule" which signified cosmic order originally and later came to mean the principle of righteousness. It came to be the principle which preserved the world from physical disorder and moral chaos and was identified with Truth (*satya*). While *rta* almost disappears in the Sanskrit, *Dharma* takes its place and is used in the Upanishads to represent the highest reality. In the *Brhadaranyaka Upanishad* 1. 4. 14, *Dharma* is described as "the sovereign power of the sovereign power", and in *Mahanarayana Upanishad* 21:6, "nothing is harder to describe than the *Dharma*."] Thus De Silva concludes that "in this word *Dharma* the Buddha found ready a concept of the highest Reality which was familiar in the Brahmin schools of his time and which he could use in place of the word *Brahman*."\(^1\)

**Dharma--personal Reality**

*Dharma* also becomes a personal Reality. De Silva sees the *Dharma* become hypostatized into a Divinity, as in the "Holding in Reverence" passage, just as the abstract concept of *Brahman* became

\(^1\)Ibid., pp. 31-32. Instances of the Buddha's use of *Brahman* and *Dharma* as equivalents and compound expressions are cited. Especially meaningful is the use of *Dhammakayo*, which literally meant a Dharma-body or the incarnation of the *Dhamma*. In the *Agganna Sutta* king Pasenadi honors Gautama not because the latter is "well-born," but because the Dharma "has found its most complete realization in the Tathagata." Buddhaghosha's interpretation of the reference to the Tathagata as the incarnation in this Sutta states:

"The *Dhamma* is his body because he springs from the *Dhamma*. Because the *Dhamma* is his body, he is called the Incarnation of the *Dhamma*; for the *Dhamma* in the sense of the highest (*settha*) is called *Brahman*. He has become the *Dhamma*, that is he possesses the nature of the *Dhamma*, and because he has become the *Dhamma* he has become the *Brahman*" (ibid., pp. 33-34).
the personal god Brahma. The Geigers have drawn attention to the
celebration of a god named Dharma in Bengal in present day India who
is identified with Brahma and is praised as the creator and originator
of all things. Through this kind of popular hypostatizing the concept
of Dharma was personified and stood in the center of Buddhist thought
and devotion through the centuries. Though the common man thought
of Dharma as a god like Vishnu or Siva, in the Buddhist view Dharma
was "completely supernatural" and could be seen only by those who
possessed the "Dhamma-eye" (Dhamma Cakku). Nevertheless it is pointed
out that "the Dhamma is a reality to which one pays homage, reveres,
honours and serves; in other words, worships." Evidences of this are
cited from the Pali canon, in which Dhamma is conceived of in personal
terms as a protecting deity (Jataka IV. 55.1; 1.31.31; Theragata 1.
303).\footnote{Ibid., pp. 34-36.}

\textbf{Dharma—ethical Ideal and \textit{summum bonum}}

Dhamma is also the ethical Ideal and the \textit{summum bonum} in
Buddhism. In Hinduism the \textit{summum bonum} is the attainment of oneness
with Brahman, and in Buddhism it is the attainment of Nirvana.
Although in the Pali canon Dhammahood is not spoken of as a state of
attainment, De Silva traces a connection between the ultimate attain­
ment in the two religions and Dharma. Thus he says, "In the Buddhist
scriptures the term Brahma Path ("Brahma-patha") is the way which
leads to salvation, to deliverance, to Nirvana. Thus the word Brahman
becomes for the Buddhist a designation of Nirvana."\footnote{"Some Issues in Buddhist-Christian Dialogue," p. 53.} Terms such as
nibbuto (allaying), sitibuto (quenching), and sukhapatisamvedi (bliss) which are associated with attainment of Brahmahood are also associated with the attainment of Nirvana. This correspondence between Brahman and Nirvana is evident in the frequently found passage in the Pali canon, "He is neither a self-tormentor, nor a tormentor of others, is here now allayed, quenched, become cool, an experiencer of bliss that lives with self Brahma-become" (Digha Nikaya III. 233; Majjhima Nikaya I. 341, 344, 349, II. 159-161; Anguttara II. 206, 208, 211). Thus the correspondence De Silva has traced between Brahman and Nirvana relates to the Dhamma-God idea because of the correspondence between Brahmapatha (Brahma path) and Dhammamagga (the path of the Dhamma). Dhamma is the ethical Law contained within the Cosmic Law, the ethical is set within and has value only in the context of the metaphysical because "The ground and significance of the 'ethical Dhamma' is that it is based on and derived from the 'Eternal Dhamma.'"¹ De Silva finds that Rabindranath Tagore fittingly sums up the main thrust of his discussion thus:

This Dharma and the Brahman of the Upanisads are essentially the same. . . . Dharma in Buddhism is an eternal reality of Peace, Goodness and Love for which man can offer up the homage of his highest loyalty, his life itself. This Dharma can inspire man with almost superhuman power of renunciation, and through the abnegation of self lead him to the supreme object of his existence, a state that cannot be compared to anything we know in this world, and yet of which we can at least have a dim idea, when we know that it is only to be reached, not through the path of annihilation, but through immeasurable love. Thus to dwell in the constant consciousness of unbounded love is named by Lord Buddha, Brahmanihara or moving in Brahman.²

² Ibid., pp. 39-40.
Even though Buddhist orthodoxy frowned on the concept of God, deep spiritual yearnings within the hearts of Buddhists sought fulfillment through a slowly developing Buddhalogy. To begin with "the Buddha never claimed to be divine, and he never wanted people to worship him." However, De Silva asserts that today, while the expressions of devotion may vary, "there is no doubt that the centre of devotion for all Buddhists, in whatever land they are, is the Buddha himself." This transition began with the veneration of the dead teacher as perfect saint and homage being paid to his relics. Later symbols representing the Buddha (the Bodhi tree and Buddha images) became the object of worship. Eventually it climaxed in the worship of the Buddha himself, who was "converted into the very God he denied, calling him 'The chief god of all gods' (Devatideva)." This process of deification was resisted by the Hinayana Buddhists, but among the Mahayanists the Buddha came to be venerated as "a reflection of the Supreme." He was accorded with miraculous powers and titles with numinous connotations such as Bhagavad and Tathagata, and the scriptures represented him as higher than the Brahma in Hinduism. Hindu gods were adopted into popular Buddhism in the attempt to reconcile Buddha as a divinity with the historical fact of a teacher who did not claim to be divine. Even for the average Theravada Buddhist the Buddha is "the Ideal of worship and devotion, who lives now," thus instances of Buddhist prayers are

\[1\] Ibid., p. 47.

\[2\] Ibid., p. 46.
cited from Sri Lankan newspapers. However the orthodox, informed Theravada Buddhist of Burma, Thailand, and Sri Lanka continues to regard the Buddha "as the Supreme Teacher, the greatest Guide who has shown man the way to perfection—but yet a man."¹

The two most important Buddhological developments identified by De Silva are the development of the important religious concept of Adi-Buddha, and the philosophical concept of Dharmakaya. Adi-Buddha, a central concept of Nepalese Buddhism also having an important place in Tibet and Japan, is prevalent in Sri Lanka but never developed strongly. De Silva sums up the Adi-Buddha's main attributes calling him "the Primordial Buddha, the originative Buddha essence, self-creative, the source and originator of all things and the original Evolver of the Buddhas and Bodhisatvas."² He has thus no difficulty

¹Ibid., p. 47.

²Ibid., p. 49. A clearer picture of the concept of Adi-Buddha is revealed in a consideration of his titles. As Paramadibuddha he is Buddha from the beginning; as Andibuddha, the beginningless Buddha; as Urubuddha, the Buddha of Buddhas; and as Svayambhu lokanatha he is "the Self-Existent Lord of the World." Among the Bodhisatvas evolved by Adi Buddha are (a) Manjusri, "the Lord of Harmony", the male personification of Wisdom, and the counterpart of Brahma or Visva-karma the creator of the universe; (b) Avalokitesvara, "the Lord who looks down with pity on all men", who is said to have been incarnated three hundred times in order to save those in danger; and, (c) Vajra-pani "the thunderbolt-handed", the dread enemy of spirits whom he destroys with his thunderbolts. It is significant that these three correspond to the Hindu Trimurti, i.e., Manjusri to Brahma the Creator, Avalokitesvara to Vishnu the Preserver, and Vajra-pani to Shiva the Destroyer. Notable among the Buddhas evolved are Amitabha, worshipped as a personal God who grants grace by the Mahayanists; and Maitreya, the embodiment of love whose advent is expected to take place five thousand years after the Parinirvāṇa of Gautama. De Silva has noted that Buddhists reject the Christian suggestion that the messianic expectations connected with the worship of Maitreya are fulfilled in Christ (ibid., pp. 50-54).
in seeing Adi-Buddha as an adaptation intended to serve as a counter­
part of the Hindu concept of Brahma, the personal creator God."\(^1\)

**Dharmakaya**, the philosophical concept of the "One Cosmic
Mind" or of "Reality," a central concept in Madhyamika Buddhist
philosophy,\(^2\) is like Adi-Buddha identified particularly in Japanese
Buddhism. Literally meaning Dharma-Body, and in philosophical
language "Essential Body", De Silva says:

> It indicates the eternal reality that is the ground
or source of everything. It is the ground of Being.
"Absolute Suchness", "the Void", "the Alaya-vinnaya"
[central or universal consciousness], "Prajna" [divine
intuition] and "Nirvana" are some epithets used for
Dharma-kaya in different contexts. It is Dharma as
the Absolute or Ultimate Reality.\(^3\)

**Dharmakaya** being the "Essential Body" is the source of all,
and the "Reflected Bodies" which are divided into the categories of

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\(^1\)Ibid., p. 50. G. P. Malalasekera in his encyclopedia article
on the Adi-Buddha differs strongly saying:

> "It would be a complete misconception to consider
the Adi-Buddha as just another version of the God Creator.
That would be an absolute reversal of the Buddhist point
of view which essentially and fundamentally denies the
notion of a god creator. The conception of the Adi-Buddha
should rather be regarded as an attempt to express the
universality of experience, the essential oneness of
Samsara and Nirvana which has played so important a part
in the development of the Mahayana." See Encyclopedia of

De Silva however maintains that Malalasekera's rationalization
of this concept is unconvincing since Adi-Buddha is said to be "the
origin of all things" and "to have appeared at the beginning in the
form of light and by meditation produced Avalokita, who in turn
produced the universe with all the Buddhas and Bodhisatvas" (Why
Believe in God?, p. 50).

\(^2\)The Madhyamika or the Middle Doctrine School of Mahayana
Buddhism was founded by Nāgārjuna in the second century A. D. to har-
monize rival doctrines on the nature of Reality.

\(^3\)Ibid., p. 55.
Nirmana-kaya and Sambhogakaya are its manifestations. Nirmana-kaya or "Form Body" is the incarnation of the Dharmakaya in a human form as Buddha, as in the case of Gautama. Although these "incarnations" take human flesh and blood they are believed to be mere appearances and not real persons. The Sambhoga-kaya, "the Communal Body", is "the Body in which the Dharmakaya appears to superhuman beings and Bodhisatvas in this world and other celestial realms, and preaches the Dharma." Since the term Sambhoga implies the idea of community, mutuality, or fellowship, De Silva ventures what he terms "a fantastic suggestion" in asking, "Could it be that Sambhoga-kaya is that which creates fellowship or is the basis of communion?"¹

De Silva concludes his delineation of the development of Buddhalogy with the Trikaya (Triple Body) doctrine referred to as the Buddhist Trinity. Bhikku Sangarakshita calls it "one of the finest flowers of Buddhist thought", and Ninian Smart who sees its similarity to the Christian doctrine of the Trinity notes that its significance for us is that in it "we find intimations of a religion of devotion and worship so dear to the hearts of theists."² D. T. Suzuki has suggested that the central concept in this devotion and worship, the Dharmakaya, is personal, since the Buddhas and Bodhisatvas who emanate from him are personal. De Silva sees some similarities and also significant differences between Trikaya and Trinity, and at best is able only to find striking approximations, thus he says: "The Dharmakaya seems to echo the Christian doctrine of God, the

¹Ibid., p. 56.

Nirmana-kaya the doctrine of the Son who is the Incarnation of the Father, and the Sambhoga-kaya the doctrine of the Holy Spirit."^1

Anattā and the Indispensability of God

In proposing that the biblical understanding of Tilakkhana, especially anattā, can enable us to understand what the term "God" means, De Silva has found a basis to speak to the Buddhist from within the Buddhist's non-theocentric view of life. He maintains that the logical consequence of examining the human condition in terms of anattā is to acknowledge the indispensability of God. Thus he says:

"It is my contention that, if anattā is real, God is necessary; it is in relation to the Reality of God that the reality of anattā can be meaningful. Because man is anattā, God is indispensable; because man is absolutely anattā God is absolutely necessary. The conditioned (samkhata) man has nothing to hope for unless there is an Unconditioned Reality (asamkhata).^2"

The Buddhist affirmation that man has an intrinsic power by which he can save himself contradicts the doctrine of anattā. The Bible takes anattā in all seriousness and denies any form of intrinsic power in man (either karmic force, or the power of mind--vinnāna) by which he can transcend conditioned existence. Thus citing the Calvinist axiom finitum non capax infiniti (the finite is not capable of the infinite), De Silva asserts the Christian position that "there is no human solution to the human problem." Or as Karl Barth has put it, "man exists as he is grounded, constituted and maintained by God."^3

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^2 The Problem of the Self, p. 138.


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De Silva has maintained that the dimension of transcendence has manifested itself in Buddhism in its inclination towards an ultimate reality in Nirvāṇa. At the 1970 seminar on "The Buddhist Attitude to God", he found himself in full agreement with the Buddhist university professor who spoke of Nirvāṇa as being beyond logic and as the object of experience.¹ The Buddha refused to give an answer to the question as to what Nirvāṇa is as the real answer could only be

¹See above, p. 222. De Silva maintains that God is known not by argument but in experience, as "unless the conviction of God is given in and through experience, it cannot be reached by logical inference." Several instances of this conviction are cited, e.g., Wordsworth's experience in his poem on Tintern Abbey when he "felt a presence that disturbs me with joy," Sir Ernest Shackleton's vivid consciousness of a Divine Companion in his book South, Sadhu Sundar Singh's vision of Christ that led to his conversion, and the words of Douglas M. Burns, "I sometimes experience a strong feeling of the existence and presence of something transcendent, infinite, eternal and good; something which can influence my own destiny and the destiny of all creation." However the question remains whether the conviction that is experienced does in fact point to the existence of God. The question in the Buddhist mind is, "Can God be proved?" For De Silva, the dialogue between king Milinda and the Venerable Nagasena, on the possibility of proving the existence of Nibbāna, is useful to answer the Buddhist. In reply to Milinda's question as to whether it was "possible by simile or argument or cause or method to point out the shape or configuration or age or size of Nibbana," Nagasena's reply is that Nibbāna defies description as it has no counterpart and like the devas (gods) belonged to an incorporeal class (arupakayika deva). Nibbāna, he avers, could be experienced just as "a precious gem causes delight; even so, sire, does nibbana cause delight." While the reality of Nibbāna could not be proved by logic, reasoning or argument, "the Venerable Nagasena took for granted that Nibbana is." Neither Nirvāṇa nor God can be proved by argument. De Silva therefore maintains that the so-called proofs of the existence of God--cosmological, teleological, ontological, etc.--are useful only to help us understand what we have already experienced. They do not induce belief or create faith but only serve to clarify, confirm, and support what we believe already. And as to the validity of experience in establishing the existence of God, he says:

"The knowledge of God can be verified on the level of spiritual experience, and this verification is as valid as the verification of the sweetness of the cake by the "experience" of taste or the sweetness of music by the aesthetic experience" (Why Believe in God, pp. 2-10).
discovered in experience. Similarly God too is beyond logical analysis and is known only in experience. It was also pointed out that in the approach to the question of the reality of God, it would be a mistake to begin with a definition and description because God cannot be defined just as Nirvāṇa cannot be defined. However both God and Nirvāṇa could be spoken of as "Transcendent Reality," as De Silva notes; the fundamental thesis of the professor's presentation was that

While Buddhism rejects the notion of God so defined [as found in the Oxford Dictionary, and the description found in the Book of Common Prayer], it accepts an impersonal, transcendent and ultimate reality beyond time, space and causality. In this sense Buddhism could speak of a God beyond the God of theism.¹

The scriptural quotation most frequently employed to support the notion of a Transcendental Reality in Buddhist thought is the famous Udāna passage in the Pāṭaligama Vagga of the Khuddaka Nikāya I. 3-8.

Monks, there is (atthi) a not-born (ajātam), a not-become (abhutam), a not-made (akatam), a not-compounded (asamkhatam). If that unborn, not-become, not-made, not-compounded were not, there would be apparent no escape from this here that is born, become, made, compounded. But since, monks, there is an unborn, unbecome, unmade, uncompounded, therefore is apparent the escape from this here that is born, become, made, compounded.²

The underlying implications of this passage are of crucial importance to the discussion of the Buddhist view of God. Whether the epithets "Unborn" and "Uncreated" refer to Nirvāṇa as the Absolute or to an Absolute Reality beyond Nirvāṇa has been a matter of dispute among scholars. It has been argued that Nirvāṇa as "cessation of desire", which is its traditional interpretation in a positive sense, ³

makes it dependent on a psychological state prior to which it could not have existed. On the other hand if Nirvāṇa is interpreted negatively as an experience of complete extinction, it cannot exist separately. Thus since the epithets "Unborn" and "Uncreated" cannot in the strict sense be applied to Nirvāṇa, some have held "that these epithets refer to an Absolute Reality distinct from Nirvāṇa. It is a Reality that is (atthi)".1

The import of the Udāna passage for De Silva comes into sharp focus in his dialogical response to Gunapala Dhamasiri's controversial work A Buddhist Critique of the Christian Concept of God.2

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1 The Problem of the Self, p. 140. Attempting to understand Nirvāṇa from the Christian viewpoint De Silva holds that it is "an experience related to the Absolute and is not the Absolute in itself." The Udāna passage has been interpreted in this way by some Buddhist interpreters. Māgārjuna making specific reference to this passage is of the view that Nirvāṇa (deliverance from conditioned existence) is possible because there is a Paramārtha (Ultimate Reality). According to D. C. Wijewardene and H. Oldenberg it is likely that expressions applied to Brahmān in the Upanishads were borrowed, which would mean that the epithets used in the Udāna passage would apply to an Ultimate Reality other than Nirvāṇa. Cf. D. C. Wijewardene, Revolt in the Temple (Colombo: Sinha Publications, 1953), p. 398, and H. Oldenberg, Buddha: His Life, His Doctrine, His Order, tr. William Hoey (London: Luzac, 1928), p. 283. Even E. R. Sarathchandra, who rules out the idea that the Buddha believed in an Absolute Reality, refers to the Udāna passage as the solitary instance which might lead to the interpretation "that the Buddha placed an uncaused absolute reality against the fleeting reality of the phenomenal world as did the Vedānta." Cf. E. R. Sarathchandra, Buddhist Psychology of Perception (Colombo: Ceylon University Press, 1958), p. 101. Thus De Silva concludes that since this manner of speaking about Ultimate Reality was congenial to the Indian mind, it is likely that the Buddha and later Buddhist thinkers were influenced by the Upanishads. (The Problem of the Self, pp. 140-141).

2 See above, pp. 56-57. De Silva has undertaken a critical examination of Dhamasiri's treatment of the related concepts of anattā and Nirvāṇa in this book. He sees Dhamasiri making a false start in the first chapter "God and the Soul" by assuming that "an understanding of the soul contributes much to the understanding of
According to Dharmasiri Nirvana is complete extinction, thus he says that the Udāna passage cannot be understood "to indicate a positive and an ontological existence of Nirvana." Dharmasiri's negative interpretation leans heavily toward the error of ucchedaditthi (nihilism). By dispensing with the idea of God he has also eclipsed Nirvāṇa. Thus Dharmasiri's book is, for De Silva, a classic illustration of the truth that "if God is not annihilation is the end."

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1 A Buddhist Critique, p. 185.

2 "Anatta and God", p. 108. De Silva contends that Dharmasiri's explanation of Nirvāṇa as "absolute extinction" makes of Buddhism "a deferred or delayed materialism." Thus Dharmasiri says that the Buddha used Nirvāṇa in the sense of "complete extinction," and that when the five khandas are annihilated "consciousness reaches its end" (cf. A Buddhist Critique, pp. 180-181). By "absolute extinction" Dharmasiri does not mean the extinction of desire (tanha), a view which would have been consonant with the best Theravada tradition. Instead, as De Silva points out, what he means is that "at death the saint becomes 'completely' extinct." Even the positive statements about Nirvāṇa as "supreme bliss," "intellectual enlightenment," "uprooting of attachment," etc., Dharmasiri maintains are applicable only when the person is living. Complete Nirvāṇa takes place at the death of the arahant which is always referred to as parinibbana, "pari" meaning "completely" or "in every respect" (cf. A Buddhist Critique, p. 188). Dharmasiri maintains that the ucchedaditthava that the Buddha rejected was not "the annihilationist view," but the materialist view according to which all men are fully extinguished soon after death. The Buddha rejected the materialist view because he accepted the fact of rebirth. It is only at the parinirvāṇa of the saint, after his cycle of rebirth is ended, that he becomes "completely," "in every respect" extinct. This view, according to De Silva, is nothing but "a deferred or delayed materialism." See "Anatta and God", pp. 107-108.
Since man is absolutely anattā there is a need for a hypothesis of an Ultimate Reality, God, or the Unconditioned, to avoid the error of ucchedaditthi. Thus the basic implication of the Udāna passage is "that the Unconditioned Reality is indispensable if man is to escape the conditioned; apart from the Unconditioned there can be no escape for that which is conditioned."

For De Silva then, the Christian-Buddhist meeting point on the doctrine of God hinges on the fact that the full depth and significance of anattā can be understood only in relation to the Unconditioned (God). He concludes his exposition responding to H. Oldenberg's interpretation of the Udāna passage, which he says "probably voices the Theravada position." For Oldenberg the Buddha's words "there is an uncreated" need not necessarily signify that Nirvāṇa is a Transcendent Reality, but they merely signified "that the created can free himself from the curse of being created—there is a path from the World of the created out into dark endlessness." Oldenberg, seeing that this position is open to a negative or positive interpretation, raises the question: "Does the path lead into a new existence? Does it lead into Nothing?" He answers: "The Buddhist creed rests in a delicate equipoise between the two. The longing of the heart that craves the eternal has not nothing, and yet the thought has not a something which it might firmly grasp [italics De Silva's]."

The words he has italicised De Silva considers crucial, as they point

1The Problem of the Self, p. 139.
3Ibid., p. 142.
us to what he believes represents the Buddhist understanding of the import of the Udāna passage:

They mean that the longing of the heart for the eternal hits something and not nothing, but that something is a reality apprehended in religious experience which surpasses the human mind and speech to grasp, define and describe. If this can be regarded as the Buddhist approach to reality, then there is much that Christians can learn from it.1

Thus for De Silva the correct Theravada position is that the concept of Nirvāṇa indicates that "the longing of the heart for the eternal hits something", i.e., a Transcendent Reality or God. To adopt the negative interpretation of Nirvāṇa, as Dharmasiri has done, is to dispense with God at the expense extinguishing Nirvāṇa. By doing this all that Dharmasiri has achieved is in "making Buddhism the most materialistic and pessimistic of all religions."2 Since the born, the become, the made, the compounded, cannot by its own intrinsic power transcend finitude, God or the Ultimate Reality becomes absolutely necessary.

Dharmasiri’s book, is however, a challenge to search for a worthier concept of God. Having found theological and philosophical explanations of God wanting, he himself seems to be looking for a nobler concept of God.3 Christians need to guard against thinking

1 Ibid., pp. 141-142.
3 That Dharmasiri's book can have a positive value for Christians becomes apparent to De Silva, because of what is said at the end of the sixth chapter: "Lastly, it is not only a good fortune but a logical certainty that a good Buddhist will necessarily achieve union with God, provided God exists and is good, as the

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that they can understand God by theories and conceptual formulations. By putting God under a microscope and minutely analyzing him, Christian theology has hindered belief in God "to the point that God ceases to be God," and "the resulting theologies, theories, and conceptual formulations (most of which are inventions of a western culture and not truly biblical) have obscured our vision of Reality." Thus De Silva posits the view that God must be found and experienced at "the supra-depth level of ultimacy."

It is at the supra-depth level of ultimacy that one has a relationship with the Transcendent, and a sense of oneness and communion with Reality. It is at this level, to the Buddhists the realm of Avyakata (the inexplicable), that one realizes there is a Reality which goes beyond the level of rational thinking. Of the discovery of this Reality, this Unborn, Unbecome, Unmade, and Uncompounded, De Silva says:

God is really known in the abyss of one's being, in the realisation that one is anattā and therefore cannot depend on oneself for one's salvation. To reach that point, one has to pass through the dark night of the soul; through the desert where God himself has forsaken one... It is the discovery of emptiness—that man is but dust and to dust he shall return--

Buddha explained to the brahmin Vāsettha who desperately insisted that Brahma (God) exists: 'And so you say, Vāsettha, that the bhikku (Buddhist monk) is free from anger, and free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself; and that God is free from anger, and free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself. Then in sooth, Vāsettha, that the bhikku who is free from anger, free from malice, pure in mind, and master of himself should after death, when the body is dissolved, become united with God, who is the same—such a situation of things is every way possible" (A Buddhist Critique, p. 124).

1 The Problem of the Self, p. 142.
that can annihilate self, and in the annihilation of self, one is led to the discovery of the oneness of emptiness and fullness. When man realises that he is naththi (nothing) in himself, he discovers that he is in fact atthi in the abyss of his being.\(^1\)

Of this realization of one's nullity or anattāness, of one's utter creatureliness, this experience of dying in order to be released from the burden of self, De Silva declares: "This I take is what Nirvana means--the extinction of the ego."\(^2\) This experience is common to both Buddhist and Christian. He notes that Muggeridge, speaking of the sense of oneness that results from the experience of confronting God, says, "This sense of oneness, with the consequent release from the burden of the self, I take to be God--something which indubitably exists, which not only has not died, but cannot die."\(^3\) What Muggeridge calls "something" is the living God, and of this "something" there has never been and never will be a completely

\(^1\) The Problem of the Self, p. 143. Noting that there are certain states of consciousness in Buddhist psychology which exceed rational thought in which realities not present to the senses can be known, De Silva draws attention to Lokuttara, the spiritual sphere in which God is realized. Four spheres are listed in the Dhammasangani, the first book of the Abhidhamma, which deals with the states of consciousness (cittas), viz., Kamaracara--the sensuous, Rupavacara--the form sphere, Ampavacara--the formless, and Lokuttara--the supramundane. As consciousness passes from the lower to the higher spheres there is an "emergence of states of insight which can plumb depths of truth which discursive intellect cannot reach, which includes intellectual or cognitive faculties but transcends them." In the highest and final stage, the Lokuttara, is found An-annatannassamit' in-driya or the faculty of "believing I shall come to know the unknown." Thus of the Lokuttara De Silva asks, "Is this not the level on which God can be known?" See Why Believe in God? pp. 12-13.

\(^2\) "Anatta and God," p. 112.

satisfactory definition. This "something", undefinable and indescribable, is the Absolute Reality distinct from Nirvāṇa. It is the "ultimate Beyond which gives meaning to the proximate beyonds—the experiences of transcendence in everyday life."¹

Despite the utter ineffability and incomprehensibility of God, man's attempt to give expression to his realization of God inevitably results in the use of some kind of symbol. Radhakrishnan's remark that the Absolute reveals himself as Light, Love, and Life to seekers of different temperaments is especially significant as the very same symbols are used in the Bible to signify God. However, it is pointed out that the meaning of the symbols, analogues, and metaphors that are used is bound up with the faith-community that uses them. While Allah has significance for Muslims and Jehovah for the Jews, these terms may not carry meaning in different contexts. For De Silva, this means that

We cannot talk of God without at the same time talking of ourselves. Whatever name we may use for 'God' will be meaningless unless it points to something within us and beyond us. In other words, the term 'God' must combine the existential and the ontological, the ethical and the metaphysical, the within and the beyond.²


²Why Believe in God?, p. 62. The hesitance to speak about God due to the difficulties and limitations of language is illustrated in the experience of the Israelites. Thinking the name of God was too sacred to be pronounced they used the four consonants YHWH to signify him, but sheer necessity forced them to come up with the pronounceable name Adonai (my Lord). Christian mystics who have felt that God is not definable and nameable have had the same experience, as can be seen in the work of Pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite who wrote about God as follows:

"Ascending higher, we say. . . .
not definable, not nameable,
As we have already noted certain symbols were used to signify the ultimate Reality in Buddhism, e.g., the Adi-Buddha idea (comparable in some ways to the Father-God in Christianity) and the Trikaya doctrine (similar to the doctrine of the Trinity).\(^1\) A particularly noteworthy meeting point between the religions in the use of symbols for God is found in the Trinitarian concept. De Silva has traced the resemblances between Trikaya and Trinity and has also drawn attention to the points of contrast between the Buddhist and Christians views. The basic reason he advances for the rise of trinitarian concepts is stated as follows: "The tension between ultimacy and concreteness in the concept of the Absolute drives towards a unity in a trinitarian structure [italics De Silva's]."\(^2\) In the development of the Trikaya doctrine there is at first the Dharmakaya, the Absolute or the Ultimate. The need to think of the Absolute in concrete terms, since Dharmakaya was a pure abstraction that failed to satisfy religious

not knowable,
not dark, not light
not untrue, not true,
not affirmable, not deniable
for
While we affirm or deny of those orders of beings
that are akin to Him
we neither affirm not deny Him
that is beyond
all affirmation as unique universal Cause and
all negation as simple pre-eminent Cause,
free of all and
to all transcendent.
Thus Dionysius begins by saying God cannot be defined or named, but ends up calling him the Beyond, the unique universal cause, the pre-eminent cause, the transcendent (ibid., pp. 62-64).

\(^1\) See above, pp. 231-234.

\(^2\) Ibid., p. 72.
aspirations, resulted in the Nirmanakaya. However, this urge for concreteness resulted in a kind of polytheism, viz., the belief in Buddhas, Bodhisatvas, and gods, and the Absolute in Buddhism became prone to the danger of losing its ultimacy. The gods in Buddhism being only super beings and subject to the law of anicca lacked ultimacy. Thus De Silva maintains that in the resulting tension between ultimacy and concreteness, a trinitarian concept arose to maintain the balance. The resolution of this tension within the framework of the Christian concept of the Trinity stands in marked contrast and is stated by De Silva as follows:

In Christian thought God is the Ultimate Reality (Dharma-kaya): but in the Incarnation (Nirmanakaya) he became the concrete Reality. Christ was not a partial revelation of Reality. In Him was the fullness of the Godhead. Thus in His concreteness ultimacy was not lost. We say that God is Spirit. Spirit is opposed to matter; spirit is transcendent to all things material. But the spirit is immanent in all things. Thus transcendence (ultimacy) and immanence (concreteness) are held together in a unity. The concept of the Trinity is of great importance because in it ultimacy and concreteness, transcendence and immanence, metaphysics and ethics, stability and dynamism, are held together in a Unity.

De Silva's translational theology in terms of Tilakkhana, in all its facets, finds its fulfilment in the reality that is God. It is in his anattaness, in the abyss of his being, that man discovers God and his authentic self. "If God is, then the realisation that one is anattā leads to the experience of emptiness and fullness (sunnatā-punnata, natthi-atthi, anattā-pneuma) all in one."² It is

¹Ibid., pp. 71-72.
²The Problem of the Self, p. 145.
in the worship and experience of God that man makes his pilgrimage toward that ultimate goal the Kingdom of God, the Community of Love. Christianity and Buddhism agree on the need for self-negation, which Buddhists emphasize is an essential aspect of the Nibbāna experience. Both see the need to put an end to the egocentric life of craving and self-interest by deliberately denying the self. This, however, "does not mean the annihilation of the self but an experience in which the notion of 'I', 'me' and 'mine', of separate individuality, disappears."¹ In Christian teaching and experience there is something strikingly analogous to the Buddhist notion of the need to strip oneself of I, Me, Mine. But the essential point of difference is in the Christian emphasis on the indispensability of God. Since man is really anattā, God is indispensable for his salvation:

Unlike Buddhism Christianity says that it is only by abandoning oneself to God that one can die to self. . . . So the sovereign cure for the problem of self, as Christianity sees it, is to turn one's attention away from self to God and allow the divine reality to occupy the centre of one's being.²

It is only by losing oneself in this I-Thou relationship that one can cease to be a separate self. The Bible teaching is that the authentic "self" exists only in relationship. It is a relationship in which one "loses oneself completely, and in losing oneself one finds oneself. Exclusive individuality is negated, but personality finds fulfilment."³ Thus in the New Testament idea of the Kingdom

¹Ibid., p. 125.
²Ibid., pp. 128-129.
³Ibid., p. 129.
of God as a Community of Love, in which "love integrates being with being and being with Being." De Silva suggests, "we have an answer to the Buddhist quest for self-negation as well as for a form of self-fulfillment, without one contradicting the other." This is the basis for a Christian doctrine of anattā, in which the self is denied without yielding to a nihilistic view, and authentic selfhood is affirmed without yielding to an eternalistic view:

Here we can find a satisfactory solution to the problem of the quest for self-identity which does not fall into the errors of either nihilism or eternalism. Since the person exists only in participation and not by an intrinsic potentiality, there is no question of eternalism; and since the person retains a differentiation in communion, there is no question of nihilism. But such an understanding is possible only if we accept the reality of God, with whom a person can enter into communion.

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1 Ibid., p. 135.
2 Ibid., p. 130.
3 Ibid., p. 137.
CHAPTER IV
EVALUATION AND REFLECTION

Religious truths do not meet in the library, they meet in the minds and souls of men.¹

In 1966, as director of the Study Center, De Silva said in his report to the NCC and to the Methodist Synod: "What the present situation demands from the church are. . . a re-formulation of her theology, a re-adjustment of her methods and a readiness to perceive points of contact with non-Christian religions--a task to which the church pays only lip service."² That he has essayed this task almost single-handed to become the foremost practitioner of dialogue on the Sri Lankan scene is widely acknowledged.³ In this chapter we have made an evaluation and an interpretive assessment of the re-formulation of theology that De Silva has undertaken, and of the dialogical method he has spelled out in his constant quest for points of contact to dialogue meaningfully with the Buddhist. We have compared his dialogical approach with other Sri Lankan approaches, Buddhist and Christian, and considered some Buddhist responses with regard to dialogical method and the central theological issues of the Buddhist-

¹Buddhism and the Claims of Christ, p. 22.
³See above, pp. 34-37.

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Christian encounter. We have also reflected on these issues, seeking to bring together that which is decisive for the construction of a framework of theological understanding of other religions.

The basic issue we confront in our evaluation of the corpus of De Silva's writings as a test case on inter-religious dialogue is whether authentic religious dialogue is possible. In the fundamental propositions he made at Nairobi, De Silva asserted that it is indeed possible to know the religious faith of others, i.e., that there is a "sharing in the spirituality of others," and "the real test of faiths is faiths-in-relation." In dialogue the authenticity of one's own faith and that of the other is maintained, because in it one gets to know the faith of the other in depth, and it "refines and sharpens" one's faith and "enriches and strengthens" commitment to it.\footnote{See above, p. 62.} Our description of De Silva's theology as "a practised theology of dialogue," and as "translational," predicates that theological reflection should begin with concrete involvement in living encounter with other religions. Thus dialogical theology is seen as theology-in-context. It is in the process of reflection in the context of each other's faith that the limits of present clarities are transcended. From the Christian standpoint De Silva's theology must be evaluated on whether he has maintained an authentically Christian relation to the Buddhist and his world; and from the Buddhist viewpoint, for De Silva's theology to be translational the Buddhist must be able to recognize his faith in De Silva's portrayal of it. We must ask the question whether his dialogical efforts have in fact been a two-way
process in which a true congruence of concepts and categories have been achieved. Whether De Silva and his dialogue partner have grasped each other's centralities, and the degree to which mutuality has been achieved while preserving the authenticity of the respective faiths, constitutes the underpinning of the evaluative criteria we have used.

Our examination of De Silva's dialogical theology and method, and his use of Buddhist terms and thought-forms in relation to Christianity, is set in the perspective of the Asian Christian theologian living in the midst of non-Christian religions. We must examine the validity of De Silva's stance that Asian expressions of theological thought need to be freed from Western theological systems in the task of making truth intelligible. His call for "freedom from teutonic captivity," was a call to break down the walls of separation between the religions.¹ In practice this meant that Asian theology needed to be translational, an approach which required an openness to the deepest religious convictions of others. This approach has raised the fear of syncretism which, largely under the overpowering influence of Kraemer, has come to be understood as an illegitimate mingling of different religious elements. Ever since Tamaram (1938) the rightness of one's approach to interfaith relations has proceeded by taking up a position relative to Kraemer, either endorsing or repudiating.² De Silva's dialogical approach has challenged the Kraemerian view and maintained that translational theology is the

¹See above, pp. 16-17.
²See above, p. 64.
inevitable risk that Asian Christians living in the midst of other religions must take. Thus in our evaluation of the validity of his stance on the basic issues of dialogue such as the uniqueness of Christ, revelation outside of Christianity, other religions as ways of salvation, and the relation of witness to mission, the pivotal question we ask is: In translation, i.e., in speaking the language of the Buddhist, has De Silva recognized the "other" as "other" and refused to water down genuine distinctions between the two faiths?

Sri Lankan Christian Approaches
Points of Departure

A comparison of De Silva's dialogical point of departure, with those which contemporary Sri Lankan Christian theologians have taken in their conversation with Buddhism, bears significantly on De Silva's assertion that the real test of faiths is faiths in relation. He has repeatedly asserted that Buddhism can fertilize and enrich the Christian's faith and enable him to see new dimensions of truth, indicating that for him in authentic dialogue there are converging foci of truth. We find De Silva looking at Christianity through Buddhist eyes and maintaining that some truths in Buddhism are correctives to certain deviations from biblical truths. Thus for him truth, especially religious truth, is not simply a matter of either-or but of both-and. A comparison with the approaches of other Christians seems to bear this out.

In his selection of the three signata of Buddhism, anicca, anattā, and dukkha, as the starting point for the construction of a framework of theological understanding, De Silva has taken hold of Buddhism's most central categories. As S. Z. Aung has noted, the
anattā theory "forms the central doctrine of Buddhist philosophy."\(^1\) This is the right starting point for De Silva who maintains that a living theology begins with living existential realities. Kraemer, who saw a radical discontinuity between the biblical revelation and all religions and maintained that syncretistic distortion resulted from adaptation, has pointed out that Buddhism's "originality and force reside in the fact that it conceived the transience (anitya or anitta) of all existence and the supreme need to achieve escape from it with such extreme intensity as cannot be surpassed."\(^2\) Though Kraemer could also say that "Buddhism teaches with a kind of prophetic vigour that what really matters is man and his deliverance, and nothing else,"\(^3\) his concept of revelation precluded empathetic understanding of Buddhism.

De Silva's empathetic understanding of Buddhism, and ability to speak from within it, stands in contrast to the approaches of fellow Sri Lankans D. T. Niles and Bryan De Kretser. D. T. Niles, who differed from Kraemer in that he saw the possibility of greater mutuality between the two religions, saw Buddhism as one of the most realistic of the great religions of the world. He describes himself as a Christian student of Buddhism and says that "while to some extent a student can approach the study of religion neutrally, he can never completely or even adequately do so."\(^4\) Thus he does not


\(^3\)Ibid., pp. 174-175.

\(^4\)Buddhism and the *Claims of Christ*, p. 22.
attempt any formulation of a general theory between the Christian faith and the Buddhist dhamma, but says to the Buddhist, "all that I can do is to present my faith as a Christian to you as a Buddhist in as meaningful a language for you as I am able to use, and then leave it at that." His use of Buddhist terms is therefore, as the title of each chapter in his book indicates, to communicate the Christian's perspective, dogmas, faith, life, beliefs, and proclamation in language that has significance for the Buddhist. He differs significantly from De Silva in that while he speaks to the Buddhist, and listens, he does not communicate from within Buddhism. We find that De Silva has spoken from within Buddhism both on the theoretical and existential levels. He dialogues with the Theravada as well as the other branches of Buddhism. Recognizing that Buddhism runs a gamut of mentalities from the deeply critical to the animistic, De Silva dialogues with theoretical as well as popular Buddhism. Thus while Niles remains at a comparative approach—as he dares not minimize the contradiction between faith in God and the Buddhist's natural presuppositions, De Silva has found the point of contact—that if anatta is real God is indispensable, and traces the development of

1 Ibid.

2 Kraemer's evaluation of Niles' work gives the impression that Niles is speaking one-sidedly rather than dialogically. He says that Niles has become "a Buddhist to the Buddhists" in order to preach Christ as the power and wisdom of God. He sees Niles "striking a right balance in the confrontation of Buddhism and Christianity," because "he is able to demonstrate that Buddhism in no sense affords a foundation on which the Christian faith can be based. In Christ all things become really new" (ibid., p. 11).

3 Ibid., p. 24.
a Buddhology in the attempt to bridge the gulf, which in the view of traditional apologetics, exists between so-called Buddhist "atheism" and the Christian idea of a personal God.

Bryan De Kretser, another notable Sri Lankan contributor to the Christian-Buddhist encounter, takes a clearly one-sided either-or approach and describes his work Man in Buddhism and Christianity as "an academic statement on the Buddhist and Christian conception of man," in which comparison is "made between dogmatic Hinayana orthodoxy and dogmatic Christianity." While religious meaning is in some measure accessible to the non-participant scholar, is the academic exercise of comparative religions adequate? Is not subjective participation an essential condition for understanding the faith of others? As Wilfred Cantwell Smith has pointed out, to merely play the role of an observer is to ignore the faith of the other:

The participant can see very clearly that the outsider may know all about a religious system, and yet may totally miss the point. The outsider may intellectually command all the details of its external facts, and yet may be—indeed, as an outsider, presumably must be or demonstratively is—untouched by the heart of the matter.

De Silva's approach to Buddhism stands apart from that of Niles and De Kretser in that he has to a greater measure attempted the apprehension of Buddhism as a dynamic living faith. He has studied Buddhism in Sri Lanka's Buddhist universities, receiving a

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1 p. i.

2 Ibid., p. 1.

diploma in Theravada Buddhism from Vidyalankara and following a study course in the Mahayana at Vidyodaya. More importantly, he has in his numerous encounters listened empathetically to Buddhists on living issues such as nationalism, politics, race, and violence. This empathetic approach has facilitated the development of a contextual theology. Note, for instance, the relevance to dialogue of his grasp of the Buddhist view that from the earliest times the Buddhist religion and the Sinhala nation constituted an indivisible whole. That he sought to come close to the heart of Buddhism and understand its existential meanings is best revealed in his work Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices in Sri Lanka, in which he portrays the look and the feel of being a Buddhist in the various strata of society. Here he presents not a highly rational, intellectual philosophy but the Buddhism of the believer, a religion in which devotion and feeling play a major role. Thus he says:

>Buddhism has a religious sap which has made it a living vital religion. This religious sap consists, as in other religions, not only of doctrines and ethical teachings, but also of historical traditions, ceremonies, rites, rituals and myths, all of which have combined to form the faith by which Buddhists live.

1 See above, pp. 38-40.

2 Buddhism: Beliefs and Practices in Sri Lanka (Colombo: The Ecumenical Institute, 1980), p. v. The kind of personal engagement that De Silva had with Buddhism was reflected at his funeral, as the obituary issued by the Ecumenical Institute indicates:

"It was perhaps significant that, on its way to the crematorium at Kanatta, the funeral procession wended its way through both the Christian and Buddhist sections of the cemetery symbols of a man who had sought to bring about a deeper understanding between these two faiths." "Rev. Dr. Lynn De Silva," Colombo: 1982, p. 2 (Mimeographed.)
De Silva's most original contribution to theological thought is the Christian-Buddhist concept of anatta-pneuma, which we have delineated in the third chapter. He has acknowledged that it was the systematic treatment of anatta in the Buddhist texts that led him to the analysis of comparable texts in the Bible, and thus the recognition of the biblical denial of the immortality of the soul. It is the willingness to accept the Buddhist understanding of anatta without minimizing it in any way that has made this conceptualization of Buddhist-Christian anthropology possible, and also makes it valid in terms of the dialogue. It is not possible to grasp the meanings of concepts apart from the context of their religious functioning. Thus the pervasive notion, found in traditional Christianity and Western thought, of an immortal soul has prevented Sri Lankan Roman Catholics from entering into a dialogue on the most central of Buddhist centralities, anatta.

G. H. Rothermundt, noting the difference in the concepts of the soul "between De Silva and Roman Catholic theologians who are also engaged in the quest for a contextual theology," says that "Obviously the latter are aiming at an indigenous theological anthropology from a different angle." He cites Mervyn Fernando's article

1 "An Evaluation of 'Dialogue'," p. 91. A recent example is that of Dr. Antony Fernando, lecturer in Christian Culture at the University of Kelaniya in Sri Lanka, who has questioned whether De Silva's exposition of anatta is what the Buddha understood it to be. Fernando has reacted to De Silva's statement that the notion of an immortal soul "entered Christian thinking through the influence of Greek philosophy and is altogether alien to what the Bible teaches about the nature and destiny of man" (Problem of the Self, p. 3). He says that the doctrine of anatta (soullessness) was not the Buddha's view but resulted from the confrontation between early Buddhism and Greek philosophy. He maintains that the Buddha's view found in the
"Self, Reality and Salvation in Christianity and Buddhism," as an example. In it Fernando calls for true congruence of concepts and categories and maintains that the categories of "Self," "Absolute Reality," and "Salvation or Liberation" are the "most basic and fundamental categories" of both systems.\(^1\) He then proceeds to explain the concept of the self in terms of Aristotelian "substance," as "an independent, perduring entity."\(^2\) Michael J. Mooney in a response to Fernando points out that though Christians may have explicated the concept of the self in terms of Aristotelian substance, "the final meaning of such notions should be sought in the function

\[\text{Anattalakkhana Sutta} \text{ (the no-self sermon) is not the metaphysical version of the no-soul theory found in the Buddhist classic the Milindapanha, a dialogue that is "traceable to the days of Greek domination in India and conducted between a Buddhist monk called Nagasena, and a Greek monarch called Milinda (or Menander)" see Antony Fernando, Buddhism and Christianity: Their Inner Affinity (Colombo: The Ecumenical Institute for Study and Dialogue, 1981), p. 46. Nagasena's illustration that the five aggregates consist of the human being in the same way that different parts makes up the chariot was not the Buddha's view. The Buddha's aim was to show that the true self was to be found outside the aggregates. His discussion on the aggregates had nothing to do with the soul but was concerned with a personality building technique. Thus for the Buddha there were two types of self and neither was the soul. The first was the false self that is to be negated in samsara, and the second is the enlightened or emancipated self in Nirvana. Thus Fernando concludes: "The 'no-self' or the 'anattā' doctrine of the Buddha is not a doctrine of 'no-immortal soul' or even of 'no-individuality'" (ibid., p. 51). Fernando states in his introduction that he has aimed at maximum fidelity to the original thought of the Buddha, and that some of his thoughts are not "identical with the interpretation found in some contemporary Buddhist manuals" (ibid., p. 3). Orthodox Sri Lankan Theravadins are likely to see Fernando's interpretation as another attempt to smuggle in, or leave the way open for, belief in the soul as a permanent entity. See above, pp. 150-152, and 173.

\(^1\)International Philosophical Quarterly 12, No. 3 (September 1972): 415.
\(^2\)Ibid., p. 416.
they perform in the concrete religious life of their traditions as disclosed in the texts analyzed.\(^1\) He then cites the eminent Buddhist scholar T. W. Rhys Davids, who insisted that Buddhism rejects, as religiously bankrupt, any and every theory of enduring selfhood and noted that the failure to grasp this "has rendered so very large a portion of the voluminous Western writings on the subject of so little value."\(^2\) The difference between the Catholic approach and that of De Silva is that Catholics proceed deductively from their own tradition, whereas De Silva proceeds dialogically from a common point of departure by getting as close as possible to the Buddhist meaning of anattā.

The Buddhist Response and the Search for Common Ground

Margaret Chatterjee makes the observation that in the past religion has done much to foster the spirit of "we" over against "they", and religious language has been "persuasive" and often backed up by force, thus impeding genuine communication. Answering the question whether the language of one faith can be translated into the language of another faith, she says that "the crux of the problem of the failure of inter-religious communication lies in the contrast between 'This means to me' and 'That means to you'." Religious faith however becomes translational when we find "a vehicle which can lead

\(^1\) "On Comparing Christian and Buddhist Traditions: A Response to Mervyn Fernando," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 13, No. 2 (June 1973): 270.

to the affirmation "This means to me but I know what that means to you."¹ We now consider some Buddhist responses to De Silva's dialogical affirmations and compare his approach to that of Buddhist dialogists.

De Silva has clearly gone beyond the comparative religions approach of Shanta Ratnayake in the endeavor to meaningfully translate his religious faith. Ratnayake has been a co-editor of Dialogue and has undertaken a serious comparative study in his work Two Ways of Perfection: Buddhist and Christian.² Assessing Ratnayake's contribution in the foreword to this book, Edmund Perry describes Ratnayake as a "comparative religionist" who as one born, reared, and disciplined in Theravada Buddhism, has demonstrated that it is possible through academic study to "enter into the spirit of Christianity as well as into its thought-world and thereby gain an admirably accurate understanding of Christianity as Christians themselves understand it."³ However the question remains whether comparative religious studies at the academic level are an adequate vehicle for the translation of one religious faith to that of another. Ratnayake has treated the data of both religions with fairness and respect and taken pains to point out the basic distinctions between the religions. The study ends listing the similarities and dissimilarities between the Buddhist way of insight-wisdom and the Christian way of faith; as


² See above, p. 58.

³ Two Ways of Perfection, p. xiii.
Perry points out, he has sought to understand each way in its own environment "having grasped the Buddhist contextual understanding and separately the Christian contextual understanding."\(^1\) There has, however, been no attempt to speak from within the other's context; thus we find no significant degree of mutuality has been achieved.

De Silva's approach differs significantly. Beyond identifying parallels and non-parallels he seeks for points of contact to listen to and understand, to speak and be understood. Religions must not only eschew their exclusivity, they must overcome their introvert nature as there can be no meaningful communication as long as discussion remains solely within Christian or Buddhist terms of reference. De Silva's dialogical contribution stands apart from that of other Sri Lankans in that his religious faith has in some measure succeeded in transcending its embodiment to arrive at an inclusive attitude to the faith of the other. It is this impulse toward mutuality, this openness or porosity, the acknowledgement that other faiths contain truths that enables one to transcend present clarities and make a creative contribution to theology. This does not mean the abandonment of personal commitment to one's particular faith since for De Silva the point of contact was often antithetical, and though the way was open for mutual fertilization there are also points of doctrinal irreducibility. Thus we find that he has in the main taken a dialectical approach and treated Buddhism and Christianity as complementary systems.\(^2\) We now consider the response of three notable Buddhist interlocutors to this approach.

\(^1\text{Ibid., p. xii.}\)

\(^2\text{Though the words of the Buddhist monk, who likened Buddhist-Christian dialogue to a monkey trying to kiss its fiancee through a}\)
What is "Christian," What is "Buddhist"

De Silva has been charged by Alec Robertson, in the exchanges following the NCC seminar in 1967, with making "a travesty and hotch-potch of the two teachings as expounded by the Founders of the two doctrines." He sees De Silva erring in his attempt to come up with new interpretations by reconciling the fundamental Christian doctrines of God, heaven, and repentance, with the doctrine of the Buddha. We now consider a fundamental problem of conceptual dialogue which Robertson's allegation points to— that of correctly defining the other's position within the spectrum of his own religion.

With regard to his interpretation of the doctrine of God, De Silva is faulted for the use of Amāta (Deathless), Akatannu (Uncreated), Asankatha (Unconditioned), and Tathata (The Truly-So) to suggest the Christian idea of God, whereas these terms refer to Nirvāṇa in Theravada Buddhism and "in fact have no resemblance to the Christian idea of God." Robertson also objects to De Silva's use of a sheer dissonance between the religions (see above, pp. 63-64), De Silva's dialogical method indicates an attempt to transcend the radical differences and find a certain harmony. This is not found by a facile inclusivism but dialectically, as De Silva's choice of similes so well illustrates. Thus dialogue is neither a meeting of porcupines or jelly fish, but of persons (see above, p. 69); and this form of dialogue takes neither the "python" approach which does not recognize the mission of the other (see above, p. 76), nor does it envisage a synthesis of all religions to form a world religion (see above, p. 78). Commitment and openness are the hallmarks of the authentic dialogue in which there is neither a total acceptance nor a total rejection of the other.

1"Buddhist Attitude to Christianity: Continued," p. 25.

Mahayana terms such as "pure essence," "basis of the world," "cosmic mind," and "body of the Buddha," as these are "not found in the Pali Canon of the Theravada (the pristine and pure teachings of the Buddha accepted by scholars as the authentic teachings)." He also takes exception to De Silva's observation that a deification of the Buddha has taken place, and that to the average Buddhist the Buddha is an all-knowing, prayer-answering God. Malalasekera's reference to the living presence of the Buddha in the Vihara has been completely misunderstood, as this is only "a symbolic representation" or "an aid for the concentration of the mind." Even to the most illiterate Buddhist it did not mean that the Buddha was present in reality in the Vihara. Since this view is diametrically opposed to the teachings of the Buddha, Robertson concludes that De Silva has come up with "a novel and new-fangled interpretation to fall in line with the Christian doctrine that the Living God is present in the Church," and that "There is no truth whatsoever in the statement of Rev. de Silva that there is a wide gulf between theoretical Buddhism and Buddhism as it is practised."}

In our view Robertson's denial of a gulf between theoretical and popular Buddhism cannot be sustained. His appeal to the authority

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2 See above, p. 176.
4 Urmila Phadnis has shown that Buddhism, regarded strictly as a system of thought in its canonical context, is only an aspect in its evolution and growth as an ideology and an institution. She has
of the Pali Canon as acceptable to scholars and the rejection of Mahayana terms raises the question whether dialogue is valid only if it is a scholarly exercise and appeal can be made to the "original gospel" or the Buddha-vacanam (Buddha-word). Buddhists and Christians are confronted by a bewildering array of sects or denominations in each other's religions and have difficulty in defining what is "Buddhist" and what is "Christian." De Silva's own dialogical enterprise has taken both popular and scholarly Buddhism into account, an approach dictated by the needs of the dialogical setting. In communicating the Christian view on the themes of God, man, and salvation in relation to Buddhist thought, he has been cognizant of the rational temper of Sinhalese Buddhism and of the lay Buddhist's existential affirmations. For Robertson, De Silva's citation of terms and texts from schools other than the Theravada, are inadmissible as a basis for dialogue as it would not be citing the "Buddhist" viewpoint.¹

¹Edward Conze has pointed out that the Sri Lankan Theravada and Japanese Zen both reject traditional Buddhism, the former in the name of a Pali Canon and the latter in the name of "a direct transmission outside the Scriptures." He describes the exclusivism of the Sri Lankan Theravadins thus:
"The original gospel, spoken in Pali (!) by the Buddha, taken to Ceylon about 250 B.C., then forgotten everywhere else, and preserved alone by
Is an authentic dialogue possible between De Silva's inclusive approach and Robertson's exclusive, sectarian position? With an ecumenical outlook in relation to his fellow Christians, De Silva recognizes a central core of teachings which constitutes historic Christianity. He sees a unity that can be called "Christian" in the diversity of schools and traditions. He has engaged other Buddhist interlocutors who have recognized the possibility of a valid dialogue between participants who subscribe to the central traditions of their religions. The absence of agreement on what is "Christian" between Robertson and De Silva in their 1967 encounter stands out in their discussion on anthropology. Robertson's description of the Christian view of the soul as an immaterial substance maintained in eternal existence after the dissolution of the body at death and his

virtuous Ceylonese and those others who received it from them. How this reminds us of Calvinism, with its few children of the light, and its vast "mass of perdition" (Further Buddhist Studies [Oxford: Bruno Cassirer, 1975], pp. 147-148).

1 Bhikshu Sangharakshita uses the simile of the tree to depict a central tradition in Buddhism, i.e. the Buddha-sasana (the Buddha's teaching) or the manifold formulations of the Dharma: "It may be said that the Buddha's transcendental realization is the root, His original Doctrine... the trunk, the distinctive Mahayana doctrines the branches, and the schools and the sub-schools of the Mahayana the flowers. Now the function of flowers, however beautiful, is to produce fruit.... The Bodhisattva Ideal is the perfectly ripened fruit of the whole vast tree of Buddhism" (A Survey of Buddhism [Bangalore: The Indian Institute of World Culture, 1957], p. 432).

Buddhadasa Indappanno views Buddhism and Christianity as systems in their totality, of which the inner essences and the outer forms could be compared. See above, pp. 58-59.

2 "Buddhist Attitude to Christianity," p. 5.
view that the final resuscitation of the material particles of the body is also Christian teaching are rejected by De Silva on the basis that "it is quite foreign to the teaching of the Bible," though he says some Christians may have held this position. In our delineation of De Silva's estimate of man (see chapter III), it can be seen that De Silva differentiates between the view of an immortal soul in traditional Christianity under the influence of Platonism and the view of man as a unity for which he repeatedly cites biblical authority. Faulted by De Silva for wrongly interpreting Christian doctrines, Robertson claims to have "presented orthodox Christian doctrine" and holds that De Silva has given "modern interpretations to Christian doctrines so that they may fall in line with the Buddhist teachings, which view is not acceptable to the majority of the Christian denominations." Perhaps Robertson means to say that De Silva's existentialist approach, which allows him greater latitude in accommodating Buddhist views, would not be acceptable to traditional, conservative, evangelical theology.

This dialogue carried on at the discursive level points to the limitations imposed by the difficulties of identifying what is "Buddhist" and what is "Christian." There was the need to settle what was authoritative for each of the dialogue partners if they were to be heard authentically. J. J. Spae, musing about this problem, asks:

What is the specific place, or should I say, the specific "authenticity" of the Buddhism professed

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1 "Christian Attitude to Buddhism," p. 12.
2 "Buddhist Attitude to Christianity: Continued," p. 27.
by the Kyoto School within the overall spectrum of Buddhist doctrines, traditional and modern? In other words, when dialoguing with these scholars, to what extent do we dialogue with "Buddhism"-- or with "Christianity"--seen through their eyes?¹

A question pertinent to the whole enterprise of inter-religious dialogue is whether genuine dialogue takes place between two systems, or more specifically between two narrowly defined positions. The exchanges between De Silva and his Buddhist interlocutors in the same dialogical series (see above, pp. 100-103), on the acts of Buddhist and Christian intolerance, are indicative of its wider scope. Neither Buddhism nor Christianity can detach itself completely from its associated history. In both religions things have gone wrong historically and it has not been all "Heilsgeschichte." Heinrich Ott has rightly pointed out that "Buddhism and Christianity are not systems, but complex 'worlds.'" The method of the philosophical-theological unification of systems (as a whole or in particular points) is for this reason doomed to failure (when viewed as the method).²

But the worlds of Buddhism and Christianity do not touch each other unless there is first and foremost a meeting of people, of Robertson--the English Theravada Buddhist, and De Silva--the Sri Lankan Methodist Christian. Hans Waldenfels has maintained that those engaged concretely in dialogue (as in the case of De Silva) come to realize "that there is simply no such thing as a dialogue between the religions in the abstract sense. There is only dialogue between


²"The Beginning Dialogue between Christianity and Buddhism The Concept of a 'Dialogical Theology' and the Possible Contribution of Heideggerian Thought," Japanese Religions 11, Nos. 2 & 3 (September 1980): 82.
people." And it is only when there is "a basic openness to listen to one another" that "we can speak of shared investigation of the truth in the broadest sense of the term."\(^1\) Authentic dialogue develops out of specific encounters and is not the result of theological methodologies worked out in libraries.

Existence Transcending Reality and God Talk

"It is an etymological injustice to refer to Buddhism as a religion.... To call Buddhism a religion is a contradiction in terms. Buddhism not only does not admit the existence of a God, it also denies the existence of a soul."\(^2\) These statements from the *The Buddhist*, the journal of the Young Men's Buddhist Association in Colombo, raise the question whether Buddhism could be called a religion. It also raises the question whether inter-religious dialogue is possible with Buddhism, especially with the Theravada. As Carl F. H. Henry reports, the reaction of Buddhist spokesmen in Sri Lanka was hardly conciliatory when a Roman Catholic churchman claimed that the Buddha "was surely in communion with God." Henry points out that in the Sri Lankan Buddhist view, "The Buddha did not believe that ultimate reality is personal, and Buddhism therefore has an atheistic or antitheistic foundation."\(^3\) We now consider the Buddhist response to De Silva on this question.

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De Silva has argued that Buddhism is a religion and that the concept of God is not absent in it. He has taken several approaches, but in keeping with his use of the central Buddhist categories his main dialogical thrust has been that the biblical understanding of anattā can locate the place of "God" in Buddhist thought. Describing the Buddha as "the first great death-of-God theologian" he has argued that the Buddha did not reject but reformed the concept of God or Brahma. He has also traced Buddhological developments in Mahayana Buddhism and the deification of the Buddha in popular or lay Buddhism. However, we find that his Theravada interlocutors, K. N. Jayatilleke and Gunapala Dharmasiri, point to stark differences between Theravada orthodoxy and De Silva's use of the Buddhist concepts of Tathata-Dharma and Nirvāna--to denote the idea of God.

At the NCC seminar in 1967, Jayatilleke objected to De Silva's handling of the terms "Yahweh" and "Tathata," as he considered it a spurious identification and a misrepresentation. Yahweh was considered the "God of war," and the more precise meaning of Yahweh was "I will be that which I will be." "Tathata" had been used in the Pali Canon to refute an erroneous view, it had "never been used of any theistic deities and is a Buddhist coinage to denote the Transcendent." It was an "abstract noun formed from Tatha meaning 'true, thus, so or such' and is used of the transcendent reality of Nirvana in the sense of

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1De Silva had maintained that Tathata, a word found in the Theravada canon, and Yahweh seemed to point to the Ultimate Reality. Since Yahweh meant "I-am-that-I-am " and Tathata "That-which-is-as-it-is," De Silva noted that it accorded with St. Bernard's definition of God: "HE IS" ("Christian Attitude to Buddhism," p. 11).
the 'The Truth' (the sense is impersonal)."¹ De Silva found Jayatilleke's more precise definition of Yahweh helpful in elucidating his view of God, as it meant that "God is 'Being' and not 'a being', and secondly that He is active and unfolding Being and not static being."² He also sees a connection between this idea and the idea of Tathatta (the synonym for Tathata), which is defined as "the state of being so" in the Pali-English Dictionary of the Pali Text Society, and is used in the sense of "The Truth" and of Nibbāna. He thus maintains that the comparison between the terms is not so spurious as Jayatilleke makes it out to be, and notes that:

Dr. Jayatilleke will, however, say that the Truth as conceived by Buddhism is impersonal and cannot be identified with the personal God of Theism. I think the difficulty here is that when we talk of theism we think in anthropomorphic terms, as the ancient Hebrew people certainly did and even thought of Jehovah as the God of War. For this reason some theologians prefer to drop this misleading term theism and talk of a "God beyond theism". This does not mean that God is impersonal; rather it means that God is suprapersonal. It means that 'Being' has some determinate character and is distinguishable from becoming and as such possesses the character of transcendence like Nibbana. But as active and unfolding Being, Being also has the character of immanence so that it is possible for us to say in the words of St. Paul, "we live and move and have our being in Him."³

It is worth noting that though Jayatilleke does not believe in a divine, omnipotent creator, he acknowledges the transcendent reality of Nirvāṇa, which he sees as impersonal Truth. In the limited

¹"Christian Attitude to Buddhism: Criticized," p. 18.
³Ibid.
discussion that was possible at the Seminar, De Silva argued convincingly against Jayatilleke's characterization of the comparison between Tathata and Yahweh as a spurious identification. He focussed on the nub of the dialogical problem, the difficulty of expressing the Transcendent or finding an adequate language to talk about God. In this context Jayatilleke's position could be described as a transcendental agnosticism, one which does not preclude the definition of Buddhism as a religion. Trevor Ling observes that in contexts where studies in religion are being undertaken and systems of thought and philosophy are classified, Theravada Buddhism is considered a religion even though "belief in a divine, omnipotent creator is the sine qua non of any system that is to be called religion." \(^1\) Theravada Buddhism qualifies because the most basic criterion by which a movement passes as religious is "belief in some existence-transcending reality." Belief in a creator-god is just one example of this basic feature of religion. Thus he says of Theravada Buddhism:

For although Theravada Buddhism is non-theistic, or agnostic about the idea of a creator-god, nevertheless its central affirmations include both the characterisation of empirical human existence as inherently unsatisfactory, and a belief in the possibility of its transcendence by means of the enlightenment gained by the Buddha. It is this which seems to give Theravada Buddhism the quality of a religion and which accounts for its general acceptance as such.\(^2\)

The existence transcending reality becomes the common basis for a dialogue between Theravada Buddhism and other religions. Ling

\(^1\) Karl Marx and Religion in Europe and India (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1980), p. 155.

\(^2\) Ibid., pp. 155-156.
points to the Buddha's enlightenment as the means by which the Buddhist transcends his unsatisfactory state. De Silva has dealt with the more apposite question regarding the source of the Buddha's enlightenment, as according to the "Holding in Reverence" passage the Buddha is directing worship to a reality greater than himself.¹ Using Ling's term we may thus say that the Dhamma in which the Buddha took refuge is the "existence-transcending reality," which De Silva identifies as the "Dharma-God." This concept connotes the idea of the worship of an existence-transcending reality, and for De Silva, "the heart of religion is worship and the essence of worship is adoration."² The idea of a personal God is also seen, as he cites evidence from the Pali canon that Dhamma is conceived in personal terms.³ It is at this point that De Silva's Buddhist interlocutors see the widest gulf between the Buddhist and Christian concepts of the existence transcending reality. Buddhadasa Indapanno identifies Dharma with God, but in his explanation of God as found in Buddhism, he sees God neither as a person nor a spirit but as an all-inclusive entity.⁴ Gunapala Dharmasiri's negative interpretation of Nirvana dispenses with the notion of an existence-transcending reality altogether. In meeting Dharmasiri's contention De Silva has shown that the import of the Udāna passage is that an existence-transcending reality, be

¹See above, pp. 225-226.
³See above, pp. 227-228.
⁴See above, pp. 223-225. John Ross Carter has noted that at the highest level Dhamma transcends personalistic ascriptions. See above, pp. 116-117.
it God or Nirvāṇa, is indispensable because of man's anattāness. This is the crucial Christian-Buddhist meeting point for De Silva, as he goes on to show persuasively that in harmony with the Theravada position "the longing of the heart for the eternal hits something," i.e. a Transcendent Reality or God.¹ This "something" in the Theravada conceptualizations may not be the Christian way of expressing God, but it is the point at which the Christian and Theravada Buddhist can meet and speak to each other.

The problem is one of God-talk, a common language, and translational theology. Thus Paul Knitter takes note of De Silva's emphasis on the need to be open to each other's experiential theology, as by entering into the words used in Buddhist scriptures and paying due regard to the practices of contemporary Buddhists "we will recognize that the Buddhist experience of Nirvana, Sunyata, Satori is not unrelated to the Christian experience of God."² The Buddha's silence on God, Buddhist apologists have maintained, is due to his recognition of the limitations of the human intellect and the emptiness of words. However Knitter notes that, in De Silva's view, to label Buddha an atheist or to declare that Nirvāṇa or Sunyata are utterly godless is "to abuse Buddha's language—or lack of language."³ Thus De Silva sees the need for a willingness on the part of the Christian to learn from Buddhist experience and language of the

¹ See above, pp. 239-240.


³ Ibid.
Ultimate. God is in the realm of *avyakata* (the inexplicable), and is known in the realization of one's *anattāness*, in the abyss of one's being--the supra-depth level of ultimacy. Since Christians, trained in Western methods of analysis and interpretation, have put God under a microscope and attempted to conceptualize that which is beyond all concepts, Buddhists silence commends itself as a corrective to Christians in coming to a realization of what is beyond words.

Thus at this point, where others have seen the most radical differences between the two religions, De Silva sees possibilities of a fruitful dialogue. There is of course always the need to give expression to experience in order to give it meaning, and it is in the conceptual realm that insurmountable divergences surface. Ninian Smart questions De Silva's claim that for the Buddhist the heart of religion is worship and that the Buddha worshipped the *Dhamma*. Smart sees the Buddha reshaping and emasculating the idea of worship, "Indeed the great relevance of Dr. Dharmasiri's critique is that God is an object literally of worship, but literal worship is not at the heart of Theravada."¹ Smart focusses on other hazards in the dialogue, and noting that *Dhamma* and *Nirvāṇa* were not known by Jesus and Paul just as covenant and Israel were unknown to the Buddha, he observes that it "shows how unnerving the whole issue about the truth of religions is."² A translational theology such as De Silva's seems

²Ibid., p. 20.
to provide a viable answer, as the traditions have developed in isolation and need a common language to find common ground. Unbridgeable differences may be found, and at these points, Buddhists and Christians must at the present stage of the dialogue recognize a doctrinal irreducibility rather than yield to a facile syncretism. The conversation must continue, because it is in this interaction that each other's language is learned, that new means of communication are created, and new frontiers conquered.

Buddhism and Christianity as Complementary Systems
Anatta-Pneuma the Translational Basis

Translational theology is exploratory in nature and entails risks. In 1961, the Rangoon Consultation Statement noted that the paper presented by De Silva had demonstrated that there were great advantages in the use of Buddhist concepts to "translate" the Gospel, and it also warned of the attendant dangers to which the church had not yet been exposed as it had been overcautious in the translation of the Gospel. It warned against "bending" the Gospel to make it fit Buddhist conceptions and of leaving the impression that there was no essential difference between the two messages. It also stated that "there must come the point where the conceptions of Buddhism are transcended or restated in a revolutionary way that the Buddhist as such, would not accept: This is the challenge of the Gospel."\(^1\) There is always the need to guard against the danger of syncretism, it might however be asked whether the element of risk

\(^1\) A Consultation on Buddhist-Christian Encounter, "Rangoon Consultation Statement: Communication of the Gospel to the Buddhists," p. 73.
has been avoided and whether the Rangoon statement has obviated the possibility of dialogue. This approach makes the Christian gospel the yardstick in the discussion, rules out mutuality, and fails to be translational. M. M. Thomas, commenting on De Silva's Rangoon paper which attempted to clarify the message of Jesus Christ in terms of the historical actualization of the ideal bodhisattva, warns of "certain dangers of minimising the real differences in 'meaning-content' of the categories used." He also points to the "possibilities of building a common language for inter-faith dialogue about fundamental differences," and that "it also helps the Buddhist and Christian to have an appreciation of each other's faith within the scheme of salvation of one's own." Thomas is pointing to the risk that De Silva and all Asian Christians are compelled to take in spelling out their thoughts in the languages of non-Christian cultures. In today's context of cultural and religious pluralism the word "dialogue" indicates this compulsion. De Silva has taken this risk and attempted the development of a common language. He has maintained that this is precisely what the Buddha did, as did the Bible writers and early Christians living in religiously plural settings. In order to communicate in an intelligible language, the Gospel writer John risked the possibility of syncretism. Our evaluation now considers De Silva's use of Buddhist concepts and terms and his treatment of Buddhism and Christianity as complementary systems.

\[^1\text{Man and the Universe of Faiths, p. 94.}\]

\[^2\text{See above, p. 116.}\]
De Silva has treated Buddhism and Christianity as complementary systems with the aim of helping Buddhists understand Christianity within their description of the human predicament. We see De Silva the evangelist proclaiming the Gospel and making it meaningful to the Buddhist, and De Silva the dialogist establishing a theological foundation and thus indicating a genuine reverence for the religion of the other. He has seen these as mutually complementary roles, and indeed as the pressing challenge before Asian Christian theologians, viz., that of reconstructing theologies in their different contexts without relinquishing Christ's theological irreducibility on the one hand, or taking up the absolutist view that rejects the possibility of God's saving action from within non-Christian faith.  
To what extent has he succeeded in terms of his thesis that such a venture need not result in a syncretism or an emasculated Gospel?

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1 The theological stance that Christ has been salvifically at work in other religions, explicitly stated in more recent articles (see above, pp. 208-210), has been implicit in his approach to Buddhism. De Silva's theological task bears comparison with that of the second century apologists, especially Justin Martyr, who lived in a religiously plural context. James E. Sellers holds that the risk in the expression of the new and different message of Christianity by the apologists was inevitable as "they could do so only by taking over the familiar old motifs and giving them new meaning" (The Outsider and the Word of God: A Study in Christian Communication [Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1961], p. 61). According to Paul Tillich the task of relating theology to the surrounding culture is risky but unavoidable,

"I am not unaware of the danger that in this way the substance of the Christian message may be lost. Nevertheless, this danger must be risked, and once one has realized this, one must proceed in this direction. Dangers are not a reason for avoiding a serious demand." See Systematic Theology, vol. 3 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), p. 4.

Sellers notes that Justin maintains in his second Apology that the divine logos had imparted seeds of truth to those outside Christianity, and that men like Abraham and Socrates who had discerned the reality of the logos could be called Christians. However, in
With the exception of the 1963 encounter with Gunaseela Vitanage on the subject of the "Search for the Historical Jesus," in which he took a somewhat apologetic posture, nearly all of De Silva's dialogical writings treat Buddhism and Christianity as complementary systems. He finds this a viable enterprise because of the repeated correspondences between the biblical account and the Buddhist texts on the Tilakkhana analytic which is fundamental to the Buddhist view of reality. By tracing close approximations between terms and parallel accounts, and by the constant juxtaposition of Buddhist and Christian doctrinal conceptions, De Silva attempts to transcend the old categories and give expression to converging insights in his expositions of Christ as *Bodhisattva, anattā-pneuma*, progressive sanctification and rebirth, and *Dharma-logos*. David C. Scott, in a review of De Silva's essay "An Existential Understanding of the Doctrine of Creation in the Context of Buddhism," has questioned this use of the *logos* concept to find common ground, Christianity would not yield to a syncretistic relationship with pagan philosophy as "The point of contact is the very point--indeed, the only point--at which Christianity's Gospel and paganism's unbelief come into conflict. Justin seeks both 'the contrast and the connection' between divine revelation and human knowledge" (*The Outsider and the Word of God*, p. 63). The aim of Justin and the apologists was to show that Christianity was the truth since it alone had a correct understanding of God. Hendrick Kraemer's position has been essentially the same—that points of contact in the real deep sense of the word could only be found by antitheses. For De Silva the point of contact could become a source of mutual enrichment, serve as a corrective, and at points of doctrinal irreducibility be antithetical. The preliminary assumptions of Justin and Kraemer pre-empt dialogue, whereas De Silva is open to the possibility of formulating or reformulating his position in the context of dialogue since inter-faith dialogue is a search for the living truth, and as he has cogently pointed out, "Authentic, living theology arises from an interplay between the 'Logos' and the culture in which it seeks to express itself." See above, p. 61.
the antiphonal nature of De Silva's explication of the existential
significance of the biblical creation account in terms of Tilakkhana:

My main problem is at the point of de Silva's
apparent methodological presupposition that Buddhism
articulates the questions implied in the human pre-
dicament while the Bible provides the answers.
Surely a greater degree of mutuality than this is
discernible in Buddhist-Christian relationships.

Scott's criticism calls attention to a necessary condition
for genuine dialogue—the need to avoid undue dominance from one
side. While neither partner in the dialogue may claim twenty-twenty
vision, there is always the need to guard against the temptation
to read into the other tradition what one would like to find there.
De Silva's exposition of Buddhism and Christianity as complementary
systems seeks to avoid an uneven centrality of concepts by accepting
the Buddhist concept of the three characteristics of all phenomenal
existence as the common basis, common because De Silva finds an
even more radical expression of Tilakkhana in the Christian scriptures.
It was the systematic treatment of anatta in the Buddhist texts that
sent him back to the Hebraic roots of the Christian faith and the
insight that Buddhism is in harmony with the biblical understanding
of man. Since it can be shown that in the biblical and Buddhist
texts there is nothing in man that can be identified as a soul-entity,
Christian theology is faced with the same problem as Buddhism, viz.,
finding a satisfactory explanation of the meaning of selfhood or per-
sonality which provides for the negation of the self that does not
amount to nihilism (ucchedaditthi) and for the affirmation of the
self that does not amount to eternalism (sassataditthi). It is this

1"Book Reviews," Religion and Society 15, No. 3 (September
basis of commonality that makes his most original contribution, a Buddhist-Christian estimate of man--the Anattā-Pneuma concept--possible. Here, in answer to a question articulated in Buddhism but which Christianity too has to face, De Silva has dealt with the relationship between Buddhist non-self and the Christian teaching of the spirit.

There is a dual aspect in De Silva's dialogical platform. It is the common element of the Tilakkhana analytic that opened the way for a creative interaction, thus De Silva first speaks from within the Buddhist conceptual framework. The traditional Theravada answers failed to provide a satisfactory definition of authentic selfhood. The paradox of na ca so na ca anno did not settle the question of personal identity, neither was it possible to argue that there was moral responsibility (which karma implies) because of Vinnana, a continuity of process without an identifiable self. Neither the attempt to smuggle in the soul idea, nor a nihilistic interpretation of Nirvāṇa, settled the question of what attained Nirvāṇa. In the light of this De Silva then answers from the Christian point of view. Traditional Christianity with its belief in an immortal soul tended toward an unscriptural eternalism, but the radical biblical teaching of anattā meant that man needed a power outside of him to escape nihilism. Man is created in the image of God which indicates a relationship, this is pneuma--the personal-communal dimension of man. Since pneuma is a gift this is not a new hidden soul theory, but selfhood found in relation to God who is Spirit, in a mutually interacting "I-Thou" and not in an exclusive "I". There is fellowship and communion, but not absorption, thus personal identity
will be retained but not an exclusive self-contained individuality--a concept of selfhood that yields neither to ucchedaditthi nor to sassaditthi.

The significance of De Silva's exposition of the anattā-pneuma concept to dialogue depends on the willingness of both Buddhists and Christians to recognize the potential of translational theology to open up new frontiers of religious understanding. Already we see distinct advantages in this method of communication, i.e., the treatment of Buddhism and Christianity as complementary systems of thought. It opens the way for a much greater measure of intelligibility, giving the terms and categories of each faith deeper meaning and richer significance. It has led Christians to a more scriptural anthropology, and in the reconciliation of Buddhist and Christian anthropology, we see De Silva open a window for Buddhist agnosticism to consider the need for God in view of the inadequacy of an anthropocentric soteriology in the face of anattā. This approach does not water down the need to remain true to that which is essentially Christian or Buddhist. De Silva has maintained that in any theology there is always an unchanging core containing elements of constancy and continuity, faithfulness to which is indispensable to authentic dialogue.¹ The approach recognizes that there are varying degrees of mutuality at different points, and there is need to suspend judgment until more familiarity with the other has been established.

¹In his quest for points of contact with Buddhism we find De Silva often meets the Buddhist in an antithetical way, thus Trinity is distinguished from Trikaya because the gods in Buddhism lack ultimacy; the Buddhist's faith in Buddha, being less than personal, differs from the Christian's faith in Christ; and, in
The translational approach is not tradition bound; rather it is exper­
mental and exploratory. It does not prejudice the dialogue with a preconceived general theory of religious interpretation but seeks a basis for understanding the religious insights of others and making Christian affirmations more comprensible to them.

Asian Christian Self-Understanding
Christology, Mission, Eschatology

The decisive issue in inter-faith dialogue for the Christian, sine qua non, is the uniqueness of Jesus Christ as saviour and the universality of the salvation provided in him. The claim to uniqueness and universality mandates the need to determine the salvific status of other faiths. A negative conclusion raises questions of theodicy, a positive one threatens the dynamic of mission. To the Asian Christian seeking a new self-understanding in his religiously plural setting the question is: Is salvific revelation to be found in religions outside of Christianity?

An Inclusivist Christology

De Silva's stance is clear, that God's acts of divine self­
communication take place not only within Christianity but also

Christianity suffering is only an element of finitude, for the Buddhist suffering and finitude are identical. In his treatment of the Agganna Sutta and the biblical creation and fall stories as symbols to be spiritually interpreted, he is careful to maintain the distinction that creatio-ex-nihilo is a religious affirmation of the sovereignty of God and the creatureliness of man. However, in commending the uniqueness of Christ as the ideal Bodhisattva, he opts for a literal understanding of the incarnation rather than a mythical expression of the fact. Thus he argues that the Avataras of Hinduism and Bodhisattvas of Buddhism, unlike in the Christ-event, were without historical or factual basis. There are times when his identification of terms could benefit from a wider application of scriptural meaning, as in his identification of desire (tanha) with sin as in Jas 1:14-15. Desire is the root of sin when it is misdirected, but there is also a righteous desire as in Ps 42:1-3 and Matt 5:6.
outside its structures. Salvation in the absolute sense is rooted in God. In Christ it is absolute (as he is identified with God) and relative as he is the agent working out God's salvific purposes even as Confucius, Zoroaster and Buddha are God's instruments. The uniqueness of Christ is preserved in the eschatological aspect of salvation, the fact of his ultimate divine rulership of history. It is because salvation is a cosmic fact, and Christ alone of all religious leaders has claimed that all things are summed up in him, that the New Testament emphasis on the uniqueness of the Christ-event is vindicated. De Silva's position ultimately does not seem to differ from the fulfillment theory, though the fulfillment takes place as an eschatological reality in Christ and not in empirical Christianity. The irreducible difference between Christ and the other instruments of God is that he alone gives meaning and value to history. While this may still appear as religious imperialism to the non-Christian, it provides a Christological basis for the recognition of the reality and salvific presence of God in other religions.

The import of De Silva's Christology for Asian Christians is that theological reflection must take into account these other instruments of God. Salvation in other faiths is not seen as human striving; it is by grace because it is the divine initiative that calls these salvific instruments into use. In the process of reconception a symbiosis can take place because they too are God's instruments. The non-Christian religions are not merely loci of divine encounter, as Kraemer would have them, nor are they simply human creations; they are vehicles of salvific revelation. Such an
inclusive approach, however, seems to blur the need for an explicit avowal of Christ and missionary activity.

**Dialogue as Mission**

De Silva's understanding of the church and its mission stems from his inclusivist Christology. Since mission is primarily God's activity and the church is never the sole agent of mission, mission is defined inclusively. The recognition that other religions too have a mission connotes a broader view of mission. The numerical expansion of the church is not mission, rather the proclamation of authentic "good news" means collaborating with non-Christians in those concerns which touch people everywhere as human beings. De Silva's stricture that winning over non-Christians into Christianity is an act of alienation must be viewed in relation to the pejorative meaning the word "proselytism" has acquired in Asian countries. It would seem that a major task confronting Asian Christians is that of rethinking their conceptions of mission and evangelism and distinguishing them from mere proselytism.

De Silva's own conception attempts to hold a delicate balance between proclamation, conceptual dialogue, and social action. Because Christ is already at work in other religions, partnership with the other in social concerns is Christian mission, and proclamation may be done within the conceptual framework of the other. We might say that in this sense Christian mission can be looked upon as the quest for ultimate reality and ultimate meaning, and that proclamation is most effective in dialogue as it transcends present understanding and widens the periphery of mankind's religious vision.
The evaluation by a Western Christian of the Christian and Buddhist reaction to De Silva’s use of Dhamma in the translation of logos in John 1:1 brings home this distinctive mission that belongs to the Asian theologian. He says that

Christians will have demonstrated that they see more in dharma-person (dharmayāno) than in Word-person (vākyayāno). They will have extended the horizon of their vision of Christ and will have deepened the bases of their self-understanding in Christ through the notion of dharma-person. Buddhists will have found occasion to rest at ease knowing that Christians, in their different way, have also discerned the fundamental good news shared for centuries by Buddhists: dhamma/dharma, salvific truth, abides and is not remote from persons.¹

De Silva’s experience underscores the importance of interfaith dialogue for a theology of missions, as proclamation must take place within the cultural milieu and heritage of the other. The church must give up its institutional self-interest and discover the Asian face of Jesus Christ in an incarnational ministry. To do this it must unreservedly accept its minority position. Only in this way could it be the servant church. Christianity could be given a real chance if the church were freed from the opprobrium of colonialism. The Buddhist evaluation of De Silva’s Study Center is significant. Mahinda Palihawadana sees De Silva’s Study Center break from the missiology of conquest and power characteristic of the colonial era and undergo cultural incarnation without discarding its Christian heritage.² De Silva’s framework of theological understanding of other faiths commends itself to the Asian Christian as

¹ "Translational Theology," p. 176.
² See above, p. 53.
a model of self-understanding as it developed out of the conversation with Buddhism. In doctrine and practice he has epitomized dialogue as mission, seeking to maintain the irreducible theological uniqueness of Christ while finding a place for God's saving activity through Christ in the non-Christian religions.

Eschatological Expectations

In presenting the resurrection as the answer to the Theravada paradox na ca so na ca anno, De Silva makes a very sharp judgment on the difference of quality between the Christian and Buddhist hope. The resurrection gives assurance that the continuity and separate identity of the individual is maintained. It also liberates the Buddhist, in whose cyclical view of time history has no finality, from the nightmare of karma and rebirth. There is no assurance in the Buddhist notion of eternal recurrence, during which good and bad epochs alternate, of a collective salvation from suffering or a final happy consummation. De Silva's emphasis on the once-for-allness of

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1 Swami Vikrant has, however, pointed out that the attempt by Christian apologists to press for the superiority of their tradition because of its historical nature, and its linear concept of time, needs to be reconsidered. He maintains that in the dialogue with Indian religions it must be noted that Indian systems of thought do not teach a purely cyclic concept of time, and "the linear concept of time itself is metaphysically inadequate as it leaves the beginning and the end unexplained" ("Christian Mission and Indian Religious Pluralism," Journal of Dharma 6, No.2 [April-June 1981]: 155-156). It must be noted that De Silva is cognizant of the Mahayanist eschatology which holds to the definitive fulfillment of the advent of Maitreya five thousand years after the Parinirvana of Gautama. See above, p. 231. Paul Knitter takes note of the warning that has been voiced in the current dialogue that it is too simplistic to brand the Buddhist experience of time as cyclic, and observes that: "Given the central Buddhist affirmation that bad karma can be overcome and that there is a process of rebirths, one might better speak of an upward spiral movement or time within Samsara" ("Horizons on Christianity's New Dialogue
an eschatological solution takes on special force in the framework of the Tilakkhana analytic. Christ gives meaning to all men who live in history, as by his involvement in history he has conquered the negativities of anicca, dukkha, and anattā. Thus the final solution to the unsatisfactoriness and transitoriness of life is found when he sums up all things in himself in the end time.

De Silva, however, has difficulty in harmonizing the once-for-allness of resurrection with the intermediate state which he proposes as the Christian alternative to rebirth in contradiction to the once-for-allness of the double predestination theory. The advantage of such a position in speaking to the Buddhist, in whose view there are many opportunities for salvation in the recurring circles of birth and death, are obvious. However, in doing so, De Silva fails at several points to be consistent to the radical biblical concept of anattā, the central category in his dialogue with Buddhism.

Evidently De Silva's concept of progressive sanctification, an actualization of the positive elements and purging of all egocentric elements, goes on in the spiritual sphere of life. For the Buddhist it is death and rebirth taking place continually, not empirically but spiritually, and for the Roman Catholic it is a process

With Buddhism," p. 52). Kosuke Koyama, a Japanese Christian dialoguing with the Theravada in Thailand, presents the view that the cyclical and not the linear view has been the source of hope to the Thai Buddhist in his existential context. Since nature is cyclically oriented, hope and salvation come with the monsoon rain, thus "when a man's life is viewed and experienced in terms of a circular movement, he becomes relatively free from the sense of despair and crisis. Once-for-allness breeds psychological tension and turmoil" (Waterbuffalo Theology [New York: Orbis Books, 1976], p. 30). The "many-times" life "accepts nature's hope and salvation" (ibid.)
of purging and purification happening daily beginning in this life. These views he finds comparable to John's view of passing from death into life, i.e., eternal life beginning now. It is, however, not quite clear whether the intermediate state, in which man is progressively sanctified till he reaches perfection, begins at death or after the resurrection.¹

De Silva's position is strikingly reminiscent of Origen's view of the history of salvation as the progressive restoration of the spiritual creation to its primal state. In the first book of

¹ De Silva's statement that the anguish and the remorse of the rebellious, i.e., of those "who have sinned against the truth, who have turned away from the light," begins when "earthly limitations are removed at death" (see above, p. 211), seems to indicate that the intermediate state begins at death. This would imply a conscious existence in the intermediate state between death and resurrection, which certainly cannot be reconciled with the biblical view of the nature of man as delineated by De Silva. The whole point about biblical anattā is that it depicts man's utter inability to transcend conditioned existence which is subject to decay and death. He has also indicated that the intermediate state is spent in the "many mansions" at the time of the second coming of Christ, "I will come again and receive you" (John 14:3), which according to the biblical picture of the end-time is when the general resurrection of the righteous takes place. That the intermediate state begins at this time would seem to be his overriding position, as indicated by an unambiguous statement indicating that death is the complete cessation of life:

"If anicca and anattā are real, there can be nothing in man that can survive death. In the Christian view, it is only by an act of re-creation that continuity beyond the grave is possible. This is what resurrection means. Resurrection is most meaningful in the context of Tilakkhana... The doctrine of resurrection contradicts the notion of the immortal soul within man which survives death. It emphasizes the fact of man's mortality, that man comes to a total end at death" ("Emergent Theology in the Context of Buddhism," p. 232).

It appears that his ambivalence at this point stems from difficulties posed by such passages as the story of Dives and Lazarus, which when taken in isolation from the overall biblical picture of anattā can be construed to imply a conscious state after death.
his De Principiis, Origen supposes that even the damned and the
devils would be brought into voluntary subjection to Christ after
having undergone sufficient disciplinary punishment.¹ De Silva's
intermediate state, as the theodicy which answered the embarrassing
question of the salvation of the unevangelized, concerned those who
were never consciously aware of Christ. Thus he includes among the
righteous the "anonymous Christians," i.e., those who have responded
to the reality which Christians call "God" whether they knew Christ
explicitly or not.² Apparently De Silva makes no distinction between
those who were never consciously aware of Christ and those who con-
sciously rejected him. Since hell, heaven, and the intermediate
state form a kind of continuum in which one passes from a near state
of annihilation to the closest union with God, it seems that the con-
cept of judgment in the biblical sense is almost entirely absent in
his eschatological scheme. Lostness in the final sense has not been
defined, and it appears that he slides into an unrestricted universal-
salism that is inconsistent with his radical biblical picture of
anattā.

In his kenotic Christology De Silva leaves us in no doubt
that the anxiety which Christ experienced in Gethsemane, and the cry
of dereliction on the cross, indicate that Christ shared in man's
anattāness by experiencing the sense of perdition that is not relieved
by the expectation of the resurrection.³ The death which is the
result of the wages of sin, unlike physical death, is complete

¹Origen Origen De Principiis 1:6-8 (ANF 4:260-267).
²See above, p. 209.
³See above, p. 181.
annihilation. Anattā represents the utter desolation that the enmity against God means. The biblical truth about anattā is that by his conscious and persistent rejection of God man can be ultimately lost, i.e., be totally annihilated because of eternal separation from God.¹ Thus the biblical solution to anattā, anicca, and dukkha must be consistent with a biblical eschatology conceived of in cataclysmic and ultimate terms of final judgment, second coming, resurrection, and a final restoration in which sin and sinners will be no more.

Final Reflections

Resurrection as the Point of Contact and the Differentia

We have already made the point that the Asian Christian theologian is faced with a challenge very similar to that of the patristic writers, i.e., making the gospel meaningful to their non-Christian environment by finding points of contact.² The Asian theologian, however, as in the case of De Silva, maintains an openness in which the point of contact is the entry for a dialogue. When doctrinal

¹ J. S. Whale, commenting on the urgency of the issues raised by eschatology, maintains that though the Christian life is a foretaste of the eternal blessedness in God, grace can be resisted and salvation is not inevitable: "There is something genuinely at stake in every man's life, the climax whereof is death. Dying is inevitable, but arriving at the destination God offers to me is not inevitable. It is not impossible to go out of the way and fail to arrive. Christian doctrine has always urged that life eternal is something which may conceivably be missed. It is possible to neglect this great salvation and to lose it eternally, even though no man may say that anything is impossible with God or that his grace may ultimately be defeated." (Christian Doctrine [Cambridge: The University Press, 1956], p. 186.

² See above, pp. 276-277.
views collide he explores the possibility of overcoming the seeming antithesis in a higher synthesis. He does not attempt to resolve doctrinal tensions in isolation but as fitted into a wider framework of thought. Being open to the possibility that the views of other religions may be closer to the Bible, and thus remind him of blind spots and of insights he may have lost on his journey, he is ready to listen. There are also points at which it is necessary to recognize that he is up against ultimate incompatibilities. Ernst Benz says that in this respect "the discussion between Christianity and Buddhism has reached a point that is basically similar to the situation resulting from Augustine's study of Neo-Platonic writings." He is referring to the statement, in Confessions (VII, 9), that Augustine found all of the Johannine statements about the Logos in the books of the Neo-Platonists except for the one which stated that the Logos had become flesh. In their endeavour to universalize the Christian consciousness while maintaining its characteristic differentia, the patristic writers emphasized the role of the incarnation in God's saving plan. In De Silva's treatment of Buddhism and Christianity as complementary systems, the resurrection seems to perform such a function and is suggestive of an approach similar to the patristic use of the incarnation.


2 William A. Thompson maintains that the Christian's belief in the risen Lord generates the openness that is needed for a creative encounter with the world religions. Thus he calls for a shift away from the patristic focus on the incarnation, the reformation focus on the theologia crucis, and the more recent Roman Catholic emphasis.
The resurrection has been presented by De Silva as the solution of the Theravada paradox na ca so na ca anno with telling effect as a means of establishing individual identity. It seems to us that a good case can also be made for resurrection as a more consistent theodicy than De Silva's intermediate state. An intermediate state, in which hell and heaven become a continuum, fails to recognize Jesus as the Lord of history who fulfills the Christian expectation of the eschaton with its idea of a definitive fulfilment of salvation history at the end of time. We have noted De Silva's apposite presentation of Jesus Christ as the ideal Bodhisattva who has come into human history and provides the perfect solution to the negativities of Tilakkhana. The dimension of resurrection is necessary to complete the picture because it is in resurrection that samsaric existence is terminated, the cosmic dimensions of resurrection are crucial to theodicy. The solemn biblical truth is that in the resurrection all men receive their final rewards. Unlike the "many many times" of the cyclic view, or the intermediate state in which all men are in progressive or regressive states till ultimate salvation, in the resurrection God brings a halt to the state of dukkha and an end to the impermanence of this world.

on merit, to a focus upon the resurrection:
"The more a belief in the risen Lord becomes the center of Christianity, the more that belief itself should universalize the Christian consciousness--the more, that is, the Christian himself should participate in that paschal mystery of death to one's narrow and compromising horizons and resurrection to wider and more universal horizons" ("The Risen Christ, Transcultural Consciousness, and the Encounter of the World Religions," Theological Studies 37, No. 3 [September 1976]: 408).
The once-for-allness of resurrection does not, however, stand in the way of the free human response if it is held that salvific revelation is made available to all men. J. Verkuyl points out that the Christ who is coming to the final manifestation of his messianic kingdom is ceaselessly active in "the harvest fields of the history of religions... In the crucified and resurrected Lord, God is reaching forth his hand to the whole cosmos and to human beings in all religions (cf. II Cor 5)." Thus while there is no salvation apart from Christ, in some way divine grace impinges upon the human consciousness. The redeemed life begins at this point, but it must await the consummation of the resurrection. The biblical categories of judgment and resurrection are antithetical to the notion of universal salvation, and to miss this is to distort the biblical picture of salvation.

Syncretism and a Frontier Theology

Though there are patristic counterparts to current Asian theological problems, and some of what they have to say is suggestive, we must take note of the new kind of confrontation that dialogue implies today. There is a greater dimension of mutuality, theologians of dialogue in the Asian situation while advancing the claim that Christianity is universally adequate must at some time recognize the universality and adequacy of other faiths. Unlike the frontier in the age of the Fathers, the Asian Christian has the added task of breaking the lead strings of the West and of overcoming the syncretisms

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of Western Christianity. In a translational theology such as De Silva's, freedom from Teutonic captivity also means the liberation of the Asian Christian from his exclusivistic attitude to other faiths. Thus two aspects of religious encounter which must engage the attention of Asian theologians is the need for a redefinition of the term "syncretism" and the development of a "frontier theology." Michael Pye has taken note of J. H. Kamstra's disagreement with Kraemer's view of syncretism as an illicit contamination or a sign of religious decadence. Kamstra sees syncretism as "the coexistence of elements foreign to each other" and as a "syncretism from within" in which elements continue to exist in a religion merely because of their familiarity even after they have lost their original meanings. Pye observes that as a result of his emphasis "from within", Kamstra

... is able to recognise a parallel hermeneutical activity in quite diverse traditions. In any religion considered dynamically syncretisms may be seen to be in the process of being unmasked and broken off while at the same time new ones are being built up again. Kamstra says that in this sense every theologian and every theological faculty moves in a frontier territory.3

The frontiers of inter-religious dialogue pose peculiar challenges to Asian and Western Christians. Each religion requires a dialogical hermeneutic suited to its ethos, as Marcello Zago says,

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3Ibid., p. 87.
"every religion has a physiognomy of its own." De Silva has shown the impossibility of theologizing in the Buddhist context till a common language is developed. The language may not meet all the requirements of traditional orthodoxy, but as Niels-Erik Andreasen has said in another context, "God is more concerned with presenting His message in common human language than in shielding it from all potential misunderstandings." In a similar vein M. M. Thomas notes that even the best theological definitions of faith are fragmentary or partial; thus he calls for a new understanding of the meaning of orthodoxy and heresy with respect to Christian theology. In his view the heretic has often been a better Christian and invariably a better evangelist because "he is on a particular frontier in dialogue with the world of men." An important component for fruitful interfaith dialogue will be Christian tolerance and understanding of frontier theologians who do not always conform to traditional and conceptual forms of confession.

A frontier theology will be cognizant of persons and not conceptual systems, it does not proceed abstractly from a theological concept but begins with the meeting of persons. As Koyama states it, "our ultimate interest must lie with understanding the Buddhist and not Buddhism; what matters for the Christian gospel is not Buddhism,


but the Buddhist. In the Majjhima Nikaya, Sutta 72, the Buddha is said to consider rigid doctrinal positions to be "a wilderness, a puppet show, a writing and a fetter," which are "coupled with misery, ruin, despair and agony"; thus "this that is called doctrine is something that the Tathgatha has quit." M. Palihawadana sadly admits that Buddhists failed to assimilate this lesson and "went on to build a strong attachment to what were called 'right views'." Thomas Merton, out of a living encounter in Buddhist lands, concluded, in contradiction to the practice of Western scholars of Buddhism, that the real area for investigation was theology rather than psychology or asceticism. However, he adds, "It must be theology as experienced in Christian contemplation, not the speculative theology of textbooks and disputations." In their dialogue with Zen Buddhism, Christians are well-advised to look for their inspiration to a Bernard of Clairvaux rather than a Thomas Aquinas or a Karl Barth. Dialogue is personal and relational rather than propositional. As Lukas Vischer has observed: "Systematization inevitably turns the concept of dialogue into a Procrustean bed into which much can only be fitted by force." Systematization is nevertheless an indispensable rearguard to a frontier theology as it ensures the holistic nature of authentic dialogue. Paul Knitter sees conceptual formulations or doctrines as

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1. Waterbuffalo Theology, p. 122.
a corrective to the Buddhist emphasis on "the emptiness of words and the limitations of intellect." However he maintains that Christians "can proclaim the value and even necessity of doctrine only if with equal insistence they recognize its inadequacy." There is a wide consensus among Christians that a doctrinal basis for dialogue between religions rests on the question whether salvific revelation is to be found in other faiths. The fulfillment theory, anonymous Christianity, the unknown Christ, prevenient grace, and cosmic covenant may be considered attempts to sift out that which is theologically decisive for the validity of a universally salvific revelation. They are attempts to show how the particular history of Jesus can have redemptive efficacy on universal history. The claim of Asian Christians in actual encounter has been that it is possible to hold to a doctrine of salvific revelation in other faiths without compromising the finality of Christ. Thus De Silva claims for Christianity a specific, universally valid role distinctive from Buddhism but he does so not in opposition but in complementarity. A task facing theologians of dialogue everywhere is to determine the biblical essentials of a consistent view of salvific revelation in the world religions.

The Arena of the Spirit

A theology crossing religious frontiers is imperative to Christian mission as it seeks to show in what way Jesus Christ as Lord encompasses the world and therefore all religions. It must necessarily be a theology of openness with an inclusive perspective, but this openness is not free from certain underlying biblical

1"Horizons on Christianity's New Dialogue," p. 47.
presuppositions. On the basis of our study the essentials of a consistent biblical view would include the universality of God's salvific will, the uniqueness and therefore the indispensability of salvation in Jesus Christ, the fact of the confused state of man in sin who is therefore in need of a special revelation, and the response of faith which connotes the element of free human decision, all brought together in the all-embracing work of the Holy Spirit in mediating the grace of Jesus Christ to all men. Such a view holds together the vindication of God and the genuine worth of man. God does not condone man in his sin, neither does he deny man the opportunity of salvation. Grace is available to all men but it is resist-able, thus man must take the responsibility if he is ultimately lost. Thus God is both just and a saviour, and man is not a mere cipher in the plan of salvation. In harmony with this biblical view of salvific revelation interfaith dialogue becomes the arena in which the Holy Spirit is at work. D. T. Niles indicates that the Spirit is beckoning from ahead, thus Christians must be prepared to encounter "the result of God's free initiative, the previousness of Jesus Christ in every situation."¹

by the Holy Spirit is not limited to the visible Judeo-Christian structures. As Paul Loeffler has said:

The Spirit is according to the Acts, always 'ahead' (not 'outside') of the Church, precisely because salvation and the Church are never complete. Thus the present circle of members has to be broken open all the time to bring in people of different races, creeds, cultures and social groups.¹

Thus the dynamic of missions is not vitiated, for in the New Testament account of the Spirit and the Church, there was the need of the evangelizing agencies of the church and at the same time the Spirit mediated grace universally making possible the salvation of the unevangelized. Since it is impossible to limit the Spirit's role in salvific revelation. We must humbly acknowledge God's free initiative in revelation. This revelation by the Spirit though not accompanied by the written revelation does not contradict it, for both are given by the same Spirit. Jesus testified of the Spirit, "The wind blows where it wishes and you hear the sound of it, but do not know where it comes from and where it is going; so is everyone who is born of the Spirit" (John 3:8).

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